Aena GBAS CAT I Implementation at Malaga Airport:
Towards an Operational GNSS Landing System
Patricia Callejo, Aena Satellite Navigation Division, Spain
Aitor Alvarez, Aena Satellite Navigation Division, Spain
Fco. Javier De Blas, Aena Satellite Navigation Division, Spain
BIOGRAPHY
Patricia Callejo is an Aeronautical Engineer
specialized in Air Navigation Systems by the
Polytechnic University of Madrid (Spain). Within
the Aena Satellite Navigation Division, she is in
charge of technical issues, data processing and
analysis of onboard and on-ground systems
performances since 2006. Her background in data
collection campaigns and data analysis comes from
her work in Airborne Remote Sensing field, in
which she was specialized in positioning and
orientating remote sensors for the Spanish National
Institute for Aerospace Technology (INTA).
Aitor Alvarez is an Aeronautical Engineer from the
Technical University of Madrid (Spain). He works
at Aena as the Head of the GNSS Certification
Department being in charge of the Aena GNSS
(EGNOS and GBAS) implementation projects.
Since February 2009, he is a member of the ESSP
SAS Board of Directors.
Fco. Javier de Blas is an Aeronautical Engineer and
Master in Airport Systems from the Polytechnic
University of Madrid (Spain). After working for
Senasa (Services and Studies for Air Navigation and
Aeronautical Safety) for four years, he began
working as a GNSS consultant for the Aena Satellite
Navigation Division in 2008, dealing with GNSS
implementation projects.
INTRODUCTION
Aena started its GBAS CAT I Programme in the late
90s. By means of carrying out the installation of
several GBAS Ground Station Prototypes, Aena’s
Satellite Navigation team has had the opportunity to
acquire the experience and know-how to continue
working towards a certifiable CAT I system
installation. Therefore and after the complete
technical development of the new SLS-4000 system
and its installation in Malaga Airport, Aena is
facing up to the last step of the way to make GBAS
become a reality: the Operational Implementation
phase.
This phase represents a great challenge by its own:
it will be the first time for Aena and the Spanish
Civil Aviation Authority to manage the operational
approval of a New Air Navigation System within
the SES (Single European Sky) Regulation
framework. As a consequence a group of activities
affecting every aspect of the service provision
(maintenance, safety, security, charting, AIS, etc.)
will be done to integrate every change produced by
this new system into the structure of Aena and to
comply with every requirement included in the
regulations.
At the same time and due to the operational purpose
of this process Aena is improving its cooperation
activities with users. In this sense Aena and some
Airlines (Air Berlin, Thomson) are working together
to promote the operational implementation at
Malaga, and in the near future in other Spanish
Airports. Currently Air Berlin is playing a key role
by monitoring GBAS performances in their regular
approaches to Malaga Airport, and reporting their
results. In addition to these activities Aena keeps
collaborating with other stakeholders worldwide
(FAA, JACB, DFS).
This paper covers on one side the present status of
the Aena GBAS Programme and the description of
the Spanish approach to the process to obtain the
Operational Approval of a New Air Navigation
System within the SES Regulation framework.
On the other side, special attention is paid to the
results of the experimental tests on the performances
of the GBAS Ground Stations. Both in-flight and
on-ground trials are described and results are
presented. Several aspects as accuracy, integrity and
availability as well as broadcast signal coverage are
analysed versus CAT I specifications along a
number of experimental tests performed at different
sites.
AENA’s GBAS PROJECT STATUS
As mentioned before, Aena started its GBAS
Programme in the late 90s. The starting activities
consisted in the installation and first trials with an
experimental differential station. Later on the first
complete ground station installation was a SCAT-I
(SLS-2000) manufactured by Honeywell. This
system consisted of three GPS reference receivers
and a rackable processing unit including corrections
computation and VHF broadcasting both within the
same unit. A VDB transmitting antenna completed
the system.
After this installation Aena upgraded it to the PSP
CAT I Prototype (Honeywell’s SLS-3000 Beta
LAAS Plus). This ground system comprises four
improved GPS antennas and four GPS receivers
referred as Remote Satellite Measurement Units or
RSMUs. The antennas are composed of a High
Zenit Antenna (HZA) and a Multipath Limiting
Antenna (MLA), which data are integrated into a
sole GPS solution by software. In addition this
ground system comprises a Differential GPS cabinet
and a VHF Data Broadcast cabinet. The first one is
in charge of computing the GPS differential
corrections, performing the integrity monitoring and
synchronizing the VDB transmission. The second
one is in charge of transmitting the VHF signal to
the VHF antenna and monitoring this signal. Within
the PSP, the transmission power was increased in
order to achieve the coverage volume according to
CAT I requirements. In this way, the GBAS VDB
antenna is responsible of radiating the GBAS signal
from the station to the aircraft. Moreover eleven
integrity monitors plus eleven continuity monitors
and various Built-In-Test-Equipment monitors
complete the system improvement in order to
achieve CAT I performances.
independent channels plus two VDB transmitters
and two VDB receivers for signal monitoring
purposes are part of this advancement. Some other
improvements affect the user/maintenance interface
and the data recording capability of the system.
Equipment for Monitoring GBAS
With the aim of monitoring and testing GBAS
signal quality and performances, several systems
and tools have been implemented both on ground
and onboard.
With regard to ground systems and tools, a GNSS
Monitoring Station or GMS was installed in the
surroundings of the GBAS facility. The GMS 670 is
an independent monitoring system manufactured by
Thales ATM. It monitors the GPS space segment as
well as the GBAS ground segment. The GMS
provides a real time end to end validation capability
of the differentially corrected GPS signal equivalent
to the “ILS-field monitor”.
This monitoring station is composed of a main
cabinet, which includes data processors and
recorders, two GPS antennas, one connected to a
GPS/SBAS receiver and the other to a GPS/SQM
receiver, a VHF antenna connected to a Telerad
VHF receiver and an integrated interference
monitoring module (see Figure 1).

Presently the incoming step goes through the

Figure 1. GNSS Monitoring Station components:
installation of the brand new GBAS ground system
GMS cabinet, GPS/SBAS and GPS/SQM receivers
SLS-4000. A system also manufactured by
antennas mounting and VHF antenna.
Honeywell which is expected to obtain the FAA
System Design Approval by the mid of this year and
The GMS receives and process GNSS signals, both
the FAA Operational Approval by the end of 2009.
GPS and SBAS, receives the GBAS messages from
The operational philosophy of the SLS-4000 is
an external independent CAT I GBAS station,
similar to the PSP system but significant software
monitors these messages as well as the VDB link,
and hardware improvements have been introduced
performs position monitoring by computing 3D
at the design level. Four new GPS antennas will
errors, 2D errors, vertical errors and protection
replace the current ones. These new antennas are
levels, displays real time data, parameters and
specially designed to minimise the multipath effects.
operational status on-site and online, is able to plot
The previous two cabinet configuration is unified in
historical data versus time and performs permanent
a single rack integrating the processor and the VDB
recording on hard disk of all relevant data, including
subsystems but preserving and even improving the
GPS raw data, position solutions, alerts and monitor
redundancy model from its predecessor. Four
alarms. This capability allows for post-processing
Differential Correction Processors organized in two
and incident investigation. Moreover, Aena has
developed a GMS data convertor SW application in
order to convert the raw data recordings of the GMS
into Pegasus readable files. This option permits the
user to analyse GMS data with the commonly used
Pegasus toolset.

In addition, Aena’s GMS integrates an interference

monitoring function by means of the RFI module.
This module is continuously monitoring the L1
signal against the ICAO GNSS SARPS interference
mask [1]. The most critical interference signals are Figure 4. VHF portable antenna mounted on a mast
those within the frequency range of 1.575 GHz ± 10 for static measurements.
MHz. In case of an interference event, spectrum
data is stored and an alarm is raised in the GMS user
interface application.

