A.

Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional

G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the
limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render
judgment thereon.1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9
July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a

house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with
Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas
(Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita,
for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth
that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses
would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt

dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR,
she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her
that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions.
Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce
check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting
from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When the check was deposited with
the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account
was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay.
Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money
was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of
the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the
purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in
possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the
said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned
amount of P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea
of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo
City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
with the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector

Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner
described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion
Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the
amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from
the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the
pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under
which he was accused in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by
the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a
Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari12 before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to
file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9
February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court,
with the following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO

PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A

PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT
OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati
City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was
dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was
signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct
proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The
only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check
provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any
of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to
Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth –
who was the offended party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not satisfy the requirement of
prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the
demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount
of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was
actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not
proven to be that of petitioner’s.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed
a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit
its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23
September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional
period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as
charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial
court with respect to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of
trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the
Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece
of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to
weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand"
was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth
suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of
Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s
signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive
clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review
of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this
general rule, as follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding
as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense
of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own
personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the
amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her
believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually,
private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without
citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on
conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established
by the prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to
present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible
scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not
warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that
the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the
following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City
because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not
inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the
BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his
argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of
prosecution’s evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate
his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence,
Hector’s allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear
to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the
factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court
remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on review.17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it
must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the
prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the
trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that

he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by
the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However,
aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution
presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn
statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged
was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the
subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,
P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on
October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the
certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum
scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by
Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the
elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12,
1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling
the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of
Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense
of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume
the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently,
the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's
house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume
was able to induce Yu to part with his money.

xxx
 From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the
offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC
of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR

TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to
transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to
pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY.
HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering
aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a

check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the
sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada
Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason:
ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is
demand by the offended party to the offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to
where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was
allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will
work for the Deed of Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital
gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial
as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go
over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you
said Atty. Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty.
Treñas by you, what happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a
bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315,
par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered
motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court
by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner
and form prescribed by law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to
move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was
committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and
other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where,
due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner
was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city
has no jurisdiction over the case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility
strongly militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules
16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.1âwphi1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as
for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the money was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due
or upon demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground
for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that
petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation
should include an order to immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with
the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the
Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007

MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 21275 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip" to
the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isip’s conviction for
Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite
City, and its Amended Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the
RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from
Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for
the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the
sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein
accused once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and
with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and
notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the
jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of
₱200,000.00, Philippine Currency. 3
Petitioner’s wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84,
156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No.
146-84 reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the
amount of ₱562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received from
Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the drawee bank for payment was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, accused refused and still refuses
to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the
above-stated amount of ₱562,000.00, Philippine Currency.4

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense was
committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other
informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check

147-84 17 March 1984 518644 ₱50,000.00

148-84 30 March 1984 518645 ₱50,000.00

149-84 12 March 1984 0300865 ₱150,000.00

155-84 25 March 1984 518674 ₱95,000.00

156-84 29 March 1984 518646 ₱90,000.00

157-84 1 April 1984 518669 ₱25,000.00

The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of
Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, received from one Leonardo A.
Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings
valued at ₱120,000.00, with the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and
deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21,
1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by means of false
pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their
own personal use and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669,
dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount of ₱90,000 and
₱25,000, respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose
for the redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in the
abovestated amount of ₱120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6
Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and
agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment
thereof, the four other informations are similarly worded. The specifics thereof are as
follows:

Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date of Check No./Date Amount
Jewelry Receipt Return
257-84 030086/03-12-84 ₱150,000
₱150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84
260-84 518647/03-25-84 ₱95,000
₱95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
261-84 518672/03-27-84 ₱562,000
₱562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
378-84 518644/03-17-84 ₱50,000
₱200,000 02-03-84 -
518645/03-30-84 ₱50,000

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There
being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the
parties’ respective briefs, are the following:

i) Prosecution Version. –

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by complainant’s father,
Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in
the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués (pp.
8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced
complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14,
ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly – that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant

spouses received from complainant a 6 carat men’s ring valued at ₱200,000.00 with the
condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis for
₱200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if sold
on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead,
Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively,
for ₱50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was
acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular men’s ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while
Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30,
respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant’s residence in
Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of
south sea pearls with diamond worth ₱150,000.00. The condition was that the proceeds
be turned over to complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March
30, 1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs.
Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for ₱150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as
payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in
Cavite City and got from the latter a men’s ring (7 carats) worth ₱200,000.00. Mr. Isip
signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold,
on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension
which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp.
41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa
against Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1)
Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds valued at ₱120,000.00. As with
their previous agreement, the item was to be returned or the proceeds of the sale be
delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs.
Isip issued two (2) personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29,
1984 for ₱90,000.00 and ₱25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring
(p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and
Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta
Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of complainant
and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace
worth ₱95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the
condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March
27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647)
dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa
against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant informing him
that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was
the most opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs.
Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit ‘O’) acknowledging the value
thereof to the tune of ₱562,000.00.

Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered on
March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit ‘O’, Mrs. Isip issued a
postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱562,000.00
as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and
Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14,
tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Demand
letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his
residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero
Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street,
Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964
(Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and
Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr.,
Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) – appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business;
while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX goods,
real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr.,
10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining
jewelry from losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for
financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr.,
Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital,
he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza
Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19).
Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila,
appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who participated only as a witness,
started having transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February, March
and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged
jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr.,
Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several
checks to complainant as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry which have
either been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had
conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and
antics, and real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant
who caused the same to be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his
wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the
obligations of appellants to complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23;
Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta
issued which were initially dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr.,
3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against
appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid
checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not bring them (Tr.,
3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment and
complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the
pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid
any misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not
comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with
complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document acknowledging obligations to him in
one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants
learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in Manila, complainant filed
the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7

On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion thereof
reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84,
147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of
Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱120,000.00 for the value of the articles misappropriated;
Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of
₱150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of,
from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱562,000.00; Crim.
Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12)
years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose
the amount of ₱200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of
Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount
of ₱200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs.8

In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose’s ancestral
house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs
where he was connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its allegations
that the transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip
that the money with which the complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions
was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted the defense’s
claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the
defense’s contention, that the obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover
to complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to human
nature to demand payment when the same had already been made and the alleged
set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably and subsequently dismissed
upon motion of the City Prosecutor’s Office at the instance of the complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of
jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner,
the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 finding him to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved
in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a
7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following
as errors:

-I-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE

CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE
GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.

- II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW,
ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE
GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.

- IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND

MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED
UPON THEM AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR
GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY
INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch
XVII) –

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence
imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
that the sum of ₱200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear
interest at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid;

2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged;
and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the sums of
₱120,000.00, ₱150,000.00, ₱95,000.00, ₱562,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 representing the
amounts involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid.10
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the venue was properly laid and
that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired
at complainant’s ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses
charged took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the
charges on the ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984,
the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry Circular No.
4 of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84),
the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for
the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the
defense’s claim of redemption/dacion en pago – that real and personal properties were
conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal
of some of the cases – to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though
novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as
long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In these five cases, it
ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases. Consequently,
the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,11 but held them liable to
complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling of conviction. It found petitioner’s claims that he did not
receive the jewelry worth ₱200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt he
issued for said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon him to sign
under threat of criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his
friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive.

On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased wife,
Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction
in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with
Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12

On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta M.
Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the
following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of
the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows:

"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED,
accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged and the civil aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13

Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He
raises the following issues:

First – WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;

Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER

RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE
CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID
OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not
altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements
of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he
states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the
transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur that simply because complainant
had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and
had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual residents of
Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He
adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is likewise
inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and received by
petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if
any, may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not follow that
because complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs, the
transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts
that there is no competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed in
Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case
136-84 covering roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged
leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is

jurisdictional.14 The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.15 It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.16

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the
venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown
that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral
home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence17 from the Bureau of
Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task
to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations
applies.18

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that
the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife
actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction
was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far
from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can
procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It
is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but
twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of
jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioner’s late
wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in
Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not
entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the
trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial
evidence.19 It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon
this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the
trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold
that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in Cavite
City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the ring
subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously
flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not
due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the
fact remains that there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner
insists there is no competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on
record. The acknowledgment receipt21 executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that
he received the ring in question. Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and
merely executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant
deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation
of what he executed and signed. The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily
against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private
transactions have been fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has
been followed 22Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner understood
fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon
him then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so.
Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship
with complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is
clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt when he
received the ring from complainant in Cavite City.

Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied by the
testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7
March 1984.24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same
occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal
liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84,
the same was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient
to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the
fact that complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some
of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation
as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of
receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same
under threat of prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the
Court should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said case because
the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to
preserve their good relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a
reason to deny the application of the novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case No.
136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed to
complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever
balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the
properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the
dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife.
This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him
were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased wife.
Complainant testified that the properties he received were in settlement of cases other
than the cases being tried herein.26 In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse
settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as
payment.27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were
not yet settled when the criminal cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial,
is untenable. The main reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said
case was that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take place, four
essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only
the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of
novation, was that there were checks issued as payment, though subsequently
dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear
that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring that
could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that
petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender
receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies
receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the
money or property. 28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from
complainant a seven-carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose
of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his own
benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from complainant,
petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and
prejudice to complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in
order.
WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the May
26, 2004 Decision1 and the July 28, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81096.

The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8)
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein
private respondent.

The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for
brevity) under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential
Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private respondent claimed
payment of just compensation over said agricultural lands.

It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only ₱227,582.58,
while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at
₱317,259.31.

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11 November
2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning
bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN
D-05-02-VC-005.

On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private respondent,
the fallo of which reads:

Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby preliminarily fixed at TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT &
91/100 (₱2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land Bank of the Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby
ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and guidelines,
minus the sum already remitted per Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V
eventually issued an Order dated 8 October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the valuation claim of
petitioner herein with respect to her due share in the above lots to the tune of Two Million
Five Hundred Forty Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven and 58/100 (₱2,540,211.58) Pesos.
Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant
to existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already paid per Order dated January 2,
2003.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for

Determination of Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian
Case No. 03-06.

The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed
Order dated 12 November 2003 "for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or
comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the DARAB
2003 Rules of Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that
the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the instances when a court may dismiss
a case on its motion."

As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November
2003, petitioner LBP elevated the case before the Tribunal through the present Petition for
Review, theorizing:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

CASE MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE

DARAB 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES FILED AND
PENDING BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO
ITS EFFECTIVITY AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.3

On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.

The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an
appeal from the adjudicator's resolution shall be filed before the DARAB and not before
the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC without first seeking the
intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation
was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was
already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, and under its transitory provision, it is provided
that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an
appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the DARAB, the RTC,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated July
28, 2004.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:

 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT
VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE
THE COURT A QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION
OF THE DARAB.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE
RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, 2002.4

Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation was
filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002,
long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory
provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the
adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the DARAB
Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from the transitory provision that it is
the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure,
thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is
the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing
with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the filing of the
respondent's claim for just compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the
adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination of just compensation shall not
be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought

directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner
brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.

In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original
action and, since the case was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office
was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the
RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.

Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.

The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just
compensation under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must
first be appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

The court rules in the negative.

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction
are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of
the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.

In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony
with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation
and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power
conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an
administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain
(for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v.
Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies,
while in Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the then
Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial
Peace Act.6

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation to
landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over
Wycoco's petition for determination of just compensation even where no summary
administrative proceedings was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction
over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s
re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of
just compensation, thus –

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if
the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus,
although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus,
direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s
complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no
summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to
perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to
Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.8 x x x

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank questioned the alleged
failure of private respondents to seek reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead
filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory
between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while
the second refers to judicial proceedings.1avvp hi1

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in

the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken
under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before
the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under
agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of
just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.10

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred
in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of just compensation
despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court
stated that:

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise
of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of
just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which
is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC
properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just compensation.12

The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying on
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring
the matter to the Board by filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be
less than five (5) days.

Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to
contest the resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period
provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with the land valuation, hence said
valuation shall become final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination.
The party who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an
original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction over the subject
property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but
shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled
to only one motion for reconsideration.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking
of lands under RA 6657 is a power vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of
the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by
the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear
import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to
the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation.14 In
accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC
and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law.15 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies while rules of procedure cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May
26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi
City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay petitioner's petition
for the determination of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. Nos. 173935-38 December 23, 2008

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,

vs.
MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, LILY F. RAQUEÑO, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, MA. CRISTINA
A. ILUSORIO, AND AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueño were charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio
(petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising
from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp._x0016_ (LDC), of a petition in
the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of
Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in Makati.
The Information reads:
On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon,
a notary public in and for Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such, and
in which Petition said accused subscribed and swore to, among other things, facts known
to them to be untrue, that is: That the Petitioners claim that the title was lost, which fact
was material matter and required by law to be stated in said Petition, when in truth and in
fact as the said accused very well knew at the time they swore to and signed the said
petition for Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21578, that said statement appearing in paragraph 4 of said Petition:

"4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City, the petitioners had their respective offices, renovated and by reason thereof,
documents were moved from their usual places and thereafter, sometime in the early part
of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners were ready to have the mortgage
documents registered, the said owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. _x0016_21578
could no longer be located at the places where they may and should likely be found
despite earnest and diligent efforts of all the petitioners to locate the same;"

was false and untrue because the said title was in the possession of the complainant,
Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the above false statement was made in order to obtain a New
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

Contrary to law.1 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against
respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before
the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three petitions, also on behalf of LDC,
before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 17010,2 170113 and 170124 covering properties located in
Tagaytay City.

As the purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the above-mentioned

petitions for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles over properties located in
Makati City and Tagaytay City after the owner’s copies thereof could no longer be found
"despite earnest and diligent efforts" to locate the same.

Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president of LDC,5 has in her
possession those titles, filed her opposition to respondents’ petitions.6 Respondents
forthwith amended their respective petitions,7 the amendments reading, according to
petitioner, as follows:

4. On November 4, 1999, in the belief that the aforesaid owner’s duplicate copy of CCT
No. 21578 had been lost and can no longer be recovered, the petitioners filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City a petition for the cancellation and issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the lost copy;

5. However, after the jurisdictional facts and evidence had been presented before the said
court, the above-named respondents, through their counsel, filed their opposition to the
petition on the ground that the said owner’s duplicate copy of Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 allegedly is not lost and is actually in their possession and, thereafter, in a
subsequent hearing held on February 10, 2000, said respondents, through counsel,
presented before this Honorable Court the duplicate copy of said CCT No. 21578;
6. The owner’s duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law, should be in the actual
possession of the registered owner thereof and it is indubitable that LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is the registered owner entitled to the possession and
control of the evidence of ownership of all corporate properties;

7. The respondents have no authority nor legal basis to take and continue to have
possession of said CCT No. 21578, not one of them being a corporate officer of
LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the registered owner of said property;

xxxx

9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to take possession of CCT No.
21578, should be ordered by this Honorable Court to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy
thereof, which they continue to hold without legal and/or justifiable reasons, not only for
the purpose of causing the registration of the mortgage thereof in favor of the
mortgagee/petitioner, Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for the reason that it is the
corporation, as owner of the property, who [sic] is entitled to possession and control and
therefore, said CCT must, pursuant to law, be kept at the corporation’s principal place of
business.

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and Tagaytay
RTCs,8 petitioner filed charges of falsification of public documents and perjury against
respondents before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office.9

By Resolution of April 6, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista, with the

imprimatur of the City Prosecutor, dismissed the falsification charges but found probable
cause to indict respondents for perjury.10 Four informations for perjury were accordingly
filed before the MeTC Pasig, one against respondents Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner and Lily F.
Raquero; another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and
Aurora Montemayor; still another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A.
Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; and the last against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio,
Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 121496,
121497, 121498 and 121499, respectively.

After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for their quashal on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue, lack of bases of the charges as
the original petitions had already been withdrawn, and privileged character of the
pleadings.11

Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by Order12 of June 13, 2001, ruled that venue was
properly laid, viz:

To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,] the vital point is the allegations
[sic] in the complaint or information of the situs of the offense charged. If the complaint or
information alleges that the crime was committed in the place where the court has
jurisdiction, then that court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. (Colmenares vs.
Villar, 33 SCRA 186). In other words, what is important is the allegation in the complaint
that the crime was committed in the place which is within the court’s jurisdiction (Mediante
vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).

In the instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses were committed in Pasig
City. Hence, pursuant to the aforecited doctrinal rulings, this court has the venue or
territorial jurisdiction over these cases. (Underscoring supplied)
Nonetheless, finding that respondents’ petitions are privileged, the MeTC, citing Flordelis
v. Judge Himalalaon13 and People v. Aquino, et al.,14 granted the Motions to Quash, viz:

However, the Court finds the third ground[-privileged character of the pleadings]
meritorious. In the case of Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84 SCRA 477) which is also a
prosecution for Perjury, the Supreme Court held:

"x x x x

Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an appropriate pleading filed
in court that is relevant to the issues in the case to which it relates is absolutely priveleged
[sic] and it is the law that the same may not be made the subject of a criminal prosecution.
(People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)"

Similarly, the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are contained in a Petition
filed before the Regional Trial Courts of Makati and Tagaytay Cities which are relevant to
the case the same being for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate
of title alleged to be lost.

x x x x.

As the facts charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the information contains
averments which, if true, would nonetheless constitute a legal excuse or jurisdiction [sic],
quashal of the Information[s] is thus in order.

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having been denied,15 petitioner

appealed to the Pasig City RTC Branch 263 of which, by Decision16 of January 25, 2006,
affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration,17 petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for review
on certiorari,18 contending that:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES OF FLORDELI[S] VS.

HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA 477) AND PEOPLE VS. AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING]
THAT STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS, EVEN IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner is of the view that People v. Aquino19 cited by the RTC does not apply in the
present controversy as that case involved a libel case and "there is no authority which
states that the rules on absolute privileged statements in pleadings apply to both crimes of
perjury and libel."20

Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of Flordelis v. Himalaloan21 apply
wherein the Court sustained the quashal of the therein information for perjury as the
answer to the complaint containing the alleged false allegations did not have to be under
oath.

In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into the petition’s alleged procedural crack
by underscoring the apparent disregard by petitioner of the established policy of judicial
hierarchy of courts, pointing out that the petition should have been first filed with the Court
of Appeals.22
On the merits, respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent rulings of the MeTC and
RTC that allegations made by the parties or their counsel in a pleading are privileged in
nature. Moreover, they contend that since they had amended the original petitions, there
were no more bases for the charges of perjury."23

A word first on the procedural question raised by respondents. The present petition is one
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (APPEAL FROM THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS), Section 2(c) provides that in all cases where only
questions of law are raised, the appeal "shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 45."24 Indubitably, the issue tendered in this case is
a question of law, hence, there is no violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

On the merits, the Court denies the petition on the ground that, contrary to the lower
courts’ ruling, venue of the Informations was improperly laid in Pasig.

The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as the situs of the offense
charged where respondents’ petitions were notarized. Albeit the Informations referred to
the "subscribed and sworn" petitions of respondents as bases of the charges, there is no
mention therein that those petitions were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The
Complaint-Affidavits,25 which initiated the criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional
details. Consider this allegation:

6. On November 4, 1999, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly

representing LAKERIDGE filed a verified Petition for Issuance of a New Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City x x x x, (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

as well as this:

06. On November 10, 1999, AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA.
CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified
Petitions for Issuance of a New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 17010, 17011 and 17012 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City x x x x. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations that perjury was
committed in Pasig is neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has
jurisdiction over them. The purported perjurious petition quoted in each of the Informations
in fact indicates that, with respect to the CCT of the Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs
of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action arising therefrom is in
Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.

Perjury is committed as follows:

Article 183, Revised Penal Code.

False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations. – The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

x x x x26 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

There are thus four elements to be taken into account "in determining whether there is
a prima facie case" of perjury, viz:

(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized
to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.27(Citation omitted)

It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter, however,
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires,28 which is imperative in perjury29

Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,30 the action for perjury must be instituted
and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful
statement upon any matter was made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay.31

It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may
issue.

Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving
of false statement. So United States v. Cañet 32teaches, viz:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from
the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly
submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the
making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.33 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

While the Court finds that, contrary to the MeTC and RTC ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly laid, and on that score the Court denies the present petition
as priorly stated, it is confronting the sole issue raised by petitioner – whether the
questioned petitions of respondents are, as the MeTC held and which the RTC affirmed,
absolutely privileged on the basis of Flordelis and Aquino.

The issue had already been addressed by the Court in Choa v. People,34 in this wise:

Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that
the term "absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical
meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and slander." x x x x.

x x x x.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for
having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This Court held that no perjury
could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil
action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one element of the crime
of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be
required by law." 35 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Verily, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated this Court’s rulings
in Flordelis and Aquino as respondents’ petitions-bases of the subject Informations for
perjury are required by law to be under oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, on the ground that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig has
no jurisdiction over the Informations for perjury against respondents, DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015

ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY.
EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated
August 28, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.

The factual antecedents are as follows: ChanRobles Virtu alawlibrary

The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.,
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still
its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses
in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
claimed reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory
portion of the Information filed against her reads: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the

municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical
person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden
Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation
in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00)
and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim
reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty.
Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the
amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved
during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of
Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
 Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4
On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground that none of
the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence,
the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue.

In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for
arraignment, the decretal portion of the Order reads: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that

accused has already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court by filing cash bond for their respective
temporary liberty, set this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November
22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the Session Hall,
10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.

The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment

on November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.

SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a
Resolution7 dated January 24, 2006.

Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and January
24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis
or merit.9 On Navaja's contention that the case for falsification of private document against her was filed
with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue, hence, the RTC ruled: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly

pointed out by the MCTC, the improper venue was already
resolved squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he
held that “there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating
that the falsification took place in Jagna”.

