G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966 SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter.
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL, respondent-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent
and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum
up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest",
it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded
gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency,
and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the
privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no
purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be
provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called
"Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number
of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize;
the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of
a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter
lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a
screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning
stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed
can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region
will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day
all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex
dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize
and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively.
At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be
placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for
winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for
third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a),
1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of
which read as follows:
belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-
class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the
mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines,
or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the
Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any
manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any
information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme
depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any
person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any
person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise
for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or
employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same
in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped
upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class
mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the
representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and
telegraphic transfer service.—The Director of Posts may, upon
evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged
in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution
of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any
kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any
postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said
person or company or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation
for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or
telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its
agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the
contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not
Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its
counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the
foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part
of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities,
condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the
Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217,
Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise"
which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10,
1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest
but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have
to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that
judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of
the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were
joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court
rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the
proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted
by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner
does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to
bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic
issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which
was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked,
declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
. . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule
64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua
non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The
Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951;
Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579;
Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of
the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon
the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy,
a number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a
business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned
right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to
advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the
appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law,
admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof —
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of
the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes.
Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales
promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the
dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was
found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor.
However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the
pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in
the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference
as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus
reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective
theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon
its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his
ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the
appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to
be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The
appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed
contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the
privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability
of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a
legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real — not
a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are as real as their
interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the
divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom
to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's
proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and
enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and
the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders
are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation
unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration
(Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30,
1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past
when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its
own doubts, or by the fears of others" — which admittedly does not confer a
cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of
right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz.,
251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no
question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear
provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the
contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose
lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances
here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the
matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to
a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether
or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a
question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the
matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the
handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no
breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement
over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a
fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of
immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the
propriety — nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it
accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-
blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the
language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P.
2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the
appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to
choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply
to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the
contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is
also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be
vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or
permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which
is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one
equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of
Court) — which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can see in the
present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in
our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the
ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and
pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the
very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously
overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines).
In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called
upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case
will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J.,
399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising
was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan
had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were
conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against
the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari
materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d.,
435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82
A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra,
condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General
to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the
postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the
second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922,
in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt
on the power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned provisions of
the Postal Law, this Court declared that —
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the
authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States
Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of
the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery"
extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such
as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc.,
and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
 (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs.
Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30
Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs.
Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company
vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and
chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention.
Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed
down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this
matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just
cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms —
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not
condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving
the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for
the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the
language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus —
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops?
You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number
of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex
dealer will dispense from — to —, and win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be
given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a
Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and
accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all
angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the
stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to
unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to
prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our
appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who
may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying
a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be
tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service
were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of
value.1awphîl.nèt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales
promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage
by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the
chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of
consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal.
App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for
the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something
of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented,
the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The
following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or
in fact does receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or
otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of
consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98
S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be
administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the
appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this
aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its
tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice.
Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon
Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that
a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a
gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of
whether or not the proposed contest — wanting in consideration as we have
found it to be — is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub
silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled
out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers
and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice
of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement
each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur.,
654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with
Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E.,
605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As
thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already
noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be
encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is
capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added
comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding
that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the
element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.:
Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec.
Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater
Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side
of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift
enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite
elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d.,
139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297;
People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff,
88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S.,
851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words
and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not
identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and
"gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the
necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically
eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra;
State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The
lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore,
that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in
association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and
consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis —
which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the
element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited
only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so
construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent
to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein
included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the
law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in
statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent
the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on
grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to
suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public
morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it
is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger
amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the
contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.
If, as it has been held —
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute
"lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving
the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby.
City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words
and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end,
we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes
therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the
element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule
that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action
for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described
in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the
Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY
EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners, vs.THE
HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO,
COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP,
and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a
court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer,
here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito
A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to
dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood
Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was such an order dated
July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In
the order assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner
union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction
should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well
as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were
"temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing,
impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress
from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City
and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending
the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this
Court." 2
The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5,
1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division,
Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent
Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao,
Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm
before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly
living allowances. 4Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of
strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca,
president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living
allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel
without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of
the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for
yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9,
1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge
against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for
obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded
the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and
suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there
was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners.
It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by
defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the
exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion
to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required
respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard
on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining
order was issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in
Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated
July 20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the
hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing
ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing,
petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically
Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e)
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12
On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the
original jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order
complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand,
instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met
squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and
answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant petition has merit and
should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time
the decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out,
the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and
in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No.
1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided "that the Regional
Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral
and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were thus vested with
jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of
employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the
story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further
amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus
enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based
on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation
pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims
for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;
[and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless
expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the
lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional trial court now, is
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took
effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus:
"(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2)
unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers
or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this
petition. certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of
jurisdiction to act on the matter.
1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only
mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now,
certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when
he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a
strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation
cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court
even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing
words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience. Thus, "The
first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the
lapse of sixty years. 24
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court
has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain
command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original
and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or
a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the
opening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question often
brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action
filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries,
separation benefits and damages — the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor
Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was
categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over
the case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject
matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it
must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the
jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes
of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or
statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree 1691 which took
effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217.
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All
money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees'
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases
involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-
employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28 That same
month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De
Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30
3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March
of 1982, was not followed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for
damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On this point,
reference may be made to our decision in National Federation of Labor, et al. v.
The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on
September 15, 1983. In that case, the question involved was the failure of the
same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking
petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order of Minister Blas F.
Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On
the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would not
comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration
came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the labor unions
involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket
line and start returning to work on August 20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople
denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is
concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration.
The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that
whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to
the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and a strike
has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall
immediately return to work and the employees shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between the
exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the
express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it
is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act
on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for
damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that
even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the
appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management &
Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-
American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny question as
to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn"35 between the power
lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been
to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to
the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should
fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Code is even
more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest
of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the
often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely,
the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of
disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982,
issued by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is
likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the
Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any
further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing
it. The temporary restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
De Castro, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and express the hope that Art. 217 should not undergo repeated
amendments.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and express the hope that Art. 217 should not undergo repeated
amendments.
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional
Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his
capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an
action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as
amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of
private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San
Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan,
issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner
thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck
should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a
letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of
Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent
order of July 12, 1989.2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to
the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter
dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied
then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary."3 Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case
4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a
motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent
Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question.8 Hence, this present petition,9 with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on
September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,10 the
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted
by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver
that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the
truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand,
would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due
process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and
(2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary
of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck
as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence
on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in
order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if
a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's
intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the
case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule.
This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,13 (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question,14 (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,16 (5) when there is
irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,20 (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,21 (10) when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before
the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the
petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the
order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative
forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their
case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your
favorable action, then this letter should be considered as
an appeal to the
Secretary.24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the
Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they
acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest
lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the
DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine
a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial
court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.25 In
Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,26 which was
reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this
Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex
and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled
exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but
rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they
argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the
May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no
leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing,
but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.28 One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.29 In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense.30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration,31 as in the instant case, when private respondents were
undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of
July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco,32 we
ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly
have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the
court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting
illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section
68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as
follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly
[sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private
respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently
does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A,
which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or
His Duly Authorized Representative To Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies
on the matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the
act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is
that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as
to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.33 Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.34 In this wise,
the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws
"more responsive to present situations and realities" and in
view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources
of the country," that the government opted to add Section
68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative
remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to
supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement
of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of
EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is
most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to
conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the
benefit and welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources
may be effectively conserved and
protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of
our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of
our forestry laws suffers from
technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this
difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts more
responsive to present situations and
realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
"conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other
hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a
criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If
as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under
Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at
all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any
solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.35
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive
Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received
by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used
by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your
claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in
no case could a criminal case be filed against her as
provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. . .36
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated
order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is
contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in
the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the
crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner
thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed
out:
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
and further amended by Executive Order No. 277
specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance
used in the transport of forest products not covered by the
required legal documents. She may not have been
involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee
or fare the same is therefor liable. . .37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and
punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners
admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be
charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an
act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of
Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are
reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or
other products without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and
disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or
permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its
amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other forest
products without license. — Any
person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove tim
ber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal
documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code . . .
(Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No.
277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705
as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest
products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the
penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277
when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted
the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them
for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D.
705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in
view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering
the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum,
being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the
claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be
recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully
detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody,"40 and
it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful
meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without
any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is
sufficient.41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding
that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for
tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it
is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.42 Private
respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of
the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was
seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the
required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705
as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably
warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or
his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of
the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally
permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question
the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit
that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions
of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the
Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal
of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head
whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse
of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party
of said decision, unless appealed to the President in
accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966.
The Decision of the Department Head may not be
reviewed by the courts except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are
hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on
September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is
directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Case Digest SAMPLE:
LEONARDO A. PAAT v. CA, GR No. 111107, 1997-01-10
Facts:
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of
private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San
Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in
Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
etitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order... of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within
which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On
June 22, 1989,[1] Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-
A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Private respondents filed a letter of... reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the
June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however,
denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.
ending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for... replevin, docketed as Civil
Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,[5] which issued a writ ordering the return of... the truck to private
respondents.
Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss
with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause
of action for their failure to exhaust administrative... remedies.
petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin
because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
Issues:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an
action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the... decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals
Ruling:
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence
on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in
order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before
the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the
petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the
order of July 12, 1989.
In their... letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,[23] private respondents
clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to
avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest
lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
By the... very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within
its jurisdiction.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly
have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the
court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit... conveyances used in transporting
illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section
68 of P.D. 705,... It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary
and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and
forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules
and regulations.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the
DENR to confiscate, not only 'conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the
other hand, confiscation of forest products by the 'court' in a criminal action has
long been provided for in Section
68.
What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not
used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not... used in the commission
of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the
owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
commission... of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as
amended by E.O. 277.
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest
products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided
for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them
for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D.
705, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are
hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on
September 27, 1993 is... hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is
directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
Principles:
"SECTION 68. xxx... xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed,
as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in
the area where the timber or forest... products are found."
Section 68-A
"SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may... order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and...
policies on the matter."
However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by
Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the
conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required
legal documents. She may not have been... involved in the cutting and gathering
of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or
fare the same is therefor liable. xxx"
"SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products
without license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and
disposable public lands, or from... private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277
) sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity
"SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
'Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from... private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx."
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.
Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court
is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent
to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution
for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it
does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information
dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO
MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his
possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik),
Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first
having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at
the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the
accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has
neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the
same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a
firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel
of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not
a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that
he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does
the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in
the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant,
answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a
statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms
that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed
to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office
of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the
effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the
accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly
appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the
parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him
are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The
decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such
he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of
courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the
accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of
this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To
the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father,
ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners, vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO
AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971,
rendered by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the
dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
 Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that
henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all
legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption
of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R.
Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience
and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel
Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and
Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson
Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be
changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the
petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their
adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent
provisions of the New Civil Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the
records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the
petitioners. 1
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the
adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In
re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy
and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc.
No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were
caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered
published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their
father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors'
mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was
presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred
its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the
respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held
that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would
violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally
exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of
Millendez,6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not
only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the
reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and
irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a
subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any
disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil
Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in
law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear
and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule
is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject
of statutory construction. 7
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the
Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes
of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in
force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the
Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero
and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have
legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the
Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in
paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to
persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by
creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none
exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more
towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to
promote that objective.9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no
longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above
the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the
recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the
COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action
No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order,
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why
they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay
recall election was without COMELEC approval.2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor
General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of
the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion
adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the
required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.3
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states
that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is
now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act
No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In
support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo,
237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local
election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election,
hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local
official may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph
(b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation
of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.5 An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation of Section
74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not
be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as
this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth". . .8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against
the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for
the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be
more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be
filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular
election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months
away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12,
1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.
However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be
considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of
elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national
officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President,
Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and
municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and
municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays,
and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise
disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for
the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the
person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is
that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in
the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec.
424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than
18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election
(whether national or local).
Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization,
and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with
certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of
local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243
SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact
does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically
provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz.,
the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of
the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local
election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.
However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be
considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of
elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national
officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President,
Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and
municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and
municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays,
and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise
disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for
the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the
person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is
that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in
the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec.
424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than
18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election
(whether national or local).
Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization,
and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with
certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of
local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243
SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact
does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically
provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz.,
the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of
the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local
election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, vs.DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T.
Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the
nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated
on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics
Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely
filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was
likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed
by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the
September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the
November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September
19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2,
2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia,
who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on
the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10,
2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion
for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40,
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The
motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following
ISSUES
I FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS
TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE
WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN
RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT
REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR
APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL
IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING
THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved
is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to
the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the
CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico
case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said
case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied
because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from
this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were
solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity
of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this
case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity
of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal
from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his
purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties
who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital
obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of
the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the
phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
"petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
There is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention."
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial
justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this
case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court
has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and
should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for
taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their
very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period
for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced
in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly
adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s
earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the
circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed
its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision
which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for
review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case
of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the
right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential
part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant
has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social ANTONIO T. CARPIO
institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 Associate Justice
thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus: Chairperson, Second Division
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and CERTIFICATION
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. the opinion of the Court’s Division.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen RENATO C. CORONA
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the Chief Justice
foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868 August 13, 2004
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families RE: REQUEST OF JUDGE TITO G. GUSTILO THAT THE SECOND 25%
weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the GRANT OF THE SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR JUDGES BE INCLUDED IN
concern alone of the family members.17 THE COMPUTATION OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RESOLUTION
SO ORDERED. CALLEJO, SR., J.:
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA In his Letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Associate Justice Jr., Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23,
avers that he is due to retire at the age of 70 (compulsory retirement) on
WE CONCUR: September 29, 2004. By then, he would have served the Judiciary for 21 years;
7 years and 11-and-1/2 months of which as Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo
City. Judge Gustilo requests that, considering his retirement is "barely one
ANTONIO T. CARPIO month from November 2004," the second tranche of the Special Allowance
Associate Justice granted to judges under Republic Act No. 92271 be included in the computation
Chairperson of his retirement benefits.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227, which took effect on November 11, 2003,2 granted
NACHURA CASTRO* additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance to justices, judges and
Associate Justice Associate Justice all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court
of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court. Section 2 thereof reads:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances. – All justices, judges and all
other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of
the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as
ATTESTATION
authorized under existing laws shall be granted special allowances
equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the basic monthly salary
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the 6758, as amended, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
Court’s Division. Law, to be implemented for a period of four (4) years.
 The grant of special allowances shall be implemented uniformly in
such sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
basic salaries of the positions covered hereof. Subsequent
implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the
extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in
Section 3 hereof.
Further, Section 5 of the same law provides:
Sec. 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retirement Benefits. – For
purposes of retirement, only the allowances actually received and the
tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented
and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other
positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the
Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included
in the computation of their respective retirement benefits.
On March 9, 2004, in A.M. No. 03-12-04-SC (Re: Possible Means to Implement
the Special Allowance under R.A. 9227 and to Increase the Judiciary
Development Fund), the Court promulgated the GUIDELINES ON THE GRANT
OF ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION IN THE FORM OF SPECIAL ALLOWANCE
FOR JUSTICES AND JUDGES IN THE JUDICIARY AND ALL OTHER
OFFICIALS WITH THE EQUIVALENT RANK OF JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. The
Guidelines provide for the manner of the implementation in this wise:
4.1 The Special Allowance shall be implemented uniformly in such
sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
actual basic monthly salaries for the positions covered starting 11
November 2003 until the one hundred percent (100%) special
allowance is fully implemented.
If the source of fund is insufficient to cover the twenty-five percent
(25%) special allowance for any year, it shall be granted in such
sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported
by the funding source specified in Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 9227;
provided that annually the special allowance shall always be twenty-
five percent (25%) of the actual "basic monthly salary."
The Guidelines, likewise, reiterate that:
4.2 For purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the
special allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the
time of retirement shall be included.
Paragraph 7.0 thereof states that cases not covered thereby shall be referred to
the Chief Justice for resolution.
Judge Gustilo claims that pursuant to OCA Circular No. 48-2004 dated March 3,
2004, the first tranche of the Special Allowance equivalent to 25% was
implemented starting November 11, 2003. The next 25% (second tranche) will
be implemented on November 11, 2004. In this connection, Judge Gustilo
appeals to the Chief Justice that, in the computation of his retirement benefits,
the second tranche of the Special Allowance be included since his retirement is
only one (1) month and twelve (12) days before its implementation on November
11, 2004.
In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that "in the past, Judges who retire
in October are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay." He, thus,
invokes the "liberal policy" of the Court "in granting benefits to the underpaid
Trial Court Judges."
In the Memorandum dated June 18, 2004 for the Chief Justice, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA)3recommends that the request of Judge Gustilo be
granted. The OCA cites Judge Gustilo’s service record in the Judiciary, which
started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary record of disposing cases
at an average of 2.25 cases each month. It also mentions that Judge Gustilo, as
Executive Judge, introduced several innovations in the Iloilo City courts and was
able to manage well the 17 judges under his administrative supervision. Further,
Judge Gustilo was the recipient of several "awards and
recognitions."4 Considering the foregoing, the OCA concludes that "it is but just
and fair that the second additional Special Allowance of 25% be granted to him
and included in the computation of his retirement benefits."5
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated July 6, 2004, referring Judge
Gustilo’s letter and the OCA’s memorandum to her for study and
recommendation, Chief Attorney Edna E. Diño submitted her Report dated July
15, 2004. The Chief Attorney recommends that Judge Gustilo’s request be
denied for not being in accord with Rep. Act No. 9227 and the Guidelines
promulgated by the Court.
After a careful evaluation of Judge Gustilo’s letter, the OCA’s memorandum and
the Chief Attorney’s report, the Court, regrettably, cannot grant the request of
Judge Gustilo.
It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.6 With respect to the manner of
computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted
under Rep. Act No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below, could not be
any clearer:
Sec. 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retirement Benefits. – For
purposes of retirement, only the allowances actually received and the
tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented
and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other
positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the
Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included
in the computation of their respective retirement benefits.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of retirement,
only the allowances "actually received" and the tranche or tranches "already
received and implemented," upon the date of retirement, shall be included in the
computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise put, before the Special
Allowance could be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it
should have been "actually received" and the tranche or tranches thereof should
have been "already implemented and received" at the date of retirement.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is clear and unambiguous. There is no room for
its interpretation. Further, the foregoing exchange among the members of the
Bicameral Conference Committee7 on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill
(SB) No. 2018 and House Bill (HB) No. 51788 is particularly instructive:
...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Accepted.
Section 4. No questions? (Silence)
Section 5. (Silence)
Just again for purposes of record and clarification, Section 5, lines 3
and 4, "For purposes of retirement, only the allowances actually
received…," and so forth and so on, I just like to make it clear that the
computation of retirement would include the salary already being
received, plus the special allowance.
THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Because this seems to
suggest that you compute, rather the computation of retirement will
be on the basis only of the special allowance. So, at least, let’s make
that on record.
THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Yes. On record, yes.
And I think that first word in the title of Section 5, "Inclusion" also
explains that.
REP. LIBANAN. Mr. Chairman.
THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Congressman Libanan.
REP. LIBANAN. For the sake of further clarification, would it mean
that if, for example, a judge retires on the second year of the
implementation, so his retirement benefits would be only computed….
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). On the basis of what he is
already receiving.
REP. LIBANAN. … on the basis of [what] he is receiving, not on the
100 percent.
THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Actually receiving. That is
correct.
REP. LIBANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Can we now go back to
Section 5?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Section 5, Mr. Chairman, just a
suggestion but in the House panel
… retirement laws in favor of the retiree, it cannot do so in this case because, as
SEN. ARROYO. Kasi kung mandatory, doon sa voluntary, hindi
naman dapat iyon.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). I’ll be constrained to withdraw my
proposal.
SEN. ARROYO. But your idea is very attractive.
SEN. VILLAR. In fact, it’s too attractive. In the first place, iyong
allowance is already part of the retirement benefit. Iyon, malaking
bagay na iyon, eh.
Mr. Chairman, may add-on pa. Medyo sobra naman yata na iyon.
SEN. ARROYO. No, because by the accident of birth, when they
retire, they retire on the second year, halimbawa, 68 sila ngayon.
Pagkatapos, mandatorily they have to retire at the age of 70, di iyong
benefits nila is …
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). For those born in 1934 up to
1937.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). But the fact here remains, the
allowances they have been receiving so far which is over and above,
kasama na talaga sa retirement. I mean, sobra-sobra na, eh. Lahat
na lang ng allowance na puwedeng gawin, nandoon na, eh. At saka
nagre-retire pa sila sa 70, ibig sabihin talagang marami na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Okay?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). So, as is?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Nandoon na, eh.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). So, whether they retire at 60
or 70, whether they opt for early retirement or mandatory
retirement, they will receive the actual. Would it not be a good idea to
encourage them to stay on …9
Thus, the congressional records as well as the text itself of Rep. Act No. 9227
reveal the unequivocal intention of the lawmakers that only the Special
Allowance actually received at the date of retirement shall be included in the
computation of the retirement benefits.
The Guidelines promulgated by this Court pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9227 is even
more definite as it used the term "accrued" in this wise: "only the special
allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the time of retirement
shall be included." As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney:
Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is used in
the Guidelines instead of "the tranche or tranches of the special
allowance already implemented and received" which is used in
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is
conveyed. The word "accrue" means "to come into existence as an
enforceable claim: vest as a right" or "to come by way of increase or
addition: arise as a growth or result" or "to be periodically
accumulated in the process of time whether as an increase or a
decrease." Hence, a Special Allowance that has not yet come into
existence as an enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the
recipient judge as a matter of right cannot be considered in the
computation of retirement benefits.10
Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and demandable;
vested."11 In the case of Judge Gustilo, on the date of his retirement, the second
tranche of the Special Allowance has not accrued as yet; hence, it cannot be
said that the same is due and demandable or that it has vested insofar as he is
concerned.
The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section
5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is called for by the fact that, under Section 3
thereof,12 the source for the Special Allowance is the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF), established under Presidential Decree No. 1949, which basically
comes from the docket fees paid by litigants:
... As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed in
amount, as its amount depends on the amount collected by the courts
and the amount of increase in docket fees that the Court would
impose. The fact of the JDF becoming insufficient has been foreseen
by the Court and is reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1 of the
Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting that until now, the first
tranche of the Special Allowance has been received only for the
months of 11 November 2003 until February 2004. The delay in
receipt thereof may continue if courts nationwide do not timely
transmit the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be
disbursed only if the reports of collections and the deposits under the
JDF account for the Special Allowance tally in accordance with
accounting and auditing rules.13
While this Court had, in certain cases,14 adopted a liberal stance in interpreting
earlier stated, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous. In
other words, there is no room for interpretation but only simple application of
the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% or
second tranche of the Special Allowance granted under Rep. Act No. 9227 be
included in the computation of his retirement benefits is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1 An Act Granting Additional Compensation in the Form of Special
Allowances for Justices, Judges and all Other Positions in the
Judiciary with the Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals
and Judges of the Regional Trial Court, and For Other Purposes.
2 Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9227 provides that it "shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation." It was published in Today on
October 25, 2003 and the Times on October 27, 2003.
3 Signedby Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño.
4 These awards are: (1) National Awardee of the 3rd PNP
Anniversary on January 29, 1994 at Camp Crame, Quezon City; (2)
Plaque of Recognition for his services as Executive Judge given on
March 4, 1991; (3) Plaque of Appreciation given by the IBP, Iloilo
Chapter, on April 4, 1997; (4) Certificate of Appreciation given at the
Forum with Educators, Media and other Concerned Sectors on
Enhancing Communication Between the Judiciary and the Citizenry,
given at the Days Hotel, Iloilo City, on September 11, 1998; and (5)
Certificate of Recognition for his assistance to the Supreme Court
Centenary Celebrations Executive Committee, given on June 11,
2001.
5 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, p. 2.
6 ABLeasing and Finance Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 405 SCRA 380 (2003).
7 The Senate Conferees were Senators Francis Pangilinan, Manuel
Villar, Jr., Joker Arroyo, Edgardo Angara and John Osmeña.
The House of Representatives Conferees were Representatives
Rolando Andaya, Jr., Marcelino Libanan, Rodolfo Albano, Jr., Danton
Bueser, Rolex Suplico, Gilbert Remulla and Bellaflor Angara-Castillo.
8 SB No. 2018 and HB No. 5178 became Rep. Act No. 9227.
9 Deliberationsof the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of SB No. 2018 and HB No. 5178, September
3, 2003, pp. 17-32.
10 Report of the Chief Attorney dated July 15, 2004, p. 5.
11 BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed., p. 19.
12 The said provision states:
Sec. 3. Funding Source. – The amount necessary to
implement the additional compensation in the form of
special allowances granted under this Act shall be sourced
from, and charged against, the legal fees originally
prescribed, imposed and collected under Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court prior to the promulgation of the
amendments under Presidential Decree No. 1949, dated
July 18, 1984, and from the increases in current fees and
new fees which may be imposed by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines after the effectivity of this Act.
In the event that the said amounts are insufficient to cover
the grant of allowances on the last year of implementation
of this Act, the National Government shall subsidize the
special allowance granted for justices, judges and all other
positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of
justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the
Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws in
an amount not exceeding One hundred sixty-five million
pesos (Php165,000,000.00) per annum.
If the collections from any increase in current fees and any
new fees imposed after the effectivity of this Act exceed
the amount needed to fund the special allowances granted
to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary
with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals
and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under
existing laws, the surplus may be used by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to grant additional
allowances exclusively to other court personnel not
covered by the benefits granted under this Act.
G.R. No. 125183 September 29, 1997
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR. CELSO T. TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA,
QUIRICO T. TORRES, CATALINA BONGAT, MILAGROS A. HERBOLARIO,
ROSALINDA A. PIMENTEL, PURIFICACION MORELLA, FRANCISCO
RENION, SR., MARCELINA CORPUZ, BENEDICTO FALCON, MAXIMO
FALCON, MARIO BOLANOS, VICENTE T. SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA
G. DORADO, JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LUISA
ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ, VICTORIANO ESPANOL, MARIO L.
AGUILAR, FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO PURISIMA, JR., PROCOPIO B.
PENARANDA, ELADIO MAGLUYAN, HELENITA GUEI, CELESTINO
MONTANO, ROMEO GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO, JIMMY MACION, DAISY A.
MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR HERBOLARIO, MANOLITO
HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO ANCHETA, TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA
SAMPAGA, MARIQUITA RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA, MAGDALENA
CABREZA, MARIA BIANDILLA, NILDA ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO,
and NAPOLEON D. VILORIA, SR., respondents.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing and seeking to reverse and set aside: a) the decision dated
November 23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b) the resolution
dated May 28, 1996 denying reconsideration of said decision.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain
parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was
occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare
land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after
resettling these squatters would the municipality be able to develop and
construct its municipal government center on the subject land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan
started to develop its government center by constructing the INP Building, which
now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the
site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the
Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central Post Office
Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987,
former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as
follows:
PROCLAMATION NO. 164
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO.
1716, DATED FEBRUARY 17,
1978, WHICH RESERVED FOR
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
CENTER SITE PURPOSES
CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED
 IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
JUAN, METROPOLITAN MANILA,
ISLAND OF LUZON, BY
EXCLUDING FROM ITS
OPERATION THE PARCELS OF
LAND NOT BEING UTILIZED FOR
GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES
PURPOSES BUT ACTUALLY
OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND DECLARING
THE LAND OPEN TO
DISPOSITION UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC
LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested
in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1716,
dated February 17, 1978, which established for municipal
government center site purposes certain parcels of land
mentioned therein situated in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by excluding from its operation the parcels
of land not being utilized for government center site
purposes but actually occupied for residential purposes
and declaring the land so excluded, together with other
parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but
nevertheless occupied for residential purposes, open to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, as
amended, subject to future survey, which are hereunder
particularly described as follows:
Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270
xxx xxx xxx
Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-740
and Psd-810
xxx xxx xxx
Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th
day of October in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-
seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
By the President:
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Acting Executive Secretary
(Rollo, pp. 148-151.)
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of
herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San
Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either
removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were
claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation
No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that
the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for
government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164
is absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in a decision dated July
17, 1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on
April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents
hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in
question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under
Proclamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner
municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and
private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR
from disposing and awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No.
164.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present recourse.
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that ultimately, the central
question and bone of contention in the petition before us boils down to the
correct interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No.
1716.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by
hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of the fact that an earlier
judgment, which had become final and executory, had already settled the
respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No. 164. This
notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the reasons why the court had previously
ruled in favor of petitioner's rights over the subject property against the claims of
private respondents.
We find good legal basis to sustain petitioner's position on the issue of res
judicata insofar as the particular area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which
was the subject matter of the earlier case, is concerned.
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b)
the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21 [1995]).
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of
parties, we have ruled that only substantial identity is required and not absolute
identity of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682 [1966]). The
addition of public respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no
moment. Likewise, there is identity of cause of action since the right of the
municipality over the subject property, the corresponding obligation of private
respondents to respect such right and the resulting violation of said right all
remain to be the same in both the first and the second actions despite the fact
that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second
action, they were the respondents.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res judicata only extends to such
portion of land covered by Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not
be automatically segregated from the land covered by Proclamation No. 1716. It
does not include those portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation
No. 1716.
Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon
the above premise and our discussion may properly end here. However, there
exists a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has
reference to a fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No.
164 on October 16, 1987 by then President Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by
Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation.
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-
called bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the
reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she
issued her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional
Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under
Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to
exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a
new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known
later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987,
President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution.
Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October
6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely on Congress.
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the attention of petitioner as
well as the courts before which this case has already passed through, this Court
cannot help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164.
Because this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct
derogation of the most basic principle in the separation of powers between the
three branches of government enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply
close our eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity of a law.
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid
(Salas vs. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734 [1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
[1978]). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted
by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of
legislative power by the executive branch. For this Court to allow such disregard
of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of
presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to
uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task
that we take this exception from the Court's usual practice of not entertaining
constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and
adequately argued.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid
exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE. Public respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources is
hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution
that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined,
and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.2 The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform
and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be
the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of
situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government
and the people who run it.4
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1,
dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted
by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer.
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power
of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor.7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon
A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the
historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his
slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced
of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the
good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for
a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people,
must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the
political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts
untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged
sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and
undermined the people’s trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people’s faith
and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President’s battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in
the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft
and corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related
to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it
has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any
agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, to
produce documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain
information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain
information from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan
and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or
documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies
and for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as
the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize
any person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of
justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a
state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution,
to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a
special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence
on corruption of public officers and employees and their
private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if
any, when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to
believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under
pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial
agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the
agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it
may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons,
professionals and other personnel determined by it as
necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of
procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently
carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to
ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations,
proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of
evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate
and necessary in connection with the objectives and
purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. – x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. – x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. – x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. – x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. –
Any government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear
upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative
disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. – x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. – The Office of the President shall
provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its
powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. – x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. – x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. – The Commission shall accomplish
its mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. – x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. – x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared
unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter
to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body,"
it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It
is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding
body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot
impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have
been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to
establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a country’s past."9 They are usually established
by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism
to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns
of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3)
they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.10 "Commission’s members
are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations,
the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions
and recommend institutional reforms."11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg
and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body
set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of
a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South
Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence
and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa’s model. The latter placed more emphasis
on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC
is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer12puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out
by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To those who talk about reconciliation, if
they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they
have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation
without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to
their occurring over and over again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners
asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both
cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators
summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent
statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of
1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates
the consistent and general international practice of four decades
wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate
human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of
Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an
adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by
publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is
eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of
poverty.
 (g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally
challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can
bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a statute."13
In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners
and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a
public office because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended
by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,17 and settled jurisprudence that
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate
funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not
a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive
orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of
the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by
President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative
Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential
Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO)by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the
principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their
respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of
its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.19
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been
put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their
petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the
case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or
are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commission’s investigations,
petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.20
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the
petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels
for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of
their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a
resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.22
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing
to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.23 It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail
congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained,
or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion
of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power
and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.
The case of David v. Arroyo24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi.
Thus:
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest"
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest"
is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing
is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the
category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing
in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where
it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure
of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real
parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held
that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to
restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in
any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general
interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,
it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a
litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse
Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included.
Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."25
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed
to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,27 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance28 laid down
in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco29are non-existent in this case. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.
There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the
issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the
status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the
country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming
political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because
the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth
Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President.31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must
be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by
law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed32 since there is no
provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to
create a truth commission.33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office,
cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer,"
"consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."34 Insofar as it vests in the President the
plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating
a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the
effectivity thereof.35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a
public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive
branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the
President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1)
does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth
commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of
the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs
of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of
agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.36Such
continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by
issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this
delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation
by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to
numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has
long been recognized.37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other
two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-
finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated
functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.38 This power, as the
OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of
Article VII of the Constitution.39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct
fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are
enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise
of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.40 The power of
the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control
over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise
of his other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,41 his power for
rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes42 and in order to be informed
on matters which he is entitled to know.43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,44 where it was held that
the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control
and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the
power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order
to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in
the government.45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC
fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the
Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly,
the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point
to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to
the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,46
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We
must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes
place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices
or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It
falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power
of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power
of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former
is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,
empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the
above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772.48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize
salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of
E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive
Secretary.49
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for
the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic
and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government
including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one
of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will
necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency
during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became
functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor
General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last
whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now
would you agree with me that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective
anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the
entire National Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis
of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17
reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes
does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark
case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government
with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the
President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited
to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus,
in Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into
the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of
Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it
was ruled:
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is
to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in
the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the
government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power
as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress
to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there
will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no
impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.56 As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority
to directly assume the functions of the executive department.57
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as
it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that
"Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law."58 In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these
quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must
be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate
was delineated by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate"
is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire
into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The
purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the
law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy
x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and
arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.60 Even
respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.61
Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation."62 The
actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits
of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given to the
commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that
of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.64
At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,65 it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution
and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the
Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction
with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates
the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of
probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide
the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of
the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the
Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission,
its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the
Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or
not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of
their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for
possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all
members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan
hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also
cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
that of former President Arroyo.67
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft
and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the
administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations
where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to
have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification
formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized
exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or
persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the
selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to
end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners
advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and
subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with
equal force."70
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous
administration" as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption
solely during the said administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the commission
would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the
petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection
clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the
previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid
classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which
the Executive Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration
from past administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public
confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-
finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the
current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the
policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for
investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the
evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the
policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully
executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede
the current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to
investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even
as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent
administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President
Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by
former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an
ad-hoc and independent citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor,
former President Fidel V. Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s
duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."78
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."82
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification
will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary
that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-
application of the law to him."84
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions
of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not
substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous
administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo
administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration
from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread
reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the
Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."88
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit
the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The
OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point,
may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness."89The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the
legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and
the evil it breeds."90
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the
earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is
beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the
PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous
administrations, given the body’s limited time and resources. "The law does not
require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically
recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century’s worth of graft
cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from
arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the
truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for
being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,92
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is
limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should
not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.94While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is,
for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to
survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To
exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would
only confirm the petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an
"adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written: "A
rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or
assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political
activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor
union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights."
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to
the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a
class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter
be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations
and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which
are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought
under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the
members of the class."97
The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection clause."98 "Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all
the evils within its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged
under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply
because it happens to be incomplete.100 In several instances, the
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or
regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process.101 "With regard to
equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to
cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."102
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned
from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even
mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the
investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is
violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103
To disprove petitioners’ contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the
OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large
scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.104The
OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the
acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not
guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of
the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he
would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This
will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was
"crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration."105
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata
v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision,
however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was
arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of
action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating
fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again,
this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present
political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest
it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as
Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to
its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review must be within constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and
which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, not of men."110
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have clause of the Constitution.
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and
the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from
been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments. carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source SO ORDERED.
of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that WE CONCUR:
instrument secures and guarantees to them."107
RENATO C. CORONA
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own Chief Justice
will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it
by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions Associate Justice Associate Justice
under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as
void and unconstitutional.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble Associate Justice
Associate Justice
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But
then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not
justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be Associate Justice
Associate Justice
allowed.108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will
continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of
this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude."109 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, C.J.:
Of Truth and Truth Commissions
The fundamental base upon which a truth commission is created is the right to
the truth.1 While the right to the truth is yet to be established as a right under
customary law2 or as a general principle of international law,3 it has nevertheless
emerged as a "legal concept at the national, regional and international levels,
and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information to victims or to
their families or even society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding
serious violations of human rights."4
A truth commission has been generally defined5 as a "body set up to investigate
a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country ...,"6 and
includes four elements:
... First, a truth commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is
not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of
certain human rights abuses, or violations of international humanitarian law, over
a period of time. Third, a truth commission usually exists temporarily and for a
pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of its
findings. Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some sort of authority,
by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater
security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its
report.7
As reported by Amnesty International,8 there are at least 33 truth commissions
established in 28 countries from 1974 to 2007 and this includes the Philippines,
which created the Presidential Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) in 1986
under the post-Marcos administration of Pres. Corazon C. Aquino.
The Philippine Experience
Notably, Pres. Corazon C. Aquino created not one but two truth
commissions.9 Aside from the PCHR, which was created to address human
rights violations, the Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG
was also established. The PCGG was tasked with assisting the President in the
"recovery of all in-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship," among others.10 Unlike the present embattled and
controversial Truth Commission, however, the PCGG was created by Pres.
Corazon C. Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers under Executive Order No.
1,11 which in turn, was sanctioned by Proclamation No. 3.12
And unlike the PCGG, the present Truth Commission suffers from both legal and
constitutional infirmities and must be struck down as unconstitutional.
Power To Create Public Offices: Inherently Legislative
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government.13 This principle is one of the cornerstones of our constitutional
democracy and it cannot be eroded without endangering our government.14 The
1987 Constitution divides governmental power into three co-equal branches: the
executive, the legislative and the judicial. It delineates the powers of the three
branches: the legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive department to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies.15 Each branch is
independent and supreme within its own sphere and the encroachment by one
branch on another is to be avoided at all costs.
The power under scrutiny in this case is the creation of a public office. It is
settled that, except for the offices created by the Constitution, the creation of a
public office is primarily a legislative function. The legislature decides what
offices are suitable, necessary or convenient for the administration of
government.16
The question is whether Congress, by law, has delegated to the Chief Executive
this power to create a public office.
In creating the Truth Commission, Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) points to
Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III of E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987 as its legal basis:
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. —
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System,
by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office
of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision pertains to the President’s continuing delegated power to
reorganize the Office of the President. The well-settled principle is that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of his delegated legislative power to reorganize
them under existing statutes.17 Needless to state, such power must always be in
accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.18
In creating the Truth Commission, did the President merely exercise his
continuing authority to reorganize the executive department? No.
Considering that the President was exercising a delegated power, his actions
should have conformed to the standards set by the law, that is, that the
reorganization be in the interest of "simplicity, economy and efficiency." Were
such objectives met? They were not. The Truth Commission clearly duplicates
and supplants the functions and powers of the Office of the Ombudsman and/or
the Department of Justice, as will be discussed in detail later. How can the
creation of a new commission with the same duplicative functions as those of
already existing offices result in economy or a more efficient
bureaucracy?19 Such a creation becomes even more questionable considering
that the 1987 Constitution itself mandates the Ombudsman to investigate graft
and corruption cases.20
The Truth Commission in the Light of The Equal Protection Clause
Equal protection is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section
1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
... nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
It is a right afforded every man. The right to equal protection does not require a
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.21 It
requires simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.22
In certain cases, however, as when things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.23 In Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union,24 the Court declared:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Thus, for a classification to be valid it must pass the test of
reasonableness,25 which requires that:
(1) it be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to present conditions; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
All four requisites must be complied with for the classification to be valid and
constitutional.
The constitutionality of E. O. No. 1 is being attacked on the ground that it
violates the equal protection clause.
Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
deliberately vests the Truth Commission with jurisdiction and authority to solely
target officials and employees of the Arroyo Administration.26 Moreover, they
claim that there is no substantial distinction of graft reportedly committed under
the Arroyo administration and graft committed under previous administrations to
warrant the creation of a Truth Commission which will investigate for prosecution
officials and employees of the past administration.27
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the creation of the Truth
Commission does not violate the equal protection clause. According to them,
while E.O. No. 1 names the previous administration as the initial subject of the
investigation, it does not confine itself to cases of graft and corruption committed
solely during the past administration. Section 17 of E.O. No. 1 clearly speaks of
the President’s power to expand its coverage to previous administrations.
Moreover, respondents argue that the segregation of the transactions of public
officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is
a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils
which the executive order seeks to correct.28
On its face, E.O. No. 1 clearly singles out the previous administration as the
Truth Commission’s sole subject of investigation.
Section 1. Creation of a Commission – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION", which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports
of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action to be taken to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
Section 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding Section 17, which provides:
If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administration, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
supplemental Executive Order." (Emphasis supplied),
such expanded mandate of the Truth Commission will still depend on the whim
and caprice of the President. If the President decides not to expand the
coverage of the investigation, then the Truth Commission’s sole directive is the
investigation of officials and employees of the Arroyo administration.
Given the indubitably clear mandate of E.O. No. 1, does the identification of the
Arroyo administration as the subject of the Truth Commission’s investigation
pass the jurisprudential test of reasonableness? Stated differently, does the
mandate of E.O. No. 1 violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
Yes.
I rule in favor of petitioners.
(1) No Substantial Distinction –
There is no substantial distinction between the corruption which occurred during
the past administration and the corruption of the administrations prior to it.
Allegations of graft and corruption in the government are unfortunately prevalent
regardless of who the President happens to be. Respondents’ claim of
widespread systemic corruption is not unique only to the past administration.
(2) Not Germane to the Purpose of the Law –
The purpose of E.O. No. 1 (to put an end to corruption in the government) is
stated clearly in the preamble of the aforesaid order:
WHEREAS, the President’s battle-cry during his campaign for the Presidency in
the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds; xxx
In the light of the unmistakable purpose of E.O. No. 1, the classification of the
past regime as separate from the past administrations is not germane to the
purpose of the law. Corruption did not occur only in the past administration. To
stamp out corruption, we must go beyond the façade of each administration and
investigate all public officials and employees alleged to have committed graft in
any previous administration.
(3) E.O. No. 1 does Not Apply to Future Conditions –
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the classification does not even refer to
present conditions, much more to future conditions vis-avis the commission of
graft and corruption. It is limited to a particular past administration and not to all
past administrations.29
We go back to the text of the executive order in question.
xxx
Whereas, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases if graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
xxx
Section 1. Creating of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION", which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end investigate reports
of graft and corruption, x x x if any, during the previous administration; xxx
Section 2. Power and Functions. Powers and Functions. – The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption x x x, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit
its findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. x x x
The above-quoted provisions show that the sole subject of the investigation will
be public officers and employees of the previous administration only, that is, until
such time if and when the President decides to expand the Truth Commission’s
mandate to include other administrations (if he does so at all).
(4) E.O. No. 1 Does Not Apply to the Same Class –
Lastly, E.O. No. 1 does not apply to all of those belonging to the same class for it
only applies to the public officers and employees of the past administration. It
excludes from its purview the graft and the grafters of administrations prior to the
last one. Graft is not exclusive to the previous presidency alone, hence there is
no justification to limit the scope of the mandate only to the previous
administration.
Fact-Finding or Investigation?
The nature of the powers and functions allocated by the President to the Truth
Commission by virtue of E.O. No. 1 is investigatory,30 with the purposes of
determining probable cause of the commission of "graft and corruption under
pertinent applicable laws" and referring such finding and evidence to the proper
authorities for prosecution.31
The respondents pass off these powers and functions as merely fact-finding,
short of investigatory. I do not think so. Sugar-coating the description of the
Truth Commission’s processes and functions so as to make it "sound harmless"
falls short of constitutional requirements. It has in its hands the vast arsenal of
the government to intimidate, harass and humiliate its perceived political
enemies outside the lawful prosecutorial avenues provided by law in the
Ombudsman or the Department of Justice.
The scope of the investigatory powers and functions assigned by the President
to the Truth Commission encompasses all "public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration."32
There is no doubt in my mind that what the President granted the Truth
Commission is the authority to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints
of graft and corruption against his immediate predecessor and her associates.
The respondents see nothing wrong with that. They believe that, pursuant to his
power of control and general supervision under Article VII of the
Constitution,33 the President can create an ad-hoc committee like the Truth
Commission to investigate graft and corruption cases. And the President can
endow it with authority parallel to that of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigations. Citing Ombudsman v. Galicia34 the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigations is not exclusive but shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies.
I take a different view. The operative word is "authorized".
Indeed, the power of control and supervision of the President includes the power
to discipline which in turn implies the power to investigate.35 No Congress or
Court can derogate from that power36 but the Constitution itself may set certain
limits.37 And the Constitution has in fact carved out the preliminary investigatory
aspect of the control power and allocated the same to the following:
(a) to Congress over presidential appointees who are impeachable
officers (Article XI, Sections 2 and 3);
(b) to the Supreme Court over members of the courts and the
personnel thereof (Article VIII, Section 6); and
(c) to the Ombudsman over any other public official, employee, office
or agency (Article XI, Section 13 (1)).
However, even as the Constitution has granted to the Ombudsman the power to
investigate other public officials and employees, such power is not absolute and
exclusive. Congress has the power to further define the powers of the
Ombudsman and, impliedly, to authorize other offices to conduct such
investigation over their respective officials and personnel.38
The Constitution has vested in Congress alone the power to grant to any
office concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases of graft and corruption.
In a myriad of cases, this Court has recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of
other bodies vis-à-vis the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints of graft and corruption as authorized by law, meaning, for any other
person or agency to be able to conduct such investigations, there must be a law
authorizing him or it to do so.
In Ombudsman v. Galicia (cited in the ponencia) as well as Ombudsman v.
Estandarte,39 the Court recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of the Division
School Superintendent vis-à-vis the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints of graft and corruption committed by public school
teachers. Such concurrent jurisdiction of the Division School Superintendent was
granted by law, specifically RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.40
Likewise, in Ombudsman v. Medrano41 the Court held that by virtue of RA 4670
the Department of Education Investigating Committee has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints
against public school teachers.
Even the Sangguniang Panlungsod has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Ombudsman to look into complaints against the punong barangay.42 Such
concurrent authority is found in RA 7160 or the Local Government Code.
The Department of Justice is another agency with jurisdiction concurrent with the
Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of public officials and
employees.43 Its concurrent jurisdiction is based on the 1987 Administrative
Code.
Certainly, there is a law, the Administrative Code, which authorized the Office of
the President to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation of graft and corruption cases. However, the scope and
focus of its preliminary investigation are restricted. Under the principle that the
power to appoint includes the power to remove, each President has had his or
her own version of a presidential committee to investigate graft and corruption,
the last being President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) under E.O. No. 268. The PAGC exercised concurrent
authority with the Ombudsman to investigate complaints of graft and corruption
against presidential appointees who are not impeachable officers and non-
presidential appointees in conspiracy with the latter. It is in this light that DOH v.
Camposano, et al.44 as cited in the ponencia should be understood. At that time,
the PCAGC (now defunct) had no investigatory power over non-presidential
appointees; hence the President created an ad-hoc committee to investigate
both the principal respondent who was a presidential appointee and her co-
conspirators who were non-presidential appointees. The PAGC (now also
defunct), however, was authorized to investigate both presidential appointees
and non-presidential appointees who were in conspiracy with each other.
However, although pursuant to his power of control the President may supplant
and directly exercise the investigatory functions of departments and agencies
within the executive department,45 his power of control under the Constitution
and the Administrative Code is confined only to the executive
department.46 Without any law authorizing him, the President cannot legally
create a committee to extend his investigatory reach across the boundaries of
the executive department to "public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration" without setting apart those who are still in the executive
department from those who are not. Only the Ombudsman has the investigatory
jurisdiction over them under Article XI, Section 13. There is no law granting to
the President the authority to create a committee with concurrent investigatory
jurisdiction of this nature.
The President acted in violation of the Constitution and without authority of law
when he created a Truth Commission under E.O. No. 1 to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation of
complaints of graft and corruption against public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration.
Investigation or Quasi-Adjudication?
Respondents argue that the Truth Commission is merely an investigative and
fact-finding body tasked to gather facts, draw conclusions therefrom and
recommend the appropriate actions or measures to be taken. Petitioners,
however, argue that the Truth Commission is vested with quasi-judicial powers.
Offices with such awesome powers cannot be legally created by the President
through mere executive orders.
Petitioners are correct.
The definition of investigation was extensively discussed in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights:47
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate"
is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire
into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The
purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the
law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."48 (Italics in the original)
The exercise of quasi-judicial power goes beyond mere investigation and fact-
finding. Quasi-judicial power has been defined as
… the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons
before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.49(Emphasis
supplied)
Despite respondents’ denial that the Truth Commission is infused with quasi-
judicial powers, it is patent from the provisions of E.O. No. 1 itself that such
powers are indeed vested in the Truth Commission, particularly in Section 2,
paragraphs (b) and (g):
b) Collect, receive, review, and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the
cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, …
xxx
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees
and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when
in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable
ground to believe they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent
applicable laws;
xxx
The powers to "evaluate evidence" and "find reasonable ground to believe that
someone is liable for graft and corruption" are not merely fact-finding or
investigatory. These are quasi-judicial in nature because they actually go into the
weighing of evidence, drawing up of legal conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and the exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial
nature.
The evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence is a quasi-judicial/judicial
function. It involves an assessment of the evidence which is an exercise of
judicial discretion. We have defined discretion
as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for
which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed.50
It is the "the act or the liberty to decide, according to the principles of justice and
one’s ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without
willfulness or favor."51
Likewise, the power to establish if there is reasonable ground to believe that
certain persons are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws
is quasi-judicial in nature because it is akin to the discretion exercised by a
prosecutor in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation. It involves a judicial (or quasi-judicial) appraisal of the facts for the
purpose of determining if a violation has in fact been committed.
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to
usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting
the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the
crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be
prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of
the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may
not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation
has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act
becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for, the production
and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside
or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge
or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly
speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be
considered to be a quasi judicial officer.52
Hence, the Truth Commission is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the
discharge of its functions.
As a mere creation of the executive and without a law granting it the power to
investigate person and agencies outside the executive department, the Truth
Commission can only perform administrative functions, not quasi-judicial
functions. "Administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals."53
Executive Order No. 1 and the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, being
contrary to the Constitution, should be nullified.
I therefore vote that the petitions be GRANTED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur, through this Separate Opinion, with the conclusion that the Executive
Order No. 1 (EO 1 or EO) creating the Truth Commission is fatally defective and
thus should be struck down.
I base my conclusion:
(1) On due process grounds;
(2) On the unconstitutional impact of the EO on the established legal
framework of the criminal justice system;
(3) On the violation of the rule on separation of powers;
(4) On the violations of the personal rights of the investigated persons
and their constitutional right to a fair trial;1 and
(5) On the violation of the equal protection clause.
Two inter-related features of the EO primarily contribute to the resulting
violations. The first is the use of the title Truth Commission, which, as used in
the EO, is fraught with hidden and prejudicial implications beyond the seemingly
simple truth that purportedly characterizes the Commission. The second relates
to the truth-telling function of the Truth Commission under the terms of the EO.
Together, these features radiate outwards with prejudicial effects, resulting in the
above violations.
The full disclosure of the truth about irregular and criminal government activities,
particularly about graft and corruption, is a very worthy ideal that those in
government must fully support; the ideal cannot be disputed, sidetracked or
much less denied. It is a matter that the Constitution itself is deeply concerned
about as shown by Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers.
This concern, however, co-exists with many others and is not the be-all and end-
all of the Charter. The means and manner of addressing this constitutional
concern, for example, rate very highly in the hierarchy of constitutional values,
particularly their effect on the structure and operations of government and the
rights of third parties.
The working of government is based on a well-laid and purposeful constitutional
plan, essentially based on the doctrine of separation of powers, that can only be
altered by the ultimate sovereign – the people. Short of this sovereign action, not
one of the departments of government – neither the Executive, nor the
Legislature, and nor the Judiciary – can modify this constitutional plan, whether
directly or indirectly.
Concern for the individual is another overriding constitutional value. Significantly,
the Constitution does not distinguish between the guilty and the innocent in its
coverage and grant of rights and guarantees. In fact, it has very specific
guarantees for all accused based on its general concern for every Filipino’s life,
liberty, security and property. The Constituion, too, ensures that persons of the
same class, whether natural or juridical, are treated equally, and that the
government does not discriminate in its actions.
All these, this Court must zealously guard. We in the Court cannot ever allow a
disturbance of the equilibrium of the constitutional structure in favour of one or
the other branch, especially in favour of the Judiciary. Much less can we pre-
judge any potential accused, even in the name of truth-telling, retribution,
national healing or social justice. The justice that the Constitution envisions is
largely expressed and embodied in the Constitution itself and this concept of
justice, more than anything else, the Judiciary must serve and satisfy. In doing
this, the Judiciary must stand as a neutral and apolitical judge and cannot be an
advocate other than for the primacy of the Constitution.
These, in brief, reflect the underlying reasons for the cited grounds for the
invalidity of E.O. 1.
I. THE EO AND THE "TRUTH" COMMISSION.
A. THE TERMS OF THE EO AND THE RULES;
NATURE OF THE "TRUTH COMMISSION"
The Philippine Truth Commission (Truth Commission or Commission) is a body
"created" by the President of the Philippines by way of an Executive Order (EO 1
or EO) entitled "Executive Order No. 1, Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010." The Truth Commission’s express and avowed purpose is
–2
"to seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft
and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officials and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration, and thereafter recommend the appropriate
action to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor."
Under these terms and by the Solicitor General’s admissions and
representations, the Truth Commission has three basic functions, namely, fact-
finding,3 policy recommendation,4 and truth-telling,5 all with respect to reported
massive graft and corruption committed by officials and employees of the
previous administration.
The EO defines the Truth Commission as an "independent collegial body" with a
Chairman and four members;6 and provides for the staff,7 facilities8 and
budgetary support9 it can rely on, all of which are sourced from or coursed
through the Office of the President. It specifically empowers the Truth
Commission to "collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence."10 It defines how
the Commission will operate and how its proceedings will be
conducted.11Notably, its hearings shall be open to the public, except only when
they are held in executive sessions for reasons of national security, public safety
or when demanded by witnesses’ personal security concerns.12 It is tasked to
submit its findings and recommendations on graft and corruption to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman,13 and submit special interim reports
and a comprehensive final report which shall be published.14 Witnesses or
resource persons are given the right to counsel,15 as well as security protection
to be provided by government police agencies.16
The Rules of Procedure of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Rules),
promulgated pursuant to Section 2(j) of EO 1, further flesh out the operations of
the Commission.17 Section 4 assures that "due process shall at all times be
observed in the application of the Rules." It provides for formal complaints that
may be filed before it,18 and that after evaluation, the parties who appear
responsible under the complaints shall be provided copies of the complaints and
supporting documents, and be required to comment on or file counter-affidavits
within ten (10) days.19 The Rules declare that the Commission is not bound by
the technical rules of evidence,20 reiterate the protection afforded to witnesses
provided under the EO,21 and confirm that hearings shall be open to the public.22
B. THE TITLE "TRUTH COMMISSION"
AND DUE PROCESS
Both the parties’ memoranda dwelt on the origins and nature of the term "Truth
Commission," with both using their reading of the term’s history and usages to
support their respective positions.23 What comes across in available literature is
that no nation has a lock on the meaning of the term; there is only a long line of
practice that attaches the term to a body established upon restoration of
democracy after a period of massive violence and repression.24The term truth
commission has been specifically used as a title for the body investigating the
human rights violations25 that attended past violence and repression,26 and in
some instances for a body working for reconciliation in society.27
The traditional circumstances that give rise to the use of a truth commission
along the lines of established international practice are not present in the
Philippine setting. The Philippines has a new democratically-elected President,
whose election has been fully accepted without protest by all presidential
candidates and by the people. A peaceful transition of administration took place,
where Congress harmoniously convened, with the past President now sitting as
a member of the House of Representatives. While charges of human rights
violations may have been lodged against the government during the past
administration, these charges are not those addressed by EO 1.28Rather, EO 1
focuses entirely on graft and corruption. Significantly, reconciliation does not
appear to be a goal – either in the EO, in the pleadings filed by the parties, or in
the oral arguments – thus, removing a justification for any massive information
campaign aimed at healing divisions that may exist in the nation.
As a matter of law, that a body called a Truth Commission is tasked to
investigate past instances of graft and corruption would not per se be an
irregularity that should cause its invalidation. The use of the word "truth" is not
ordinarily a ground for objection. Not even the Constitution itself defines or tells
us what truth is; the Charter, fleshed out by the statutes, can only outline the
process of arriving at the truth. After the Constitution and the statutes, however,
have laid down the prescribed procedure, then that procedure must be observed
in securing the truth. Any deviation could be a violation depending on the
attendant circumstances.
No international law can also prevent a sovereign country from using the term as
the title of a body tasked to investigate graft and corruption affecting its citizens
within its borders. At the same time, international law cannot be invoked as a
source of legitimacy for the use of the title when it is not based on the
internationally-recognized conditions of its use.
No local law likewise specifically prohibits or regulates the use of the term "truth
commission." Apart from the procedural "deviation" above adverted to, what may
render the use of the term legally objectionable is the standard of reason,
applicable to all government actions, as applied to the attendant circumstances
surrounding the use in the EO of the title Truth Commission.29 The use of this
standard is unavoidable since the title Truth Commission is used in a public
instrument that defines the Commission’s functions and affects both the
government and private parties.30 The Commission’s work affects third parties as
it is specifically tasked to investigate and prosecute officials and employees of
the previous administration. This line of work effectively relates it to the
processes of the criminal justice system.
In the simplest due process terms, the EO – as a governmental action – must
have a reasonable objective and must use equally reasonable means to achieve
this objective.31 When the EO – viewed from the prism of its title and its truth-
telling function – is considered a means of achieving the objective of fighting
graft and corruption, it would be invalid if it unreasonably or oppressively affects
parties, whether they be government or private.
C. THE COMMISSION’S FUNCTIONS
As worded, the EO establishes the Commission as an investigative body tasked
to act on cases of graft and corruption committed during the previous
administration. This is an area that the law has assigned to the primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.32 If probable cause
exists, these same cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan33 whose decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court.34
Whether a Commission can engage in fact-finding, whose input can aid the
President in policy formulation, is not a disputed issue. What is actively disputed
is whether the Truth Commission shall undertake its tasks in a purely
investigative fact-finding capacity or in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. This
issue impacts on the level of fairness that should be observed (and the standard
of reason that should apply), and thus carries due process implications. Equally
important to the issue of due process are the function of truth-telling and the
effects of this function when considered with the title "Truth Commission."
C.1. The Truth-Telling Function
The Solicitor General fully verbalized the truth-telling function when he declared
that it is a means of letting the people know the truth in the allegations of graft
and corruption against the past administration.35 The Solicitor General, in
response to the questions of J. Sereno, said:
Justice Sereno: . . .I go now to the truth-telling part of the commission. In other
words, can you describe to us the truth telling and truth seeking part of the
commission?
Solicitor General Cadiz: Your Honor, of course our people will find closure if
aside from the truth finding of facts, those who have been found by the body
to have committed graft and corruption will be prosecuted by the
Ombudsman. It is. . .Your Honor, there is a crime committed and therefore
punishment must be meted out. However, Your Honor, truth-telling part, the
mere narration of facts, the telling of the truth, will likewise I think to a
certain degree, satisfy our people.
Justice Sereno: Are you saying therefore the truth-telling, that the narration like
the other narrations in the past commissions has an independent value apart
from the recommendations to indict which particular persons?
Solicitor General Cadiz: I agree Your Honor. And it is certainly, as the EO says,
it’s a Truth Commission the narration of facts by the members of the
Commission, I think, will be appreciated by the people independent of the
indictment that is expected likewise. [Emphasis supplied.]
His statement is justified by the EO’s mandate to seek and find the truth under
Section 1; the opening to the public of the hearing and proceedings under
Section 6; and the publication of the Commission’s final report under Section 15
of the EO.36
C.2. Legal Implications of Truth-Telling
Truth-telling, as its name connotes, does not exist solely for the sake of "truth";
the "telling" side is equally important as the Solicitor General impressed upon
this Court during the oral arguments.37 Thus, to achieve its objectives, truth-
telling needs an audience to whom the truth shall be told.38 This requirement
opens up the reality that EO 1 really speaks in two forums.
The first forum, as expressly provided in the EO, is composed of the persons to
be investigated and the recipients of the Commission’s reports who are expected
to act on these reports, specifically, the President (who needs investigative and
policy formulation assistance); Congress (who may use the Commission’s
information for its own legislative purposes); and the Ombudsman as the
investigative and prosecutory constitutional office39 to which, under the EO, the
Commission must forward its interim and final reports. The Commission’s
hearings and proceedings are important venues for this forum, as this is where
the investigated persons can defend themselves against the accusations made.
The element of policy formulation, on the other hand, is present through the
Commission’s interim and final reports from which appropriate remedial policy
measures can be distilled. The element of truth-telling – in the sense of
communicating to the public the developments as they happen and through the
interim and final reports – exists but only plays a secondary role, as the public is
not a direct participant in this forum.
The second forum – not as explicitly defined as the first but which must implicitly
and necessarily be there – is that shared with the general public as the audience
to whom the President (through the EO and the Truth Commission) wishes to tell
the story of the allegedly massive graft and corruption during the previous
administration. This is the distinct domain of truth-telling as the Solicitor General
himself impliedly admits in his quoted arguments.40 Section 6 of the EO fully
supports truth-telling, as it opens up the Commission’s hearings or proceedings
to the public (and hence, to the mass media), subject only to an executive
session "where matters of national security or public safety are involved or when
the personal safety of the witness warrants the holding of such executive or
closed-door session hearing."
These separate forums are not distinguished merely for purposes of academic
study; they are there, plainly from the terms of the EO, and carry clear
distinctions from which separate legal consequences arise.
Both forums involve third parties, either as persons to be investigated or as part
of the general public (in whose behalf criminal complaints are nominally brought
and who are the recipients of the Commission’s truth-telling communications) so
that, at the very least, standards of fairness must be observed.41 In the
investigative function, the standard depends on whether the tasks performed are
purely investigative or are quasi-judicial, but this distinction is not very relevant to
the discussions of this opinion. In truth-telling, on the other hand, the level of the
required fairness would depend on the objective of this function and the level of
finality attained with respect to this objective.42
In the first forum, no element of finality characterizes the Commission’s reports
since – from the perspective of the EO’s express purposes of prosecution and
policy formulation – they are merely recommendatory and are submitted for the
President’s, Congress’ and the Ombudsman’s consideration. Both the President
and Congress may reject the reports for purposes of their respective policy
formulation activities; the Ombudsman may likewise theoretically and nominally
reject them (although with possibly disastrous results as discussed below).
In the second forum, a very high element of finality exists as the information
communicated through the hearings, proceedings and the reports are directly
"told" the people as the "truth" of the graft and corruption that transpired during
the previous administration. In other words, the Commission’s outputs are
already the end products, with the people as the direct consumers. In this sense,
the element of fairness that must exist in the second forum must approximate
the rights of an accused in a criminal trial as the consequence of truth-telling is
no less than a final "conviction" before the bar of public opinion based on the
"truth" the Commission "finds." Thus, if the Commission is to observe the rights
of due process as Rule 1, Section 4 of its Rules guarantees, then the right of
investigated persons to cross-examine witnesses against them,43 the right
against self-incrimination,44 and all the rights attendant to a fair trial must be
observed. The rights of persons under investigation under Section 12 of the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution45 must likewise be respected.
II. THE EO’S LEGAL INFIRMITIES.
A. THE TITLE "TRUTH COMMISSION" + THE TRUTH-TELLING FUNCTION =
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
A.1. The Impact of the Commission’s "Truth"
The first problem of the EO is its use of the title "Truth Commission" and its
objective of truth-telling; these assume that what the Truth Commission speaks
of is the "truth" because of its title and of its truth-telling function; thus, anything
other than what the Commission reports would either be a distortion of the truth,
or may even be an "untruth."
This problem surfaced during the oral arguments on queries about the effect of
the title "Truth Commission" on the authority of the duly constituted tribunals that
may thereafter rule on the matters that the Commission shall report on.46 Since
the Commission’s report will constitute the "truth," any subsequent contrary
finding by the Ombudsman47 would necessarily be suspect as an "untruth;" it is
up then to the Ombudsman to convince the public that its findings are true.
To appreciate the extent of this problem, it must be considered that the hearings
or proceedings, where charges of graft and corruption shall be aired, shall be
open to the public. The Commission’s report shall likewise be published.48 These
features cannot but mean full media coverage.
Based on common and usual Philippine experience with its very active media
exemplified by the recent taking of Chinese and Canadian hostages at the
Luneta, a full opening to the media of the Commission’s hearings, proceedings
and reports means a veritable media feast that, in the case of the Truth
Commission, shall occur on small but detailed daily doses, from the naming of all
the persons under investigation all the way up to the Commission’s final report.
By the time the Commission report is issued, or even before then, the public
shall have been saturated with the details of the charges made through the
publicly-aired written and testimonial submissions of witnesses, variously viewed
from the vantage points of straight reporting, three-minute TV news clips, or the
slants and personal views of media opinion writers and extended TV coverage.
All these are highlighted as the power of the media and the environment that it
creates can never be underestimated. Hearing the same "truth" on radio and
television and seeing it in print often enough can affect the way of thinking and
the perception, even of those who are determined, in their conscious minds, to
avoid bias.49
As expected, this is a view that those supporting the validity of the EO either
dismisses as an argument that merely relies on a replaceable name,50 or with
more general argument couched under the question "Who Fears the Truth."51
The dismissive argument, to be sure, would have been meritorious if only the
name Truth Commission had not been supported by the Commission’s truth-
telling function; or, if the name "Truth Commission" were a uniquely Filipino
appellation that does not carry an established meaning under international
practice and usage. Even if it were to be claimed that the EO’s use of the name
is unique because the Philippines’ version of the Truth Commission addresses
past graft and corruption and not violence and human rights violations as in
other countries, the name Truth Commission, however, cannot simply be
dissociated from its international usage. The term connotes abuses of untold
proportions in the past by a repressive undemocratic regime – a connotation that
may be applicable to the allegations of graft and corruption, but is incongruous
when it did not arise from a seriously troubled regime; even the present
administration cannot dispute that it assumed office in a peaceful transition of
power after relatively clean and peaceful elections.
The "Who Fears the Truth?" arguments, on the other hand, completely miss the
point of this Separate Opinion. This Opinion does not dispute that past graft and
corruption must investigated and fully exposed; any statement to the contrary in
the Dissent are unfounded rhetoric written solely for its own partisan audience.
What this Opinion clearly posits as legally objectionable is the government’s
manner of "telling;" any such action by government must be made according to
the norms and limits of the Constitution to which all departments of government
– including the Executive – are subject. Specifically, the Executive cannot be left
unchecked when its methods grossly violate the Constitution. This matter is
discussed in full below.
A.2. Truth-telling and the Ombudsman
To return to the scenario described above, it is this scenario that will confront the
Ombudsman when the Commission’s report is submitted to it. At that point, there
would have been a full and extended public debate heavily influenced by the
Commission’s "truthful" conclusions. Thus, when and if the Ombudsman finds
the evidence from the report unconvincing or below the level that probable cause
requires, it stands to incur the public ire, as the public shall have by then been
fully informed of the "facts" and the "truth" in the Commission’s report that the
Ombudsman shall appear to have disregarded.
This consequence does not seem to be a serious concern for the framers and
defenders of the EO, as the Commission’s truth-telling function by then would
have been exercised and fully served. In the Solicitor General’s words "Your
Honor, there is crime committed and therefore punishment must be meted out.
However, your Honor, truth-telling part, the mere narration of facts, the telling of
the truth, will likewise I think to a certain degree satisfy our people." On the
question of whether truth-telling has an independent value separate from the
indictment - he said: "And it is certainly, as the EO says, it’s a Truth Commission
the narration of facts by the members of the Commission, I think, will be
appreciated by the people independent of the indictment that is expected
likewise."52
In other words, faced with the findings of the Commission, the Ombudsman who
enters a contrary ruling effectively carries the burden of proving that its findings,
not those of the Commission, are correct. To say the least, this resulting reversal
of roles is legally strange since the Ombudsman is the body officially established
and designated by the Constitution to investigate graft and other crimes
committed by public officers, while the Commission is a mere "creation" of the
Executive Order. The Ombudsman, too, by statutory mandate has primary
jurisdiction over the investigation and prosecution of graft and corruption, while
the Commission’s role is merely recommendatory.
Thus, what the EO patently expresses as a primary role for the Commission is
negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission and its truth-telling
function. Expressed in terms of the forums the EO spawned, the EO’s principal
intent to use the Truth Commission as a second forum instrument is unmasked;
the first forum – the officially sanctioned forum for the prosecution of crimes –
becomes merely a convenient cover for the second forum.
A.3. Truth-telling and the Courts
The effects of truth-telling could go beyond those that affect the Ombudsman. If
the Ombudsman concurs with the Commission and brings the recommended
graft and corruption charges before the Sandiganbayan – a constitutionally-
established court – this court itself would be subject to the same truth-telling
challenge if it decides to acquit the accused. For that matter, even this Court, will
be perceived to have sided with an "untruth" when and if it goes against the
Commission’s report. Thus, the authority, independence, and even the integrity
of these constitutional bodies – the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan, and the
Supreme Court – would have been effectively compromised, to the prejudice of
the justice system. All these, of course, begin with the premise that the Truth
Commission has the mandate to find the "truth," as it name implies, and has a
truth-telling function that it can fully exercise through its own efforts and through
the media.
A.4. Truth-telling and the Public.
A.4.1. Priming and Other Prejudicial Effects.
At this point in the political development of the nation, the public is already a very
critical audience who can examine announced results and can form its own
conclusions about the culpability or innocence of the investigated persons,
irrespective of what conclusions investigative commissions may arrive at. This is
a reality that cannot be doubted as the public has been exposed in the past to
these investigative commissions.
The present Truth Commission operating under the terms of the EO, however,
introduces a new twist that the public and the country have not met before. For
the first time, a Truth Commission, tasked with a truth-telling function, shall
speak on the "truth" of what acts of graft and corruption were actually committed
and who the guilty parties are. This official communication from a governmental
body – the Truth Commission – whose express mandate is to find and "tell the
truth" cannot but make a difference in the public perception.
At the very least, the widely-publicized conclusions of the Truth Commission
shall serve as a mechanism for "priming" 53 the public, even the Ombudsman
and the courts, to the Commission’s way of thinking. Pervasively repeated as an
official government pronouncement, the Commission’s influence can go
beyond the level of priming and can affect the public environment as well
as the thinking of both the decision makers in the criminal justice system
and the public in general.
Otherwise stated, the Commission’s publicly announced conclusions cannot but
assume the appearance of truth once they penetrate and effectively color the
public’s perception, through repetition without significant contradiction as official
government findings. These conclusions thus graduate to the level of "truth" in
self-fulfillment of the name the Commission bears; the subtle manipulation of the
Commission’s name and functions, fades in the background or simply becomes
explainable incidents that cannot defeat the accepted truth.
A very interesting related material about the effect of core beliefs on the
decision-making of judges is the point raised by United States Supreme Court
Associate Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo54 in his book The Nature of the Judicial
Process55 where he said:
… Of the power of favour or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil sense, I
have found no trace, not even the faintest, among the judges whom I have
known. But every day there is borne in on me a new conviction of the
inescapable relation between the truth without us and the truth within. The spirit
of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group
in which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have
given us place. No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all
times the empire of the subconscious loyalties. "Our beliefs and opinions," says
James Harvey Robinson, "like our standards of conduct come to us insensibly as
products of our companionship with our fellow men, not as results of our
personal experience and the inferences we individually make from our own
observations. We are constantly misled by our extraordinary faculty of
‘rationalizing’ – that is, of devising plausible arguments by accepting what is
imposed upon us by the traditions of the group to which we belong. We are
abjectly credulous by nature, and instinctively accept the verdict of the group.
We are suggestible not merely when under the spell of an excited mob, or a
fervent revival, but we are ever and always listening to the still small voice of the
herd, and are ever ready to defend and justify the instructions and warnings, and
accept them as the mature results of our own reasoning." This was written, not
of judges specially, but of men and women of all classes.56 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, Justice Cardozo accepted that "subconscious loyalties" to the "spirit" of
the group, i.e., the core beliefs within, is a major factor that affects the decision
of a judge. In the context of EO 1, that "spirit" or core belief is what a generally
trusted government’s57 repeated invocation of "truth" apparently aims to reach.
This goal assumes significance given the Solicitor General’s statement that
truth-telling is an end in itself. Read with what Justice Cardozo said, this goal
translates to the more concrete and currently understandable aim – to establish
the "truth" as part of the accepted public belief; the EO’s aim is achieved
irrespective of what the pertinent adjudicatory bodies may conclude, as even
they could be influenced by the generally accepted "truth."
Further on, Justice Cardozo, speaking in the context of the development of case
law in common law, went on to say, quoting Henderson:58
When an adherent to a systematic faith is brought continuously in touch with
influences and exposed to desires inconsistent with that faith, a process of
unconscious cerebration may take place, by which a growing store of hostile
mental inclinations may accumulate, strongly motivating action and decision, but
seldom emerging clearly into consciousness. In the meantime, the formulas of
the old faith are retained and repeated by force of habit, until one day the
realization comes that conduct and sympathies and fundamental desires have
become so inconsistent with the logical framework that it must be discarded.
Then begins the task of building up and rationalizing a new faith.
Although written in another context, this statement – relating to how one’s belief
is supplanted by another – runs parallel to how the belief system of an individual
judge can be subtly affected by inconsistent influences and how he ultimately
succumbs to a new belief.
Without doubt, the process of converting to a new belief is an unavoidable and
continuous process that every decision maker undergoes as the belief system
he started with, changes and evolves through in-court experiences and exposure
to outside influences. Such exposure cannot be faulted, particularly when
brought on by the media working pursuant to its exercise of the freedoms of the
press and speech, and speaking in the course of the clash of ideas in the public
forum. The same exposure, however, is not as neutral and fault-free when it is
precipitated by the government acting as a catalytic agent to hasten the
achievement of its own ends, in this case, the disclosure of the "truth" regarding
the alleged graft and corruption during the previous regime.
In the context of the EO, the Executive can investigate within the limits of its
legal parameters and can likewise publicize the results of its investigations to the
full limit of allowable transparency. But in so doing, it cannot act as catalyst by
labelling the action of the Commission it has created as officially-sanctioned and
authoritative truth-telling before the officially-designated bodies – the
Ombudsman and the courts – have spoken. While the emergence of truth is a
basic and necessary component of the justice system, the truth-seeking and
truth-finding processes cannot be speeded up through steps that shortcut and
bypass processes established by the Constitution and the laws. As heretofore
mentioned, the international experiences that gave rise to the title Truth
Commission were transitional situations where, for peculiar reasons (such as the
temporary absence of an established judicial system or the need to speed up the
transition to democratic rule), the use of ad hoc commissions were called for. In
the Philippine setting, the closest similar situation would be the immediate
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution as the country struggled in the transition
from authoritarian martial law regime into a full-fledged democracy. To be
sure, the shortcut to the emergence of truth, fashioned under the terms of
EO 1, finds no justification after the 1987 Constitution and its rights,
freedoms and guarantees have been fully put in place.
A.4.2. The Effects on the Judicial System
To fully appreciate the potential prejudicial effects of truth-telling on the judicial
system, the effects of media exposure – from the point of view of what transpires
and the circumstances present under truth-telling and under the present justice
system – deserve examination.
Under the present justice system, the media may fully report, as they do report,
all the details of a reported crime and may even give the suspects detailed
focus. These reports, however, are not branded as the "truth" but as matters that
will soon be brought to the appropriate public authorities for proper investigation
and prosecution, if warranted. In the courts, cases are handled on the basis of
the rules of evidence and with due respect for the constitutional rights of the
accused, and are reported based on actual developments, subject only to
judicial requirements to ensure orderly proceedings and the observance of the
rights of the accused. Only after the courts have finally spoken shall there be any
conclusive narrative report of what actually transpired and how accused
individuals may have participated in committing the offense charged. At this
point, any public report and analysis of the findings can no longer adversely
affect the constitutional rights of the accused as they had been given all the
opportunities to tell their side in court under the protective guarantees of the
Constitution.
In contrast, the circumstances that underlie Commission reports are different.
The "truth" that the Commission shall publicize shall be based on "facts" that
have not been tested and admitted according to the rules of evidence; by its own
express rules, the technical rules of evidence do not apply to the
Commission.59 The reported facts may have also been secured under
circumstances violative of the rights of the persons investigated under the
guarantees of the Constitution. Thus, what the Commission reports might not at
all pass the tests of guilt that apply under the present justice system, yet they will
be reported with the full support of the government as the "truth" to the public. As
fully discussed below, these circumstances all work to the active prejudice of the
investigated persons whose reputations, at the very least, are blackened once
they are reported by the Commission as participants in graft and corruption,
even if the courts subsequently find them innocent of these charges.
A.5. Truth-telling: an unreasonable means to a reasonable objective.
Viewed from the above perspectives, what becomes plainly evident is an EO
that, as a means of fighting graft and corruption, will effectively and prejudicially
affect the parties inter-acting with the Truth Commission. The EO will erode the
authority and even the integrity of the Ombudsman and the courts in acting on
matters brought before them under the terms of the Constitution; its premature
and "truthful" report of guilt will condition the public’s mind to reject any finding
other than those of the Commission.
Under this environment, the findings or results of the second forum described
above overwhelm the processes and whatever may be the findings or results of
the first forum. In other words, the findings or results of the second forum –
obtained without any assurance of the observance of constitutional guarantees –
would not only create heightened expectations and exert unwanted pressure, but
even induce changed perceptions and bias in the processes of the first forum in
the manner analogous to what Justice Cardozo described above. The first
casualties, of course, are the investigated persons and their basic rights, as fully
explained elsewhere in this Opinion.
While EO 1 may, therefore, serve a laudable anti-graft and corruption purpose
and may have been launched by the President in good faith and with all
sincerity, its truth-telling function, undertaken in the manner outlined in the EO
and its implementing rules, is not a means that this Court can hold as
reasonable and valid, when viewed from the prism of due process. From this
vantage point, the Commission is not only a mislabelled body but one whose
potential outputs must as well be discarded for being unacceptable under the
norms of the Constitution.
B. DISTORTION OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The EO and its truth-telling function must also be struck down as they distort the
constitutional and statutory plan of the criminal justice system without the
authority of law and with an unconstitutional impact on the system.
B.1. The Existing Legal Framework
The Constitution has given the country a well-laid out and balanced division of
powers, distributed among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, with
specially established offices geared to accomplish specific objectives to
strengthen the whole constitutional structure.
The Legislature is provided, in relation with the dispensation of justice, the
authority to create courts with defined jurisdictions below the level of the
Supreme Court;60 to define the required qualifications for judges;61 to define
what acts are criminal and what penalties they shall carry;62 and to provide the
budgets for the courts.63
The Executive branch is tasked with the enforcement of the laws that the
Legislature shall pass. In the dispensation of justice, the Executive has the
prerogative of appointing justices and judges,64 and the authority to investigate
and prosecute crimes through a Department of Justice constituted in accordance
the Administrative Code.65 Specifically provided and established by the
Constitution, for a task that would otherwise fall under the Executive’s
investigatory and prosecutory authority, is an independent Ombudsman for the
purpose of acting on, investigating and prosecuting allegedly criminal acts or
omissions of public officers and employees in the exercise of their functions.
While the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is primary; it takes
precedence and overrides any investigatory and prosecutory action by the
Department of Justice.66
The Judiciary, on the other hand, is given the task of standing in judgment over
the criminal cases brought before it, either at the first instance through the
municipal and the regional trial courts, or on appeal or certiorari, through the
appellate courts and ultimately to the Supreme Court.67 An exception to these
generalities is the Sandiganbayan, a special statutorily-created court with the
exclusive jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by public officers and
employees in the exercise of their functions.68 Underlying all these is the
Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate the rules of procedure applicable to
courts and their proceedings,69 to appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary other than judges,70 and to exercise supervision over all courts and
judiciary employees.71
In the usual course, an act allegedly violative of our criminal laws may be
brought to the attention of the police authorities for unilateral fact-finding
investigation. If a basis for a complaint exists, then the matter is brought before
the prosecutor’s office for formal investigation, through an inquest or a
preliminary investigation, to determine if probable cause exists to justify the filing
of a formal complaint or information before the courts. Aside from those initiated
at the instance of the aggrieved private parties, the fact-finding investigation may
be made at the instance of the President or of senior officials of the Executive
branch, to be undertaken by police authorities, by the investigatory agencies of
the Department of Justice, or by specially constituted or delegated officials or
employees of the Executive branch; the preliminary investigation for the
determination of probable cause is a task statutorily vested in the prosecutor’s
office.72 Up to this point, these activities lie within the Executive branch of
government and may be called its extrajudicial participation in the justice system.
By specific authority of the Constitution and the law, a deviation from the above
general process occurs in the case of acts allegedly committed by public officers
and employees in the performance of their duties where, as mentioned above,
the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction. While the Executive branch itself may
undertake a unilateral fact-finding, and the prosecutor’s office may conduct
preliminary investigation for purposes of filing a complaint or information with the
courts, the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction gives this office precedence and
dominance once it decides to take over a case.73
Whether a complaint or information emanates from the prosecutor’s office or
from the Ombudsman, jurisdiction to hear and try the case belongs to the courts,
mandated to determine – under the formal rules of evidence of the Rules of
Court and with due observance of the constitutional rights of the accused – the
guilt or innocence of the accused. A case involving criminal acts or omissions of
public officers and employees in the performance of duties falls at the first
instance within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,74 subject to
higher recourse to the Supreme Court. This is the strictly judicial aspect of the
criminal justice system.
Under the above processes, our laws have delegated the handling of criminal
cases to the justice system and there the handling should solely lie, supported
by all the forces the law can muster, until the disputed matter is fully resolved.
The proceedings – whether before the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ombudsman, or
before the courts – are open to the public and are thereby made transparent;
freedom of information75 and of the press76 guarantee media participation,
consistent with the justice system’s orderly proceedings and the protection of the
rights of parties.
The extrajudicial intervention of the Commission, as provided in the EO, even for
the avowed purpose of "assisting" the Ombudsman, directly disrupts the
established order, as the Constitution and the law do not envision a situation
where fact-finding recommendations, already labelled as "true," would be
submitted to the Ombudsman by an entity within the Executive branch. This
arrangement is simply not within the dispensation of justice scheme, as the
determination of whether probable cause exists cannot be defeated, rendered
suspect, or otherwise eroded by any prior process whose results are
represented to be the "truth" of the alleged criminal acts. The Ombudsman may
be bound by the findings of a court, particularly those of this Court, but not of any
other body, most especially a body outside the regular criminal justice system.
Neither can the strictly judicial aspect of the justice system be saddled with this
type of fact-finding, as the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused
lies strictly and solely with the courts. Nor can the EO cloak its intent of
undercutting the authority of the designated authorities to rule on the merits of
the alleged graft and corruption through a statement that its findings are
recommendatory; as has been discussed above, this express provision is
negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission and its truth-telling
function.
A necessary consequence of the deviation from the established constitutional
and statutory plan is the extension of the situs of the justice system from its
constitutionally and statutorily designated locations (equivalent to the above-
described first forum), since the Commission will investigate matters that are
bound to go to the justice system. In other words, the Commission’s activities,
including its truth-telling function and the second forum this function creates,
become the prelude to the entry of criminal matters into the Ombudsman and
into the strictly judicial aspect of the system.
In practical terms, this extension undermines the established order in the judicial
system by directly bringing in considerations that are extraneous to the
adjudication of criminal cases, and by co-mingling and confusing these with the
standards of the criminal justice system. The result, unavoidably, is a qualitative
change in the criminal justice system that is based, not on a legislative policy
change, but on an executive fiat.
Because of truth-telling and its consequence of actively bringing in public opinion
as a consideration, standards and usages other than those strictly laid down or
allowed by the Constitution, by the laws and by the Rules of Court will play a part
in the criminal justice system. For example, public comments on the merits of
cases that are still sub judice may become rampant as comments on a truth
commission’s findings, not on the cases pending before the courts. The
commission’s "truthful" findings, made without respect for the rules on evidence
and the rights of the accused, would become the standards of public perception
of and reaction to cases, not the evidence as found by the courts based on the
rules of evidence.
Once the door is opened to the Truth Commission approach and public opinion
enters as a consideration in the judicial handling of criminal cases, then the rules
of judging would have effectively changed; reliance on the law, the rules and
jurisprudence would have been weakened to the extent that judges are on the
lookout, not only for what the law and the rules say, but also for what the public
feels about the case. In this eventuality, even a noisy minority can change the
course of a case simply because of their noise and the media attention they get.
(Such tactics have been attempted in the immediate past where pressure has
been brought to bear on this Court through street demonstrations bordering on
anarchy, the marshalling of opinions locally and internationally, and highly
partisan media comments.) The primacy of public opinion may, without doubt,
appeal to some but this is simply not the way of a Judiciary constitutionally-
designed to follow the rule of law.
Another consequent adverse impact could be erosion of what the Constitution
has very carefully fashioned to be a system where the interpretation of the law
and the dispensation of justice are to be administered apolitically by the
Judiciary. Politics always enters the picture once public opinion begins to be a
significant consideration. At this point, even politicians – ever attuned to the
public pulse – may register their own statements in the public arena on the
merits of the cases even while matters are sub judice. The effects could be
worse where the case under consideration carries its own political dimensions,
as in the present case where the target involves the misdeeds of the previous
administration.
Whether the Judiciary shall involve, or be involved, in politics, or whether it
should consider, or be affected by, political considerations in adjudication, has
been firmly decided by the Constitution and our laws in favour of insulation
through provisions on the independence of the Judiciary – the unelected branch
of government whose standard of action is the rule of law rather than the public
pulse. This policy has not been proven to be unsound. Even if it is unsound, any
change will have to be effected through legitimate channels – through the
sovereignty that can change the Constitution, to the extent that the Judiciary’s
and the Ombudsman’s independence and the exercise of judicial discretion are
concerned, and through the Congress of the Philippines, with respect to other
innovations that do not require constitutional changes.
To be sure, the President of the Philippines, through an executive or
administrative order and without authority of law, cannot introduce changes or
innovations into the justice system and significantly water down the authoritative
power of the courts and of duly designated constitutional bodies in dispensing
justice. The nobility of the President’s intentions is not enough to render his act
legal. As has been said often enough, ours is a government of laws, not of men.
C. LIMITS OF THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
While the Executive participates in the dispensation of justice under our
constitutional and statutory system through its investigatory and prosecutory
arms and has every authority in law to ensure that the law is enforced and that
violators are prosecuted, even these powers have limits.
The independence of the Ombudsman and its freedom from interference from all
other departments of government in the performance of its functions is a barrier
that cannot be breached, directly or indirectly, except only as the Constitution
and the laws may allow. No such exception has been allowed or given to the
President other than through the prosecution the Department of Justice may
undertake77 when the Ombudsman has not asserted its primary jurisdiction. The
concurrent jurisdiction given to the Department of Justice to prosecute criminal
cases, incidentally, is a grant specific to that office,78 not to any other office that
the Executive may create through an executive order.
The Executive can, without doubt, recommend that specific violators be
prosecuted and the basis for this recommendation need not even come from the
Department of Justice; the basis may be the findings of the Office of the
President itself independently of its Department of Justice. Notably, the other
branches of government may also, and do in fact, make recommendations to the
Ombudsman in the way that Congress, in the course of its fact-finding for
legislative purposes, unearths anomalies that it reports to the Ombudsman.
Even the Supreme Court recommends that Judiciary officials and employees
found administratively liable be also criminally prosecuted.
The Executive can also designate officials and employees of the Executive
Department (or even appoint presidential assistants or consultants)79 to
undertake fact-finding investigation for its use pursuant to the vast powers and
responsibilities of the Presidency, but it cannot create a separate body, in the
way and under the terms it created the Truth Commission, without offending the
Constitution.
The following indicators, however, show that the President was not simply
appointing presidential assistants or assistants when he constituted the Truth
Commission as an investigating or fact-finding body.
