Case Digest for Legal Research

1. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, pet. vs. SPS. Edito and Merian
Tirol and SPS. Alejandro and Miranda Ngo, resp.

G.R. No. 171535. June 5, 2009

588 SCRA 635

Ponente: C.J. Puno

Facts:

Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners, Edito P. Tirol and Alejandro Y. Ngo, along with
their spouses Merian Tirol and Miranda Ngo, respectively, purchased a parcel of land from a
certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins. As evidenced by the Tax Declaration and Transfer Certificate
Title No. 18216, the plaintiffs-appellees believed it was a clean title and proceeded with the
purchase. However upon their request for a height clearance the plaintiffs-appellees were
referred to Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), it appeared that the
latter also owned the land dating back to 1958.

The land in question (Lot No. 4673) was originally owned by spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef however they lost the original title of the land during World War II. They sold
the land to both MCIAA, defendant-appellant, and spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz
Patalinghug; to the former on March 23, 1986, and to the latter on January 1, 1974. Spouses
Cuizon and Patalinghug secured a reconstitution of the title certificate and sold the same
land to Elma Jenkins who in turn sold the land to the plaintiffs-appellees. But MCIAA, upon
purchase, registered the land under Act No. 3344 instead of under the Land Registration Act.

Initially the Trial Court ruled in favor of the MCIAA however upon motion for
reconsideration of the plaintiffs-appellees the Trial Court reversed its order and held
that Tirol and Ngo with their spouses are the owner of the land invoking Article 1544
of the Civil Code with the provision: If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable
property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. And that the
registration of the MCIAA of the land under Act No. 3344 is not the registration of land
contemplated by law for it go against the provision of the Land Registration Act, being that
the land in question is in fact a registered land.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied the petition of the
defendant Appellant.
Issue(s):

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs were buyers in good faith?

2. Who has superior claim over the land between MCIAA and spouses Tirol and Ngo?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC and the CA however provided a different
reason for its decision.

The higher court held that a person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
correctness of the title and the law will not oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal
status of the property except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonable man to make such inquiry. In applying to the
instant case, the plaintiff-appellees acted in good faith as they had performed what is
required of them by law. Likewise, the contact entered into by the original owner and the
defendant-appellant was not correctly registered therefore it is only binding between the
seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third person.

The court also held that Lot No. 4763 was in fact a registered lot therefore the deed of sale
should’ve been ruled under Act. No 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act.
Registering the sale of the land under Act 3344 and not Act 496 leaves the sale to be
considered unregistered and the deed does not operation as constructive notice to the whole
world. Furthermore the registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in
order to effect and bind the land. Therefore the court ruled that the plaintiff-appellees are
the persons with the superior rights to the property in question.
2. Vicente A. Miel, pet., vs. Jesus A. Malindog, resp.

G.R. No. 143538. Feb. 13, 2009

579 SCRA 119

Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario

Facts:

On 19 July 1994, petitioner Vicente A. Miel, an engineer in the Samar Engineering District,
Department of Public Works and Highways, Catbalogan, Samar (SED-DPWH) filed with the
Civil Service Commission, Region Office in Tacloban a complaint for falsification of official
documents, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and grave
misconduct against respondent Jesus A. Malindog, then employee also of SED-DPWH as an
engineer.

Petitioner alleged in his complaint that respondent submitted three separate personal data
sheets (PDS) that contained contradictory and apparently deceitful information therein:
respondent stated under the service record section of his first PDS that he worked for
PHILPOS BAGACAY MINES, from 1 July 1984 to 9 October 1986; then respondent
indicated under the service record section of his second PDS that he worked at the Philippine-
Japan Highway Loan Division (PJHLD) from 1 May 1984 to 9 October 1986; finally on this
third PDS under the service record section respondent wrote that he was “on leave” from his
job from 1 January 1984 to 9 October 1986. Due to respondent’s false statements made in
his PDS, he was granted a loyalty cash pay amounting to P 1,500.00, also he was
recommended for promotion to Engineer III in the same government agency.

Upon investigation, the Civil Service Commission found the respondent guilty of dishonesty
and issued a resolution thereby dismissing the respondent from service. CSC-HO held that
respondent’s actuation constituted dishonesty under the CS Rules. The corresponding
penalty of such offense is dismissal from service with all the accessory penalties including
perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from taking future government
examinations.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Civil Service Commission however it
was denied. Thus, the respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appeal
was submitted fifty-one (51) days after the prescribed reglementary period. Nevertheless the
CA reviewed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CSC with modification. Instead of
dismissal from service, the Court of Appeals sanctioned the respondent with a penalty of 1
year suspension without pay as they considered the mitigating circumstances to wit: (1)
respondent’s long years of service in the government; and (2) his unblemished record in the
past.

The petitioner questioned the decision of the court of appeals and contested the following
errors: (1) the Court of Appeals failed to apply the rules of procedure on the filing of appeals;
and (2) the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by imposing the penalty of one year
suspension instead of dismissal from service.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling:

No, the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court held that under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court the fifteen-day period to
appeal commenced to run from receipt of the judgment, final order or resolution by the party’s
counsel on record. The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal within the reglementary
period will make the judgment final and executory by operation of the law. Perfection of an
appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional; failure to do so renders that questioned decision final and deprived the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the decision. However in Baylon v. Fact-Finding
Intelligence Bureau, the Supreme Court laid down the range of reasons which may provide
justification for a court to resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life,
liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel’s negligence without the participatory negligence on
the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits
of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

The failure of the respondent’s counsel to file the appeal was the latter’s negligence and the
former is not at fault. Therefore the Court of Appeals still held jurisdiction. Likewise, Section
53 of the Civil Service Rules, viz.: Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or
Alternative Circumstances.—In the determination of the penalties to be imposed,
mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense shall be considered. In the case at bar the mitigating circumstances are in attendant
to wit: (1) respondent’s long years of service in the government; and (2) his unblemished
record in the past.

The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the decision of the appellate court however warned
the respondent that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severity in the future.
3. People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appelle vs. Francisco Taruc, accused-
appellant

G.R. No. 185202. Feb 18, 2009

579 SCRA 682

Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario

Facts:

Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged with the crime of murder in connection with
the death of Emelito Sualog before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3. The accused
shot the victim which resulted to the latter’s death. The accused pleaded not guilty for the
crime charged.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder and
sentenced Taruc the penalty of death along with the payment for damages to the victim’s
family. However the accused escaped from prison on 23 August 2002 and was not present
during the pronouncement of the RTC’s decision.

Since the case was penalized by death penalty the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the
case despite the fleeing of the accused. Upon review the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modification. In view of the effect of the amendment brought about
by Republic Act 9346 which prohibits the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines, the
CA changed the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused lost his right to appeal upon escaping from jail?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that an accused loses his right to appeal when he/she escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bails or flees to a foreign country, unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court. However the escape of the accused from prison does not preclude the Court
of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, consideration that what was involved was
capital punishment – automatic review is mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but
a duty to review all death penalty cases.

In the case at bar the accused lost his right to appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the case
and ordered the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus.