Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

Facts: March 8, 1995 – Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. March
23, 1995 – Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet
the residency requirement. March 29, 1995 – Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELEC‘s head office in Intramuros claiming that her
error in the first certificate was the result of an ―honest misrepresentation‖ and that she
has always ―maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. April 24, 1995 –
COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found
Montejo‘s petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos‘ corrected certificate of
candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled. May 7, 1995 – COMELEC en banc
denied Marcos‘ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24. May 11,
1995 – COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos‘ proclamation to the office
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes.
However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended
even if she did win. May 25, 1995 – In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she
was the winner of the said Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus
candidate, of the first district of Leyte. Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution‘s residency qualification requirement (as intended
by the framer‘s of the constitution)2. The confusion of the ―honest mistake made when
filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence
is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence
where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest
mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The
instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used
by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their
marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voter‘s
registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be
argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the
CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husband‘s right
to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation
does not mean or intend to lose the wife‘s domicile of origin. After the death of her
husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the
PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and
their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the
House of Representatives. Yes. The mischief in petitioner‘s contention lies in the fact that
our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In
any event, Sections 6. 2) As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by
Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986. 3) The husband shall fix
the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband
if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 4) The husband and wife are
obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over
the question of the petitioner‘s qualifications after the elections. No. The HRET‘s
jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.