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The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from

their
operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the
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attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter, as specifically mandated under
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Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty,
honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
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office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities.

Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking
liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason
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offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s counsel,
which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have
held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a
sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule

which likewise dealt with the late filing of a petition for certiorari, we recognized that although
procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system,
we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases to
afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends
of justice would be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general objective of procedure is to facilitate
the application of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties and always be guided by
the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the administration of justice.
Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful
of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due
process. In numerous cases, this Court ha

- We therefore submit that the late filing of the Apellant’s brief merits the relaxation of the
prtcoedural rules

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful
of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due
process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.

http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jun2007/gr_168115_2007.php

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