Figure 5. VHF and GPS portable antennas mounted

on a vehicle for dynamic measurements.

With regard to airborne systems, Aena’s investment

is dedicated to the development of a GBAS
airborne experimental platform. In this sense, a
Beechcraft King Air A-100 is instrumented for
GBAS and SBAS experimental flight tests.

Figure 2. GMS VDB link real time monitoring.

An additional ground system is the VDB signal

recording portable platform, developed by Aena
for experimental measurements of GBAS signal
field strength at the ground level. This portable
platform is composed of a Telerad VDB receiver, a
VHF portable antenna, a Novatel OEM4 GNSS
receiver plus antenna and two computers to manage
and record data. The layout of this platform is
depicted in Figure 3. Figure 6. Beechcraft King Air A-100.

On the subject of GBAS flight testing purposes, the

Figure 3. VDB signal recording portable platform
connections layout.
equipment integration includes a Rockwell-Collins
Multi-Mode Receiver, MMR R-C GLU 925, a
Telerad VHF receiver, a GPS/SBAS independent
receiver and a Processing Console which acquires,
stores and processes data as well as it displays
navigation solutions in real time. The layout of this
platform is depicted in Figure 7.
 Within this scenario, Malaga’s Airport was chosen
for the materialization of the Aena’s GBAS
Programme.

The current GBAS Ground System components

(SLS-3000 Beta LAAS Plus) were installed in 2006
(see Figure 9).

Figure 7. Airborne platform connections layout.

Currently, this platform is being upgraded at HW

level by the integration of a new SBAS receiver,
several ruggedized storage devices and more
powerful processing units. At the same time, it is
being redesigned at SW level for full compatibility
with Pegasus post-processing.

GBAS SCENARIO AT MALAGA Figure 9. Current GBAS components: the DCP and
VDB racks, a GPS antenna with the HZA and MLA
Malaga is located in the South of Spain, next to the components and the VDB antenna.
Mediterranean Sea. Malaga’s Airport is the
southernmost airport on the European continent. It This ground facility is going to be upgraded in May
connects seventeen Spanish cities and almost one 2009 to the certifiable SLS-4000. All the compo-
hundred European cities. It is ranked fourth in the nents from the preceding ground system will be
Spanish airport network and twenty-fifth in Europe. replaced except the VDB antenna which will remain
Currently, this airport is being remodelled and from previous installation (see Figure 10).
expanded. A new terminal area to double the
airport’s current capacity, new aprons and an
airfield expansion consisting in the construction of a
second runway depicts Malaga’s Airport as the
perfect scenario for new technologies opportunity.

At present, Malaga’s Airport is provided with one

runway serving two ILS CAT I approaches:
RWY13 and RWY31. The first one comes from a
mountainous area with a glideslope of 3.2º and the
second one comes from the sea with a nominal
glideslope of 3.0º.

Figure 10. SLS-4000 GS components: DCP/VDB

rack, GPS MLA antenna and VDB antenna.

Malaga’s present airport layout showing the

locations of the GBAS related ground equipment
can be seen in Figure 11.

Figure 8. Malaga’s Airport airfield.

 VDB Tx Antenna position
GBAS Reference Receivers positions
GNSS Monitor System (GMS) position
Figure 11. GBAS related ground equipment
locations at Malaga Airport.
Ground Tests Results
In order to check the GBAS signal coverage down
to 12 feet above terrain [3], some ground tests have
been performed using the VDB signal recording
portable platform.
Firstly the portable platform VHF Rx antenna gain
pattern was experimentally characterized to correct
the field strength measurements. The Rx antenna
horizontal pattern obtained from the characterization
process can be observed in Figure 12:
RX Antenna Pattern Diagram
330
0
300
-5
-10
-15
270
240
210
180
Figure 12. VHF Rx portable antenna calibrated
horizontal pattern.
After that, the GBAS signal was measured
throughout the runway and the service roads. Field
strength data and GNSS observables were collected,
corrected and correlated. The SW applications in
charge of acquiring data are the Pegasus Online
Convertor tool for the VHF data and the GPSolution
(Novatel) for the GPS data. To obtain the corrected
GPS position solution, GrafNav (Novatel) SW tool
was applied. To correct the field strength
measurements some Matlab specific routines were
developed.
Figure 13 shows the following sets of data versus
time: the raw field strength as directly measured by
the VHF receiver (in green), the theoretical field
strength estimated by using only free space losses
(in red), the theoretical field strength introducing
losses with multipath (in purple) and the corrected
field strength (in blue) computed by the application
of the correction for cable losses, the factory
characterization of the VHF receiver error and the
calculated Rx antenna gain pattern.
RWY31: Comparison of estimated signal and signal at the antenna input (dBm)
0
-10
-20
-30
Field Strength (dBm)
-40
-50
-60
-70
-80 Free Space
Multipath
-90 Corrected
Measured
-100
399900 399950 400000 400050 400100
Time (s)
Figure 13. Comparison of measured, corrected and
theoretical field strength.
The result of these comparisons are coherent with
30
the expectations, since the free space losses model is
5
only valid for short distances with respect to the
0 60 VDB antenna (right area of the graph) where
multipath effect is negligible. The improved model
is only valid for long distances (left area of the
90
graph) where multipath effect becomes quite
significant.
120
Figure 14 depicts the results of the field strength
150
measurements on both RWY31 and RWY13
revealing a good matching. Figure 15 locates both
sets of data together with the service roads
measurements on Malaga’s Airport image. It was
verified that the measured signal along both
runways and thresholds was good enough and
appropriate for autolanding. The corrected signal
reached a maximum signal of –11 dBm in RWY31
and –13 dBm in RWY13 and a minimum of –61
dBm in RWY31 and –60 dBm in RWY13. These
values are far away from the limits specified in [1]
and [2].
 Field Strength comparison
36.665 36.67 36.675 36.68 36.685

-15

-25
Field Strength (dBm)

-35

-45

-55

-65 Figure 16. Example trajectory of some approaches

Latitude (º) RWY31 RWY13
to RWY31 and a Circular Orbit. CPDGPS position
Figure 14. RWY31 and RWY13 corrected field solution plotted over Malaga airport surroundings.
strength data comparison.

IF

FAP

Figure 17. Approaches to RWY31. Navigation

System Flight Path altitude vs distance to LTP.
Figure 15. Malaga’s Airport GBAS field strength
level at 12 ft above terrain. The analysis of the GBAS positioning performance
of the airborne segment comprises the study of the
Flight Tests Results positioning errors, which will be studied by
analysing the Navigation System Errors, the Flight
The GBAS signal performance and coverage has Technical Errors and the Total System Errors. The
been tested through several flight tests carried out Path Definition Error (PDE) will be normally
with Aena’s GBAS airborne experimental assumed as negligible.
platform. A number of approach procedures to both
thresholds have been flown in addition to several
maneuvers specific to check the signal coverage
volume limits according to [1] and [2].

To compute the flown trajectories or Actual Flight

Paths, GrafNav (Novatel) SW application is used to
compute a CPDGPS position solution. To get the
performances of the Navigation System the Pegasus Figure 18. Definition of positioning error
modules GNSS_Solution and Dynamics are applied components.
to the MMR data recordings. Several tools as
Filewatch, M-File runner and Matlab graphs are The Navigation System Flight Path (NSFP)
used to visualize and analyse the results of the computed by the MMR according to GBAS
processing. received data was very accurate. In fact, the Cross
Track Navigation System Error mean (95% of the
absolute values) was around 0.20 meters and the Up
Track Navigation System Error mean (95% of the Approaches to RWY13 - Cross Track FTE vs Distance to LTP (Final approach segment)
200
absolute values) was around 0.70 meters for the 150 AF01
AF02
approaches to RWY13 and 0.50 meters for the ones 100
AF03

FTE CT (m)
50 AF04
to RWY31. The Total Navigation System Error 0
-50
mean (95%) was lower than 0.75 meters in both -100
procedures. Figure 19 shows the Navigation System -150
-200
Error values for some approaches to RWY13. 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
Distance to LTP (m)
1.6 1.8 2 2.2
4
x 10
Approaches to RWY13 - Up Track FTE vs Distance to LTP (Final approach segment)
200
Approaches to RWY13 - Cross Track NSE vs Distance to LTP 150
2 100
AF01

FTE UP (m)
50
AF02
1 AF03 0
NSE CT (m)

AF04 -50

0 -100
-150
-200
-1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
Distance to LTP (m) x 10
4

-2
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Figure 20. Approaches to RWY13. FTE cross and
Distance to LTP (m) 4
x 10 up track components vs. distance to LTP inside the
Approaches to RWY13 - Up Track NSE vs Distance to LTP
2 final approach segment.
1
The analysis of the GBAS integrity and availability
NSE UT (m)

0
performance covers the study of the Protection
-1 Levels (PL) and Alert Limits (AL) as well as their
interrelation. On this topic, Figures 21 and 22
-2
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 present the Lateral and Vertical Navigation System
Distance to LTP (m) x 10
4

Error (red) together with the Lateral and Vertical

Figure 19. Approaches to RWY13. Navigation Protection Levels (green) and the Lateral and
System Error cross and up track components vs. Vertical Alert Limits (blue) for a set of approaches
distance to LTP. to RWY31.
Regarding the Flight Technical Errors (FTE), from 70
Approach AU01
70
Approach AU03

the Final Approach Point (FAP) on, the Cross Track 60 60

LNSE - LPL - LAL (m)

LNSE - LPL - LAL (m)

FTE remained lower than 100 meters in the majority 50 50

of the approaches. In the complete set of approaches 40 40

30 30
the Cross Track FTE presented a decrease tendency 20 20

with distance, being lower than 50 meters from 10 10 10

kilometres down to the LTP. It is worth mentioning 0

0 5000 10000 15000
0
0 5000 10000 15000
LAL Distance to LTP (m) Distance to LTP (m)
that the Cross Track FTE was negative through all LNSE
LPL
Approach AU04 Approach AU05
the approaches, which could be due to cross-wind 70 70

conditions, a pilots characteristic flight manner 60 60

LNSE - LPL - LAL (m)

LNSE - LPL - LAL (m)

50 50
when facing a procedure, or a navigation system 40 40

offset. In the final approach segment the Up Track 30 30

FTE remained lower than 100 meters for the whole 20 20

set of approaches. Attention must be paid on the fact 10 10

0 0
that, in the majority of the approaches, the error was 0 5000 10000
Distance to LTP (m)
15000 0 5000 10000
Distance to LTP (m)
15000

always positive. This means that the path was flown Figure 21. Approaches to RWY31. Lateral NSE,
at a higher altitude than the guidance, probably LPL and LAL vs. distance to LTP.
because of safety proceedings.
 Approach AU01 Approach AU03
50 45

VNSE - VPL - VAL (m) 40

40
It must be stressed that for all the flight tests

VNSE - VPL - VAL (m)

35

30
30

25
executed up to date, the Navigation System Errors
20
20 have remained well below the Protection Levels,
10
15

10
which means that integrity was provided for the
5
approaches. Moreover, the Protection Levels
0 0

VAL
0 0.5 1
Distance to LTP (m)
1.5
4
x 10
2 0 5000 10000
Distance to LTP (m)
15000
computed by the MMR during the flight tests were
VNSE
VPL
Approach AU04 Approach AU05
always below the Alert Limits, hence assuring the
45 45

40 40
availability in every of the approaches.
VNSE - VPL - VAL (m)

VNSE - VPL - VAL (m)

