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PEOPLE V PEREZ [G.R. No. L-856. April 18, 1949.

]
People of the Philippines represented by Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and
Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali vs. Susano Perez (alias Kid Perez) represented by Crispin Oben and
Isidro Santiago

TUASON, J.:

Facts: Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's
Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.

Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts
1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 were substantiated. Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 are all similar: recruiting, apprehending
and commandeering numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them,
as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of high-ranking
Japanese Military officials. In count 6, the accused, together with his Filipino companions,
apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the
provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet
Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japs high ranking officers.

Issue/s: Whether or not the deeds of the accused constitute the crime of treason.

Ruling: If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's
company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling
them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without
doubt produces the same general result. Yet by common agreement those and similar
manifestations of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as
treason.

In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the
nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts
between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon
their nature, degree and purpose. As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and
comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and, in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. Intent of
disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.

However, the accused is found to be guilty of the crime of rape, for the rape of Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation.
Without his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.
Under the general law of criminal procedure, conviction for a crime different from that
designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practised, provided only that such
crime "is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the
proof presented during the trial."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ADLAWAN [G.R. NO. L-456. 29 MARCH 1949]

People of the Philippines represented by First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and
Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez vs Cucufate Adlawan represented by C. de la Victoria & Ramon
Duterte and Sotto & Soto

REYES, J.:

Facts: We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000
imposed by the People's Court upon the appellant, Cucufate Adlawan, who was charged with
treason but convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of treason with murder,
robbery, and rape." The conviction is based on defendant's plea of guilty to a complaint of
treason, which was committed in twenty-four (24) separate instances, all of which with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called
'Philippine Constabulary,' an enemy-sponsored military organization, knowing fully well that the
aims and purposes of said organization are, among others, to extend every aid and cooperation
with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of America and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; also by adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and
the Imperial Japanese Forces, , in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-
Tai. By his plea of guilty appellant admits having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the
information. But he now pleads for a modification of the sentence, contending that the lower
court erred:

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be


appreciated; 2. Whether or not the accused was correctly charged with the complex crime of
treason with murder, rape and robbery.

Ruling: we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have been convicted of the so-
called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and
raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere
elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and
identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty
of treason only. Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On
the other hand, his admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the
CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked. There is, however, merit in the
contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength should
not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the offense of
treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty." But the facts alleged in the information
show that appellant, in committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by
being unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of
torture and finally putting them to death, and, as appears in count No. 18, he also chose to add
ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his
wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they
are by the allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these
two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against
him. However, since five members of this court are opposed to the imposition of the death
penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P20,000.

SANTOS V MISA [G.R. No. L-319. March 28, 1946.]

Go Tian Sek Santos vs Eriberto Misa, Director of Prisons

BENGZON, J.:

Facts: The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter
Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth
Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a political prisoner. Such detention, he
claims, is illegal, because he has not been charged before, not convicted by, the judge of a
competent court, and because he may not be con􏰃ned under Act. No. 682, as he owes allegiance
neither to the United States nor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused Go Tian Sek Santos, a Chinese Citizen, can be prosecuted by
the Comonwealth of the Philippines despite him not owing allegiance to such government.

Ruling: As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject. However, he is
included among those contemplated by Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which states
that “Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the
Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to Commonwealth Government,
the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other
things as the Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with and/or
affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and
take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . . And,
provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the
aforesaid political prisoners are concerned , until the filing of the corresponding information with
the People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the
formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government.”

The Solicitor General states that the accused should be prosecuted for the crime of Espionage,
punishable under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not require the offender to
owe allegiance to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

PEOPLE V ABAD [G.R. NO. L-430. JULY 30, 1947.]

People of the Philippines represented by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and
Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles vs. Francisco M. Abad (alias Paquito) represented by Alejo
Labrador

PERFECTO, J.:

Facts: The accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with
homicide and sentenced to death, to pay a 􏰃ne of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias
Salvador in the amount of P2,000, and to pay costs. Abad was charged with the crime of treason
as de􏰃ned and penalized under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code by giving aid and comfort
to the Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces during the period comprised between
December 24, 1943, and September 26, 1944, where he served as an informer and spy of the
Japanese Army, participating in raids, and causing the arrest and incarceration of Filipinos
suspected to be members of the guerilla force.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the acts of the accused constitutes as treason; 2. Whether or not the fact
that the Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas can be considered as a Mitigating
Circumstance; 3. Whether or not the age of the accused, being under the age of 20 years old, can
be considered as a Mitigating Circumstance.

Ruling: 1. the fact that appellant caused the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by
pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him and his brother
Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence to the Japanese enemies and
of giving them aid in the attainment of their war purposes, among them the suppression of
American or anti-Japanese propaganda.

2. No, the fact that the father and brother of the accused was killed by the guerillas cannot be
considered as a mitigating circumstance for the crime of treason because they are not enumerated
in those mentioned in Article 13 – Mitigating Circumstances, of the Revised Penal Code.

3. Yes, the age of the accused can be considered as a mitigating circumstance. The fact that his
eldest brother, Mariano, was the liaison o􏰃cer of the Japanese and another elder brother, Felix,
was also in the service of the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by his widowed mother,
the accused had to depend on Mariano for his support, the same as the other members of the
family, are circumstances from which, in view of appellant's immature age, did not allow him the.
freedom of initiative and action which should be expected of a person who is aware of the full
consequences and responsibility for his acts. The circumstances of this case justify crediting
appellant with a mitigating circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.

UNITED STATES V CABALLEROS [G.R. NO. 1352. MARCH 29, 1905]

The United States represented by Solicitor-General Araneta v Apolonio Caballeros, et al.,


represented by Hipolito Magsalin.

MAPA, J.:

Facts: The defendants have been charged as accessories to the crime of assassination or murder
perpetrated on the persons of the American school- teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France,
John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals
or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal the
crime.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime of accessories to the crime
of assassination or murder.

Ruling: although Roberto Baculi confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it
appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers.
And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the
crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he
was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group
who killed the Americans, but that he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some
bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and
Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him the butts of their
guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (Article 8, par. 9 of the Revised Penal Code).

There is no proof that Apolinario Caballeros took any part in any way in the execution of the
crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as
well as on of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the
place of occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt,
made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as
the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the
same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession
to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution,
Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise
made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which
do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of
pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4 Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission.)

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render
the defendants criminally liable according to law.

PEOPLE V CATANTAN [G.R. NO. 118075. SEPTEMBER 15, 1997]

People of the Philippines represented by The Solicitor General vs Emiliano Catantan y


Tayong represented by the Public Attorney’s Office

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts: EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged
with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of
1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a 􏰃rearm and a bladed weapon, acting in
conspiracy with one another, attacked, assaulted and in􏰃icted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil
and Juan Pilapil, Jr. who were then 􏰃shing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their
fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused Catantan should be held criminally liable for Piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532.

Ruling: Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, de􏰃nes piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or
watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through
Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to
ignore the fact that a 􏰃shing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testi􏰃ed, the accused
suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them
as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards,
and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which,
Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon. While appellant insists that
he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which
they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the
Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another
pumpboat that would take them back to their lair.

Wherefore, accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong is found guilty of the crime of Piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532, “Anti-Piracy and Anti- Highway Robbery Act of 1974.”

PEOPLE V SIYOH [G.R. NO. L-57292. FEBRUARY 18, 1986.]

People of the Philippines v. Julaide Siyoh, Omar-Kayam Kiram, Namli Indanan and Andaw
Jamahali

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Facts: JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW


JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder, which
occurred in the Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines. That the accused
being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with 􏰃rearms and taking advantage of their
superior strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other,
with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon
things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, 􏰃re their guns into the air and
stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio
de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas,
boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches,
stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of
P18,342.00, Philippine Currency.

the said accused, 􏰃red their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo
Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have
performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Quali􏰃ed Piracy
with Quadruple Murder, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid
himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman,
which prevented his death."

Issue/s: Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appelants were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is su􏰃ciently proved in this
case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A)
On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the
window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men
at Baluk-Baluk Island: B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness
Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the
two accused talked in Baluk-Baluk Island near the dilapidated house: C) The two accused,
without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors banca: D)
That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and
undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on
their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime

PEOPLE V LOL-LO AND SARAW [G.R. NP. 17958. FEBRUAR 27, 1922]

People of the Philippines represented by Acting Attorney-General Tuason v Lol-lo and Saraw
represented by Thos. D. Aitken

MALCOLM, J.:

Facts: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat
eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of
navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned
by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros 􏰃rst asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat,
took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the
women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the
exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the
idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly
violating them, the Moros 􏰃nally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women
were able to escape.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the offense charged is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands; 2. Whether or not the facts constitute a public
offense under the laws in force within the Philippine Islands.

Ruling: 1. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority
and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Pirates are in law
hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

2. The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the
effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The
political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting
at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would
be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens
of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands.