Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.

l Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present peti
he probate of the will allowed after due hearing.

dents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and dec

spondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's

ntervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, e

a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Int
al adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents
ith the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-document examiner whose views undermine
ioners likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written

Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perf
her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the peti

ly submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' inter

on, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

s, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.

1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's test

te of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three o
Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom
cted probate proceedings.

ndent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its ord
ents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This

t of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

ontravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

lsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' in
vance.

cend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus ra

not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such c

wer court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite:

ring na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidon

-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:

 erto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en part
a napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testament
g ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria.

silia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cru
nstitution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of
s and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

equisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be fal

ulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix
are that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it conv
But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed he
sis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of

e the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after a
institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have

gue and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana,"were borrowed from the language of the law o
willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her di
eptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare t
er Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other n

the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one w

tion on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the princip
al judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsificat

n a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5

1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first — an act
has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court. 7

d Villamor, JJ., concur.

Solla v. Ascueta, 49 Phil. 333, 347-348.

os v. Aranzaso, L-23828, Feb. 28, 1966 16 SCRA 352.

Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, Vol. I, pp. 354-355.

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants,

4, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Ba
P200,000.

oque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share o

d a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423,

properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two
ved for his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the meantime¬ Maria Gerardo was appointeä administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a p
on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence

ion of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had execute
s Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian
me Court, which affirmed the same.1

Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his

fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitl

uestion is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of t

of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of Firs
iano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 18

ded, shall be null and void.

was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco
ldren and successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civ
Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the project of partitio
ndant.

d to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
ally being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendan
expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose
nvalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri

Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a co
o Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be no compromise over
ate.

oposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate an
of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not i
nless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

ibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for h
e no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature of a judgment by consent, based
e ground of mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise agreement a pr
ummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, lon

asis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in co
ovided: .

t letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall exten
as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these Island

of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like

would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this
h the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is binding against all of th
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not a

may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inad
an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a deci

94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:

d that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor.
does not mean that the guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated
refore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that
pproving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings.

cation but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction

ve ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was
, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo,
nly be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.

became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree d
in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred when in Au
Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife, Sa
omise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made, the same can not bind the wards, the
and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).

ings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Cas
ed by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account f
nt should have been given due course.

nd set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said
e action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds o

concur.

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1
o this Court, and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484).

roject submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of Calif
by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law (G.R.

of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria
s daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the pro
intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court an

hether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance

ent to the issue in this case:

Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young V

above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

uardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way rel
NDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Da
t which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.

xxx xxx xxx

LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now residing, as aforesaid, at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, Ca
of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime; Provide
minate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the re
A LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder
d one-half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los Angele
me, to go in equal parts to the descendants of the deceased; and, provided further, that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton
o City Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and Richard Borton, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to th

, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, whic

direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir

icle 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging
a, but left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within t

which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it m

legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.

5. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:

moria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso no. Este no se encuentra plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido
optar una solucion bien diferente de la señalada para el caso de pretericion.

aciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de extraños o en favor de otros legitimarios por via de legado donacion o mejor
r solamente lo que le falta; al complemento de la porcion que forzosamente la corresponde.

erencia legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna cantidad o porcion de bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la misma
eta: es mas formularia que real. Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay verdadera pretericion. (6 Manresa, 7th Ed.,

his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:

se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste en cuanto olvida o no atiende el testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del d
en parte alguna de la herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni por el de legatar o aunque le mencionara o nombrara sin dejarle mas o me
etericion se regula por el articulo 814, y produce accion de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de complemento de

or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him so

sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento. 1äwphï1.ñët

xxx xxx xxx

sulta con evidencia al relacionar este articulo con el 815. El heredero forzoso a quien el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su
se reconociese el derecho del heredero como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda. Aquel se ocupa de privacion c

or completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814. Privar parcialmente de la legitima, es menguarla o reducirla dejar al legitimario un
se determina en los articulos 814 y 815. (6 Manresa p. 418.)
 so esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e institucion o disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa
cir que el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que la corresponda, podria pedi
a. (Sanchez Roman — Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.)

mpletion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by
because in the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is

according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937), that view was changed by A

ateria en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna racional modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedente
er aquella mediante el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro titulo que no
, era cuando bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad suplementum para completarla, sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de h

nspira cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero forzoso, a quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le
e sean inoficiosas conforme al articulo 817, cuya interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la sancion de la jurisprudencia (3); si
a el texto del articulo, "el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, etc., esto es por titulo de legado o donacion mortis causa

5, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy w
r could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)

n the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his nat
cial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would hav

their theory of preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by u
t bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her leg
ts thereof subsequently accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of Lucy Duncan that a

for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die wi
ve living issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the testator na
at which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir conc

as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estat
fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will of the dec

., concur.

RESOLUTION
 eged oversight and asking for the corresponding correction, in the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision, which re

for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substituted heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die w
ve living issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the testator n
at which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864, Civil Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir conc

d in her brief particularly in pages 28 and 32 thereof. This is indeed quite true, but the reference to and discussion of the rights of the s
rs defined in so far as, under the terms of the will, they may affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant. This point of course was not an
n this kind of substitution," because in the brief for oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she makes the conclusion "that the Last Will and T
appellant.

ed by eliminating the following phrase in the first sentence: "although no reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-appe

ur.

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

., petitioner,

VELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

ted February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an in

the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balana

his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was
hat her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out

rs old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distr
f the conjugal assets. *

ce, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received

dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. O
wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confir

of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probat
state.

ounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not
in its order of October 15, 1973.

e lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leav
y of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
 llegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be co

October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be dec

o creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was v
set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and Octo
abeyance.

5, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no autho
V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his w

rt denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessm

, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

egality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the pet
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). 1äwphï1.ñët

nd in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave

he invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
he invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the b

to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Pat

during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the

r by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

al, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the othe

husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more ch
o, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years fro

gal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

he partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition wou

s renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the
pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention".
thed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take

onjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

r sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 85
ter the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inoff

ntestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .

in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate cou
vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).

ma facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incu
st 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).

of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpreta

tention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avo
31 SCRA 754, 762).

itions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

isposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

gh no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to c
nistration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of th

e and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge
t find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should n

order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedin
operties which I acquired during my married life with my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., namely: (Here follows an enumeration of nine lo

ted from my deceased father, Cecilio Julian, namely: (Here follows a description of two lots).

l not be divided among my heirs during the lifetime of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr. but should be kept intact. The respective legitim

ded and distributed in the manner as follows:" (Here follows a partition of the nine conjugal lots and the two paraphernal lots. The test
gal lots. She did not restrict the partition to her one-half conjugal share but included her husband's one-half share.).

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 RNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.

44 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72

rt of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 A

ourt of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:

nch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testament
nd his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on Febru
sions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testamen

oney which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, o
n Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concep

to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

ents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain f
daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

ed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the In

rial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

iew of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p.

dents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 19

minary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;

validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;

. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does n
 mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct

etition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and

utional and ineffectual.

n the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution

he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

er because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (N
scend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsor
ent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petition
of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterite
clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

e entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

e of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other tes
nterpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased
. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

e proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claim
RA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary dis
ed under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. How
ding to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.

s an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 5
re not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law
g a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).

e general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testa
has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy o
129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).

ourt is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court o
was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate co

ng will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or
ffort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-

g spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidenc
 s with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the
e passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Cou

No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the procee
he reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course o

s when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs c
ty. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision
ondents.

he right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amou
e Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appe

ecision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFI

, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

ertence.

n the will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or inadvertence, there is true preterirton
Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).

11 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical addendum supplied).

vered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case the institution of heir is not wholly void but only insofar as it prejudices the legitim

tor had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the execution of the will, he would have instituted such heir. On t
tino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition, pp. 174-175).
 pted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result that total intestacy ensued.

ertence.

n the will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or inadvertence, there is true preterirton
Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).

11 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical addendum supplied).

vered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case the institution of heir is not wholly void but only insofar as it prejudices the legitim

tor had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the execution of the will, he would have instituted such heir. On t
tino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition, pp. 174-175).

pted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result that total intestacy ensued.

erman and Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr.

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances
 Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which prop

s which reversed the Decision2 dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.

nd after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Esca
Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).3

are meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don
on and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled "Josefa Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros D
Don Julian.
 CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, rendered a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land
Julian.7 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commer

effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:

Josefa Teves Escaňo and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
s which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now sele
Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and

with Assumption of Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also exec
utes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petiti

bject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an order11 cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Anton

ot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Bala
ildren executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate15 dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotte
63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate16 dated 9 November 1983.

ed that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed.17

, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 6

of the decision reads:

gment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:

stered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375;

d.19

agraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.20It added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement
Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage.

eir shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latter’s
on Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagr
four (4) children.22

of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian d
rt also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, w
nger a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper su
stigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 520

ate decision reads:

and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro,

s.

ary 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitim
ed to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in th

l heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had rese
tion where the said title was registered or transferred," were not filled up, thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious

view on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.

a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to
as tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious

ns of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of A

ted again:

efa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its acce
h would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the properties now selected
n L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reye

he heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, th

adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is relevant, where w
n. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:

, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

authorized by law.

y likewise be the object of a contract.

of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and

ime of the contract.36 A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Ar
 urely hereditary in nature.37

aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:

, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.38 The partition will of course be effective only after death. I
n will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succes

ode. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his
s provided by law.41

is property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a spec
orce on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the l

47. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the sec
pect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related w

etitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the se
ilagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

ship of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate co
ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.

n the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution o
or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him som
m in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly
al omission of a forced heir.47

r vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak
erit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along t

rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and d
crutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her chi

tle to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.49 A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise a

cing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a To
ioner’s title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature.51
 T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process es
his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decre

instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such instrumen

gistered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds sha
ote upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which the new cert
of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land

d it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No
n the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entr
uance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid transaction.

ew Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.

reconstitution of the said owner’s duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owner’s dupl
75 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds had not been lost.

tution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s
of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer c
ent of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost,53 as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the owner

ansfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so co
No. 1529.

nt is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:

ted by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the C
o B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño, transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities as reflecte

ourt of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12thJudicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the followin
. Assessed value - P2,720.00

he registration of the transfer of the above corporation.

eby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGH

sent the consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of all the ninete
untant that the assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental D

otated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the assignment.56However, the said annotation57 shows that the mo
poration and there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have been the consideration for th

sent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is e

ct whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409
all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was

Code is clear on the point, thus:

ublic document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

ment, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

s from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the don
deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is eithe

of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.

finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times.63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate c
ssues.64 Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just decision

or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument w
own the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.

ourt of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
Justices Fermin Martin, Jr. and Presbitero Velasco, Jr.

Milagros Donio while Milagros Reyes and Pedro are their acknowledged natural children.[3]
 t preceding paragraph would sell any of the properties adjudicated to the said Julian L. Teves in this agreement, his two childr
case, when the latter two shall refuse to buy may Julian L. Teves or his heirs already mentioned sell the same to other third persons.

21 (1988).

by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

No. 106401, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 309, 315-316. A contrary opinion, however, is advanced by Tolentino and Reyes and Pu
 direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of he

....

Teves(not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of J
nd his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)

lagrosa which shall remain undivided during the lifetime of Julian L. Teves and shall be under the joint administration of Julian L. Tev
Teves, the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa may then be partitioned and the one-half undivided share which in this agreement pertains t
and his four minor children, the two acknowledged natural, Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and the other two

Philippines.

40 Phil. 921, Escutin v. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922.

....

....
and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary.

nio v. Taleseo, 370 Phil. 452 (1999), citing Saura Import and Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., 8 SCRA 143
220 SCRA 639, March 30, 1993; Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196 citing 4 C.J.S. 1734 and 3 C.J.S. 1341; Barons Marketing Corp. v
R. No. L-60129, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 799, 805; Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206 (1996) citing Secti

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

ants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers a

raphic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that sa

mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the in
in consequence the institution is void.

oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

l perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

e of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due exe
y the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions

not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only afte
a nullity?

d. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court reje
ety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the

he will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
 a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved si

direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir

Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —

the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and better

On this point Manresa comments:

ra o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte algun

el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

fore us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

4 Pa. 484.6

decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to

y; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parteMitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

mate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga N
This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracte
e. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosa

o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero e
preferencia al 817. 10

e uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador
ige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de her

n that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of su
cle 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.

heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
ocederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herede
uencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta
interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretex
s terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho co

the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they
are in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition grantin
uls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... to
la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to

her because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
presa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18Sanchez Roman empha
ust be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

heir names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer fro

disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto,
all also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in
uage, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the oth

legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent o

eretofore cited, viz:

n by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduce
acies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity o
egacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would

institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the
nd they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in th
e. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

he Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institu

ed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

JJ., concur.

440-441; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. 393, 394-395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679; Riera vs. Palmorali, et al., 40 Phil. 105
1077.

hilippine Civil Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8; citing Gil vs. Murciano, L-3362, March 1, 1951, likewise opined that "the right to make a wi

s of a valid disinheritance, confirm the theory that disinheritance "must be express (not implied) (Art. 918 ; otherwise there is preteritio
are now Arts. 907 and 918 of the present Civil Code.

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Today is Tuesday, August 06, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

nts.
ment rendered by the former Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 3956, an action for Recognition.

children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On February 3
Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the same Court. ZONIA entered her
s executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from the GARCIAS who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children o

se of Action" impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead, like
estate in addition to ZONIA, which was opposed by the latter, but which the Trial Court granted in its Order dated April 15, 1970. 1

es' respective Memoranda as: 1) the question of recognition of the GARCIAS; 2) the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the hereditary s

e dispositive portion of which decrees: têñ.£îhqw â£

. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia and the defendant Sonia Ana Tuagnon as the illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano und
the will is hereby declared null and void and the three (3) children shall share equally the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without prej

o. 49018).

d the Appellate Court, particularly, the finding that the GARCIAS and ZONIA are, in fact, illegitimate children of the DECEDENT. The
ried Pilar Riosa. The latter died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became his second wife in 1928. The un
4, 1931 (Exhibits "A" & "3"); and on November 3, 1935, Emeteria Garcia was born (Exhibits "B " & "2"). Their birth certificates and ba
acts of support and provisions for their education.

on but only petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon, born on July 26, 1941, is living. In her Birth Certificate, her status was listed as "illegitima

9, 1943 (Exhibits "R-1" and "S-1"). On December 22, 1943, SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de Reconocimien
the Local Civil Registrar on the same date.

tuting ZONIA as his universal heir to all his personal and real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province of Albay
h 10, 1969 in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, in a Decision also rendered by Judge Eze

cess of jurisdiction in declaring substitute defendant Zonia Ana Solano, now petitioner, an illegitimate child of the late Dr. Meliton Sola
cess of jurisdiction in ordering the division of the estate of Dr. Meliton Solano between the petitioner and private respondents, when s

cess of jurisdiction in declaring nun and void the institution of heir in the last will and testament of Dr. Meliton Solano, which was duly

ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO; 2) to order the division of the estate in the same action despite the pendency of Special P
concluding that total intestacy resulted.

O's death, the Trial Court ordered his substitution by ZONIA, "the only surviving heir ... as of as of now" 4 In her "Appearance of Subs
stament of the late Dr. Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings No. 842, which is already final and executory, with least interferen
record but asserted new rights in her capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and administratrix, "and challenged the right of th
GARCIAS filed a "Reply to Appearance of ZONIA ... and Supplemental Cause of Action ... "vigorously denying that ZONIA was SOLA
ANO's Will was merely conclusive as to its due execution; that the supposed recognition under a notarial instrument of ZONIA as an
ZONIA is, like them, an adulterous child of SOLANO with Trinidad Tuagnon.

n complaint but also in their "Reply to Appearance and Supplemental Cause of Action". ZONIA presented no objection to the presenta
d the relationship of the GARCIAS' to SOLANO and presented the notarial recognition in her favor as an acknowledged natural child
nto a contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their respective rights as such. No e

on of heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacy resulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties in SOLANO

hould be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. That proceeding was not one
ld have terminated except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to file pleadings therein. Secondly, upon
ses were consolidated. The records further disclose that the action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec. Procs. No. 842 w
ee is not concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will. 6

e GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a not
divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of ZONIA
NIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. têñ.£îhqwâ£

ct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; bu

nidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil Code, 9 and

GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the conclusions of the Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy ens
1
It is a plain that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a
mate children consists of one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, 13 the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to participation therein
the value of the estate.

e Will is valid and should be respected.

h held that where the institution of a universal heir is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate succe
specification of individual property; there were no specific legacies or bequests. It was upon that factual setting that this Court declar
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies 'the institution of heir'. Considering, however, that the will before us solely provide

Code, supra, applies merely annulling the "institution of heir".

never questioned before either Court. ZONIA herself had gone, without objection, to trial on the issues raised and as defined by the
had voluntarily submitted, after she had received an unfavorable judgment, The leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 16 on this poin

his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction. The question whether the court has ju
that such practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an

estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while that of
affirmed in all other respects. No costs.

estate of a deceased but one instituted by the testator himself, Dr. Meliton Solano, for the allowance of the will during his lifetime und
s therein after Dr. Solano's death. But the issues between the parties as to their status and hereditary shares in view of the probated w
who was substituted by petitioner as defendant (and sole heir of the estate under the probated will) after his death. In effect, therefor
ng before the same judge and the same branch of the trial court could be correctly said to have been. consolidated. Finally, petitioner

estate of a deceased but one instituted by the testator himself, Dr. Meliton Solano, for the allowance of the will during his lifetime und
s therein after Dr. Solano's death. But the issues between the parties as to their status and hereditary shares in view of the probated w
who was substituted by petitioner as defendant (and sole heir of the estate under the probated will) after his death. In effect, therefor
ng before the same judge and the same branch of the trial court could be correctly said to have been. consolidated. Finally, petitioner
428 (1967).

in acts inter vivos or in a last will and testament, and by prescription

9).

Constitution
Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances
Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive