CASE DIGEST

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146

SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in
a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners
on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file
an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
Issues:
Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision
Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190
of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for... the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due
to the lack of necessary repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the
"last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the
tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine... of "last clear chance", which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
Basa vs Mercado Case Digest

Persons and Family Relations GR No. L- 42226 :

Facts: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30,
1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him
the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration proceedings. On
April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said
proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter
because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of
hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim
that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied
with in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication
of the required notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the
hearing on the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and
the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the
first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants
also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in
which the notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga.

Issues: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to the sec.
630 of Code of Civil Procedure?

Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of general circulation?

Held: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for
three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first
publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the
hearing. The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view
of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information;
that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular
intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made inIng Katipunan precisely
because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The law
does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a
newspaper of general circulation.
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F.
BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two
children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati,
which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in his
bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge had
been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent
instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.

After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the
affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married
to Zenaida Ongkiko.

The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was
celebrated twice without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to
De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California was because he believed in good
faith and for all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without
marriage license.

He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case
because his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd
relationship was 1991 under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his
act to cohabit with De Castro

Held:

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practiceof
law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko,
he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student
would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when
he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the CivilCode or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule
of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 to his case.
CASE DIGEST

Article 4, Vested right, defined

QUIAO vs. QUIAO; GR No. 176556, July 4, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao. The RTC rendered the decision declaring the separation of the mentioned parties.
The custody of the minor children was awarded to Rita. Their properties were to be divided
equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. However, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children. He was further
ordered to reimburse the sum of P19,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of
P5,000.00.

Petitioner claimed that his vested rights over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership was violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children.

ISSUE:

What is the concept of “vested right” from the perspective of the due process clause?

Was petitioner’s “vested right” over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership
violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Article 63 (2)
and 129 of the Family Code?

RULING:

No.

In the en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, it was
explained that:

The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process
that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.

Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. From the foregoing, it is clear that while
one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.

First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her.

Second, when the Decision was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial
court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7)
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.