Explicitly Said or Only Implied PDF

Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221
brill.com/orie
Explicitly Said or Only Implied?

The Development of the manṭūq / mafhūm Dichotomy in Islamic Legal
Hermeneutics*
Nora Kalbarczyk
KAAD, Bonn
kalbarczyk@kaad.de
Abstract
There are two main approaches in Islamic legal theory to the classification of a meaning
as explicit or implicit. The two approaches—i.e. the Šāfiʿite and the Ḥanafite—differ
with regard to their underlying hermeneutic paradigms. It is sometimes assumed that
the “standard” Šāfiʿite approach corresponds to that of Āmidī (d. 631/1233). However, as
this paper argues, there were two other authors who had a major impact on the evolu-
tion of the Šāfiʿite approach: the post-Avicennian polymath and Šāfiʿī jurist Faḫr ad-dīn
ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210); and the Mālikite jurist Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (d. 646/1249) who creates his
own classification—on the basis of both Āmidī’s approach and the Ḥanafite paradigm.
Aḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī (d. 756/1355) eventually modified Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s classification using
Rāzī’s framework—and this is the version which is nowadays referred to as the Šāfiʿite
approach.
Keywords
Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) – implication (mafhūm) – Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī – Sayf
ad-dīn al-Āmidī – Ibn al-Ḥāǧib
* A former version of this paper was presented and discussed at a workshop on Islamic legal
theory and philosophy in Berkeley (April 30–May 2, 2016). I would like to thank the editors
for giving me the possibility to publish the article in this volume. Moreover, I am very grateful
to the editors and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. All remaining flaws
are of course mine.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi: 10.1163/18778372-04601006

Downloaded from Brill.com08/05/2019 12:40:12PM
via University College London
explicitly said or only implied? 187
1 Introduction
Classical Islamic legal theory develops, inter alia, a methodology for the inquiry
into the language of revelation in order to find or infer rules from it. Thus, uṣūlīs
have to deal with the fact “that revelation often implies more than it explicitly
says.”1 Implied meanings are, in the words of Ġazālī (d. 505/1111), those mean-
ings “that can be known from the expressions not with regard to their linguistic
form (ṣīġa), but with regard to their import ( faḥwā) and allusion (išāra),” i.e.
they can be known through an additional meaning which is related to the first
meaning and which is hinted at through, for example, contextual markers.2
The definition of “implication” differs from scholar to scholar and from
school to school—and depending on these definitions, there are different
views of what remains in the realm of explicit speech. Putting to one side some
of the nuanced differences in definition, terminology and classification, one
can identify two main approaches: the Šāfiʿite (applied not only by the Šāfiʿīs
but also by the Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs) and the Ḥanafite. These approaches are
based on two different views of understanding something by means of lan-
guage.3 This comes with a different assessment of the epistemological status
of the respective meaning.
In the Šāfiʿite tradition the relation between explicit and implicit speech is
seen as a dichotomy: manṭūq (“that which is articulated”) and mafhūm (“that
which is understood/implied”); the former is regarded as yielding greater cer-
tainty than the latter. While manṭūq encompasses a hermeneutical hierarchy in
which revelational language is classified with regard to the status of its clarity
within the realm of explicit speech, the mafhūm category comprises five types.
The following overview is laid out by Ġazālī:4
1 David R. Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imag-
ined a Revealed Law (New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 2011), p. 7.
2 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed. by Ḥamza b. Zuhayr Ḥāfiẓ
(Medina: Šarikat al-Madīna al-munawwara li-ṭ-ṭibāʿa wa-n-našr, 1993), vol. 3, p. 402 ff.
3 For these two approaches, see for example Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics,
p. 7 and pp. 190ff.; Mohamed M. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics: Sunni Legal Theorists’
Models of Textual Communication (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), p. 175; Bernard
G. Weiss, The Search for God’s Law. Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 22010), p. 481; Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty:
An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013), p. 50
and p. 98.
4 Here I refer to al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, pp. 402–449.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221 Downloaded from Brill.com08/05/2019 12:40:12PM

188 kalbarczyk
[1.] dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ—an additional meaning which is required to under-

stand the overall meaning of a phrase or which is required for upholding
the truthfulness of the speaker; it often amounts to the ellipsis (iḍmār) of
a word;5
[2.] dalālat al-išāra—an alluded meaning which is not intended by the
speaker;6
[3.] dalālat at-taʿlīl—an implied meaning that is the ʿilla, the explanation or
justification for the ruling in question;7
[4.] mafhūm al-muwāfaqa—an implied meaning or rule (ḥukm) which is in
agreement with the explicit meaning or rule; it often amounts to the argu-
mentum a minori ad maius (at-tanbīh bi-l-adnā ʿalā l-aʿlā/hinting at the
higher by means of the lower);8
[5.] dalīl al-ḫiṭāb/mafhūm al-muḫālafa—an implied meaning or rule which is
the negation of the stated rule with regard to all cases that are not stated.
One can put it differently: A stated rule is only valid with regard to the
stated cases, all other cases which are not stated are not covered by that
rule. It is approximately equivalent to the argumentum e contrario. For
example, the fact that zakāt is prescribed for grazing animals is taken to
5 For the discussion about the equivalence or distinction of iqtiḍāʾ and iḍmār, see al-Ġazālī, al-
Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 405, ll. 9–10, Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. by Ṭaha
Ǧābir Fayāḍ al-ʿAlwānī (Riyāḍ: Ǧāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad b. Suʿūd al-Islāmiyya, 1979),
vol. 1, p. 351 and Šihāb ad-dīn al-Qarāfī, Nafāʾis al-uṣūl fī šarḥ al-Maḥṣūl, ed. by Muḥammad
ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2000), vol. 1, p. 302, l. 23–p. 304, l. 1.
6 For the concept of dalālat al-išāra in general, see al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, pp. 406–8;
Šukrija H. Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law (Cambridge: The Islamic
Texts Society, 2003), pp. 11–7; Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, pp. 161–6; Robert Gleave,
Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh:
University Press, 2013), pp. 53–4; Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, p. 476, Mohammad
H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2013),
pp. 169–71.
7 Cf. al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, pp. 409–10; Ahmad Hasan, “Finding the Cause of a Legal
Injunction in Islamic Jurisprudence”, Islamic Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (1986): pp. 15 ff. Other names
for this concept are īmāʾ wa-išāra and tanbīh wa-l-imāʾ.
8 For mafhūm al-muwāfaqa in general, see Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, pp. 188 ff.;
Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law, pp. 49 ff.; Weiss, The Search, pp. 477ff.;
Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 171–2 and Marie Bernand, “Controverses Mé-
diévales sur le Dalīl al-Ḫiṭāb”, Arabica, vol. 33, no. 3 (Nov. 1986): pp. 269–94; Muṣṭafā Ǧamāl
ad-dīn, al-Baḥṯ an-naḥwī ʿinda l-uṣūliyyīn (Baghdad: Dār ar-Rašīd li-n-našr, 1980), pp. 276 ff.; for
mafhūm al-muwāfaqa in aš-Šāfiʿī’s thinking, see Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Herme-
neutics, p. 60.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

mean that it is only prescribed for grazing animals and not prescribed for
stall-fed animals.9
Mafhūm is an ambiguous term in Šāfiʿite legal hermeneutics: On the one hand

it is a generic term for the different kinds of implication and in this function it
is the antonym of manṭūq. On the other hand it is used to refer to two kinds of
implication, namely the above-mentioned mafhūm al-muwāfaqa and mafhūm
al-muḫālafa.
The Ḥanafite approach does not assume a dichotomy between explicit and
implicit meanings. Rather, it encompasses a range from explicit to implicit sig-
nification covering four different types:10
[1.] ʿibārat an-naṣṣ—This is the explicit meaning of the text and it is equiva-
lent to manṭūq; this is the highest grade in the epistemological hierarchy
and leads to certain knowledge (ʿilm qaṭʿī);
[2.] išārat an-naṣṣ—an alluded meaning; it is equivalent to dalālat al-išāra in
the Šāfiʿī classification laid out above. This, and all subsequent kinds of
signification lead both to certain knowledge or to presumption (ẓann);
[3.] dalālat an-naṣṣ—equivalent to mafhūm al-muwāfaqa in the Šāfiʿī classi-
fication. In contrast to mafhūm al-muwāfaqa, though, it is taken to be an
immediate linguistic understanding and not a rational deduction. Every-
9 For a detailed inquiry into this method and an argumentation against it, see inter alia al-
Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, pp. 413–49; Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, at-Taqrīb wa-l-iršād, ed.
by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd (Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risāla, 1998), vol. 3, pp. 331 ff.;
Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī, at-Talḫīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. by Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismaʿīl
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2003), p. 225ff.; cf. Zysow, The Economy of Certainty,
pp. 100–9, and Bernand, “Controverses Médiévales sur le Dalīl al-Ḫiṭāb”, pp. 269–94; Weiss,
The Search, pp. 482–93; Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, pp. 192–224; Kamali, Princi-
ples of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 179–85; Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic
Law, pp. 55–60.
10 Cf. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, pp. 159–75, Kamali, Principles of Islamic Juris-
prudence, pp. 167–75; Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law, pp. 3–40;
ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Bazdawī (together with al-Buḫārī’s commentary): Kašf al-asrār,
ed. by Aḥmad Ḫalūṣī and Muṣṭafā Darwīš (Istanbul, 1890), vol. 1, p. 67; Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Ibn
as-Sāʿātī, Kitāb al-Badīʿ, ed. by Muṣṭafā Maḥmūd al-Azharī and Muḥammad Ḥusayn ad-
Dimyāṭī (Riyāḍ/Cairo: Dār Ibn al-Qayyim/Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 2014), vol. 3, pp. 113ff.; see also
the entry dalāla in ʿAlī b. Muḥammad aš-Šarīf al-Ǧurǧānī, Kitāb at-Taʿrīfāt, ed. unknown
(Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḫayriyya, 1888), p. 46.

190 kalbarczyk
one who speaks the language, it is argued, would come to the same con-
clusion;
[4.] iqtiḍāʾ an-naṣṣ—equivalent to dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ in the Šāfiʿī classification.
In the 18th century, the Ḥanafite Niẓām ad-dīn al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī (1225/1810),
known as Baḥr al-ʿulūm, cites a Šāfiʿī classification which remains to the present
day11 the “standard” Šāfiʿī approach to implicit meanings and which differs con-
siderably from the above-mentioned approach of earlier scholars:
Text 1
[§1] As for the Šāfiʿite school (aš-šāfiʿiyya), they divide the signification
(dalāla) into
[1.] manṭūq (‘that which is articulated/said’)—i.e. that [kind of significa-
tion] in which the expression signifies the affirmation (ṯubūt) of the rule
(ḥukm) which is mentioned by way of congruence (muṭābaqa), contain-
ment (taḍammun) or implication (iltizām);
and, by contrast (bi-ḫilāfihī),
[2.] mafhūm (‘that which is understood/implied’)—i.e. that kind of sig-
nification which occurs not by being mentioned (maḏkūr) but by being
quiet about it.
[§2] Therefore manṭūq and mafhūm are the two parts of signification
(qismā d-dalāla). That is, what the expression [i.e. “signification”] origi-
nally (maṣdariyyatan) signifies, while it is said that manṭūq and mafhūm
belong to the parts of what is signified (madlūl), nonetheless the parts of
signification are the signification with regard to manṭūq and mafhūm.
[§3] Manṭūq [is either]
[1.1] plain (ṣarīḥ), that is what signifies by way of congruence or contain-
ment
[1.2] or, by contrast, not plain (ġayr ṣarīḥ)—that is that which signifies
neither by way of congruence nor by way of containment; it signifies,
therefore, by way of implication (iltizām).
[§4] According to this [classification] implication belongs [1.] to the man-
ṭūq category, but some Šāfiʿites—among them the author of the Minhāǧ
[i.e. Bayḍāwī]—include it [2.] under mafhūm.
[§5] [ad 1.2] ‘not plain’ (ġayr ṣarīḥ) is divided into that kind of significa-
11 See for example Wahba az-Zuhaylī, al-Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islamī (Damascus: Dār al-fikr, 1986),
vol. 1, p. 360.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

figure 1 The Šāfiʿī classification according to the Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt

dalāla
dalālat al-manṭūq dalālat al-mafhūm
ṣarīḥ ġayr ṣarīḥ mafhūm al-muwāfaqa mafhūm al-muḫālafa
muṭābaqa taḍammun iltizām
intended unintended
condition no condition dalālat al-išāra
dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ al-tanbīh wa-l-īmāʾ
tion which is intended by the speaker […], this is called dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ,
[…] and it is called īmāʾ wa-tanbīh […]; and it is divided into that which is
not intended [by the speaker] and this is išāra. […]
[6] [ad 2] mafhūm is either mafhūm muwāfaqa, and this is dalālat an-naṣṣ
[…] or mafhūm muḫālafa, and this means the (contradictory) opposite of
the ḥukm of that which is explicitly mentioned (huwa ṯubūt naqīḍ ḥukm
al-manṭūq) is affirmed.12
Baḥr al-ʿulūm’s own account is quite different from the aforementioned classi-
fication. Most of the kinds of implication which initially were subsumed under
the mafhūm category are now a part of manṭūq—that means that implications
now belong to the realm of explicit speech. Furthermore the threefold classifi-
cation of signification (muṭābaqa, taḍammun, iltizām), which goes back to Ibn
Sīnā (d. 1037), is integrated into this scheme to specify the different layers of
manṭūq.
The present paper aims to inquire into the different stages which lead up to
this “standard” Šāfʿī approach to implicit signification and argues that there are
two scholars who had a major impact on this development. The first is the Šāfiʿī
Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) with his work Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh and
the second is the Mālikī scholar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (d. 646/1249) with his work Muḫ-
12 Niẓām ad-dīn al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī, Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt bi-šarḥ Musallam aṯ-ṯubūt, ed.
by ʿAbdallah Maḥmūd Muḥammad ʿUmar (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2002), vol. 1,
p. 449, l. 19–p. 451, l. 1.

192 kalbarczyk
taṣar al-Muntahā—both works generated important commentary traditions in

which the different approaches were elaborated upon.
The different steps in the development of the standard approach will be
retraced in this paper: From Rāzī’s synthesis between Avicennian concepts and
uṣūlī hermeneutics to Bayḍāwī’s partial adoption and Āmidī’s own approach to
Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s remodeling; with Aḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī’s (d. 756/1355) commentary
on Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s Muḫtaṣar the “standard” Šāfʿī approach was completed.
2 Merging Avicennian Concepts into uṣūlī Hermeneutics:

Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s Maḥṣūl
The Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh turns out to be a very influential work that
attracted a lot of commentatorial effort. It was—and still is—one of the foun-
dational works of this discipline.13 With a few adjustments the work is modeled
after the Kitāb al-Muʿtamad by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Ibn Ḫallikān (d. 681/1282)
alludes to this reliance on the Kitāb al-Muʿtamad by saying that “Faḫr ad-dīn
ar-Rāzī extracted his Kitāb al-Maḥṣūl from it” (wa-minhū aḫaḏa Faḫr ad-dīn
ar-rāzī kitāba l-maḥṣūl).14 The major difference between these two books—
besides the different theological frameworks—lies in Rāzī’s chapter on expres-
sions where he integrates Avicennian philosophy of language and logic into
legal and linguistic deliberations.15 The Maḥṣūl reflects the impact Ibn Sīnā’s
(d. 428/1037) thinking had on subsequent generations of scholars in the Islamic
world whose philosophical activities are increasingly being reappraised: Ibn
Sīnā’s concepts and vocabulary spread into later works and were merged into
the Islamic scholarly disciplines, fulfilling various functions.16 Faḫr ad-dīn ar-
Rāzī, who was well versed in several disciplines, including theology, legal the-
13 Cf. Thomas Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguität. Eine andere Geschichte des Islams (Berlin:
Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2011), p. 160.
14 Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Ḫallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān, ed. by
Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār aṯ-ṯaqāfa, 1968–72), vol. 2, p. 1616, ll. 4–6—I owe many thanks to
Gregor Schwarb who has drawn my attention to this passage.
15 Cf. Nora Kalbarczyk, Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie. Die avicennische
Klassifikation der Bezeichnung bei Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, forthcoming (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
16 Cf. Dimitri Gutas, “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–
ca 1350”, in Avicenna and his Heritage, ed. by Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet (Löwen:
University Press, 2002), pp. 81–97, esp. pp. 84–5 and Dimitri Gutas, “Avicenna’s philosoph-
ical project”, in Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, ed. by Peter Adamson (Cambridge:
University Press, 2013), pp. 28–47, esp. pp. 33–5.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

ory, philosophy, logic or grammar, can be held responsible for the fact “that Ibn
Sīnā entered the madrasa”, i.e. that Avicennian philosophy and logic became
part of the curriculum of jurists and theologians.17 He composed several com-
mentaries on Ibn Sīnā’s writings, among them his commentary on the Išārāt
wa-t-tanbīhāt. The logical part of that commentary can be regarded as par-
ticularly influential; for its explanations, topics and questions were intensely
absorbed and discussed in the subsequent tradition. The logic parts of later
commentaries on the Išārāt, such as Naṣīr ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) or
Sayf ad-dīn al-Āmidī’s (d. 631/1233) commentaries, are fundamentally based on
Rāzī’s commentary—in such a manner that some passages can only be prop-
erly understood with recourse to it.
Faḫr ad-dīn’s logic, in turn, is itself thoroughly informed by Ibn Sīnā—to that
degree “that Rāzī’s logic is incomprehensible apart from Avicenna’s system”.18
That is not only true for his works on logic but also for numerous passages from
his writings on other scholarly disciplines, such as uṣūl al-fiqh.
In his Maḥṣūl Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī combines two language-related traditions,
namely logical propaedeutics and legal hermeneutics, both with regards to
contents and structure. In the subchapter “on the division of expressions” ( fī
taqsīm al-alfāẓ) his focus lies on how expressions relate to meanings; i.e. he
inquires into the several different aspects of the possible relations.19 There are
basically three ways of signification—a classification which goes back to Ibn
Sīnā:20
(1) There is a primary way in which an expression is taken to signify the

complete meaning or definition—this way is called signification by con-
gruence (muṭābaqa).
17 Gerhard Endress, “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa: Intellectual Genealogies and Chains
of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East”, in Arabic Theology,
Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank, ed.
by James E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), p. 398.
18 Tony Street, “Faḫraddīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique of Avicennan Logic”, in Logik und Theologie. Das
Organon im Arabischen und im Lateinischen Mittelalter, ed. by Dominik Perler and Ulrich
Rudolph (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 99–116, here p. 101.
19 Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. by Ṭaha Ǧābir Fayāḍ al-ʿAlwānī (Riyāḍ:
Ǧāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad b. Suʿūd al-Islāmiyya, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 219–36.
20 In my forthcoming PhD thesis (Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie. Die avi-
cennische Klassifikation der Bezeichnung bei Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī) I examine the emergence
and usage of the classification of signification in the works of Ibn Sīnā, in Islamic legal the-
ory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and in post-Avicennian logic.

194 kalbarczyk
(2) There is a secondary way of signification in which the expression signifies

a notion by containment (taḍammun), i.e. it signifies intrinsic and essen-
tial constituents of the notion.
(3) When an expression signifies a meaning which corresponds neither to its
definition nor to a part of it but which is somehow attached to this mean-
ing, this is called the extrinsic way of signification (dalāla ḫāriǧiyya)21 and
amounts to an implication (iltizām).
An important reason why Ibn Sīnā developed this threefold classification of

signification in his logical propaedeutics is his discussion of the scope of signi-
fication of the predicables.
Faḫr ad-dīn now uses this classification for uṣūlī hermeneutics as well: The
category of congruent signification (dalālat muṭābaqa) encompasses several
relationships between an expression and a meaning employed in logic and uṣūl
al-fiqh. Among these are the relationships which previously were covered by
the uṣūlī category of manṭūq: He delineates four main relationships: (1) A word
might correspond to exactly one meaning; (2) several words might be loosely
connected to several meanings; (3) different words could signify one and the
same meaning; (4) or, inversely, one expression could signify several different
meanings at the same time. This last case is a real hermeneutical challenge.
Ad (1), a word might correspond to exactly one meaning—this relation
seems to be very obvious. However, it is far more complex here, as Faḫr ad-
dīn ar-Rāzī discusses several logical and ontological relationships on the basis
of Ibn Sīnā’s writings on logic. He distinguishes, for example, the particular
relation between a word and its meaning from the universal relation. Whereas
the particular relation is a proper name which denotes the individual person
in question, the universal relation is, for example, the case in which a genus
name denotes every single one of its species, just like the term “animal” denotes
human being, horse or ox; in philosophy, this kind of relation is known as Aris-
totelian “synonymy” (tawāṭuʾ). This relation encompasses more cases that fall
outside my concern here.
Ad (2), the second possible relation between word and meaning that Rāzī
describes is as follows: Several words might be loosely connected to several
meanings, either with an essential relation between the meanings or without
such a relation. This is called “heteronymy” (mutabāyina). Just as in (1), it is
important in Avicennian logic. The meanings might be totally unrelated to each
21 Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Madḫal, ed. by Ibrāhīm Madkūr, Ǧurǧ Qanawātī et
al. (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿĀmma li-Šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-Amīriyya, 1952), I.8, p. 43, ll. 9–11.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

