Villavicencio vs Lukban

Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al
deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their
knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October
25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their
jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons
according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be
brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of
court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted
with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing
her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

YICK WO VS. HOPKINS

Facts
Yick Wo was imprisoned for operating a laundry in a wooden building in violation of a San Francisco statute. That statute vested in the board of
supervisors the discretion to grant or withhold licenses to operate laundries in wooden buildings. Yick Wo had operated the laundry in the same building
for 22 years and fire wardens and safety inspectors had inspected the premises and found them safe. The board denied licenses to all Chinese-
American applicants but denied only one of 80 non-Chinese Americans.
Yick Wo was fined ten dollars and was imprisoned for failing to pay. Yick Wo sued the Supreme Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus and the
Court found that the board of supervisors had acted within the scope of its authority and denied the petition. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.

Issues

1. May a city enforce an ordinance in a racially discriminatory manner?

2. Does a law or ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
Holding and Rule (Matthews)
1. No. A city may not enforce ordinances in a racially discriminatory manner.
2. Yes. A law or ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
If the statute were discriminatory on its face the court would have applied strict scrutiny. In this case however the statute was not discriminatory on its
face and the court looked to rational basis. The statute was ostensibly intended to reduce the risk of fire; however the court also noted that only Chinese
laundries were affected by the statute. The court concluded that the statute was intended to reduce Chinese laundries rather than the risk of fire and
ruled that the statute was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade

aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process

the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

the Act violates international and treaty obligations

the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the
Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued
by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an
enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American
occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military
force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even
during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating
them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to
annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the
occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the
court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said
should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force
from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT
CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of
Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the
laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate
the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and
maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a
government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:36 PM
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice and
corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the
conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.

RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said
contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law,
by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.