This court notes that in that particular resolution,

reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro
who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja,
the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote
something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor
then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after
issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use
thereof must have been intended to create an impression that
the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit

of another witness, which categorically states that Ms.
Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her

 claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City
not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or
indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In
other words, the said contention would necessarily result in
a “neither here no there” situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.

In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the
September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7, 2008.
Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE

JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the
alleged crime of falsification of a private
document was committed in Jagna, Bohol.

ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional

and cannot be presumed or established from the
alleged acts of the petitioner on a totally
different and unrelated time and occasion.

iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases

were established for the protection of the
rights of the accused and to prevent undue
harassment and oppression. chanrob lesvir tualla wlibra ry

II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF

FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER
VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING

OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE DENIAL OF A
MOTION TO QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.

On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case for
falsification of a private document, Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements12 of
such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that there is no showing in
the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of falsification
of a private document was committed or consummated in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in
the complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot
determine the venue because the place of issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It
was also impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for
reimbursement under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4, 2003, was
prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued on October
2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the issuance of the subject
receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of falsification
of private document to speak of. She explains that any damage that private respondent could have
suffered would only occur when it pays the request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense Report
submitted on October 6, 2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the said
receipt.

Navaja's arguments are misplaced.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained by the Court
in Foz, Jr. v. People,14 thus: chanRobles virt ualLawlib rary

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired

by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try
the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus,
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: chanRobles virtualLawlib rary

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be

instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. chanrob lesvir tualla wlibra ry

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or

information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where
it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification. chanrob lesvir tualla wlibra ry

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically place the
venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of
jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed
or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually
falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the
falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended.17 chanrobles law

Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because
not one of the essential elements of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction,
the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such
crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the Information clearly alleged that she committed
such crime thereat, to wit:chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the

municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical
person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden
Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation
in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00)
and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim
reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty.
Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the
amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved
during trial. xxx18
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the said crime
in Jagna, Bohol, viz:chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

“ 4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the

amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred at Garden's
Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02
October 2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is
hereto attached as Annex “C”.

5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's

expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual amount she
incurred at Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy
of the duplicate original official receipt (pink copy)
certified true and correct by the cashier of Garden's Cafe,
Jagna is hereto attached as Annex “D”.

6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon

receiving it with the intent of causing damage to DKT.”
19

Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information and not by the result of proof20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for
falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.

Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol,
cannot be sustained at this point where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the material
allegations of the charge against her, which include the place where the subject receipt was falsified.
However, given that the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence adduced during the trial would show that the
crime was indeed committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based
on such ground.

On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of because at the
time of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the
Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present, as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause such damage is sufficient.22 chanrobles law

Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor as to the
sworn statement of a certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her
sworn statement pertains to an incident in Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate
and distinct from the facts material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said statement in
upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the accused on
a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue must be determined solely
and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or presumed from other
collateral allegations.

The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual issue of whether
the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court held:
chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers
on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of
fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of

being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value
of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to
determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once
the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed
is one of fact. chanrob lesvir tualla wlibra ry

Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is
a question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and,
subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the parties during trial.26 In certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to
probe and resolve factual issues, viz: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,

or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial
court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of

specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in

the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by
the respondent;
 (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts

not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.27
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.

It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry
even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue
of improper venue was already resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are
sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna.”29 The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb such factual finding.

Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional State
Prosecutor without specifying the factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC
had squarely addressed such issue as follows: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

This court notes that in that particular resolution,

reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro
who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja,
the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote
something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor
then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after
issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use
thereof must have been intended to create an impression that
the receipt was prepared by the cashier herself.”

In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit

of another witness, which categorically states that Ms.
Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her

claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City
not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or
indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In
other words, the said contention would necessarily result in
a “neither here no there” situation.30
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue
of the case violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds that such evidentiary
rule has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was committed for purposes of filing a
criminal information which merely requires the existence of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara,
Jr.,33 the Court expounded on the concept of probable cause in this wise: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal

information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it
 import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence

showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.34
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her favor as the
accused, and strictly against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and
inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court from that of the province where
the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose to prosecute separately the other cases
for falsification of private document against her in different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City,
Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal
cases, involving minimal amounts of actual damages,35 should have been filed in one (1) criminal
jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.

The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon: chanRobl esvirtualLawli brary

The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints

filed against her should be filed in one jurisdiction would
be a blatant violation of the law on jurisdiction as one
cannot file a criminal case other than where the offense was
allegedly committed.

In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged

to have been committed in different venues, then it is just
unfortunate that whatever complaints have to be filed, will
have to filed in those different venues. To do otherwise would
36
be procedurally fatal.
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases
is an essential element of jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not
be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for
any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section
5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and
weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and
impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage
of justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions,
which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can hardly be
considered as compelling reason which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.

Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly
committed in different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is
only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of falsification as there are documents
falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is where the document was actually falsified40.

The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.

On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a petition
for certiorari from the denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and that lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a
motion to quash, the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection
may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.

On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition
for certiorari to question the denial of a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was
patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. She claims that
not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash, but there
is likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her
assertion, she cites a ruling41 that when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the court should dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.

Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court
reiterated the fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and,
therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari, thus: chanRobl esvirtualLawli brary

In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that “ a

special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The established rule is that, when such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not
to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the
case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.”
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy
to assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances: chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and

the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief;

(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial

justice;

(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and

(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention,

making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
43
consideration thereof.

As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed to prove
that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of discretion she
imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly
denied her motion to quash.
Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as they are
properly resolved in due course of the proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and
the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cral awlawlibrary

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse
and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of
petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the
petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City
(MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under
oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath
which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong
and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before
the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47,
Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article
183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping
in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the
third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no
other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed;
and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the
Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.4 The
MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged
Tomas with perjury. 5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for
reconsideration.6

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v.
Bildner8 which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false
document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou
v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the
long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the
high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the
execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the
criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the
city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as
the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells
solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge
against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the
complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents
but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the
court of Makati City.9 (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later
than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different
from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65
petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal
case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.10
 The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the
Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is
more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing
the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy
Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that
was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to
the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the
crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where
the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the
proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only
hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second,
laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having
an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for
his defense are available.13

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and
the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be

understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or
is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only
in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed
sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some
of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard
against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.14

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article
183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made
for a legal purpose.15(emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined
together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding
that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the
MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under
oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath
which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
x x x.16

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last
portion of the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for

sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal
or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary
public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed
and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City
is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements
constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati
City, not Pasay City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict
between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in
verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of
certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed
and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question
posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to
try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places
where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing
that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority
the case of United States. v. Cañet18 which ruled:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from
the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly
submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the
making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring
deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila
where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated
in Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the
case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case entitled
U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that –

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of
the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the
crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been
made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical
background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in
our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and
against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false
testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases
(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making
of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties
in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in
2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the
present RPC took effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited
Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case.
Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present
RPC took effect.22

The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through the
presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the
Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of
criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission,
and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect.

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person,
in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to
such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is
guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and
by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable
of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until
such time as the judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 539224 and 539325 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere
execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.27

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be
the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of
representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by
the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the
presentation was the act that consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the

RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and
traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:30

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s
Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code
and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together
with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law,
passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of
the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3
and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and
2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony,
whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on
false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of
Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on
false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding,
while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe and strict than
those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements
and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under
oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied;
emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an
oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially
involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila
and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this
perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place
where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been the
City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.

In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and

accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as
basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This
came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between
judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of
false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false
testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing
the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where the
submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the
place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in
the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly
lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities
stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of
Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to
assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate
copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may
issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions
were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being
the intentional giving of false statement,"32citing Cañet as authority for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because
of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the
determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken
is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks
of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil
cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been
Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false
testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable as
the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under
Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling,
then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been
applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a
judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of
Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on
the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was
taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes
from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of
Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on
venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any
one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the
1âwphi1

passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,34 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue
of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where
any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of
two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent
spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the
Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes
one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive
act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at
that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

B. Jurisdiction to issue hold departure order

BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City

Branch 1, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino
S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity
and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that
respondent judge issued a "hold departure order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold departure orders" shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. She further alleged that
respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order. chanrob1es virt ua1 1aw 1ibra ry

When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order because
he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished a copy
of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued
an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue
of denial of due process, respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified
of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.

The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed "hold departure
order," recommended that he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that
"hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regional trial court." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do
not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued
one in the instant case.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence." The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not
been remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the
development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was
circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous cases before the
Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in
their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions with zeal
and fervor.chanrob1es virt ua1 1aw 1ibrary

In recent cases, 1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on erring
judges. Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on respondent judge.

WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a repetition of the
same and similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. chanrob1es virt ua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

C. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the Complaint

G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution2dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners
Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as
follows:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively,
of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar
Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write
and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article
entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to
wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their
patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation
office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo,
because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health
problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos,
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19
last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her
under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and
must undergo an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at
Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got
angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own
without his nod as he had one to recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two
weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[.
On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.

The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family
and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a
catheter punched on her right side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side
of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it
would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some ₱150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of
the company physician.

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your
side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind
them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But,
sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their
patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations
prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for
much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable
religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of
promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they
still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is
many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals
separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula
while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
death!

My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994,
Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City.
May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity,
trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation
as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and
therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and
reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte,

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.

On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr.
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and
punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱1,000.00 each.7

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8 dated February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
April 8, 2005.

Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE
"LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN

THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF

PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY
NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE
NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation
was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent
doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners
pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a
patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the
columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be
lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good
faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in
finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or
actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to
the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further
contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnist’s
exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News,
did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a
factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every indictment for
libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the
evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA,
affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some
facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result of the case − a
situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not
require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel,
has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them
with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information
dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction
over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that
petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the
trial court’s jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an
objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged
may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or
on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given
only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was
recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned
ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances
involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are
not present in the instant criminal case.11

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in

Macasaet v. People12 that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides
the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:

Article 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of
the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time
of the commission of the offense.15

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time
of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the
province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the
province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the
Court quotes again, to wit:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively,
of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar
Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write
and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article
entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."

The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that
Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not
establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a private individual
with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with
malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident
purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a
magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as
Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the
following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is
utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants "cause[d] to be published in
'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila." The Information states that the
libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila.
The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general
circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File
was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was published
and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies such as the
Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does
not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu. 1avvph i1

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila
courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no
impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general
circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would
allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo,
simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence
is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.18

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where
the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was "published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire
Philippines," the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City
was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may
also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the
residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and
positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission
of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged that the "offended
party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing
and reputation in the community," the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to
establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained
its ruling in this wise:

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency;
no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more
than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient
stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house
therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are
essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised
intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that
as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been
actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing
therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private
complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts
business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a
resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute
residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not
conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.21
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.22 Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel
case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to
hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and
the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522
are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015

ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD

NATIVIDAD, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution2 dated August 9, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated
February 23, 2009 and Order4 dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos.
08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Decision5 dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

The antecedent facts are as follows:chanRobl esvirtual Lawli brary

Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio
Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties
agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first
delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last
delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks.6

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of

P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project.
After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn
from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity,
petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo,
Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner
communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again,
respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored
upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks
were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a
closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but
to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.7 Thus, on
August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory
portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 337902

th
That on or about the 20 day of October 2003, or prior
thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
 above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL
MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by
ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check
described below:
Check No. : 2960203217

Drawn
: Metrobank
Against

In the :
amount Php434,430.00

Postdated : October 20,

/ Dated 2003

Payable : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND

to CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof,
said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount
of such check upon its presentment which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the said accused failed lo pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 337903

That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior

thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL
MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by
ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check
described below:
:
Check No.
2960203218

Drawn : Metrobank
Against

In the :
amount Php13,032.00

Postdated : October 20,

/ Dated 2003

Payable : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION

to SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof,
said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount
of such check upon its presentment which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days alter receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending that
respondent and his partners be charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the prosecution had proven all
the elements of violation of BP 22 as against respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent
to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check No.
2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check
No. 2960203218 or a total penalty of Two Hundred Thousand
Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. However,
accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt. Both accused Malong and Natividad are ordered to
jointly pay the private complainant the total sum of Four
Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos
(Php447,462.00) which are the face value of the two (2) checks
issued, subject of these cases, with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum and three percent (3%) penalty per
month as stipulated in the invoices, reckoned from the date
of receipt of the demand on February 28, 2004, until the
 amount is fully paid, plus the costs of suit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.9 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no
jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered
to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense
actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that during the retaking of petitioner's
testimony on March 14, 2008, the records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor manifested
his presence in court and that he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus,
since there was no appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a proper delegation of authority,
the proceedings should be declared null and void.10

On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a
quo] the issue of authority of the private prosecutor to
present witness Morillo in the absence of the public
prosecutor during the March 14, 2008 proceeding, and only did
so after obtaining an adverse judgment, it would be an
injustice if all the proceedings had in the case would be set
aside.

The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A

violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense,
which is oft-repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this
doctrine, jurisdiction may be had in several places where one
of the acts material to the crime occurred.

Accused Natividnd postulates that since the checks were

presented suid dishonored in Makati City, which is not the
place where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo]
lacks jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The
fact remains that the bank where it was presented lor payment
is in Makati City. These checks passed through this bank for
clearance, confirmation, and or validation processes.
Moreover, the eventual dishonour indeed took place or was
completed at the end of the collecting bank in Makati City,
where the private complainant maintains her account over
which the court [a quo] has jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's

appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the
appealed decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in
full.

SO ORDERED.11 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the lower courts'
rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent portions
of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of
the offense happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably
established that the subject checks were issued to private
complainant at petitioner's office in Pampanga. Said checks
were drawn from petitioner's account in Metrobank, Pampanga
branch.

The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor

of the checks by the maker also transpired in Pampanga. After
private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the
checks, she immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in
Pampanga, personally informed him and his companions of the
dishonor of the checks and tendered a demand letter for the
payment of the construction materials.

Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the

drawee bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity of the
subject checks, private complainant deposited the same in
her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch.
Subsequently, she was informed by the latter bank that the
subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Metrobank,
Pampanga branch.

Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened

in Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be filed in said
place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in
Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that since she
deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati
City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the
same bank, the case may be filed in Makati City. However,
as correctly argued by the OSG, the act of depositing the
check is not an essential clement of BP 22. Likewise, the
fact that private complainant was informed of the dishonor
of the checks at her bank in Makuti City did not vest the
MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled
in any of the places where its constitutive elements actually
transpired. And, knowledge of the payee of the dishonor of
the checks is not an element of BP 22. The law speaks only
of the subsequent dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank
and the knowledge of the fact of dishonor by the maker.
Consequently, none of the elements of the offense can be
 considered to have transpired in Makati City. Thus, the venue
of the instant case was improperly laid.12 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following argument:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY
DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE
A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
13
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SAID COURT. ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where the dishonored checks were deposited,
had jurisdiction over the instant case. In support of her contention, petitioner cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,14 wherein it was held that since the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was deposited
and presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the RTC
of Pam.pa.nga clearly had jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was charged.15 Thus,
petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC did not have jurisdiction
to try the instant case. That none of the essential elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 occurred in
the City of Makati is belied by the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of the court of the place
where the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment.

Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP 22 were duly proven beyond reasonable
doubt. First, the prosecution sufficiently established that the respondent issued the subject checks as
shown by the documentary evidence submitted. They were issued for value, as payment for the
construction supplies and materials which petitioner delivered to the accused.

As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was clearly shown that respondent had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank, which subsequently dishonored
the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that "the dishonor of a check when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." In this case, petitioner states that the
prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the subject checks were presented within the time period
required by law. In fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee bank dishonored the subject
checks was even personally delivered by petitioner to respondent as evidenced by the demand letter
signed by respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
in his account with the drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently dishonored for the
reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, is in line with the appellate
court's and respondent's stance that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the instant case. According to the
OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an essential element of the offense under the Bouncing
Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,16 the OSG posited that the place of deposit and the place
of dishonor are distinct from each other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered, and
dishonored is the proper venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila.
x x x The check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch,
Metro Manila. x x x The information at bar effectively charges
San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction
of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations
of the complaint or information. Although the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ,
San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and
knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also
overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that
 crimes committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed
in Pasig.17 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed that the MeTC of Makati City did not
have jurisdiction over the instant case for none of the essential elements of violation of BP 22 occurred
therein.

The contention is untenable.

It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed.18

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the place
of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the
check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the proper
venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such conclusion.

In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in
payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank
deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been
dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of the loan
proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City,
wherein crimes committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC of
Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was issued,
delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of hmrfficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan.
The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee. Associated
Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it
at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends thai the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig h;ui no jurisdiction over this case since no proofhas
been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored
or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on
November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated
February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was
deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the
check can be filed in any of the places where any
of the elements of the offense occurred, that is,
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or
dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San

 Jisars as the place of drawing and issuing. The
jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information. Although, the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Baisk, sit
its Tariac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued
and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place
of issue airul delivery was San Juan and
knowledge, as an essential part of she offense,
was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There
is no question that crimes committed in November,
1989 in San Juan arc triable by the RTC stationed
in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in
this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon
19
the RTC in Pasig City. ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof that
the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that lcnowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC
of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, cither expressly or impliedly, that the place
where the check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions involving violations of BP 22, it is true
thai the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the feet that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank
of San Juan, while the same was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation cannot
be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of the place of deposit cannot exercise
jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the absence, thereiore, of any ground, jurisprudential or
otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply
inapplicable to the issue at hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals20 cited by petitioner is more squarely on point with
the instant case. In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the
Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in the Angeles
City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands, joven was advised, however, that the Commercial Bank of
Manila returned the check for the reason that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed
account." Consequently, the accused was charged with violation of BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga.
On the contention of the accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court
categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged
herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place
in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no
basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited
and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch
of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly
confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It
must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized
as transitory or continuing crimes and so is the crime of
estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.21 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,22 wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure were
the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed
considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on
 the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is welksedled
that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory
or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and
essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory,
while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein
any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with
a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for
violation of BP 22 may be tiled in any of the places where
any of its elements occurred - in particular, the place where
the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check

was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal
that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment
at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the
territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this
light, the denial of the present petition remains
warranted.23 ChanRobl esVirt ualawl ibrary

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place
where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued,
and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for
it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch
of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and
rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain
procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.24 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case
must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.25 cral awred

There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a
decision of a lower court,26 when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or
its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party,27 when
there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires.28

Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused
in double jeopardy,29 in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.30

Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic,
the same should be summarily dismissed. The unique and special circumstances attendant in the instant
petition, however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.

First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of
respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein.
Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right
of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his
acquittal.31 In the oft-cited People v. Salico,32 the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of
the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is
always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that
the defendant is not gniity. Dismissal terminates the
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does noi show that
the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information
is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.The
only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not
correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when,
after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the
defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the
ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt thai the defendant is guilty; for in such
case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case
is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove
that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case,
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense
before a court of competent jurisdiction.33 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue
of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution.34 The appellate
court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was
committed within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to
show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as
an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its
exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De Vera v. Spouses
Santiago,36 the Court categorically ruled that the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling
the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the
RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law.
The resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law
[B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of
circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for
37
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages. ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely "whether the Court of Appeals erred
when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case
despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court." Evidently,
therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein
rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the
crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
commission.38 Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with
respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law
that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.39

More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered as an acquittal
of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that his constitutional right to protection against double
jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez,40 the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions
thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been
laid down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal (of the criminal
case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made
upon motion, or with the express consent of the
defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal
or based upon consideration of the evidence or
of the merits of the case; and (3) the question
to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal he
found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or
41
innocence of the defendant. ChanRoble sVirtu alawli brary

A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the foregoing requisites. First, as
early as the stage of respondent's appeal of the MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been
moving for the dismissal of the case alleging the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CA's
dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to have been with respondent's express
consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based upon a
consideration of the merits. Third, the question raised in this case is based purely on a question of law.
In view therefore of the presence of all three requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the
appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.

As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition in the absence of the OSG's
participation, the circumstances herein warrant the Court's consideration. In Narciso v. Sta.
Romana-Cruz,42 the Court gave due regard to the ends of substantial justice by giving due course to a
petition filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo,
however, provided an exception to the above doctrines in this
manner:
 While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals,
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or the
State in criminal proceedings pending in this
Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs.
Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and
the issues in this action could be determined
in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner,
by entertaining the petition at bar. As an
offended party in a criminal case, private
petitioner has sufficient personality and a
valid grievance against Judge Adao's order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his
(private petitioner's) father.
x x x x

The ends of substantial justice indeed require the

affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this point.
Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot
confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court
is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.

To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without

any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought about
by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be
left without recourse to address a substantive issue in
law.43 ChanRob lesVir tualaw librar y

In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial justice, it must give due course to
the instant petition and consequently rule on the merits of the same. The circumstances surrounding this
case left petitioner with no other suitable recourse but to appeal the case herself. Not only was there an
absence of support from the OSG, said government office also took a position in contrast to the rights and
interests of petitioner. Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to petitioner's
interest as well as the grounds used to support them were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In fact,
these erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate court in their entirety, dismissing the instant
case in a manner not in accord with law and applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply
procedural rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing, as the CA had, petitioner's action
poses serious consequences tantamount to a miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can
postpone criminal prosecution and delay the administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the
erroneous ground of lack of jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and open loopholes in our
criminal justice system.44

Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the Court forego a
rigid application of the technicalities under

the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed by the records, petitioner
had already fulfilled her end of the agreement in giving respondent, as early as in the year 2003,
construction materials amounting to half a million pesos and yet up until now, she has not been paid
therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her
right allegedly violated by respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing
of the case with the appropriate court, her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the
mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA,
without providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very beginning
and refile her complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in the first place.

Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court cannot turn
a blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the
rules.45 Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings.
Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose
is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed.46 Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18,
2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723
are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009,
of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated
September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuall awlibrary

D. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 06, 2016

RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212427-28

SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THROUGH
ITS SPECIAL PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212694-95

SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, AND THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212794-95

RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213477-78

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213532-33

RONALD JOHN LIM, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, Respondents.
 G.R. Nos. 213536-37

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 218744-59

MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE NARAG PAULE, AND MARILOU
DIALINO BARE, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court are consolidated petitions1 filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen.
Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De
Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution2 dated March 28,
2014 and the Joint Order3 dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in
OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several
others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (d) (1),
(2), and (6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,4 as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Further assailed are: (1) by Cambe,6 the Ombudsman's Joint Order7 dated March 14, 2014, which denied
Cambe's Supplemental Counter-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend Proceedings;8 (2) by Sen.
Revilla,9 the Ombudsman's Order10 dated May 15, 2014 which denied Sen. Revilla's Omnibus Motion11 to
re-conduct the preliminary investigation, among others; and (3) by petitioners Mario L. Relampagos
(Relampagos), Rosario Salamida Nuñez (Nuñez), Lalaine Narag Paule (Paule), and Marilou Dialino Bare
(Bare),12 the Resolutions dated November 13, 201413 and May 13, 201514 of the Sandiganbayan which
affirmed the finding of probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272,
0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.

The Facts

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of
public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years
2006 to 2010,15 in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.16 The charges are contained in two (2)
complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder17 filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
Atty. Levito D. Baligod on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0316; and (2) a Complaint for
Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 301918 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the
Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0395, both before the Ombudsman.
Briefly stated, petitioners were implicated for the following acts:

(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles's JLN (Janet Lim Napoles)
Corporation19 in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects,20 and for receiving significant portions of the
diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback";21

(b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for processing the
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF,22 and for personally receiving his own
"commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds;23

(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion,
and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the commencement via "business propositions"
with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to
serve as "conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation
documents to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and
machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating
disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation;24

(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing and
releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs25 through, among others, their designation as
cral awred

Presidents/Incorporators26 of JLN-controlled NGOs, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma

Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI)27 and Ginintuang Alay sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (GAMFI),28 respectively,
and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's control;29 and
(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by
acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting in the release of the Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.30

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this case, Sen.
Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission"
or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.31 Upon their agreement on the conditions
of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding IA
tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of
either the project cost or the amount stated in the SARO,32 the legislator would then write a letter
addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse such
request to the DBM for the release of the SARO.33 By this time, the initial advance portion of the
"commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator.34 Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would
then direct her staff - including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas
(Suñas) to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be
used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO,
and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the
legislator;35 and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the legislator,
which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.36 Once the documents are approved, the same
would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.37 Thereafter, the DBM would
release the NCA38 to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction
and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten
percent (10%) share in the project cost.39 Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and
deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis.40 Once the funds
are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the
withdrawal thereof.41 Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the
proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting.42 Napoles would then decide how much will be
left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and
Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence.43 Finally, to liquidate the
disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation
reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear
that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually
inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects.44 Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help
of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.0045 to the
JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least
P224,512,500.0046

In the Orders dated November 19, 201347 and November 29, 2013,48 the Ombudsman directed
petitioners, along with several others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits, to which petitioners
complied with, except for Napoles and Lim.49

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and
Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always
been regular and above-board"; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there
is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him
and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.50

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental
Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents
were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any
of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.51

For his part, De Asis filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, admitting that: (a) he was an
employee of the JLN Corporation; (b) he did pick up checks for JLN-controlled NGOs; and (c) he was an
incorporator in one of the JLN-controlled NGOs; but denying that he personally benefited from the
supposed misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.52

Meanwhile, Relampagos, et al., in their separate Counter-Affidavits dated December 13, 2013,
contended that: (a) there is no probable cause and factual or legal basis to indict them for the offenses
charged; and (b) the criminal complaints did not specifically mention their names as among those who
allegedly participated in the misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.53

Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and Cambe separately moved for the
suspension of the preliminary investigation54 on the criminal complaints, which were, however, denied
by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order55 dated January 28, 2014, holding that no prejudicial question exists
to warrant the suspension of the preliminary investigation proceedings.56

Cambe filed another motion57 to suspend proceedings of the preliminary investigation, claiming that the
filing of the criminal complaints was premature since the Commission on Audit (COA) had yet to issue an
Order of Execution in relation to the Notices of Disallowance58 (NDs) against Sen. Revilla's Office,
docketed as Special Audits Office (SAO) ND Nos. NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09).
The said motion was, again, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order59 dated March 14, 2014 (March
14, 2014 Joint Order). Thus, Cambe elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 212014-15.

Meantime, Sen. Revilla filed a Motion to be Furnished Copies of Motions, Pleadings, and Other
Submissions (Motion to be Furnished),60 praying that he be furnished with copies of all the
counter-affidavits filed by the parties in this case, which was denied by the Ombudsman in an
Order61 dated March 11, 2014. His motion for reconsideration62 thereof was likewise denied by the
Ombudsman in an Order63 dated March 27, 2014.

Sen. Revilla likewise filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition (Of the Special Panel of Investigators),64which
was also denied by the Ombudsman in an Order65 dated March 7, 2014. His motion for
reconsideration66 thereof was further denied in an Order67 dated May 9, 2014.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of
one (1) count of Plunder,69 and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16)
counts of violation of Section3 (e) of RA 3019.70

The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a
complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the IAs, and the
JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through the said scheme, they
were able to siphon out government funds in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00, with at least
P224,512,500.00 received by Sen. Revilla.71

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis,
and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the
charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla
amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as
described above; and (c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00,72 way more than
the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder.73

In the same manner, the Ombudsman established probable cause to indict all the petitioners (along with
several others), except Lim, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in light of the following: (a) Sen.
Revilla, Cambe, and Relampagos, et al. are all public officers, while private individuals Napoles and De
Asis all conspired with these public officers; (b) said public officers exhibited manifest partiality to
Napoles and her cohorts by favoring her controlled NGOs without the benefit of public bidding and
without having been authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance, as legally mandated; (c) said
public officers likewise exhibited their bad faith by unduly benefiting from the "ghost" PDAF-funded
projects through the receipt of "commissions," "kickbacks," and the like; and (d) their collective acts
caused undue injury to the government in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00.74

Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration75 of the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution. Specifically, Sen. Revilla, in his motion for reconsideration,76 pointed out that the
Ombudsman's use of the counter-affidavits, which documents he prayed to be furnished with in his
denied Motion to be Furnished, was a grave violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.

Pending resolution of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman issued a Joint
Order77dated May 7, 2014 granting Sen. Revilla's Motion to be Furnished, but only with respect to the
counter-affidavits of his six (6) co-respondents.78 He was also directed to file his comment thereon.
Dissatisfied, Sen. Revilla then filed an Omnibus Motion79 dated May 13,2014 praying for the: (a) partial
reconsideration of the May 7, 2014 Joint Order; (b) recall of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution; and (c)
re-conduct of the preliminary investigation and reconstitution of another special panel of
investigators.80The said Omnibus Motion having been denied by the Ombudsman in an Order81 dated
May 15, 2014, Sen. Revilla elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 212427-28.

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order82 (June 4, 2014 Joint Order) denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and, thereby, affirming the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution
with minor modifications to correct clerical errors.83 These Ombudsman's issuances led to the filing
of certiorari petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212694-95, G.R. Nos. 212794-95,
G.R. Nos. 213477-78, G.R. Nos. 213532-33, and G.R. Nos. 213536-37.

Consequently, on June 6 and 9, 2014, Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before
the Sandiganbayan, charging: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of
Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240;84 and (b) all the petitioners (along with
several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267 to 0282.85
To forestall the service of the warrant of arrest against him, Sen. Revilla filed on June 13, 2014, a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment and/or Suspension of
Proceedings.86Likewise, Relampagos, et al. moved that the Sandiganbayan declare lack of probable
cause against them and suspend proceedings.87

On June 19, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against petitioners
and their co-accused and, thereby, issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against them.88

Thereafter, Relampagos, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution Dated 19
June 2014 with Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and to Defer Arraignment.89

In a Resolution90 dated August 28, 2014, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion, and
dismissed Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and 0282 in so far
as Relampagos, et al. were concerned for the reason that the SAROs pertinent to these criminal cases
were not issued or signed by Relampagos, et al., but by then DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya. However,
the Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to present additional evidence to establish the existence of
probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276,
0279, and 0280.

The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and 0282
against Relampagos, et al. was appealed91 by the prosecution, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in
a Resolution92 dated November 13, 2014. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the
finding of probable cause against Relampagos, et al. in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272,
0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280 on the ground that the defenses they raised were evidentiary in
character.93 In particular, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue of whether the IA's endorsement was
indispensable before the SARO can be issued is a matter of evidence to be threshed out during trial.94

Hence, Relampagos, et al. filed a motion for partial reconsideration95 citing DBM Circular Letter No.
2015-1, s. of 2015,96 which supposedly clarified that the IAs' endorsements are no longer required
before the issuance of the corresponding SARO. The said motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution97 dated May 13, 2015, pointing out that said DBM Circular was issued only after the
Ombudsman's issuance of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution.98 Thus, Relampagos, et al. elevated the
issue before the Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 218744-59.

The Issue Before This Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should
be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

All petitions are bereft of merit.

I. Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings.

At the outset, the Court traverses the procedural issue raised by Cambe in his petition in G.R. Nos.
212014-15. In particular, Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint
Order which denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of
Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him. This relates to the
twelve (12) NDs received by the Office of Sen. Revilla on January 14, 2014 and February 4, 2014
pertaining to expenditures charged against his PDAF during the period 2007 to 2009, docketed as SAO
ND Nos. TRC-2013-016-PDAF(07-09) to 019-PDAF(07-09)99 and NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to
020-PDAF(07-09),100 respectively, which Cambe claims should first attain finality; otherwise, the filing of
the criminal complaints would be premature pursuant to the COA's 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure.101

The Court disagrees.

The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is
clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the
filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan,102 this Court explained that:
[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available
against a public officer for impropriety in the performance
of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2)
criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese
remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,
 simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense
may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

x x x x

It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are

distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern
or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative
cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.103
In Reyna v. COA (Reyna),104 this Court particularly declared that "[t]he criminal case filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the
COA."105

Cambe's reliance on Section 6, Rule XIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA is misplaced.
As worded, the provision only accounts for the possibility of the filing of criminal charges upon referral of
the audit findings to the Ombudsman:
Section 6. Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall
report to his Director all instances of failure or refusal
to comply with the decisions or orders of the Commission
contemplated in the preceding sections. The COA Director
shall see to it that the report is supported by the sworn
statement of the Auditor concerned, identifying among others,
the persons liable and describing the participation of each.
He shall then refer the matter to the Legal Services Sector
who shall refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman or
other appropriate office for the possible filing of
appropriate administrative or criminal action.
Nowhere does the provision state any delimitation or precondition to the filing of such criminal charges.
As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, "an audit disallowance may not necessarily result in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible persons. Conversely,
therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even without an audit disallowance. Verily,
Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in [Reyna] that a proceeding involving an audit
disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint."106

In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14, 2014 Joint
Order which denied Cambe's motion to suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe's petition in G.R. Nos.
212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue
anent the presence of probable cause against all petitioners.

II. Parameters of Review.

Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the Ombudsman's
determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion. This observed policy is based not only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as
well.107

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.108

Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and
positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief."109 "[T]hus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify
a conviction would suffice."110

In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause,
"only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not
absolute certainty."111 In this case, the petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or
violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2112 of RA 7080, as
amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d)113 thereof; and (c) that the
aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).114 On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)115of
RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.116 In determining probable cause therefor,
only a showing of the ostensible presence of these elements is required.

It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary
investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
should be held responsible for it."117 It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution's evidence."118 Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well
as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level."119 Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings."120 In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that "probable
cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay,"121 and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the
proceedings is improper.122

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion
in finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of
Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019.

III. Probable Cause Against Sen. Revilla.

First, in G.R. Nos. 212694-95, Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the
June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged,
Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and
further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the
whistleblowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to
the res inter alios acta rule.

The petition holds no water.

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the
forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen.
Revilla123himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as
well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the
legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents - even those not actually signed by
Sen. Revilla - directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under
the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v.
Ochoa (Belgica),124this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation."125 "At its core, legislators may it be through project lists, prior consultations or
program menus - have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations."126 It is through this
mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire
expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

In particular, the Ombudsman details that "the NGO endorsed by the legislator would be among those
organized and controlled by Napoles. In fact, these NGOs were specifically set by Napoles for the x x x
purpose [of having the PDAF funds released]."127 Napoles's staff would then "prepare the PDAF
documents for the approval of the legislator and reflecting the preferred NGO to implement the
undertaking."128 These documents "are transmitted to the IA which, in turn, handles the preparation of
the MOA relating to the project, to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA[,] and the NGO
concerned." "The projects are authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for pork barrel
allocations. [However,] [i]t bears noting that the NGO is directly endorsed by the legislator
[and that] [n]o public bidding or negotiated procurement [took] place."129 As such, there was a
defiance of Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 012-2007 which states that:
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically
earmarks an amount for projects to be specifically contracted
out to NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO through
competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section
53[(j)] of the [IRR-A]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it
must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery] should be
ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a
questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature
rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed
handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine."130 Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the
findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores)131 and Forensic Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui)132 cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the
PDAF documents in their handwriting analyses.133 In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,134 this Court
ruled that "[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a
definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and that "[a] comparison based on a mere [photo]
copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results."135Furthermore,
it may not be amiss to state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be
tested. They still have to authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a
doubt, the prosecution should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui's findings with
evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own handwriting experts during trial to rebut such
findings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen.
Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution:
"[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of
the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of
[Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of
signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same
hands."136 Verily, the Ombudsman's own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the
purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect. "[F]indings of fact by
the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence,"137 as in
this case.

The Ombudsman's finding on the absence of forgery furthr gains credence in light of the July 20, 2011
Letter138signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation Letter). The letter evinces on
its face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his and Cambe's signatures appearing on the
PDAF documents:
After going through these documents and initial examination,
it appears that the signatures and/or initials on these
documents are my signatures or that of my authorized
139
representative.
The Ombudsman further noted that the Confirmation Letter appeared to have originated from Sen.
Revilla's Office because it was issued Bar code/Reference No. 0-2011-13079.140

At this juncture, it deserves mentioning that while Luy indeed admitted that there were times that the
whistleblowers would forge the signatures of the legislators in the PDAF documents, he,
however, explicitly qualified that such forgeries were made "[w]ith the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi
sila po ang nag-uusap":
Sen. Escudero: Ang tanong ko, finorge or may finorge na ba
kayong pirma ng senador o congressman dahil pinepeke nga
'yong beneficiary, 'di ba, galing sa listahan ng kung
sino. x x x.
 Mr. Luy: With the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang
nag-uusap, mav pagkakataon po na fino-forge po.

Sen. Escudero: May pagkakataong fino-forge [ninyo] ang

pirma ng mambabatas?

Mr. Luy: Opo.141

Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the
legislators' signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior agreement
with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this authorization allows for a more expedient
processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need not pass through the
legislator's respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the legislators room for
plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim
their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy's testimony completely makes sense as to
why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to forge their signatures. As such,
even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean that the legislators did not
authorize such forgery.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -
are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the
inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that,
of all the Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy,
Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated142 to have dealt with Napols in the plunder of their PDAF.
Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy
since they were employees of JLN Corporation - the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation and in their
respective capacities, were individually tasked by N&poles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate
the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the
withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.143

Among others, it is interesting to note that, as per Luy's testimony, Sen. Revilla was given his own
codename, same as the other involved legislators with whom Napoles transacted with:

58. T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"?

S: Ang pangalan pong taong [tumanggap] ng pera ang nilalagay

ko sa voucher pero minsan po ay codename ang nilalagay ko.

59. T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"?

S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng

codename kasi daw po ay sa gobyerno kami nagta-transact.

T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang

60. mga "codenames" ng mga ka-transact ni JANET LIM
NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang [Chief of Staff]?

S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,

 "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA" kay Senator Jinggoy
Estrada, "POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla,
"GUERERA" kayCongressman Rizalina Seachon-Lanete,
"BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA,
"BULAKLAK" kay Congressman SAMUEL DANGWA,
"SUHA" kayCongressman ARTHUR
PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kay Congressman EDGAR
VALDEZ. Mayroon pa po ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa
ngayon po ay sila lang po ang aking naalala.144
As observed by this Court in the Reyes case, "the names of the legislators to whom the PDAF shares were
disbursed x x x were identified by the use of 'codenames.' These 'codenames,' which were obviously
devised to hide the identities of the legislators involved in the scheme, were known by a select few in the
JLN Corporation,"145 such as the whistleblowers. The level of detail of the whistleblowers' narration of
facts would surely impress upon a reasonable and prudent mind that their statements were not merely
contrived. In addition, the fact that they had no apparent motive as to why Sen. Revilla, among all others,
would be drawn by the whistleblowers, into such a high-profile case of plundet should likewise be taken
into account. Further, in Reyes, this Court observed that:
[W]histleblower testimonies - especially in corruption cases,
such as this - should not be condemned, but rather, be
welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating
themselves in order to expose the perpetrators and bring them
to justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et
al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.) [590 Phil.
8, 49-50 (2008)], the Court gave recognition and appreciation
to whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that
corruption is often done in secrecy and it is almost
inevitable to resort to their testimonies in order to pin down
the crooked public officers.146
Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter alios
actarule. However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman,147 this Court had unanimously ruled that the
testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of
Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence,
considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation.
This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter:
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of
the whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res
inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters
of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing
rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should
not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court
sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence,
which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules
on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long
as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."
 This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar
observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting
the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection
interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter.
Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on
evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction
and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,"
as in this case.148(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis149 mandates a similar application of the
foregoing ruling to this case.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception
on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."150 Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the
whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his coaccused in
the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore,
the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation
and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should
be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

To add, the prosecution also presented Luy's ledger entries which corroborate his testimony that Sen.
Revilla dealt with Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy's records disclose that the kickbacks
amountpd to "at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007;
P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and P33,512,500.00 for 2010."151

Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or that
none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla
does not mean that they did not personally know of his involvement. Because of their functions
in JLN Corporation as above-stated, it is evident that they had personal knowledge of the fact that
Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she transacted with. More significantly, they
personally processed the PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla's Office, which lasted
for a considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their
testimonies should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.

In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."152 The substantial basis
for crediting the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions
in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned, as well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution
tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert
to pillage his PDAF funds.

The prosecution further submitted the affidavits of Sen. Revilla's corespondents which constitute
direct evidence that provide an account of Sen. Revilla's involvement, this time from the perspective of
certain IA officials.

Among others, National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal,
echoed the Ombudsman's finding that "[Sen.] Revilla, through Cambe, [was] responsible for 'identifying
the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs' which was manifested in the letters
of [Sen.] Revilla[.]"153

For his part, Technology Resource Center (TRC) Deputy, Director General Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan)
narrated that he met Janet Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007. According to him, Napoles introduced
herself as "the representative of certain legislators who supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for
PDAF-funded projects"; at the same occasion, Napoles told him that "her principals were then Senate
President [Enrile], [Sen. Revilla], [and] [Sen. Estrada.]" Cunanan further averred that he "often ended
up taking and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff
members," all in connection with PDAF projects. In addition, Cunanan even conveyed that Luy would
occasionally go to his office to pressure him to expedite the release of the PDAF funds by calling the
offices of the legislators concerned.154

Cunanan's statements were furthr corroborated by TRC Department Manager III Francisco B. Figura
(Figura), wno averred that legislators would "highly recommend" NGOs/foundations as conduit
implementors and that if TRC disagreed with their recommendations, said legislators wquld feel insulted
and take away their PDAF from TRC, resulting in the latter losing the chance to earn service
fees.155According to Figura, this set up rendered TRC officials powerless to disregard the wishes of Sen.
Revilla especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.156

At this juncture, this Court would like to dispel the notion. that due process rights were violated when Sen.
Revilla was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents in the preliminary investigation
proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R. Nos. 212427-28. This matter was already
resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court said:
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his
supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
of the affidavits of his [co-respondents]. The right of the
respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3 (b), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court
has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties.
or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine."
Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman's
Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
of the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting
witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
157
of the affidavits of his co-respondents.
In any event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted Sen.
Revilla's requests to be furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the opportunity to
comment thereto.158 Thus, there is more reason to decline his flawed claims of denial of due process.
Case law statethat the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard,159 which was undeniably
afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.

The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report)160 also buttress the finding
of probable cause against Sen.Revilla. This report presents'in detail the various irregularities in the
disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators in the years 2007 to 2009, such as: (a) the IAs
not actually implementing the purported projects, and instead, directly releasing the funds to the NGOs
after deducting a "management fee," which were done at the behest of the sponsoring legislator,
including Sen. Revilla; (b) the involved NGOs did not have any track record in the implementation of
government projects, provided fictitious addresses, submitted false documents, and were selected
without any public bidding and complying with COA Circular No. 2607-001 and GPPB Resolution No.
12-2007; and (c) the suppliers who purportedly provided supplies to the NGOs denied ever dealing with
the latter. Resultantly, the COA Report concluded that the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla were
"ghost" or inexistent.161
The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications conducted by the Field
Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to determine whether or not Sen. Revilla's
PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood projects. In the course of investigation, it was
revealed that the mayors and municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received livelihood assistance
kits/packages, purportedly procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF, actually denied receiving the same and
worse, were not even aware of any PDAF-funded projects intended for their benefit. Moreover, the
signatures on the certificates of acceptance and delivery reports were forged, and in fact, the supposed
beneficiaries listed therein were neither residents of the place where they were named as such; had
jumbled surnames; deceased; or even downright fictitious. The foregoing led the FIO to similarly
conclude that the purported livelihood projects were "ghost" projects, and that its proceeds amounting to
P517,000,000.00 were never used for the same.162

Taking together all of the above-stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend to prima
facieestablish that irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF and that he
had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head of Office which unquestionably exercised
operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman correctly observed, "[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by
virtue of his position as a Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority
projects and programs. He indorsed [Napoles's] NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks
and commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be
'ghost projects', and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts,
[there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."163 Hence, he should
stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten
wealth in the amount of at least P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or
acquired through a combination or series of overt acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore,
Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder.