35 35

30 30

25 25 Regarding GBAS signal coverage, Figure 24

20 20

15 15
represents field strength values collected during
10

5
10

0
0 5000
Distance to LTP (m)
Figure 22. Approaches to RWY31. Vertical NSE,
VPL and VAL vs. distance to LTP.
Likewise concerning the integrity assessment, the
Safety Index parameter represents the ratio between
the navigation system error and the protection level
at the same point. This parameter indicates that
integrity requirements are met when it is below 1.0.
Next figure represents Safety Index values versus
the distance to the LTP for the approa-ches to
5
some approaches to RWY31. The approaches
10000 15000
0
0 5000 10000 15000
intervals are marked in the graph. It can be observed
Distance to LTP (m)
that the values do not reach the minimum value of –
87 dBm (red line in the graph). The four approaches
present comparatively the same boundary values:
maxima around –50 dBm and minima around –80
dBm. The mean values vary from –63 to –68 dBm.
The highest values in the graph correspond to the
instant when the aircraft passed above the ground
station VDB transmitter antenna (yellow and red
samples in the graph).
Approaches to RWY31 - Field Strength vs Time

RWY13 and to RWY31. The lower the Safety Index -5

-10

is, the safer the manoeuvre in terms of integrity -15

-20

margin and misleading information events. -25

-30

-35
Field Strength (dBm)

-40
Approaches to RWY13 - Vertical Safety Index -45
1
-50
AF01
0.8 AF02 -55
NSE UT / VPL

AF03 -60

0.6 AF04 -65

-70

0.4 -75

-80
0.2
-85

-90
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 -95
Distance to LTP (m) x 10
4
287800 288000 288200 288400 288600 288800 289000 289200 289400 289600 289800 290000 290200 290400

Approaches to RWY13 - Lateral Safety Index AU01 AU03 AU04 AU05

1 GPS Time (s)

0.8 Figure 24. Approaches to RWY31. GBAS signal

NSE CT / LPL

0.6 field strength vs. time.

0.4

0.2
Figure 25 represents the field strength values during
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Distance to LTP (m)
3.5 4 4.5 5
4
a circular orbit manoeuvre. This manoeuvre is used
x 10

Approaches to RWY31 - Vertical Safety Index

to check the GBAS signal lower level at the
1
coverage volume limits. The most significant event
Safety Index (NSE UT / VPL)

0.9 AU01
0.8
0.7
AU03
AU04 appears in the middle of the graph, where an interval
0.6 AU05
0.5 of 5.5 minutes contains no data (from 292568 sec. to
0.4
0.3
0.2
292902 sec.). It can be stated that there is a shadow
0.1
0
area where the GBAS signal cannot be reached
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000
Distance to LTP (m) because of the local orography. This event happens
1
Approaches to RWY31 - Lateral Safety Index
in an area where approach procedures are not
Safety Index (NSE CT / LPL)

0.9
0.8 affected (see the orange marked region within
0.7
0.6 Figure 25). Apart from that event, it can be
0.5
0.4
0.3
observed that a few values were below the minimum
0.2
0.1
of –87 dBm (red line in the graph). The rest of the
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 samples present their mean value around -75 dBm.
Distance to LTP (m)

Figure 23. Approaches to RWY13 and to RWY31

respectively. Safety Index vs. distance to LTP.
 Circular Orbit - Field Strength vs Time

-5
Although these experimental curves comply with
-10

-15
(are below) GAD C curve and therefore with CAT I
-20

-25
requirements, a significant improvement will be
-30

-35
achieved with the installation of the new MLA
single component antennas which are integrated
Field Strength (dBm)

-40

-45

-50

-55
within the SLS-4000 ground system. Figure 27
-60

-65
presents the CMC versus elevation curve for these
-70

-75
new antennas and reference receivers (courtesy of
-80

-85 Honeywell) where continuous and lower values are

evinced.
-90

-95

291200 291400 291600 291800 292000 292200 292400 292600 292800 293000 293200 293400 293600 293800

GPS Time (s)

Figure 25. Circular Orbit. GBAS signal field

strength vs. time.