other, such as, for example, “stone” and “horse,” which only have in common the
ontological fact of falling under the category of “body”. However, the meanings
could also have a closer relation to each other: for example, in Arabic there are
several words which denote in one way or other the meaning of “sword.” But
each of them emphasizes a different aspect of the sword: the word sayf stresses
that it is made of iron, muhannad that it is a special kind of sword from India,
and ṣārim that it is sharp. Since each of them conveys different information,
they are not regarded as being “synonyms” (in the sense of Stoic “synonymy”
which nowadays corresponds to the commonly known usage of “synonymy”).
Ad (3), “synonymy” (in the Stoic and modern-day sense) would be the case
in which there are several expressions for only one meaning without convey-
ing any further information about the item; an English example might be “to
begin” and “to start” which both signify the same meaning. With regard to
the exegetical process, Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī qualifies these first three relations
as being explicit and clear; they belong to the so-called naṣṣ category, which
had been introduced by Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī to apply to all those expres-
sions in which there is a single literal meaning for each word; thus, the ḥukm
based on this meaning has the high status of certainty. The first uṣūlī writer to
discuss these three relations in his uṣūl al-fiqh work was Ġazālī. However, he
merely discussed them in his book’s first chapter which is dedicated to logic
and propaedeutics and did not merge them with uṣūlī hermeneutics. Faḫr ad-
dīn ar-Rāzī, in contrast, tries to systematize both hermeneutical traditions.
Ad (4), as an inversion of the third case, the fourth relation is the case in
which one expression has several different meanings. With regard to herme-
neutics this fourth case is the most problematic—or arguably the most fruit-
ful—relationship between a word and its meaning. Faḫr ad-dīn elaborates on
this category in a highly systematic way. In doing so, he systematizes the various
hermeneutical terms at stake here:
(4.1) First of all, it might be the case that initially the word was coined for
only one meaning and subsequently was transferred to denote a second
meaning, maybe due to a relationship (munāsaba) between the first and
the second meaning (manqūl ilayhi, lit. “the transferred-to meaning”).
(4.1.1) It might even be the case that the denotation of the second
meaning becomes more common than the first one. An example
is the term ṭāliq, which initially meant a happy person and is now
primarily used with regard to the legal status of being divorced. To
express the relationship between the word and this second mean-
ing, one speaks of a ‘transferred expression’ (lafẓ manqūl). If the

196 kalbarczyk
meaning is from the legal sphere, the word is called a ‘legal expres-
sion’ (lafẓ šarʿī), such as the word ṭāliq in our example. It might also
belong to a special language use (ʿurf ), such as technical terms (iṣṭa-
lāḥāt) in different scholarly fields.
(4.1.2) If neither of the two meanings is more likely to be meant,
Rāzī says, the expression is called ‘proper’ (ḥaqīqa) with regard to
the first meaning and ‘figurative’ (maǧāz) with regard to the second
meaning. In Rāzī’s systematization the hermeneutical pair ḥaqīqa
and maǧāz points to the fact that one expression signifies more than
one meaning, whereas one meaning was the first one and was later
joined by a second one, and that there is no preponderance, i.e., both
meanings are likely to be meant. The kind of maǧāz which is meant
in this classification, maǧāz luġawī, can be traced back to the gram-
marian and rhetorician ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Ǧurǧānī.
(4.2) But the origination of one word signifying two (or more) mean-
ings could also be different. The word could have been laid down for two
meanings simultaneously, not at different points in time.
(4.2.1) When there is no preponderance and the meanings are all

equally likely to be meant, the expression is called a “homonymous”
term (muštarak; homonymy: ištirāk) with regard to both meanings.
With regard to one of the two meanings, it is called muǧmal. That
means that if the person who interprets the texts opts for one mean-
ing, he first of all has to explain why he does so and secondly has to
explain what exactly this meaning indicates.22
(4.2.2) As for the case in which the signification of the expression
is stronger with regard to one of the two meanings, the expression
is called ‘obvious’ (ẓāhir) with respect to the preponderant (rāǧiḥ)
meaning and muʾawwal with respect to the inferior (marǧūḥ) mean-
ing. That is to say, the interpreter has to explain and to substantiate
why he opts against the ẓāhir meaning and for the less likely mean-
ing. In contrast to the muʾawwal expression, the ẓāhir expression is
seen as being explicit with regard to its meaning and thus as yielding
a result with a higher epistemological status.
22 Literally, muǧmal means “that which is summed up without differentiation”, for example
the exact regulation of the prayer.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

Rāzī summarizes his scheme under the two genera unambiguity and ambi-
guity: Naṣṣ and ẓāhir fall under the generic term muḥkam (here for unambigu-
ity), whereas mutašābih is the generic term of muǧmal and muʾawwal.23
In Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s hermeneutical system there are basically three dif-
ferent levels of iltizām (implication):24
[a] iltizām on the level of logical propaedeutics. Iltizām as a kind of extrinsic

signification is of importance in order to avoid redundancies, omissions
and fallacies, especially when it comes to ensuring the precise and accu-
rate signification of the quiddity;25
[b] iltizām on the level of general/common language as one of the three ways
of signification: in Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s work iltizām transcends the realm
of predicable semantics and becomes applicable to all expressions, be
they universal or particular. For Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī the threefold classifi-
cation of signification (on the level of meanings) is the counterpart of the
division of expressions into ism, fiʿl and ḥarf ;26
[c] iltizām as a category for legal implications: broadly speaking, Faḫr ad-dīn
subsumes the concept of manṭūq under dalālat al-muṭābaqa and the con-
cept of mafhūm under dalālat al-iltizām.
In the following section I will give a rough overview of Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s
systematization of legal implications.
His starting point is the distinction between simple expressions and com-
pound expressions: It is either the meaning of a simple or of a compound
expression that implies a further meaning. Rāzī goes on to classify the implied
meaning with regard to the function it has for the hearer in understanding
the statement: assuming an implied meaning is either (1.) a condition (šarṭ)
for the hearer in order to understand the overall meaning of the statement, or
(2.) a consequence that results from the meaning of the statement.27 The first
amounts to dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ (“signification by requirement”) which according
to Faḫr ad-dīn is either
23 Cf. Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, pp. 227–31.

24 I have elaborated on this in Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie.
25 Cf. Nora Kalbarczyk, “The Threefold Classification of Signification: Aspects of the Origins
of muṭābaqa, taḍammun and iltizām in al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Treatises on De Interpre-
tatione and the Predicables”, forthcoming.
26 Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, Šarḥ al- Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt, al-Manṭiq, ed. by ʿAlī Reẓā Naǧafzādeh
(Teheran: Anǧomān-e Āṯār va-Mofāḫer Farhangī, 2005), p. 22, ll. 8–12.
27 Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, p. 232, ll. 13–4.

198 kalbarczyk
[1] based on reason (ʿaqliyyatan)—as in the saying [of the prophet] “error
(ḫataʾ) and forgetfulness (nisyān) were removed (rufiʿa) from my commu-
nity”, because reason indicates that the meaning could not be true unless
we find there concealed the legal qualification (al-ḥukm aš-šarʿī),28
or
[2] deduced in a legal manner (šarʿiyyatan)—as in his saying ‘By God,

I certainly will manumit this slave’; for this implies the acquisition of
the property (taḥṣīl al-milk) [i.e. manumission implies ownership] because
only after it [i.e. after the acquisition of the property] the fulfillment (wafāʾ)
of his words [i.e. of his promise] is legally possible.29
Prior to Faḫr ad-dīn the jurists classified three factors that lead to assume this
kind of implication: (i) the truthfulness of the speaker (ṣidq al-mutakallim) is
only maintained when the hearer assumes an implied meaning;30 or (ii) the
explicit meaning would under legal considerations be problematic, or (iii) it
would rationally make no sense. With regard to the first case, jurists discussed
inter alia the above-quoted ḥadīṯ “error (ḫataʾ) and forgetfulness (nisyān) were
removed (rufiʿa) from my community”. Since Muslims can be and often are mis-
taken in everyday life this statement would be wrong; thus, the truthfulness of
the speaker, in this case Muḥammad, would be damaged.31 In order to make
this sentence true and to uphold the truthfulness of the speaker, one has to
assume there to be an ellipsis. Hence, the complete sentence would be: “Ruling
(ḥukm) on an error (ḫataʾ) and forgetfulness (nisyān) was removed (rufiʿa) from
my community”.32 According to this understanding God did not remove error
itself but only ruling on an error from the Muslim community; other jurists
specify that it is muʾāḫaḏa (blame) and ʿiqāb (punishment) for error which are
removed.33 Faḫr ad-dīn deems this statement to make no sense under ratio-

30 Al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 403, l. 5 and ll. 8ff.
31 For references concerning dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ in general, see Ramić, Language and the Inter-
pretation of Islamic Law, p. 29–38; Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, p. 170–5, Weiss,
The Search, p. 475 and Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 179; for this example
in particular, see Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law, p. 30 and p. 33 f.,
Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, p. 172f.
32 Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 2, p. 382, ll. 11.
33 Al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 404; Sayf ad-dīn al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, ed.
by ʿAbd ar-Razzāq ʿAfīfī (Riyāḍ: Dar aṣ-Ṣumayʿī, 2003), vol. 3, p. 82, l. 5.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

nal considerations; he pays no attention to the question of the “truthfulness

of the speaker”. Other prominent instances of sentences that rationally make
no sense include “Ask the village” (wa-sʾali l-qaryata) [Q 12:82], i.e. “Ask the
inhabitants of the village” (wa-sʾali ahla l-qaryati). This is a trope (maǧāz);34
namely, metonymy in Western rhetoric. Also there is “Forbidden for you are
your mothers” (ḥurrimat ʿalaykum ummahātukum) [Q 4:23], i.e. “Forbidden to
you is intercourse (waṭʾ)/marriage with your mothers”.35 As an example for
legal considerations which lead one to assume an ellipsis, Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī
cites the following sentence: “By God, I will certainly manumit this slave” (wa-
Llāhi la-uʿtiqanna hāḏā l-ʿhāḏā). Ġazālī describes the context of this sentence:
“[…] if someone points at the slave of someone else and says ‘By God, I will
certainly manumit this slave’, it would be incumbent upon him to possess [the
salve]”.36 The problem of this statement lies in the fact that the condition for
manumission is the possession (milk) of the slave: Only the owner can manu-
mit the slave and not someone else—therefore this statement implies a legal
procedure, i.e. a transaction.37
From a given statement a further meaning could also result—this implied
meaning either corresponds to the main intention of the statement or it does
not:
The first is like the fact that—for those who do not establish this by means
of analogy (ʿinda man lā yuṯbituhū bi-l-qiyās)—the prohibition of saying
‘Fie!’ (taḥrīm at-taʾfīf ) indicates the prohibition on striking.38
Faḫr ad-dīn alludes here to the controversy about the interpretation of Q 17:23:
Your Lord has commanded that you should worship none but Him, and
show kindness to your parents. If either or both of them attain old age
with you, say not say ‘Fie’ to them and do not rebuke them, but always
speak gently to them.39
34 Cf. for example Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, at-Tafsīr al-kabīr aw Mafātiḥ al-ġayb (Beirut: Dār al-
kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2013), vol. 18, p. 152, l. 13; for this example, see al-Bāqillānī, at-Taqrīb,
vol. 1, p. 352, ll. 16ff.; see also Gleave, Islam and Literalism, p. 9.
35 Al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 405, l. 1 and Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 3, p. 163;
Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 172.
36 Al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 404, ll. 11–2.
37 Al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 404, ll. 7–13.
39 Translation by Wahiduddin Khan (New Delhi, 2009).

200 kalbarczyk
The scholars infer from the prohibition of saying any word of contempt to
one’s parents that striking them is also forbidden. It is the method of how to
come to this conclusion that is controversial: Is this some kind of literal signi-
fication and thus an immediate signification, or is it an analogy? Scholars who
reject inference by analogy (be it in general or in particular cases) place this
kind of implication under the heading of ‘natural linguistic capacity’ which
leads to “knowledge imposed upon the mind without reflection.”.40 That is,
from the prohibition “say not say ‘Fie’ (uff ) to them and do not rebuke them,
but always speak gently to them” [Q 17:23] they understand that if it is forbid-
den to insult or chide one’s parents, everything that is worse than this is also
forbidden—a kind of immediate argumentum a minori ad maius (at-tanbīh
bi-l-adnā ʿalā l-aʿlā) so to speak.41 Some legal scholars of the Šāfiʿite tradition
however call this kind of inference ‘implication by accordance (mafhūm al-
muwāfaqa)’; for the implied legal consequence (ḥukm) (namely the prohibition
of striking), is in accordance with the explicit legal consequence of that state-
ment (that is, the prohibition of insulting one’s parents), but it comprises more
than what is explicitly stated.42 It is this understanding of this kind of inference
40 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī uṣūl al-fiqh
(Cambridge: University Press, 1997), p. 96.
41 Cf. al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 411, l. 12, cf. also Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, at-Tafsīr al-
kabīr, vol. 20, p. 152, ll. 3–4; ll. 9–10. For the question of whether the a fortiori argument
belongs to qiyās or not, see Rosalind Gwynne, “The A Fortiori Argument in Fiqh, Naḥw
and Kalām,” in Studies in the History of Arabic Grammar II: Proceedings of the 2nd Sym-
posium on the History of Arabic Grammar, Nijmwegen, 27 April–1 May 1987, ed. by Kees
Versteegh, and Michael G. Carter (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), pp. 165–75. For a
presentation of the different arguments of the proponents of linguistic and analogical
inference, cf. al-Ġazālī, Šifāʾ al-ġalīl fī bayān aš-šubah wa-l-muḫīl wa masālik at-taʿlīl (Bagh-
dad 1971), pp. 52–56.; cf. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, pp. 96–97; Hallaq,
“Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica, vol. 36 (1989): pp. 289–96,
esp. p. 290. Particularly the Ḥanafites, who in other cases do use analogy, emphasize the
“non-inferential, purely linguistic” premises for attaining knowledge, cf. Hallaq, A History
of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 97, but also al-Ġazālī subscribes to this kind of immediate
knowledge with regard to that kind of argument and rejects to call it an a fortiori argument
or qiyās al-ʿilla (al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 411, l. 4–p. 412, l. 13), as some other Šāfiʿites
do (Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” p. 292); the restrictive
Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm who rejects the use of analogy in general arrives at the same conclusion
(ibid., p. 295, note 28). For a summary of the Ḥanafite stance, see inter alia Niẓām ad-dīn
al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī, Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt, vol. 1, p. 446, ll. 19 ff.
42 Cf. above; al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3, p. 412, ll. 14–5; cf. Weiss, The Search for God’s Law,
p. 477.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

which leads Rāzī to subsume it under iltizām, although with respect to this par-
ticular case Rāzī himself assumes an analogy on the basis of the prohibition of
impairment (īḏāʾ);43 this is inferred “by means of a perspicuous analogy (qiyās
ǧalī) that belongs to the kind of inference (istidlāl) through a minori ad maius
(bi-l-adnā ʿalā l-aʿlā).44
It is also conceivable that the implied meaning is not in accordance with
the main intention but is a somewhat incidental consequence from the main
intention and either affirms or negates the main intention or the ḥukm:
[ad I.3.2.2.1] The first is like his words [Q 2:187] ‘So you may now con-
sort with them’ ( fa-alʾāna bāširūhunna). This is extended to the moment
when the white fiber (al-ḫayṭ al-abyaḍ) can be discerned; it follows with
regard to that person who gets into the state of major ritual impurity
(aṣbaḥa ǧunuban) that his fasting is not impaired. Otherwise it would be
necessary to forbid the sexual intercourse (waṭʾ) in another part of the
night to the extent that the ablution could take place.45
According to Q 2:187 eating, drinking and having intercourse is allowed dur-

ing the nights of Ramaḍān until dawn. In this context scholars discussed the
question of when the ablution must take place in order to end the state of rit-
ual impurity and to begin the fast. In the view of some scholars the ablution
must take place before dawn—therefore all activities forbidden during day-
time must be ended at this point. However the majority of scholars hold that
the ablution can take place at daybreak. This interpretation implies that the
state of impurity which lasts until the moment of ablution does not impair the
fast that should have begun with the daybreak as well.46 The non-intended, but
43 Al-Qarāfī, Nafāʾis al-uṣūl, vol. 1, p. 306, l. 3.

44 Rāzī, at-Tafsīr al-kabīr aw Mafātiḥ al-ġayb, vol. 20, p. 152, ll. 3–5.; cf. al-Qarāfī, Nafāʾis al-
uṣūl, vol. 1, p. 306, l. 3.; cf. Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,”
p. 292.
Cf. Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 5, pp. 121ff.; for a fortiori-arguments in Islamic
legal theory and the question of whether they can be subsumed under the qiyāsāt at all,
see Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments”, pp. 289–96 and Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal
Theories, pp. 96–7 and p. 29; see also Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, pp. 96–100 and
Weiss, The Search, pp. 478–80; for an overview over this kind of argument in several Islamic
disciplines, see Gwynne, “The A Fortiori Argument in Fiqh, Naḥw and Kalām,” pp. 165–77.
46 Cf. Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, at-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 5, p. 94, ll. 23–5, al-Ġazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 3,
p. 408; see also Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law, p. 12.

202 kalbarczyk
implied meaning is therefore that the impurity does not impair the fasting at
this point of time; the meaning of the sentence and its ḥukm are affirmed by
this implication. According to the Šāfiʿī and Ḥanafī terminology, this is called
išārat al-lafẓ (i.e. signification by allusion).
In the second kind the meaning or the ḥukm is not affirmed but negated:
As for the second it is the [question of ] whether the specific mention-

ing of something signifies the negation [of that rule] which is omitted [in
the statement] (anna taḫṣīṣa š-šayʾi bi-ḏ-ḏikri hal yadullu ʿalā nafīhi ʿammā
ʿadāhu)—God knows it.47
This refers to the controversial argumentum e contrario (dalīl al-ḫiṭāb/mafhūm

al-muḫālafa). In contrast to the kind of implication in which the legal ruling
is confirmed for this particular case, the argumentum e contrario is such that
the statement implies a negation of the ruling for other cases that are not
mentioned—or to put it differently this means that a rule encompasses only
the facts or cases which are explicitly mentioned and excludes all other facts
or cases. The question is whether this kind of argument amounts—according
to Rāzī—to an implication at all and whether it is a valid form.48
figure 2 Outline of Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s system of legal implications

[ad I.3] [The division of signification by implication]
As for the division of signification by implication, we say:
The meaning that is inferred from the signification by implication is either
inferred from (mustafādan min)
[I.3.1] the meanings of simple expressions (min maʿānī l-alfāẓi l-mufradati)
[I.3.2] or from the state of their composition (min ḥāli tarkībihā).
[ad I.3.] [Explanation for this twofold division:] The first has two parts (qismāni);
the meaning which is signified by way of implication either
[ad I.3.1] is a condition (šarṭ) for the meaning that is signified by way of con-
gruence,
[ad I.3.2] or follows (tābiʿ) it [i.e., this meaning follows from the meaning
that is signified by way of congruence].
[ad I.3.1] If it is the first, then it is called dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ (‘signification by
requirement’).
[p. 233] Then, it might be that the condition

48 Cf. Kalbarczyk, Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

[I.3.1.1] is based on reason (ʿaqliyyatan)

[I.3.1.2] or is based on legal (šarʿiyyatan) considerations.
[ad I.3.2] As for the case in which it [i.e. the implied meaning] follows
(tābiʿ) its composition,
[I.3.2.1] it is either among the things that complete that meaning, or
[I.3.2.2] it is not [among them].
[ad I.3.2.1]
The first is like the fact that—for those who do not establish this
by means of analogy (ʿinda man lā yuṯbituhū bi-l-qiyās)—the prohi-
bition of saying ‘Fie!’ [i.e. insulting] (taḥrīm at-taʾfīf ) indicates the
prohibition on striking [i.e. mafhūm al-muwāfaqa].
[ad I.3.2.2] As for the second: that which is signified by implica-
tion is either
[I.3.2.2.1] affirmative (ṯubūtiyyan) [i.e. išārat al-lafẓ] or
[I.3.2.2.2] negative (ʿadamiyyan). [i.e. mafhūm al-muḫālafa].49
In Faḫr ad-dīn’s system of legal implications iltizām, in a nutshell, comprises all

those kinds of implication which were covered by mafhūm in the Šāfiʿī texts—
with the exception of the implication of the ratio legis (ʿilla) of the respective
ḥukm (taʿlīl/īmāʾ wa-išāra/tanbīh wa-l-imāʾ) which is dealt with in the respec-
tive qiyās chapter on how to find the ʿilla.50
Rāzī does not merely recapitulate the different kinds of implications. Rather,
by carving out the different principles that underlie these implications he
brings them into a new systematic order.
Starting with the differentiation between the simple and compound expres-
sion, he classifies the implied meanings according to whether they are the
condition for a meaningful sentence or whether they are the consequence
from the understood meaning. Whereas previous scholars had equated the
concepts of positive/affirmative and negative implication with mafhūm al-
muwāfaqa and mafhūm al-muḫālafa,51 for Faḫr ad-dīn dalālat al-išāra is the
positive/affirmative implication which is opposed to mafhūm al-muḫālafa, i.e.
the negative implication. For Faḫr ad-dīn the main difference between mafhūm
al-muwāfaqa on the one hand and mafhūm al-muḫālafa and dalālat al-išāra on
the other hand is due to the following two questions:
49 Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, p. 232, l. 9–p. 234, ultimate line; cf. the translation of
this section in Kalbarczyk, Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie, pp. 54–67.
50 See Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 5, pp. 143ff.
51 Cf. Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, p. 7.

204 kalbarczyk
figure 3 Outline of Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s system of legal implications

implication (iltizām)
by the meaning of by the meaning of

a simple expression a compound expression
the implied meaning

is a
condition (šarṭ) consequence
dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ in agreement with not in agreement

the intended meaning with the intended meaning
(mafhūm al-muwāfaqa)
affirmative negative
implication implication
(dalālat al-išāra) (mafhūm al-muḫālafa)
– Does the implied meaning go along with the main intention of the sentence
(which applies to the case of mafhūm al-muwāfaqa)?
– Is the implied meaning an incidental consequence from the main inten-
tion—an additional meaning, so to speak which either affirms or negates
the main intention?
By subsuming the legal implications (1.) dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ, (2.) dalālat al-išāra,
(3.) mafhūm al-muwāfaqa and (4.) mafhūm al-muḫālafa under the iltizām cat-
egory, Faḫr ad-dīn integrates this classification in his overall system of legal
hermeneutics and makes the former manṭūq/mafhūm dichotomy obsolete.52
3 Towards the Standard Approach
Subsequent Šāfiʿī and Mālikī scholars, whose works are explicitly or implicitly
related to the Maḥṣūl, adopted and elaborated upon this classification in such a
way that something new and lasting was created—namely the “standard” Šāfiʿī
legal implication scheme. This development will be traced in the next section.
52 Cf. Kalbarczyk, Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie, pp. 186–209.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

In his Minhāǧ, which is supposed to be an extract from the Maḥṣūl com-

mentaries at-Taḥṣīl mina l-Maḥṣūl by Sirāǧ ad-dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283) and
al-Ḥāṣil mina l-Maḥṣūl fī uṣūl al-fiqh by Tāǧ ad-dīn al-Urmawī (gest. 656), the
Šāfiʿī ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar al-Bayḍāwī (685/1286)53 summarizes the distinction
between explicit and implicit meaning and its subclasses:
Text 2
Divine speech (al-ḫiṭāb) signifies the (legal) ruling (ḥukm)

[1.] either by being explicit (bi-manṭūqihī) so that it agrees with the legal
usage (šarʿī), then with the conventional usage (ʿurfī), then with the lex-
icographical usage (luġawī) and then with the figurative usage (maǧāzī);
[2] or by being implicit [lit. by that which is understood of it] (bi-mafhū-
mihī).
This is either
[2.1] that [meaning] which is attached to the simple [expression; i.e.
to the meaning of the simple expression], which rationally or legally
depends on it [i.e. on that implied meaning]—such as ‘Throw and free
your slave on behalf of me’ (irm wa-iʿtiq ʿabduka ʿannī); this is called
[dalālat] iqtiḍāʾ; or
[2.2.1] it is attached to the compound [i.e. to the meaning of the com-
pound expression] being in accordance with it [i.e. both meanings
are in accordance with each other with regard to the legal ruling], that
is faḥwā l-ḫiṭāb, just like the prohibition of insulting signifies the
prohibition of beating and
[2.2.2] [there is also dalālat al-išāra] just like the permission of sexual
intercourse (ǧawāz al-mubāšāra) until dawn indicates the permis-
sion to fast in the state of major ritual impurity (ǧunuban);
[2.2.3] or [the implied meaning] is the opposite (muḫālafa) [i.e. the
meanings are not in accordance with each other with regard to the
legal ruling]—just like the [specific mentioning of a ruling] implies
the negation of that ruling which exceeds that which is mentioned;
this is called dalīl al-ḫiṭāb.54
53 This date of death is given by Suyūṭī, see Ǧalāl ad-dīn as-Suyūṭī, Kitāb Buġyat al-wuʿāt,
ed. by Muḥammad Amīn Ḥānǧī and Aḥmad b. al-Amīn Šinqīṭī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat as-Saʿāda,
1908), vol. 1, p. 286, l. 5; for the controversy about al-Bayḍāwī’s date of death, see J. Robson,
“al-Bayḍāwī”, EI2 and as-Suyūṭī, Kitāb Buġyat al-wuʿāt, vol. 1, p. 286, l. 6.
54 ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar al-Bayḍāwī, Minhāǧ al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed. by Salīm Šabʿāniyya
(Damascus: Dār Dāniya, 1989), p. 68, ll. 11–6.

206 kalbarczyk
figure 4 Explicit and implicit signification in Bayḍawī’s Minhāǧ al-wuṣūl

dalāla
manṭūq mafhūm
mufrad murakkab
iqtiḍāʾ faḥwā al-ḫiṭāb dalālat al-išāra dalīl al-ḫiṭāb

(= mafhūm al-muwāfaqa) (= mafhūm al-muḫālafa)
In summarizing the relevant passage in the Maḥṣūl, Bayḍāwī continues to dis-

tinguish between manṭūq, i.e. every kind of signification which is based on
primary or secondary imposition, and mafhūm. Although Bayḍāwī adopts the
same starting point for his systematization, namely meanings that are implied
by the meaning of the simple and compound expressions, the legal implica-
tions Rāzī had classified as belonging to the iltizām category now belong to
the mafhūm category: (1.) dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ, (2.) dalālat al-išāra, (3.) mafhūm al-
muwāfaqa and (4.) mafhūm al-muḫālafa. Just like Rāzī, Bayḍāwī does not list
taʿlīl/īmāʾ wa-išāra here. But unlike Rāzī he does not adopt further kinds of dif-
ferentiation such as condition, consequence, intention, positive and negative
implication. Nor does he refer at this point to the threefold classification of sig-
nification. That is to say, Bayḍāwī adopts certain but not all aspects from Razī’s
new scheme; and—as Baḥr al-ʿulūm wrote—he classifies all legal implications
under mafhūm.
In his legal works, the Šāfiʿī Sayf ad-dīn al-Āmidī (631/1233) does not adopt
the scheme of the Maḥṣūl but uses—in a more systematic way and with a
slightly different terminology—the scheme of Ġazālī.55 Āmidī’s scheme proves
to be very influential for the subsequent tradition and for the development
of the later “standard” Šāfiʿī legal implication scheme. Āmidī distinguishes
between al-manẓūm, lit. that which is ordered/arranged, and ġayr al-manẓūm,
lit. that which is not ordered/arranged; this is similar to the manṭūq/mafhūm-
distinction, with ġayr al-manẓūm being equivalent to mafhūm with regard to
its function. In the following passage he further subdivides ġayr al-manẓūm:
55 Yunis Ali seems to suggest that Āmidī integrates the threefold classification of muṭābaqa,
taḍammun and iltizām into the manṭūq/mafhūm classification, but this is a back projec-
tion by the later tradition (which is why Yunus Ali can give no textual evidence), cf. Yunis
Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, pp. 180–1.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

Text 3
“The second part [of the book] is about the signification of that which is
not ordered (ġayr al-manẓūm):
This is [that kind of signification] in which the [word] signifies not on
account of its plain linguistic form and its imposition (bi-ṣarīḥ ṣīġatihī
wa-waḍʿihī).
That which is signified is either [1.] intended (maqṣūd) or [2.] unintended
(ġayr maqṣūd) by the speaker.
[1] If it is intended, it [i.e. that which is implicitly signified] is either
[1.1] such that the truthfulness of the speaker (ṣidq al-mutakallim) or
the correctness of what is uttered by him depends on it,
[1.2] or such that it does not depend on it.
[ad 1.1] If it depends on it, it is called dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ.
[ad 1.2] If it does not depend on it, it is either of such a kind
[1.2.1] that that which is understood (mafhūm) lies within the realm
of articulated speech (nuṭq) [i.e. there is a relation between the
expressions and the implied meaning. This relation is based on sig-
nification but is not immediate.]
[1.2.2] or that this is not the case.
[ad 1.2.1] If it is the first, this [kind of signification] is called dalālat
at-tanbīh wa-l-īmāʾ
[lit. ‘signification by hinting and indicating/gesturing’].
[ad 1.2.2] If it is the second, the signification is called dalālat al-
mafhūm.
[ad 2] If the signified meaning [or ‘that which is signified’] is not intended
by the speaker, the signification of the expression is called dalālat al-
išāra.”56
Like Ġazālī, Āmidī describes implicit signification in such a way that the mean-
ing is not signified by the linguistic form (ṣīġa) itself, i.e. by the arrangement
(manẓūm) of the word or the words, but by something that transcends the mere
arrangement of the words. The meaning is not carried by the word itself.57 Like
56 al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, vol. 3, p. 81, ll. 1–12; see also al-Āmidī, Muntahā as-sūʾl fī ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed.
by Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2003) p. 165, ll. 6–10; cf. Weiss:
The Search, p. 474; for a detailed discussion of legal implications in al-Āmidī’s work, see
Weiss, The Search, pp. 473–93.
57 Cf. Weiss, The Search, p. 473.

208 kalbarczyk
figure 5 Explicit and implicit signification in Āmidī’s Iḥkām

dalāla
manẓūm ġayr al-manẓūm = lā bi-ṣarīḥ ṣīġatihī
intended (maqṣūd) unintended (ġayr maqṣūd)
as a condition not as a condition dalālat al-išāra
dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ nuṭq dalālat al-mafhūm
tanbīh wa-īmāʾ mafhūm al-muwāfaqa mafhūm al-muḫālafa
Ġazālī and Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, Āmidī also distinguishes between an intended
and an unintended implicit meaning, the unintended meaning being some
kind of consequence of the main (and intended) meaning.58 He also refers to
the implicit meaning as being a condition for the truthfulness of the speaker
or the correctness of his statement. The logical counterpart, the implicit mean-
ing as a consequence of the statement, is not mentioned. Āmidī considers the
implication of dalālat at-tanbīh wa-l-īmāʾ or taʿlīl to be a special case because
the signified meaning remains to a certain degree in the realm of articulated
language/words. This is also the reason why Rāzī does not treat this case in his
chapter on implications and why Āmidī refers the reader to the qiyās section.59
In Āmidī’s scheme of legal signification the dichotomy of explicit versus
implicit signification is retained and all kinds of legal implications still remain
in one category, i.e. the ġayr manẓūm category (equivalent to lā bi-ṣarīḥ ṣīġatihī,
lit. [signification] does not occur on account of [the word’s] plain linguistic
form).
In his Muḫtaṣar al-Muntahā (an abridgment of his book Muntahā l-wuṣūl
wa-l-amal fī ʿilmay al-uṣūl wa-l-ǧadal, which is a summary of Āmidī’s Iḥkām60)
58 For the distinction between intended and unintended meaning, see Weiss, The Search,
p. 474.
59 Al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, vol. 3, p. 82, l. 14. Elsewhere he explicates that in the
dichotomy of manṭūq/ġayr manṭūq all five kinds of implication belong to the realm of
ġayr manṭūq, cf. al-Āmidī, Muntahā as-sūl fī ʿilm al-ūṣūl, p. 264, ll. 1–2.
60 Cf. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad ibn Ḫaldūn, al-Muqqadima (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān,
1970) [Reprint of the edition by Benjamin Duprat, Paris, 1858], vol. 3, pp. 22, ll. 18–20; there
the summary of Āmidī’s Iḥkām is referred to as al-Muḫtaṣar al-kabīr; see also Sherman
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

the Mālikī jurist Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (d. 646/1249) adopts Āmidī’s scheme with some
important and influential modifications:
Text 4
That which is articulated (in an explicit way) and that which is implied
(al-manṭūq wa-l-mafhūm):
[1.] The signification is explicit (manṭūq): this is what the expression sig-
nifies at the point of articulation (maḥall an-nuṭq).
[2.] That which is implied is in contrast to it, i.e. it is not [signified] at the
point of articulation (maḥall an-nuṭq).
[ad 1] The first [i.e. al-manṭūq] is
[1.1] ṣarīḥ (‘plain’)—it is that which the expression was posited for;
[1.2] ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ (‘not plain’) is in contrast to it; it is that which is
attached [to the meaning the expression was posited for] (mā yalzamu
ʿanhū).
[ad 1.2] If it [i.e. the attached meaning]
[1.2.1] is intended and [if ]
[1.2.1.1] the truthfulness (ṣidq) [of the speaker] or the correctness
[of the expression] rationally or legally depends on it, it is dalālat
iqtiḍāʾ—as for example ‘error (ḫataʾ) and forgetfulness (nisyān)
were removed (rufiʿa) from my community’, ‘Ask the village’
[Q 12:82], […]
[1.2.1.2] and if [the correctness] does not depend on it [i.e., on the
implied meaning] and if there is no explanation of it [i.e. the ruling]
while it is connected to a ruling, then it would be strange, it is tanbīh
wa-īmāʾ61—as will be dwelled on later;
[1.2.2] If it [i.e. the implied meaning] is not intended, it is dalālat
išāra, for example ‘women are lacking (nāqiṣāt) rationality and reli-
gion’. If you ask: In which way are they lacking their religion?—It is
said: ‘Each one of them remains for half of her lifetime (in the state
of) not praying’—it is not intended to state more than the monthly
period (ḥayḍ) and less than [the time of ] purity; however it follows
from this exaggeration to mention this [explanation].62
A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb Al-Dīn
al-Qarāfī (Leiden: Brill, 1996), p. 8, fn. 49.
61 Which is the same as taʿlīl, see footnote 6.
62 Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, Muḫtaṣar al-Muntahā, pp. 924–34, cf. Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, Kitāb Muntahā, pp. 147–8
and al-Āmidī, Muntahā, p. 165, ll. 6–10.

210 kalbarczyk
figure 6 Explicit and implicit signification in Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s Muḫtaṣar al-Muntahā

dalāla
intended unintended
dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ tanbīh wa-īmāʾ
Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s starting point is the dichotomy between explicit and implicit
speech for which he uses manṭūq and mafhūm. Like Āmidī he employs the dif-
ferentiation between ṣarīḥ and ġayr ṣarīḥ but he uses it to distinguish between
different kinds of explicitness in the realm of articulated speech (manṭūq)—
either causing an immediate or mediate understanding. Thus, ġayr ṣarīḥ
becomes a subcategory of manṭūq and is not equivalent to implicit speech
(mafhūm) anymore.63 That means that dalālat iqtiḍāʾ, tanbīh wa-īmāʾ and dalā-
lat išāra—which in relation to each other are differentiated according to Āmi-
dī’s criteria—do not belong to the category of implication (what would in the
present scheme be the mafhūm category and in Āmidī’s the ġayr manẓūm cate-
gory), but still to the manṭūq category. In Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s approach more kinds of
signification are classified as being in some way or other explicitly articulated
than in Āmidī’s understanding: The realm of explicit speech is extended while
the realm of implicit speech is reduced.
Therefore Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s classification is not a mere reproduction of Āmidī’s
classification.64
63 Gleave seems to suggest that ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ in Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s classification belongs to
mafhūm which seems prima facie plausible, but in fact Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s approach is slightly
different, cf. Gleave, Islam and Literalism, p. 53.
64 Yunis Ali indeed states that Ibn al-Ḥāǧib “applies the term manṭūq (what is said) in a
very broad sense”, Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, p. 185. According to him, this
approach goes back to al-Ǧuwaynī. Maybe he draws this conclusion from the fact that their
approach to mafḥūm is equivalent inasmuch as it only encompasses mafhūm muwāfaqa
and mafhūm muḫālafa, cf. Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī, al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. by
Ṣāliḥ b. Muḥammad b. ʿUwayḍa (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 165–6.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

What has changed is more than a simple shift of subclasses in the dichotomy
between explicit and implicit speech. This change gives the subclasses a differ-
ent status with regard to their epistemic value. Before elaborating on this ‘shift
of paradigm’, I will briefly outline one additional element in the development
of this classification. In his commentary to Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s Muḫtaṣar, the Šāfiʿī
ʿAḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī (d. 756/1355) brings in a new aspect, namely the threefold
classification of signification:
Text 5
I say:
[1.] That which is articulated (in an explicit way) (manṭūq) is divided into
[1.1] ṣarīḥ (‘plain’) and
[1.2] ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ (‘not plain’);
[ad 1.1] ṣarīḥ is that which the expression was posited for; hence it
signifies it [i.e. meaning] by way of congruence (muṭābaqa) or con-
tainment (taḍammun),
[ad 1.2] ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ, in contrast to that, it is that [meaning] which
the expression was not posited for but is attached to it; thus it signi-
fies by implication (iltizām).
Ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ is divided into [1.2.1] dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ and [1.2.2] īmāʾ
and [1.2.3] išāra; because it is either intended by the speaker or
not.65
ʿAḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī adopts the same classification as Ibn al-Ḥāǧib and com-
bines it with the threefold classification of signification: Whereas congruence
(muṭābaqa) and containment (taḍammun) are taken to be plain (ṣarīḥ) types
of signification, iltizām belongs to the ġayr ṣarīḥ type of signification; all three
now belong to the manṭūq category. In contrast to Rāzī’s scheme, iltizām is no
longer a genus for all kinds of legal implications but only for dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ,
dalālat al-išāra and tanbīh wa-l-īmāʾ (Rāzī did not classify the latter under ilti-
However, this does not say much about his manṭūq approach, which does not correspond
to Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s.
65 ʿAḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī, Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar al-Muntahā, ed. by Fādī Naṣīf and Ṭāriq Yaḥyā (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2000 [1421]), p. 254, ll. 1–4. For the impact of this work on later tra-
ditions, see Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni
Legal System (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998), pp. 97 ff.; Josef van Ess, Die
Träume der Schulweisheit. Leben und Werk des ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ǧurǧānī (gest. 816/1413)
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013), pp. 64f.

212 kalbarczyk
figure 7 Explicit and implicit signification in ʿAḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī’s Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar
al-Muntahā
dalāla
muṭābaqa taḍammun iltizām
intended unintended
dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ al-tanbīh wa-l-īmāʾ
zām).66 The two kinds of implication mafhūm al-muwāfaqa and mafhūm al-
muḫālafa are now no longer classified under the three kinds of implication.
This will become very relevant with regard to the question of the illegitimacy
of the argumentum e contrario in Ḥanafī reasoning.67 This scheme corresponds
to the scheme Baḥr al-ʿulūm calls ‘the Šāfiʿī classification’.
4 Parallel Development in Logical Works
ʿAḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī’s classification, which combines Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s jurispruden-

tial subdivision with the classification of three ways of signification, corre-
sponds to a parallel development in logical works, i.e. in the commentaries
and supercommentaries to Naǧm ad-dīn al-Kātibī’s (d. 657/1276) ar-Risāla aš-
šamsiyya. This is the view that the “meanings of meanings” are always based on
posited words and therefore always remain in the realm of articulated speech.
This view was eventually canonized by Šarīf al-Ǧurǧānī (gest. 816/1413) in his
encyclopedia Kitāb at-Taʿrīfāt.
66 See also Tāǧ ad-dīn as-Subkī, Rafʿ al-ḥāǧib ʿan Muḫtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, ed. by ʿAlī Muḥam-
mad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawǧūd (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1999), vol. 3,
p. 485.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

Both developments mark the end of a controversy that goes back to Faḫr
ad-dīn ar-Rāzī’s distinction between a congruent signification based on impo-
sition (waḍʿ) and signification by containment or implication which is based
on reasoning. In the first type the “meaning” (al-maʿnā) of an expression is
signified immediately; in the second “the meaning of the meaning” (maʿnā l-
maʿnā) has to be derived by a reasoning process (dalāla ʿaqliyya). As I have
shown elsewhere,68 the subsequent logical tradition struggles for the right
understanding of these three ways of signification:69 While [a] some schol-
ars supported Rāzī’s view that only the congruent kind of signification could
be called dalāla waḍʿiyya (‘signification based on imposition’), [b] others con-
sidered both the signification by congruence and by containment to be dalāla
waḍʿiyya. Both positions can be traced back to different passages from Ibn Sīnā’s
œuvre.
Eventually position [c] became widely accepted: All three ways of signi-
fication can be regarded as dalāla waḍʿiyya. The ‘signification based on rea-
soning’ (dalāla ʿaqliyya), in contrast, is conceptualized in a different man-
ner: here the implication process is not based on verbal language any more
but on indications such as signs, gestures and mere sounds (like breathing
as a sign for someone’s presence behind a curtain).70 Iltizām still refers to
an implication (iltizām) in which the ‘meaning of the meaning’ is signified.
The meaning of the meaning is also based on the fact that an expression was
posited for a meaning—for it is this meaning from which a further meaning
is understood; but this is not an immediate understanding. It is through the
transmission of the Šamsiyya commentaries by Quṭb ad-dīn ar-Rāzī at-Taḥtānī
(d. 766/1365) and its canonization by Šarīf al-Ǧurǧānī that this position gains
acceptance.
5 Objections to Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s approach
The Ḥanafī jurist Akmal ad-dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Bābartī (d. 786/
1384) defends Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s classification in his supercommentary ar-Rudūd
wa-n-nuqūd: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, which is based on Iṣfahānī’s Bayān

69 Sometimes this debate is also introduced into uṣūl al-fiqh works, see for example Taqī ad-
dīn as-Subkī and Tāǧ ad-dīn as-Subkī, Ibhāǧ fī Šarḥ al-Minhāǧ, ed. by Šaʿbān Muḥammad
Ismāʿīl (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kullīyāt al-Azharīyah, 1981), vol. 1, p. 203 f.
70 Cf. Kalbarczyk, Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie.

214 kalbarczyk
al-Muḫtaṣar.71 Objections were brought forward, for example, by the Šāfiʿī ʿAlāʾ
ad-dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 729/1329)72 whom Bābartī quotes:
Text 6
Šayḫ ʿAlāʾ ad-dīn al-Qūnawī doubted that ġayr ṣarīḥ (‘not plain’) belongs
to manṭūq […], since he said: The first one is ṣarīḥ, and it is that for which
the expression was posited. But ġayr ṣarīḥ is contrary to it […]. The fact
that he said ‘ġayr ṣarīḥ is contrary to it’ indicates that it must be a differ-
ent category than manṭūq. Therefore the signification of the expression is
divided into three parts: [1.] manṭūq, this is ṣarīḥ, and [2.] mafhūm, which
is the opposite of manṭūq, and [3.] ġayr ṣarīḥ, which is also the opposite
of each one of them [i.e. of manṭūq and mafhūm]. There is no difference
(wa-lā tafriqa) between the parts of ġayr ṣarīḥ (namely iqtiḍāʾ, tanbīh
and išāra) and mafhūm (namely [to understand] striking from insulting)
with regard to the fact that the signification of the expression is such that
something external to that for which the expression was posited is signi-
fied.73
According to the objection by the Šāfiʿite al-Qūnawī it is impossible to under-

stand ‘not plain’ (ġayr ṣarīḥ) as being some kind of explicit/articulated (man-
ṭūq) signification; rather, he equates manṭūq with ‘plain’ (ṣarīḥ) and its coun-
terpart mafhūm with ġayr ṣarīḥ since they share the same qualifications. This
understanding amounts to that of Āmidī who considers all legal implications
to be some kind of ġayr ṣarīḥ signification.
However the view that these kinds of signification are to be regarded as legal
implications—and hence as mediate, rather than immediate, significations—
is a distinctive Šāfiʿite view and is (obviously) not shared by Ibn al-Ḥāǧib. In the
71 Cf. the editor’s introduction to Šams ad-dīn al-Iṣfahānī, Bayān al-Muḫtaṣar: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar
Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, ed. by Muḥammad Maẓhur Baqā (Mekka: Ǧāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1986), p. 25;
cf. also the editor’s introduction to Akmal ad-dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Bābartī, ar-
Rudūd wa-n-nuqūd: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, ed. by Tarḥīb b. Rabīʿān ad-Dawsrī (Riyāḍ:
Maktabat ar-Rušd Nāširūn, 2005), vol. 1, p. 63.
72 For Šāfiʿī ʿAlāʾ ad-dīn al-Qūnawī, see Livnat Holtzmann, “The Dhimmi’s Question on Pre-
determination and the Ulama’s Six Responses: The Dynamics of Composing Polemical
Didactic Poems in Mamluk Cairo and Damascus”, Mamluk Studies Review vol. 16 (2012):
pp. 36–7.
73 Al-Bābartī, ar-Rudūd wa-n-nuqūd, vol. 2, p. 355, ll. 12–20.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

Šāfiʿite dichotomy between manṭūq and mafhūm, the first one is considered to
have a greater epistemological value, it “is stronger (aqwā) than mafhūm”.74
Opposed to the Šāfiʿite scheme is the Ḥanafite scheme which does not have
a dichotomous understanding. Rather it differentiates in a hierarchy between
four different levels of signification (and certainty), namely ʿibārat an-naṣṣ
(in the broadest sense it amounts to the Šāfiʿite manṭūq category), išārat an-
naṣṣ (amounts to dalālat al-išāra), dalālat an-naṣṣ (amounts to mafhūm al-
muwāfaqa) and iqtiḍāʾ an-naṣṣ (amounts to dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ). In the Ḥanafite
explanation of these hermeneutical methods and techniques there is a ten-
dency to declare certain meanings as intuitively and immediately understood
by all who are proficient in Arabic—rules for deriving certain meanings or
epistemological objections put forward by Šāfiʿite scholars would thus become
superfluous.
With regard to mafhūm al-muwāfaqa or dalālat an-naṣṣ the Ḥanafite Niẓām
ad-dīn al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī writes that the meaning or the ḥukm “is intuitively
(badīhī) understandable for the person in command of the [Arabic] language
(li-l-ʿārif bi-l-luġa)”75 while the person “who considers this [i.e. mafhūm al-
muwāfaqa] to be an analogy claims that this is not a signification by the means
of language (luġatan) or usage (ʿurfan), but that the ḥukm follows from the exis-
tence of the ʿilla”.76 The Ḥanafite objection also applies to the categorization of
dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ: in this case, as Niẓām ad-dīn argues, “an expression is implied
in the arrangement of the words (muqaddar fī naẓm al-kalām) which signifies
according to one of the ways of signification—so how should it be ‘not plain’
(ġayr ṣarīḥ)?”77
On the one hand there is the tendency to locate certain kinds of significa-
tion in the realm of language, i.e. in the semantic realm where one can grasp
these meanings with an “ordinary linguistic competence”78—in the hermeneu-
tical procedure these meanings are regarded as legitimate and as bringing for-
ward certain knowledge. On the other hand there is the tendency to declare
certain meanings as being—in one way or another, for example by analogy—
derived and therefore of a derivative epistemological value. While the first
tendency, which can be labeled the Ḥanafite paradigm, allows for a greater
74 Cf. al-Āmidī, Muntahā, p. 149, l. 7.

75 Al-Laknawī, Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt, vol. 1, p. 446, ll. 22–3.
76 Al-Laknawī, Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt, vol. 1, p. 447, ll. 21–2.
77 Al-Laknawī, Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt, vol. 1, p. 449, l. 35.
78 Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, p. 50, cf. Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of
Islamic Law, p. 18.

216 kalbarczyk
exegetical latitude in the legal practice, the latter—the Šāfiʿite paradigm—is

prone to narrowing the exegetical leeway.79
The approach of the Mālikī jurist Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, who transfers most of the
kinds of signification that in the Šāfiʿite scheme belonged to the mafhūm cat-
egory to the manṭūq category, is more in line with the Ḥanafite paradigm.
Nonetheless, Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s scheme was—in the modified version by Īǧī—
of utmost importance for the Šāfiʿite uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. This scheme is
quoted by the Ḥanafī Niẓām ad-dīn al-Anṣārī al-Laknawī (1225/1810) as the
standard Šāfiʿī approach (which is still in use today),80 as I have pointed out
at the beginning of this paper. After having outlined this scheme he refers—
anachronistically—to Bayḍāwī’s Minhāǧ al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl which is not in
accordance with this later scheme. Bayḍāwī’s Minhāǧ and Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s Muḫ-
taṣar generated two different commentary traditions that were parallel to each
other. This means that the two different approaches to legal implications (Bay-
ḍāwī’s on the one hand and Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s on the other) existed side by side and
were discussed and justified in the respective commentaries—in some cases
this was even done by one and the same scholar who commented on both
works and on both approaches.81 It is in Subkī’s commentary on the Minhāǧ
where both approaches were discussed—and here Subkī finally accepted Ibn
al-Ḥāǧib’s classification which then was established as the Šāfiʿī classification.82
Niẓām ad-dīn however disputes both al-Bayḍāwī’s old classification of Ibn
al-Ḥāǧib’s and Īǧī’s new classification. For him the old one could not be right
because it is evident that all three ways of signification, i.e. congruence (muṭā-
baqa), containment (taḍammun) and implication (iltizām), are within the
frame of posited language and thus must belong to the manṭūq category. The
new one must be criticized on the grounds that it classifies dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ
under al-manṭūq al-ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ—according to Niẓām ad-dīn it is a very plain,
congruent and immediate kind of signification.83 This approach is in accor-
dance with the Ḥanafite paradigm which displays “optimism as to the workings
of language”.84
79 Cf. Weiss, The Search, p. 481.

80 See for example az-Zuhaylī, al-Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islamī, vol. 1, p. 360.
81 See for example Šams ad-dīn al-Iṣfahānī, Bayān al-Muḫtaṣar; al-Iṣfahānī, Šarḥ al-Minhāǧ
li-l-Bayḍāwī fī ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed. by ʿAbd al-Karīm b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad an-Namla (Riyāḍ:
Maktabat ar-rušd, 1999); Tāǧ ad-dīn as-Subkī, Rafʿ al-ḥāǧib ʿan Muḫtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib; as-
Subkī, Ibhāǧ fī Šarḥ al-Minhāǧ.
82 As-Subkī, Ibhāǧ fī Šarḥ al-Minhāǧ, vol. 1, p. 368, ll. 3–4.
83 See al-Laknawī, Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt, vol. 1, p. 449, l. 31–p. 450, l. 2.
84 Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, p. 109.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to inquire into the different stages which lead up
to the “standard” Šāfʿī approach to implicit implication. The first important
stage in this development is the system of legal hermeneutics in Faḫr ad-dīn
ar-Rāzī’s Maḥṣūl. He uses one of the three ways of signification, namely impli-
cation (dalālat al-iltizām) which also plays a vital role in his logical works, as
a generic term for four Šāfiʿī kinds of implications: (1.) dalālat al-iqtiḍāʾ, (2.)
dalālat al-išāra, (3.) mafhūm al-muwāfaqa and (4.) mafhūm al-muḫālafa. Faḫr
ad-dīn outlines this classification regardless of whether he himself considers
the respective kind of signification to be an iltizām implication or some kind
of qiyās (as in the case of mafhūm al-muwāfaqa), or whether he considers it to
be a valid kind of legal reasoning in the first place (as in the case of mafhūm al-
muḫālafa). Dalālat al-iltizām functions for him as a comprehensive hermeneu-
tical toolbox which encompasses competing approaches. Subsequent uṣūlīs do
not adopt his hermeneutical toolbox in this form but elaborate upon it in quite
an insightful way: Bayḍāwī in his Minhāǧ, for instance, accepts Faḫr ad-dīn’s
systematization to a certain extent, while still retaining mafhūm as a generic
term.
The dichotomy manṭūq/mafhūm is passed on from scholar to scholar. How-
ever, in Ibn al-Ḥāǧib’s Muḫtaṣar al-Muntahā a paradigm shift takes place. So
far this has not received much attention. Instead, scholars and commentators
then and now reacted in one of the following ways: they found the new classifi-
cation incomprehensible (for example the Šāfiʿī scholar ʿAlāʾ ad-dīn al-Qūnawī,
d. 729/1329, or the Islamicist Yunis Ali); or they adopted the new classifica-
tion silently (like the Šāfiʿī ʿAḍud ad-dīn al-Īǧī, d. 756/1355) or loudly (such as
the Ḥanafī Akmal ad-dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Bābartī, d. 786/1384); or
they did not discern any change in Ibn al-Ḥāǧīb’s classification with regard to
the former classification of Āmidī. Indeed, Ibn al-Ḥāǧib—just like Āmidī—
labeled legal implications as “not plain” (ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ), which indicates that
the implied meanings and legal rulings are not signified by the mere form of
the word itself. However, in contrast to Āmidī, who equated “not plain” (ġayr
aṣ-ṣarīḥ) with mafhūm and subsumed all kinds of implications under it, for
the Mālikī Ibn al-Ḥāǧib the category “not plain” (ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ) now does not
belong to mafhūm, the realm of implicit speech, any more but to manṭūq,
the realm of explicit speech. Ibn al-Ḥāǧib pours out the toolbox and arranges
everything in a new way: The dichotomy “explicit speech” (manṭūq = ṣarīḥ)
vs. “implicit speech” (mafhūm = ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ) shifts its contents and turns
to “explicit speech” (manṭūq = ṣarīḥ and ġayr aṣ-ṣarīḥ) vs. “implicit speech”
(mafhūm = almost empty), whereas the latter one comprises only two kinds of

218 kalbarczyk
implication, mafhūm al-muwāfaqa and mafhūm al-muḫālafa, because all other

types were subsumed under manṭūq.
This synthesis ultimately became accepted in the Šāfiʿī school. The relevance
of this shift can be summarized as follows: in the dichotomy between manṭūq
and mafhūm, the uṣūlīs from the Šāfiʿī and Mālikī school had considered the
first category to have a higher status with regard to epistemological certainty;
thus, the transfer of certain kinds of implication to the category of “explicit
speech” means first of all an upgrade in the epistemological hierarchy.
Bibliography
al-Āmidī, Sayf ad-dīn. al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. Ed. ʿAbd ar-Razzāq ʿAfīfī. Riyāḍ: Dār
aṣ-Ṣumayʿī, 2003.
al-Āmidī, Sayf ad-dīn. Muntahā as-sūʾl fī ʿilm al-uṣūl. Ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī. Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2003.
al-Bābartī, Akmal ad-dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd. ar-Rudūd wa-n-nuqūd: Šarḥ Muḫ-
taṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, vol. 1. ed. by Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAwn al-ʿUmarī; vol. 2 ed. by Tarḥīb b. Rabīʿān
ad-Dawsrī. Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-Rušd Nāširūn, 2005.
al-Bāqillānī, Qāḍī Abū Bakr. at-Taqrīb wa-l-iršād. Ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd.
Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risāla, 1998.
al-Baṣrī, Abū l-Ḥusayn. Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīd Allāh.
Damascus: al-Maʿhad al-ʿilmī l-faransī li-d-dirāsāt al-ʿarabiyya, 1964–1965.
Bauer, Thomas. Die Kultur der Ambiguität. Eine andere Geschichte des Islams. Berlin:
Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2011.
al-Bayḍāwī, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar. Minhāǧ al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl. Ed. Salīm Šabʿāniyya.
Damascus: Dār Dāniya, 1989.
al-Bazdawī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad. Kanz al-wuṣūl ilā maʿrifat al-uṣūl (with al-Buḫārī’s
commentary Kašf al-asrār). Ed. Aḥmad Ḫulūṣī and Muṣṭafā Darwīš. Istanbul, 1890–
1.
Bernand, Marie. “Controverses Médiévales sur le Dalīl al-Ḫiṭāb”. Arabica, vol. 33, no. 3
(Nov. 1986): pp. 269–94.
Endress, Gerhard. “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa: Intellectual Genealogies and
Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East”. In Ara-
bic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of
Richard M. Frank, ed. by James E. Montgomery, pp. 371–422. Leuven: Peeters, 2006.
van Ess, Josef. Die Träume der Schulweisheit. Leben und Werk des ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-
Ǧurǧānī (gest. 816/1413). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013.
Ǧamāl ad-dīn, Muṣṭafā. al-Baḥṯ an-naḥwī ʿinda l-uṣūliyyīn. Baghdad: Dār ar-Rašīd li-n-
našr, 1980.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

al-Ġazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl. Ed. Ḥamza b. Zuhayr
Ḥāfiẓ. Medina: Šarikat al-Madīna al-munawwara li-ṭ-ṭibāʿa wa-n-našr, 1993.
al-Ġazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. Šifāʾ al-ġalīl fī bayān aš-šubah wa-l-muḫīl wa masā-
lik at-taʿlīl. Ed. Ḥamd al-Kabīsī. Baghdad: al-Maṭbaʿa l-iršād, 1971.
Gleave, Robert. Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal
Theory. Edinburgh: University Press, 2013.
al-Ǧurǧānī, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad aš-Šarīf. Kitāb at-Taʿrīfāt. Ed. unknown Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa
al-Ḫayriyya, 1888.
Gutas, Dimitri. “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–
ca 1350”. In Avicenna and his Heritage, ed. by Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet,
pp. 81–97. Leuven: University Press, 2002.
Gutas, Dimitri. “Avicenna’s philosophical project”. In Interpreting Avicenna: Critical
Essays, ed. by Peter Adamson, pp. 28–47. Cambridge: University Press, 2013.
al-Ǧuwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn. al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Ed. Ṣāliḥ b. Muḥammad b.
ʿUwayḍa. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1997.
al-Ǧuwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn. at-Talḫīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismaʿīl.
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2003.
Gwynne, Rosalind. “The A Fortiori Argument in Fiqh, Naḥw and Kalām”. In Studies
in the History of Arabic Grammar II. Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on the His-
tory of Arabic Grammar, Nijmwegen, 27. April–1. May 1987, ed. by Kees Versteegh and
Michael G. Carter, pp. 165–77. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company, 1990.
Hallaq, Wael B. “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās”. Arabica, vol. 36
(1989): pp. 286–306.
Hallaq, Wael B. A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī uṣūl al-fiqh.
Cambridge: University Press, 1997.
Hasan, Ahmad. “Finding the Cause of a Legal Injunction in Islamic Jurisprudence”.
Islamic Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (1986): pp. 11–44.
Holtzmann, Livnat. “The Dhimmi’s Question on Predetermination and the Ulama’s
Six Responses: The Dynamics of Composing Polemical Didactic Poems in Mamluk
Cairo and Damascus”. Mamluk Studies Review, vol. 16 (2012): pp. 1–54.
Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, Ǧamāl ad-dīn. Kitāb Muntahā al-wuṣūl wa-l-amal fī ʿilmay al-uṣūl wa-l-
ǧadal. Ed. unknown. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1985.
Ibn al-Ḥāǧib, Ǧamāl ad-dīn. Muḫtaṣar al-muntahā fī s-sūʾl wa-l-amal fī ʿilmay al-uṣūl
wa-l-ǧadal. Ed. Naẓīr Ḥamādū. Algiers: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2006.
Ibn Ḫaldūn, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad. al-Muqqadima. Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān,
1970. [Reprint of the edition by Benjamin Duprat, Paris, 1858].
Ibn Ḫallikān, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad. Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān. Ed.
Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār aṯ-ṯaqāfa, 1968–72.
Ibn Sāʿātī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. Kitāb al-Badīʿ. Ed. Muṣṭafā Maḥmūd al-Azharī and Muḥam-
mad Ḥusayn ad-Dimyāṭī. Riyāḍ/Cairo: Dār Ibn al-Qayyim/ Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 2014.

220 kalbarczyk
Ibn Sīnā. Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Madḫal. Ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr and Ǧurǧ Qanawātī
et al. Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿĀmma li-Šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-Amīriyya, 1952.
al-Īǧī, ʿAḍud ad-dīn. Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar al-Muntahā (with glosses by Taftazānī and Ǧur-
ǧānī). Ed. Fādī Naṣīf and Ṭāriq Yaḥyā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2000.
al-Iṣfahānī, Šams ad-dīn. Bayān al-Muḫtaṣar: Šarḥ Muḫtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib. Ed. Muḥam-
mad Maẓhur Baqā. Makka: Ǧāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1986.
al-Iṣfahānī, Šams ad-dīn. Šarḥ al-Minhāǧ li-l-Bayḍāwī fī ʿilm al-uṣūl. Ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm
b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad an-Namla. Riyāḍ: Maktabat ar-rušd, 1999 [1420].
Jackson, Sherman A. Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shi-
hāb Al-Dīn al-Qarāfī. Leiden: Brill, 1996.
Kalbarczyk, Nora. Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie. Die avicennische
Klassifikation der Bezeichnung bei Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, forthcoming, Leiden: Brill,
2018.
Kalbarczyk, Nora. “The Threefold Classification of Signification: Aspects of the Origins
of muṭābaqa, taḍammun and iltizām in al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s Treatises on De
Interpretatione and the Predicables”, forthcoming.
Kamali, Mohammad H. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Cambridge: Islamic Texts
Society, 32013.
al-Laknawī, Niẓām ad-dīn al-Anṣārī. Fawātiḥ ar-raḥamūt bi-šarḥ Musallam aṯ-ṯubūt. Ed.
ʿAbdallah Maḥmūd Muḥammad ʿUmar. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2002.
al-Qarāfī, Šihāb ad-dīn. Nafāʾis al-uṣūl fī šarḥ al-Maḥṣūl. Ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir
ʿAṭā. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2000.
Ramić, Šukrija H. Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law. Cambridge: The
Islamic Texts Society, 2003.
ar-Rāzī, Faḫr ad-dīn. al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh. Ed. Ṭaha Ǧābir Fayāḍ al-ʿAlwānī.
Riyāḍ: Ǧāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad b. Suʿūd al-Islāmiyya, 1979.
ar-Rāzī, Faḫr ad-dīn. at-Tafsīr al-kabīr aw Mafātīḥ al-ġayb, vol. 1–33. Ed. Ibrāhīm Šams
ad-dīn and Aḥmad Šams ad-din. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2013.
ar-Rāzī, Faḫr ad-dīn. Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt, al-Manṭiq. Ed. ʿAlī Reẓā Naǧafzādeh.
Teheran: Anǧomān-e Āṯār va-Mofāḫer Farhangī, 2005.
Stewart, Devin J. Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal
System. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998.
Street, Tony. “Faḫraddīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique of Avicennan Logic”. In Logik und Theologie.
Das Organon im Arabischen und im Lateinischen Mittelalter, ed. by Dominik Perler
and Ulrich Rudolph, pp. 99–116. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
as-Subkī, Tāǧ ad-dīn. Rafʿ al-ḥāǧib ʿan Muḫtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāǧib. Ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad
Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawǧūd. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1999.
as-Subkī, Tāǧ ad-dīn and As-Subkī, Taqī ad-dīn. Ibhāǧ fī Šarḥ al-Minhāǧ. Ed. Šaʿbān
Muḥammad Ismāʿīl. Cairo: Maktabat al-Kullīyāt al-Azharīyah, 1981 [1401].
as-Suyūṭī, Ǧalāl ad-dīn. Kitāb Buġyat al-wuʿāt. Ed. Muḥammad Amīn Ḥānǧī and Aḥmad
b. al-Amīn Šinqīṭī. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat as-Saʿāda, 1908.
Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221

Vishanoff, David R. The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists
Imagined a Revealed Law. New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 2011.
Weiss, Bernard G. The Search for God’s Law. Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf
al-Dīn al-Āmidī. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 22010.
Yunis Ali, Mohamed M. Medieval Islamic Pragmatics: Sunni Legal Theorists’ Models of
Textual Communication. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000.
az-Zuhaylī, Wahba. al-Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islamī. Damascus: Dār al-fikr, 1986.
Zysow, Aron. The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal
Theory. Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013.


Explicitly Said or Only Implied PDF

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Explicitly Said or Only Implied PDF

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Oriens 46 (2018) 186–221