Besides, case law holds164 that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of
a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla and his
copetitioners165), any question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.

In fine, Sen. Revilla's petitions in G.R. Nos. 212427-28 and G.R. Nos. 212694-95 are dismissed for
lack of merit.

IV. Probable Cause Against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him, as well as its failure to furnish him copies of his
corespondents' counter-affidavits.

The above-discussed pieces of evidence are all equally significant to establish probable cause against
Cambe. There is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such
authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the
allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as
the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various
JLN-controlled NGOs.166

Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for
himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who would go to Napoles's office
and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla's
"commissions" or "kickbacks" coming from the PDAF scam. The cash would come either from Luy's vault
or from Napoles herself.167 In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and
Napoles.

For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be no valid objection against the appreciation of the
PDAF documents and whistleblowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cam
be at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the
counter-affidavits ,of his co-respondents. Thus, this Court holds that Cambe should likewise stand trial
for the crimes charged, and his petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 be dismissed.

V. Probable Cause Against Napoles.

In G.R. Nos. 213536-37, Janet Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014
Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the
specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public
officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan.

Napoles's arguments are untenable.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the
mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman, Napoles would approach
legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and "offer to 'acquire' his x x x PDAF allocation in exchange for a
'commission' or kickback amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF."168 Once Napoles was informed
of the availability of Sen Revilla's PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the available
projects specifically indicating the IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are released by
Sen. Revilla's Office, Napoles would then give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to Sen.
Revilla, or in case of his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen. Revilla's behalf.
Once the SARO and/or the NCA regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver the
promised "kickbacks" to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles's
NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of which turned out to be "ghost" or "inexistent;" thus,
allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.169

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the
accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman,
this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as
it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other
personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's
PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause
against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to
illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government.

That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has
been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private
individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said
officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.170 In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in
concert with public officers in the systematic pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly
indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

Thus, Napoles's petition in G.R. Nos. 213536-37 is dismissed.

VI. Probable Cause Against De Asis.

In G.R. Nos. 213477-78, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of gravely abusing its discretion in finding
probable cause against him for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, contending, inter alia,
that the performance of his functions as driver and messenger of Napoles hardly constitutes overt acts of
the aforesaid crimes or a willful participation thereof. In this regard, he asserts that as a mere high school
graduate and former security guard, it is highly unimaginable for him to conspire with his employer and
other high-ranking government officials to commit the aforesaid crimes.

The petition has no merit.

Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator171 of KPMFI which was one of
the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF
allocations.172 Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly n,amed De Asis as one of those who
prepared money to be given to the lawmaker.173 Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among
others, rec ived the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that,
after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet
Napoles's house.174 Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all
probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.

To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on his perceived
want of criminal intent, as well as the alleged absence of the elements of the crimes charged. However,
such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are better ventilated during trial and not during
preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown
trial on the merits.175

In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict De Asis
for the crimes charged. Consequently, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213477-78 is dismissed.

VII. Probable Cause Against Lim.

In G.R. Nos. 213532-33, Lim argues that the Ombudsman. gravely abused its discretion in finding
probable cause against him for Plunder. According to him, the criminal complaints do not allege a specific
action he committed that would demonstrate his involvement for the crime charged.

Lim's contention is without merit.

As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course
of the perpetuation of the PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles - which includes Lim -
would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla.176 The preparation and
delivery of kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that relate to his
involvement in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the money and
did not deliver the same as he claims,177 the act of preparation is still connected to the common objective
of the conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause against him for thb crime
charged. Hence, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213532-33 is likewise dismissed.

VIII. Probable Cause Against Relampagos, et al.

Meanwhile, in G.R. Nos. 218744-59, DBM employees Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated November 13, 2014178 and May 13, 2015179 which judicially found
probable cause against them for eight (8) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, thereby
affirming the Ombudsman's earlier finding of probable cause against them (at least for the said eight [8]
counts that were affirmed). In particular, they argue that: (a) they cannot be faulted for issuing the
SAROs without prior IA endorsement as it was authorized under the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs)
for the years 2007 to 2009; and (b) there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the
DBM itself prescribes shorter periods in the processing of the same.180

Relampagos, et al.'s arguments fail to persuade.

As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs issued in the
perpetuation of the PDAF scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where
Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working - a finding that they themselves did not dispute.181 More
significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively identified Relampagos, et al. as Napoles's
"contact persons" in the DBM; and (b) the COA Report found irregularities in their issuances of the
aforesaid SAROs and NCAs.182 Ostensibly, these circumstances show Relampagos et al.'s manifest
partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and her cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the
Government. Thus, they must stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

As to their contentions that there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the GAAs for
the years 2007 to 2009 authorized such issuances even without prior IA endorsement and that the DBM
itself prescribes a shorter processing time for the same, suffice it to say that these are matters of defense
that are better ventilated in a full-blown trial. The timing of the SARO releases by these DBM officials, as
well as any deviations from legal procedure are but part of a multitude of factors to be threshed out
during trial in order to determine their exact culpability. Verily, the confines of a preliminary investigation
do not yet allow a full exposition of the parties' claims. Relampagos, et al.'s petition in G.R. Nos.
218744-59 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

Case law states that "the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue. All
that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the
counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."183 In the review of the Ombudsman's
determination of probable cause, we are guided by this Court's pronouncement in Vergara v.
Ombudsman,184 where it was ruled that:
[C]ourts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of
discretion in determining probable cause unless there are
compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable
cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a
showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to justify the
issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse
of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted
without jurisdiction.185
Meanwhile, with respect to the Sandiganbayan's judicial determination of probable cause, this Court,
in Delos-Santos Dio v. Court of Appeals,186 enlightens that:
[A] judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after
the filing of the information in court is appropriate only
when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly
inferred from the evidence presented and not when its
existence is simply doubtful. After all, it call)lot be
expected that upon the filing of the information in court the
prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence
necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the
objective of a previously-conducted preliminary
investigation being merely to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.187
In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding
probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record
and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key
documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings;
otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation.
Jurisprudence teaches us that "[i]n dealing with probable cause[,] athe very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be proved."188 Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the standard of
probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a quo. All the
petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of erit. The findings of probable cause against all
petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to
commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED. cral awlawlibrary

G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the Resolution2of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005
dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria
Amante for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province
of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold
of a cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to
defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection,
which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she
obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22,
1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent
Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours
from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
(OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated
to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the
OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at
Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in
relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in
the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00),
Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of her office, for which she is
duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent
and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said
cash advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and
prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed
with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete
proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the
unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not
included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the
Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was
occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where
the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's
claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should
be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the
assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has
jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those
enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the
law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade
of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case
against Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to
the proper court.

The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and
academic.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION

OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN
RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA
1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II,
SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner
disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public
office.

Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way
the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to
the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the
paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante,
the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over
cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases
where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those
mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or
felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official
must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a
decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it
cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of
the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. 1avvph i1

In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public
officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in
relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with
the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a
background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of
official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. x x x

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of
The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February
5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on
May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the
time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that
to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence
of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said
provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case
was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation
to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A.

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over
the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive
branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the
law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still
fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors,
vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same
law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an
offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following
ratiocination:

x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of
specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases
mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their
salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to
cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are the specific cases mentioned in
Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are committed even by
public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration,
jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however,
falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized
that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a
requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1)
(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is
charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a
case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This
being the case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar
because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case,
even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under
Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the
aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official
occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could
exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary
grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 1avvph i1

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the
discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this
Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606,
as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless
of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the
Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office.
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public
officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be
charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies
in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are
limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense
committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or
rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with
grave threats, this Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal
councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at
and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a
privilege speech critical of petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations,
the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official
functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution
wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when
he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by
complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the
municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been
irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege
speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed
against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals
that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section
4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had
been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the
Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The
said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses
involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of
the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b),
it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public
officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have
been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the
principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that
principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle
set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation
to the accused’s office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office
[is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through
Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element of the crime
of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x20

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those
public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is
a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of
the lawmakers  who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers  to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash
the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student
regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December
31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student
regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the
KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of
Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City,
while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her
office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University
of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested
the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from
the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000
and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands
made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and
refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has
no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against
Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not
from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As
a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed
that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds.
Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not
alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law.
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all
phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer.
As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds
the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s
stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion
for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this
Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to
his office.

Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student

body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does
she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection
(g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the
inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that
the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the
general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by
law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to
enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint,
on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers
and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and
such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and
hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board
of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of
directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is
performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation.
This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested
with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million was
received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a
matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this
case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING
THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed
in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada,
not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds.
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot
be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The
ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule
applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a
plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require
the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the
denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion
or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions
to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss
the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on
lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar
by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent
judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based
on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the
amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered
him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this
Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25She
repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It
bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative
history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times,
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however,
That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has
not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The
said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on
private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person
having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or
take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting
or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government,
in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal
relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices
and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat
maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to
be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to
the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan
sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong
batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive

Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta
and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National
Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9,
1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and
Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of
Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27,
1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance
and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness
in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial
Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses.
As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of
Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same
crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a
fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private
persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts,
apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution
does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec.
1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right.
It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public

office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the
BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More

than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or
respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x
x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
did not quash the information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and
not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the
merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference
to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of
his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer
shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio
D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The
Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that
with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a
repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A

lawyer’s conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor
and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL, Petitioners, v. THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus 1 with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution 2 dated
June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the order 3 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental petition, 4 petitioners assail the
Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without or beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that
court and the People of the Philippines as additional parties in this case. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: chanrob1es virtua l 1aw library

PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both residents of Barangay Dampulan,
Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police
Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits, 5 filed
before the Philippine National Police — Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third
Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein
petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, 6 municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy"
Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo
Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan
likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal
Police Force of dereliction of duty.

The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998,
PO2 Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents’ house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva
Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified
persons accompanied them. Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service
pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then
forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.

PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him
with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and
said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" (You son of a
bitch! I will kill you, I will create an accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the
municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent
hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng
senaryo at report." (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a report.)

At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, PO2
Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido
Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck
PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, while Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel was holding the latter.
PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was told that he
would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter
that he was in good physical condition.

PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened
because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided
a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested
members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor. 7

In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he
suffered and other documentary evidence. 8

After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action. 9

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and required
petitioners and their companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,
10 petitioners and their companions denied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2
Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They further
alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm
complaint.

On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution 11 recommending
that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime
of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the
other respondents below were dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.

On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution. chanrob1es virtu a1 1aw 1ibrary

Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777 12 for less serious physical
injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778 13 for
grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14, 1998 resolution of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation 14 with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was,
however, denied by the OSP in the assailed order 15 dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998,
the Ombudsman approved the OSP’s order of denial.

On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.

With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by
virtue of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the resolution and the order.

On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners’ motion 16 reiterating their plea for the issuance
of a TRO directing public respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.
17

Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution: chanrob1es virtu al 1aw library

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN

DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL
CONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHEN PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE ARREST
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION OF
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and

3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED
AGAINST PETITIONERS.

Petitioners’ formulation of the issues may be reduced to the following: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw library

(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the informations
against petitioners?

(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal
Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider
the exculpatory evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good
physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija. 18 With such admission, PO2
Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him
and need not be proven in any other proceeding. 19

Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP, counter that
petitioners raise a factual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate
that this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners in the charges against them and being
evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in a full-blown trial. 20

We find the present petition without merit.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 21 Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will
not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. 22 Said exercise of powers is based upon his
constitutional mandate 23 and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the
office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 25 we held
that:chanrob1es virt ual 1aw library

This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise
of such discretion.

In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.

There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding
PO2 Eduardo’s admission that he was in good physical condition when he was released from the police
headquarters. 26 Such admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records
show that no such averment was made in petitioners’ counter-affidavit 27 nor was there any document
purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only
raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration. 28 In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did
admit signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical condition when he left the police
station. However, the admission merely applied to the execution of said document and not to the
truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but
a matter of evidence best addressed to the public respondents’ appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature
and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. chanrob1es virt ua1 1aw 1ibrary

Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but now bears
stressing: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw library

. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value
of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision,
resolution or order. 29
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold
positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. 30 As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay
captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 31

Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 32 Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 33 and
Layus v. Sandiganbayan, 34 we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he
is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249, 35 provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused (Emphasis supplied) are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" 36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." 37 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel
has a salary grade of 27. 38 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No.
24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case
No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.

First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the
exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. 39 As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.

Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual
remedies provided by law are adequate and available. 40 Prohibition is granted only where no other
remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete
remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the
issuance of the writ. 41 In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law.
They could have filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They have
only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown any adequate excuse for their
failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the
informations, during their much delayed arraignment, 42 but its denial is not a proper subject
for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory order. 43

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court
whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.
44 The foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court and the expediency
of preventing unnecessary litigation; 45 it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not properly
rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it. 46 The records show that petitioners
only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.

Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. 47
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment. 48 Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the
exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of
mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be. 49 Moreover, as
earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where such
remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie. 50

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. chanrob1es virt ua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and
set aside the August 18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent
Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.

The facts are plain and undisputed.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in
relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is
under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets,
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in
Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the
registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the
name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the
damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the
OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing
Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No.
8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an
official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a
compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the
subject law would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher
applies only to officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those
specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are
separated by the conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are different,
apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together "relating one to the other" to give
effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was
specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’
intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was
already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to
dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.

Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v.

Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.
On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution,
disposing: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the
instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore
issued against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those
exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary
Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that
respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government
occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary
Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s
pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan 15 were cited.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.

Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
required respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due
course thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed
by petitioner.

At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary
Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the public
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying
as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who
is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains
that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606,20Section
20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in
Section 4, Article XI thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A.
7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further
modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.30

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which
states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:

"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.

"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

x x x"

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher,
and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their
salary grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director
and higher" is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate
Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
over the cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of
the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall
remain with the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court
to concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law
became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of
the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades
were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding
important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis supplied)

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to
big-time cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those
accused who are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small
fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by
the law.36 In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying
a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration
in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically
included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the
jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is
given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat
quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
statute – its every word.39

Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,40 a
department manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a
student regent of the University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department
and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and
Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold
any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues,
his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the Regional
1avvph i1

Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of
the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary
Grade 26.44It was opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the
offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence,
jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying
positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation
to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position
of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of
jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of
the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is
classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the
ground that respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
Records disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on September 17, 2009.Also, he was
arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
The August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan
Second Division, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

E. Jurisdiciton of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 229781

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN.
RONALD M. DELA ROSA, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police,
PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS, in his capacity as Director, Headquarters Support
Service, SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as Chief, PNP Custodial
Service Unit, and ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION,
INSTRUCTION OR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE
ISSUED BY THE COURT, Respondents
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status
Quo Ante Order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De
Lima. In it, petitioner assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge
Hon. Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204,
in Criminal Case No. 17-165, entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1)
the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of
arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated
February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing the petitioner to the
custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and finally, (4) the supposed omission of the
respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC.2

Antecedents

The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted
several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following complaints with the
Department of Justice:

a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and Corruption

(VACC), represented by Dante Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al.;"

b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel Lasala vs.
Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;"

c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian, represented by his wife
Roxanne Sebastian, vs. Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" and

d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs.

Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al. "4

Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors (DOJ Panel),5 headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor
Peter Ong, was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation.6

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,7 wherein the
petitioner, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the
Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion").8 In the main, the petitioner argued that
the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints against her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel,
the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the
complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.

A hearing on the Omnibus Motion was conducted on December 9, 2016,9 wherein the
complainants, YACC, Reynaldo Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala (Lasala), filed
a Joint Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion. 10
On December 12, 2016, petitioner, in turn, interposed a Reply to the Joint
Comment/Opposition filed by complainants VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In addition,
petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve Pending Incident and to
Defer Further Proceedings. 11

During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has
decided not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions.12 The
DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and
declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner moved
for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel.13

On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition
and Certiorari14assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her.
The petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are
currently pending with the Special 6th Division of the appellate court.15Meanwhile, in the
absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded
with the conduct of the preliminary investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated
February 14, 2017,17 recommended the filing of Informations against petitioner De Lima.
Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner De
Lima and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City. One of the Infonnations
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-16518 and raffled off to Branch 204, presided by
respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for violation of Section 5 in relation
to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the
following averments:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of
Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of
their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P.
Dayan, being then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed to
De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in
the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in
the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power,
position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid of De
Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being
lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and
traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima,
through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting
to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the high profile
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.19

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20mainly raising the following: the
RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks
authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the
allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the
Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged
as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order 22finding
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused.
The Order stated, viz.:
 After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by
the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA
M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC
DAYAN.

WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the

abovementioned accused.

SO ORDERED.23

Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017 ,24 which
contained no recommendation for bail, was issued against petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of
Arrest on petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017
Order,25 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for
the following reliefs:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated
23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and
the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch
204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima, et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge

from conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash
is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary

restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the
proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior
to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February
23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom.26

On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the respondents,
interposed its Comment to the petition.27 The OSG argued that the petition should be
dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the hierarchy of
courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive grounds, the OSG
asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged against the
petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional and procedural rules, and
so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the assailed orders and
warrant.28

On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant
issues raised. The Court then heard the parties in oral arguments on March 14, 21, and 28,
2017.29
In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30 claiming that
petitioner falsified the juratsappearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for
injunctive relief. The OSG alleged that while the advertedjurats appeared to be notarized
by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest
logbook31 in the PNP Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame for February 24, 2017 does
not bear the name of Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG maintained, petitioner De
Lima did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date in Quezon
City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the petition should therefore be
dismissed outright for the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.

In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria Cecille
C. Tresvalles-Cabalo dated March 20, 201732 to shed light on the allegations of falsity
in petitioner'sjurats.

The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017.33

The Issues

From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10, 201734 and
discussed by the parties during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution by this Court
are:

Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with
the Court of Appeals.

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information

before the trial court renders the instant petition premature.

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule
against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the
assailed Information.

B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding

probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is
resolved or until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.

OUR RULING

Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront the issue
of the alleged falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for
injunctive relief.

In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not
notarize the petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and
Affidavit of Merit in this wise:

4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to PNP, CIDG,
Camp Crame, Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the previous night.

5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was
informed that the Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.

6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De
Lima and confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator
given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested from her staff a photocopy
of any of her government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature. A
photocopy of her passport was presented to me. I compared the signatures on the Petition
and the Passport and I was able to verify that the Petition was in fact signed by her.
Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of her Passport to the Petition which I appended to
my Notarial Report/Record.

7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that
it was her who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.

8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I sought
entry to the detention facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM). x x x

xxxx

11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to Senator
De Lima to confirm the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave Camp Crame.35

At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have "stamped and
signed the [Verification and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]" inside Camp Crame,
presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it necessary to, hours later, "confirm with
Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized the Petition." Nonetheless, assuming
the veracity of the allegations narrated in the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that
petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the
certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty.
Tresvalles-Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."

Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to
sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary, viz.:

SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary

public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
 (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such

instrument or document.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces the
evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires /roof of its
due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence,"37 the same cannot be
considered controlling in determining compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and
2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn
certificate of non-forum shopping."

In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." "A
pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as
an unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed." "Failure to
comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."

In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly
swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and
invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. The significance of
a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity was elucidated in William Go Que
Construction v. Court of Appeals,39where this Court held that:

In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against

Forum Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under
oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not
indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private
respondents) competent evidence of identities.

Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004,

entitled the "2004 Rules on Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice), ajurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

xxxx

In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that

noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein "does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order
its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
 circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby."
"Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct." Here, there was no
substantial compliance with the verification requirement as it cannot be
ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the truth
of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427
given the lack of competent evidence of any of their identities. Because of
this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief
is shrouded in doubt.

For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground
of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or
compelling reasons."' Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist -
any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies
the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private
respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is
pending in another forum.

xxxx

Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that

the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification
against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a
party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora." The important purposes behind these requirements cannot
be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying
their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially called for in
light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the
remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by
simply treating the insufficient submissions before it as compliance with its
Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a
proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently
and grossly ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused
its discretion. All things considered, the proper course of action was for it
to dismiss the petition.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that
the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and
not merely speculative. It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a
meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere
expedience or sheer caprice,41as what apparently happened in the present case. Similarly,
the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature also
negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the filing of
the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned pleading that
does not deserve the cognizance of this Court.42 In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman,43the Court held thus:
 The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the
requirement of verification and that of certification against forum shopping.
A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading and thus
produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certifv against forum
shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, and is not curable by amendment of the initiatory pleading.
(Emphasis and italicization from the original.)

Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary. There is,
therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner's non-compliance
therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief of certiorari to
observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a "mere
technicality."44 Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these
prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.45 Thus, as
in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is to dismiss outright the
present petition.

Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits denial on
several other grounds.

PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court.46 It
will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts.47 The
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important
component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical
and arbitrary reasons.48 In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,49the Court
explained the reason for the doctrine thusly:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence
of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned
to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when
serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

xxxx

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented
before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law
which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the
facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In
many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the "actual case" that makes ripe a determination of the
 constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be
national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts
at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still
be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that

reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is
collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of
the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs
can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground
or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of
some confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court
of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals,
this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly
performs that role.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court
were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent
vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to

the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be
allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case
is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by
this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review
involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the
petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order
complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy. 51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present

petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is
obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety
of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither
will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to
the minority party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent
judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the
issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of
her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also
forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the
government.
Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first
impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she
the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact, stripped
of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that could
have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do so in
the first place.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be
disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the
grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself,
this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of law. It is
established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it is from a
review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor,
including other documents and/ or evidence appended to the Information.52 This matter,
therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate court, which is in the better
position to review and determine factual matters.

Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the
rule on the hierarchy of courts in the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the
practical aspects of the administration of justice in deciding to apply the exceptions rather
than the rule. However, it is all the more for these practical considerations that the Court
must insist on the application of the rule and not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner
herself alleges, with the President having declared the fight against illegal drugs and
corruption as central to his platform of government, there will be a spike of cases brought
before the courts involving drugs and public officers.53 As it now stands, there are 232,557
criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other
offenses pending before the R TCs.54 This Court cannot thus allow a precedent allowing
public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants to
be brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling
reason.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by
petitioner's Prayer, which to restate for added emphasis, provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and fair play,
Petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated
23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the
Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 204,
Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge

from conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash
is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary

restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the
proceedings; and
 d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior
to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February
23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom.55 (Emphasis supplied)

Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated
February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated
February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention
and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.

More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b)
of the prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an
unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the
existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against interest
binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.56 It is based on the presumption that "no man
would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. "57 It can be
presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it does
not.58

Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in
filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."

Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to
Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the
petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to
Quash according to the desire of petitioner.

This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should not
pre-empt the action of a trial court:

Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works
against them. Under that provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty
stipulated by the parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the
court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial
court has not yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon by
CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable. Such finding will be made by
the trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their
respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI
and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is
premature.59 (Emphasis supplied)

In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60the Court likewise held that a
petition for certiorari can be resorted to only after the court a quo has already and actually
rendered its decision. It held, viz.:

We note, however, that the appellate court never actually ruled on whether
or not petitioner's right had prescribed. It merely declared that it was in a
position to so rule and thereafter required the parties to submit
memoranda. In making such a declaration, did the CA commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? It did not.
 xxxx

All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided

nothing and whatever petitioner's vehement objections may be (to any
eventual ruling on the issue of prescription) should be raised only after
such ruling shall have actually been promulgated.

The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.61(Italicization from the original. Emphasis
supplied.)

An analogous ruling was made by this Court in Diaz v. Nora, where it ruled
in this wise:

x x x In the case of the respondent labor arbiter, he has not

denied the motion for execution filed by the petitioner. He
merely did not act on the same. Neither had petitioner
urged the immediate resolution of his motion for execution
by said arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it was
not even given the opportunity to pass upon the question
raised by petitioner as to whether or not it has jurisdiction
over the appeal, so the records of the case can be
remanded to the respondent labor arbiter for execution of
the decision.

Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate

remedy to seek relief from public respondents but he failed
to avail himself of the same before coming to this Court. To
say the least, the petition is premature and must be struck
down.62 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground
that these were not criminal cases that involved a pending motion to
quash. However, it should be obvious from the afore-quoted excerpts that
the nature of the cases had nothing to do with this Court's finding of
prematurity in those cases. Instead, what was stressed therein was that
the lower courts had not yet made, nor was not given the opportunity to
make, a ruling before the parties came before this forum.

Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized

considering that petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of
the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively
in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be
preempting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said
motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of
orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes
an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial court, as the latter
abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on
the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements
set before this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of
"final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise
its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is

in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed

is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts

the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no controversy for this
Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of the lower
court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter
provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a
vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review a non-existent court action. It can only act to
protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it is
not for this Court to negate "uncertain contingent future event that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all," as the lower court's
feared denial of the subject Motion to Quash.63

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of
controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues are
involved."64 The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts
through avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves
in abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not
present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that
has not and indeed may never transpire."65
Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of
this Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls
short of the Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to
Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion
for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a
judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this Court to declare as having
been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no]

other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in law."66 Thus, the failure
to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later discussed, before a
premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23

and 24, 2017 Orders she is currently assailing in this Petition. As this
Court held in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a] motion for
reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its
factual and legal errors x x x [it] is mandatory before the filing of a petition
for certiorari."67The reasons proffered by petitioner fail to justify her present
premature recourse.

Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of
litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of Article
VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and attention to
matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket.
There is no reason to consider the proceedings at bar as an exception.

PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails

himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
other court. It is considered an act of malpractice as it trifles with the courts
and abuses their processes.68 Thus, as elucidated in Luzon Iron
Development Group Corporation v. Bridgestone Mining and Development
Corporation,69forum shopping warrants the immediate dismissal of the
suits filed:

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of

multiple judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the
purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if
not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is
that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes
which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon
orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.

xxxx
 What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the
vexation caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different
courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the
same issues.

xxxx

We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against
forum-shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any confusion, this Court
adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of
these rules results in the dismissal of a case. The acts committed and
described herein can possibly constitute direct contempt.70

This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which
states that "[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other.
Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.71

Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both actions are
the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity. 72

Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence necessary to
sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if
the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same
facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within
the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is
not.73

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the
criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor
General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending
before the trial court.

As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to
Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same.
In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the
alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of
the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to
indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in
both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and
her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our ruling in Jent v. Tullet Prebon
(Philippines), Inc. 74 does not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and the
motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar if not the same reliefs.
What is more, while Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an
"appeal or special civil action for certiorari" from the rule against the violation of forum
shopping, the good justice overlooks that the phrase had been used with respect to forum
shopping committed through successive actions by a "party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum."75 The exception with respect
to an "appeal or special civil action for certiorari" does not apply where the forum shopping
is committed by simultaneous actions where no judgment or order has yet been rendered
by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on the Motion to Quash.
Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R TC
are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against
forum shopping.

With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in the
present case. Should we grant the petition and declare the RTC without jurisdiction over
the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's Motion to Quash in deference to this
Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash in the
interim, the instant petition will be rendered moot and academic.

In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a party
to a case before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright because petitions that cover
simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and expeditious processing and
adjudication of cases.

On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the
instant petition on substantive grounds.

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No.
17-165, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She
posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct
Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as
the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming
that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan
still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the
Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some
justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the Information
charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive jurisdiction to
try violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the
petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as
an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even
those committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the
laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was
streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary to clarify
the crime with which the petitioner is being charged. For ease of reference, the
Information filed with the R TC is restated below:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

Versus Criminal Case No. 17-165

LEILA M. DE LIMA (NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315 and NPS No.

XVl-INV-16K-00336) For: Violation of the
(66 Laguna de Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
South Bay Village, Paraiiaque City and/or 2002,Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Room 502, GSIS Building, Financial Center, Section 26 (b), and Section 28, Republic Act
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City), RAFAEL No. 9165 (lllegal Drug Trading)
MARCOS Z. RAGOS (c/o National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila) and
RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, (Barangay
Galarin, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan), Accused

x-------------------------------------x

INFORMATION

The undersigned Prosecutors, constituted as a Panel pursuant to

Department Orders 706 and 790 dated October 14, 2016 and November
11, 2016, respectively, accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z.
RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in
relation to Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b) and Section 28, Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of
2002, committed as follows:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013,

in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De
Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of
Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then
the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by
taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and
confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then
the employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De
Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence
over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there
commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De
Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and
authority demand, solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the
Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by
reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized
by law and through the use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and
thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and
Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to
Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012,
 Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012,
and One Hundred Thousand (₱l00,000.00) Pesos
weekly "tara" each from the high profile inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison.

CONTRARY TO LAW.76

Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the
Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very designation of the
crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is
charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, 77 the
designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being charged, viz.:

The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation

of the offense as appearing in the Information. The designation of the
offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being
charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble
states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No.7610."78(Emphasis supplied.)

Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted
would convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug
Trading. The pertinent provisions of RA 9165 read:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall

mean:

xxxx

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous

drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail,
mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money
or any other consideration in violation of this Act.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

xxxx
 SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or conspiracy to
commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty
prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

xxxx

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical;

xxxx

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. -

The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall
be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any
public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of
Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the
other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading.
The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as
"a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of
substances,"79necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is the
bribery and corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent
vintage regarding billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports
without the scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed
hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial
contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the offense for
which the persons involved should be penalized.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately,
the Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under
Article 210 of the RPC.80 As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on
solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery,
form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The
averments on how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply
complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in
willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and
other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and
Section 28, of RA 9165.

On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the actual
trafficking of dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non
sequitur given that the allegation of conspiracymakes her liable for the acts of her
co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a co-conspirator to
take a direct part in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not even know of all the
parts which the others have to perform,81 as conspiracy is the common design to commit a
felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. 82 As long
as the accused, in one way or another, helped and cooperated in the consummation of a
felony, she is liable as a co-principal.83 As the Information provides, De Lima's participation
and cooperation was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the NBP inmates.
The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of evidence that need
not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out during trial.
Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the
necessary elements of Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases
supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for a valid Information for Illegal Drug
Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of these cases was "Illegal Sale" of
dangerous drugs -- a crime separate and distinct from "Illegal Trading" averred in the
Information against De Lima. The elements of "Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the
elements of Illegal Trading under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), of RA 9165. The
definitions of these two separate acts are reproduced below for easy reference:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall

mean:

xxxx

(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other
consideration.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous

drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail,
mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money
or any other consideration in violation of this Act.

It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes
much broader than that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered
as only one of the possible component acts of illegal trading which may be committed
through two modes: (1) illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or (2) acting as a broker
in any transactions involved in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.

On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses punishable
by RA 9165. Section 3(r) of RA 9165 provides:

(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery,

administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation,
distribution, importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.

In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are defined as
follows:

(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body
of any person, with or without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation,
ingestion or other means, or of committing any act of indispensable
assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to
himself/herself unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for
purposes of medication.

xxxx

(d) Chemical Diversion. - The sale, distribution, supply or transport of

legitimately imported, in-transit, manufactured or procured controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted, mixtures or in concentrated
form, to any person or entity engaged in the manufacture of any
dangerous drug, and shall include packaging, repackaging, labeling,
 relabeling or concealment of such transaction through fraud, destruction of
documents, fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration, use of front
companies or mail fraud.

xxxx

(i) Cultivate or Culture. - Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or

permitting the planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the source
of a dangerous drug.

xxxx

(k) Deliver. - Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another,

personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.

xxxx

(m) Dispense. - Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or

any dangerous drug with or without the use of prescription.

xxxx

(u) Manufacture. - The production, preparation, compounding or

processing of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from
substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical
synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and
shall include any packaging or repackaging of such substances, design or
configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling of its container; except
that such terms do not include the preparation, compounding, packaging
or labeling of a drug or other substances by a duly authorized practitioner
as an incident to his/her administration or dispensation of such drug or
substance in the course of his/her professional practice including research,
teaching and chemical analysis of dangerous drugs or such substances
that are not intended for sale or for any other purpose.

xxxx

(kk) Use. - Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of

consuming, either by chewing, smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing,
drinking or otherwise introducing into the physiological system of the body,
any of the dangerous drugs.

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized
and defined in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of
Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading.

More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it
impossible to provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic
devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way
radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely
perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the subject of
the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital technology coupled with ride sharing and
delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed without getting one's
hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the
elements of Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in
Illegal Trade) would be impractical.

The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by
"acting as a broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the
accused may neither have physical possession of the drugs nor meet the buyer and seller
and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916,
jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a middleman, negotiating
contracts relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:

A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a

commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of
which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never
acting in his own name, but in the name of those who employed him; he is
strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both
parties.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they
actually took no part in the negotiations, never saw the customer."85 For the Court, the
primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing "the buyer and the seller together, even
if no sale is eventually made. "86 Hence, in indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to
require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration.87 For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to
prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the buyer and
seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages,
e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms"
is sufficient.

The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway.
After all, the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion
of whether, what, and whom to charge.88 The exercise of this discretion depends on a
smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the prosecutors.89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there
can be no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but
with violation of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case,
possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend
the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information

may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial,
a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan
or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No.
17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law.90 It is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action.91 Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress
may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and
determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to
the general law on jurisdiction of courts.92

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the
rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain
reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC
as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the
following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court
with the authority to hear drug-related cases:

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of

the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the
Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - x x x x

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case
filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation
and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and
properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of
some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of
proportion to his/her lawful income:

xxxx

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property,
or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall
be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia
legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.

xxxx

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses

to Apply Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - x x x

A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on

dangerous drugs to a Center may be filed by any person authorized by the
Board with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such
person is found.

xxxx

Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with

an Offense to Treatment and Rehabilitation. - If a person charged with an
offense where the imposable penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6)
years and one (1) day, and is found by the prosecutor or by the court, at
any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or
the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and
transmit copies of the record of the case to the Board.

In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public
interest requires that such drug dependent be committed to a center for
treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her commitment
 with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she is being
investigated or tried: x x x

xxxx

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special

courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial
region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act.
The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on
the population and the number of cases pending in their respective
jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases

involving violations of this Act.

Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take
cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals,93this Court
categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug related-cases, as
follows:

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara,

People v. Santos, and Ordonez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this
case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prision
correccional. We say by analogy because these cases involved marijuana,
not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of RA. No.
6425, as amended by Section 17 of RA No. 7659, the maximum quantities
of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of
imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For the latter, if the
quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000 to PIO million shall be
imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the
imposable penalties should be as follows:

xxxx

Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most be only prision
correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no
jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Big.
129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as thus
amended now reads:

xxxx

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we

cannot disregard. x xx The aforementioned exception refers not only to
Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in
Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e.
g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nos.
1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual
 Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First
Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned
regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the
case at bar, Section 39 of RA No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44,
which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said Act.

xxxx

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is
clearly evident from the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of RA
No. 7691.

Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as

amended by P.D. No. 44, is no longer operative because Section 44 of
B.P. Big. 129 abolished the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed,
Section 44 provides that these courts were to be "deemed automatically
abolished" upon the declaration by the President that the reorganization
provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed, this Court should not lose
sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely replaced the Courts
of First Instance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section
44, to wit:

xxxx

Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts of

First Instance carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original
jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect
to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on
Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in
Caro v. Court of Appeals and in the resolution of 26 February 1997
in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial Courts
have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96 this
Court mandates that:

xxxx

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of RA. No. 6425,
as amended, regardless of the quantity involved, are to be tried and
decided by the Regional Trial Courts therein designated as special
courts.94 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The dissents
would highlight the provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the erstwhile drugs
law, which provides:

SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit

Criminal Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable under this Act.
For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction"
is a clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such
"exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and
resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is

unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive
original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from
among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new
phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original
jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs
of each judicial region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on House
Bill No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended:"

Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill
which states that the measure will undertake a comprehensive
amendment to the existing law on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425, as
amended. Adverting to Section 64 of the Bill on the repealing clause, he
then asked whether the Committee is in effect amending or repealing the
aforecited law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision of law which is in
conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or modified
accordingly.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the Committee's intention

was only to amend RA No. 6425, then the wording used should be "to
amend" and not "to repeal" with regard to the provisions that are contrary
to the provisions of the Bill.

Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs

Case, which provides that "the Supreme Court shall designate regional
trial courts to have original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by this
Act," Rep. Dilangalen inquired whether it is the Committee's intention that
certain RTC salas will be designated by the Supreme Court to try
drug-related offenses, although all RTCs have original jurisdiction over
those offenses.

Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the

Supreme Court's assignment of drug cases to certain judges is not
exclusive because the latter can still handle cases other than drug-related
cases. He added that the Committee's intention is to assign drug-related
cases to judges who will handle exclusively these cases assigned to them.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he

would like to propose the following amendment; "The Supreme Court shall
designate specific salas of the RTC to try exclusively offenses related to
drugs."

Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the
creation of exclusive drug courts because at present, almost all of the
judges are besieged by a lot of drug cases some of which have been
pending for almost 20 years.95 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
Senate Bill No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of R TCs that will
exclusively handle drug-related offenses was used to skirt the budgetary requirements
that might accrue by the "creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was never intended to
divest the R TCs of their exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The
Records are clear:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). x x x [W]e would like to propose

the creation of drug courts to handle exclusively drug cases; the
imposition of a 60-day deadline on courts within which to decide drug
cases; and No. 3, provide penalties on officers of the law and government
prosecutors for mishandling and delaying drugs cases.

We will address these concerns one by one.

1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases.

Any comments?

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). We have no objection to this

proposal, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, this is one of the areas where
we come into an agreement when we were in Japan. However, I just
would like to add a paragraph after the word "Act" in Section 86 of the
Senate versions, Mr. Chairman. And this is in connection with the
designation of special courts by "The Supreme Court shall designate
special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each
judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this
Act. The number of court designated in each judicial region shall be based
on the population and the number of pending cases in their respective
jurisdiction." That is my proposal, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). We adopt the same proposal.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr.

Chairman, but I'd like to call your attention to the fact that my proposal is
only for designation because if it is for a creation that would entail another
budget, Mr. Chairman. And almost always, the Department of Budget
would tell us at the budget hearing that we lack funds, we do not have
money. So that might delay the very purpose why we want the RTC or the
municipal courts to handle exclusively the drug cases. That's why my
proposal is designation not creation.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation.

Approved.96

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is
not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are
currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1606.98 As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
 a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Provided, That
the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from
the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not
exceeding One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a

special anti-graft court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its
characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under
Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan

shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to

hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted
by the petitioner and the dissents as a catchall provision, does not operate to strip the R
TCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out by
Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials were
never considered excluded from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes
government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs, while
Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials and
employees. The adverted sections read:
 SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for
Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated,
Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laborat01y Equipment Including the
Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed - The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (Pl0,000,000.00), in
addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates,
misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or surrendered
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful
acts as provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the
proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or
have received any financial or material contributions or donations from
natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as
prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the
government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations.

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. -

The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall
be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any
public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general

rule, couched in a "broad and general phraseology. "100 Exceptions abound. Besides the
jurisdiction on written defamations and libel, as illustrated in Morales 101and People v.
Benipayo, 102 the RTC is likewise given "exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,"103 regardless of
whether such violation was committed by public officers occupying positions classified as
Grade 27 or higher in relation to their offices. In fact, offenses committed by members of
the Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of RA
7055,104"service-connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
but by court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to
their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal
actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be
considered.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction
to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an
exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule
under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be
considered as an exception to the general.105
Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165.
However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no
express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is the rule that an implied
repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so
repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced.106 The presumption against implied repeal
is stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the other general.107 The
mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law
applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage. Thus, this Court ruled:

x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over

a general law - regardless of their dates of passage - and the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception to the general.

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes.

If reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that
manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere
repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the
court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.108

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the

general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by
high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special
law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by
such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by
the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was
committed in relation to the public officials' office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive
jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the
technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of
RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic
substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable.109 In
fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine
their composition and nature.110Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are
specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific
instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence
and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration of
RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant
sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one
of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on
matters relating to prohibited substances.

Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over
violations of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs
cases pending before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a single case filed before
the Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the drugs
law. Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed before
the Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" and malversation.111 With these, it would not only be unwise but reckless to
allow the tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to
hear and decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the accused.

Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate

for emphasis, states:
 Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the
government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or
bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an
amount not exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases
handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving
high-ranking public officials. With the dissents' proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to
the influx of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of
the Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over
drug-related cases despite the accused's high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the
more proper.

Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in
the release from detention and restore the liberty and freedom of petitioner. The R TC has
several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by petitioner
in her Motion to Quash.

Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative
actions when confronted with a Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;

2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or

3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is
meritorious. Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the
Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can order the
amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to

quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an

offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable by
an amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v.
People:

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. In People v.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When a motion to quash is filed
challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and
order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
 pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an
offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances,
courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it
should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By
allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary
appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the
proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process

underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade,
the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a
court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an
Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of
Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions,
effectively curtails the State's right to due process.112

Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a
matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not
yet been arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the amendment of the
February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner. This power to order the
amendment is not reposed with this Court in the exercise of its certiorari powers.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of
the Infonnation, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order
sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution113 or
require the release of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint or information be
filed without discharging the accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:

Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash

is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be
filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the
accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If
no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within
the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may
allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged
unless he is also in custody for another charge.

Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an
information on only two grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already been
extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in petitioner's Motion to
Quash filed before the court a quo.

The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even
granting, for the nonce, the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the
warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy
against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari.
This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established doctrine:

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the

chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to
question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of
procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the
continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's
 decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial
of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but
as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately
question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is

not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under
Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of
an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and
speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial
as discussed above.114 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied the
opportunity to act and rule on petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the gun and
prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing the trial court in its
tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her motion to quash instead
of prematurely filing the instant recourse.

In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss the
petition and direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the
necessary proceedings to expedite the adjudication of the subject criminal case.

RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE

CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST

The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the February 23, 2017 Order115 finding probable cause to arrest the
petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge should have first resolved the pending Motion
to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no probable cause to justify
the petitioner's arrest.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.116

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion
to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or
jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court117 required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
 by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.

It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer
and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to
a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of the
Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a
trial court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea.118 What is more,
it is in accord with this Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller119that "[a]s the presiding
judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused."

This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao 120does not support the petitioner's
position. Miranda does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused
even pending a motion to quash the infonnation. At most, it simply explains that an
accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law.

Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle

requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of
jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed February 23, 2017 Order
even before resolving petitioner's Motion to Quash. There is certainly no indication that
respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in finding probable cause to issue
the petitioner's arrest.

And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017 Order
violated her constitutional rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v.
Makasiar. 121Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally determine the
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed
Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor.122 This hardly deserves serious consideration.

Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before
a warrant of arrest may issue. The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure124 command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the
prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances
presented by both parties. "125 This much is clear from this Court's n1ling in Soliven cited
by the petitioner, viz.:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.126

It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the
warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and
"all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case."
The assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for easy reference and provides,
thusly:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by
the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA
M. DE LIMA x x x.127 (Emphasis supplied.)

As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to
have evaded her duty or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that
substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest. "All the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader category than the "supporting
evidence" required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that
respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her
by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents. At the
very least, she certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, as described in Ho v. People:

The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v.
Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest,
'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the criminal proceeding,
the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb v. De
Leon we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct
a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial
determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence."

xxxx

x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in

finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for
an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on
the existence (or non-existence) of probable cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less
than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could
ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by
forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution
finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence
on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial
finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
 Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the
judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point
is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation,
as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and
functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has
consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely
on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.128 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the
accused.129 She is given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest.130 A finding of probable cause to order the accused's
arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction.131 It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.132

Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found probable
cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is not surprising given that
the only evidence available on record are those provided by the complainants and the
petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this. Thus,
there is nothing to disprove the following preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors
relative to the allegations in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-165:

Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan
should be indicted for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3Gj),
Section 26(b) and Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing to the delivery of PS
million in two (2) occasions, on 24 November 2012 and 15 December
2012, to Dayan and De Lima. The monies came inmate Peter Co [were]
proceeds from illicit drug trade, which were given to support the senatorial
bid of De Lima.

Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support
the senatorial bid of De Lima. Ragos demanded and received
₱100,000 tara from each of the high-profile inmates in exchange for
privileges, including their illicit drug trade. Ablen collected the money for
Ragos who, in turn, delivered them to Dayan at De Lima's residence.133

The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of several
persons. For instance, in his Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent Jovencio P.
Ablen, Jr. narrated, viz.:
21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir.
Ragos asking where I was. I told him I was at home. He replied that he will
fetch me to accompany him on a very important task.

22. Approximately an hour later, he arrived at my house. I boarded his

vehicle, a Hyundai Tucson, with plate no. RGU910. He then told me that
he will deliver something to the then Secretary of Justice, Sen. Leila De
Lima. He continued and said "Nior confidential 'to. Tayong dalawa lang
ang nakakaalam nito. Dadalhin natin yung quota kay Lola. SM 'yang nasa
bag. Tingnan mo."

23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a]
black handbag. When I opened the bag, I saw bundles of One Thousand
Peso bills.
1âwphi1

24. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, we arrived at the house located at

Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both
alighted the vehicle but he told me to stay. He then proceeded to the
house.

26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate. Dep.
Dir. Ragos then handed the black handbag containing bundles of one
thousand peso bills to Mr. Dayan.

27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door of
the house. She was wearing plain clothes which is commonly known
referred to as "duster."

28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high that
is why I was able to clearly see the person at the main door, that is, Sen.
De Lima.

29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw
Mr. Dayan hand the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, which she received.
The three of them then entered the house.

30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house.
He no longer has the black handbag with him.

31. We then drove to the BuCor Director's Quarters in Muntinlupa City.

While cruising, Dep. Dir. Ragos told me "Nior 'wag kang maingay kahit
kanino at wala kang nakita ha," to which I replied "Sabi mo e. e di wala
akong nakita."

32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched
me from my house and we proceeded to the same house located at
Laguna Bay comer Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir.
Ragos "Quota na naman Sir?"Dep. Dir. Ragos replied "Ano pa nga ba,
'tang ina sila lang meron. "134
Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated September 26,
2016 a similar scenario:

8. One morning on the latter part of November 2012, I saw a black

handbag containing a huge sum of money on my bed inside the Director's
Quarters of the BuCor. I looked inside the black handbag and saw that it
contains bundles of one thousand peso bills.

9. I then received a call asking me to deliver the black handbag to Mr.

Ronnie Dayan. The caller said the black handbag came from Peter Co and
it contains "Limang Manoi<' which means Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) as a "manoR' refers to One Million Pesos (Php
1,000,000.00) in the vernacular inside the New Bilibid Prison.

10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house
of the then DOJ Sec. Leila M. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner
Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I knew I had to
deliver the black handbag to Sen. De Lima at the said address.

11. Before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima at the

above[-]mentioned address, I called Mr. Ablen to accompany me in
delivering the money. I told him we were going to do an important task.

12. Mr. Ablen agreed to accompany me so I fetched him from his house
and we proceeded to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above-mentioned
address.

13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we
will do is deliver Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De
Lima. I also told him that the money was in the black handbag that was on
the floor of the passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it, to
which Mr. Ablen complied.

14. Before noon, we arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima located at

Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I alighted
from the vehicle but I went to the gate alone carrying the black handbag
containing the Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for me.
I then handed the handbag containing the money to Mr. Dayan.

17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De Lima
was waiting for us. At the main door, Mr. Dayan handed the black
handbag to Sen. De Lima, who received the same. We then entered the
house.

18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to
my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City.

19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to
again deliver the plastic bag containing money from Peter Co to Mr.
Ronnie Dayan. This time the money was packed in a plastic bag left on my
bed inside my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the outside of
 the bag, I could easily perceive that it contains money because the bag is
translucent.

20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding
to the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay
Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, where I know I could find Mr.
Dayan.

21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I
answered yes.

22. We arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned

address at noontime. I again parked in front of the house.

23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I
was greeted by Mr. Ronnie Dayan. At that point, I handed the bag to Mr.
Dayan. He received the bag and we proceeded inside the house.135

The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by several
felons incarcerated inside the NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified in the following
manner:

6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna

nanghihingi ng kontribusyon sa mgaChinese sa Maximum Security
Compound ng NBP si dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong
pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013 Elections. Dalawang beses akong nagbigay
ng tig-P5 Million para tugunan ang hiling ni Sen. De Lima, na dating DOJ
Secretary;

7. Binigay ko ang mga halagang ito kay Hans Tan para maibigay kay Sen.
Leila De Lima na datingDOJ Secretary. Sa parehong pagkakataon,
sinabihan na lang ako ni Hans Tan na naibigay na ang pera kay Ronnie
Dayan na siyang tumatanggap ng pera para kay dating DOJ Sec. De
Lima Sinabi rin niHans Tanna ang nagdeliver ng pera ay si
dating OIC ng BuCor na si Rafael Ragos.

8. Sa kabuuan, nakapagbigay ang mga Chinese sa loob

ng Maximum ng PIO Million sa mga huling bahagi ng taong 2012 kay
dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado
sa2013 Elections. Ang mga perang ito ay mula sa pinagbentahan ng
illegal na droga.136

All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in
conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the
allegation that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.

Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is
inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons
and whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence.

Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan 137 - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this
Court rule that testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held
that said testimonies should be received with great caution, but not that they would not be
considered. The testimony of Ramos' co-accused was, in fact, admitted in the cited case.
Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman138that
hearsay evidence is admissible during preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long

as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.139 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, the admissibility of evidence,140 their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the
credibility of the witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown
trial,141 not during a preliminary investigation where the technical rules of evidence are not
applied142 nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on the
merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present their respective evidence in
support of their allegations.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence,
have to be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with
dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124295 October 23, 2001

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II,
MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the
Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition1 for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman's action
investigating petitioner for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e).2

On August 23, 1995, we promulgated a decision in Administrative Matter No.

RTJ-94-1270.3 The antecedent facts are as follows:

"x x x [P]ursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the
owners of the properties affected by the project, namely, defendants Tessie Amadeo,
Reynaldo Lao and Rev. Alfonso Galo. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No.
22,052-93 and presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.

"The government won the expropriation case. x x x

"As of May 19, 1994, the DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners, the total sum of
P15,510,415.00 broken down as follows:
Dr. Reynaldo Lao – P 489,000.00
Tessie P. – P 1,094,200.00
Amadeo
Rev. Alfonso - P
Galo 13,927,215.00

"In an order dated April 5, 1994, the lower court granted Tessie Amadeo's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The Order
was received by DPWH (Regional XI) through its Legal Officer, Atty. Warelito Cartagena.
DPWH's counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, received its copy of the order only on
May 10, 1994.

"On April 6, 1994, Clerk of Court Rogelio Fabro issued the corresponding Writ of
Execution. On April 15, 1994, the writ was served by respondent Sheriff Paralisan to the
DPWH-Region XI (Legal Services) through William Nagar.

"On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the
Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy
as 'All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public Works and
Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City'x x x.

"The auction sale pushed through on May 18, 1994 at the DPWH depot in Panacan,
Davao City. Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. x x x Sheriff Paralisan issued
the corresponding certificate of sale in favor of Alex Bacquial. x x x

"Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to

withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from
doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo,
Regional Equipment Engineer, Regional Equipment Services, DPWH depot in Panacan,
Davao City. Engr. Alejo claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and
informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were
still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.

"On May 20, 1994, Alex Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a
'break through' order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties.
The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes on the same date.

"On May 21, 1994, Alex Bacquial and Sheriff Paralisan returned to the depot, armed with
the lower court's order."4

Thus, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot,
including the repairable equipment within the DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from
the depot for five successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily
suspending the writ of execution it earlier issued in the expropriation case and directing
Bacquial not to implement the writ.5

However, on June 21, 1994, the lower court issued another order upholding the validity of
the writ of execution issued in favor of the defendants in Special Civil Case No. 22,
052-93.6

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of
Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court
directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the
report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other
persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. Also, on
September 21, 1994, the Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor
General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D.
No. 807.7

After considering the foregoing facts, on August 23, 1995, the Supreme Court
promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent NORBERTO PARALISAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court (Branch XVII), Davao City, is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, in violation of Section 36 (b), Article IX of PD 807. Accordingly,
respondent sheriff is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. The office of the Court Administrator is directed to conduct an investigation
on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the investigation so warrants.
The Office of the Solicitor General is likewise ordered to take appropriate action to recover
the value of the serviceable or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex
Bacquial."8 (italics ours)

On January 15, 1996, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela (hereafter, Valenzuela) of the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be
charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e)
and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming
of a judge.9

On January 22, 1996, Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao a criminal complaint10 charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).

On February 6, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation

Officer II Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray issued an order directing petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit within ten days.11

On February 22, 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a
motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme
Court.12

On March 15, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray denied the
motion of petitioner.13

Hence, this petition.14

The issue is whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in
the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal
complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he
conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on
the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.
The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation
because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the
propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court
Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge that would
pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

We grant the petition.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

"Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases."15

xxx xxx xxx

"Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary."16 (underscoring ours)

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.17

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the
laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of
powers.18

Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing
a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The
order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not
such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in
the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the
courts. "No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation
service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a
judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous
so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone."19

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the

case and refer the complaint against petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO,
STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY
JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, Petitioners, v. HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order
dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by
the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary
Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP
General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking
officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to
separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino.
The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80,
4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit
of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to
file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents
submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn
statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary
Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco,
in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private
individuals for the following alleged crimes:

A.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James
Wong and Wong Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; andcralawlibrary

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was
made after taking the sworn statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong
Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these
witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino
and the other persons named in the witnesses' sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino
received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit their
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation
on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall.
However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18,
2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by
Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar
set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to
the Court's ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and military
officials such as private respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001,
denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as
basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent's rank and/or civil service classification has no
bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or]
Bribery, nor are they related to respondents' discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman
and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses
committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall
rule thereon with finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General
received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and
Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation
on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued that by
conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsman's mandate
of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the
Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and
Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED,

and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the
respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf,
individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No.
2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners to file
their counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it,
or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by the
petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as
there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will
suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with
Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary
Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of
prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND
THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING

THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT
FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES,
RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING

RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT
THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.
V

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY HELD FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central
question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary
investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the
same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second
proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against the
respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the
assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the
speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case,
considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being
charged have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only
be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the
authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names and
reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in
themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of procedure
are not to be applied when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their
conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions
of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ,
which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. 'It is the declared policy of the State to provide the
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. 'To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have
the following powers and functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the
Secretary of Justice. - There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of
the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are
hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
the cases filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of
Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the
said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and
military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has
already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already
pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases; '.10

The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation
of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including
the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following
rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents
cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the
pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the
matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power
and right to add an input into the Ombudsman's investigation. Only in matters where the
other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make
preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final
decision of the Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the
respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers with
respect to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is
contrary to ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous,
for the Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary
investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such
recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a situation
must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any
stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is
the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the
law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary
investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of
by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold of the
situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the
investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary
common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the
respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman.
Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the
Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers
negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The
hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman
the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public
officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the
Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch above other
grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended independence to
the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the
Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the
Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens, of recognized
probity and independence and must not have been candidates for any elective office in
the immediately preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the
rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their
term of office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15
Upon their cessation from office, they are prohibited from running for any elective office in
the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the
Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these
measures are intended to enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the
principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the
bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual
powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints
against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint
lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants
based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention through sources
other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct,
informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is
sufficient information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary
citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal
expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Vis - à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate
public officials is given preference over other bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office
of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives
the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation
of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other
investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative bodies,
such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim
equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees. The
Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension
of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom
to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies
as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman
before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with
the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to
that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct
the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1,
issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in
Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over
said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of
coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the
Court recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with
the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the
investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against
petitioner's assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with

the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of
Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a
warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by the
DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to
conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its
previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers
is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be
noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely with the
DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed

with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ
panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue
raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information without
previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated
its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it
should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial
prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v.
Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against
petitioners public officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of
power between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark
contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially
with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately
acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter
refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary

investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly
administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual
affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific charges, the
very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the
respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same
complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote
multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who
would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the
same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two
bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions
regarding the guilt of the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds,
and the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of
proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and ANGELITO A.

PELAYO,Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN,
THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September
18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and
set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin
of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to
the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting
to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.
Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against herein
petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28)
Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against herein petitioners before
the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).
The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000. It
recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In
a Memorandum4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On
October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP
Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The
cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that:

I.

THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT

OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
 II.

THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,

SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn
the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend
the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They
point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the
Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of
the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate
and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners
maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component
of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the checks were issued to
petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his personal funds for
expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed by the
Pinatubo victims.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the
OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No.
6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman.6

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the
Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such
other functions or duties as may be provided by law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:

x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the
Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the
Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now
embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution,
which provides:

Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

xxx

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by
law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner
Rodrigo:

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the

Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the
Tanodbayan, may it not? cral awred

MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.
 MR. MONSOD:

Yes.

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as provided by law."

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.

MR. RODRIGO:

So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:

And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by
the Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as may be provided by law." The
sponsors admitted that the legislature later on might remove some powers from the
Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.

MR. COLAYCO:

Madam President, that is correct.

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which
has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be
raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?

xxx

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):

xxx

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting
the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and
functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner
Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at
some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that
he be more effective. ςηαñrοbl εš νιr†υα l lαω lιbrαrÿ

This is not foreclosed.

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.7

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:

x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among the
offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is
unconstitutional and void.

The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x

xxx

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth
known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now
or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D.
No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those
powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform
functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein,
Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer
them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions
and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office
of the Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag,
declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under
the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770,
the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.11 The
Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was
authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the
filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that
under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to
the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770
should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant
consideration.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country
to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes
a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.14 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υα l lαω l ιbrα rÿ
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation,15the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability
of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practicethatwhen a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare
decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.
It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to
the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue.16

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
"[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the
becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and
the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only upon
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our
judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that the
doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how
or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law
with the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued
by the latter.

The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP Resolution
recommending dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court
of Appeals,18 to wit:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of
appeal. In certiorariproceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess
the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an
inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the
evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari . An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . Certiorari will not be issued
to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to
re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the
findings of fact of the court a quo.19

Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause would
necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its
disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given due course.

Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer
or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been
the consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by substantial
evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he
has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three
branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside
pressure and improper influence.21

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is imperative for
petitioners to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to
wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described above.
Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power
of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third
Division; hence, it should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

.R. NO. 135687 July 24, 2007

(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,

represented by: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO, WENCESLAO PASCUAL, GAUDENCIO
VIDUYA, JULIA M. MACUJA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE TEVES, ALEJANDRO
MELCHOR, RECIO M. GARCIA, DBP BOARD OF DIRECTORS LORENZA N.
SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S. GARCIA, STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R. GARCIA & SONS
DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(Re: OMB-0-96-2644)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,

represented by: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
PLACIDO MAPA - Board of Director/Chairman DBP,
RECIO GARCIA - Member,
JOSE TENGCO, JR. - Member,
RAFAEL SISON - Chairman,
JOSE R. TENGCO - Member,
ALICE L. REYES - Member,
CESAR SALAMEA - Chairman,
DON PERRY - Vice Chairman,
ROLANDO M. SOZA - Member,RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.,RICARDO SILVERIO, JR.
RICARDO S. TANGCO, Stockholders/Directors of Golden River Mining
Corp., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
(Re: OMB-0-96-2645)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,

represented by: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
PANFILO O. DOMINGO - Former PNB President,
CONRADO S. REYES - Former NIDC General
Manager,
CONRADO T. CALALANG, ANTONIO M. GONZALES, NORBERTO L. VILLARAMA,
SENEN B. DE LA COSTA, ANTONIO O. MENDOZA, JR., IGNACIO C. BERTUMEN,
Stockholders/Officers of Filipino Carbon and Mining Corporation, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Order1 of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by
petitioner docketed as OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its
Order2 of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
which created herein petitioner Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans (Committee).

On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as
PCGG consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the
loan accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation,
report and recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons
Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation
(Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).

With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that the said corporation
obtained from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of
₱26,726,774.72 and a straight industrial loan amounting to ₱29,226,774.72 on October
26, 1967 for the purpose of redeeming mortgaged properties, rehabilitating buildings and
equipment and defraying its operational expenses.

Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that the corporation obtained
loan accommodations from DBP beginning from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31,
1986, it had a total obligation of ₱43,193,000.00; that out of its five loan accounts, only the
first two loans of Golden River obtained in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently collateralized,
leaving three other loans without any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained
in 1980 for the amount of ₱14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13, 1982
for the amount of ₱5,551,000.00; and refinancing loan obtained on December 1, 1982 for
the amount of ₱7,118,656.52.

As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the said corporation applied
with the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4
Million on January 17, 1977; that the loan application was favorably recommended by the
President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the application was subsequently
approved by PNB's Board of Directors on August 17, 1977.
Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three
corporations did not have sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with
respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged
that the above-mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not only
the viability of their operations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the
Committee found the loan accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as behest
loans.

The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file
the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors,
the former PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the
respective stockholders/officers of the three corporations.

Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used by the Committee as its
bases in filing separate complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein
private respondents for alleged violation of the provisions of Sections 3 (e)3 and (g)4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and Josephine S. Garcia,

stockholders of PRGS; and Wenceslao Pascual, Gaudencio Viduya, Julia D. Macuja,
Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose Teves, Alejandro Melchor, Recio Garcia, Rafael Sison, Cesar
Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Rolando Soza, then officers and members of the Board of
Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2643.

The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco,
stockholders of Golden River; and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose
Tengco, Jr., Rafael Sison, Jose de Ocampo, Jose R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Perry and Rolando M. Soza, then officers and members of the Board of
Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2644.

The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB President; Conrado S. Reyes, then
NIDC General Manager; and Conrado Calalang, Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto L.
Villarama, Sene B. dela Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza, Jr. and Ignacio C. Bertumen, officers
and stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2645.

Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were consolidated by the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein
respondents. The Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions
entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as having
been committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the
Ombudsman found that, contrary to the claims of herein petitioner, the loan accounts
obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it in its Order
dated August 31, 1998.

Hence, herein petition.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu proprio, the three
complaints without first requiring respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and
petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner
further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that petitioner's evidence is
insufficient, the Ombudsman should have first required petitioner to clarify said evidence
or to adduce additional evidence, in accordance with due process.

Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time as evidence shows that the said
motion was timely filed.

Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three complaints and the subsequent
issuance of a single Order dismissing them is erroneous. Petitioner argues that the three
complaints cannot be lumped together and a single order issued for their resolution as
these complaints involve different sets of facts and are based on different loan
transactions.

Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted as part of the complaints
were not considered by the Ombudsman when it issued the assailed Orders; that the
findings of the Committee that the subject loans are behest loans prevail; and, that the
right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is not barred by prescription.

In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission as authority, contends that the provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the
Constitution, which provides for the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover
ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil actions and not to criminal cases. The Ombudsman
further avers that prior to its amendment, Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the
period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was ten years. Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982
increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. Applying the Constitution and the law to
the present case, the Ombudsman argues that, except with respect to the two loan
transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the other alleged criminal acts of
herein private respondents in connection with the loan transactions they entered into in
the years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995. Hence, private respondents
can no longer be prosecuted with respect to these transactions.

The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is authorized to
dismiss, motu proprio, a complaint even without requiring the respondents to file their
counter-affidavits and even without conducting a preliminary investigation.

As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1,
1982, the Ombusman contends that based on pieces of evidence presented by the
complainant, the said loans had more than sufficient collateral.

The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his application of pertinent laws as
well as rules of evidence deserve great weight and respect and even accorded full faith
and credit in the absence of any showing of any error or grave abuse of discretion.

Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea,
Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T. Calalang, Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C. Silverio
filed their respective Comments. While the present petition is pending in this Court,
respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose Teves died.5 In a Resolution6 issued by this Court
dated February 22, 2006, respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo
Salcedo and Antonio Mendoza were dropped as respondents for an earlier resolution of
the case after all efforts of petitioner to ascertain their correct and present addresses
proved to be in vain.
With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their respective comments, the
Court dispenses with the comments in order that the present petition may be resolved.

The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this was the main basis of the
Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner's complaints.

Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.

In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto7 , the Court held that the
imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other words, the
prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution may be barred by
prescription.8

Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195,
which took effect on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under
the said Act was increased from ten to fifteen years.

As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein respondents had already
prescribed, the Court's disquisition on an identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto9 is
instructive, to wit:

The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code are found in Articles 90 and 91 of the same Code. For those
penalized by special laws, Act No. 3326, as amended, applies. Here, since R.A. 3019, the
law alleged to have been violated, is a special law, the applicable law in the computation
of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy."

The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee vs. Hon. Desierto*, we held:

x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because,
as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of
the loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the
offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed
from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.

The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase ‘if the same not be known’ in Section 2
of Act No. 3326 does not mean ‘lack of knowledge’ but that the crime ‘is not reasonably
knowable’ is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the
intent of the law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides
no room for interpretation but only application."

We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest
Loans vs. Desierto** thus:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349
SCRA 767; Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact
Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person
would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an
exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2,
Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted ‘when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person.10

The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the exact dates when the alleged
offenses were discovered. However, it is not disputed that it was the Committee that
discovered the same. As such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than
October 13, 1992, the date when the Committee was created. It is clear, therefore, that
the alleged criminal offenses against herein respondents had not yet prescribed when the
complaints were filed in 1996. Thus, the Ombudsman seriously erred in dismissing the
three complaints filed by petitioner on the ground of prescription.

As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the Ombudsman to deny petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time:

The Ombudsman is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty in the
determination of whether or not the said Motion was really filed beyond the reglementary
period as provided under the pertinent rules of the Office of the Ombudsman. However,
this presumption is disputable. In the present case, petitioner contends that the subject
Motion was sent by registered mail on July 29, 1998, which was the last day allowed for
filing of the same. As proof of such mailing, petitioner presented a Certification11 issued by
the Central Post Office in Manila stating therein that Registered Letter No. 74220 was sent
by the PCGG on July 29, 1998, addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila, and
that said letter was duly delivered to and received on August 5, 1998 by an authorized
representative of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman failed to controvert
petitioner's submission in any of the pleadings filed in the present petition. A simple
referral to the date that appears on the front page of the Motion for Reconsideration,
indicating the date when the Office of the Ombudsman received the Motion, would have
easily disputed the allegation of petitioners. In the absence thereof, the Court finds that
the presumption of regularity of the Ombudsman's performance of his official duties must
yield to the evidence presented by petitioner. As such, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be considered
as timely filed.

Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31, 1998 of the Ombudsman
shows that there are grounds other than late filing upon which the Ombudsman denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, to wit:

xxxx
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of this
case, particularly the fact that the subject loans are now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and
behest loans, the same remains to be bare allegations with no new evidence tendered to
thwart the Order in question.

The complaints herein are plain and simple. There is no allegation even that the
questioned loans were granted "at the behest" of respondent officials in these cases x x x.

x x x x12

It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing the complaints was not
merely the prescription of the complaints, but also the lack of any allegation therein that
the questioned loans are behest loans.

However, while there was no specific or particular mention that the questioned loan
accounts were "behest loans," the complaints contain allegations consistent with the
criteria laid down by Memorandum Order No. 61 issued by President Ramos on
November 9, 1992.

The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame of reference in determining
whether a loan, which is under scrutiny, is behest:

(a) It is under-collateralized;

(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

(c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, like the presence of
marginal notes;

(d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;

(e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

(f) Use of corporate layering;

(g) Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and

(h) Extraordinary speed with which the loan release was made.13 (Emphasis supplied).

In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon. Desierto,14 the Ombudsman

adopted the position that to qualify as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria
enumerated in Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present.

It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in the present case that the
complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon were bereft of any allegations that their
questioned loans are behest, considering that said complaints explicitly alleged the
presence of two of the criteria: that the subject loans are "under-collateralized" and that
the borrower corporations are "undercapitalized."

Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman,

otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, provides:

SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the
case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for want of
palpable merit, but a sense of justice and fairness demands that the Ombudsman must
set forth in a Resolution the reasons for such dismissal.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court.15 This Court has held that the constitutional and statutory mandate that no
decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based applies as well to dispositions by
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.16 In fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, makes the Rules of Court applicable, in a
suppletory manner, to its own rules of procedure. One of the requirements provided under
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court is that a judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case should state the facts and the law on which it is based.

A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman shows that there is no
express finding that the complaints filed by petitioner were manifestly without merit. There
is no explanation or discussion, whatsoever, as to how it reached its conclusion that the
disputed loans are not behest insofar as PRGS and Filcarbon are concerned.

Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon, the Court
finds it necessary to refer them back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on
their merits.

As to Golden River, the Ombudsman did not err in dismissing the complaint against it with
respect to its loan transactions obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982. The
Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Ombudsman, to wit:

Discussing these two loans, we find that in 1980, Golden River Corporation was granted a
refinance in the amount of P14,724,430 pesos. Such grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is
less than 50% of the said P14,724,430 pesos, hence, this cannot be said to be granted
with insufficient collateral, taking the same as reference point alone without the previous
collaterals and assets which were admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in
paragraph b, p. 2 of the Sworn Statement of Orlando L. Salvador (p. 10, Records,
OMB-0-96-2644)

xxx

Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on December 1, 1982 is not more than 50% of the
additional assets alone which is the money equivalent of the two refinanced loans of
P14,724,430.00 and P5,551,000.00 the total of which is P20,275,430.00 pesos.
Considering that the refinancing ratio has a maximum of 70% of the total
assets/collaterals, even the last two loans which were within the prescriptive period are
not without sufficient collaterals.

In other words, collaterals were sufficient in accordance with Sec. 78, R.A. 337, as
amended (General Banking Act) x x x17

This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine
whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is
basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient
in form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he
may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form
and substance. Quite relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the
Ombudsman18 and reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto,19 to wit:

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the
1avvp hi1

Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This
court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, ‘beholden to no one, acts
as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.’20

As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.21 The basis for this rule was provided in the
case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman22 where the Court held as follows:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.23

While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion,24 the Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse
of discretion in dismissing the complaint against Golden River insofar as the two 1982
loan transactions are concerned.

However, the complaint against Golden River had not been completely disposed of by the
Ombudsman as it failed to discuss the refinancing loan obtained by the said corporation in
1980 for the amount of ₱14,724,430.00. Hence, the complaint against Golden River
should also be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its merits with
respect to the aforementioned loan.

Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints without
requiring respondents to file their counter-affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further
require petitioner to clarify its evidence or adduce additional evidence.

It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that
point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt
of a complaint.25 Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he
may recommend its outright dismissal.26 The Ombudsman has discretion to determine
whether a preliminary investigation is proper.27 It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to
dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be
expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.

Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act of consolidating the
three complaints and of issuing a single order for their dismissal considering that, with the
exception of the complaint regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River which
was separately discussed by the Ombudsman on their merits, the dismissal of all the
other complaints was based on a common ground, which is prescription.

However, in the remand of the complaints against respondents, orderly administration of

justice behooves the Ombudsman not to consolidate the three complaints, as the
respective respondents therein would inevitably raise different defenses which would
require separate presentation of evidence by the parties involved.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Except with respect to the
complaints relative to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982, and
December 1, 1982, the assailed Orders of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 and
August 31, 1998 in OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645 are SET
ASIDE.

The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation on the
respective merits of the complaints against herein respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Section 2, Rule II of its Rules of Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Guimaras; the COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA
Resolution2 which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an
Information which reads, as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the
Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue
Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in the
custody and possession of public funds in the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine
Currency, representing the value of her collections and other accountabilities, for which
she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with deliberate
intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and
benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her
account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege
her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing
Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with
salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be
investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman
whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that
the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner,
but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.7 Moreover, it
sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in
Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9,
1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the
prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the
RTC.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was
filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information.8

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in its December 18,
2001 Order.10

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in
the Decision under review.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.

Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for
Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file
the same in light of this Supreme Court’s ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case,
which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated
February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the
Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and
denial of the accused to due process.13
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the
Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution
of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had
no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and
prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26,
2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the
said decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case.
Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the
Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.

The petition lacks merit.

The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben
Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to
dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman
before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman,
the Court reversed the RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on
March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has
powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but
also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission
of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer
or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly

in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable
by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to
investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman
are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the
limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees
of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every
case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the
Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in
accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of
Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the
regular prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of
Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are
hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the
same. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in which, citing the
August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed
before it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court’s Uy
ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court’s assailed Orders x x x are, in
hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman has
prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal
information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the
operative ruling on the issue.

Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have
retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is
constitutionally proscribed."17

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that
law as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law
but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous
legislative intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court
in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its
effectivity on December 7, 1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal

interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed
under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation,
has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have
a prospective application.19 But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a
judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its
legislation.20
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of
unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied
upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the
Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect
has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and
prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the
Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

F. Review of the Decisions of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 May 30, 2011

THERON V. LACSON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, and TEODORICO C. TAGUINOD, in
his capacity as General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Public Estates
Authority, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489

JAIME R. MILLAN and BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, and the PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set
aside the June 8, 2004 Decision and the September 20, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and CA-G.R. SP No.78290.1

The Facts

Petitioners Theron V. Lacson (Lacson), Jaime R. Millan (Millan) and Bernardo T.

Viray (Viray) were non-presidential appointees and career service officials of respondent
Philippine Estates Authority (PEA), holding the positions of Deputy General Manager for
Finance, Legal and Administration; Assistant General Manager; and Department General
Manager, respectively.2
On October 3, 2002, Sulficio O. Tagud (Tagud) filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) accusing petitioners Lacson, Millan and Viray for
overpricing, by ₱600,000,000.00, the contract for the construction of the Central
Boulevard Project (the Project), otherwise known as the President Diosdado Macapagal
Boulevard.3

Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the
criminal and the administrative aspects of the case.4 The criminal case, docketed as
OMB-C-C-02-0667-J and entitled "Sulficio O. Tagud Jr., et al. v. Ernesto Villareal, et al.,"
charged petitioners for committing an act in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080. The
administrative case, docketed as OMB-C-A-02-0523-K, on the other hand, charged them
with Dishonesty, Serious Misconduct and Acts Inimical to the Interest of the Public Service
in violation of Section 52A (1), (3) and (20) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.5

Meanwhile, on October 14, 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission (PAGC) requested the Ombudsman for authority to conduct administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and other individuals involved in the
Project.6

In its Letter-Reply dated October 17, 2002,7 the Ombudsman responded in the following
manner:

This has reference to your letter dated 14 October 2002 requesting for authority to
conduct administrative disciplinary proceedings against the presidential appointees at the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) named respondents in the case involving the construction
of the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard (PDMB). It is our humble view that the
authority is not necessary.

The Office takes the opportunity to confirm the fact that the case filed with this Office on 3
October 2002, involving the subject controversy, is criminal in nature. It now bears the
docket number OMB-C-C-02-0667-J, entitled "Sulficio Tagud, Jr., et al. versus Ernest
Villareal, et al." The basic complaint has not been further docketed as an administrative
case. Thus, the same did not preclude the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an
administrative complaint against the concerned PEA officials. [Emphasis supplied]

Subsequently, on November 12, 2002, a formal complaint was filed by the Investigation
Office of PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including petitioners, with acts
and/or omissions contrary to: (1) Item 1B2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1594, as amended; (2) Section 3(i), (g) and (e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (3) Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
No. 3019, as amended; (4) Articles 8.1 and 8.2 of the Construction Agreement signed on
April 10, 2000 between PEA and J.D. Legaspi Construction; and (5) Section 46 (a) and (b)
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, as amended, in particular Item (B), Nos. 3, 4 and 27, in
relation to R.A. No. 3019, as amended.8

On the same date, PAGC issued an order requiring petitioners to file their
counter-affidavit/verified answer (not a motion to dismiss or motion for bill of particulars)
within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt of the order. Preliminary conference
was set on November 22, 2002.9

During the preliminary conference, petitioners raised several jurisdictional issues,

particularly the following: the absence of certification of non-forum shopping in the
complaint; the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate them; the lack of
jurisdiction of PAGC over the complaint against them considering that they were not
presidential appointees and there was no allegation that they had conspired with the
presidential appointees who were charged with them; the futility of any investigation by
PAGC as the same would have no bearing on the case filed with the Ombudsman; and
the fatally defective complaint which was not based on personal knowledge of the
complainant who, as an officer of PAGC, was merely a nominal party and was never privy
to the project subject of the investigation.10

PAGC directed petitioners to file their memoranda to formalize their arguments.11

On November 28, 2002, PAGC issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of

petitioners from PEA with the imposition of the corresponding accessory penalties of
forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from employment in the government.12

In a letter dated December 16, 2002, the Office of the President, through the Executive
Secretary, informed the PEA Chairman and Members of the Board that the President
approved the recommendation of PAGC in its November 28, 2002 Resolution dismissing
the petitioners from PEA and imposing upon them the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and disqualification from employment in the government service, and
directed them to take the necessary actions to effect the instructions of the President. 13

On December 18, 2002, petitioners received a notice dated December 4, 2002 informing
them that PAGC had resolved their case and that the records therein had been forwarded
to the Office of the President. It also advised the petitioners that any inquiry relative
thereto should be addressed to the said office.14

After securing a copy of the PAGC Resolution, petitioners Millan and Viray, together with
Manuel R. Beriña, Jr. (Beriña) filed a motion for reconsideration15 dated January 2, 2003
with the Office of the President assailing the November 28, 2002 Resolution and
Recommendation of the PAGC.

This motion was not acted upon.16

On July 25, 2003, PEA dismissed the petitioners. They received their copies of the notice
of dismissal on July 28, 2003.17

Aggrieved, Beriña, Millan and Viray filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 with the CA on July 30, 2003, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 78290.18

Lacson, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order19 in a
letter dated August 11, 2003 addressed to Teodorico C. Taguinod (Taguinod), PEA
General Manager and Chief Executive Officer. This motion, however, was denied on
August 20, 2003.20

On August 25, 2003, Ernesto L. Enriquez (Enriquez) and Lacson filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 with the CA, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP
No. 78749.21 Said petition, however, was later consolidated with CA G.R. SP No. 78290
upon motion of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). But, before the consolidation of
the mentioned petitions, writs of preliminary injunction were issued.22 The writs, dated
August 6, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 78290 and September 16, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No.
78749, temporarily enjoined the respondents from implementing the dismissal orders.23

Finally, in a consolidated decision dated June 29, 2004, the CA dismissed the
consolidated petitions.24

On July 5, 2004 and July 22, 2004, Lacson in CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and Beriña, Millan
and Viray in CA-G.R. SP No. 78290, filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.25 Unfortunately for petitioners, both motions were denied in a resolution
dated September 20, 2004.26

Hence, these petitions.

Upon motion of the OSG, on behalf of respondents Executive Secretary and PAGC, the
Court issued a resolution ordering the consolidation of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165404
and 165489 with the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475.27

ISSUES

In their respective petitions for review, petitioners assigned the following errors, to wit:

I.

Respondents erred when they issued the questioned memoranda and ordered the
dismissal of Petitioners allegedly on the basis of the recommendation of the respondent
PAGC, in that:

A. Under the constitution and the laws applicable, it is the ombudsman which has the
jurisdiction to investigate and recommend the dismissal of career service officers such as
petitioners herein.

B. it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the investigation and removal of
Petitioners and not Respondent PAGC.

C. Executive Order No. 12, series of 2002, which grants Respondent PAGC the authority
to investigate and recommend the dismissal of public officers and employees within the
civil service who are non-presidential appointees as petitioners herein is unconstitutional
and invalid for being contrary to law.

D. The direct action of Respondents in dismissing the PetitionerS from the service without
the head of respondent PEA having conducted any investigation at all is contrary to law.

II.

Respondents erred in dismissing the Petitioners from Respondent PEA and public office
in that:

a. Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to due process of law, petitioners
having been deprived of a formal investigation which they are entitled to under the rules of
procedure of the ombudsman and the uniform rules on administrative cases in the civil
service.

b. The Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to security of tenure as they were
terminated from service upon a mere presidential directive.

iii.

Respondents engaged in prohibited forum shopping by the filing of multiple administrative

complaints against Petitioners for the same cause; hence, the instant charge against
petitioners should be dismissed.28

These alleged errors in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 and G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489
can be categorized into two principal issues:
(1) Whether it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the investigation on the charge of
overpricing of the Project against petitioners; and

(2) Whether the Court can still review the dismissal ordered by PEA.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies

Petitioners argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it is only the
Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over them.

In this regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive,
but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to
the offense charged. 29 Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share
its authority to conduct an investigation concerning administrative charges against them
with other agencies.

At any rate, this issue is already moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated
its investigation of petitioners. This can be gleaned from the certified true copies of the
Ombudsman’s May 30, 2008 Decision as well as the July 3, 2008 Review and
Recommendation which the petitioners submitted in compliance with the November 22,
2010 Resolution requiring them to inform the Court of the status of their cases before the
Ombudsman. It appears therefrom that the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative
case against the petitioners because the charges had already been passed upon by
PAGC.30

Having been dismissed by PEA, petitioners should have appealed to the Civil Service
Commission

Despite the claim of petitioners that the decision to dismiss them was upon orders of the
President or upon undue pressure exerted by the Office of the President to implement the
PAGC recommendations, still the undeniable fact is that the dismissal of petitioners was
actually made and effected by PEA.

Granting that PEA committed an error, whether substantial or procedural, petitioners

should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Section 47,
Chapter 6, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), to wit:

(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it
may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or
other action to be taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions
shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially
appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."[Emphasis Supplied]

It is only after appealing the case to the CSC that it can be elevated to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. From there, said case can be
appealed to the Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Unfortunately, petitioners chose the wrong remedy. Instead of appealing their dismissal by
the PEA to the CSC, they chose to question it before the CA.

For their failure to appeal to the proper forum, the decision of the PEA dismissing them
has become final and executory. It should be emphasized that "the right to appeal is a
statutory right and the party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the
requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost."31

As petitioners’ dismissal has become final and executory, the Court no longer has the
power to review and act on the matter.

There was no violation of petitioners’ right to due process and security of tenure

Even granting that this Court can still review the PEA action to terminate the petitioners,
they have not shown that their right to due process and security of tenure was violated.

Petitioners argue that they were denied due process because their order of dismissal was
not accompanied by any justification from the PEA Board of Directors who merely relied
on the findings of PAGC.

This argument, however, deserves scant consideration.

As conversely pointed out by respondents, petitioners cannot claim that their dismissal
was unattended by the requisite due process because they were given the opportunity to
be heard in the course of PAGC’s investigation.

Indeed, as career service officers, the petitioners enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed
under the 1987 Constitution.32 This is further reiterated in Section 36(a) of P.D. No. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which clearly provides that
"no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law and after due process."

The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural and
substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when
warranted, be effected only after notice and hearing. On the other hand, substantive due
process requires, among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate
to and effect the administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a
member of and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting
the rights and interests of the public.33

Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal.
Petitioners cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As long as
their dismissal is for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met, the law
will not prevent their removal from office.

Per records of the case, the exercise of disciplinary action against petitioners was justified
because (1) they committed acts punishable under the anti-graft laws; and (2) their
conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service.34 Thus, their removal from office
was for a legal cause.

Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due process, well-established is the
rule that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to
submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.35 The demands of due
process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered.36In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,37 this Court laid down the cardinal and primary rights to be observed and
respected in administrative proceedings:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have some evidence to support a finding or conclusion;

(4) The evidence must be substantial (that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion);

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

(7) The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reasons
for the decisions rendered.38

In this regard, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where
they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions through their memoranda. The
essence of due process is the right to be heard and this evidently was afforded to them.
Thus, petitioners’ assertion that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite due
process cannot be sustained. 1avvp hi1

In sum, the removal from office of petitioners was valid. PEA dismissed them for cause
and in accordance with the requisites of due process. Petitioners, as PEA officers and
employees, are under the disciplining authority of the PEA Board, pursuant to Section 11
of P.D. No. 1084, the Charter of the Public Estates Authority,39 which states that:

Section 11. Appointment, control and discipline of personnel. The Board, upon
recommendation of the General Manager of the Authority, shall appoint the officers and
employees of the Authority and its subsidiaries; fix their compensation, allowances and
benefits, their working hours and such other conditions of employment as it may deem
proper; grant them leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate;
discipline and/or remove them for cause; and establish and maintain a recruitment and
merit system for the Authority and its affiliates and subsidiaries. (Emphases supplied)

At any rate, as earlier stated, as the petitioners did not appeal the decision of the PEA to
dismiss them to the CSC, it has become final and executory and the Court can no longer
review it.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144492 December 18, 2008

LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS L.
MOMONGAN, JUDGE ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G. NALANGAN, ASTERIA E.
CRUZABRA, JULIO C. DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First
Congressional District of South Cotabato which includes General Santos City (city),
assailing that portion of the Resolution2 dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing the case against private respondents, former city
Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez (Mayor Nuñez), Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director for Region XI Augustus L. Momongan
(Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O. Adre (Judge Adre), former
City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of Deeds Asteria E.
Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional
Technical Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga) (respondents).

The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:

Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal on
October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which states that:

do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort
site purposes, under the administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to
private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the
said municipality and more particularly described as follows:

Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation

The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park

A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of Dadiangas,
Municipality of General Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an area of 52,678
square meters.

On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26), known as the "Charter
of the City of General Santos" was enacted creating the City of General Santos where it is
provided that "The National Government hereby cedes to the City of General Santos the
ownership and possession to all lands of the public domain within the city." Later, said Act
was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August 16, 1971 (Record, pp. 27-28) wherein
it read that "The disposition of all lands of the public domain within the city shall be in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one,
as amended: Provided, That all incomes and receipts derived from such disposition shall
accrue exclusively to the city as provided in this Act."

On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was
thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square
meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or
a total of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent to the original area.

However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168 (Record, pp. 29-31), which
provides that:

do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168 dated October 3,
1963, which established the recreational and health resort reservation situated in the
Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao, certain
portions of the land embraced therein and declare the same open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which parcels of land are more particularly described as
follows:

Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D

(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality
of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area
of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE METERS. x
xx

Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D

(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality
of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area
of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE
METERS. x x x

Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is
therefore reserved for recreational and health resort site purposes.

As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with the
District Land Office and consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in 1983.
In 1984, two cases were filed by the local government of General Santos City against the
said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other hand, the Heirs of
Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction and Damages. The
said three cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 22, presided by respondent Judge Abednego Adre.

On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed
Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991, entitled "Resolution Approving the Compromise
Agreement to be entered into by and between the City Government of General Santos
represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park"
(Record, pp. 1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said Compromise Agreement
(Record, pp. 33-39) state that:
1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D and Y-2, MR-1160-D
with combined area of THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT
(37,658) SQUARE METERS, and from this the HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES shall
receive a total net area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) SQUARE METERS and to the
CITY shall pertain the remainder of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658) SQUARE METERS which if added to Lot X, MR-1160-D,
previously donated to the CITY as stated in par. 7 of the WHEREAS clause, with an
area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE METERS (located in
between Lots Y-1 and Y-2), the CITY shall retain a total area of THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT (32,678) SQUARE METERS.

Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuñez,
assisted by respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo
Kusop.

As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent Judge Abednego

Adre issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52), covering the three pending cases, on May 6,
1992, the dispositive portion of which states:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in conformity with

Article 6 in correlation with Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the same is
hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED as judgment in these cases. The parties are enjoined
to faithfully comply therewith.

A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.

However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an Extraneous
Subject from the Coverage of the Judgment thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of
Clarificatory Order" submitted by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer
and Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge issued another
Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited three cases, stating
that:

ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and jurisprudence, the motion for
exclusion of Lot X, MR-1160-D comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS is
GRANTED. The movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to the
City of General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise
agreement.

On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales
Patent over portions of Lot X, to be divided as follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp.
60-75):

Applicants Area applied

1. Mad Guaybar
2. Oliver Guaybar
3. Jonathan Guaybar
4. Alex Guaybar
5. Jack Guiwan
6. Nicolas Ynot
7. Carlito Flaviano III
8. Jolito Poralan
9. Miguela Cabi-ao
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar - 999 sq. m.;
11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.;
12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.;
13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.;
14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr. - 510 sq. m.; and,
16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.

The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land
Management Inspector, recommended for the approval of the survey authority requested
by the above-named private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418).

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private respondents by public
respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X was
subdivided into 16 lots (refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).

On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez, assisted by respondent

City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to application
documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X
applied by private respondents and stated therein that "this office interposes no objection
to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on application covering portions
thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X,
MR-1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said
court’s order dated July 22, 1997."

Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor Leonardo Dinopol,
together with recommendation for approval from respondent Rivera, submitted an
appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16 stating therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square
meter and existing improvements of residential light house per lot with an appraised value
ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers, Record, pp.
421-500).

Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report

addressed to the Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16)
applicants recommending for the private sale of the subject lots to the above-named
applicants-respondents, without public auction (refer to sample letter-report of
recommendation in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer,
Renato Rivera, also issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants
addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and of
the private sale (please refer to sample recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o],
Record, p. 78).

A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same date stating therein
that on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold (Record, p. 79).

On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were issued by the Register of
Deeds of General Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra, which titles were also signed
by respondent Augustus Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to wit:

Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No. Record Page No.

1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;
9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;
13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;
16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.

Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the
above-named registered owners sold their lots, through their attorney-in-fact, respondent
Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
in the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand Pesos
(P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then, Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were issued in the name of the vendee on September 25,
1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).

On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of
Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to
the exchange of lots X-6 and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter two
lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots X-15 and X-16 were
exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to respondent Nilo
Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).3

Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit4 before the

Ombudsman against the respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera
(Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan,
Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar,
Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose
Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal),
Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation
of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,5 as amended,
and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents.

The Ombudsman's Ruling

In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman held that Mayor
Nuñez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf
of the city and pursuant to the authority granted to them by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor
Nuñez and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the
Ombudsman opined that the validity of the Compromise Agreement had been settled
when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the RTC found it to be in order. The
Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the
facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have
regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against the
respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the
following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are
probably guilty thereof:

1. CESAR JONILLO – sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document to the

sixteen (16) recommendation reports submitted;

2. RENATO RIVERA – sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document relative to

the sixteen (16) reports submitted, all dated August 4, 1997;

3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR,

JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT, JOLITO PORALAN,
MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, JOEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO,
JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON, ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and JOSE
BOMEZ in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR JONILLO and RENATO RIVERA–
one (1) count each for private respondents and sixteen (16) counts each for public
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;

4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO – as conspirators for

twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral
Deeds of Sale;

5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR,

JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR,
[J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON – one (1) count
each as conspirator in the falsification of public document relative to the corresponding
unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;

6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO – twelve (12)
counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government inn the
correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and

7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR,

JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR,
[J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON – one (1) count
each of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator in short-changing the
government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS.

Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned respondents be filed with the
proper courts.

Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN,

ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and
AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of
criminal cases against private respondents, for offenses committed not in
conspiracy with the herein public respondents, by the proper parties-in-interest.

SO RESOLVED.6

On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however,
denied by the Ombudsman in his Order7 dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that
since the criminal Informations were already filed against the aforementioned indicted and
the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of
General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
 The Sole Issue

Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:

THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY
FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL DISPOSITION
OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER.8

Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence pointing to the
existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and those indicted, which led to the
illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of a
grand conspiracy, petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and
involvement of each respondent, as follows:

1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997 was part of the grand
scheme and was made the basis for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of
Mad Guaybar and his companions. The same Order was likewise used by Mayor Nuñez
and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no objection to the said applications. The
assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years after his Judgment
based on the Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre, therefore,
violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

2. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by reason of their respective
offices and as administrators of the properties of the city, that Lot X of the Magsaysay
Park is owned by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. Yet, Nalangan's
Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed RTC Order, stated that per
verification, there was no existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city.
Likewise, in their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing the
applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan endorsed
the same and interposed no objection thereto. Said Indorsement was part of the grand
conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale of the said property to AFP-RSBS, to
the injury of the city. Petitioner submits that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan also violated
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

3. After Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and
after Jonillo submitted his falsified report on August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date,
scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar and his companions on September 5, 1997.
Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X on September 5, 1997
without public auction and at the disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera.
Therefore, Diaz, as a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification of public documents.

4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the Motion for Issuance of a
Clarificatory Order before Judge Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the
assailed RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the RTC that upon
verification, they did not find in the records any deed of donation executed by the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a grand scheme
to defraud the city.

5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not disposable and alienable
and is, therefore, not a proper subject of a sales patent application. Despite such
knowledge and based on the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan allowed
Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his companions by approving their
miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
covering the subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false
reports, and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar and his
companions, to the injury of the city.

6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents and titles may be
considered as ministerial, the circumstances under which the titles were issued in the
names of Mad Guaybar and his companions and eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS,
indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the grand conspiracy to defraud the city.
Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on September 22,
1997. On the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners' copies of the
OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of selling their
respective lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA in their respective titles.
On September 25, 1997, Atty. Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
on the same day the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax due thereon. On the
same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in lieu thereof, twelve (12) Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were
transferred and registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by virtue of
deeds of exchange executed by the registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner
submits that Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions; instead, she
allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFP-RSBS so swiftly, that it could
only be interpreted as part of the scheme to defraud the city. 9

In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
his investigatory and prosecutory functions, by completely ignoring and disregarding the
pieces of substantial evidence which clearly establish the existence of a common design
among the respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and disposition of Lot X
of the Magsaysay Park.

On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective defenses against
petitioner's claims, as follows:

1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), contends that, in
effect, petitioner is asking this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the
Ombudsman during the preliminary investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v. Office
of the Ombudsman10 and Young v. Office of the Ombudsman,11 this Court accorded
highest respect for the factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits, have valid and
legal justifications, sufficient for the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.12

2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists between her and other
respondents charged before the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to
Cruzabra refer to recorded transactions which are legal acts. Such allegations did not
discuss how the alleged conspiracy was committed; they are merely conjectures and bare
allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and there is no convincing
evidence to support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain any restriction
to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As such, Cruzabra submits that it would be
most unfair if she would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply because she
exercised her ministerial functions as Register of Deeds.13
3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive Director of the DENR,
he is duly authorized to sign patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard
procedure and processes were complied with, Momongan simply relied on his
subordinates and on their good faith. He argues that he acted in accordance with law,
department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to require him to scrutinize every
phase of a report of a subordinate is a very tall order.14

4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution15 of the Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense
and Security, dated December 23, 1998, not one of the respondents was recommended
for prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the Magsaysay Park. Judge
Adre claims that he acted properly, and even sought the opinion of the OSG before the
Compromise Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre narrated that due to the
vagaries of politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no motion for execution was filed by
then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband of petitioner, after Mayor Nuñez lost in the
elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not
execute any deed of donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC did not lose
jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for Clarification and Exclusion were filed; thus,
the issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X and enjoining the Heirs of Cabalo
Kusop from donating the same to the city in keeping with the intent and spirit of the
compromise agreement, was proper.16

5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not be disturbed, as they
are not attended by grave abuse of discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance
with law; that as the Regional Technical Director is not required to go to the premises of
the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he may rely on the data submitted by
the CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.17 Moreover, Borinaga argues that the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of
time.18The Certification19 dated October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records
Officer IV of the Office of the Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served
with a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo,
Process Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on February 4, 2000.

6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he participated in a grand
scheme to unlawfully dispose of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he
issued the notice of sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite documents submitted to
his office.20

7. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuñez did not violate the Charter of
the City, because when she entered into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop, she was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution No.
87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of committee and public hearings. The same
was also referred to the OSG, which recommended its approval. When the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but to tell
the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of donation made in favor of the city. While they
admit to have issued Indorsements, they made it clear that the DENR shall undertake only
what is legally feasible. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan asseverate that they had no intention
of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even filed a case against Mad
Guaybar and his companions.21

Our Ruling

The instant Petition lacks merit.

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)22 provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she received
through counsel the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she
failed to establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus,
failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned Certification
that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24,
1999. There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest
of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late
filing of the motion for reconsideration. After the respondents made such allegation,
petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification
why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant Petition ought to be
dismissed. And on the substantive issue raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit.

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of
a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.23 Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good
and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule would encourage
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in
much the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decide to
file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.24

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what
the petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,25 where
we laid down the following exceptions to the rule:

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the

accused;

2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions;

3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;

4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,

whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by, or in contemplation of law.26

The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this
case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. We concur with
the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the charges against respondents, as
approved by Ombudsman Desierto, thus:

Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is constrained to limit its
evaluation of the issue on the participation of each respondent in the titling of Lot X,
whether the same would constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.

1. Respondent Abednego Adre – His participation extends only to his issuance of an

Order excluding Lot-X from the coverage of the Compromise Agreement.

A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise Agreement confirms the
Order of the respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The Order of respondent judge
was made in accordance with the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that respondent
judge assisted in preserving the claim of the government of General Santos City over Lot
X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private respondents.

2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan – Said respondents’ participation in the titling of

Lot-X was when they issued or caused the issuance of Indorsements stating therein that
"this office (Office of the Mayor) interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings
your (CENRO) office may pursue on the application covering portions thereof (Lot-X)."

The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be construed as a waiver on

the part of General Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given
DENR the authority to take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the titling of the
property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR has the responsibility,
authority and the power to grant alienable and disposable lands to deserving claimants.

Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that respondents Nuñez and
Nalangan gave unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing said Indorsements. In fact,
they protected the interest of the government over Lot-X by immediately filing a case for
nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances thereof.

xxxx
[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan, Asteria
E. Cruzabra – Based on the evidences on record, these respondents were in the regular
performance of their official functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X was due to
the fact that the documents for titling were submitted to their respective offices as a matter
of course, and there is nothing that they can do but to follow the established procedure
upon finding that all the documents for titling were submitted.27

Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause
is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely
abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this
respect, petitioner fails.28

Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under
Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:

(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;

(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties, or in relation to his or her public functions;

(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party;

(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to such parties; and

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect.29

Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the
accused that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with
gross inexcusable negligence. Bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable
under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral
judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior purposes.
On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious
indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be affected.30

As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident
bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. It must be
stressed that it is good faith, not bad faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human
Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which
springs from the fountain of good conscience.31

Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted.
However, as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not
supported by ample evidence. At best, the evidence adduced was not clear as to
respondents' participation in the acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi- the
burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the prosecution. The inherent weakness of
complainant's case is not a ground for the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation.32 For it is fundamental that conspiracy cannot be presumed. Conspiracy
must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common
design.33 This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.

All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal complaint against respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DOJ v LIWAG (REPEAT)

G. Procedure before the Ombudsman

[A.M. NO. MTJ-05-1581 : February 28, 2005]

PETER L. SESBREÑO, Complainant, v. JUDGE GLORIA B. AGLUGUB, Metropolitan

Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Peter L. Sesbreño filed a Verified Complaint1 dated March 2, 2004 against

respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross Ignorance
of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service relative to Criminal Case No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et
al.

It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique
Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuñez (Nuñez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely
Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro,
Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3)
cases were assigned to respondent judge's branch and subsequently consolidated
for disposition.

After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued a Consolidated

Resolution2 dated May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave
Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting for arraignment the case for
Usurpation of Authority. Except for Marcelino who failed to appear during the
arraignment, all of the accused were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a warrant
for Marcelino's arrest.

Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants' Urgent Manifestation3

dated February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused were also charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 104 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of arrest be likewise
issued against all of the accused.

Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order5 dated February
12, 2004 stating that a charge for violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the
complaint for Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to oversight.
However, since the statute only applies to members of seditious organizations
engaged in subversive activities pursuant to People v. Lidres,6 and considering
that the complaint failed to allege this element, respondent judge found no
probable cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing
Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules), respondent
judge denied complainant's prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office (PPO) for review.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Thereafter, complainant's counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreño (Atty. Sesbreño), filed a

Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest Against Non-Appearing Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not act
on these motions allegedly because the court had already lost jurisdiction over the
case by then.

The PPO affirmed respondent's order and remanded the case to the court for
further proceedings on the charge of Usurpation of Authority.

During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and
Nuñez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño, however, did not move for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the
scheduled hearing.

The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant administrative
complaint.

Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the
Rules when she refused to issue warrants of arrest against the accused.
Complainant also faults respondent judge for allegedly motu proprio reconsidering
her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to
the Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.

In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint7 dated

March 26, 2004, respondent judge counters that the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is discretionary upon the judge. Since she found no indication that the accused
would abscond, she found it unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO
has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO can take
action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus, she acted in
accordance with law when she forwarded the records of the case to the PPO for
review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant insists.

Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreño of falsification,

and the latter of violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly, the affidavit which was attached to the instant verified
complaint was not notarized by Atty. Raul Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty.
Sesbreño was allegedly convicted of Homicide and may have been suspended from
the practice of law.

Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainant's Reply To Respondent's

Comment Dated March 26, 20048 dated May 11, 2004. He further contends that there
is no provision in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be
the "Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor" as respondent judge contends. He adds
that respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 8 since she
has yet to forward her resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman.

Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to his complaint was
notarized by Atty. Corro as certified by a member of the latter's staff. Complainant
also disproves respondent judge's allegation that Atty. Sesbreño is in the habit of
filing administrative complaints against judges, explaining that the latter merely
acted as counsel for litigants who filed administrative complaints against certain
judges.

In another Verified Complaint9 filed on March 18, 2004, complainant further charges
respondent with violating Sec. 9(b), Rule 112 of the Rules.

Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative

Complaint10 dated May 7, 2004 clarifying that contrary to complainant's allegation,
she did not conduct a preliminary investigation in the case for Usurpation of
Authority. What was submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge for
violation of R.A. 10. It was her resolution dismissing the charge for violation of R.A.
10 which was transmitted to the PPO for appropriate action. However, since the
charges for violation of R.A. 10 and Usurpation of Authority were contained in a
single complaint, respondent judge deemed it proper to forward the entire records
to the PPO.

Complainant filed a Complainant's Reply To Respondent's Comment Dated May 7,

200411 dated May 20, 2004 substantially reiterating his allegations.

The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a supplemental
complaint per the notation in the Memorandum12 dated June 25, 2004.

In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in conducting a

preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing
warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial; in issuing her
Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10;
and in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the
Ombudsman.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit but that respondent judge should be reminded to be
more circumspect in the performance of her duties.13 It made the following
findings:

A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules reveals that
there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue
a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence,
its issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this
case, the private prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.

As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who, with or without
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to the Government, or
to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so,
shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than
ten (10) years. Violation thereof is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court but
subject to preliminary investigation.

Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she conducted
the preliminary examination of the complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the
case, respondent Judge found no probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the
case. Therefore, when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
case for lack of probable cause, she was acting in accordance with the procedure
on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office on review. Sec. 5 of Rule 112 provides that the
resolution of the Investigating Judge is subject to review by the provincial or city
prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.

It is respondent Judge's contention that the resolution shall be reviewed by the

Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charge of
Violation of R.A. No. 10.

However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" provides
that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the Ombudsman to act as special
investigator or prosecutor only on certain cases. Such provision is not applicable
to the issue at hand. Therefore, respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the
case for review to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. Nonetheless, complainant
failed to show that respondent Judge was motivated by bad faith when she issued
the assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error for which she could not be
held administratively accountable absent any proof of fraud or other evil motive.14

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or

information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.15 Thus, a
preliminary investigation is not required nor was one conducted for the charge of
violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months.16

This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said section provides:

Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.'

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. 'If the complaint or information is filed with
the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by
this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within
ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no
probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally
examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however,
require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no
probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from
its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ

When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment

order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if
the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under
custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.

Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed directly with the
Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules
shall be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for
trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested,
and hold the latter for trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to merely
issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary to
place the accused under custody.

It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused even after having personally examined
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions for the
determination of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place
the accused in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the
judge's sound judgment.17

Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the case to the
prosecutor for review.

In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, found probable
cause to hold the accused for trial for the charge of Usurpation of Authority and
forthwith set their arraignment and the pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the
course of action taken by respondent judge.

Neither is there merit in complainant's contention that respondent judge should

have issued a warrant of arrest against the accused for their failure to appear
during the initial presentation of evidence for the prosecution for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority. The issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of
the accused during trial is discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, there is nothing in
the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of
the accused during trial.
Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she failed to rule on
the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003.
Nonetheless, she asserts in her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative
Complaint18 dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary investigation for
the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the charge after taking into
consideration the affidavits and evidence presented. Complainant does not dispute
the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge.19
Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she
merely did so to correct an oversight.

Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it was the dismissal of
the charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to the PPO for review. It was
imprudent, however, for respondent judge to transmit the entire records of the case
to the PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the
records of the case. Respondent judge should have ensured that at least one
complete set of the records remained in her sala so that the prosecution for
Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her actuation was,
we do not agree with complainant that respondent judge was motivated by an evil
intent to delay the case.

This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her
Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the
Office of the Ombudsman instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since the
charge of violation of R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.

This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 820 entitled Clarifying and
Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides "that all
prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover,
"[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases21 against public officers and employees
prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial
or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval
thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon,
including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the dismissal of the
complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or
fine of not more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman."

Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance
with law when she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact
that the PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead of
forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative
Order No. 8 is quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have
taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the
disposition of the case.

In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by
bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent judge's actuations are
hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay the case which characterizes
the offense of gross ignorance of the law.22

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in
the performance of her duties in the future.

SO ORDERED.

H. Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors

G.R. No. 158543 July 21, 2004

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER

PUNZALAN, petitioners,
vs.
DENCIO DELA PEÑA and ROBERT CAGARA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the June
6, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At
around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas,
was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall
Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived.
Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero
mo?"2 Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako."3 Irked by the
response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The
group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted, "Yariin na
‘yan!"4 Thereafter, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with
a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was
carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him
in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the
gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the
thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latter’s house and locked
themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted,
"Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!"5 Dela Peña, Cagara, and
Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek
assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael
Plata for Attempted Homicide6 and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of
Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges7 for grave oral
defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against
the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and
Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats
filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).

In their counter-affidavit,8 the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were
fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed
as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on
October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda
approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert,
magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa
kita ng trabaho."9 In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory
statements.

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,10 holding that Cagara
failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a
state of distress and, hence, were not actionable.11 The charge of Attempted Murder
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor
because complainant Dela Peña’s claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the
defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier
against the latter.12

Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23,
2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28,
1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others – (1)
that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to
Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall
and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave
Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong

City is directed to file information for three (3) counts of slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two (2) counts [of] other light threats against
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin,
Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz, Emmanuel
Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven
Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond
Poliquit; information for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark
Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson Mendoza,
Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and John Does; and to report
action taken within 10 days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents,
filed separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set
aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations
against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should be
dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as
Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case
filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in support
thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to prove that Rainier,
Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The

resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
is directed to withdraw the separate informations for slight oral defamation, other light
threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all respondents and to
report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.14

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated October 11, 2000.15

On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
praying that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight
Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier,
Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin.16

On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned

Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set aside
insofar as it directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander "Toto"
Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez,
Vicente "Joven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and
Raymond Poliquit.

The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it
directed the withdrawal of information for two (2) counts of other light threats against
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.18 Hence, the instant petition raising the
following assignment of errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND OCTOBER 11, 2000.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT,
SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY
HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE
GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT
PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.19

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding of probable cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral
Defamation and against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted
Homicide.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in the
judge’s findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact, appeal
is the remedy.20

Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts
without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority
as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction.21 In the case
of Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan,22 it was held that grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient
that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be
grave.23
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and control"
includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or
modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.24

In the case of People v. Peralta,25 we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests
the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom
to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,26we
declared that:

A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence
of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action
where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the
averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after
investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.

Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the
functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted
homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory
remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City
Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the best
person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and
determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within
the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient
evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the decision of the
City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than
Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it
was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated
June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the
charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on
August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein respondent Dencio
Dela Peña should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that
resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan.

In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of
discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent
case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been
made with grave abuse.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
attempted homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.