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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles


_______________________________________________________________________________

Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016


with former C.J. Sereno’s Dissenting Opinion
AUGUST 20, 2018

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana


issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP,
General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of
President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to


the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors
and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by


petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and


several others, in their capacities as human rights advocates or human
rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act
of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr.


and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his
grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his


personal capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as
Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of
victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial
law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their
official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former


Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and several others,
suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the
martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez,


former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the
dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens
and taxpayers.

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga


and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph,


former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the
Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of
Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as


member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official
and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of


Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of


administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed


memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws.

RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity


of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest


opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal


rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases


and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude
into areas committed to the other branches of government. Those areas
pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.cralawred As they are concerned with
questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of
judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have
the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question
that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military
cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national
healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given


question, requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an


injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no
standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition


and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations
victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal
standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have
Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the


interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the
President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB
by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that


the issues raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a


party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available. If
resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative


remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those
exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case,
petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC
is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the
exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue


restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance


with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be
allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the
Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also
condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-
dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the
ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’
alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2,
11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art.
XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of


our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as
providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to
the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the


Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of


principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the


principles and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

Note:

DISSENTING OPINION
Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

SERENO, C.J.:

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’


enduring values, which this Court must zealously protect.

Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987
Constitution embodies the Filipinos’ enduring values. The protection of
those values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That this is
the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly
comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various
fashions by the Court itself.

See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the
environment, women, children, labor, the indigenous people, and
consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived of
their human rights.

Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively
promulgate rules for the protection of human rights, and how the Court
in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs of kalikasan,
habeas data, and amparo.

Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part
of this Court to protect the cherished values of the Constitution would be
a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be passive relative to
the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But when
called upon to discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986
Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the protection of constitutional
rights, a zealousness that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It
cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective
activism.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v GSIS


G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell


through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel


Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the
execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to
GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid,
MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a
self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to


enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation.

Tañada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997


Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization
for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and
on the ground that it infringes legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored
nation” and national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed in the same
footing in terms of products and services. However, the Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that
the WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be
read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only
to “rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” but not every aspect of
trade and commerce. There are balancing provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the
WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesn’t rule out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of
sovereignty when entering into treaties.

Facts:

 This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade
Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and the
Senate concurring in the said treaty.

 Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss
global economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International
Trade Organization.

 However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades and
Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then established.

 The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and
barriers.

 Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”

 It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement
“place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!


In seeking to nullify the Senate’s act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute

Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12,
Artilce XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!

Petitioners’ Contentions:

 Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the Constitution mandating “economic
nationalism” are violated by the so-called “parity provisions” and “national treatment” clauses
scattered in parts of WTO Agreement

o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related
investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights),
Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

o “shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin”

 Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

 Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.

 Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.”

Ruling:

 These provisions are not self-executing

o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.

 Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said
article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:

o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services

o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life

 The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow
the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

 WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with
each member’s vote equal in weight.

 Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

o Tariff reduction – developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing
24% in 10 years

o Domestic subsidy – developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing
countries at 13% in 10 years

o Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of


36% in 10 years

 Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets

 The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion

Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress? NO!

 A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.

 While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.

 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family of
nations & limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

GR No. 171947-48 December 18, 2008


Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be
jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila
Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming,
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading


of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and


rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of


Water Quality.–– Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a
degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may
be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––
It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and
clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of
his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall
undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or
entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On
the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of
a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila
Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible
to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by


Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other
judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end
in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is


institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order


G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,

ABAD, J.:

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the


ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage,
President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state
of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring


martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to
review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on
December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP
1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

ISSUES
Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
[privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and
academic?

RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground
that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and


restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the
issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the


government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining
actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the
Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court
in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue
of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not


unavoidable for two reasons:

1. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and


suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the
joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review
and validate or invalidate the same.

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act
in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise
Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after
the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not
have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme


Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers,
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable
one in the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the


joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on
the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become
moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial
law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.

2. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law


and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just
eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The
military did not take over the operation and control of local
government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any
law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be
enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either
released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition
for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests
made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended
by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and
sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was
localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never


took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it
having become moot and academic.
Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

G.R. NO. 101083 July 30, 1993


OPOSA et al, vs. HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging
companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country.
Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;


Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of


continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel
all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses
to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action
to the judicial power of the Court.

2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their


complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

3. Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs


indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:

the Court held that:

1. The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power
of the Court.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice


Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a
case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According
to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest,
making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an
actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the
decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to
sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm


and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified
data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found


under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for
Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE II. Nature of Constitutional Provisions and Principles
_______________________________________________________________________________

it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-


perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.


The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein
.

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is


not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-
777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

Abitan, Alexandra P.
Doctor of Jurisprudence

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