Civil military relations

Sajjad Sardar. Published on April 19, 2012 in The Nation.

Civil-military relations can be defined in terms of a balance between the civilian and
military organization and institutions and their internal cohesiveness. Ideally, in an
open society, military enjoys the professional autonomy while submitting itself to the
political authority. According to present theory of civil military relation, there is
complete separation between the civil and the military. In the correct relations, the
military plays a subordinate role in the execution of defence and security policies.
Civilian decisions are hypothetically accepted as final. Military inputs are asked not
forced in the decision or policy making. The most famous case of submitting to the
civilian rule was of General MacArthur after the Korean War.

But this submission was also indicative of civil-military tension. Even in the
developed democracies, there are instances which show civil-military severances.
During the Cuban missile crisis, there was a serious divergence between the Kennedy
cabinet and the Pentagon. Each one was blaming the other for having fewer brains.
In case of India, during the Brasstacks exercises held in July 1986, Indian Army
Chief General Krishnaswamy Sundarji had planned to turn exercise into an
operation against Pakistan without the knowledge of the Prime Minister Rajiv
Ghandi. However despite these clashes, the military remains under the civilian
control in high politically cultured societies due to public attachment to the civilian
way of life denying legitimacy to military action in the public eye.

The reason for military intervention is all too often cited by scholars as political
instability. According to Huntington, “The most important causes of the military
intervention are not military but political and reflect not the social and
organisational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and
institutional structure of the society.” In a low politically cultured societies there is
less participation and attachment of the public towards the political institution and
government so chances of coup are always more. Military considers national interest
as supreme and deems it to be its duty to protect it. It is when the Army starts to
draw distinction between national interest and the allegiance to the present
government, the chances of intervention increases.

Military takeover is always carried out on the pretext of bad governance and
corruption but it is very strange that military regimes too become victim of
corruption and eventually collapse. Military interventions are always followed by the
announcement that it is for a very short duration but ultimately military falls in love
with power. Military junta is considered incapable of dealing with more complex
issues of the country. It is unable, to transform its organisational and technological
skills to their countries’ setups.
1
The democratization or civilianisation of polity is a complicated and mysterious
situation because it is suffering from the influences of the military regime and their
impact on society and social change. Military and bureaucracy become more
vulnerable to political influence in the post military state. Similarly, the political
parties are most plagued by “Patrimonialism,” which creates factions at all level in
the party as soon as it assumes the powers. Political leader try to control these
factions through enhancement of their personnel control over the party. The
personalisation of party politics compels the factions’ leaders to rely on their loyalty
towards the leader rather then numerical strength of the party workers thus
alienating the political workers.
 Having said that, the after effects of the military era continuously haunt and shape
the future policies of the civilian governments who have experienced military
intervention. Last but not least we should not forget that democracy might not
necessarily be the best political system, but is the best we have.

Civil-military Relations & Democracy

The word ‘civil’ refers to the civil government as an entity, of which the military itself
is a significant part. The civil government is decidedly the superior of the two and the
only relationship between them should be that of a superior and a subordinate. But,
in Pakistan’s case, the subordinate entity has, time and again, toppled the superior
entity’s rule. These interventions have impacted all state institutions including the
Constitution, Parliament, Judiciary and the Civil Services so hugely that all sections
of the society abhor any repeat of such intervention.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington, in his book ‘Soldier in the State’ and Morris
Janowitz in the ‘Professional Soldier’, agree that the worlds of the military and the
civil are fundamentally different from one another. Both these political scientists
discussed in their respective books that how best the two can coexist without
endangering liberal democracy.

Huntington believes there is a strong contrast between the attitudes and values held
by the military personnel, who are mostly conservative, and those held by the
civilians, who are mostly liberal. Each of their separate world consisted of separate
institutions with their own operative rules and norms. Huntington suggested that in
order for the civilian authority to maintain control, it needs to find a way to direct
the military without unduly infringing on their internal autonomous character and
organisation or the prerogatives of the military world and thus provoking a backlash.
The civilian authority has to determine the quantum of control which must
necessarily be institutional and lawful and not for seeking political advantages.

Professor Janowitz more or less agrees with the above thesis, but introduces a theory
of convergence, meaning that while the differences remain within the two separate
worlds, the civil authority, understanding the need for a strong professional military
and still desiring supremacy in control and direction within a democratic state, must
try to get institutionally closer to each other through better understanding and
arrangements. The arrangements proposed by him are the establishment of large
paramilitary forces fully trained and equipped to remain at the backup of the police
and other civil forces, which must also be equally well trained and equipped but
which must be able to deal effectively as a first layer with the internal disturbances.
In essence, both Huntington and Janowitz would want the military to remain totally
away from the negative political and social influences of the civilian world on a
2 professional army and, to a lesser degree, on the paramilitary forces.

Pakistan Army inherited strong British traditions of strict meritorious recruitment, a

very rigorous and professional training for the officers’ core leading to a recognised
university degree, inculcation of strict discipline, goal orientation, refresher courses
and mid-service training as well as a high level of esprit de corps. They are
encouraged to live in isolated cantonments with their families and generally come in
contact with their civilian counterparts sometimes in city markets or on TV. They
have their own sports grounds, own social get-togethers, own schools and colleges
and own hospitals. So, the Pakistani military has a world of its own where the rules
of behaviour, conduct of business, modalities of doing work, respect for orders from
 above, nature of conferences, levels and depths of discussions are totally different
from their civilian counterparts.

Pakistan Army’s Strengths

Let us look at the institutional arrangements of Pakistan Army Officers’ Corps a little
more closely for a better understanding. The following attributes in Pak Army
officers are more conspicuous:
1. The military is a highly organized and disciplined force with a clear command
and control structure from top to bottom. It recruits its soldiers and officers
quite transparently on merit and in accordance with fixed standards to
ensure quality of intake. It is highly disciplined and abhors disorganisation
and ill discipline. What the civilians may consider the political convulsions as
the beauty of democracy, the military would consider, chaotic and
undesirable. The military’s concept of loyalty to Pakistan is somewhat fixed
and is a result of its own acquired knowledge and perceptions of the currents,
cross-currents and under-currents prevailing in the region.
2. The military believes that it is mandated to fight such subversive attempts by
the Constitution and defence policy. It, therefore, keeps fighting for budget in
proportion to India’s much larger budget to be able to pursue its defence.
3. The military believes in preparing itself for various eventualities and variants
of war in great detail. These follow the Defence Policy objectives and
guidelines approved from time to time by the federal cabinet. Detailed
planning is done, for instance, for evacuation of people in case of damage to a
river or canal to safer places and for that to pinpoint places for
lodging/boarding, identification of boats and boatmen, hospitals, food,
transportation etc. Nothing is left to chance or to verbal orders.
4. The military believes in looking after its soldiers and officers in peacetime to
enable them to fight any war without domestic worries. The military looks
after their health and other basic needs, even after retirement. These
measures include many privileges greatly criticised by many civilians, but
jealously guarded by the military.
5. The military believes in strict discipline, which would forbid unauthorised
contact by any officer with any outsider or a political personage. The
promotions and appointments within the military are made by following
strict standards and all outside influences in this regard are greatly
discouraged and looked down upon.
6. Since soldiers and officers are drawn mainly from rural lower middle class,
largely from Punjab, KP and Sindh, few even from Balochistan; they are
mainly conservative, and religiously inclined and by and large averse to
Western modernism. The military has fought three wars with India, and is
fighting presently an elusive war against the terrorists whom one cannot even
3 easily recognise that who are from within Pakistan and our own people but
led astray by adverse beliefs and propaganda.

Strengths of the Civilian Government

On the other hand, the civilian government draws its strength from the political
party who had won an election. But, in Pakistan, the contesting parties not only
appeal directly to the voters but also seek support of multiple smaller interest groups
who all become the winner after the elections for their return of favour. These
favours usually are beyond the pale of legal propriety and devoid of merit. Generally,
the parties do have their manifestos containing their proposed political, social,
economic and other programmes and policies. These policies are implemented by
 the bureaucrats who are recruited on merit, trained in various professions and
placed in jobs with appropriate tools and work environment for carrying out the
programmes and policies.

In a parliamentary democracy, where governments can change after elections, such

trained specialists should be totally neutral and apolitical. Otherwise, every new
government will have to recruit hundreds and thousands of these specialists afresh
which would be a tortuous process. The worse will be if a party in power tries to woo
these permanent state servants to serve their own party and personal interests by
various means which would come within the definition of corruption. To prevent
such eventualities, the framers of the Constitution provided a framework which
holds the governments accountable and checks them from indulging in malpractices.
This framework is in the form of:
1. Parliament, with opposition parties free to ask any question and enquire into
anything.
2. Judiciary, which not only interprets laws but also checks the government
where it goes wrong.
3. Auditor General, a senior post protected by the Constitution to audit the
government expenditures.
4. The Executive, comprising the military and the civil service under the control
of the executive government to carry out all its lawful orders.

Conclusion: The strength of an elected government lies in its popularity amongst

the people which is determined by the effectiveness and quality of the various
services performed by the state functionaries under the general policy control and
guidance of the political government. The true fruits of democracy are enjoyed by the
people of a state through good governance.

The people want democracy, but they also want peace, order and justice around
them within their own life time. They want end to their poverty within their own
lives. They want health, education, equal opportunities of development for all
children now, not tomorrow. This is the essence of social contract. The convergence
between the civilian government, the political elite and the civil and military
professionals takes place around good governance delivered to the governed whose
ultimate satisfaction is the guarantee of a sound polity.

Civil-military relations in historical perspective

Asif Haroon Raja is a retired Brig Gen, war veteran, defense and security analyst, columnist,
author of five books, Vice Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research
Centre. Published on March 14, 2018 in Global Village Space.
4
In his ten year rule, Field Marshal Ayub Khan achieved phenomenal all round results
mainly because he had kept the politicians out till 1964 under EBDO. He debarred the
politicians from politics for ten years on account of their dismal performance after the
murder of Liaqat Ali Khan in October 1951. Their incompetence and their indifference
to the rule of law and constitution making as well as their craze for corruption had
strengthened bureaucracy-military oligarchy and had shifted the pendulum of power
to the seat of governor general. C-in-C Gen Ayub Khan was given additional portfolio
of Defence Minister by Ghulam Muhammad (GM) to fortify bureaucratic rule.
 The judiciary committed the original sin of weakening growth of democracy by
overturning the decision of the Sindh High Court and validating the dissolution of
Constituent Assembly headed by Khawaja Nazimuddin by GM in 1954. PML lost its
sway after it suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Jugto Front in East Pakistan in
1954. While no general elections could be held, it took nine years to formulate the 1956
constitution. Palace intrigues masterminded by GM and Iskandar Mirza resulted in
changeover of six PMs in seven years.

The reasons why Ayub Khan opted for controlled democracy (Basic Democrats) were
the ineptness of politicians and huge illiteracy rate. In his and Iskandar Mirza’s view,
the majority didn’t even know the meaning of democracy and their basic rights and
hence needed to be educated and trained for democracy at least for next ten years.
EBDO was annulled in 1964 on account of lobbying by Ayub Khan’s blue-eyed Foreign
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) whom he used to call ‘son’ and Bhutto addressed
Ayub as ‘daddy’.

Driven by his own political ambitions, ZAB lobbied for recommencement of politics.
Revival of political parties by the same lot of corrupt and disgruntled politicians was a
mistake which proved costly for Ayub Khan as well as for Pakistan. They ganged up to
oust Ayub Khan by propping up aging Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah to compete in next
presidential election in April 1965, which she lost.

Failing to oust him, ambitious ZAB in league with Maj Gen Akhtar Ali Khan prevailed
upon Ayub Khan and reluctant Gen Musa to launch Operation Gibraltar in August
1965. He had assured his mentor that India will not wage an open war against Pakistan
and the fomented insurgency will remain confined to occupied Kashmir only. This
clever move aimed at discrediting Ayub, who by then had earned world fame, was
similar to the one made by Gen Musharraf in summer of 1999 to get rid of Nawaz
Sharif (NS). ZAB exploited the Tashkent Declaration which he himself had drafted and
after parting ways with Ayub, he established PPP in 1967.

ZAB-Sheikh Mujib coordinated agitations in the two wings against Ayub’s policies and
celebration of Decade of Development forced Ayub to resign and hand over power to
C-in-C Gen Yahya Khan, who had agreed to impose martial law only if Ayub abdicated
power. But for the negative role of the politicians who were instrumental in freeing
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman involved in Agartala conspiracy case in 1968, and the rigidity
of ZAB after the 1970 general elections, Yahya had to preside over the division of
Pakistan into two halves in December 1971.

After Yahya’s 2 ½ years misrule, and ZAB rule during which he adorned the hats of
president, civilian martial law administrator and later the PM, he gifted 1973
constitution to the nation but became autocratic and not only created FSF but also
authorised ISI to meddle in politics. After him, Gen Ziaul Haq ruled the country for 11
5 years and Gen Musharraf for nine years. All told, out of 70 years of Pakistan’s history,
the military reigned supreme for 34 years. For unexplained reasons, it couldn’t doctor
the chronic diseases which afflicted Pakistan. In their urge to gain legitimacy, each
military ruler shared power with the same set of tainted politicians to put up a façade
of sham democracy. While Gen Zia experimented Islamization and party-less system,
Gen Musharraf experimented enlightened moderation and devolution of power at
grassroots levels to establish true democracy.

Each military takeover started its journey efficiently but began to wobble soon after it
accommodated disgraced politicians. The mix of military and politicians made the
pudding unpalatable and led to the disgraceful ouster of military rulers without
achieving tangible lasting results. Frequent military takeovers and unnatural marriage
 of convenience bred civil-military tensions that were duly accentuated by hostile
foreign powers.

Governed by security paradigm owing to unabated hostility of India, the military

establishment drew red lines and made sure that the parameters of foreign and
defence policies take due cognizance of these lines. Another consideration was that the
ruling party should be pro-establishment and should have a clear understanding of
threat perception. As such, when not in power, while monitoring the borders and
internal security threats, the establishment has also kept a watch on the civil
government to see whether it is abiding by the security constraints.

Sheikh Mujib was put on trial by Ayub Khan on charges of linkage with India and
conspiracy to create Bangladesh, but was bailed out by politicians. He should have
been tried by a military court. ZAB was not spared by Gen Zia because after his
deposition, he had pledged to teach the generals a lesson. PPP was hounded by Gen Zia
because of its anti-Army posture. To counter the threat posed by MRD movement in
interior Sindh, MQM was created in 1984. Security concerns impelled the
establishment to create IJI in 1988 to prevent PPP from winning two-thirds majority.
Benazir Bhutto (BB) was viewed as a security risk. PPP was twice ousted from power
prematurely in 1990 and in 1996 on account of corruption, weak governance and
alleged connection with anti-Pakistan foreign powers to roll back nuclear program. NS
led regime was sacked in 1993 and in 1999 by President Ghulam Ishaq since he had
developed the habit of locking horns with him and with Army chiefs. This trend has
continued till this date.

PPP was brought to power in 2008 at the behest of USA an UK. Memogate scandal in
2011 spoilt civil-military relations. Superior performance of PML-N under Shahbaz
Sharif (SS) enabled PML-N to return to power in 2013 but it was never at ease with the
establishment. Some quarters suspect that the establishment is backing PTI, PPP and
the judiciary to prevent PML-N from gaining power in 2018 elections.

In other words, democracy has been kept controlled, as was done by Ayub Khan. Gen
Zia came out with Article 58 2(B) to balance up power between the executive head and
president but in reality it was a sword of Damocles hung over the head of the former.
He used it to axe the government of Junejo in May 1988 since he had started showing
eyes to the military. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan used it twice and President Laghari
once. This draconian Article was annulled after the passage of 18th amendment in
2014. Civilian president couldn’t have achieved his objective without the blessing of
Army.

The military with the support of judiciary and other organs like NAB, Rangers, ANF,
ISI and MI, has kept successive civil governments under its invisible leash. Politicians
in the opposition are an added source of anxiety to the ruling government because of
6 their tendency to entice or provoke the army chiefs to seize power. Opposition parties
are also exploited by invisible hands to exert pressure on the sitting government. What
is indisputable is that out of all the State institutions, the military is by far the best and
has delivered.

After the death of Gen Zia, the military had to contend with PPP and PML-N
throughout the 1990s. Gen Musharraf’s witch hunting couldn’t demolish the populous
leaders of two mainstream parties. It was owing to his selective accountability through
NAB which impelled BB and Nawaz Sharif (NS) in exile to sign Charter of Democracy
(CoD) in May 2006. Both agreed to let each other rule for full 5-year term, and to clip
the powers of the establishment as well as of judiciary. BB dishonored it by secretly
meeting with Musharraf at Dubai in January and July 2007 to share power.
 In deference to the framework of CoD, the then PM Yusaf Raza Gilani made an effort
to civilianize ISI by placing it under Ministry of interior in August 2008, but Gen
Ashfaq Kayani foiled it. Memogate scandal which surfaced in October 2011 was
designed to undercut the military and ISI and to tilt the balance of power completely in
favor of civil supremacy. This move was again nipped in the bud by Gen Kayani and Lt
Gen Shuja Pasha. Secretary Defence Lt Gen retired Naeem Khan Lodhi had to lose his
seat in the civil-military tussle.

Notion of two-party system (PPP and PML-N taking turns from 1988 onward) was
broken by PTI in 2013 elections, but it further polarized politics and reinvigorated the
political antagonism of 1990s. Some say that PTI under Imran Khan (IK) was backed
by the establishment to not only challenge the monopoly of the two mainstream
parties, but to also come forward as a third political force as an alternative to dynastic
and feudalistic political models. This was necessitated in the wake of black rule of PPP
under Zardari.

Egged on by certain powers, IK led PTI in collusion with Tahirul Qadri led PAT and
Sheikh Rashid launched their first abortive assault to gain power in July 2014. The
next attempt to forcibly lock down Islamabad and grab power was made in October
2015, but it also backfired. Panamagate scandal in April 2016 gave a chance to the
detractors of the ruling regime to take the judicial route in June that year. There on the
judiciary took up the battle and achieved first success on July 28, 2017.

The five-member bench of the Supreme Court under Justice Asif Saeed Khosa invoked
corruption charges to remove NS from office and disqualified him from politics for life.

The second battle was initiated by the apex court in the form of filing of three
references of corruption against NS, his three children, son-in-law and Finance
Minister Ishaq Dar. Accountability court duly monitored by Supreme Court judge was
mandated to wind up the cases by March 13, 2018. The references were based on
nine-volume JIT report supposedly containing loads of incriminating material to
convict and punish the accused. The opponents of NS hailed the verdict and joyously
declared that the chapter of NS was closed and sooner than later the PML-N would fall
like house of cards.

This phase also saw the counter offensive launched by NS. Both sides propagated their
respective narratives for the consumption of the public. PTI, later on joined by the PPP
became the mouthpiece of judiciary and drummed up tales of alleged corruption of NS
and held him responsible for the malaise in the society.

Assisted by his daughter Maryam Nawaz, NS played the ‘victim card’. His narrative
appealed to the senses of his voters in Punjab and his fans and has generated a
sympathy wave. He laments that all decisions of the Supreme Court are NS-specific
7 and that he was unjustly wronged under a pre-disposed conspiracy. He rants that the
court as well as JIT were prejudiced, vindictive toward him and his family and soft
toward the petitioners. He points out the glaring loopholes in the judicial verdict which
was based on Iqama and not on Panama. He has successfully sold his narrative that
the judiciary backed by the establishment had hatched a conspiracy to unseat him,
dismantle PML-N and pave the way for IK led PTI.

His counter offensive which he began with his GT road move from Islamabad to
Lahore in early August 2017, followed by successive public meetings, statements and
tweets has put the super active judiciary on the back foot. His narrative has helped
PML-N in scoring successive victories in all the by-elections including the stronghold
of PTI at Lodhran. Increasing size of public gatherings and their vociferous support
 encouraged NS, Maryum and few other PML-N leaders to attack the judiciary more
offensively. Two have been served contempt of court notices.

NS tirade against the judiciary is well received by his followers particularly when he
presents the long list of his accomplishments and the poor performance of his political
opponents. They feel that rather than finding corruption in Panama case or in his 4 陆
years tenure, digging out past history of NS and his family dating back to 1960s was ill
intentioned. And when nothing came out in the big hunt, disqualifying him for life on
Iqama was unfair. Not mentioning salary from his son in his 2013 income tax return
which he never received was a slip and not a motivated crime to prescribe such a heavy
punishment.

After losing two seats of power, NS became rebellious and contemplated on

implementing the clauses of CoD so as to remove the perpetual threat posed by the
military-judiciary combine to the civil rule. He intended to do so in case the PML-N
returns to power with two-thirds majority in both the Houses, or possibly after
winning Senate elections. His dangerous intent caused anxiety to the judiciary,
opposition parties and the establishment and made them ponder how to avert it. NS
was already seen as a security risk because of his unusual softness for India and
business connection with Jindal.

The establishment’s manipulative role behind the curtains, judicial activeness and
assertiveness, PTI’s politics of agitation and abuses, and PPP’s machinations has made
the overall political environment tension ridden. When efforts by opposition parties to
scuttle Senate elections failed, intrigues and horse trading scaled new heights to
manipulate Senate elections results. The first brick of scheming was laid by Zardari in
Baluchistan in January 2018 where he succeeded in replacing PML-N’s CM Sanaullah
Zehri with PML-Q legislator Abdul Qudus Bizenjo, The political coup deprived PML-N
of six sure Senate seats.

PML-N was once again attacked by the judiciary in the last week of February 2018. A
panel headed by chief justice Nisar Saqib disqualified NS from heading the PML-N. It
also invalidated his selection of candidates to run on the party’s ticket in Senate
elections scheduled for March 3. Ironically, Nisar has not prevented absconder Gen
Musharraf from heading a political party as he has done in case of NS. Perforce, NS
nominees took part in election as independents. They stuck to the mother party once
they got elected and PML-N bagged 33 seats, 19 short of the figure to be able to elect
chairman and deputy of Senate of its choice.

Zardari broke all records of horse trading to win the loyalties of legislators from other
parties and managed to win 10 seats from Sindh and 2 in KP, taking the total to 20
seats. PTI secured 12 seats including one surprise seat from Punjab. On the election
day of chairman/deputy, PPP-PTI alliance claimed 51 seats, and the PML-N 52 seats.
8
While the opposition fielded Sadiq Sanjrani, PML-N nominated -Raja Zafarul Haq for
the seat of chairman. In the final counting, Sanjrani won the contest bagging 57 votes
and Zafarul Haq 46 seats. Win was made possible by purchasing loyalties of 14
independents from Baluchistan-FATA and of defectors. It is clear that magic of
Zardari’s wealth worked once again and about six PML-N voters sold their votes. The
hall echoed with slogans of ‘Jeeay Bhutto’ and ‘Ek Zardari Sub Pe Bhari-’. For the
deputy chairman contest between the PML-N led coalition nominated candidate
Usman Kakar and opposition fielded Saleem Mandiwala, the latter won securing 54
votes as against 44 votes polled for Kakar. Speculations are that the secret hands not
only brought PPP-PTI together but also helped in horse trading to deny PML-N the
pivotal seat.
 Outcome of the senate elections is a big setback for the PML-N since it has thwarted its
plan to clip the wings of judiciary. The indecisiveness of NS in selecting the nominee
till the 11th hour proved costly for the party. By virtue of its majority in both houses,
PML-N can still pass a bill by calling a joint session. Fouled elections have lowered the
esteem and moral position of IK and his PTI, and also exposed the faces of vote buyers
and sellers. Everyone is wondering as to why the super active apex court meddling into
others domain remained inactive and allowed biggest horse trading to take place right
under its nose.

After the intense battle of Senate which has further vitiated the atmosphere, the next
battle will be fought for the interim caretaker government and PM for 3 months.
Having witnessed the hype and furor created in Senate elections and election of
chairman, it can be assumed that similar rumpus will flare up again next month.
Having helped PPP in winning both seats in Senate elections, PTI must have already
brokered a deal with PPP for a sizeable share in interim setup. It will vie for choice PM
and CM Punjab.

Taking into account the heightened hostility among the major political parties,
resurgent Far Right, and the hard reality that in a fair and free electoral contest,
PML-N victory is a foregone conclusion, possibility of the caretakers getting converted
into a much talked of technocrat government for a period of one year or so to carry out
essential electoral, bureaucratic and judicial reforms, restore the health of economy,
and to step up accountability to cleanse the Aegean stables cannot be ruled out.

In the cleanup drive, the three references against NS will be taken to their logical end if
not done earlier, while cases against Punjab bureaucracy and Shahbaz will be speedily
disposed of. Some PPP and PTI leaders and bureaucrats from other provinces will also
be hauled up to allay the impression that accountability is selective.

The next election may pave the way for a PPP-PTI-MQM (P)-ANP-JI ruling coalition.
PPP and PTI may work out a compromise formula of power sharing by letting IK and
Bilawal to sit in PM’s chair for 2 ½ years each, while Zardari may once again sit in the
chair of president.

We must not lose sight of another option which PM Abbasi has up his sleeve. The
constitution authorizes him to extend his rule by one year under exceptional
circumstances. If he opts for this option, it will trigger nationwide protests and strikes
and will impede development works, CPEC and further weaken the economy. It will
however disrupt the ‘technocrats’ plan and cause a split in opposition ranks. In case
Abbasi in collusion with the President Mamnoon declare emergency, it may bring the
situation close to civil war.

To me, all this political engineering does not sound well and may not fetch expected
9 results. There is little to celebrate the victory of a man from Baluchistan since the
victory is symbolic and will not help in removing the age-old socio-politico-economic
grievances of the Baloch. A segment has been thoroughly brainwashed by outside
powers, and to wash away this poison from their minds and hearts, a methodical
psycho-economic treatment is required. A PM from Baluchistan (Zafarullah Jamali),
or federal education minister Zubaida Jalal hailing from Kharan district brought no
improvement.

Gen Musharraf’s development agenda was resisted by the Sardars who have all along
been anti-development. Baloch insurgency flared up in 2004 to prevent mega projects
including Gwadar port. In my view, it was apt handling of NS who empowered Baloch
and Pashtun nationalists and that of dedicated work of Army which brought a healthy
 change and broke the back of separatist movement. Senate chairman can do little for
the development of his province. However, I wish him all the best and also wish that
sanity prevails and we move forward for a smooth political transition free of intrigue
and deception.

Civil-military relations
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN
missions in Iraq and Sudan. Published on January 18, 2019 in Dawn Newspaper.

The PTI-led government faces many challenges. One it does not acknowledge is that
of civil-military relations. Yet, in a constitutional democracy, if civil-military
relations are not clearly conducted within the framework of civilian supremacy they
will, sooner or later, become problematic. Many see the current state of civil-military
relations as providing a civilian mask for selective military rule. The political salience
of the military in Pakistan is too obvious to be denied. This needs to be addressed if
the country is to be governed and transformed into a modern democracy that can
overcome the challenges of the 21st century.

However, it is equally undeniable that civilian rule in Pakistan has largely failed to
provide effective and acceptable governance. The reasons for this are many and
generally known. They include the patriarchal nature of party politics; massive
entitlement-based leadership and political corruption; extractive administrative and
political institutions; endemic poverty and deprivation; and the ‘majboori’ of the
masses who provides captive vote banks for self-serving political leaders and their
parties.
Moreover, the necessarily security-oriented nature of the state in its initial years
enabled or compelled the military in Pakistan to play a political role beyond its
normal remit. Over time, this came to be regarded, especially within the military, as
the political norm. As a result, two parallel political narratives evolved; one civilian
and the other military. Parallel lines, by definition, never meet! Civil-military
relations have, accordingly, become an issue that does not easily allow for productive
discussion. Disagreements are often papered over with anodyne ‘consensus’.

The recently elected government will now have to overcome the weight of the past.
Being ‘on one page’ with non-elected subordinate institutions may have tactical
advantages. But it cannot remain a policy imperative. If it does, it will undermine
democracy, good governance, human resource development and, above all,
nation-building. Accordingly, it is incumbent on both the civilian and military
leadership to facilitate the proper development of civil-military relations within the
context of civilian supremacy. After all, civilians comprise 99 per cent of the
country’s population.

10 Democracy and good governance are learning processes which involve the
development of a whole range of credible institutions, practices, attitudes and habits
of mind that nourish them. This inevitably takes time. Meanwhile praetorian
interventions, whatever the immediate compulsions and even justifications may be,
undermine political learning processes and unintentionally but palpably inflict
lasting damage on political society. In a country like Pakistan, which is in dire need
of wide-ranging and deep structural reforms to successfully cope with a range of
looming existential challenges, any deviation from the path of democratic, inclusive
and participatory governance will cast a pall over its future.

There is a view that for any elected government to successfully contextualise

civil-military relations within the framework of civilian supremacy — a fundamental
 premise of the Constitution — it must first ‘stoop to conquer’ the reservations of the
military. These reservations relate not only to institutional interests; they also reflect
an entrenched inclination of the military to regard its political salience as
indispensable for the security and survival of the country whatever the letter of the
basic law of the land might suggest to the contrary.
This is also a response to the largely valid perception of civilian political
incompetence and irresponsibility. Correcting this perception is, of course, easier
said than done. There is the reality of the dismal record of civilian governance. Much
of this incompetence is still on display. Parliamentary proceedings by and large
provide a disgusting spectacle. Reportedly, over 300 parliamentarians including
ministers have been suspended for not submitting details of their assets! There are
also disparities in civilian and military power and differences in their institutional
and political perspectives. Moreover, a political culture of popular resignation still
exists according to which “the strong do as they wish and the weak suffer what they
must”.

The prime minister seeks to transcend this political resignation and build a new
political dispensation. As a result, the people are becoming more insistent in their
demand for a just and responsive political order. Given the current empathy between
the ruling party and the military there is a real opportunity to strengthen the
democratic principle of civil-military relations under the rubric of civilian supremacy.
This will entail progressively altering largely unarticulated but pervasive
assumptions in the military that (a) it is an autonomous stakeholder in the
governance of the country, (b) it should remain more or less exempt from
supervision of elected civilian authority including parliament, (c) its inputs in the
formation of policies of particular interest to it should be taken as policy parameters,
and (d) it should have protection from the criticisms of civil society and the media.

For any elected civilian government to alter these assumptions it will first need to
establish the credibility of its governance as well as its moral and political authority.
In the past, elected governments have, almost without exception, irrevocably lost
their moral and political authority within a year or two of assuming office. This
undermined their ability to face down the political assertiveness of unelected
institutions. Military rule, for all its limitations and disadvantages, has often been
superior to civilian parliamentary rule because of the latter’s record of bad
governance and the betrayal of its pledges. Nevertheless, the longer-term costs of
deviations and dilutions of democratic governance are massive, and are still being
paid by Pakistan.

The Quaid departed far too early. Since his passing, no civilian government has
delivered on its promises. Neither, for that matter, has military rule whether covert
or overt. Accordingly, despite misgivings about the early performance of the PTI-led
government, there is no reason to give up on it because of initial trials and errors. All
11 the available alternatives to the PTI, civilian or otherwise, have been tested and
found woefully wanting. After a year, however, the government will need to stand on
its own record of delivery. The misdemeanours of its predecessors will no longer
provide an explanatory or political crutch. Its success in this regard will also go a
long way towards resolving the perennial problem of civil-military relations
 Pakistan’s four-star democracy
Sajid Mahmood Sajid. Published on November 2, 2017 in Daily Times.

The democratic traditions of parliamentary government are yet to be established in

Pakistan. The Pakistani brand of democracy is quite bizarre and continues to evolve.
I coined this new term, ‘four-star democracy’ for Pakistan where army rather than
the elected parliament plays a dominant and leading role in major decision-making.
In Pakistan, the army is headed by a Four Star General and the office of the Chief of
Army Staff (COAS) is more powerful than the office of the Prime Minister (PM).
Welcome to the four star democracy of Pakistan.
In Pakistan, intellectuals, lawyers, civil rights activists and ruling politicians support
democracy and civil rights while the general public sees military generals as saviours.
This mindset has existed for many decades in Pakistan. Even elected sitting opposition
in parliament of Pakistan always look towards to the GHQ for interference, regime
change or midterm elections. There has always been confusion as to who rules
Pakistan. The military has always tried to influence statecraft in Pakistan. Principles,
doctrines and issues of foreign relations and national security are decided and
executed by the military as per traditions and the elected government sometimes
pretends it runs the show. Lets explore a few historical and recent features and the
roots of Pakistan’s four star democracy.
Firstly, Pakistan has witnessed almost four phases of military rule up till now:
Military rule of General Ayub Khan (1958-1969); General Yahya Khan (1969-1971);
General Ziaul Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007). Pakistan
has experienced military rule for 30 years. Here I am talking about military rules
lead by military dictators and not martial laws.
Secondly, general elections were held in 1970, 1977, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007
and 2013 in Pakistan. The following are the three phases of democratic rule in
Pakistan: 1971-1977; 1988-1999 and 2008-present date. Hence the total time period
of democratic rule in Pakistan is approximately 26 years. During this experimental
time period, elected politicians of Pakistan established their identity as corrupt and
incompetent. In 2017, Pakistani elected politicians are still playing a democratic
comedy drama on the Parliament floor. The parliament has become a constitutional
theatre full of corrupt comedians. Hence the army is given the license to interfere in
politics because it is perceived that Pakistani military generals are patriots who have
the competence to handle foreign policy and national security matters.
Thirdly, mistrust between military and elected civilian political leaders is another
major feature of Pakistan’s four star democracy. ‘Bloody civilians’ is a popular phrase
often used by military men in Pakistan. They use this phrase for politicians most of
the time. Three or four star class in military think and believe that politicians sitting
in the parliament are not worthy of handling issues of foreign policy and national
12 security. So in Pakistan, the military never gives a free hand to elected politicians.
Lastly, historically the American factor has been very dominant in the evolution of
the four star democracy. America has used military dictators in the past for its own
geo-political and regional ambitions. For instance, the USA used General Zia in the
1980s to fight the USSR in Afghanistan. Similarly, after the 9/11, the USA hired
General Pervez Musharraf in 2001 to fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. At the end, I would like to suggest some cures for the four star
democracy. When a corruption free Parliament full of honest and sagacious political
leaders will be there, then parliamentary democratic conventions will start to grow
and the civilian leadership will be able to run state affairs freely and democratically
according to the constitution.