Ground Station Performance Tests Results

Based on the GBAS Reference Receivers

observables, one can perform a pseudorange
accuracy performance analysis of the GBAS
pseudorange corrections. This analysis can be
characterized by a Code-Minus-Carrier (CMC)
evaluation (see [2]). Figure 26 presents the CMC
versus elevation computed for the two components
of the current receiving antennas installed at
Malaga, the MLA and the HZA.
Figure 27. CMC of new MLA single component
antenna versus elevation.
Additionally, the pseudorange corrections accuracy
can be characterized by analyzing the B-values
broadcast by the GBAS ground station (see [2]).
Figure 28 presents a GAD assessment carried out
from collected data in Malaga’s Airport according to
B-values methodology. Figure 29 presents the same
GAD assessment but based on data collected from
the SLS-4000 (courtesy of Honeywell). The
comparison between both graphs makes clear the
improvement achieved for low elevation angles
(from 5º to 40º) in the SLS-4000 new antennas and
RSMUs.

Figure 28. PR_GND estimation and GAD assessment

Figure 26. CMC of MLA and HZA versus elevation. based on real B-values generated by the PSP GS.

Figure 29. PR_GND estimation and GAD assessment
based on real B-values generated by the SLS-4000
GS.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION IN SPAIN
From the start of the GBAS project Aena has been
working within a harmonized initiative coordinated
under the EUROCONTROL Landing and Take-Off
Group (LATO) and the EUROCONTROL and FAA
International GBAS Working Group (IGWG)
umbrella to assure a common strategy for the
Operational Validation of the new GBAS CAT I
systems.
Together with DFS (Germany) at European level
and with ASA and the FAA at International level,
Aena has been the first ANSP with a program for
GBAS operational implementation to be certified in
the short term, playing a leading role through the
work done within the LATO and the IGWG groups.
Once every CAT I technical objective is about to be
reached and after more than ten years from the
beginning, the Aena’s GBAS Programme is close to
its successful completion by the last challenging
step in its way: the Operational Approval.
Since 2004 the European air navigation regulatory
framework has undergone several deep changes due
to the emergence of a new concept: the Single
European Sky (SES). This new scenario stated in
the SES Regulation involves important changes in
every aspect of the air navigation service provision.
Therefore the operational approval of a brand new
navaid as GBAS represents a great challenge, as it
will be the first time for Aena as ANSP and for the
Spanish Civil Aviation Authority (DGAC) to
manage the operational approval of a new air
navigation system within the SES Regulation
framework.
Two main processes can be identified at a high level
within the complete procedure. On one hand Aena is
already certified as an ANSP since December 2006
in accordance with [4]. Nevertheless to provide this
new GBAS service Aena will have to apply for an
extension of its certificate to include this service.
As a consequence of this process to obtain an
“extended certificate” every aspect of the service
provision (maintenance, safety, security, charting,
AIS, etc.) has to be analysed to identify any impact
of the introduction of this new service and to
integrate any change needed to comply with every
requirement included in the SES Regulation. This
process involves the coordination of nearly all the
Departments within Aena which deal with the
aspects of the service provision, entailing a vast
effort at institutional level.
On the other hand, in order to ensure the
interoperability of all the systems in the EATM
network and before the system is put into service,
Aena has to produce an EC Declaration of
Verification of the GBAS ground system
confirming its compliance with the corresponding
requirements specified in [5]. To fulfill this task
Aena has developed its own process by going
further than the Regulation [5] and taking the
chance to design an ambitious process which will be
able to track every system requirement through all
the system lifecycle. This system verification
process considers four different stages related with
the evolution of the system operational
implementation:
- overall design,
- development and integration of the system,
- operational system integration, and
- system maintenance.
This identification of stages aims to ease the
tracking of the compliance with every requirement
at each verification stage where it is applicable. In
addition to that and to give the process a coherent
structure, every stated compliance will be supported
with documentary evidences guaranteeing the aimed
traceability.
As part of the System Verification process and to
cover some of the safety requirements of the system
is worth to point out that Aena has recently started a
Spanish Iono Study in order to validate the iono
threat model which is integrated in the SLS-4000
GS for the Spanish national territory. This is a
pioneer initiative involving the analysis of the GPS
observables from the receivers distributed
throughout the Spanish territory along a solar cycle. Haro, Javier de Andres and Rogelio Roman (Aena’s
This activity will hopefully mean a first step to a Satellite Navigation Division).
European iono assessment.
REFERENCES

[1] ‘Aeronautical Communications. Radio

Navigation Aids’ ICAO Annex 10 Vol. I.
[2] ‘Minimum Operational Performance
Specification for GBAS Ground Equipment to
support CAT I Operations’ EUROCAE ED-
114.
[3] ‘Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation Aids’
ICAO Doc. 8071 Vol. II.
[4] Regulation (EC) No. 550/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 10 March
2004 on the provision of air navigation services
in the single European sky (the service
Figure 30. Spanish territory iono assessment first provision Regulation).
results. [5] Regulation (EC) No. 552/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 10 March
Leaving SES apart and focusing at a national level, 2004 on the interoperability of the European
there are some other activities defined by the Air Traffic Management network (the
Spanish Regulation needed to operationally interoperability Regulation).
implement the GBAS system that Aena is set to
comply with. The reviewing of regulations defining ACRONYMS
air navigation phraseology, obstacle consideration
areas and the definition and approval of the AL: Alert Limit
operational GBAS CAT I procedure are part of the CAT: Category (of precision approach
task to be accomplished. operation)
CMC: Code-Minus-Carrier
Meanwhile, always bearing in mind the operational CPDGPS:Carrier Phase Differential GPS
purpose of this process, Aena is improving its DFS: Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH
cooperation activities with users and stakeholders DGAC: Direccion General de Aviacion Civil
worldwide in order to promote the use of GBAS and (Spanish CAA)
to disseminate its capabilities. The actual interest EASA: European Aviation Safety Agency
and cooperation of Airlines like Air Berlin and EATM: European Air Traffic Management
Thomson are the basis for the future development EC: European Commission
and expansion of GBAS, thus Aena will keep EGNOS: European Geostationary Navigation
improving its effort to gather every support to its Overlay Service
project. FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAP: Final Approach Point
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FAS: Final Approach Segment
Ft: Feet
The authors would like to thank the following FTE: Flight Technical Error
people and organisations that have provided an GBAS: Ground-Based Augmentation System
invaluable support in the preparation and execution GMS: GNSS Monitoring System
of the tests and procedures presented within this GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System
paper: Brian Koosmann, Mark Cady, David Jensen GPS: Global Positioning System
and Dennis Clark (Honeywell), Paco Morales and GS: Ground Station
the rest of the Malaga ATC, Victor Cuevas, Alfredo HZA: High Zenit Antenna
Serrano, Fco. José Morales and Javier Monje HW: Hardware
(Spanish Eastern Sector Radio Navigation Aids ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organisation
Maintenance Department), Miguel A. Sagrado and IF: Intermediate Fix
the Senasa Avionics Maintenance staff jointly with IGWG: International GBAS Working Group
the pilots of the Aena’s experimental aircraft ILS: Instrument Landing System
(Senasa), Miguel A. Sanchez-Rosel and Alberto de JCAB: Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
la Fuente (GMV), as well as Luis Andrada, Pablo LATO: Landing And Take-Off group
LTP Landing Threshold Point SARPS: Standard And Recommended Practices
MLA: Multipath Limiting Antenna SBAS: Satellite-Based Augmentation System
MMR: Multi-Mode Receiver SES: Single European Sky
NSE: Navigation System Error SQM: Signal Quality Monitoring
NSFP: Navigation System Flight Path SW: Software
PL: Protection Level Tx: Transmitter
PSP: Provably Safe Prototype VDB: VHF Data Broadcast
RWY: Runway VHF: Very High Frequency
RFI: Radio Frequency Interference
Rx: Receiver