First, the President "created" the Truth Commission; the act of creation goes
beyond the mere naming, designation or appointment of assistants and
consultants. There is no need to "create" – i.e., to constitute or establish
something out of nothing, or to establish for the first time80 – if only the
designation or appointment of a presidential assistant or consultant is intended.
To "create" an office, too, as the petitioners rightfully claim, is a function of the
Legislature under the constitutional division of powers.81 Note in this regard, and
as more fully discussed below, that what the Revised Administrative Code,
through its Section 31, allows the President is to "reorganize," not to create a
public office within the Executive department.
Second, the Truth Commission, as created by the EO, appears to be a separate
body82 that is clearly beyond being merely a group of people tasked by the
President to accomplish a specific task within his immediate office; its members
do not operate in the way that presidential assistants and consultants usually do.
It is not insignificant that the Commission has its own Rules of Procedure that it
issued on its own on the authority of the EO. Note that these are not the rules of
the Office of the President but of another body, although one constituted by the
President.
The Commission has its own complete set of officers, beginning from the Chair
and members of the Commission; it has its own consultants, experts, and
employees, although the latter are merely drawn from the Executive
department;83 and it even has provisions for its own budget, although these
funds ride on and are to be drawn from the budget of the Office of the President.
Third, the Commission has its own identity, separate and distinct from the Office
of the President, although it still falls within the structural framework of that
office. The Commission undertakes its own "independent" investigation84that,
according to the Solicitor General, will not be controlled by the Office of the
President;85 and it communicates on its own, under its own name, to other
branches of government outside of the Executive branch.
Lastly, the Commission as an office has been vested with functions that not even
the Office of the President possesses by authority of law, and which the
President, consequently, cannot delegate. Specifically, the Commission has its
truth-telling function, because it has been given the task to disclose the "truth" by
the President, thus giving its report the imprimatur of truth well ahead of any
determination in this regard by the constitutional bodies authorized to determine
the existence of probable cause and the guilt or culpability of individuals.
If the President cannot give the official label of truth independently of the courts
in a fact-finding in a criminal case, either by himself or through the Department of
Justice, it only follows that he cannot delegate this task to any assistant,
consultant, or subordinate, even granting that he can order a fact-finding
investigation based on the powers of his office. This truth-telling function
differentiates the Truth Commission from other commissions constituted in the
past such as the Agrava, Feliciano and Melo Commissions; the pronouncements
of the latter bodies did not carry the imprimatur of truth, and were mere
preliminary findings for the President’s consideration. An exact recent case to
drive home this point is the Chinese hostage incident where the Office of the
President modified the Report submitted by a duly-constituted group headed by
Secretary Leila de Lima.86 Apparently, the findings of the De Lima committee did
not carry the imprimatur of truth and were merely recommendatory; otherwise
the Office of the President would not have modified its findings and
recommendations.
Still on the point of the President’s authority to delegate tasks to a body he has
constituted, in no case can the President order a fact-finding whose results will
operate to undercut the authority and integrity of the Ombudsman in a reported
violation of the criminal laws by a public servant. The President’s authority –
outside of the instance when the Department of Justice acts in default of the
Ombudsman – is to bring to the attention of, or make recommendations to, the
Ombudsman violations of the law that the Executive branch uncovers in the
course of law enforcement. This authority should be no different from that which
Congress and the Supreme Court exercise on the same point.
Given all the possibilities open to the President for a legitimate fact-finding
intervention – namely, through fact-finding by the Department of Justice or by
the Office of the President itself, utilizing its own officials, employees,
consultants or assistants – the President is not wanting in measures within the
parameters allowed by law to fight graft and corruption and to address specific
instances that come to his attention. To be sure, the Philippine situation right
now is far from the situations in South Africa, Rwanda, and South
America,87 where quick transitional justice88had to be achieved because these
countries were coming from a period of non-democratic rule and their desired
justice systems were not yet fully in place. This reality removes any justification
for the President to resort to extralegal (or even illegal) measures and to
institutions and mechanisms outside of those already in place, in proceeding
against grafters in the previous administration.
If the President and Congress are dissatisfied with the Ombudsman’s
performance of duty, the constitutionally-provided remedy is to impeach the
Ombudsman based on the constitutionally-provided grounds for removal. The
remedy is not through the creation of a parallel office that either duplicates or
renders ineffective the Ombudsman’s actions. By the latter action, the President
already situates himself and the Executive Department into the justice system in
a manner that the Constitution and the law do not allow.
D. THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY EITHER UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OR UNDER THE LAWS TO CREATE THE TRUTH
COMMISSION.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the authority to create offices is lodged exclusively
in Congress. This is a necessary implication89 of its "plenary legislative
power."90 Thus, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or statutory
grant, no public office can be created except by Congress; any unauthorized
action in this regard violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
In essence, according to Father Joaquin Bernas, "separation of powers means
that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the executive, settlement of
legal controversies to the judiciary."91 This means that the President cannot,
under the present Constitution and in the guise of "executing the laws," perform
an act that would impinge on Congress’ exclusive power to create laws,
including the power to create a public office.
In the present case, the exclusive authority of Congress in creating a public
office is not questioned. The issue raised regarding the President’s power to
create the Truth Commission boils down to whether the Constitution allows the
creation of the Truth Commission by the President or by an act of Congress.
D.1 The Section 31 Argument.
EO 1, by its express terms, 92 is premised on "Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code
of the Philippines, which gives the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. The Solicitor
General, of course, did not steadfastly hold on to this view; in the course of the
oral arguments and in his Memorandum, he invoked other bases for the
President’s authority to issue EO 1. In the process, he likewise made various
claims, not all of them consistent with one another, on the nature of the Truth
Commission that EO 1 created.
Section 31 shows that it is a very potent presidential power, as it empowers him
to (1) to re-organize his own internal office; (2) transfer any function or office
from the Office of the President to the various executive departments; and (3)
transfer any function or office from the various executive departments to the
Office of the President.
To reorganize presupposes that an office is or offices are already existing and
that (1) a reduction is effected, either of staff or of its functions, for transfer to
another or for abolition because of redundancy; (2) offices are merged resulting
in the retention of one as the dominant office; (3) two offices are abolished
resulting in the emergence of a new office carrying the attributes of its
predecessors as well as their responsibilities; or (4) a new office is created by
dividing the functions and staff of an existing office. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
Hon. Executive Secretary addresses this point when it said:
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them.93
These traditional concepts of reorganization do not appear to have taken place
in the establishment of the Truth Commission. As heretofore mentioned, by its
plain terms, it was "created" and did not simply emerge from the functions or the
personality of another office, whether within or outside the Office of the
President. Thus, it is a completely new body that the President constituted, not a
body that appropriated the powers of, or derived its powers from, the
investigatory and prosecutory powers of the Department of Justice or any other
investigatory body within the Executive branch.
From the Solicitor General’s Memorandum, it appears that the inspiration for the
EO came from the use and experiences of truth commissions in other countries
that were coming from "determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict" for
purposes of making "recommendations for [the] redress and future
prevention"94 of similar abusive rule or conflict. It is a body to establish the "truth
of what abuses actually happened in the past;" the Solicitor General even
suggests that the "doctrine of separation of powers and the extent of the powers
of co-equal branches of government should not be so construed as to restrain
the Executive from uncovering the truth about betrayals of public trust, from
addressing their enabling conditions, and from preventing their recurrence."95 By
these perorations, the Solicitor General unwittingly strengthens the view that no
reorganization ever took place when the Truth Commission was created; what
the President "created" was a new office that does not trace its roots to any
existing office or function from the Office of the President or from the executive
departments and agencies he controls.
Thus, the President cannot legally invoke Section 31 to create the Truth
Commission. The requirements for the application of this Section are simply not
present; any insistence on the use of this Section can only lead to the invalidity
of EO 1.
D.2. The PD 1416 and Residual Powers Argument
Independently of the EO’s express legal basis, the Solicitor-General introduced a
new basis of authority, theorizing that "the power of the President to reorganize
the executive branch" is justifiable under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416, as
amended by PD No. 1772, based on the President’s residual powers under
Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292." He cites in this regard the case of
Larin v. Executive Secretary96 and according to him:
x x x This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416.
These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees.97 [Emphasis supplied]
Unfortunately, even the invocation of the transitory clause of the 1987
Constitution (regarding the validity of laws and decrees not inconsistent with the
Constitution) cannot save EO 1, as PD 1416 is a legislation that has long lost its
potency.
Contemporary history teaches us that PD 1416 was passed under completely
different factual and legal milieus that are not present today, thus rendering this
presidential decree an anachronism that can no longer be invoked.
Prior to the EDSA Revolution of 1986 (and the 1987 Constitution), President
Marcos exercised legislative powers and issued PD 1416, as amended by PD
1772, which, by its express terms, allowed the President to reorganize and/or
create offices within the National Government. This was sanctioned in the
exercise of the President’s martial law powers and on the basis of Article XVII,
Section 3(2) of the 1973 Constitution.98
Upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, and the re-introduction of the
presidential form of government, the "separation of legislative and executive
powers"99 was restored. Similarly recognized were the limits on the exercise of
the carefully carved-out and designated powers of each branch of government.
Thus, Congress regained the exclusive power to create public offices; PD 1416,
as amended by PD 1776 – a creation of the legal order under President Marcos
– lost its authority as a justification for the creation of an office by the President.
That PD 1416, as amended by PD 1776, has been overtaken and rendered an
obsolete law, is not a new position taken within this Court. In his separate
concurring opinion in Banda v. Executive Secretary,100 Justice Antonio T. Carpio
pointedly posited that the ruling in Larin v. Executive Secretary101 (reiterated in
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora102 and Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association v. Court of Appeals103), which relied on Section 20,
Chapter 7, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation with P.D. 1416,
cannot validate Executive Order No. 378 assailed in that case because "P.D.
1416, as amended, with its blending of legislative and executive powers, is a
vestige of an autrocratic era, totally anachronistic to our present-day
constitutional democracy." 104
Thus, the present and firmly established legal reality is that under the 1987
Constitution and the Revised Administrative Code, the President cannot create a
public office except to the extent that he is allowed by Section 31, Chapter 10,
Book III of the Revised Administrative Code. As discussed above, even this
narrow window cannot be used as the President did not comply with the
requirements of Section 31.
D.3. The Authority of the President under the Faithful Execution Clause
Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution directs and authorizes the
President to faithfully execute the laws and the potency of this power cannot be
underestimated. Owing perhaps to the latitude granted to the President under
this constitutional provision, the Solicitor General posited that the President’s
power to create the Truth Commission may be justified under this general grant
of authority. In particular, the Solicitor General argues that the "President’s
power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of
laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency
– is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive." 105 The Solicitor
General further argues: "That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean he is bereft of such
authority."106
That the President cannot, in the absence of any statutory justification, refuse to
execute the laws when called for is a principle fully recognized by jurisprudence.
In In re Neagle, the US Supreme Court held that the faithful execution clause is
"not limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress according to their express
terms."107 According to Father Bernas, Neagle "saw as law that had to be
faithfully executed not just formal acts of the legislature but any duty or obligation
inferable from the Constitution or from statutes."108
Under his broad powers to execute the laws, the President can undoubtedly
create ad hoc bodies for purposes of investigating reported crimes. The
President, however, has to observe the limits imposed on him by the
constitutional plan: he must respect the separation of powers and the
independence of other bodies which have their own constitutional and statutory
mandates, as discussed above. Contrary to what J. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
claims in his Dissent, the President cannot claim the right to create a public
office in the course of implementing the law, as this power lodged exclusively in
Congress. An investigating body, furthermore, must operate within the Executive
branch; the President cannot create an office outside the Executive department.
These legal realities spawned the problems that the Solicitor General created for
himself when he made conflicting claims about the Truth Commission during the
oral arguments. For accuracy, the excerpts from the oral arguments are best
quoted verbatim.109
Associate Justice Nachura: Mr. Solicitor General, most of my questions have
actually been asked already and there are few things that I would like to be
clarified on. Well, following the questions asked by Justice Carpio, I would like a
clarification from you, a definite answer, is the Truth Commission a public office?
Solicitor General Cadiz: No, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Ah, you mean it is not a public office?
Solicitor General Cadiz: It is not a public office in the concept that it has to be
created by Congress, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Oh, come on, I agree with you that the President can
create public offices, that was what, ah, one of the questions I asked
Congressman Lagman.
Solicitor General Cadiz: Thank you, your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Because he was insisting that only Congress could
create public office although, he said, the President can create public offices but
only in the context of the authority granted under the Administrative Code of
1987. So, it is a public office?
Solicitor General Cadiz: Yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: This is definite, categorical. You are certain now that
Truth Commission (interrupted)
Solicitor General Cadiz: Yes, Your Honor, under the Office of the President
Proper, yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Again?
Solicitor General Cadiz: That this Truth Commission is a public office, Your
Honor, created under the Office of the President.
Associate Justice Nachura: Okay, created under the Office of the President,
because it is the President who created it. And the President can create offices
only within the executive department. He cannot create a public office outside of
the executive department, alright.
Solicitor General Cadiz: Yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Okay. So, the Commissioners who are appointed
are what, Presidential Assistants? Are they Presidential Assistants?
Solicitor General Cadiz: They are Commissioners, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: They are, therefore, alter-egos of the President?
Solicitor General Cadiz: No, Your Honor. There is created a Truth Commission,
and Commissioners are appointed and it so stated here that they are
independent.
Associate Justice Nachura: Aha, okay.
Solicitor General Cadiz: Of the Office of the President.
Associate Justice Nachura: Are you saying now that the Commissioners are not
under the power and control of the President of the Philippines?
Solicitor General Cadiz: It is so stated in the Executive Order, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Aha, alright. So, the Truth Commission is not an
office within the executive department, because it is not under the power of
control of the President, then, Section 17 of Article VII would not apply to them,
is that it?
Solicitor General Cadiz: Your Honor, the President has delineated his power by
creating an Executive Order which created the Commission, which says, that
this is an independent body, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: Okay. So, what you are saying is, this is a creation
of the President, it is under the President’s power of control, but the President
has chosen not to exercise the power of control by declaring that it shall be an
independent body?
Solicitor General Cadiz: Yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura: That is your position. I would like you to place that in
your memorandum and see. I would like to see how you will develop that
argument.
The Solicitor General, despite his promise to respond through his Memorandum,
never bothered to explain point-by-point his unusual positions and conclusions
during the oral arguments, responding only with generalities that were not
responsive or in point.110
Specifically, while admitting that the Truth Commission is a "creation" of the
President under his office pursuant to the latter’s authority under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Solicitor General incongruously claimed that
the Commission is "independent" of the Office of the President and is not under
his control. Mercifully, J. Nachura suggested that the President may have
created a body under his control but has chosen not to exercise the power of
control by declaring that it is an independent body, to which the Solicitor General
fully agreed.
Truth to tell (no pun intended), the Solicitor General appears under these
positions to be playing a game of smoke and mirrors with the Court. For
purposes of the creation of the Truth Commission, he posits that the move is
fully within the President’s authority and in the performance of his executive
functions. This claim, of course, must necessarily be based on the premise that
execution is by the President himself or by people who are within the Executive
Department and within the President’s power of supervision and control, as the
President cannot delegate his powers beyond the Executive Department. At the
same time, he claims that the Commissioners (whom he refuses to refer to as
Presidential Assistants or as alter egos of the President)111 are independent of
the President, apparently because the President has waived his power of control
over them.
All these necessarily lead to the question: can the President really create an
office within the Executive branch that is independent of his control? The short
answer is he cannot, and the short reason again is the constitutional plan. The
execution and implementation of the laws have been placed by the Constitution
on the shoulders of the President and on none other.112 He cannot delegate his
executive powers to any person or entity outside the Executive department
except by authority of the Constitution or the law (which authority in this case he
does not have), nor can he delegate his authority to undertake fact-finding as an
incident of his executive power, and at the same time take the position that he
has no responsibility for the fact-finding because it is independent of him and his
office.
Under the constitutional plan, the creation of this kind of office with this kind of
independence is lodged only in the Legislature.113 For example, it is only the
Legislature which can create a body like the National Labor Relations
Commission whose decisions are final and are neither appealable to the
President nor to his alter ego, the Secretary of Labor.114 Yet another example,
President Corazon Aquino herself, because the creation of an independent
commission was outside her executive powers, deemed it necessary to act
pursuant to a legislative fiat in constituting the first Davide Commission of
1989.115
Apparently, the President wanted to create a separate, distinct and independent
Commission because he wants to continuously impress upon the public – his
audience in the second forum – that this Commission can tell the "truth" without
any control or prompting from the Office of the President and without need of
waiting for definitive word from those constitutionally-assigned to undertake this
task. Here, truth-telling again rears its ugly head and is unmasked for what it
really is – an attempt to bypass the constitutional plan on how crimes are
investigated and resolved with finality.
Otherwise stated, if indeed the President can create the Commission as a fact-
finding or investigating body, the Commission must perforce be an entity that is
within the Executive branch and as such is subject to the control and supervision
of the President. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the existence of the
Commission – already outlined above in terms of its processes, facilities, budget
and staff – cannot but lead to control. Likewise, if indeed the Truth Commission
is under the control of the President who issued the EO with openly-admitted
political motivation,116 then the Solicitor General’s representation about the
Commission’s independently-arrived "truth" may fall under the classification of a
smoke and mirror political move. Sad to state, the Solicitor General chose to aim
for the best of all worlds in making representations about the creation and the
nature of the Commission. We cannot allow this approach to pass unnoticed and
without the observations it deserves.
If the President wants a truly independent Commission, then that
Commission must be created through an act of Congress; otherwise, that
independent Commission will be an unconstitutional body. Note as added
examples in this regard that previous presidential fact-finding bodies, created
either by Executive or Administrative Orders (i.e., Feliciano, Melo, Zeñarosa and
IIRC Commissions), were all part of the Executive department and their findings,
even without any express representation in the orders creating them, were
necessarily subject to the power of the President to review, alter, modify or
revise according to the best judgment of the President. That the President who
received these commissions’ reports did not alter the recommendations made is
not an argument that the President can create an "independent" commission, as
the Presidents receiving the commissions’ reports could have, but simply did not,
choose to interfere with these past commissions’ findings.
In sum, this Court cannot and should not accept an arrangement where: (1) the
President creates an office pursuant to his constitutional power to execute the
laws and to his Administrative Code powers to reorganize the Executive branch,
and (2) at the same time or thereafter allow the President to disavow any link
with the created body or its results through a claim of independence and waiver
of control. This arrangement bypasses and mocks the constitutional plan on the
separation of powers; among others, it encroaches into Congress’ authority to
create an office. This consequence must necessarily be fatal for the
arrangement is inimical to the doctrine of separation of powers whose purpose,
according to Father Joaquin Bernas, is:
to prevent concentration of powers in one department and thereby to avoid
tyranny. But the price paid for the insurance against tyranny is the risk of a
degree of inefficiency and even the danger of gridlock. As Justice Brandeis put
it, "the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted…not to promote efficiency
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
governmental powers among the three departments, to save the people from
autocracy."117
Indeed, to allow one department of government, without the authority of law or
the Constitution, to be granted the authority to bestow an advanced imprimatur
of "truth" bespeaks of a concentration of power that may well overshadow any
initiative to combat graft and corruption; in its own way, this grant itself is an
open invitation to the very evils sought to be avoided.
E. VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF INVESTIGATED PERSONS
E.1 Violation of Personal Rights
Separately from the above effects, truth-telling as envisioned under the EO,
carries prejudicial effects on the persons it immediately targets, namely: the
officials, employees and private individuals alleged to have committed graft and
corruption during the previous administration. This consequence proceeds from
the above discussed truth-telling premise that –whether the Commission reports
(recommending the charging of specific individuals) are proven or not in the
appropriate courts – the Commission’s function of truth-telling function would
have been served and the Commission would have effectively acted against the
charged individuals.
The most obvious prejudicial effect of the truth-telling function on the persons
investigated is on their persons, reputation and property. Simply being singled
out as "charged" in a truth-telling report will inevitably mean disturbance of one’s
routines, activities and relationships; the preparation for a defense that will cost
money, time and energy; changes in personal, job and business relationships
with others; and adverse effects on jobs and businesses. Worse, reputations can
forever be tarnished after one is labelled as a participant in massive graft and
corruption.
Conceivably, these prejudicial effects may be dismissed as speculative
arguments that are not justified by any supporting evidence and, hence, cannot
effectively be cited as factual basis for the invalidity of the EO. Evidence,
however, is hardly necessary where the prejudicial effects are self-evident, i.e.,
given that the announced and undisputed government position that truth-telling
per se, in the manner envisioned by the EO and its implementing rules, is an
independent objective the government wants to achieve. When the government
itself has been heard on the "truth," the probability of prejudice for the individual
charged is not only a likelihood; it approaches the level of certainty.
In testing the validity of a government act or statute, such potential for harm
suffices to invalidate the challenged act; evidence of actual harm is not
necessary in the way it is necessary for a criminal conviction or to justify an
award for damages. In plainer terms, the certainty of consequent damage
requires no evidence or further reasoning when the government itself declares
that for as long as the "story" of the allegedly massive graft and corruption during
the past administration is told, the Commission would have fulfilled one of its
functions to satisfaction; under this reckless approach, it is self-evident that the
mistaken object of the "truth" told must necessarily suffer.
In the context of this effect, the government statement translates to the
message: forget the damage the persons investigated may suffer on their
persons and reputation; forget the rights they are entitled to under the
Constitution; give primacy to the story told. This kind of message, of course, is
unacceptable under a Constitution that establishes the strongest safeguards,
through the Bill of Rights, in favor of the individual’s right to life, security and
property against the overwhelming might of the government.
E.2 Denial of the right to a fair criminal trial.
The essence of the due process guarantee in a criminal case, as provided under
Section 14(1) of the Constitution, is the right to a fair trial. What is fair depends
on compliance with the express guarantees of the Constitution, and on the
circumstances of each case.
When the Commission’s report itself is characterized, prior to trial, and held out
by the government to be the true story of the graft and corruption charged, the
chances of individuals to have a fair trial in a subsequent criminal case cannot
be very great.
Consider on this point that not even the main actors in the criminal justice
system – the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan and even this Court – can avoid
the cloud of "untruth" and a doubtful taint in their integrity after the government
has publicized the Commission’s findings as the truth. If the rulings of these
constitutional bodies themselves can be suspect, individual defenses for sure
cannot rise any higher.
Where the government simply wants to tell its story, already labelled as true, well
ahead of any court proceedings, and judicial notice is taken of the kind of
publicity and the ferment in public opinion that news of government scandals
generate, it does not require a leap of faith to conclude that an accused brought
to court against overwhelming public opinion starts his case with a less than
equal chance of acquittal. The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the
playing field cannot but be uneven in a criminal trial when the accused enters
trial with a government-sponsored badge of guilt on his forehead.118 The
presumption of innocence in law cannot serve an accused in a biased
atmosphere pointing to guilt in fact because the government and public opinion
have spoken against the accused.
Viewed from the perspective of its cause, the prejudicial publicity, that adversely
affects the chances of an accused for a fair trial after the EO has done its job, is
not the kind that occurs solely because of the identity of the individual accused.
This prejudice results from a cause systemic to the EO because of its truth-
telling feature that allows the government to call its proceedings and reports a
process of truth-telling where the tales cannot but be true. This kind of systemic
aberration has no place in the country’s dispensation of criminal justice system
and should be struck down as invalid before it can fully work itself into the
criminal justice system as an acceptable intervention.
F. THE TRUTH COMMISSION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The guarantee of equal protection of the law is a branch of the right to due
process embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. It is rooted in the
same concept of fairness that underlies the due process clause. In its simplest
sense, it requires equal treatment, i.e., the absence of discrimination, for all
those under the same situation. An early case, People v. Cayat,119 articulated
the requisites determinative of valid and reasonable classification under the
equal protection clause, and stated that it must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
In our jurisdiction, we mainly decide equal protection challenges using
a "rational basis" test, coupled with a "deferential" scrutiny of legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.120 Our views on the matter,
however, have not remained static, and have been attuned to the jurisprudential
developments in the United States on the levels of scrutiny that are applied to
determine the acceptability of any differences in treatment that may result from
the law. 121
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.122 summarizes the three tests
employed in this jurisdiction as follows:
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality
of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny
in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate
scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification
serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which
a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. [Emphasis supplied]
The most exacting of the three tests is evidently the strict scrutiny test, which
requires the government to show that the challenged classification serves a
compelling state interest and that the classification is necessary to serve that
interest.123 Briefly stated, the strict scrutiny test is applied when the challenged
statute either:
(1) classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic; or
 (2) infringes fundamental constitutional rights.
In these situations, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and it
falls upon the government to demonstrate that its classification has been
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests; otherwise, the law
shall be declared unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.124
In EO 1, for the first time in Philippine history, the Executive created a public
office to address the "reports of graft and corruption of such magnitude that
shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed….during the previous administration" through fact-finding, policy
formulation and truth-telling.125 While fact-finding has been undertaken by
previous investigative commissions for purposes of possible prosecution and
policy-formulation, a first for the current Truth Commission is its task of truth-
telling. The Commission not only has to investigate reported graft and corruption;
it also has the authority to announce to the public the "truth" regarding alleged
graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.
EO 1’s problem with the equal protection clause lies in the truth-telling function it
gave the Truth Commission.
As extensively discussed earlier in this Opinion, truth-telling is not an ordinary
task, as the Commission’s reports to the government and the public are already
given the imprimatur of truth way before the allegations of graft and corruption
are ever proven in court. This feature, by itself, is a unique differential treatment
that cannot but be considered in the application of the jurisprudential equal
protection clause requirements.
Equally unique is the focus of the Commission’s investigation - it solely
addresses alleged graft and corruption committed during the past administration.
This focus is further narrowed down to "third level public officers and higher, their
co-principal, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration."126 Under these terms, the subject of the EO is
limited only to a very select group – the highest officials, not any ordinary
government official at the time. Notably excluded under these express terms are
third level and higher officials of other previous administrations who can still be
possibly be charged of similar levels of graft and corruption they might have
perpetrated during their incumbency. Likewise excepted are the third level
officials of the present administration who may likewise commit the same level of
graft and corruption during the term of the Commission.
Thus, from the points of truth-telling and the focus on the people to be
investigated, at least a double layer of differential treatment characterizes the
Truth Commission’s investigation. Given these disparate treatment, the equal
protection question that arises is: does the resulting classification and
segregation of third level officials of the previous administration and their
differential treatment rest on substantial distinctions? Stated more plainly, is
there reasonable basis to differentiate the officials of the previous administration,
both from the focus given to them in relation with all other officials as pointed out
above, and in the truth-telling treatment accorded to them by the Commission?
Still a deeper question to be answered is: what level of scrutiny should be given
to the patent discrimination in focus and in treatment that the EO abets?
Although this question is stated last, it should have been the initial consideration,
as its determination governs the level of scrutiny to be accorded; if the strict
scrutiny test is appropriate, the government, not the party questioning a
classification, carries the burden of showing that permissible classification took
place. This critical consideration partly accounts, too, for the relegation to the
last, among the EO’s cited grounds for invalidity, of the equal protection clause
violation; the applicable level of scrutiny may depend on the prior determination
of whether, as held in Serrano, the disparate treatment is attended by
infringement of fundamental constitutional rights.
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution. Justice Carpio-Morales, although in dissent in Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,127 elaborated on this
point when she said:
Most fundamental rights cases decided in the United States require equal
protection analysis because these cases would involve a review of statutes
which classify persons and impose differing restrictions on the ability of a certain
class of persons to exercise a fundamental right. Fundamental rights include
only those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. And precisely because these statutes affect fundamental liberties,
any experiment involving basic freedoms which the legislature conducts must be
critically examined under the lens of Strict Scrutiny.
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms
such as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote. [Emphasis supplied]
In the present case, as shown by the previously cited grounds for the EO’s
invalidity, EO No. 1 infringes the personal due process rights of the investigated
persons, as well as their constitutional right to a fair trial. Indisputably, both these
rights – one of them guaranteed under Section 1, Article III, and under Section
14 of the same Article – are, by jurisprudential definition, fundamental rights.
With these infringements, the question now thus shifts to the application of the
strict scrutiny test – an exercise not novel in this jurisdiction.
In the above-cited Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. case,128 we stated:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where
the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
xxx
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons
favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought
to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication
of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution
and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor. [Underscoring supplied]
Stripped of the usual deference accorded to it, the government must show that a
compelling state interest exists to justify the differential treatment that EO 1
fosters.
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.129 helpfully tells us the compelling
state interest that is critical in a strict scrutiny examination:
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
In this same cited case, the Court categorically ruled that "the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest."130
On its face, the compelling state interest the EO cites is the "urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants."131 Under these terms, what appears important to
the government as means or mediums in its fight against graft and corruption are
(1) to expose the graft and corruption the past administration committed; (2) to
prosecute the malefactors, if possible; and (3) to set an example for others.
Whether a compelling State interest exists can best be tested through the prism
of the means the government has opted to utilize.
In the usual course and irrespective of who the malefactors are and when they
committed their transgressions, grafters and corruptors ought to be prosecuted.
This is not only a goal but a duty of government. Thus, by itself, the prosecution
that the EO envisions is not any different from all other actions the government
undertakes day to day under the criminal justice system in proceeding against
the grafters and the corrupt. In other words, expressed as a duty, the compelling
drive to prosecute must be the same irrespective of the administration under
which the graft and corruption were perpetrated. If indeed this is so, what
compelling reasons can there be to drive the government to use the EO and its
unusual terms in proceeding against the officials of the previous administration?
If the EO’s terms are to be the yardstick, the basis for the separate focus is the
"extent and magnitude" of the reported graft and corruption which "shock and
offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people." What this "extent and
magnitude" is or what specific incidents of massive graft are referred to,
however, have been left vague. Likewise, no explanation has been given on why
special measures – i.e., the special focus on the targeted officials, the creation of
a new office, and the grant of truth-telling authority – have been taken.
Effectively, by acting as he did, the President simply gave the Commission the
license to an open hunting season to tell the "truth" against the previous
administration; the Commission can investigate an alleged single billion-peso
scam, as well as transactions during the past administration that, collectively,
may reach the same amount. Only the Commission, in its wisdom, is to judge
what allegations or reports of graft and corruption to cover for as long as these
were during the past administration. In the absence of any specific guiding
principle or directive, indicative of its rationale, the conclusion is unavoidable that
the EO carries no special compelling reason to single out officials of the previous
administration; what is important is that the graft be attributed to the previous
administration. In other words, the real reason for the EO’s focus lies elsewhere,
not necessarily in the nature or extent of the matters to be investigated.
If, as strongly hinted by the Solicitor General, dissatisfaction exists regarding the
Ombudsman’s zeal, efforts, results, and lack of impartiality, these concerns
should be addressed through the remedies provided under the Constitution and
the laws, not by bypassing the established remedies under these instruments.
Certainly, the remedy is not through the creation of new public office without the
authority of Congress.
Every successful prosecution of a graft and corruption violation ought to be an
opportunity to set an example and to send a message to the public that the
government seriously intends to discharge its duties and responsibilities in the
area of graft and corruption. To be sure, the conviction of a third level officer is a
high profile accomplishment that the government can and should announce to all
as evidence of its efforts and of the lesson that the conviction conveys. This
government’s accomplishment, however, does not need to be against an official
or officials of the previous administration in order to be a lesson; it can be any
third level or higher official from any administration, including the present. In
fact, the present administration’s serious intent in fighting graft may all the
more be highlighted if it will also proceed against its own people.
It is noteworthy that the terms of the EO itself do not provide any specific reason
why, for purposes of conveying a message against graft and corruption, the
focus should be on officials of the previous administration under the EO’s special
truth-telling terms. As mentioned above, the extent of the alleged graft and
corruption during the previous administration does not appear to be a sufficient
reason for distinction under the EO’s vague terms. Additionally, if a lesson for
the public is really intended, the government already has similar successful
prosecutions to its credit and can have many more graphic examples to draw
from; it does not need to be driven to unusual means to show the graft and
corruption committed under the previous administration. The host of examples
and methodologies already available to the government only demonstrate that
the focus on, and differential treatment of, specific officials for public lesson
purposes involves a classification unsupported by any special overriding reason.
Given the lack of sufficiently compelling reasons to use two (2) of the three (3)
objectives or interests the government cited in EO 1, what is left of these
expressed interests is simply the desire to expose the graft and corruption the
previous administration might have committed. Interestingly, the EO itself partly
provides the guiding spirit that might have moved the Executive to its intended
expose as it unabashedly points to the President’s promise made in the last
election – "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."132 There, too, is the Solicitor
General’s very calculated statement that truth-telling is an end in itself that the
EO wishes to achieve.
Juxtaposing these overt indicators with the EO’s singleness of focus on the
previous administration, what emerges in bold relief is the conclusion that the
EO was issued largely for political ends: the President wants his election
promise fulfilled in a dramatic and unforgettable way; none could be more so
than criminal convictions, or at least, exposure of the "truth" that would forever
mark his political opponents; thus, the focus on the previous administration and
the stress on establishing their corrupt ways as the "truth."
Viewed in these lights, the political motivation behind the EO becomes
inescapable. Political considerations, of course, cannot be considered a
legitimate state purpose as basis for proper classification.133 They may be
specially compelling but only for the point of view of a political party or interest,
not from the point of view of an equality-sensitive State.
In sum, no sufficient and compelling state interest appears to be served by the
EO to justify the differential treatment of the past administration’s officials. In
fact, exposure of the sins of the previous administration through truth-telling
should not even be viewed as "least restrictive" as it is in fact a means with
pernicious effects on government and on third parties.
For these reasons, the conclusion that the EO violates the equal protection
clause is unavoidable.
G. A FEW LAST WORDS
Our ruling in this case should not in any way detract from the concept that the
Judiciary is the least dangerous branch of government. The Judiciary has no
direct control over policy nor over the national purse, in the way that the
Legislature does. Neither does it implement laws nor exercise power over those
who can enforce laws and national policy. All that it has is the power to
safeguard the Constitution in a manner independent of the two other branches of
government. Ours is merely the power to check and ensure that constitutional
powers and guarantees are observed, and constitutional limits are not violated.
Under this constitutional arrangement, the Judiciary offers the least threat to the
people and their rights, and the least threat, too, to the two other branches of
government. If we rule against the other two branches of government at all in
cases properly brought before us, we do so only to exercise our sworn duty
under the Constitution. We do not prevent the two other branches from
undertaking their respective constitutional roles; we merely confine them to the
limits set by the Constitution.
This is how we view our present action in declaring the invalidity of EO 1. We do
not thereby impugn the nobility of the Executive’s objective of fighting graft and
corruption. We simply tell the Executive to secure this objective within the means
and manner the Constitution ordains, perhaps in a way that would enable us to
fully support the Executive.
To be sure, no cause exists to even impliedly use the term "imperial
judiciary" 134 in characterizing our action in this case.
This Court, by constitutional design and for good reasons, is not an elective body
and, as already stated above, has neither reason nor occasion to delve into
politics – the realm already occupied by the two other branches of government. It
cannot exercise any ascendancy over the two other branches of government as
it is, in fact, dependent on these two branches in many ways, most particularly
for its budget, for the laws and policies that are the main subjects for its
interpretation, and for the enforcement of its decisions. While it has the power to
interpret the Constitution, the Judiciary itself, however, is subject to the same
Constitution and, for this reason, must in fact be very careful and zealous in
ensuring that it respects the very instrument it is sworn to safeguard. We are
aware, too, that we "cannot be the repository of all remedies"135 and cannot
presume that we can cure all the ills of society through the powers the
Constitution extended to us. Thus, this Court – by its nature and functions –
cannot be in any way be "imperial," nor has it any intention to be so. Otherwise,
we ourselves shall violate the very instrument we are sworn to uphold.
As evident in the way this Court resolved the present case, it had no way but to
declare EO invalid for the many reasons set forth above. The cited grounds are
neither flimsy nor contrived; they rest on solid legal bases. Unfortunately, no
other approach exists in constitutional interpretation except to construe the
assailed governmental issuances in their best possible lights or to reflect these
effects in a creative way where these approaches are at all possible. Even
construction in the best lights or a creative interpretation, however, cannot be
done where the cited grounds are major, grave and affect the very core of the
contested issuance – the situation we have in the present case.
Nor can this Court be too active or creative in advocating a position for or
against a cause without risking its integrity in the performance of its role as the
middle man with the authority to decide disputed constitutional issues. The better
(and safer) course for democracy is to have a Court that holds on to traditional
values, departing from these values only when these values have become
inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
In the present case, as should be evident in reading the ponencia and this
Separate Opinion, we have closely adhered to traditional lines. If this can be
called activism at all, we have been an activist for tradition. Thereby, we
invalidated the act of the Executive without however foreclosing or jeopardizing
his opportunity to work for the same objective in some future, more legally
reasoned, and better framed course of action.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I register my full concurrence with the Majority’s well reasoned conclusion to
strike down Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) for its incurable
unconstitutionality.
I share and adopt the perspectives of my colleagues in the Majority on why the
issuance has to be struck down. I render this Separate Opinion only to express
some thoughts on a few matters.
I legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has
Locus Standi of Petitioners
I hold that the petitioners have locus standi.
In particular reference to the petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, I think that their
being incumbent Members of the House of Representatives gave them the
requisite legal standing to challenge E. O. No. 1 as an impermissible intrusion of
the Executive into the domain of the Legislature. Indeed, to the extent that the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each Member, whose office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution;
consequently, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that a Member of
Congress can assail.1 Moreover, any intrusion of one Department in the domain
of another Department diminishes the enduring idea underlying the incorporation
in the Fundamental Law of the time-honored republican concept of separation of
powers.
Justice Mendoza’s main opinion, which well explains why the petitioners have
locus standi, is congruent with my view on the matter that I expressed in De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,2 viz:
Black defines locus standi as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question." In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened
with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-
present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct
any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning
of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore,
that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,
for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly,
it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct
injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus
standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a
statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed
in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association
v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized
the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed
to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to
resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far-reaching implications,"
even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach
of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable
cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring
their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and
rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such
petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as
are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is
entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or
taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may
appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip
the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing
in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where
it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure
of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real
parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held
that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to
restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
xxx
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of
transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel
the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of
the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than
otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we
pointed out: "Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest." But even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners "are not covered by the definition, it is still within the
wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised."
II
The President Has No Power to Create A Public Office
A public office may be created only through any of the following modes, namely:
(a) by the Constitution; or (b) by statute enacted by Congress; or (c) by authority
of law (through a valid delegation of power).3
The power to create a public office is essentially legislative, and, therefore, it
belongs to Congress. It is not shared by Congress with the President, until and
unless Congress enacts legislation that delegates a part of the power to the
President, or any other officer or agency.
Yet, the Solicitor General contends that the legal basis for the President’s
creation of the Truth Commission through E. O. No. 1 is Section 31, Chapter 10,
Book III, of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
reads:
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he
may take any of the following actions:
1. Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
2. Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of
the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
3. Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies.
nowhere refers to the creation of a public office by the President. On the
contrary, only a little effort is needed to know from reading the text of the
provision that what has been granted is limited to an authority for reorganization
through any of the modes expressly mentioned in the provision.
The Truth Commission has not existed before E. O. No. 1 gave it life on July 30,
2010. Without a doubt, it is a new office, something we come to know from the
plain words of Section 1 of E. O. No. 1 itself, to wit:
Section 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION", which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial body.
If the Truth Commission is an entirely new office, then it is not the result of any
reorganization undertaken pursuant to Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, the contention of the Solicitor General is
absolutely unwarranted.
Neither may the creation of the Truth Commission be made to rest for its validity
on the fact that the Constitution, through its Section 17, Article VII, invests the
President with the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In my
view, the duty of faithful execution of the laws necessarily presumes the prior
existence of a law or rule to execute on the part of the President. But, here, there
is no law or rule that the President has based his issuance of E. O. No. 1.
I cannot also bring myself to accept the notion that the creation of the Truth
Commission is traceable to the President’s power of control over the Executive
Department. It is already settled that the President’s power of control can only
mean "the power of an officer to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter."4 As such, the creation by the President of a
public office like the Truth Commission, without either a provision of the
Constitution or a proper law enacted by
Congress authorizing such creation, is not an act that the power of control
includes.
III
Truth Commission Replicates and Usurps the
Duties and Functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman
I find that the Truth Commission replicates and usurps the duties and functions
of the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the Truth Commission is superfluous
and may erode the public trust and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutionally-created quasi-judicial body
established to investigate and prosecute illegal acts and omissions of those who
serve in the Government. Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman,
including the power to:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
xxx
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in
the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
xxx
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
The Framers of the Constitution, particularly those of them who composed the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, intended the Office of the
Ombudsman to be strong and effective, in order to enable the Office of the
Ombudsman to carry out its mandate as the Protector of the People against the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. This intent is clear from the
proceedings on the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman, as follows:
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER MONSOD
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers is respectfully submitting its proposed Article in the Constitution, and we
would just want to make a few remarks on the articles and sections that we have
included.
xxx
With respect to the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan, the Committee
decided to make a distinction between the purely prosecutory function of the
Tanodbayan and the function of a pure Ombudsman who will use the prestige
and persuasive powers of his office. To call the attention of government officials
to any impropriety, misconduct or injustice, we conceive the Ombudsman as a
champion of the citizens x x x The concept of the Ombudsman here is admittedly
a little bit different from the 1973 concept x x x The idea here is to address
ourselves to the problem that those who have unlawfully benefitted from the
acquisition of public property over the years, through technicalities or practice,
have gained immunity and that, therefore, the right of the people to recover
should be respected x x x.5
xxx
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER COLAYCO
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you, Madam President.
The Committee is proposing the creation of an office which can act in a quick,
inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against the administrative
inaction, abuse and arbitrariness of government officials and employees in
dealing with the people. x x x.
xxx
[W]e have proposed as briefly as possible in our resolution an office which will
not require any formal condition for the filing of a complaint. Under our proposal,
a person can file a complaint even by telephone and without much ado, the
office of the Ombudsman is under obligation to see to it that the complaint is
acted upon, not merely attended to but acted upon. x x x. If the employee admits
that there was reason behind the complaint, he is told to do what the
complainant wanted him to do without much ado. And then that is followed up by
the corresponding report to the department of the government which has
supervision over the employee at fault, with the proper recommendation.
xxx
Under our proposal, the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate, to inquire into
and to demand the production of documents involving transactions and contracts
of the government where disbursement of public funds is reported. x x x [t]he
main thrust is action; the disciplinary or punitive remedy is secondary. On a
higher level then, the Ombudsman is going to be the eyes and ears of the
people. Where administrative action demanded is not forthcoming x x x he
(Ombudsman) is authorized to make public the nature of the complaint and the
inaction of the official concerned, x x x.6
xxx
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER NOLLEDO
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President.
xxx
Madam President, the creation of an Ombudsman x x x is in answer to the crying
need of our people for an honest and responsive government. The office of the
Ombudsman as proposed by the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
x x x is really an institution primarily for the citizens as against the malpractices
and corruption in the government. As an official critic, the Ombudsman will study
the law, the procedure and practice in the government, and make appropriate
recommendations for a more systematic operation of the governmental
machinery, free from bureaucratic inconveniences. As a mobilizer, the
Ombudsman will see to it that there be a steady flow of services to the individual
consumers of government. And as a watchdog, the Ombudsman will look after
the general, as well as specific, performances of all government officials and
employees so that the law may not be administered with an evil eye or an
uneven hand.7
On the other hand, E. O. No. 1 enumerates the objectives of the creation of the
Truth Commission, thus:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people,
must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives;
xxx
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people’s faith
and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
xxx
A comparison between the aforequoted objectives of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Truth Commission quickly reveals that the Truth
Commission is superfluous, because it replicates or imitates the work of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The result is that the Truth Commission can even
usurp the functions, duties, and responsibilities of the Office of the Ombudsman.
That usurpation is not a desirable result, considering that the public faith and
trust in the Office of the Ombudsman, as a constitutionally-created office imbued
with specific powers and duties to investigate and prosecute graft and
corruption, may be eroded.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petitions.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CASE DIGEST: LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010, GR No. 192935, 2010-12-07
Facts:
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1,
dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted
by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer.
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power
of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it usurps the constitutional authority
of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon
A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of
Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the
historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The
Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for
a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission).
the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers... and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent
collegial body," it is... essentially an entity within the Office of the President
Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an
ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It
is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in... disputes between contending parties. All it can do
is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is... a fact-finding
body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot
impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have
been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to
establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a country's... past."[9] They are usually
established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or
authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns
of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3)
they are temporary bodies that finish their... work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.[10] "Commission's members
are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose...
policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past
abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for
prosecutions and recommend institutional... reforms."[11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg
and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body
set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of
a reconciliatory tribunal is the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of
which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by
providing a cathartic experience for victims.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their
respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as
expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?... is there a valid
delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office?... whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally
mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the
legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue... interference.
Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution,
itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of
powers?
Ruling:
Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly... justifies
their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the
complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the
legislature before the Court.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their... prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing
to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained,
or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of Executive Order No. 1.
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of... transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."
Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional...
and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to... any other Department/Agency or vice
versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of... economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body
or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned
in said provision. Accordingly, the... answer to the question is in the negative.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for
the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale,
anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President
Marcos of the authority to reorganize the... administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create offices and transfer
appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its
last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will
necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency
during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became
functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution.
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis
of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws... are faithfully executed. Section 17
reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied).
the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant
of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations
to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,... fundamental
laws on public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's
powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or... in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority.
The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief
Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as
it cannot adjudicate rights of... persons who come before it. It has been said that
"Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering... the same
law."[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these
quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must
be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative... agencies.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function. To be... considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and
arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and... definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
merits of the charges against... them,[63] is certainly not a function given to the
commission.
The... function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman... contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable
cause. This is categorically out of the PTC's sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is... limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsman's primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of
the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness.
These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will
instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments... for
violations of graft laws.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to... determine whether or not there has been
a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review
which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power... also includes the duty to rule on the
constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These
provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme
Court,... on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the
other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the
other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source
of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or... invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that...
instrument secures and guarantees to them."[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own
will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it
by the Constitution. And, if after said... review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as
void and unconstitutional.
Principles:
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution
that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined,
and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.[2]
The Constitution is... the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be
the tides of time. It cannot be... simply made to sway and accommodate the call
of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
government and the people who run it.[4]
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question... the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the... earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest"
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as...
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the... avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate
was delineated by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.[59]
Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate"
is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire
into: x x to... subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The
purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the... facts inquired into by application of the
law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of... evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the...
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: x... x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy
x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. x x.
Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics
included. Citations Omitted]
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,1 is in oked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain
that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation
for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE
NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set
forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block
of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must
negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. .
..
b. The Highest Bidder must execute
the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE
WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:
a. Execution of the necessary
contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the
GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused
to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En
Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for
oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not
a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for
the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down
conditions under which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first
and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel
and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more,
the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules
which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate
that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing .
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as
a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner. provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute implementing statute. 15
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed 1986 Constitutional Commission —
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public am asking this question as the
authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law Chairman of the Committee on
or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether Style. If the wording of
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by "PREFERENCE" is given to
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme understood as a preference to
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos
who are not qualified. So, why do
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. we not make it clear? To qualified
Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the Filipinos as against aliens?
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and THE PRESIDENT. What is the
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision question of Commissioner Rodrigo?
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Is it to remove the word
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in "QUALIFIED?".
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say
definitely "TO QUALIFIED
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no against aliens or over aliens?
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I
think that is understood. We use the
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or prospective laws
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to
that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has will always lay down conditions
under which business may be
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional done. For example, qualifications on
the setting up of other financial
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation structures, et cetera (emphasis
supplied by respondents)
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
 MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of
style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as
not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to
or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second
par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress
is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos
in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional
provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically
not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco
v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of
education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles
upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
— qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission 34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to out rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It
was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The
Heart and Memory of a City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by
the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand.
Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel
reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the
site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed"
President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to
introduce an amendment to the
Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in
substituting the words "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" with the following:
"CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL
OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS
 WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President,
apparently the proponent is
agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not
give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo
amendment would refer to an
individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by Filipino
citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent,
Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in
fact, we would be limiting it if we say
that the preference should only be
100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that
meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to
individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam
President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote,
may I request that the amendment
be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment
will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the
word "Filipinos" here, as intended by
the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-
controlled entities or entities fully-
controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would
like to request Commissioner
Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a
question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT
OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that
amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is
also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more
qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is
"yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo
continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of
"MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means
that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission
regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-
Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known
as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who can make
a viable contribution to the common good, because of
credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to
Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would
be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
"qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter
shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-
qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the
sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership
in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing
proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing
that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing
legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a
line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense
that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable
legal standards for executive action. When the executive
acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government
operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the
sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered
"state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is
a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3)
when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt
therefore the transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not
yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a
stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be
to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood
to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors
must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning
that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly,
Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to
match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the
constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by
Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the
bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution
is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that
the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in
the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation
but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court
to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments.
Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities
but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its
function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not
been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles
to economic progress and development . . . in connection
with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a
Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction
"again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can
be a major obstacle to doing business here.
 Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind
referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are
viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure
that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are
not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never
shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair
and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability
and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should
not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a
budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy
as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic
and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from
whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and
welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such
basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity
to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not
talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are
talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events
in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel
where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of
their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits
to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history
and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a
place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part
in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of
the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is,
in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be
equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila
Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of
national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Case digest:
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or
the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered
to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder,
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check
as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition
before the Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
 treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that –
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In
the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite,
it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land
on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations
under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist
that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares
of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched
the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as
may be necessary for the purpose.
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors
ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-
GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S.
FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed
Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all
surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on
behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO,
NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all
surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding
Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint
for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper
mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a
result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the
defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence
and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required
precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men
working underground at the time, and in utter violation of
the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit
area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped
through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore
and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure
on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result
that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of
broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by
surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed
out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber
supports and carried off materials, machines and
equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby
trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to,
including those named in the next preceding paragraph,
represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then
working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date, five
(5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22
were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in
number, including those referred to in paragraph 7
hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate,
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of
them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine,
but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision
to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its
bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and
the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities as set out by the Special
Committee above referred to, in their Report of
investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed
completely to provide its men working underground the
necessary security for the protection of their lives
notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial
resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a
total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net
earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth
Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966,
and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of
December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the
causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by
RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the
case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to
dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing
the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also
applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an
order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on
September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and
allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the
aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the
Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over
damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of
workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was
negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected
deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the
compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I and other laws because of said injury ...
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND
CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has
jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the
provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173,
2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the
lives of its employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex
opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their
complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge
failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross
negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's
compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,
disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease,
without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for
damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court,
refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in
the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable
exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it
was held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to
accident suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and
adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court.
the case from the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's
Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional
compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of
safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex
voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have
been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito
Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages
under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then
Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice
Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the
GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP
Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter,
submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976,
is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or
that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative,
that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided
under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they
have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or
exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or
fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether
they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an
injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a
complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an
employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise.
He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or
accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective.
He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of
choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher
damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's
stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect
the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail
themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action
for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their
claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE
dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it
appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation
based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages
(actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five
thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In
fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from
accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint
instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part
of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is
the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of
workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the
complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and
deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a
breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of
the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith,
read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages
for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall
be those that are the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of
damages, as assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation
acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of
damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as
damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and
insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery
under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the
employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay
compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or
injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not
due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other
hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of
his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury
either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of
another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the
causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as
well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the
death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the
burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs.
WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission,
is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's
Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral
and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the
heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand
(P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and
medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's
Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint
alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or
occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought
to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits
should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities
or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside
the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the
employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation
Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It
is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the
victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his
employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his
heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or
fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company,
32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from
the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but
he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaña WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma,
involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue
third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out
that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and
thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under
the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary
action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot
maintain his action for damages against the respondents
(defendants below), because he has elected to seek
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation
Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this
action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for
petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil
Code are much more extensive than the amounts that
may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
they should not be deemed incompatible. As already
indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose
either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the
claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the
causal connection between the defendant's negligence
and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the
extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be
troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his
fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior
 claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.
Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the
employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative
action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than
the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner,
the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582),
applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-
tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the
petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the
amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to
dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the
deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for
compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and
all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino
Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107,
rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the
motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but
they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee
created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence
and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of
Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19,
1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted
from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952,
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate
in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11
and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7,
and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by
Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil
Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people should be
the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor,
especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art.
XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to
insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ...
and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field
of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to
guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections
6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate
the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of
workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973
Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in
Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of
basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed,
and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis
supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned
articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive
provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952),
predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took
effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social
justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their
employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of
the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the
Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of
the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and
enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia
State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence,
enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should
be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six
months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In
case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
 Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis
supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands
for work outside the same may stipulate with such laborers
that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through
accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment; and all service contracts made
in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed
to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands
for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply to injuries received outside the Island through
accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not
prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the
accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the
applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise
provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents
or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf
of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended,
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred
Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits
are administered by the System during the period of such
payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
(emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended,
C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as
amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System
(referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article
173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly,
repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages
arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And
the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the
System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as
referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security
System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme
Court form part of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera
ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.
These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a
law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the
said law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65
SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same
authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20,
1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured
employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not
accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of
Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice
Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's
Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila
Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs.
Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said
Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-
statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the
Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater
reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the
cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the
aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice
guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in
the American Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the
American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions
on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of
OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil
Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now
Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II
of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of
the employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process
clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of
his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety
devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers
which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker
and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker
and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in
effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the
part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety
measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from
the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an
exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates
of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173
of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of
the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a
throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in
1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93,
1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to
the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical
devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's
steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to
life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-
live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others
to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish
affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of
us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as
atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150
reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837
during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only
ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay
obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and
debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as
"servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs
man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to
human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The
mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the
part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the
American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much
precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The
spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot
legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code,
recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice
Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of
the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all
possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite
capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding
fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that
the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the
ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be
justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give
rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.).
Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of
the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the
same view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison
I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said
that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907,
quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was
reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the
judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in
the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief
Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of
the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is
also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the
rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the
inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to
death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the
part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault
for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section
5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the
employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the
employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and
contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic
language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was
fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of
judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ...
Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now"
(citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically
admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to
molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917).
And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212,
72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x.
When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still
more obvious that they must be received with a certain
latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who
but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet it
is what the judges do whenever they determine which of
two competing principles of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however
we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive
action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so
 desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is,
or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not
legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They
criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous
for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy
Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer,
Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But
said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of the
courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such
power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-
making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific
cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial
legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the
lowly workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights
and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect
human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs.
Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs.
Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to
extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of
Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of
the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy
provision was developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to
the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73
Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section
7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9
of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second
offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They
were also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the
Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs.
Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities,
which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of
Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the
Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal
facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public
buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of
People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate
a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property
rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed.
937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges
perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against
human rights or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum
hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in
the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where
the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the
form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not
exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as
the rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American
Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs.
Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212,
72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation,
penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra,
affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review.
There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly
providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of
powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in
Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and
political questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine
Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the
validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS
ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinion:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of
PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is
specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages
that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma,
etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages.
This argument is but a play on words. The term
compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic
Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered,
being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated
by or in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself,
which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special
law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's
Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of
remedies, as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised
simultaneously, and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other.
The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to
them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's
Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be
allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the
law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had
become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an
"election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he
should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very
least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he
has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits
he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before
the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on
December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from
Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in
Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the
statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the
Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton,
Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable,
the remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider
Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to
employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees of
the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-
7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to
employee's willful intention to injure himself or another or
to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is
exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's
Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of
Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said
injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the
meaning and intention of the law-making body must be
sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read
and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-
accepted and most obvious significations, according to
good and approved usage and without resorting to forced
or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the
meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must
be presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe
52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands
for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment. (Italics
supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory
provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act
itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies
other than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee
suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this
Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be
optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue
such other person for damages, in accordance with law; ...
(Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the
injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could
very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the
pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to
allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an
injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the
Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other
law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions
when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5
such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator
refrained from doing so. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain
the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands
for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment (and all
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this
section be presumed to include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was
amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the
addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers
to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the
place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was
amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended
the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to
sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be
more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants
compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence
of negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed an
expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the
same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that
thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA
772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case
there was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section
evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee,
injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The
legislator was again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to
an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the
law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal
of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages
suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the
express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the
principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very
least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the
exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated
in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the
situation in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen
had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would
have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith,
that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he
was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only
his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law
defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he
entered into when he accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of
Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere
relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part
of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker
was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and
guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the
assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the
many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the
need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered
employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be
compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute
and made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the
employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another
objective was to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious
procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if not
automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers'
liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers
liability legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's
compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation
represents a compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of
money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer
to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the
element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of
the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The
worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he
could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on
compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And
because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the
compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts
of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation
principle is essential to an understanding of the acts and
the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of
industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable
variety had become enormous, and government was
faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human
wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If
the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the
carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles
offered some measure of redress. Even here, however,
the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest.
The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court
placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So
long as liability depended on fault there could be no
recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed
officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both
the facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who
were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn
between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one
hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other.
The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the
injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a
fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of
the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.
Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often
paid a substantial damage bill, while only a part of this
enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his
dependents. The employee's judgment was nearly always
too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic
principle that those persons who enjoy the product of a
business- whether it be in the form of goods or services-
should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths
that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either
disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader
economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost
of accident loss only initially; it is expected that this cost
will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the
form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among
the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in
a given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can
gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any
appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate
properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that
the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be
fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic
in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability
and moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad
economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage
suit in two important respects: Fault on the part of either
employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation
payable according to a definitely limited schedule is
substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work
these two major changes, irrespective of how they may
differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of
employer and employee represents a compromise in
which each party surrenders certain advantages in order
to gain others which are of more importance both to him
and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault,
and the employee surrenders his former right to full
damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for
bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of
compensation cannot be overemphasized. The statutes
vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of
balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments
and the length of the period during which compensation is
to be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ
considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to
the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the
court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the
employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a
proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors
the worker. In this way, a compensation act drawn in a
spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and
conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be
so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little
reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and
apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout
the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this."
(Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries
and diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the
actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all
been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We
have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to
succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity
recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire
structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law
and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be
compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows
to receive employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for
industrial accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise
provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents
or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf
of the employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for
actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute
to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us
is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the
victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of
PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is
specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages
that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER
EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma,
etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages.
This argument is but a play on words. The term
compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic
Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered,
being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated
by or in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself,
which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special
law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's
Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of
remedies, as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised
simultaneously, and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other.
The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to
them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's
Compensation Act had already become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be
allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the
law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had
become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an
"election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he
should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very
least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he
has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits
he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before
the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on
December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from
Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in
Spanish and some sections of the law were taken from the
statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the
Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton,
Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable,
the remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider
Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to
employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees of
the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-
7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to
employee's willful intention to injure himself or another or
to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is
exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's
Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of
Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said
injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the
meaning and intention of the law-making body must be
sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read
and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-
accepted and most obvious significations, according to
good and approved usage and without resorting to forced
or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the
meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must
be presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe
52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands
for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment. (Italics
supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory
provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act
itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies
other than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee
suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this
Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be
optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue
such other person for damages, in accordance with law; ...
(Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the
injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could
very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the
pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to
allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an
injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the
Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other
law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions
when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5
such that the remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator
refrained from doing so. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain
the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise
provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands
for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment (and all
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this
section be presumed to include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was
amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the
addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers
to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the
place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was
amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended
the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to
sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be
more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants
compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence
of negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed an
expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the
same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that
thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA
772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case
there was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section
evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an option to an employee,
injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The
legislator was again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to
an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the
law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal
of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages
suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the
express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the
principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very
least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the
exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated
in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the
situation in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen
had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would
have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith,
that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he
was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only
his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law
defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he
entered into when he accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of
Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere
relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part
of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker
was deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and
guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the
assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the
many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the
need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered
employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be
compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute
and made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the
employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another
objective was to have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious
procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if not
automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers'
liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers
liability legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's
compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation
represents a compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of
money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer
to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the
element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of
the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The
worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he
could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on
compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And
because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the
compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts
of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation
principle is essential to an understanding of the acts and
the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of
industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable
variety had become enormous, and government was
faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human
wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If
the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the
carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles
offered some measure of redress. Even here, however,
the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest.
The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court
placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So
long as liability depended on fault there could be no
recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed
officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both
the facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who
were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn
between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one
hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other.
The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the
injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a
fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of
the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.
Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often
paid a substantial damage bill, while only a part of this
enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his
dependents. The employee's judgment was nearly always
too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic
principle that those persons who enjoy the product of a
business- whether it be in the form of goods or services-
should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths
that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and
distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either
disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader
economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost
of accident loss only initially; it is expected that this cost
will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the
form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among
the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in
a given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can
gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any
appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the
compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate
properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential that
the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be
fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic
in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability
and moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad
economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage
suit in two important respects: Fault on the part of either
employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation
payable according to a definitely limited schedule is
substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work
these two major changes, irrespective of how they may
differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of
employer and employee represents a compromise in
which each party surrenders certain advantages in order
to gain others which are of more importance both to him
and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault,
and the employee surrenders his former right to full
damages and accepts instead a more modest claim for
bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of
compensation cannot be overemphasized. The statutes
vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of
balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments
and the length of the period during which compensation is
to be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ
considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to
the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the
court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the
employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a
proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors
the worker. In this way, a compensation act drawn in a
spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and
conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be
so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little
reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and
apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout
the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this."
(Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries
and diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the
actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all
been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We
have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to
succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity
recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire
structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law
and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be
compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows
to receive employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for
industrial accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise
provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents
or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf
of the employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for
actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute
to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us
is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the
victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
Footnotes
1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.- In case of
the employee's death, injury or sickness due to the failure
of the to comply with any law, or with any order, rule or
regulation of the Workmen's Compensation Commission
or the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the employer
violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred seventy-nine and its amendments or fail to install
and maintain safety appliances, or take other precautions
for the prevention of accidents or occupational disease, he
shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to
fifty per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act.
Case digest: Floresca v. Philex G.R. No. L-30642 (1985)
upxateneoUncategorizedSeptember 22, 20183 Minutes
Topic. Purpose of Construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe
Case. Petition to review lower court decision dismissing a civil complaint lodged
against Philex
Facts. It is alleged that prior to the accident, Philex failed to address safety
concerns in the mining site. Much water accumulated in an open pit area which
caused pressure in the working shafts below. As a result, said area collapsed.
Out of 48, 5 escaped, 22 rescued within the week. But 21 were left to die due to
Philex’s order to stop rescue mission.
Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the accident falls under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and
thus outside of CFI jurisdiction. WCA provides that (1) such work-connected
deaths are within the jurisdiction of Workmen’s Compensation Commission
(WCC) and (2) if the employer is negligent, employer shall pay the compensation
plus 50% of same compensation. But in essence, the respondents invoke
Section 5 of the WCA which states: “Exclusive right to compensation — The
rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal
injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest
of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said
injury.” Because the heirs have already received compensation, they are no
longer entitled to a damage suit.
The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.
Issue. (1) Does CFI has jurisdiction? -Yes
(2) Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice
between WCA action and civil damage in regular court or can avail of both WCA
and civil damage? –Choose either one but not both.
Ratio. To answer the two issues, (2) should be addressed before (1). (2)
Generally, petitioners must choose between a WCA action and civil suit. This is
what the Section 5 of WCA provides and what has been applied in various court
decisions. But the court decided to render leeway to the petitioners given the
peculiarity of the instances. Petitioners have already received compensation
under the WCA. Afterwards, they learned of the true cause of the accident which
was Philex’s negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that
had the petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have
filed for a civil suit instead. Petitioners’ initial resort to WCA action, the court
said, is based on ignorance or mistake of fact. Because petitioners were not
informed of the true cause, they had not the choice between a WCA and a civil
suit. This then creates an exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court
remanded the case to lower court for proper judgment. (1) CFI now has
jurisdiction because of the court’s making an exception of the case.
Doctrine: The topic, limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found
within court’s discussion of the second issue. The two dissenting opinions posit
that a careful reading of Section 5 of WCA would demonstrate that when a
complainant has already availed of compensation via WCA, his/her right to sue
in civil or other courts are understood to have been extinguished. After passage
of WCA, legislature had plenty of occasion to modify relevant provision but did
not do so. This, according to dissent, is manifest of legislative’s continuing intent
to retain the exclusivity provided therein. In the majority opinion’s decision to
allow petitioners to file case despite having received their WCA compensation,
dissent argues that the court has exercised a power outside of its capacities, i.e.
that it has legislated.
To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was
a mere implementation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and
9 of Art. II of 1973 Constitution guarantees social justice, establishes adequate
services in employment, and protects labor. With these provisions, the present
court only gave effect to the rights petitioners are entitled to. No legislation
occurred, because the principles are already present and need only be applied.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. 3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging
the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial child;
Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of
The Facts the petitioner wife.
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G.
Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned The Issue
from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
(as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
which is anathema to our culture."
marriage from the start.
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee)
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
 As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed
no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case,
as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such
ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the
marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also
living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the
psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with
other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically
unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has
no more
questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill
pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of
being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it
merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty
of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely,
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant
the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel
Santos v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For
if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there
is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the
way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
 (7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special
situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in
the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding
or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites,
some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types
of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage
bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations
that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law
concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the
same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from
the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did
not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations
of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of
a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to
his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental
lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit
into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time
the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were
not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court
of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then
five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her,
a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of
his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as
"to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife
brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I)
on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on
the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity"
was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P.
Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
 the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
contracting marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an
aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in
the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent
on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help
and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only
thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article
36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce
or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the
fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true,
any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its
unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The
1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so
much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court
there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to
have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them.
It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family
has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel
Santos v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For
if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there
is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the
way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the
essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special
situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in
the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding
or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites,
some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types
of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage
bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations
that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law
concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the
same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from
the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did
not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations
of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of
a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to
his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental
lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit
into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time
the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were
not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court
of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then
five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her,
a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of
his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as
"to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife
brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I)
on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on
the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity"
was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P.
Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
contracting marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an
aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in
the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent
on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help
and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only
thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article
36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce
or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the
fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true,
any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its
unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The
1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so
much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court
there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to
have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them.
It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family
has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 25-33.
2 Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G.
Chua, ponente and chairman JJ., Serafin V.C. Guingona
and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.
4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.
5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a
substantial portion of the RTC Decision is follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations,
petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible,
dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an
infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on
petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
employed after he was relieved from the office of the
Government Corporate Counsel sometime in February,
1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the
family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent
practically abandoned both petitioner-mother and son
except during the first few months of separation when
respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a
monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four
months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents
for financial aid and support as he has no savings,
preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers.
A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner
that he bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Parañaque
for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only
for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they
were actually renting the house with the respondent's
parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside
from this. respondent would also lie about his salary and
ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his
mistress and their child. which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent turned sour if we look at the background of
their relationship. During their college days, when they
were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to
be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to
believe then that she would make an ideal wife and
mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent
because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a
year, however, they decided to break their relationship
because of some differences in their personalities. Almost
five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila,
petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They
became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a
more mature respondent. Believing that they know each
other much better after two years of going steady, they
decided to settle down and get married. It would seem.
therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other
well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of
the parties cropped-up and dominated their life together.
Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and
respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This
failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's.
In fact, even with the intervention and help of their parents
who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties
could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the
parties broke-up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and
understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in
and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or
misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent
cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic)
marriage. Rather, this resulted because both parties
cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is
unique and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman with the basic objective of
establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family
Code). The unique element of permanency of union
signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship
between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must
fully understand and accept the (implications and
consequences of being permanently) united in marriage.
And the maintenance of this relationship demands from
the parties, among others, determination to succeed in
their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding,
acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other.
Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to
observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform
these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most
likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the
unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8;
Original Records, pp. 70-73).
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on
the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all
decisions of the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese in
the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal,
Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the
Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines,
Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees
of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop
Cruz was also Secretary-General of the Second Plenary
Council of the Philippines — PCP II — held from January
20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough
equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional convention in
the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a
Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed
by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of
Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law
professor and the law practitioner.
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
state.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious connections and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and
income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly
members but the state may also do so through just
programs of social security.
Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop
Cruz. On the other hand, the text used in Santos v. CA
reads:
"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch.
Cruz's Memorandum is due to the fact that the original
Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-
worded English translations.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1 Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26,
1986 of the Civil Code Revision Committee of the U.P.
Law Center.
2 Zwack , Joseph P. Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
3 The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The
Canon Law Society of America, Paulist Press, New York,
1985.
4 Zwack, ibid., p. 47.
5 G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6 G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
VITUG, J., concurring:
1 Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, In Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100.
2 In Santos vs. Court Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3 Supra.
4 At pages 34-35.
Case Digest:
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband
and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense
quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and
duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that
she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown
gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological
incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity
laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in
complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it
to act on behalf of the state.
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of
the decision dated August 14, 1974 1in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People
of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant"
of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of
Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for
having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended)
and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an
information 3 which reads as follows:
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement
of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized
insurance company, registered under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a
Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the
amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said accused
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner,
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7
March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's
husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de
Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C;
on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident
Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve
(12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for
P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during
lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in record,
present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of
private prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation
of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the
solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of
Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... without said accused
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
agent from the office of the Insurance Commission,
Republic of the Philippines."
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly
disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued with
active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against
which appellant in her defense sought to show that being
the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in
his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal
and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to
renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent
and so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to
renew ...
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On
appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate court
finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving due
course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on the
aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the
respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted that
petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a
Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following
errors 11 allegedly committed by the appellate court:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY
THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE
INSURANCE ACT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17,
INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER.
We find the petition meritorious.
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having
violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference
to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to
determine whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the
aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its
second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:
 No insurance company doing business within the
Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any
commission or other compensation to any person for
services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person
shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner
a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such
company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as
agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of
procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for
services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or
other compensation from any insurance company doing
business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof,
without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act
from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be
renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six
months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the
Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application
of persons desiring such authority, such application being
approved and countersigned by the company such person
desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved
by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information
as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall
have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke
any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate
shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of
July of the year following the issuing of such certificate.
Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application
of the company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or
transmits for a person other than himself an application for
a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall
be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and
shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such
company is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this
section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On
the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with
the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner
shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued
to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to
such convicted person.
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph
thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its
second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this
section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be
imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under
the second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first
paragraph. Thus —
... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most
active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to
Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and
received the pay thereof — her defense that she was only
acting as helper of her husband can no longer be
sustained, neither her point that she received no
compensation for issuance of the policy because
any person who for compensation
solicits or obtains insurance on
behalf of any insurance company or
transmits for a person other than
himself an application for a policy of
insurance to or from such company
or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall
be an insurance agent within the
intent of this section, and shall
thereby become liable to all the
duties, requirements, liabilities, and
penalties, to which an agent of such
company is subject. paragraph 2,
Sec. 189, Insurance Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that
she had obtained the insurance,
for compensation
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the
Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant
apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under
the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it
is provided that,
No person shall act as agent, sub-
agent, or broker, in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for
insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation
from any insurance company doing
business in the Philippine Island, or
agent thereof, without first procuring
a certificate of authority to act from
the insurance commissioner, which
must be renewed annually on the
first day of January, or within six
months thereafter.
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of
the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled. 12
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply
that the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section
189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph.
Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the second
paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and
obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no
necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be
called an insurance agent.
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph
of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and
second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is
within the intent of Section 189. Hence —
Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, ...
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds
true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said
section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative
clause intended to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third
paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the
agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the
aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all
its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it must be borne in
mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from
isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and
independently. 16 More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it
is found or with which it is associated. 17
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of
the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has established
ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the
issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the accused
was convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a
misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit
insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an
information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either
directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the
provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is
intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without
license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance
contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at
bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the
accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is
essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be
sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor
General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance
Act.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is
acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C.J.,) Makasiar, De Castro, Fernandez, Guerrero and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
Case Digest:
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
Lessons Applicable: Insurance Agent (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act (old law)
FACTS:
 Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent
to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970
 Eugenio S. Isidro was issued a Personal Accident Policy by Perla thru its
author representative, Rodolfo for a period of 12 months with beneficiary
as Ana M. Isidro for P5,000
 Personal Accident Policy insured died by violence during lifetime of policy
 Fiscal filed against Mapalad Aisporna, wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec.
189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted,
"as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting the application of
Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de Seguros, ...
without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as
such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the
Philippines
 Defense: she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone
to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she
left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew
 RTC and CA: guilty as charged
ISSUE: W/N the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its
2nd paragraph
HELD: NO. Reversed
 Section 189 of the Insurance Act
Insurance act: Section 189
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any
agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person
for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first
procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an
agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent,
sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for
insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or
other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the
Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed
annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such
certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written
application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved
and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall
be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such
information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right
to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion.
No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July
of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be
issued upon the application of the company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any
insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application
for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in
the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent
of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in
the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent,
sub-agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the
business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke
the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter
be issued to such convicted person.
 careful perusal of the provision shows
 first paragraph - prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or
broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner (no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation in order to be called an insurance agent)
 second paragraph - defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of
this section (a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an
insurance for compensation)
 third paragraph - prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation
 The appellate court has established ultimately that she did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
 It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege
that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio
Isidro was one for compensation.
 This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained.
 It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-
appellees.
Sy Santos, Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Tagalo, Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4,
1972 and March 27, 1972, respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila
in its Civil Case No. 75138, is whether or not a banking institution may validly
refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment
debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. *
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a
quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation
and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the
plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer
within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or
Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment
by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit
of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking
Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy
Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim
Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure
of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion
to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion.
However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from
receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is
any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down
by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with
the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt
of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the
Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim
Liong instituted the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners
reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or
looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or
in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a
banking institution to disclose to any person other than
those mentioned in Section two hereof any information
concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon
conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years
or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both,
in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court
does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and
that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally
liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B
Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position
of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest
Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final
judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an
examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of
the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of
the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the
lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a
final judgment. Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should
like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means
to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax
case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and
because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court
has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether
he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such
inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under
the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that
there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment
or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a
certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will
bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that
prohibited by this amendment or by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the
inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made only for the
purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the
protection of the right in favor of the government; but when
the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or
not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by
the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into
the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question.
Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the
deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the
established rule of procedure as well as the substantive
law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision,
definitely establishing the liability of an individual for
taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be
executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this
bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the
investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to
execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become
executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax
liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will
this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the
judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such
money to satisfy that obligation to the Government, but not
to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion
of taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff
wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure
the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is
rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff
cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the
gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside
the very purpose of this law it could be reached by
attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases
it can be attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives,
No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee
report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of
or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive
that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient
of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972,
respectively, are hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Teehankee, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETERANS
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI
Manila, Branch III, and CALIXTO V. GASILAO, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of respondent Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch III, rendered on October 25, 1973 in Civil Case No.
90450 for mandamus filed by Calixto V. Gasilao against the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration.
The facts as found by the Court a quo to have been established by the pleadings
find by the parties are stated in the decision under review from which We quote
the following:
Calixto V. Gasilao, pauper litigant and petitioner in the
above-entitled case, was a veteran in good standing
during World War II. On October 19, 1955, he filed a claim
for disability pension under Section 9, Republic Act No.
65. The claim was disapproved by the Philippine Veterans
Board (now Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration).
Meanwhile, Republic Act 65 was amended by Republic
Act 1362 on June 22, 1955 by including as part of the
benefit of P50.00, P10.00 a month for each of the
unmarried minor children below 18 of the veteran Republic
Act No. 1362 was implemented by the respondents only
on July 1, 1955.
On June 18, 1957, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was
further amended by Republic Act 1920 increasing the life
pension of the veteran to P100.00 a month and
maintaining the P10.00 a month each for the unmarried
minor children below 18.
Fortunately, on August 8, 1968, the claim of the petitioner
which was disapproved in December, 1955 was
reconsidered and his claim was finally approved at the
rate of P100.00 a month, life pension, and the additional
Pl0.00 for each of his ten unmarried minor children below
18. In view of the approval of the claim of petitioner, he
requested respondents that his claim be made retroactive
as of the date when his original application was flied or
disapproved in 1955. Respondents did not act on his
request.
On June 22, 1969, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was
amended by Republic Act No. 5753 which increased the
life pension of the veteran to P200.00 a month and
granted besides P30.00 a month for the wife and P30.00 a
month each for his unmarried minor children below 18. In
view of the new law, respondents increased the monthly
pension of petitioner to P125.00 effective January 15,
 1971 due to insufficient funds to cover full implementation.
His wife was given a monthly pension of P7.50 until
January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was fully
implemented.
Petitioner now claims that he was deprived of his right to
the pension from October 19, 1955 to June 21, 1957 at the
rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 a month each for his
six (6) unmarried minor children below 18. lie also alleges
that from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968 he is entitled to
the difference of P100.00 per month plus P10.00 a month
each for his seven (7) unmarried nor children below 18.
Again, petitioner asserts the difference of P100.00 per
month, plus P30.00 a month for his wife and the difference
of P20.00 a month each for his four (4) unmarried minor
children below 18 from June 22, 1969 up to January 14,
1971 and finally, the difference of P75.00 per month plus
P30.00 a month for his wife and the difference of P20.00 a
month for his three (3) unmarried minor children below 18
from January 15, 1971 to December 31, 1971. 1
According to the records, the parties, through their respective counsels, filed on
September 24, 1973 the following stipulation of facts in the lower Court:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW the parties thru their respective counsel, and
unto this Honorable Court, respectfully state that they
agree on the following facts which may be considered as
proved without the need of the introduction of any
evidence thereon, to wit:
1. Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the
last World War that took active participation in the
liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military
service, he was rendered disabled.
2. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the
Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged
with the administration of different laws giving various
benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows
and parents; that it has the power to adopt rules and
regulations to implement said laws and to pass upon the
merits and qualifications of persons applying for rights and
privileges extended by this Act pursuant to such rules and
regulations as it may adopt to insure the speedy and
honest fulfillment of its aims and purposes.
3. On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed a claim (Claim No. Dis-
12336) for disability pension under Section 9 of RA 65,
with the Philippine Veterans Board (later succeeded by the
Philippine Veterans Administration, now Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office), alleging that he was suffering
from PTB, which he incurred in line of duty.
4. Due to petitioner's failure to complete his supporting
papers and submit evidence to establish his service
connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board
of the defunct Philippine Veterans Board on December 18,
1955.
5. On August 8, 1968, petitioner was able to complete his
supporting papers and, after due investigation and
processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his
disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits
of section 9 of RA 65, and was therefore given a pension
of P100.00 a month and with an additional P 10.00 a
month for each of his unmarried minor children pursuant to
RA 1920, amending section 9 of RA 65.
6. RA 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969, providing for
an increase in the basic pension to P200.00 a month and
the additional pension, to P30.00 a month for the wife and
each of the unmarried minor children. Petitioner's monthly
pension was, however, increased only on January 15,
1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to
the fact that it was only on said date that funds were
released for the purpose, and the amount so released was
only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase.
7. On January 15, 1972, more funds were released to
implement fully RA 5753 and snow payment in full of the
benefits thereunder from said date.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a decision be
rendered in accordance with the foregoing stipulation of
facts. It is likewise prayed that the parties be granted a
period of (15) days within which to file their memoranda. 2
Upon consideration of the foregoing and the Memoranda filed by the parties, the
lower Court rendered judgment against therein respondent Board of
Administrators, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered for petitioner and the respondents are ordered to
make petitioner's pension effective as of December 18,
1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month; and the rate
increased to P100.00 per month plus P10.00 per month
each for his ten unmarried minor children below 18 years
of age from June 22, 1957 up to August 7..1968; to pay
the difference of P100.00 per month plus P30.00 per
month and P20.00 per month each for his ten unmarried
children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1969 up to
January 15, 1971, the difference of P75.00 per month plus
P22.50 per month for his wife and P20.00 per month each
for his unmarried nor children then below 18 years of age
from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, October 25, 1973. 3
In its Petition before this Court, the Board of Administrators of the Philippine
Veterans Administration, through the Office of the Solicitor General, challenges
the abovementioned decision of the Court a quo on the following grounds:
1. The lower Court erred in ordering the petitioners to
retroact the effectivity of their award to respondent Calixto
V. Gasilao of full benefits under section 9 of RA 65 to
December 18, 1955, the date when his application was
disapproved due to dis failure to complete his supporting
papers and submit evidence to establish his service
connected illness, and not August 8, 1968, the date when
he was able to complete his papers and allow processing
and approval of his application.
2. The lower Court erred in ordering payment of claims
which had prescribed.
3. The lower Court erred in allowing payment of claims
under a law for which no funds had been released. 4
The question raised under the first assigned error is: When should private
respondent Gasilao's pension benefits start
The lower Court, quoting excerpts from Our decision in Begosa vs. Chairman
Philippine Veterans Administration, 5ruled that Gasilao's pension benefits should
retroact to the date of the disapproval of his claim on December 18, 1955, and
not commence from the approval thereon on August 8, 1968 as contended by
the Board of Administrators.
Petitioner maintains the stand that the facts of the Begosa case are not similar to
those of the case at bar to warrant an application of the ruling therein on the
retroactivity of a pension award to the date of prior disapproval of the claim. In
the Begosa case, the Supreme Court speaking thru then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Fernando, affirmed the decision of the lower Court, and ruled in
part as follows:
From the facts just set out, it will be noted that plaintiff filed
his said claim for disability pension as far back as March
4, 1955; that it was erroneously disapproved on June 21,
1955, because his dishonorable discharge from the Army
was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval
and that on reconsideration asked for by him on
November 1, 1957, which he continued to follow up, the
Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, composed of herein defendants, which
took over the duties of the Philippine Veterans Board,
finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, at the
rate of P30.00 a month. 6
Had it not been for the said error, it appears that there was
no good ground to deny the said claim, so that the latter
was valid and meritorious even as of the date of its filing
on March 4, 1955, hence to make the same effective only
as of the date of its approval on September 2, 1964 —
according to defendant's stand — would be greatly unfair
and prejudicial to plaintiff. 7
In other words, the favorable award which claimant Begosa finally obtained on
September 2, 1964 was made to retroact to the date of prior disapproval of the
claim on June 2, 1955 for the reason that such disapproval was erroneously
made.
In the instant case, on the other hand, the herein claim of respondent Gasilao
was denied on December 18, 1955 because of his "failure to complete his
supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected
illness" (Stipulation of Facts, Par. 4, ante). Nonetheless, the Stipulation of Facts
admitted in par. 1 that "Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last
World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy,
and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled." From this admission
in par. 1, it can reasonably be deduced that the action on the claim of Gasilao
was merely suspended by the Philippine Veterans Administration pending the
completion of the required supporting papers and evidence to establish his
service-connected illness. Hence, Our ruling in the Begosa case making
retroactive the award in favor of the veteran still holds.
Republic Act No. 65 otherwise known as the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as
amended, does not explicitly provide for the effectivity of pension awards.
However, petitioner seeks to remedy this legislative deficiency by citing Section
15 of the law which in part reads as follows:
Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advantage of the
rights and privileges provided for in this Act should file his
application with the Board ...
Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly requires that the
application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before
the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits
should commence form the date of he approval of the application.
This stand of the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit
and intent of the law, considering that Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law
which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor
those entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits granted thereunder, among
which are the right to resume old positions in the government, educational
benefits, the privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension for the
incapacitated, pensions for widow and children, hospitalization and medical care
benefits.
As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions
is to compensate, as far as may be, a class of men who suffered in the service
for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, 8 and more
particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness,
disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. 9 A veteran pension law is,
therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those
who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or
revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the
general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of
those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such
constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation,
and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular
language. 10
Significantly, the original text of RA 65 provided that:
Sec. 6. It also shall be the duty of the Board (then the
Philippine Veterans Board) to pass upon the merits and
qualifications of persons applying for the rights and/or
privileges extended by this Act, pursuant to such rules as
it may adopt to insure the speedy and honest fulfillment of
its aims and purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing provision clearly makes it incumbent upon the implementing
Board to carry out the provisions of the statute in the most expeditious way
possible and without unnecessary delay. In the Begosa case, it took nine years
(from June 2, 1955 to September 2, 1964) before the claimant finally obtained
his pension grant, whereas in the instant case, it took about twelve years (from
December, 1955 to August 8, 1968) for respondent Gasilao to receive his
pension claim. To Our mind, it would be more in consonance with the spirit and
intentment of the law that the benefits therein granted be received and enjoyed
at the earliest possible time by according retroactive effect to the grant of the
pension award as We have done in the Begosa case.
On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval
of the corresponding application which would be dependent on the discretion of
the Board of Administrators which as noted above had been abused through
inaction extending to nine years, even to twelve years, the noble and
humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could easily be thwarted
or defeated.
On the issue of prescription, petitioner cites Article 1144 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; and
(3) Upon a judgment.
Petitioner now contends that since the action was filed in the lower Court on
April 13, 1973 seeking the payment of alleged claims which have accrued more
than ten (10) years prior to said date, the same should have been disallowed as
to the prescribed claims.
The obligation of the government to pay pension was created by law (Sec. 9,
R.A. 65). Hence, the ten-year prescriptive period should be counted from the
date of passage of the law which is September 25, 1946, the reason being that it
is only from said date that private respondent could have filed his application.
Taking September 25, 1946 as the point of reference, the actual filing of
Gasilao's application on July 23, 1955 was clearly made within and effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period. It is not the date of the commencement of the
action in the lower Court which should be reckoned with, for it was not on said
date that Gasilao first sought to claim his pension benefits, but on July 23, 1955
when he filed his application with the defunct Philippine Veterans Board. As We
had the occasion to state in the case of Vda. de Nator vs. C.I.R., 11 "the basis of
prescription is the unwarranted failure to bring the matter to the attention of
those who are by law authorized to take cognizance thereof."
The Stipulation of Facts do not show and neither do the records indicate when
Gasilao attempted to reinstate his claim after the same was disapproved on
December 18, 1955. What is evident is that he did take steps to reinstate his
claim because on August 8, 1968, herein petitioner finally approved his
application. We find it more logical to presume that upon being properly notified
of the disapproval of his application and the reasons therefor, Gasilao, being the
interested party that he was proceeded to work for the completion of the
requirements of the Board, as in fact he was successful in meeting such
requirements. There is nothing in the record to show intentional abandonment of
the claim to as to make the prescriptive period continue to run again.
The third ground relied upon in support of this Petition involves the issue as to
whether or not the payment of increased pension provided in the amendatory
Act, R.A. 5753, could be ordered, even where there was no actual release of
funds for the purpose, although the law itself expressly provided for an
appropriation. In the case of Board of Adminitrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration vs. Hon. Agcoili, et al., 12 penned by Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, the same issue was treated in this wise:
... The inability of the petitioner to pay Abrera the
differential of P60.00 in monthly pension is attributed by it,
in its own words, "to the failure of Congress to appropriate
the necessary funds to cover all claims for benefits,
pensions and allowances." And the petitioner states that it
has "no alternative but to suspend (full implementation of
said laws until such time, as sufficient funds have been
appropriated by Congress" to cover the total amount of all
approved claims.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration
(now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is hereby
ordered to make Gasilao's pension effective December 18,
1955 at the rate of P50-00 per month plus P10.00 per
month for each of his then unmarried minor children below
18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from
June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968.
The differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife
and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for
the period from June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 by
virtue of Republic Act No. 5753 are hereby declared
subject to the availability of Government funds
appropriated for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.

We find the explanation of the petitioner satisfactory, but

we nevertheless hold that as a matter of law Abrera is
entitled to a monthly pension of P120.00 from January 1,
1972 when Republic Act 5753 was implemented up to the
present, if his physical disability rating has continued and
continues to be 60%. Payment to him of what is due him
from January 1, 1972 must however remain subject to the
availability of Government funds duly set aside for the
purpose and subject further periodic re-rating of his
physical disability.

But even if we have thus defined the precise terms, nature

and scope of the entitlement of the respondent Abrera, for
the guidance of petitioner, we nevertheless refrain from
ordering the petitioner to pay the amount of P120.00 per
month from January 1, 1972 that is due to the respondent
by virtue of the mandate of section 9 of Republic Act 65,
as amended by Republic Act 5753, because the
Government has thus far not provided the necessary
funds to pay all valid claims duly approved under the
authority of said statute. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court a quo is hereby modified to read as

follows: