University of Iowa

Iowa Research Online

Theses and Dissertations

Fall 2015

A historical commentary on Plutarch’s Life of

Demetrius
Thomas Caldwell Rose
University of Iowa

Copyright © 2015 Thomas Caldwell Rose

This dissertation is available at Iowa Research Online: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/5991

Recommended Citation
Rose, Thomas Caldwell. "A historical commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius." PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis, University of
Iowa, 2015.
https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/5991. https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.l3arbfzu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd

Part of the Classics Commons

A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON PLUTARCH’S
LIFE OF DEMETRIUS

by

Thomas Caldwell Rose

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Classics in the
Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

December 2015

Thesis Supervisor: Professor John F. Finamore

 Copyright by

Thomas Caldwell Rose

2015

All Rights Reserved

 Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

____________________________

PH.D. THESIS

_________________

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Thomas Caldwell Rose

has been approved by the Examining Committee for

the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Classics at the December 2015 graduation.

Thesis Committee: ____________________________________________

John F. Finamore, Thesis Supervisor

____________________________________________
Sarah E. Bond

____________________________________________
Paul Dilley

____________________________________________
Craig Gibson

____________________________________________
Peter Green

____________________________________________
Patrick V. Wheatley
 in memoriam
Carin Green

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have incurred far too many obligations since beginning this project some five
years ago to single out all those who offered aid and encouragement. Suffice it to say that
the kindness and generosity of the many scholars, colleagues, and friends whom I
approached with questions and requests for aid was the most heartening aspect of the
project. My greatest debt is to Peter Green, who shepherded the dissertation from its
genesis in his Hellenistic history seminar in 2010. As the work progressed he offered
unflagging support, unerring advice, and much constructive criticism. He gave freely of
that most precious commodity, his time. The benefit and the pleasure that I derived from
our many Demetrian sessions in Peter’s marvelous basement office cannot be overstated.
As the project neared completion his keen editorial eye rescued me from many
embarrassing errors and awkward turns of phrase.

I am grateful to the American School of Classical Studies in Athens for awarding

me two fellowships for study in Greece. My time at the School fundamentally shaped the
nature and scope of the commentary. Margie Miles helped open my eyes to the extent of
Demetrius’ building program and its impact on the built environment of a host of sites in
mainland Greece, while Nancy Bookidis, Charles Williams, and Guy Sanders encouraged
me to explore Demetrius’ enduring and mutually beneficial relationship with Corinth.
Jake Morton was collaborator, sounding board, and intrepid partner in exploration rolled
into one. Kyle Mahoney offered much helpful advice on Peloponnesian festivals and
topography. Yannis Lolos and Molly Richardson gave generously of their time and
expertise. In Iowa, John Finamore graciously stepped in to supervise the committee after
the tragic death of Carin Green. Craig Gibson read the entire manuscript and spotted
many errors and omissions. Chris Pelling, Georgia Tsouvala, and Shane Wallace read
portions of the introduction and made many useful suggestions. Pat Wheatley has been a
most cordial and helpful correspondent, offering encouragement and sage advice over the
course of the last five years. I’m grateful to Tony Papalas for mentoring me and
encouraging me to pursue further graduate study. My parents were wonderfully
supportive and positive—as they have always been—throughout my graduate career.
Finally, I thank my wife Adrienne, who never ceases to amaze and inspire me.

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 ABSTRACT

The Parallel Lives are primarily concerned with exploring various modes of
eudaimonia, as Plutarch mines the lives of illustrious Greeks and Romans for moral
exempla and offers them up to his audience for contemplation and imitation. In contrast
to his usual practice, Plutarch offers the Demetrius and its Roman pair the Antony as
explicitly negative examples. These men, who are “conspicuous for badness,” habitually
engage in behavior this is to be rejected, not imitated. Demetrius is capable of great
virtues, but his life provides a paradigm of how not to live. The ruinous state of
Hellenistic historiography, however, places a historical burden on Plutarch’s moralizing
biography that it was manifestly not designed to bear. Indeed, Plutarch’s Life is the sole
continuous account of Demetrius’ career, and provides the only literary evidence for
many of the events from the Battle of Ipsus in 301 BC to Demetrius’ death in 282 BC.
Despite all this, there is no full-length commentary on the Demetrius in any language.
This thesis represents an attempt to fill that gap. The commentary is not merely a survey
of relevant scholarship, but offers many original contributions to the study of Hellenistic
kingship and ruler-cult, the politics and propaganda of the Successors, and Demetrius’
pivotal role in the remarkable advances in naval technology and siegecraft for which the
period is justly famous. While the body of the commentary firmly grounds Demetrius’
career in the historical context of the early Hellenistic period, the historiographical
introduction illuminates the didactic ethics that shape Plutarch’s biographical project, and
confronts the vexed question of his sources.

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 PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Plutarch of Chaeronea was the author of many biographical and philosophical

works. A man of great piety and patriotism, he lived and worked during the late first and
early second centuries AD, when his native land had long been subject to Roman rule.
Plutarch’s biography of Demetrius, a Macedonian warlord known as Poliorcetes,
“Besieger of Cities,” is one of the principal historical sources for the early Hellenistic
period, the tumultuous decades that followed the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC.
This commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius, drawing on ancient texts, material
culture, and modern scholarship, moves chapter by chapter and offers a detailed
discussion of the many historical, military, political, and intellectual problems of the time.
The commentary is not merely a survey of relevant scholarship, but offers many original
contributions to the study of Hellenistic kingship and ruler-cult, the politics and
propaganda of the Successors, and Demetrius’ pivotal role in the remarkable advances in
naval technology and siegecraft for which the period is justly famous. Demetrius
Poliorcetes was indisputably the most colorful figure and arguably the most visionary
warlord of the Age of Successors, yet the Demetrius chronicles the life of a man
“conspicuous for badness,” in contrast to Plutarch’s usual practice. While the body of the
commentary firmly grounds Demetrius’ career in the historical context of the early
Hellenistic period, the historiographical introduction illuminates the didactic ethics that
shape Plutarch’s biographical project, and confronts the vexed question of his sources.

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 PREFACE

The nature of a commentary results in the creation of a rather elaborate edifice of

citations and internal cross-references: passages in the Demetrius are cited by chapter and
section, without the abbreviated title (e.g. 1.1); the comparison (synkrisis) that concludes
the Demetrius-Antony pair is cited by the abbreviation Comp., plus chapter and section
(e.g. Comp. 1.1); other Parallel Lives are cited by their abbreviated title, chapter, and
section (e.g. Ant. 1.1); passages in the Moralia are cited by the abbreviated title, page
number, and section (e.g. Mor. 111A). A reference to a note in the Commentary is given
by chapter, section, and line (e.g. n. 1.1.1); a reference to the Introduction is given by page
number (e.g. Intro. 1). Secondary works that are cited only once receive a full citation in
the text; secondary works that are cited more than once are indicated by an abbreviated
citation in the text (e.g. Green [1990] 1), and receive a full citation in the Select
Bibliography. I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive bibliography, but cited the
works that seem to me most salient and helpful. The text is the Teubner edition of Konrad
Ziegler (Plutarchi vitae parallelae, vol. 3.1, 2nd edn. Leipzig: 1971).

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1

PLUTARCH’S LIFE OF DEMETRIUS........................................................................68

COMMENTARY........................................................................................................124

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................344

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 INTRODUCTION

I. Demetrius Poliorcetes: A Brief Biography

Demetrius (336–282 B.C.), son of Antigonus, was indisputably the most colorful
figure and arguably the most visionary warlord of the Age of the Diadochi
(“Successors”), an era that lacked neither. His pioneering contributions to the
development of siege warfare earned him the sobriquet Poliorcetes, “Besieger of Cities”
(ns. 25.7.5, 42.10.3). Demetrius was born in lowland Macedonia, probably at Pella, in
336, the same year that Alexander succeeded his father Philip as king of the Macedonians
(n. 5.2.2). When Alexander launched his invasion of Asia in 334, Antigonus commanded
the allied Greek infantry (n. 2.1.1). The following year Alexander installed Antigonus as
satrap of Phrygia, and his family seems to have joined him there shortly thereafter (n.
2.1.1). Demetrius thus spent most of his childhood in his father’s satrapal seat at
Celaenae (n. 6.5.4). Antigonus, together with his family and friends, fled to Europe in the
chaos that followed Alexander’s death in 323 (n. 2.1.1), but he soon emerged as perhaps
the most formidable of Alexander’s would-be successors. He was named governor of
Asia at the conference of Triparadisus in Syria in 320 (n. 2.1.1), and arranged for
Demetrius to marry Phila (n. 14.2.5), eldest daughter of the regent Antipater, shortly
thereafter. Marriage alliances and polygamy were standard practices at the time, and this
was the first of at least five politically motivated marriages for Demetrius, the most
prolific bridegroom among the Diadochi (ns. 14.1.2, 25.2.4, 32.6.2, 40.7.1, 46.5.1).

The young Demetrius served as a cavalry commander in his father’s army during
the campaign against Eumenes in the winter of 317/6, contributing to the victories at
Paraetacene and Gabiene (n. 5.2.2). The defeat of Eumenes saw Antigonus at the apex of
his power: his military and financial resources and the extent of the territory he controlled
dwarfed those of any of his individual rivals (n. 2.2.1). But Antigonus’ preponderance of
power and manifest ambition were sufficient to provoke an alliance of his rivals, a
recurring scenario in the period.

In the ensuing conflict between Antigonus and the alliance of Lysimachus,

Ptolemy, and Cassander, the so-called Third Diadoch War (315–11), Demetrius was
granted his first independent commands. He was decisively defeated by Ptolemy and

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Seleucus at Gaza late in 312 (ns. V: The Battle of Gaza–5.6.3), but managed to reverse
most of his losses the next year when he surprised and routed a Ptolemaic army in Syria
(n. 6.3.1). In late 311 a peace treaty brought an end to the Third Diadoch War (n. 7.4.2).
Demetrius subsequently campaigned against the Nabataean Arabs (n. 7.1.1), and staged a
brief and largely inconsequential invasion of Babylonia (ns. 7.3.1–7.4.4). His movements
in the period 310–08 are very poorly documented—we hear only of successful operations
against Ptolemaic forces in Cilicia and at Halicarnassus, where he thwarted Ptolemy’s
attempt to seize the city (n. 7.5.1).

The relief of Halicarnassus is evidence of the Antigonid policy of actively

supporting the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities, a key component of Antigonid
propaganda from the lead-up to the Third Diadoch War until well after the death of
Antigonus in 301. Antigonus recognized both the propaganda value of posing as the
champion of Greek freedom and the necessity of securing the goodwill and cooperation
of the Greek poleis. In 315, he decreed that all the Greek cities be free, autonomous, and
ungarrisoned, and promptly dispatched messengers to spread the word far and wide.
Whether Antigonus’ proclamation was purely a calculated nod to political expediency or
in some measure motivated by a sincere commitment to Greek freedom is debatable; but
it was a propaganda masterstroke met with enthusiasm in the Greek cities, where
autonomy was nothing less than a defining principle, and a source of embarrassment for
Antigonus’ rivals, particularly Cassander, whose many garrisons in mainland Greece
openly trampled that autonomy. The reaction of the Greek beneficiaries of Antigonus’
policy was immediate and effusive. A decree of c.311 explicitly links divine honors
granted Antigonus by the citizens of Scepsis in the Troad with his efforts in support of
the freedom of the Greeks (n. 8.1.2).

In the spring of 307 Demetrius sailed from Ephesus with a large fleet and orders
to liberate Athens, where Cassander maintained a garrison that propped up the regime of
his puppet ruler, Demetrius of Phalerum (8.4.3). Demetrius seized Piraeus by a brilliant
naval stratagem, allowed Demetrius of Phalerum to withdraw to Thebes unharmed,
ejected Cassander’s garrison, and razed the Macedonian fortress on Munychia hill, a
hated symbol of foreign occupation (ns. 8.1–5, 10.1.2). The jubilant Athenians responded

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by voting Antigonus and Demetrius a host of signal honors, many of them divine in
nature, including the establishment of a cult of the Antigonid “Saviors” (n. 10.4.1). The
awarding of these divine honors marked a pivotal moment in both the development of
Hellenistic ruler-cult and Demetrius’ own divine self-fashioning (ns. 11.1.3, 12.1.2,
12.2.3, 23.5.1). Over the next two decades Demetrius was granted further divine honors
in Athens and elsewhere, culminating in the notorious ithyphallic hymn with which he
was greeted when he entered the city in 290 (ns. 12.1.2, 13.1.3, 40.8.1).

Demetrius’ first Athenian sojourn ended in 306 when he departed to campaign in

Cyprus. There he achieved his greatest military success, a smashing victory over Ptolemy
in a naval battle off Salamis. The victory ushered in a period of Antigonid thalassocracy
(n. 16.3.1), and the superiority of Demetrius’ large warships prompted a naval arms race
that persisted for several decades, resulting in the construction of colossal vessels of
unprecedented size (ns. XV–XVI: The Battle of Salamis, 20.7.2, 43.5.1, 43.5.4). The
victory at Salamis also provided the basis for the first assumption of the Macedonian
royal title outside of the Argead house: Antigonus arrogated the title for himself and
subsequently conferred it on his son. Ptolemy, Cassander, Seleucus, and Lysimachus
soon followed suit (n. XVIII: The Assumption of the Kingship).

In the immediate aftermath of this coronation, Antigonus attempted to destroy

Ptolemy once and for all, organizing a massive, amphibious invasion of Egypt in which
Demetrius led the naval contingent (n. 19.1.3). The Antigonid invasion force was plagued
by foul weather at sea and the determined resistance of Ptolemy’s forces on land, and
Antigonus opted to abort the expedition before it collapsed under its own weight (n.
19.3.1). Antigonid prestige suffered another setback in 304 when Demetrius failed to take
Rhodes, despite the construction of an awe-inspiring array of siege equipment and an epic
assault lasting more than a year (ns. XXI–XXII: The Siege of Rhodes–22.).

From Rhodes Demetrius sailed to relieve Athens, which was in danger of falling
once more into the hands of Cassander (n. 23.1.1). He landed in Boeotia, pursued
Cassander beyond Thermopylae, and routed him at Heracleia (ns. 23.2–3). He then
returned to Athens and took up residence in the rear chamber of the Parthenon, where he

  3  
passed a proverbially dissolute winter (304/3) in the company of the notorious Lamia (ns.
16.5.2–16.6.3), and other well-known hetairai (ns. 23.5–24.2).

Demetrius’ personal excesses and his penchant for intervening in the internal
affairs of the city led to a political schism in Athens. One faction who viewed Demetrius’
growing influence as a threat to Athenian freedom clashed with another that regarded
Demetrius as the guarantor of that freedom (n. 24.7.2). With his actions in 303,
Demetrius provided ammunition for both sides.

Early in that year he launched an amphibious invasion of the Peloponnesus aimed

at liberating the southern Greek cities from the garrisons of Cassander and Ptolemy. The
campaign was a smashing success and Demetrius achieved his major strategic objectives
in a few short months (ns. 25.1–4). Not only did he display his mastery of the art of
siegecraft, but also demonstrated enthusiasm for building, fortifying, and adorning cities:
Sicyon was relocated, rebuilt, and reborn as Demetrias (n. 25.3.1). Demetrius also
initiated a close and abiding relationship with the Corinthians, and Corinth benefited
repeatedly from his euergetism over the next two decades (n. 31.2.2). In the spring of 303
Demetrius returned briefly to Attica, where he was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries
in a ceremony staged exclusively for his benefit (ns. 26.1.1). The initiation, which was
carried out in record time and out of season, should probably be seen as both part and
parcel of Demetrius’ program of divine assimilation (n. 12.1.2) and an attempt to
establish his Hellenic bona fides as he rallied support for an alliance of Greek states
under Antigonid leadership (ns. 26.1.1, 26.2.1); nevertheless, his actions intensified the
anxiety of those in Athens who feared the institutionalization of the royal will in the
assembly. These fears led to open conflict between the pro- and anti-Antigonid factions,
in which the Antigonid collaborator Stratocles emerged triumphant, while Demochares,
Demetrius’ most vocal and prominent critic, was exiled (ns. 24.7.2, 24.10.3).

Demetrius returned to the Peloponnese, where he married Deidameia, sister of

Pyrrhus of Epirus (n. 25.2.4), and presided over the Argive Heraia and, probably, the
Nemean Games (n. 25.2.1). The following spring he achieved a major diplomatic
triumph: the Hellenic League was formally reconstituted at the Isthmian Games under the
dual hegemony of Demetrius and Antigonus (n. 25.4.1). The rapid expansion of

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Antigonid influence in Greece alarmed Cassander, who attempted to open negotiations
with Antigonus but was summarily rebuffed. This was enough to prompt the revival of
the anti-Antigonid alliance, as Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus agreed to converge on
Antigonus, who was occupied with the foundation of a new capital, Antigoneia, in Syria
(n. 28.2.1). Lysimachus initiated hostilities in 302, moving against the cities of Propontis,
Aeolis, and Ionia (n. 28.2.3).

Meanwhile, Demetrius was able to harness the considerable military potential of

the League for the continuing war with Cassander. In 302 he moved into Thessaly at the
head of a massive army that included 25,000 allied Greek hoplites. Demetrius
outmaneuvered Cassander and was on the point of delivering the coup de grâce when he
received an urgent summons from Antigonus, who had failed to force a decisive
engagement with Lysimachus in central Anatolia, and was threatened by the approach of
armies under Ptolemy and Seleucus (ns. 28.2.1, 28.2.3).

Demetrius patched up a hasty truce with Cassander and departed for Ephesus. He
recovered much of the coastal territory lost to Lysimachus and secured the Hellespont
and the Bosporus before entering winter quarters late in 302 (n. 28.2.3). The following
spring Demetrius and Antigonus combined their forces, but could not prevent
Lysimachus and Seleucus from doing the same. The two armies met at Ipsus in Phrygia
in the summer of 301 (n. 29.4.1). There the allies managed to exploit both the tactical
conservatism of Antigonus and Demetrius’ recklessness as a cavalry commander (ns.
29.4.2, 29.5.1). The result was a crushing defeat for the Antigonids. Antigonus, who was
in his eighties, was killed, while Demetrius managed to escape with only a small force (n.
30.2.1). Lysimachus and Seleucus divided the bulk of Antigonus’ Asian empire between
them (n. 30.1.1); Ptolemy fared even better: he annexed Coele Syria and avoided the
battle altogether (n. 31.5.4).

Demetrius was left with his considerable talents and his navy. He managed to
hold together a patchwork kingdom of port cities, most notably Cypriote Salamis, Sidon,
Tyre, Ephesus, Miletus, and Corinth (n. 30.2.5). Opportunistic raids in the region of the
Hellespont enriched Demetrius at Lysimachus’ expense (n. 31.2.5), but it was the
collapse of the Ipsus alliance that led to his full recovery. Growing tension between

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Ptolemy and Seleucus over Coele Syria led the latter to seek a marriage alliance with
Demetrius in 299. Amid great fanfare at Rhossus in Syria (n. 32.2.2), Seleucus married
Demetrius’ daughter Stratonice, and turned a blind eye when Demetrius first raided the
treasury at Cyinda, and then seized Cilicia from Cassander’s brother Pleistarchus (ns.
31.6.3, 32.1.1).

Demetrius spend the next three years in Cilicia, devoting much of his energy to
the expansion of his already formidable naval power. The shipyards of his maritime
empire hummed with activity, as did the mints at Ephesus, Tarsus, Tyre, and Cypriote
Salamis. It was in this period that coins depicting Demetrius with the bull horns of
Dionysus were first issued, the earliest certain numismatic evidence for the deification of
a living ruler (n. 30.2.5). A more prolific issue featured a winged Nike alighting on the
prow of a ship on the obverse, and a striding Poseidon brandishing a trident on the
reverse. These coins evoked the victory at Salamis, emphasized the king’s manifold
divine associations, and advertised his continuing potency at sea (n. 17.1.4).

In 296 Demetrius returned to mainland Greece, but lost most of his Aegean fleet
in a storm off the Attic coast, and suffered a serious injury in a subsequent campaign in
the Peloponnesus. He recovered, however, and assembled a new fleet of no less than 300
ships, drawn primarily from his naval stations in Cyprus. This fleet allowed Demetrius to
re-establish himself on the Greek mainland, but fatally weakened his positions in Cyprus,
Asia Minor, and Phoenicia (n. 33.2.3). By 294 nearly all of his eastern possessions were
lost to either Lysimachus or Ptolemy (n. 35.5.2).

A successful naval blockade of Athens, which had fallen under the sway of the
tyrant Lachares (n. 33.1.4), led to the surrender of that city in the spring of 295 (n.
34.1.1). Demetrius demonstrated his flair for the dramatic by addressing the Athenians
from the stage of the Theater of Dionysus, almost certainly on one of the days normally
devoted to the theatrical competitions of the City Dionysia (n. 34.4.2). He declared
himself reconciled with the Athenians, and restored the city’s democratic institutions.
The democratic restoration was celebrated with a sweeping reform of the calendar that
enabled each of the Athenian tribes to hold an abbreviated prytany in the last few months
of the year (n. 34.1.1). But the reform was revealed as an empty propaganda ploy when

  6  
Demetrius installed garrisons in Piraeus and on the Hill of the Muses in the Athenian asty
(ns. 34.7.1–2), effectively signaling the end of his commitment, however nominal, to the
freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities.

Demetrius subsequently campaigned in the Peloponnesus, twice defeating Spartan

armies (ns. 35.1–2). In 294 he intervened in Macedonia at the behest of Alexander, the
son of Cassander, who had been locked in a bitter succession dispute with his brother
Antipater since the death of their father in 297 (n. 36.1.3). Demetrius had Alexander
killed and was himself acclaimed as king by the Macedonians (ns. 36.12.6, 37.2.1).
Macedonia gave Demetrius the contiguous territorial base he had lacked since Ipsus, and
the abundant human and natural resources of his new kingdom emboldened him to adopt
the centralist ambitions of his father for his own (n. 35.5.2). Demetrius’ reign as king of
Macedonia was marked by frenzied activity across the length and breadth of the Balkan
peninsula. He founded Demetrias at a strategic site on the Gulf of Pagasae in Thessaly (n.
39.1.1), put down twin revolts in Boeotia (ns. 39.2.3, 40.2.4–40.6.1), and invaded Thrace
after Lysimachus was captured by a barbarian king (n. 39.6.3). Proximity fueled a
growing rivalry with his former protégé and brother in law Pyrrhus, the ambitious king of
neighboring Epirus. Demetrius furthered the deterioration of their relationship when he
accepted a marriage proposal from Lanassa, who happened to be Pyrrhus’ wife, and
deprived Pyrrhus of Corcyra in the process (n. 40.7.1). In 290 Demetrius held the Pythian
Games in Athens after the Aetolians occupied the environs of Delphi (n. 40.8.2). The
following year he launched a sacred war against the Aetolians and raided Epirus. The
campaign secured free access to the Delphic sanctuary for all Greeks (n. 43.3.2), but
Pyrrhus defeated an army led by one of Demetrius’ subordinates in Aetolia (ns. 41.3).
When Demetrius fell seriously ill, Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia, but was driven back (ns.
43.1–2). The two kings then came to terms and Demetrius—recovering once again—
began preparations for an invasion of Asia aimed at reconstituting the empire of his
father, and perhaps of Alexander.

The scope of Demetrius’ irredentist ambitions and the scale of his preparations
provoked a predictable response from his rivals, though Demetrius seems not to have
anticipated it (n. 44.3.1). In 288, Lysimachus and Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia

  7  
simultaneously from East and West, and a Ptolemaic fleet moved into the Aegean.
Demetrius moved first against Lysimachus, then changed tack and confronted Pyrrhus
near Beroea (ns. 44.4–6). The presence of several hostile armies and the effectiveness of
Pyrrhus’ propaganda efforts led Demetrius’ troops to defect in large numbers to the
Epirote king (n. 44.7.6). Growing disenchantment with Demetrius’ luxurious lifestyle and
inaccessibility may also have played a role in the mass desertions (ns. 42.1–2). Demetrius
fled to Cassandreia in the Chersonese, where Phila committed suicide (n. 45.1.2). Pyrrhus
and Lysimachus partitioned and occupied Macedonia (n. 44.10.5).

Demetrius fell back to central Greece where he attempted to rally his remaining
forces and allies (n. 45.2.1). Corinth remained loyal but the Athenians revolted in the
spring of 287 and expelled Demetrius’ garrison from the asty (n. 46.2.1). Demetrius
invested Athens once more, but was persuaded to lift the siege after negotiating in turn
with representatives of Ptolemy and Pyrrhus (n. 46.4.1). In the spring of 286 Demetrius
finally launched his Asian expedition, but on a much more modest scale than originally
intended (n. 46.4.2).

The campaign was initially a success, as many of the Carian and Ionian cities
came over to Demetrius (n. 46.6.1, 46.6.3). But this success was largely the product of
the absence of Lysimachus, who was embroiled in a dispute with Pyrrhus over control of
Macedonia. When the two feuding monarchs came to terms, Lysimachus was free to
dispatch an army under his son Agathocles to deal with Demetrius. The arrival of
Agathocles seems to have surprised Demetrius (n. 46.7.1). Cut off from his fleet and
harried by Agathocles’ pursuing army, he fled into central Anatolia. Famine and disease
soon took a serious toll on Demetrius’ army, and he limped over the Taurus range and
into Cilicia with his remaining forces in the autumn of 286 (n. 47.2.1).

Demetrius entered negotiations with Seleucus, and his force was permitted to
winter in Seleucid territory (48.1.2). The situation soon soured, however, leading to
clashes on both sides of the Amanus range in 285 (ns. 48.2.2–49.5.3). Reduced to
desperate straits, Demetrius surrendered to Seleucus and spent the remaining three years
of his life in hospitable captivity in Syria (n. 50.7.3). His son Antigonus Gonatas escorted
Demetrius’ remains to Demetrias in Thessaly for burial (ns. 52.5.3, 52.7.2). Gonatas

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claimed the Macedonian throne in his own right in 277, and Antigonid kings reigned in
Macedon until the Roman conquest in 168 (n. 53.9.3).

II. Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius

The foregoing summary of Demetrius’ career draws on literary, epigraphic,

numismatic, and archaeological evidence, but it could scarcely have been written without
Plutarch, who devoted one of his Parallel Lives to the Besieger of Cities. His biography
is the sole continuous account of Demetrius’ career, and provides the only literary
evidence for many of the events from the Battle of Ipsus in 301 to Demetrius’ death in
282. But Plutarch was not writing history, and the ruinous state of Hellenistic
historiography places a historical burden on Plutarch’s biography of Demetrius that it was
manifestly not designed to bear.

The Parallel Lives are primarily concerned with exploring various modes of
eudaimonia, as Plutarch mines the lives of illustrious Greeks and Romans for moral
exempla and offers them up to his audience for contemplation and imitation. He is more
interested in illuminating the character of his subjects than in providing a continuous
account of historical events, particularly when his readers can find such a narrative
elsewhere.1 In his formal and programmatic prologue to the Alexander-Caesar, Plutarch
famously claims to write biography, not history, and argues that a chance remark or jest
often illuminates character more profoundly and tellingly than descriptions of momentous
historical events:

οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφοµεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι
πάντως ἔνεστι δήλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγµα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆµα
καὶ παιδιά τις ἔµφασιν ἤθους ἐποίησε µᾶλλον ἢ µάχαι µυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ
µέγισται καὶπολιορκίαι πόλεων. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ζῳγράφοι τὰς ὁµοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ
προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἰδῶν οἷς ἐµφαίνεται τὸ ἦθος ἀναλαµβάνουσιν,
ἐλάχιστα τῶν λοιπῶν µερῶν φροντίζοντες, οὕτως ἡµῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
σηµεῖα µᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἑκάστου βίον, ἐάσαντας
ἑτέροις τὰ µεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας.
For I am writing Lives not history, and the truth is that the most brilliant exploits often
tell us nothing of the virtues or vices of the men who performed them, while on the other
                                                                                                                       
1
See the preface to the Nicias-Crassus (1.5) where Plutarch justifies his summary treatment of
Nikias’ deeds by referring to the existing, and definitive, accounts of Thucydides and Philistus. In
the Fabius, Plutarch contrasts his own approach with that of “those who have written detailed
histories” (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν οἱ τὰς διεξοδικὰς γράψαντες ἱστορίας ἀπηγγέλκασι, 16.6).

  9  
hand a chance remark or a joke may reveal far more of a man’s character than battles
where thousands die, huge troop deployments, or the sieges of cities. When a painter sets
out to create a likeness, he relies above all upon the face and the expression of the eyes
and pays little attention to the other parts of the body: in the same way, it is my task to
dwell upon those details which illuminate the workings of the soul, and to use these to
create a portrait of each man’s life, leaving to others their great exploits and battles (Alex.
1.2–3, trans. Scott-Kilvert, adapted).
Timothy Duff has warned of the dangers inherent in elevating this passage into a
general statement illustrating Plutarch’s views on the generic differences between history
and biography, pointing out that Plutarch’s biographical program encompasses a variety
of approaches, some of which closely resemble historiography.2 But if the programmatic
statement in the prologue of the Alexander-Caesar does not apply equally well to all of
Plutarch’s biographies, the Demetrius does follow this program quite closely.3 The great
campaigns of Gaza, Salamis, Egypt, Rhodes, and Ipsus are disposed of with cursory
descriptions, perhaps because both Duris of Samos and Hieronymus of Cardia, an
eyewitness to many of the pivotal events in Demetrius’ career, had already dealt with
them at length.4 Important historical episodes, even entire campaigns, are omitted, and
chronological precision is hardly a priority.5 Indeed, the radical compression of events
can create illusions of proximity and causation, and Plutarch sometimes departs without
warning from his generally diachronic narrative and presents his material thematically.
Much of the Demetrius is devoted to anecdotal material, and witty remarks and revealing
sayings abound.6 But the Demetrius and its Roman pair, the Life of Antony, depart from
the program of the Alexander, and indeed from Plutarch’s biographical project in general,
in a fundamental way: these men, who were “conspicuous for badness” (ἐπιφανῶν εἰς

                                                                                                                       
2
Duff (1999) 17–20. Wardman (1) argues that the Lives, while “obviously not historians’ history,
are to be regarded as an offshoot of ancient historiography”; cf. Hamilton XXXVIII; Pelling
(1988) 11–12; id. “Truth and Fiction in Plutarch’s Lives,” in D.A. Russell (ed.) Antonine
Literature [Oxford: 1990] 19–52, reprinted in Pelling [2002] 143–170.
3
As does its Roman pair, the Antony (Pelling [1988] 12). On the Antony, see below 19–29.
4
On Duris, Hieronymus, and the sources for the Demetrius see Intro. 40–56.
5
ns. 4.2.1, 10.4.1, 7.5.1, 15.2.3, 26.1.1, 28.2.1, 30.2.5, 31.5.6, 48.1.2.
6
On Plutarch’s use of “off-duty” anecdotes to reveal character see Duff (1999) 15. The technique
goes back at least to Xenophon (Sym. 1.1): Ἀλλ' ἐµοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν
ἔργα οὐ µόνον τὰ µετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόµενα ἀξιοµνηµόνευτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς
παιδιαῖς.

  10  
κακίαν, 1.5), habitually engage in behavior this is to be rejected, not imitated. Demetrius
is capable of great virtues, but his life provides a paradigm of how not to live.7

If Plutarch wrote a formal preface to the Parallel Lives as a whole, it has not
survived. Each of the twenty-two extant pairs, however, contains a preface, of which
thirteen are “formal” prologues in which Plutarch names both the subjects of the pair and
justifies his decision to compare them.8 These prologues are of extraordinary value for
the light they shed on the nature of Plutarch’s audience, the author’s expectations of his
readers, and, perhaps most importantly, their illustration of the ethical and pedagogical
aims of the Lives.9 In the prologue to the Aemilius-Timoleon (Aem. 1.1–4), Plutarch
establishes the moral improvement of the reader as a primary goal of his biographical
project:

Ἐµοὶ [µὲν] τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι µὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι' ἑτέρους, ἐπιµένειν δὲ καὶ
φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι' ἐµαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώµενον ἁµῶς γέ
πως κοσµεῖν καὶ ἀφοµοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀλλ' ἢ
συνδιαιτήσει καὶ συµβιώσει τὸ γινόµενον ἔοικεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἐπιξενούµενον ἕκαστον
αὐτῶν ἐν µέρει διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑποδεχόµενοι καὶ παραλαµβάνοντες ἀναθεωρῶµεν
“ὅσσος ἔην οἷός τε,” τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων
λαµβάνοντες. “φεῦ φεῦ, τί τούτου χάρµα µεῖζον ἂν λάβοις” <καὶ> πρὸς
ἐπανόρθωσιν ἠθῶν ἐνεργότερον;10
“I began the writing of my Lives for the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the
work and delighting in it now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and
endeavoring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues
therein depicted. The experience is like nothing so much as spending time in their
                                                                                                                       
7
Demetrius and Antony are hardly Plutarch’s only morally suspect subjects. Other pairs,
including the Coriolanus-Alcibiades, the Nicias-Crassus, the Lysander-Sulla, and the Pyrrhus-
Marius feature a great deal of negative material, but none are explicitly characterized as negative
examples. On Plutarch’s morally challenging Lives, see Duff (1999) 60–65, 313–14.
8
The distinction between “formal” and “informal” prefaces in the Lives was first drawn by
Stadter (1988, 276) who notes that the informal prefaces fail to name and justify both subjects of
the pair, focusing instead on standard biographical topoi such as the genealogy, education, or
physical appearance of a single subject. Duff (2011, 217–18) does not find this categorization
particularly helpful, instead emphasizing the differences between prologues that introduce a
Plutarchan “book,” or pair of Lives, and opening sections that introduce individual Lives whether
they are preceded by a prologue or not. I follow Duff in referring to introductions to pairs as
prologues, and introductions to individual Lives as prefaces.
9
On the nature of the Plutarchan preface see esp. Stadter (1988); cf. T.G. Rosenmayer,
“Beginnings in Plutarch’s Lives,” in F.M. Dunn and T. Cole (eds.) Beginnings in Classical
Literature, Cambridge (1992) 205–30; Duff (2008a); id. (2011b) esp. 216–222.
10
On this passage see Duff (1999) 30–34. The citations are from Homer (Il. 24.630) and
Sophocles (F 579).

  11  
company and living with them, when I receive and welcome each subject of my history in
turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe carefully “his stature and his qualities,” and
select from his career what is most important and most beautiful to know. ‘And oh! what
greater joy can one find that this,’ and more effective for moral improvement.” (trans.
Waterfield, adapted)
Thus, Plutarch establishes the expectation that his reader will, as he himself has done,
gaze into the “mirror of history” (ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ) and examine the virtues of each
his subjects, “taking from his deeds the most important and most beautiful to know” (τὰ
κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων λαµβάνοντες), a process
that is both pleasurable and useful “for the improvement of character” (πρὸς
ἐπανόρθωσιν ἠθῶν).

The prologue to the Pericles-Fabius reveals that the ideal reader will achieve
moral improvement not just by contemplating the virtues of Plutarch’s subjects, but also
by actively imitating them.11 Plutarch differentiates the art of virtue (ἀρετή)12 from the
other arts, arguing that the products of the former encourage both admiration and
imitation while those of the latter, such as poetry, music, and sculpture, excite only
admiration. By employing reason, the reader can seek out that that which is useful and
worthy of imitation, such as the virtuous deeds of others (Per. 1.2–4).

The Demetrius-Antony prologue, almost certainly composed after the Pericles-

Fabius pair,13 contains the standard elements of the formal preface, but offers a revision
of the moral program of the Lives. The primary role of reason and the notion that virtue is
an art are present here,14 but the Lives of Demetrius and Antony are explicitly identified
as negative examples meant to discourage imitation, and thus occupy a unique position in

                                                                                                                       
11
On the practical application of history’s mirror, see also Mor. 85a–b where Plutarch advocates
for a sort of “what would Epaminondas do?” method of moral orientation. On Plutarch’s ideal
reader, see esp. P. Stadter, “The Rhetoric of Virtue in Plutarch’s Lives,” in L. Van der Stockt
(ed.) Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch (Louvain: 2000) 493–510; D. Konstan, “‘The
Birth of the Reader’: Plutarch as a Literary Critic,” Scholia 13 (2004) 3–27; Duff (2004); id.
(2011a).
12
The conception of virtue as an art is Platonic; see J. Gould, The Development of Plato’s Ethics
(Cambridge: 1955) 3–46.
13
On the order of composition of the Lives, see Jones (1966) 66–68.
14
Duff (2004) 273.

  12  
Plutarch’s biographical project.15 The inclusion of this singular pair is all the more
striking given Plutarch’s endorsement, also in the Pericles (13.16), of the notion that
authors who write about low-life subjects are themselves of suspect character.16 Plutarch
justifies the decision to insert “bad and blameworthy” (φαύλων καὶ ψεγοµένων, 1.6)
examples into his “models of lives” (τὰ παραδείγµατα τῶν βίων, 1.5) through a rather
elaborate series of analogies and vignettes illustrating the pedagogical value of negative
examples. Musicians and physicians examine bad examples in order to produce their
opposites, and “the most perfect of the arts, self-control (σωφροσύνη), justice
(δικαιοσύνη), and wisdom (φρόνησις), proceed from the ability not only to distinguish
what is good and just and helpful, but also what is harmful, disgraceful, and unjust” (1.4).
Just as the Spartans compelled helots to guzzle great quantities of unmixed wine
(ἄκρατον) and then paraded them in the dining halls of their young men as an object
lesson in the dangers of inebriation (1.5), Plutarch trots out Demetrius and Antony, “men
who behaved recklessly and were conspicuous for badness in the power they wielded and
in their great undertakings,”17 to illustrate the hazards of a lack of self-restraint
(ἀκρασία).18 True moral maturity, then, can only be achieved by an understanding of
both virtue and vice.19 With this established, Plutarch reveals that Demetrius and Antony
are worthy subjects since their lives offer vivid confirmation of Plato’s contention that
great natures exhibit both great virtues and great vices (κακίας µεγάλας ὥσπερ ἀρετὰς

                                                                                                                       
15
Plutarch actually speaks of composing “one or two pairs” (συζυγίαν µίαν ἢ δύο, 1.5) as
negative examples, but evidently decided that the Demetrius-Antony pair was sufficient. We
know for certain of only one pair that has been lost—the Epaminondas-Scipio—and Plutarch’s
treatment of these two men, the great Boeotian hero Epaminondas in particular, was almost
certainly encomiastic. He at least intended to write biographies of Metellus and Leonidas, but it is
most unlikely that either of these would have been “negative.”
16
The association of an author’s choice of material with his own character is made most
explicitly by Aristotle (Poetics 1448B), but can be seen already in passages of Aristophanes,
particularly Frogs 830–1481. On these passages see F. Muecke, “A Portrait of the Artist as a
Young Woman,” CQ 32 (1982) 51–53; cf. Duff (1999) 56; Dillon (forthcoming) 3.
17
τῶν δὲ κεχρηµένων ἀσκεπτότερον αὑτοῖς καὶ γεγονότων ἐν ἐξουσίαις καὶ πράγµασι
µεγάλοις ἐπιφανῶν εἰς κακίαν, 1.5.
18
Akrasia is identified as the common failing of Demetrius and Antony in the concluding
synkrisis (Comp. 4.6); cf. the akrasia Demetrius exhibits in his ill-timed assignation with
Cratesipolis (9.7); on akrasia as a defining characteristic in the pair, see Lamberton 131–33.
19
Duff (2004) 275.

  13  
αἱ µεγάλαι φύσεις ἐκφέρουσι, 1.7),20 but their setbacks ultimately outweighed their
successes, and both ended their lives as failures.

The Demetrius details its subject’s wild oscillations of fortune, his triumphs and
disasters, but the characterization is a relatively straightforward portrait of sudden decline
from a promising beginning. As we might expect from such a cautionary tale, the rhetoric
of praise and blame is prominent throughout. Plutarch’s Demetrius is a man of
extraordinary gifts, but his gifts are perverted by incessant flattery and excessive honors,
and he ultimately applies his considerable talents to ends that are anything but virtuous:
luxury, spectacular display, and his perpetual and insatiable desire for conquest, be it
sexual or martial.

Early chapters detail the young man’s charisma and extraordinary physical
beauty, his devotion to his father (φιλοπάτωρ, 3.1) and friends (φιλέταιρον, 4.1), his
natural humanity (φιλάνθρωπον φύσει, 4.1). But the “in the beginning” (ἐν ἀρχῇ, 4.1)
that qualifies this litany of early virtues is ominous, as is the revelation that Demetrius
assiduously emulated Dionysus and was “the most dissolute of the kings when he had
leisure for drinking and luxurious living” (σχολάζων τε περὶ πότους καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ
διαίτας ἁβροβιώτατος βασιλέων, 2.3). His debut as a military commander at Gaza is a
disaster, but Plutarch has warm praise for his resilience in adversity (5.6), a quality that is
emphasized throughout the Life, and his subsequent campaign to liberate the Greek poleis
from the garrisons imposed on them by Cassander and Ptolemy (8.1–2).

Demetrius’ liberation of Athens and his rapturous reception in the city is the first
of many episodes in Plutarch’s richly detailed portrait of Demetrius’ tumultuous
relationship with the Athenians. The naval stratagem that wins him Piraeus and the
successful assault on the fortress of Munychia are illustrative of his martial qualities (8.3–
9.2), while his kindly treatment of Demetrius of Phalerum (9.3) is but one of many acts of
clemency to defeated foes.21 But Demetrius does not respond well to the honors that he
receives from the Athenians, who hail him as king and savior god. The deleterious effects
                                                                                                                       
20
Plutarch probably refers to Rep. 491B-495B, where it is argued that men of extraordinary
potential were capable of achieving greatness, if they received the proper education, or wreaking
havoc, if they do not (see Intro. 29, 36–37; n. 1.7.2).
21
6.4, 17.1, 34.5, 39.4.3–4, 40.6.1–3).

  14  
of the divine honors in particular receive special emphasis and rhetorical amplification.
To highlight the damage, Plutarch groups together honors that Demetrius received over a
nearly twenty year period, giving the impression that all were granted in response to the
liberation of the city in 307 (10.3–13). Comparison with other literary and epigraphic
evidence reveals that Plutarch’s litany of honors contains anachronisms, exaggerations,
and perhaps outright inventions (ns. 10.4.1, 10.4.2, 12.2.1). We cannot be certain if these
are Plutarch’s embroideries or those of his sources, but his readiness to accept that the
gods themselves actively disapproved of the ritual innovations allowing Demetrius to be
honored in divine fashion (ἐπεσήµηνε δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις τὸ θεῖον, 12.3) follows
naturally from his own priestly status and instinctive abhorrence for the modification or,
as he saw it, perversion of traditional ritual.22 Demetrius is naturally receptive to these
flatteries, but Plutarch apportions equal blame to the Athenians who propose them: “by
such absurd flattery of the man they destroyed his mind, which even before was not
entirely sound” (οὕτω καταµωκώµενοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, προσδιέφθειραν αὐτόν, οὐδ'
ἄλλως ὑγιαίνοντα τὴν διάνοιαν, 13.3).

This sweeping judgment is a fitting conclusion to Plutarch’s thematic summary of

the divine honors accorded Demetrius over the course of two decades, but it is, prima
facie, strangely premature in the historical context. Indeed, when Plutarch returns to the
chronological narrative it is to describe Demetrius’ “fair and brilliant victory” (λαµπρὰν
καὶ καλὴν τὴν νίκην) over Ptolemy at Salamis, and Demetrius’ “consideration and
humanity” (εὐγνωµοσύνῃ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ, 17.1) after the battle come in for special
praise. But this is a last gasp of virtue—Demetrius never demonstrates these qualities
again. When Demetrius seizes on the victory at Salamis to assume the royal title, the
transformation from promising youth to corrupt autocrat is already complete.

                                                                                                                       
22
For Plutarch’s stance on traditional ritual see Mor. 756A-B, where Plutarch’s father assumes
the persona of Tiresias in Euripides’ Bacchae and suggests that the whole religious foundation
and basis for piety is undermined if its security and traditional authority are threatened or
disturbed on a single point (ἐὰν ἐφ' ἑνὸς ταράττηται καὶ σαλεύηται τὸ βέβαιον αὐτῆς καὶ
νενοµισµένον, ἐπισφαλὴς γίνεται πᾶσι καὶ ὕποπτος); cf. Marc. 5.7; on Plutarch’s religious
conservatism, see Wardman 89; Lamberton 56 characterizes Plutarch’s religious orientation as
“not so much traditional piety as pious traditionalism”; cf. Kuhn 280–81; on Plutarch’s priesthood
at Delphi, see n. 40.7.1.

  15  
 The remaining historical narrative consists of a steady alternation of successes
and failures, and the key term µεταβολή appears with remarkable frequency.23 But
Demetrius’ accomplishments, which Plutarch tends to minimize,24 are no longer met with
praise, while his weaknesses draw harsh criticism. The invasion of Egypt (19.1–3), the
siege of Rhodes, and Demetrius’ second campaign of Greek liberation are all disposed of
summarily and with little interest in historical detail. Instead Plutarch focuses on
Demetrius’ scandalous behavior and growing depravity, tracing the king’s moral decline
in his deteriorating relationship with the Athenians. In the heart of the Life, the better part
of five chapters (23–27) is given over to a detailed description of Demetrius’ shameful
behavior in late 304 and early 303. From this point on the moralism grows increasingly
strident. Plutarch generally avoids direct authorial commentary in the Lives, preferring
instead to allow the reader to judge what is commendable and what is not,25 but he
explicitly and repeatedly denounces Demetrius. The king, who “ought to have shown
Athena some respect” (24.1),26 instead hosts orgies in the Parthenon. Plutarch
characterizes this behavior with the charged term ὕβρις, and snidely concludes: “he
abused so many free-born youths and Athenian women, and so filled the acropolis with
his outrages, that the place was considered to be unusually pure when his partners in
debauchery were Chrysis, Lamia, Demo, and Anticyra, those well-known prostitutes”
(24.1–2).27 The account of these crimes is followed by the story, almost certainly
apocryphal (n. 24.2.2), of Democles, an Athenian youth who hurls himself into a
cauldron of boiling water rather than submit to the king’s lecherous advances (24.2–6).
The gruesome suicide is cast in heroic terms, and Plutarch declares that “it would be
wrong to pass over the ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη of Democles” (24.2), a pronouncement
that carries all the more weight since these qualities are among the virtues identified as

                                                                                                                       
23
18.7, 30.4, 32.7, 35.4, 37.3, 41.8, 47.6, 48.4, 49.5.
24
ns. 8.5.3, 16.3.1, 25.1.4, 28.2.3.
25
C. Pelling, “The Moralism of Plutarch’s Lives,” in D. Innes, H. Hine, and C. Pelling (eds.),
Ethics and Rhetoric. Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday (Oxford:
1995), 205–220; P. Stadter, “The Rhetoric of Virtue in Plutarch’s Lives,” in L. Van der Stockt
(ed.), Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch (Louvain-Namur: 2000), 495–510; Duff (2011a).
26
τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτῷ προσῆκον εἰ δι' ἄλλο µηδὲν ὥς γε πρεσβυτέραν ἀδελφὴν αἰσχύνεσθαι.
27
τοσαύτην ὕβριν εἰς παῖδας ἐλευθέρους καὶ γυναῖκας ἀστὰς κατεσκέδασε τῆς ἀκροπόλεως,
ὥστε δοκεῖν τότε µάλιστα καθαρεύειν τὸν τόπον, ὅτε Χρυσίδι καὶ Λαµίᾳ καὶ Δηµοῖ καὶ
Ἀντικύρᾳ ταῖς πόρναις ἐκείναις συνακολασταίνοι.

  16  
“the most perfect of all the arts” (πασῶν τελεώταται τεχνῶν, 1.4) in the prologue.28
The praise of Democles is followed by more censure of Demetrius: his highly irregular
initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries is “unprecedented and unlawful” (τοῦτο δ' οὐ
θεµιτὸν ἦν οὐδὲ γεγονὸς πρότερον, 26.2); his extortion of funds from the Athenians (or
perhaps the Thessalians: Plutarch’s sources are at odds, n. 27.1.1) to finance the shopping
sprees of his hetairai is perhaps the worst of “the many lawless and shocking things done
by Demetrius in the city at this time” (27.1).29 It is telling that this litany of crimes
immediately precedes Plutarch’s account of the disaster at Ipsus, although that defeat is
attributed to Demetrius’ rash and ill-timed cavalry charge (29.4, n. 29.4.3), and is not
explicitly linked with his scandalous behavior.

After Ipsus and the death of Antigonus the fluctuations of Demetrius’ career are
presented more as the products of fortune’s whims than the consequences of his own
actions, or those of his rivals. As he struggles to recover after Ipsus, Seleucus’ offer of a
marriage alliance is “an unexpected stroke of good fortune.” He returns to mainland
Greece, takes Athens by siege, and is on the verge of an unprecedented feat—the capture
of Sparta—when he receives word that most of his Asian possessions have fallen to
Ptolemy and Lysimachus. In typical fashion, Plutarch makes no attempt to situate these
events in a broader historical context; instead, this synchronization is cited as evidence of
the power of τύχη over Demetrius: “But no other king seems to have undergone such
huge and sudden reversals of fortune; and in the career of no other does fortune seem to
have been so often transformed, from obscurity to renown, from triumph to humiliation
and from abasement to the heights of power” (35.3).30 Plutarch subsequently offers
quotations from Aeschylus (35.4), Archilochus (35.6), and Sophocles (45.3) as further
confirmation of the primacy of fortune.

                                                                                                                       
28
τὴν δὲ Δηµοκλέους ἀρετὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἄξιόν ἐστι µὴ παρελθεῖν; on Demetrius’ failure
to display these virtues, see below 28–29.
29
Πολλῶν δὲ γενοµένων ἐν τῇ πόλει τότε πληµµεληµάτων καὶ παρανοµηµάτων…
30
Ἀλλ' ἡ τύχη περὶ οὐδένα τῶν βασιλέων ἔοικεν οὕτως τροπὰς λαβεῖν µεγάλας καὶ
ταχείας, οὐδ' ἐν ἑτέροις πράγµασι τοσαυτάκις µικρὰ καὶ πάλιν µεγάλη, καὶ ταπεινὴµὲν ἐκ
λαµπρᾶς, ἰσχυρὰ δ' αὖθις ἐκ φαύλης γενέσθαι.

  17  
 The criticism grows harsher after Demetrius manages to seize the Macedonian
throne and seeks to use it as a launching pad to further conquest. A series of anecdotes
illustrate the offensiveness of his luxurious lifestyle, his inaccessibility, and his utter lack
of interest in the administration of justice (42.1–8). This last is particularly galling for
Plutarch, who enlists Timotheus, Pindar, and Homer to demonstrate that the pursuit of
justice is in fact the most kingly of enterprises (42.8–10), and condemns Demetrius for
reveling in the epithet “Besieger of Cities” rather than “City-Protector” (Πολιεύς) or
“City-Defender” (Πολιοῦχος, 42.10). Demetrius’ “great nature” has been channeled for
evil ends: “It is through such an attitude that naked power, if it lacks wisdom, allows evil
actions to usurp the place of good, and glorious achievements to be associated with
injustice” (42.11).31

Just as the insistence on the power of τύχη impedes an understanding of the

historical forces that shaped Demetrius’ career, the overt moralism and persistent
denunciation work against complex characterization. There is in fact very little
psychological interest in Demetrius, and Plutarch does not suggest that Demetrius really
struggles against the vices that will ultimately destroy him.32 Demetrius himself is largely
silent: the Life is liberally spiced with witty remarks and revealing sayings, but these are
almost always put into the mouths of others. We hear most often from the elder
Antigonus, who is ever ready with a joke or a clever adaptation of a passage from the
tragic poets (3.2, 14.3, 17.6, 19.6–8, 23.6, 28.10), but the philosopher Stilpo (9.10), the
poet Philippides (12.9), Seleucus and the physician Erasistratus (38.6–8), Demochares
(24.10), Antigonus Gonatas (40.3), even the hetaira Mania (27.10), all display their wit
and wisdom in direct speech. Demetrius is humorless,33 and his occasional, laconic
remarks—“See how many presents she gives me”(“ὁρᾷς ὅσα µοι Λάµια πέµπει;”
27.10); “Kill the one who follows me” (“κόπτε τὸν ἑπόµενον,” 36.12); “What do you
mean? Have the Spartans sent one envoy?” (“τί σὺ λέγεις; ἕνα Λακεδαιµόνιοι

                                                                                                                       
31
οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑπὸ δυνάµεως ἀµαθοῦς ἐπελθὸν συνῳκείωσε
τῇ δόξῃ τὴν ἀδικίαν.
32
Pelling (1988) 25; Duff (2012) 400–01; Beneker 168 n. 37.
33
Demetrius’ one attempt at wit in the Life, an insult of Lysimachus’ wife, is rendered in indirect
speech (n. 25.9.1). This despite the testimony of Phylarchus, who twice notes that Demetrius was
“laughter-loving” (φιλόγελως: FGrH 81 F 12, 14 = Athen. 14.614E, 6.261B).

  18  
πρεσβευτὴν ἔπεµψαν;” 42.3)—reveal little. In exchanges, he almost invariably is left
speechless, out-Laconicized by the Spartans (42.3), shamed into a brief period of
industriousness by the remonstrations of an elderly subject (42.7), and outwitted by
philosophers and prostitutes alike (9.10, 27.10). This silence, like Demetrius’ singular
vulnerability to the whims of fortune, suggests a certain lack of agency. The sense that he
is simply going through the motions, adopting in turn the roles of dutiful son, divine king,
and world conqueror, but finding contentment in none, is amplified by the repeated
comparison of Demetrius to a tragic actor.34 Plutarch’s Demetrius cannot carve out an
authentic life for himself; he is a cipher, albeit a spectacular one, to whom things
happen.35 Like the heroes of tragedy, Demetrius descends into ὕβρις; like them, he is
undone by forces he cannot control. It is only after Demetrius is captured and settles into
the routine of indolence and gluttony that consumes his final years that Plutarch pauses to
consider the workings of his subject’s mind: “Perhaps he had come to the conclusion that
this was the kind of life he had really desired all along but had missed through folly and
empty ambition.”36 It is only at the end that Plutarch’s Demetrius stops to wonder if his
grand designs and ceaseless campaigning were worth the consequent suffering, for
himself and for so many others (52.3–4). By then it is far too late.

As the first Life in a pair designed to provide examples that ought not be followed,
Plutarch’s biography of the brilliant, flawed Demetrius, a man whose talents are
ultimately undermined by his personal excesses and inability to find contentment,
establishes indices of success and failure that are then exploited far more elaborately in
the Antony.37 The Demetrius sets a baseline of behavior, both admirable and execrable,
from which Plutarch begins his account of Antony’s life.38 In constructing the Demetrius
as an anticipatory document, Plutarch has given us Demetrius the salutary example; the
historical figure remains comparatively elusive.

                                                                                                                       
34
See below 29–40.
35
Pelling (1988) 24.
36
εἴτε συγγνοὺς ἑαυτῷ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν βίον, ὃν ἔκπαλαι ποθῶν καὶ διώκων ἄλλως ὑπ'
ἀνοίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ἐπλάζετο…52.3.
37
Pelling (1988) 22.
38
Beneker 168; cf. Wheatley (2014) 100.

  19  
 III. Comparison: Demetrius and Antony

Plutarch pairs Demetrius with Marcus Antonius (83–30), better known to

posterity as Mark Antony thanks to Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, based in large
part on Plutarch. Antony proved an able cavalry commander in Syria, Egypt, and Judaea
before joining the army of Julius Caesar in Gaul in 54. After Caesar’s assassination
Antony concentrated power in his own hands, but his predominance was soon challenged
by Caesar’s heir Octavian. The two reconciled and united to destroy the army of Caesar’s
assassins in Greece. The treaty of Brundisium essentially divided the empire between
Octavian and Antony, with the latter assuming control over all the provinces east of
Scodra, in Illyria. Antony settled in Antioch, where he undertook a re-organization of the
eastern provinces and resumed his love affair with Cleopatra, last of the Ptolemaic rulers
of Egypt. The deterioration of Antony’s relationship with Octavian led to civil war in 31,
and Antony was routed in a naval battle off the promontory of Actium in western Greece
that same year. Antony and Cleopatra escaped to Egypt, where they both committed
suicide after Alexandria fell to Octavian in 30.

The Antony, among of the longest and arguably the best of Plutarch’s Lives, is one
of six biographies set in the final years of the Roman republic that Plutarch seems to have
prepared simultaneously.39 In all but one case (Nicias-Crassus) the Greek pairs of these
Lives are figures active in the fourth and early third centuries—Agesilaus, Dion, Phocion,
Alexander, and Demetrius. The pairings neatly illustrate Plutarch’s research interests at
the time,40 and indicate that he detected resonant symmetries between late Republican
Rome and Greece of the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods. For these six pairs, it
seems that Plutarch began with the Roman subject and then chose the Greek to match.41

Plutarch establishes the shared characteristics that led him to pair the two Lives at
the close of the formal preface (1.8): Demetrius and Antony are “lovers of sex and drink,

                                                                                                                       
39
The others are Pompey, Cato Minor, Crassus, Caesar, Brutus. On their simultaneous
composition, see Pelling (1979) 75–83; Duff (1999) 249; Geiger (2014) 301.
40
Pelling (1979) 83.
41
This is unusual. Generally it is not possible to know with any certainty which Life was chosen
first or how Plutarch went about the process of pairing. On the choice and pairing of subjects see
Ziegler (1951) coll. 898–99; J. Geiger, “Plutarch’s Parallel Lives: The Choice of Heroes,”
Hermes 109 (1981) 85–104; Duff (1999) 249.

  20  
they are soldierly, munificent, extravagant, and hybristic” (ἐρωτικοὶ ποτικοὶ
στρατιωτικοὶ µεγαλόδωροι πολυτελεῖς ὑβρισταί); both displayed noteworthy
fortitude in enduring changes of fortune; both ultimately met ignoble ends. But Plutarch
is painting with a broad brush here. Over the course of both Lives he enriches this rather
crude litany of shared traits and points of contact by highlighting parallel experiences
with parallel language and deploying recurrent imagery.42

The emphatic placement of ἐρωτικοὶ and ποτικοὶ suggests that, for Plutarch,
Demetrius and Antony most strongly resemble one another in their pleasure addiction,
and this is duly borne out in each Life. Demetrius exhibits no restraint in consorting with
hetairai and free-born women alike, and “in this respect he had the worst reputation of all
the rulers of his time” (µάλιστα δὴ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τότε
βασιλέων, 14.4). Antony’s drunkenness, his oppressive extravagance, and his cavorting
with women provoke disgust (βδελυττοµένων αὐτοῦ µέθας ἀώρους καὶ δαπάνας
ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ κυλινδήσεις ἐν γυναίοις, 9.5), and he earns a foul reputation for consorting
with other men’s wives (κακῶς ἐπὶ γυναιξὶν ἀλλοτρίαις ἤκουε, Ant. 6.6). In their
choice of venue for these debauches, both men intensify the offensiveness of their
behavior. Antony acquires the house of Pompey, a man renowned for his self-control (ἐπὶ
σωφροσύνῃ …θαυµασθέντος, Ant. 21.2), and the generals and ambassadors that
frequented Pompey’s halls are outrageously ejected (ὠθουµένοις πρὸς ὕβριν ἀπὸ τῶν
θυρῶν, Ant. 21.3) in favor of mimes, jugglers, and drunken flatterers. Demetrius does
Antony one better, taking up residence in the rear chamber of the Parthenon with his
stable of prostitutes and filling the acropolis with countless outrages against free boys and
women of the city (τοσαύτην ὕβριν εἰς παῖδας ἐλευθέρους καὶ γυναῖκας ἀστὰς
κατεσκέδασε τῆς ἀκροπόλεως, 24.1). Still, Antigonus is willing to overlook Demetrius’
private excesses because his son is so effective in time of war (ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολέµοις,
19.6), just as Caesar ignores accusations leveled at Antony after his protégé proves a

                                                                                                                       
42
In the Cimon (3.3), Plutarch acknowledges this technique of elaborating a crude initial
presentation of parallelism in the succeeding narratives: “We pass over perhaps some additional
similarities, but it will not be difficult to collect them from the narrative itself” (παραλείποµεν δ'
ἴσως καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς ὁµοιότητας, ἃς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἐκ τῆς διηγήσεως αὐτῆς συναγαγεῖν).

  21  
courageous and energetic leader during the war (πρὸς δὲ τὸν πόλεµον, Ant. 7.1) in
Spain.

The similarities of Demetrius and Antony are also readily apparent in their
political careers. The support of demagogues leads to honors and offices for both men,
but in each case the aid proves harmful to their character. Stratocles is the driving force
behind a series of unprecedented honors the Athenians grant Demetrius (11.1), and these
honors render Demetrius “odious and obnoxious” (ἐπαχθῆ καὶ βαρὺν, 10.2). Curio
secures Antony’s election as tribune and augur (5.2), but in his subsequent conduct,
Antony is odious (ἐπαχθής, Ant. 6.5) to everyone but his troops. Neither man possesses
any patience for the tedium of administrative duties. Demetrius keeps an embassy waiting
for two years (42.2), and callously hurls petitions into a river in full view of his subjects
(42.5), while Antony proves too lazy and foul-tempered to pay attention to the pleas of
injured parties or listen to petitioners (Ant. 6.6), and it is largely his fault that the rule of
the second triumvirate proves odious to so many (Ἦν δὲ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ Ῥωµαίοις
ἐπαχθὴς ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχή, Ant. 21.1).

The comparison accounts in part for Plutarch’s choice of material. The

proverbially close relationship between Demetrius and Antigonus (3.1–3.3) probably
explains the prominence accorded Antony’s relationship with his father (Ant. 1.1–1.3).43
Plutarch includes an account of Phila’s apparently inconsequential diplomatic mission to
her brother Cassander (32.4) in anticipation of Octavia’s highly successful negotiations
with Octavian (Ant. 35.2–3). In like fashion, Plutarch chooses to give a relatively detailed
account of Antony’s siege of Samosta in Commagene (Ant. 32.4–7)—in which he rejects
a generous initial offer, subsequently fails to take the city, and is forced to accept less
favorable terms—because of the episode’s striking similarity to Demetrius’ futile siege of
Rhodes (21–22), a far more important event.

Maritime imagery and elaborate descriptions of remarkable ships also feature

prominently in both Lives.44 Demetrius takes Piraeus by a brilliantly executed naval
assault and proclaims the restoration of Athenian liberty from the deck of his flagship
                                                                                                                       
43
Pelling (1988) 22.
44
Pelling (1988) 22.

  22  
(8.4–7); the following year he utterly destroys Ptolemy’s fleet off Cyprus (16.1–4).
Despite their unprecedented size, Demetrius’ ships lack neither beauty nor fighting
capability (43.5–7), and his fleets are a source of wonder even for his enemies (20.7).
Plutarch concludes the Life with a lavish description of the sumptuously appointed
funeral barge that formed the centerpiece of Demetrius’ memorial service at Corinth.45
The Corinthians line the beaches in mourning as Antigonus departs with his father’s
purple-draped funerary urn, the rowers timing their stroke to the penetrating tones of a
famous auletes, the splashing of the oars a kind of lamentation (53.5). Another royal
barge is the focus of the first of the maritime scenes in the Antony—Cleopatra’s arrival in
Tarsus. Plutarch’s description is even more detailed, but the language and imagery
strongly evoke the Corinthian scene in the Demetrius. Cleopatra’s ship flies sails of
purple, the rowers wield silver oars in time with the blended tones of the aulos, syrinx,
and kithara, and the denizens of Tarsus stream out to the riverbank to marvel at its
progress (Ant. 26.1–5).46 These echoes of Demetrius’ funerary scene presage Antony’s
own demise: it is Antony’s consuming passion for Cleopatra that destroys whatever
qualities he still retains (Ant. 25.1), and it is the meeting at Tarsus that awakens that
passion. This unforgettable maritime scene is followed by a host of others,47 though none
are quite so richly evocative. The sequence of maritime tableaux invites the reader to
juxtapose the final, and richly ironical defeat of each subject. Demetrius, whose strength
was largely based on naval power, is forced ever inland and endures terrible suffering
before surrendering to Seleucus in Syria, although he hopes to the last to reach his fleet at
Caunus (49.5). Antony, on the other hand, foolishly insists on fighting at sea despite the
clear superiority of his land army (Ant. 62.1–2, 63.5). After the crushing defeat at Actium
he lies prone on the prow of his flagship in misery and disbelief (Ant. 67.4).

The language and imagery of the theatre is pervasive enough in the Demetrius to
warrant fuller treatment,48 but it is also prominent in the Antony, if less insistently so.49 At

                                                                                                                       
45
On this remarkable ship, see n. 53.2.3.
46
On Cleopatra’s royal barge, see Pelling (1988) 186–88; Thompson (2013); cf. Shakespeare’s
Antony and Cleopatra 2.2.195–223.
47
Ant. 32, 35.5, 56.1, 61.1.
48
See below, 29–40.
49
Pelling (1988) 21–22.

  23  
the close of the Demetrius, Plutarch suggests that the theatricality defining the Demetrius
will continue in the Antony, and that Antony will meet an equally tragic end: “now that
the Macedonian drama is complete, let us introduce the Roman one” (Διηγωνισµένου δὲ
τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ δράµατος, ὥρα τὸ Ῥωµαϊκὸν ἐπεισαγαγεῖν, 53.10). Antony is
popular in Alexandria, where the citizens joke that he “wears his tragic mask for the
Romans, but his comic mask for them” (τῷ τραγικῷ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωµαίους χρῆται
προσώπῳ, τῷ δὲ κωµικῷ πρὸς αὐτούς, Ant. 29.4); a Roman military formation, the
testudo, has a “theatrical appearance” (ὄψιν τε θεατρικὴν παρέχει, Ant. 45.4); when
Antony lavishes lands and titles on Cleopatra and their children, the gifts are seen as
“tragic and arrogant and anti-Roman” (τραγικὴν καὶ ὑπερήφανον καὶ µισορρώµαιον
φανεῖσαν, Ant. 54.5). In the midst of a civil war, Antony and Cleopatra organize a
mammoth festival on Samos, and “while all the world around was filled with groans and
lamentations, a single island for many days resounded with flutes and stringed
instruments; theatres were filled, and choruses competed” (Ant. 56.8–9).50 We know from
the Demetrius that such theatrical excess signals impending disaster, but Plutarch
emphasizes the point in his litany of portents preceding the Actium campaign: the image
of Dionysus tumbles from the Athenian acropolis into the theatre (Ant. 60.4).51 The
theatrical language persists until the very end of the pair, as Plutarch has Antony “lead
himself off” (ἑαυτὸν ἐξήγαγεν, Comp. 6.4) at the close of the concluding synkrisis.52

The recurrent imagery and the manifold points of contact occur with such
regularity that it is difficult to imagine that Plutarch did not intend his readers to notice

                                                                                                                       
50
καὶ τῆς ἐν κύκλῳ σχεδὸν ἁπάσης οἰκουµένης περιθρηνουµένης καὶ περιστεναζοµένης, µία
νῆσος ἐφ' ἡµέρας πολλὰς κατηυλεῖτο καὶ κατεψάλλετο, πληρουµένων θεάτρων καὶ χορῶν
ἀγωνιζοµένων.
51
Note too that it is a “hurricane” (θύελλα, Ant. 60.6) that dislodges the image of Dionysus; the
same term he uses for the freak wind that tears the peplos emblazoned with the images of
Demetrius and Antigonus (ἐρράγη θυέλλης, 12.4).
52
The language Plutarch employs to introduce (ἐπεισαγαγεῖν) and lead off (ἐξήγαγεν) Antony
is reminiscent of a passage from the Table Talk with even more explicitly tragic coloring. In a
discussion of remarkable chronological correspondences it is noted that, according to the
historian Timaeus, Euripides died on the very day that the tyrant Dionysius I was born: “fortune,
as Timaeus said, was leading off an imitator of tragic suffering and introducing an enactor of
them” (τύχης, ὡς Τίµαιος ἔφη, τὸν µιµητὴν ἐξαγούσης τῶν τραγικῶν παθῶν καὶ τὸν
ἀγωνιστὴν ἐπεισαγούσης, Mor. 717C = Timaeus FrGH 334 F 105).

  24  
them,53 even if they are not always emphasized. In a few instances the symmetry seems
overdetermined. Demetrius’ relationship with the hetaira Lamia is well documented,54
but Plutarch magnifies the degree of control she exercises over Demetrius, describing it
in evocative and unusually muscular language, in anticipation of Cleopatra’s singular
potency.55 Before summarily dismissing Lamia from the narrative,56 Plutarch relates her
reaction to the judicial decision of a rather obscure pharaoh (27.11). The anecdote sits
strangely in its context, but by concluding his treatment of Lamia in this way Plutarch
leaves her, in a sense, in Egypt. The strained symmetry extends also to the historical
narratives of the pair. Plutarch probably exaggerates the extent of the suffering endured
by Demetrius and his men during their Anatolian katabasis (46.8–47.2) to emphasize the
parallel with the disastrous retreat that followed Antony’s failed Parthian invasion (Ant.
45.7–12),57 and it is more than suspicious that the two assemble armies of identical size
and composition for their final campaigns (43.3–4; Ant. 61.1–2).58 But Plutarch does not
overly indulge the impulse to distortion inherent in pairing biographies,59 and at several
points he bypasses opportunities to underscore symmetry in order to further individual
characterization.

For all his emphasis on the deleterious effects of divine honors on Demetrius’
character, Plutarch does not really highlight his well-documented program of divine self-
fashioning, and divine imitation is far more characteristic of Plutarch’s Antony.60 There
are frequent references to Antony’s emulation of Heracles and Dionysus and Cleopatra’s
imitation of Isis and Aphrodite (Ant. 4.1–3, 24.4–5, 26.2, 26.5, 36.7, 54.9, 60.3–5; cf.

                                                                                                                       
53
Pelling (1988, 23) is less certain on this count.
54
ns. 16.5.2, 16.6.1, 16.6.3, 24.1.6, 25.9.1, 27.1.1, 27.3.1, 27.3.3, 27.4.1, 27.7.1, 27.8.3.
55
λαβοῦσα τὸν Δηµήτριον, ἐκράτησε τῇ χάριτι καὶ κατέσχεν, n. 16.6.2; τῆς Λαµίας
ἀναφανδὸν ἤδη κρατούσης, 19.6; cf. n. 27.1.3.
56
“So much for Lamia” (ταῦτα µὲν οὖν περὶ Λαµίας, 27.14).
57
Demetrius’ loses 8,000 men in total (47.1); 8,000 of Antony’s men perish in snowstorms (Ant.
51.1). Cf. Ant. 45.8 where Plutarch’s description of the inflated prices paid for wheat and barley
in Antony’s camp recalls the extraordinary price of commodities in Athens during Demetrius’
siege in 295 (33.6).
58
Demetrius: 98,000 infantry (the figure is given as 100,000 in the Pyrrhus [10.5]), 12,000
cavalry, 500 warships; Antony: 100,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, 500 warships.
59
On this impulse, see Erskine (2014).
60
For Demetrius’ program of divine self-fashioning, see ns. 2.3.6, 12.2.3, 13.1.3, 52.5.2; on the
different treatment of divine imitation in the two lives, see Pelling (1988) 23, 123–24.

  25  
Pelling Antony 123–24), but Plutarch entirely omits what is probably the most notorious
instance of divine assimilation in the early Hellenistic period, the ithyphallic hymn with
which the Athenians greeted Demetrius when he entered the city in 290.61 Nor does he
mention that both Demetrius’ wife, Phila, and Lamia, his favorite courtesan, were
assimilated to Aphrodite and honored with temples in Attica.62 Indeed, Plutarch’s
willingness to sacrifice symmetry in the service of individual character development is
most evident in his treatment of Demetrius’ and Antony’s varying relationships with the
Athenians. During his time in Athens Antony is presented as a model philhellene,
restrained and unpretentious.63 His behavior contrasts strongly with his Alexandrian
excesses (Ant. 28–29). But Plutarch is dissembling to suit his narrative. During a sojourn
in Athens in the winter of 39/38, Antony reputedly engaged in all manner of excess and
publicly emphasized his identification with Dionysus.64 According to Socrates of Rhodes
(BNJ 192 F 2 = Athen. 4.148B-C), Antony had a sort of Dionysiac clubhouse constructed
over the Theatre of Dionysus in which he and his friends drank away the morning hours.
The structure was designed to resemble the caves of the Bacchic mysteries and adorned
with the attributes of Dionysus. The Athenians hailed Antony as “The New Dionysus”
(Θεὸς Νέος Διόνυσος) and the Panathenaia was evidently renamed the Panathenaia and
Antonieia (IG II2 1043 ll. 23–24), a perfect analogue for the earlier renaming of the
Dionysia in honor of Demetrius (τὰ Διονύσια µετωνόµασαν Δηµήτρια, 12.2; n.
12.2.3). Plutarch could draw attention to these similarities, but chooses not to. For
Plutarch, Athens and her flatterers encourage Demetrius’ worst excesses,65 but it is
Alexandria and Cleopatra, the supreme master of flattery in all its manifold forms (Ant.
29.1), that bring down Antony.66

                                                                                                                       
61
The omission is almost certainly not one of ignorance. Duris of Samos, an important source for
Plutarch’s early Hellenistic Lives, preserves the actual text of the hymn (on the hymn, see ns.
13.1.3, 40.8.1; on Duris see x)
62
Athen. 6.253A; 6.254A; 6.255C; ns. 14.2.5, 16.6.3, 38.2.2.
63
Pelling (1988) 208.
64
Plutarch is very well informed about Antony’s sojourns in Athens and was surely familiar with
this tradition.
65
See below, 36–39.
66
The flatteries of the Athenians utterly corrupt Demetrius (προσδιέφθειραν αὐτόν, 13.3), just as
Cleopatra destroys and corrupts (ἠφάνισε καὶ προσδιέφθειρεν, Ant. 25.1) Antony.

  26  
 As we have seen, the initial presentation of the similarities of the subjects in the
preface is elaborated and expanded, often implicitly, in each Life. The comparative
epilogue (synkrisis) that concludes the pair is largely devoted to their differences.67
Plutarch’s synkriseis are generally disappointing,68 and the Comparison of Demetrius and
Antony is no exception. The moral pronouncements and the presentation of events often
fail to harmonize with the Lives themselves.69 The tone is trivial, the moralizing is ham-
fisted,70 and there is none of the sensitivity and subtlety that mark the portrayals of
Demetrius’ decline or Antony’s internal struggle and eventual failure.71 Antony is more
to be admired since he had the courage to pursue Caesar’s power, while Demetrius
inherited his (Comp. 1.1–2); Demetrius’ will to power is blameless, as he sought to reign
over men accustomed to subjection, while Antony’s attempts to enslave the Roman
people are deemed harsh and tyrannical because, oddly, they followed so quickly on the
heels of Caesar’s supremacy (Comp. 2.1); Demetrius is applauded for his support for
Greek liberty, while Antony’s greatest victory came at the expense of the liberators of
Rome (Comp. 2.2–3); Demetrius was more generous and magnanimous in victory (Comp.
2.5); Demetrius’ many marriages were in accord with Macedonian practice, while
Antony’s marriage to Cleopatra resulted in the greatest of evils (Comp. 4.1). Demetrius
fares rather better in these initial evaluations, but the focus soon shifts to culpability as
the outrages of the pair are ordered in terms of their relative severity. Both were known
for their lascivious lifestyles, but Demetrius’ crimes were amplified by sacrilege
(ἀσέβηµα, Comp. 4.3), particularly his penchant for cavorting with whores in the
Parthenon itself. In his excesses, Demetrius harmed others while Antony harmed only
                                                                                                                       
67
A comparative epilogue (synkrisis) survives for all but four of the twenty-two pairs.
68
On Plutarch’s synkriseis see F. Focke, “Synkrisis,” Hermes 58 (1923) 327–68; C. Pelling,
“Synkrisis in Plutarch’s Lives,” in F.E. Brenk and I. Gallo (eds.), Miscellanea Plutarchea, Ferrara
(1986) 83–96 (reprinted with Postscript in Pelling [2002] 349–64); Duff (1999) 249–86; id.
(2011b); D. Larmour, “The Synkrisis,” in M. Beck (ed.) A Companion to Plutarch (Chichester,
West Sussex: 2014) 405–16.
69
In the Demetrius-Antony there is considerable dissonance between the synkrisis and the
preceding narratives: Plutarch’s assertion that Demetrius’ liaisons were harmless (Comp. 3.1–3)
is at odds with his account of the meeting of Demetrius and Cratesipolis (ns. 9.5.2, 9.7.1); the
account of Antony’s death at Ant. 77.7 would hardly seem to merit the censure Plutarch hands
down in the synkrisis (Comp. 6.3; Pelling [1988] 20).
70
Russell 142; but note Pelling’s ([1988] 19) percipient observation that “most generations have
found such direct moralism less embarrassing than our own.”
71
Pelling (1988) 19–20.

  27  
himself. Demetrius also behaved cruelly in his relentless pursuit of pleasure, most notably
in his execrable treatment of Democles, “the most beautiful and self-controlled of the
Athenians” (τὸν κάλλιστον καὶ σωφρονέστατον Ἀθηναίων, Comp. 4.5). Both men are
held responsible for their downfalls (Comp. 6.1), and neither died commendably (Comp.
6.3), although Antony at least found the strength to kill himself, even if he made a hash of
his suicide, while Demetrius died in captivity, like a wild beast tamed (καθάπερ τὰ ζῷα
χειροήθης γενόµενος, Comp. 6.4).

The differences, like the similarities, emerge more subtly in the Lives themselves.
Perhaps the most telling distinction can be discerned in the realm of ἀρετή. Like
Demetrius, Antony displays a remarkable ability to rise to the occasion in the direst of
straits. After the defeat at Mutina, when famine weighs heavy on Antony and his
retreating army, he is a marvel of perseverance and an inspiring example to his troops:

ἀλλὰ φύσει παρὰ τὰς κακοπραγίας ἐγίνετο βέλτιστος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ δυστυχῶν
ὁµοιότατος ἦν ἀγαθῷ, κοινοῦ µὲν ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῖς δι'
ἀπορίαν τινὰ σφαλλοµένοις, οὐ µὴν ἁπάντων ἃ ζηλοῦσι µιµεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν ἃ
δυσχεραίνουσιν ἐρρωµένων ἐν ταῖς µεταβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ µᾶλλον ἐνίων τοῖς ἔθεσιν
ἐνδιδόντων ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ θραυοµένων τὸν λογισµόν.72
“But it was his nature to excel in difficult situations, and he never got closer to being a
good man than when fortune was against him. It is true that it is normal for people to
recognize true virtue when difficulties have brought them low, but not everyone is strong
enough at these times of reversal to emulate what they admire and avoid what they find
distasteful; in fact, some are so weak that they give in to their characteristic flaws all the
more readily at such times and cannot keep their rationality intact” (Ant. 17.4, trans.
Waterfield, adapted).
Antony’s natural gifts are such that he can summon the strength to imitate what he
admires and shun what he hates amid adversity and deprivation; he never loses sight of
ἀρετή. That is to say that, if only for a moment, Antony approaches Plutarch’s heroic
ideal (and his ideal reader). Demetrius, on the other hand, never rises to this level. Early
in the Life he shows respect for the ἀρετή of Demetrius of Phaleron (αἰδεσθεὶς καὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἀνδρός, 9.3), allowing him safe passage to Thebes, but Plutarch never
ascribes ἀρετή to Demetrius. It is especially damning that the most outstanding display

                                                                                                                       
72
On the importance of this passage for Plutarch’s characterization of Antony, see Pelling (1988)
23.

  28  
of Plutarch’s sovereign virtues of ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη is provided by Democles73
when he commits suicide rather than submit to Demetrius’ lecherous advances (n.
24.2.2), an episode for which Demetrius is condemned again in the synkrisis (Comp. 4.5).
By the time of his final captivity it is clear that Demetrius is not even capable of
recognizing what ἀρετή really is. Kings like Demetrius are wicked and foolish, “not only
because they seek after luxury and pleasure instead of virtue and honor (τρυφὴν καὶ
ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ), but also because they do not even know how
to enjoy real pleasure or true luxury.”74 Great natures may indeed produce great virtues
and great vices, and Demetrius is credited with φιλανθρωπία, φιλεταιρία, and a natural
bent for kindness and justice;75 unlike Antony, however, he can never summon up true
ἀρετή. In the Demetrius, Plutarch presents his subject as a pale shadow of Alexander;76
at the level of the pair Demetrius suffers in comparison with his Roman counterpart. The
superior gifts of Plutarch’s Antony give him superior potential, and the scale of his
successes and failures is correspondingly larger. Plutarch’s Demetrius has a great nature,
but Antony’s is greater.77

IV. Flattery, Imitation, and Theatricality in Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius

The first figures mentioned by name in the Demetrius-Antony prologue are two
Theban masters of the aulos, Ismenias and Antigeneidas. These virtuosos had their
students observe poor players so that they would learn not to imitate bad habits and listen
with heightened pleasure to more accomplished musicians (1.6).78 The anecdote sits
comfortably in the prologue, much of which is given over to a defense of the didactic
value of negative examples. But references to the aulos and the musicians who play it are
not confined to the prologue, and Plutarch refers explicitly to the instrument on several
other occasions in the Life: the hetaira Lamia, whose corrupting influence contributes
                                                                                                                       
73
τὴν δὲ Δηµοκλέους ἀρετὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἄξιόν ἐστι µὴ παρελθεῖν, 24.2.
74
τί γὰρ ἄλλο τῶν πολέµων καὶ τῶν κινδύνων πέρας ἐστὶ τοῖς φαύλοις βασιλεῦσι, κακῶς
καὶ ἀνοήτως διακειµένοις, οὐχ ὅτι µόνον τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ
διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι µηδ' ἥδεσθαι µηδὲ τρυφᾶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἴσασιν, 52.4.
75
4.1, 6.4, 17.1.
76
See below, 33–35.
77
On Demetrius as the “lesser character” of the two, see Beneker 168.
78
Ismenias is also mentioned in the prologue to the Pericles-Fabius (Per. 1.5), again in the
context of the proper objects of imitation.

  29  
significantly to Demetrius’ decline, won a reputation for her facility with the aulos before
becoming better known for her mastery of the erotic arts (16.5; n. 16.5.2);79 Lamia
performs for Demetrius at a symposium (27.9); Plutarch lists playing the aulos among the
“useless diversions” (διαγωγὰς ἀχρήστους) pursued by some Hellenistic kings (but not
Demetrius, 20.2–3); Xenophantus, “the most celebrated auletes of his time” (ὁ δὲ τῶν
τότ' αὐλητῶν ἐλλογιµώτατος), performs at Demetrius’ funerary cavalcade off
Corinth, the closing scene of the Life (53.5; n. 53.5.1).

The plentiful references to the aulos and auletai could be explained simply as
reflections of historical reality, since a great many of the episodes Plutarch describes in
the Life would in fact have featured the instrument. The aulos accompanied public
sacrifices at religious festivals, provided ambience in both weddings and funerals, was an
indispensable component of sympotic settings, where it was often played by hetairai, and
established the rhythm of the stroke on oared warships.80 In Athens the instrument was
associated with a certain Phrygian ambience, and its outstanding threnetic qualities were
prominently featured in the scores for tragic dramas.81 Plutarch’s Demetrius, with its
numerous descriptions of weddings, lavish dinner parties, and naval tableaux, its
preoccupation with religious innovation and impiety, and its many quotations of tragic
poets is a Life quite literally set to the penetrating tones of the aulos. But the aulos and
auletai were also imbued with a metaphorical significance that resonates powerfully with
the central themes of the Demetrius.

The aulos was widely recognized as the most mimetic of instruments, capable of
imitating an incredible range of sounds and transporting its hearers into ecstatic states in
which they became something other than their normal selves.82 The expressive range of
the instrument secured it a place in nearly every important collective activity in Greek
life, but its transformative power was often perceived as threatening, particularly in
                                                                                                                       
79
ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἡ περιβόητος ἦν Λάµια, τὴν µὲν ἀρχὴν σπουδασθεῖσα διὰ τὴν τέχνην –
ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐλεῖν οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτως – , ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λαµπρὰ γενοµένη.
80
H. Huchzermeyer, Aulos und kithara in der griechischen musik bis zum ausgang der
klassischen zeit (nach den literarischen quellen), (Emsdetten, 1931); West 13–38; Wilson 75–85.
81
See West 103–04 for a surviving fragment of the vocal score for Euripides’ Orestes indicating
notes for the aulos accompaniment; on the aulos as the tragic instrument par excellence, see
Wilson 80.
82
See e.g. Pl. Symp. 215C; Longinus Subl. 39.2; West 105–06; Wilson 87.

  30  
Athens. The ambivalent position occupied by the aulos made it and the musicians who
played it potent vehicles for metaphor. With its two tongues (the reeds were also called
glossai) and its ability to mimic the voices of others, the aulos represented the dangerous
powers of appearance and imitation, and Athenian orators used auletikoi logoi to brand
their opponents as purveyors of deceptive speech.83 Philostratus concludes his damning
portrait of the Athenian tyrant Critias with an apothegm: “If the speech doesn’t
correspond with the character, we seem to speak with the tongue of another, just like
auloi (εἰ γὰρ µὴ ὁµολογήσει ὁ λόγος τῶι ἤθει, ἀλλοτρίαι τῆι γλώττηι δόξοµεν
φθέγγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ αὐλοί).84 Auletai were also equated with parasites or flatterers
(κόλακες), stock characters of the comic stage and fixtures in the courts of the Hellenistic
kings.85 In light of this metaphorical potency, the auletikos logos in the prologue is
revealed as more than a charming anecdote affirming both the importance of selecting
appropriate objects of emulation and the didactic value of negative examples; it subtly
anticipates a Life in which flattery, imitation, and theatricality are of fundamental
importance.

It has long been recognized that the Demetrius is the most explicitly and
persistently theatrical of Plutarch’s Lives.86 Plutarch’s reliance on Hellenistic sources,
many of whom were preoccupied with ostentatious display and sudden reversals of
fortune, accounts for the theatrical tenor of the life to some degree, but he has gone much
further, deliberately fashioning the Demetrius as a tragic drama, assimilating life and
theatre. This is readily evident in the recurrent language and imagery of the theatre, and
the repeated comparisons of Demetrius to a tragic actor that run like a crimson thread
through the Life. These elements are anticipated in the prologue—Demetrius and Antony

                                                                                                                       
83
Wilson 86.
84
Philostr. VS 1.502 = Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 2, Critias F1 l. 30–31.
85
e.g. the Suda (s.v. Αὐλητοῦ βίον ζῇς, Adler A 4438) gives a gloss of a proverb “You live the
life of an auletes” as “referring to those who live off others.”
86
de Lacy remains the classic study; cf. Sweet esp. 179–81; Pelling (1988) 21; Mastrocinque
(1979b); Thonemann (2005); Chaniotis (1997) 244 ff.; id., Θεατρικότητα και δηµόσιος βίος
στον ελληνιστικό κόσµο, (Herakleion, 2009): 111–128.

  31  
share traits that are characteristic of the comic miles gloriosus,87 and their careers are
marked by the dramatic alternation of triumphs and disasters—but are absent from the
narrative of Demetrius’ childhood and early career. Theatrical language and imagery
reappear after Antigonus arrogates the royal title for himself and his son (the act itself an
artfully arranged coup de théâtre, ns. 18.1.1; 18.5.5), and recur frequently thereafter. The
assumption of the kingship works a fundamental change on the character of Demetrius
and the Diadochi; their subsequent dealings with others are marked by an arrogance and
self-importance, “just as tragic actors, when they put on royal robes, alter their gait, their
voice, their deportment and their manner of speech” (18.5–6).88 When the hetaira Lamia
ascends to a position of prominence in Demetrius’ court, Lysimachus jokes that he has
seen a whore coming on to the tragic stage for the first time;89 Plutarch transitions from a
digression on Lamia to his account of the Ipsus campaign by remarking, “and now the
narrative, as it traces the fortunes and deeds of my subject, moves from the comic to the
tragic stage” (28.1).90 The recurring motif of Demetrius as a tragic actor is, in an
unforgettable scene, actually realized in Plutarch’s historical narrative: Demetrius
addresses the terrified Athenians in the theatre of Dionysus, entering through one of the
parodoi “just like the tragic actors” (ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ, 34.4; n. 34.4.2). On the stage
Demetrius is wholly in his element, and he demonstrates real mastery of the actor’s craft:
by adopting the proper tone and choosing the proper words he elicits a joyful response
from the Athenians (34.5–6). But not all audiences are so receptive to the efforts of the
acting king. In the eyes of many Macedonians, Demetrius and his rivals are but pale
imitations of Alexander, merely affecting the mannerisms, dignity and gravity of the
conqueror, like actors on a stage (ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τὸ βάρος ὑποκρίνοιντο καὶ τὸν ὄγκον
τοῦ ἀνδρός, 41.5); there is something “truly tragic” about Demetrius’ splendid
                                                                                                                       
87
They are ἐρωτικοὶ ποτικοὶ στρατιωτικοὶ µεγαλόδωροι πολυτελεῖς ὑβρισταί. For these
traits as characteristic of the miles gloriosus see Xenophontos (2012) 607–08; cf. Pelling (1988)
35, 125.
88
καὶ τοῖς βίοις καὶ ταῖς ὁµιλίαις αὐτῶν ὄγκον ἐνεποίησε καὶ βαρύτητα, καθάπερ τραγικῶν
ὑποκριτῶν ἅµα τῇ σκευῇ συµµεταβαλόντων καὶ βάδισµα καὶ φωνὴν καὶ κατάκλισιν καὶ
προσαγόρευσιν.
89
ὁ Λυσίµαχος αὐτῷ, καὶ λοιδορῶν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα τῆς Λαµίας ἔλεγε νῦν πρῶτον ἑωρακέναι
πόρνην προερχοµένην ἐκ τραγικῆς σκηνῆς·; hetairai were commonly featured on the comic
stage.
90
Τὴν δὲ διήγησιν ὥσπερ ἐκ κωµικῆς σκηνῆς πάλιν εἰς τραγικὴν µετάγουσιν αἱ τύχαι καὶ αἱ
πράξεις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὃν διηγούµεθα.

  32  
appearance (Ἦν δ' ὡς ἀληθῶς τραγῳδία µεγάλη περὶ τὸν Δηµήτριον, 41.6), but his
flamboyance ultimately inspires scorn rather than awe (41.6–8); when he is deserted by
his soldiers who refuse to make war to support his excesses, Demetrius exchanges his
“tragic” garb for a common cloak, “as if he was not a king, but an actor,” and exits the
Macedonian stage for good (44.9);91 finally, Demetrius’ funeral ceremonies are “tragic
and theatrical” (Ἔσχε µέντοι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ταφὴν αὐτοῦ τραγικήν τινα καὶ
θεατρικὴν διάθεσιν, 53.2).

Plutarch consistently links tragedy, and the theater more generally, with hollow
pretension,92 and the theatrical language and imagery emphasize the emptiness of
Demetrius’ personal splendor and lavish displays. In tragedy such display inevitably
portends disaster, and Demetrius too is brought down by his ὕβρις.93 More subtly, the
theatrical references complement Plutarch’s characterization of Demetrius as
fundamentally inauthentic. This inauthenticity stems in large part from Demetrius’
misdirected attempts to imitate Alexander: Antigonus and Demetrius assume the royal
title although this prerogative had previously been reserved for the descendants of Philip
and Alexander (10.3); when Demetrius revives the Hellenic League of Alexander at
Corinth, he believes that he has equaled and surpassed Alexander (25.4), but is soon
disabused of this notion, if only temporarily, by the crushing defeat at Ipsus. On the eve
of that battle Alexander appears to Demetrius in a dream, berates him for choosing the
wrong watchword, and announces his intention to support the opposing side (29.1). But
Demetrius’ star rises again. He ascends the throne in Macedon and plans an invasion of
Asia to recover the lands lost by his father and reconstitute the empire of Alexander
(43.3; ns. 43.2.2, 43.3.1); in support of this ambition he begins assembling a force “of a
size which no man had possessed since Alexander” (ὅσην µετ' Ἀλέξανδρον οὐδεὶς ἔσχε
πρότερον, 44.1), but succeeds only in uniting his rivals against him. While all of the
kings, Demetrius in particular, imitate Alexander in superficial details (Pyrr. 8.1–2), it is
Pyrrhus alone who evokes the “image” (εἴδωλον, 41.5) of Alexander for Demetrius’

                                                                                                                       
91
παρελθὼν ἐπὶ σκηνήν, ὥσπερ οὐ βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ὑποκριτής, µεταµφιέννυται χλαµύδα
φαιὰν ἀντὶ τῆς τραγικῆς ἐκείνης, καὶ διαλαθὼν ὑπεχώρησεν.
92
de Lacy 164; Lamberton 133; Duff (2012) 400.
93
Pelling (1988) 21.

  33  
subjects, and they soon desert their king and flock to the more convincing “copy” of the
great conqueror (µίµηµα, Pyrr. 8.2; cf. 41.5).

As a model and a precedent Alexander is omnipresent, and Plutarch fleshes out

the comparison with less explicit parallelism. The two share similar vices: Demetrius’
drinking never results in the shocking acts of violence which mar the latter part of
Alexander’s career,94 but the excessive consumption of wine is at least partially
responsible for the death of both men (52.5; Alex. 75.5–6); both men are surrounded by
sycophants of all stripes, but Alexander pays them heed only when he is drinking (Alex.
23.7), while Demetrius is naturally susceptible to flatterers.95 In the exhibition of virtue,
Alexander is clearly superior: Plutarch’s Alexander is a model of σωφροσύνη,96 at least
in the sexual realm, while Demetrius is utterly dissolute; Alexander’s ἀρετή is frequently
on display,97 but Demetrius can never muster it.98 Both men manipulate the calendar, but
Alexander changes the date to avoid a potentially costly delay in engaging the enemy
(Alex. 16.2), or uphold the credibility of his favorite seer, Aristander (Alex. 25.1–3)—in
both cases, Alexander actions inspire his troops and lead to resounding victories. The
calendrical meddling that allows Demetrius’ unorthodox initiation into the Eleusinian
Mysteries (26.2–5; ns. 26.1–5), on the other hand, is presented as one of a series of
“lawless and shocking acts” (πληµµεληµάτων καὶ παρανοµηµάτων, 27.1) that incense
and humiliate the Athenians. Both men are elected ἡγεµών of the Greeks at Corinth, but
much of the narrative of Alexander’s Isthmian sojourn (Alex. 14.1–5) is devoted to his
admiration for the philosopher Diogenes, whose independence allows him to condescend
even to Alexander, while Demetrius is so “puffed-up by his present good fortune and the
extent of his power” (τῇ τύχῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάµει τῶν πραγµάτων
ἐπαιρόµενος, 25.6)99 that he imagines he is greater than Alexander (25.4). Both men
were hailed as gods in their own lifetimes, but where Demetrius is utterly unhinged by

                                                                                                                       
94
e.g. Alex. 50–52;
95
See below, 36–39.
96
e.g. Alex. 4.8, 21.1–22.6.
97
e.g. Alex. 34.4, 41.2, 58.2.
98
See below, 39–40.
99
Demetrius is elated to match the achievement of Alexander, but his arrogance before Ipsus
recalls that of Darius before Issus: ἐπαιρόµενός τε τῷ πλήθει τῆς δυνάµεως, Alex. 18.6.

  34  
divine honors, apotheosis does not delude Alexander, who exploits his divinity for
political advantage (28.6).100

The specter of Alexander looms over Demetrius at every turn, but the great
conqueror is not Demetrius’ only object of imitation.101 Early in the Life, it is revealed
that Demetrius emulated Dionysus (ἐζήλου τὸν Διόνυσον, 2.3; ns. 2.3.6, 2.3.8), patron
deity of the theater, since that god was “most terrible when waging war, but also
supremely well suited for exploiting the ensuing peace for the pursuit of pleasure and
gratification” (2.3).102 For a time Demetrius succeeds admirably in just this sort of
Dionysiac compartmentalization.103 His peace-time revels (εἰρήνης γὰρ οὔσης
ἀφύβριζεν) are completely unrestrained (ἀνειµένως) and intemperate (κατακόρως,
19.5), but on campaign he is “as sober as those who are self-controlled by nature” (ἐν δὲ
τοῖς πολέµοις ὡς οἱ φύσει σώφρονες ἔνηφε, 19.6), “giving himself completely, now to
pleasure, now to duty” (τὰ µὲν ἡδονῇ διδοὺς ἁπλῶς ἑαυτόν, τὰ δὲ σπουδῇ) and
keeping the two spheres of his life “unmixed” (θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων ἄκρατα 19.10). But
the lack of natural restraint is ominous—σωφροσύνη is among the sovereign virtues
listed in the prologue (1.4)—and “unmixed” recalls the inhumanity (οὐ πάνυ
φιλάνθρωπον) of the Spartans who compelled helots to drink unmixed wine (ἄκρατον,
1.5), and anticipates the charge in the synkrisis that Demetrius harmed others through
precisely this lack of self-control (διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, Comp. 4.6; cf. 9.7). In the end,
Demetrius’ lack of restraint is his undoing. When Demetrius is finally deprived of any
opportunity for action he overindulges in wine, the greatest of Dionysus’ gifts to man,
and dies shamefully in captivity (52.5; n. 52.5.2).
                                                                                                                       
100
ὁ δ' οὖν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρηµένων δῆλός ἐστιν αὐτὸς οὐδὲν πεπονθὼς οὐδὲ
τετυφωµένος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄλλους καταδουλούµενος τῇ δόξῃ τῆς θειότητος.
101
Imitatio Alexandri was probably an important component of Demetrius’ Dionysiac self-
fashioning (n. 2.3.6), but Plutarch downplays Alexander’s imitation of the god, preferring to cast
the relationship of god and king as adversarial (e.g. Alex. 13.5).
102
ὡς πολέµῳ τε χρῆσθαι δεινότατον, εἰρήνην τ' αὖθις ἐκ πολέµου τρέψαι [καὶ] πρὸς
εὐφροσύνην καὶ χάριν ἐµµελέστατον. Demetrius was and fact associated with and assimilated
to a number of deities, of whom Dionysus was just one. See ns. 2.3.6, 13.1.3, 25.1.4, 30.4.1,
40.8.1.
103
See Lamberton 133–34; cf. the singular focus of Alexander: “When there was important
business to attend to, neither wine, nor sleep, nor sport, nor sex, nor spectacle distracted his
attention, as they did for other generals” (ἐπεὶ πρός γε τὰς πράξεις οὐκ οἶνος ἐκεῖνον, οὐχ
ὕπνος, οὐ παιδιά τις, οὐ γάµος, οὐ θέα, καθάπερ ἄλλους στρατηγούς, Alex. 23.2).

  35  
 In his failure to play the roles of Alexander and Dionysus successfully, Plutarch’s
Demetrius confirms the criticism of the mimetic arts in Plato’s Republic (394D–395E).
Acting and the other mimetic arts threaten the integrity of the soul: since pretense and
affectation are incompatible with authenticity, one cannot live a truly authentic life while
attempting to act out the lives of others.104 In the end, the efforts of the acting king serve
only to distance him from reality and alienate his subjects.105

But Demetrius’ inability to live an authentic life of his own, his disastrous
attempts to imitate Alexander, and his final surrender to Dionysiac excess are not
presented as an inevitable consequence of his flawed nature. Plutarch in fact emphasizes
the young Demetrius’ predisposition for justice,106 his sublime beauty and natural gifts,107
his humanity (φιλανθρωπία).108 Much of the blame for Demetrius’ inability to sustain
this early promise is laid at the feet of flatterers, in particular the Athenian sycophants
who destabilize Demetrius with the absurdity of their praise and lavish unprecedented
honors on him—honors that encourage both his worst excesses and his pretensions to
divinity. Plutarch offers the Demetrius as confirmation of “the truth of Plato’s saying that
great natures produce great virtues as well as great vices” (1.7).109 The reference is to a
passage in the Republic (491B–495B), in which Plato argues that gifted young men can
grow into either very good or very bad adults, depending on their education and early
influences.110 Towards the end of the passage, Plato has Socrates articulate the corrupting
power of flattery and early fame over the most gifted and promising young men:

“What, then, do you think that such a person will do in such circumstances,
especially if he belongs to some great city, is rich and of noble birth, and is,
                                                                                                                       
104
Lamberton 133, citing Rep. 394D-E.
105
In this Demetrius recalls the “chameleon” Alcibiades, who masterfully mimics the defining
characteristics of Spartans, Thracians, Thessalians, and Persians in turn (Alc. 23.5–6), but
ultimately succeeds only in alienating them all.
106
Demetrius’ treatment of Mithridates is cited as proof that Demetrius was “naturally humane
and a good friend” (φιλάνθρωπον φύσει καὶ φιλέταιρον, 4.1) and possessed a “natural
predisposition towards fairness and justice” (εὐφυΐας δείγµατα τοῦ Δηµητρίου πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν
καὶ δικαιοσύνην, 4.5).
107
He is “gifted and perceptive” (εὐφυὴς γὰρ ὢν καὶ θεωρητικός, 20.2).
108
4.1, 6.4, 9.2, 17.1.
109
On this passage, see n. 1.7.2.
110
On Plutarch’s interpretation of the Platonic passage see esp. Duff (1999) 47–49 and (2004)
280–81.

  36  
 besides impressive in looks and stature? Will he not be filled with extravagant
hopes, conceiving that he is capable of ruling both Greeks and Barbarians, and
will he not on this account raise himself up, being inflated in his folly with vain
posturing and pride?” (Rep. 494C-D).111
Plutarch’s portrait of a talented young man undone by the destructive effects of flattery
conforms in every respect to this Socratic paradigm, and Plutarch presents the young
Demetrius as just the sort of man who is naturally susceptible to flattery. In his own
treatise on flatterers, How to tell a Friend from a Flatterer, Plutarch notes: “But the fact
is, that as wood-worms make their entrance chiefly into the delicate and sweet-scented
kinds of wood, so it is ambitious, promising, and reasonable characters that receive and
nourish the flatterer as he hangs upon them” (Mor. 49B-C).112 Demetrius’ brilliant
promise and boundless ambition is manifest when he sails to free the Greek cities in 307:
“none of the Successors ever waged a more noble or just war” (τούτου πόλεµον οὐδεὶς
ἐπολέµησε τῶν βασιλέων καλλίω καὶ δικαιότερον, 8.2). But the culmination of this
campaign, the liberation of Athens in the summer of 307, inspires the worst efforts of
Athenian flatterers. The Athenians, Plutarch claims, are “the first of all people” to address
Antigonus and Demetrius as kings (10.3).113 The new monarchs are then voted a host of
other honors, all more or less divine in nature: the Athenians hailed Demetrius and
Antigonus as Savior-Gods (Σωτῆρες θεοί), made the priest of the newly-established cult
of the Saviors the eponymous archon, wove the figures of the Antigonids into the sacred
peplos of Athena, consecrated the spot where Demetrius first stepped down from his
chariot and erected there an altar of Demetrius “The Descender” (Καταιβάτης) and

                                                                                                                       
111
Τί οὖν οἴει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ
µεγάλης πόλεως ὢν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ µέγας; ἆρ' οὐ
πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀµηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούµενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν
βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν αὑτόν, σχηµατισµοῦ
καὶ φρονήµατος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐµπιµπλάµενον; Plato may well have had Alcibiades in mind
as a model; no doubt many of his readers made the connection.
112
ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ οἱ θρῖπες ἐνδύονται µάλιστα τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς καὶ γλυκέσι ξύλοις, οὕτω τὰ
φιλότιµα τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ χρηστὰ καὶ ἐπιεικῆ τὸν κόλακα δέ-χεται καὶ τρέφει προσφυόµενον.
113
Contemporary Athenian inscriptions confirm that Antigonus and Demetrius were not officially
addressed as kings in Athens until after Demetrius’ victory at Salamis in 306, a fact that Plutarch
himself acknowledges later in the Life (18.1; see ns. 10.3.1, 18.1.2). Thus the Antigonids were
hailed as gods in Athens before they were acclaimed kings. By retrojecting the Antigonid
assumption of the kingship, Plutarch links regal and divine honors in a corrupting nexus that
unbalances Demetrius.

  37  
established two new tribes named for Demetrius and Antigonus (10.4–6; ns. 10.4.1–
10.6.1).114 Plutarch does not equivocate in assessing the deleterious effect of these honors
on Demetrius’ character: “And now that Demetrius had shown himself great and brilliant
in his benefactions, the Athenians made him oppressive and obnoxious by the
extravagance of the honors they voted him” (10.2).115 Further honors accelerate the
destructive process. The Athenians decree that an edict of Demetrius be treated as an
oracular pronouncement, an absurdity that drives the king out of his mind (οὕτω
καταµωκώµενοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, προσδιέφθειραν αὐτόν, 13.3). The willingness of the
Athenian flatterers to confer extravagant honors on Demetrius, and his willingness to
accept and exploit them creates a mutually destructive dynamic that leads both parties
into self-delusion and suffering. After Demetrius delivers the city from the reign of
Demetrius of Phalerum and expels Cassander’s garrison from Piraeus, the Athenians
believe that they are truly free, only to be disabused of that notion by Demetrius’
penchant for interfering in the internal affairs of the city (24.6–12). Likewise, Demetrius
pins his hopes on the goodwill of the Athenians in the wake of the disaster at Ipsus, only
to find that their goodwill had been “empty and feigned” all along (κενὴν καὶ
πεπλασµένην, 30.2–5).

The final blow to Demetrius’ youthful promise comes in the aftermath of his
greatest victory. He smashes the fleet of Ptolemy near Cyprus, and Plutarch notes with
approval his subsequent displays of kindness and humanity (εὐγνωµοσύνῃ καὶ
φιλανθρωπίᾳ, 17.1). Aristodemus of Miletus, the “most accomplished in flattery of all
Demetrius’ courtiers” (πρωτεύοντα κολακείᾳ τῶν αὐλικῶν ἁπάντων) then takes it
upon himself to “crown this achievement with his greatest piece of flattery” (τῶν
κολακευµάτων τὸ µέγιστον ἐπενεγκεῖν τοῖς πράγµασιν, 17.2).116 He orchestrates a
dramatic entry into Antigoneia and announces Demetrius’ victory to Antigonus and a
                                                                                                                       
114
The list contains omissions, anachronisms, and, probably, inaccuracies or inventions (ns.
10.3.1–11.1.7, 12.1.2–12.3.5, 13.1.1–13.3.2; see above x.). The various divine honors seem to
have been voted Demetrius over a period of nearly twenty years, but Plutarch creates the illusion
of chronological proximity to emphasize the consequences of the honors for Demetrius’
character.
115
οὕτως λαµπρὸν ἐν ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις καὶ µέγαν φανέντα τὸν Δηµήτριον ἐπαχθῆ καὶ βαρὺν
ἐποίησαν τῶν τιµῶν ταῖς ἀµετρίαις ἃς ἐψηφίσαντο.
116
On this episode, see ns. 17.2.2, 17.3.1.

  38  
large crowd who then hail Antigonus and Demetrius as kings (17.5–18.1). The other
kings quickly follow suit— “so powerful was a single word from a flatterer, that it
brought about a revolution throughout the world” (τοσοῦτον ἴσχυσε κόλακος φωνὴ µία
καὶ τοσαύτης ἐνέπλησε τὴν οἰκουµένην µεταβολῆς, 18.7).

Demetrius is poorly cast in the role of king. He and his freshly-crowned rivals
assume Alexander's majesty and pomp, like actors on a stage, but become “harsher in
their administration of justice” (περὶ τὰς δικαιώσεις βιαιότεροι, 18.6), not realizing that
“nothing befits a king like the work of justice” (οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως βασιλεῖ προσῆκον
ὡς τὸ τῆς δίκης ἔργον, 42.8). Demetrius’ extravagant displays “vex” the Macedonians
(τούτοις τοῖς θεάµασιν ἐλύπει), his lifestyle is “offensive” (τρυφὴν καὶ δίαιταν
ἐβαρύνοντο, 42.1), and his inaccessibility leaves his neglected subjects to wistfully
recall the reign of Philip (42.2–7). In the last days of Demetrius’ reign the Macedonians
feel they are not ruled, but oppressed (ὑβρίζεσθαι δοκοῦντας, οὐ βασιλεύεσθαι,
42.6).117

Corrupted by flattery and consumed by the desire to emulate and surpass

Alexander, Demetrius loses sight of his humanity. The young Demetrius was inspired to
imitate the φιλανθρωπία of Ptolemy (6.4, 17.1), but after the assumption of the royal
title he never again displays the virtue. By the time the Athenians issue yet another decree
proclaiming “whatever King Demetrius orders to be righteous towards the gods and just
towards men” (πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς Δηµήτριος κελεύσῃ, τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς

                                                                                                                       
117
The destructive influence of flatterers, and their ability to thwart proper imitation extends also
to Demetrius’ rivals. Following Demetrius’ final surrender in Syria, Seleucus rejoices in the
opportunity to demonstrate that he too is capable of the sort of magnanimity in victory previously
exhibited by Ptolemy and Demetrius (Ἀκούσας δὲ Σέλευκος οὐκ ἔφη τῇ Δηµητρίου τύχῃ
σῴζεσθαι Δηµήτριον, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ, µετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καλῶν αὐτῷ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ
χρηστότητος ἐπίδειξιν διδούσῃ 50.1). But the malevolence of Seleucus’ courtiers turns his
compassion to envy (εἰς φθόνον µετέβαλε τὸν ἔλεον) and destroys his φιλανθρωπία
(διαφθεῖραι τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν τοῦ βασιλέως, 50.5). Only after Demetrius’s death does
Seleucus realize the error of his ways, and he is left to lament his failure to imitate even the regal
philanthropia exhibited by Dromichaetes, the barbarian king of the Thracians who treated the
captive Lysimachus with every courtesy and then released him (καὶ Σέλευκος ἤκουσέ τε κακῶς
καὶ µετενόησεν οὐ µετρίως ἐν ὑποψίᾳ τὸν Δηµήτριον θέµενος τότε, καὶ µηδὲ Δροµιχαίτην
ἄνδρα βάρβαρον Θρᾷκα µιµησάµενος, οὕτω φιλανθρώπως καὶ βασιλικῶς ἁλόντι
Λυσιµάχῳ χρησάµενον, 52.6).

  39  
ὅσιον καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δίκαιον, 24.10) it is clear that Demetrius is no longer
capable of recognizing true piety or justice, much less imitating it. In his treatise on
flattery, Plutarch likens the flatterer who plays the part of a friend to a “tragic actor”
(50E); in the Demetrius, the play-acting of flatterers inspires imitation of precisely the
wrong sort, with tragic results. Alexander’s ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη allow him to avoid
the oscillations of fortune that mark Demetrius’ career, but he too is susceptible to the
deceptive speech of flatterers, and for all Plutarch’s attempts to rationalize Alexander’s
drinking (e.g. Alex. 28), he makes little effort to hide the pivotal role of wine in the king’s
death. Thus, despite his unsurpassed success, emulation of the great, flawed Alexander is
a potentially perilous enterprise. Demetrius amply demonstrates these perils. He chases
the shade of Alexander, but mimics his vices and cannot match his virtues. Much of the
tragedy of Demetrius’ parallel decline and death stems from its utter predictability. In his
attempt to live out the life of another, Demetrius fails to look in the “mirror of history”
and learn from Alexander in the way that Plutarch expects his discriminating readers to
learn from Demetrius.

V. The Sources of Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius

To such a degree, it seems, is truth hedged about with difficulty and hard to
capture by research, since those who come after the events in question find that lapse of
time is an obstacle to their proper perception of them; while the research of their
contemporaries into men’s deeds and lives, partly through envious hatred and partly
through fawning flattery, defiles and distorts the truth118 (Plut. Per. 13.16, trans. B.
Perrin, adapted).
Plutarch read widely and voraciously: in the Parallel Lives alone he cites more
than 270 authors by name, the vast majority of them Greek, including some 150 authors
of historical works.119 The Lives are liberally spiced with philosophical and poetic
quotations (Plato and Homer are particular favorites), and Plutarch sometimes cites his
source (or sources) for a given historical episode or anecdote, and occasionally reveals

                                                                                                                       
118
οὕτως ἔοικε πάντῃ χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ δυσθήρατον ἱστορίᾳ τἀληθές, ὅταν οἱ µὲν ὕστερον
γεγονότες τὸν χρόνον ἔχωσιν ἐπιπροσθοῦντα τῇ γνώσει τῶν πραγµάτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν
πράξεων καὶ τῶν βίων ἡλικιῶτις ἱστορία τὰ µὲν φθόνοις καὶ δυσµενείαις, τὰ δὲ χαριζοµένη
καὶ κολακεύουσα λυµαίνηται καὶ διαστρέφῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
119
K. Zieger, RE s.v. Plutarchos (2) col. 911.

  40  
whether he accessed a given author directly or through an intermediary.120 In the
Demetrius, he does neither. He alludes once each to Sappho and Empedocles, and on
several occasions to Plato; he quotes Homer, Archilochus, Pindar, Aristophanes,
Timotheus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Philippides; he mentions a prose work by Lynceus
of Samos and a comedy by Demochares of Soli; he puts passages from Euripides,
Sophocles, and Aeschylus into the mouths of Antigonus, Demetrius, an anonymous
Theban, and one of Demetrius’ soldiers (also unnamed).121 The quotations given in
Plutarch’s own authorial voice illustrate the breadth of his learning, but the tragic
quotations attributed to historical actors in the Life may often represent material Plutarch
found already embedded in the narratives of his sources.122 But who were those sources?
Virtually all of the material that forms Plutarch’s historical narrative in the Demetrius is
unattributed. With the exception of two excerpts from a comedy by Philippides (12.7,
26.5) that Plutarch presents as representative of historical reality,123 he does not identify a
single source for these portions of the work.124 This comes as something of a shock for
the reader who completes the Alexander before turning to the biography of his most
colorful Successor: in the former Life, Plutarch cites no fewer than two dozen
authorities.125 Identifying the unacknowledged sources for the Demetrius is thus a highly
speculative business based in large part on the consideration of sources Plutarch cites
elsewhere in the Lives (especially his biographies of Demetrius’ contemporaries,
Eumenes and Pyrrhus), and conjecture about other known authors whom Plutarch might
have tapped.126 This process is further complicated by the ruinous state of Hellenistic
historiography. None of the contemporary and near-contemporary sources for the
                                                                                                                       
120
Hornblower 67–68
121
Antigonus (14.3), the Theban (45.5), and the soldier (46.10) cleverly adapt passages—Eur.
Phoen. 396, Eur. Bacc. 4–5, Soph. Oed. Col. 1–2—to suit the circumstances, while Demetrius
(35.4) apparently quotes directly from a lost play of Aeschylus (TrGF III F 359).
122
Marasco (1981) 36; n. 24.2.2.
123
The events described in the second fragment are corroborated by other sources (n. 26.5.1), but
some or all of the material in the first are comic exaggerations or inventions (ns.12.2.1–12.3.2).
124
He mentions Lynceus’ account of a dinner party arranged by Lamia (27.4), but does not quote
from it; nor indeed does he give any indication that he has seen it.
125
J.E. Powell, “The Source for Plutarch’s Alexander,” JHS 59 (1939) 229–30; Hamilton xlix-
liii; N.G.L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great: an analysis of Plutarch’s Life and
Arrian’s Anabasis Alexandrou (Cambridge: 1993) 5–163.
126
On the search for Plutarch’s sources and the tradition of Plutarchan Quellenforschung see Duff
(1999) 5–9; Lamberton 12–15; Schettino (2014).

  41  
Successor era have survived intact, and only a few fragments of the most important
accounts have come down to us. The Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus, writing in the
first century B.C., provides a detailed account of events following the death of Alexander
in Books 18–20 of his universal history, the Bibliotheca historica, but his narrative
breaks off in 302, just before the pivotal Battle of Ipsus, leaving Plutarch’s biography as
the only continuous narrative covering the last twenty years of Demetrius’ life.127 In the
absence of parallel accounts against which Plutarch’s narrative of events can be checked,
it is often impossible to determine how freely Plutarch adapted or improved upon his
source material, or indeed if he invented details to suit his portrait of Demetrius.

Plutarch seems to draw on diverse, perhaps opposing, source traditions.128 The

tone of the historical narrative is often sympathetic to Demetrius, while the abundant
anecdotal material is almost unremittingly hostile. In an important paper published in
1951, Waldo Sweet argued that Plutarch relied on an anonymous author who distilled the
historical works of Hieronymus of Cardia and the Atthidographer Philochorus into an
annalistic epitome. Plutarch, so Sweet contended, interleaves material he found in this
generally favorable annalistic epitome with a collection of anecdotes mined primarily
from Duris of Samos’ history of the period. According to Sweet, Hieronymus is the
ultimate source for the “historical framework” of the Life, with the exception of events in
Athens, which are drawn chiefly from Philochorus; the abundant, often scurrilous,
anecdotal material dealing with Demetrius’ “ethos” derives mainly from Duris.129

Sweet’s conclusions were shaped by his adherence to the now discredited view
that Plutarch eschewed original research and relied almost entirely on intermediate
sources (Mittelquellen) or recent syntheses,130 but his identification of the ultimate
sources for the Demetrius, on the other hand, remains plausible, and scholars generally
agree that Plutarch draws, directly or indirectly, and to a greater or lesser degree, on
                                                                                                                       
127
Books 15 and 16 of Justin’s Epitome of The Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus provide an
extremely abbreviated account of this period.
128
On Plutarch’s use of opposing source traditions in the interest of presenting a balanced
account, see Schettino 427–28.
129
Sweet 178–79.
130
Sweet 177. For a convincing demonstration that Plutarch actually read many of the authors he
cites, see C. Theander, Plutarch und die Geschichte (Lund: 1951) 42 ff.

  42  
Hieronymus, Philochorus, and Duris.131 He supplements these sources with an otherwise
unknown play of the Athenian comic poet Philippides, which is cited on two occasions as
evidence of discontent,132 both Athenian and divine, with the actions of Demetrius and
his partisans in the city, and he also seems to draw on another (probably) Athenian
source, the historian Phylarchus, for additional anecdotal material. Reliance on Athenian
sources could explain Plutarch’s access to details lacking from Diodorus’ account of
Demetrius’ activities in Athens, and may account, in some degree, for his preoccupation
with the tumultuous relationship between Demetrius and the Athenians. Plutarch also
drew on documentary evidence, especially Athenian decrees,133 and seems also to have
had recourse to various oral traditions.134

V.1 Hieronymus of Cardia

Any discussion of the sources for the extant works dealing with the Successors
must begin with Hieronymus of Cardia (364?–260?), a soldier, diplomat, and historian
who served a series of powerful masters in the decades following the death of Alexander.
Hieronymus was both an eye-witness to, and an important actor in, many of the events he
described, and his history of the early Hellenistic period—probably covering the period
from 323 down to the death of Pyrrhus in 272135—was certainly one of the principal
primary sources for the Age of the Successors. But Felix Jacoby was only able to collect
thirteen testimonia and eighteen fragments for his entry on Hieronymus (FGrH 154), and

                                                                                                                       
131
Manni (1953) xvii-xxiii; Flacelière and Chambry 10 ff.; Hornblower 67–70; Marasco (1981);
Andrei 42–49; Santi Amantini xxi-xxiv; Chaniotis (1997).
132
That the two fragments belong to the same play, and are in fact contiguous (although presented
by Plutarch in reverse order) was first posited by August Meineke, and has been broadly accepted
(O’Sullivan [2009b] 64).
133
Ns. 11.1.3, 12.1.2, 13.1.1.
134
On ten occasions, Plutarch cites anonymous sources, each time in relating anecdotal material:
2.1: ὁ τῶν πλείστων λόγος. ἔνιοι…λέγουσιν; 14.3: λέγεται; 19.3: λέγεται; 25.5: λέγεται;
27.2: ἔνιοι…λέγουσιν; 27.11: ἀποµνηµονεύεται; 28.10: λέγεται; 34.2: λέγεται 34.3:
ἱστοροῦσι; 38.12: λέγουσι. Cf. n. 22.7.1.
135
Diodorus refers to Hieronymus as “the one who wrote the history of the Successors”
(Ἱερώνυµος ὁ τὰς τῶν διαδόχων ἱστορίας γεγραφώς, 18.42.1), while the Suda (s.v.
Hieronymos, Adler I 201) records that Hieronymus chronicled “the events after Alexander”
(Ἱερώνυµος, Καρδιανός, ὃς τὰ ἐπ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πραχθέντα συνέγραψε). The latest dateable
fragment (FGrH 154 F 15) concerns the death of Pyrrhus in 272. For the possibility that
Hieronymus’ history covered events down to 262/1, see “Il termine ultimo delle Storie di
Ieronimo di Cardia,” Athenaeum 94 (2006) 719–22.

  43  
not one of these is a direct quotation.136 Strictly speaking, we do not have a single word
of Hieronymus. The extant fragments, though hardly a representative sample,137 suggest a
keen interest in ethnography, a penchant for geographical and historical digressions on
the people and places he treated, and an interest in supplying his readers with data, from
casualty figures to the dimensions of a fortification trench (FGrH 154 F 3, 11, 12, 13, 16,
17, 18).

Hieronymus first appears in our sources as a friend and adviser of Eumenes, a

fellow native of Cardia in the Thracian Chersonese, and perhaps a kinsman.138 He
represented Eumenes during negotiations with Antigonus Monophthalmus and Antipater
in 319 (Diod. 18.42.1, 18.50.4), was wounded at the battle of Gabiene in 316, and
subsequently joined the entourage of Antigonus (Diod. 19.44.3). A prose text from a
recently published Oxyrrhynchus papyrus (P.Oxy. 71.4808) that records biographical
details of the authors of historical works on Alexander and his Successors confirms that
Hieronymus spent the remainder of his life in the courts of the Antigonids, serving
Antigonus, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas in turn (col. ii. 9–13). In 311, Antigonus
Monophthalmus tasked Hieronymus with the collection of bitumen from the Dead Sea
(Diod. 19.100), and Plutarch reports that Demetrius installed “Hieronymus the historian”
(Ἱερώνυµον τὸν ἱστορικόν) as military governor (ἐπιµελητὴν καὶ ἁρµοστὴν, 39.4) of
Boeotia in 292. In both cases his performance left much to be desired: the attempt to
wrest control of bitumen harvesting from the local Arabs ended in the massacre of
Hieronymus’ force (n. 7.1.1), and he was unable to prevent or suppress a Boeotian revolt
(n. 39.4.2).

In contrast to his checkered military and diplomatic career, and despite the
meager remains of his work, Hieronymus the historian is generally accorded considerable
respect, at least from modern commentators, who have ranked him with the likes of
                                                                                                                       
136
To the testimonia collected by Jacoby we can now add a recently published (2007) papyrus
(P.Oxy. 71.4808) that preserves some biographical details for Hieronymus and other historians of
Alexander and the Successors.
137
Roisman (2012) 10.
138
Eumenes’ grandfather was also named Hieronymus (Arr. Ind. 18.6). Hornblower (8) and
Billows ([1990] 390) both argue that Hieronymus was the nephew of Eumenes, but this is far
from certain, and Diodorus (18.50.4) simply calls Hieronymus the “friend and fellow citizen” of
Eumenes.

  44  
Polybius and Thucydides,139 celebrated him as a historian “who sought the truth above
all,”140 and made him a byword for “good faith and reliable reporting.”141 Such lofty
praise may well be warranted: the range of Hieronymus’ experience and his privileged
access to some of the most influential figures of the era suggest that he was better
informed than any contemporary historian of whom we know, and his presentation of
data suggests that he resisted the impulse to exaggerate when his contemporaries did not.
However, the elevation of Hieronymus to the pantheon of ancient historical writers is a
modern phenomenon: we have little in the way of ancient criticism—Polybius, that
chalcenteric critic of Hellenistic historians, never mentions him—but what survives
suggests that he had a reputation for bias. In Pausanias’ estimation (1.9.8), Hieronymus
was biased against all kings, with the exception of Antigonus (presumably Antigonus
Gonatas, under whose patronage he composed his historical work) to whom he was
unfairly partial.142 Such bias is to be expected, Pausanias explains, “for a man who
associates with royalty cannot help being a partial historian” (1.9.13).143 The author of
P.Oxy. 71.4808 praises Hieronymus as a good man and an active participant in the events
he narrates (col. i. ll. 20–24), but, in the lacunose passage that follows, seems to censure
the historian for his bias (col. i. ll. 27–28).144 Dionysius of Halicarnassus (FGrH 154 T
12) included Hieronymus among a number of authors whom “no one can bear to read to
the final flourish,” but Dionysius’ list also includes Duris, Phylarchus, and Polybius, and
the criticism seems to reflect Dionysius’ negative opinion of Hellenistic historiography in
general, rather than any particular stylistic deficiency in Hieronymus.

It has long been generally agreed that Diodorus relied heavily on Hieronymus in
Books 18–20 of his Bibliotheka, in which he narrates events from the death of Alexander

                                                                                                                       
139
J. Bury The Ancient Greek Historians (London: 1909) 177, cited by Sweet 178; Hornblower 1;
Bosworth (2002) 169.
140
Tarn (1913) 411.
141
E. Badian, “A King’s Notebooks,” HCSP 72 (1968) 183–204.
142
ὁ δὲ Ἱερώνυµος οὗτος ἔχει µὲν καὶ ἄλλως δόξαν πρὸς ἀπέχθειαν γράψαι τῶν βασιλέων
πλὴν Ἀντιγόνου, τούτῳ δὲ οὐ δικαίως χαρίζεσθαι.
143
ἀνδρὶ γὰρ βασιλεῖ συνόντα ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἐς χάριν συγγράφειν.
144
C.S. Chrysanthou, “P.Oxy. LXXI 4808: Bios, Character, and Literary Criticism,” ZPE 193
(2015) 29–30.

  45  
in 323 to just before the battle of Ipsus in 301,145 although Hieronymus is never actually
cited as a source.146 Recently the idea that Diodorus’ narrative amounts to a reliable
distillation of Hieronymus has come in for some sharp criticism. David Asheri pointed
out that the correspondence of five fragments of Hieronymus to Diodorus is only
partial.147 Franca Landucci-Gattinoni, noting the criticism of Pausanias, has argued that
Hieronymus was highly unlikely to have explicitly criticized any of the Antigonid kings,
or gone out of his way to praise their rivals. Thus, Diodorus must be relying on some
other authority, at least on those occasions when Antigonus Monophthalmus is censured
for his manifest ambitions or otherwise presented in a negative light, or when Ptolemy
receives especial praise, as he often does.148 Nevertheless, Diodorus is remarkably well-
informed about the activities of Eumenes and the Antigonids, and his treatment of events
in which Hieronymus was an active participant often seem to derive from an eye-witness
account.149 On balance, it seems probable that Hieronymus was Diodorus’ primary
informant, but not his only important source. Such a conclusion is in keeping with recent
work demonstrating that Diodorus was not merely the slavish copyist he was long held to
be,150 but it introduces an additional complication to the vexed question of Plutarch’s
sources for the Demetrius: it cannot be assumed that Plutarch was relying on Hieronymus
simply because his account resembles that of Diodorus.

The notion that Plutarch drew on Hieronymus for the Demetrius stems from the
supposed parallels between the Life and Diodorus’ narrative, and the fact that Plutarch

                                                                                                                       
145
E.g. M.J. Fontana, Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno (1960: Palermo) 151–237;
Hornblower passim; Lamberton 14–15; Wheatley (2001) 146–47; id. (2014) 96–97; Anson
(2004) 19–20.
146
Diodorus mentions Hieronymus on four occasions: each time he is a historical actor in the
narrative; each time he is called “the author of the history,” vel sim. (18.42.1, 18.50.4, 19.44.3,
19.100.2).
147
D. Asheri, “Hieronymus of Cardia ca. 364–? 260 BC,” in N. Wilson (ed.) Encyclopedia of
Ancient Greece (New York: 2006) 359–60.
148
Landucci-Gattinoni (2008) xvi-xviii; cf. Meeus (2009) 52.
149
This is especially apparent in Diodorus’ accounts of the major engagements at Paraetacene,
Gabiene, Gaza, and Salamis. Wheatley (2014, 96) suggests that they all derive from
“Hieronymus’ standard battle description blueprint.” Cf. Wheatley (2001a 146–47).
150
For the compelling view that Diodorus in fact produced a work of some complexity, and
certainly made his own contributions to his narrative, see K.J. Sacks, Diodorus Siculus and the
First Century (Princeton: 1990); P. Green, Diodorus Siculus, Books 11-12.37.1. Greek History,
480-431 BC: the Alternative Version (Austin, TX: 2006).

  46  
refers to Hieronymus as “the historian” (τὸν ἱστορικόν, 39.4) when he describes the
Cardian’s appointment as Demetrius’ military governor in Boeotia.151 But Plutarch never
cites Hieronymus as a source in the Demetrius, and the reference proves only that he was
aware of his historical work;152 it hardly amounts to confirmation that Hieronymus was
one of his principal sources for the Life.153 Nor are the purported similarities between
Plutarch’s historical narrative and the parallel account of Diodorus particularly striking,
and if both authors are following Hieronymus, they vary considerably in the way they
summarize and present their findings: Plutarch’s treatment of Demetrius’ Arabian
expedition in 312 differs in both tone and content (n. 7.1.1); the events of Demetrius’
Greek campaign of 307 are presented in different order in the two accounts (n. 9.4.4);
Plutarch’s account of Demetrius’ Greek campaigns of 304 and 303 preserves details
absent in Diodorus (and vice-versa). For other pivotal events which Diodorus treats in
great detail, most notably the battle of Gaza and the siege of Rhodes, Plutarch prefers to
focus almost exclusively on anecdotal material not found in Diodorus, and his historical
narrative is so radically abbreviated that the question of a common source can scarcely be
addressed. Add to this the fact that Plutarch and Diodorus are almost certainly drawing
on different sources for the battle of Salamis (n. 15.1.3) and Demetrius’ initiation into the
Eleusinian Mysteries (n. 26.1.1), and it becomes clear that, regardless of the actual nature
of Diodorus’ debt to the historian from Cardia, there is no firm basis for attributing the
“historical framework” of the Demetrius to Hieronymus.

This is not to suggest that Plutarch did not rely on Hieronymus at all. Plutarch was
certainly familiar with his work—he cites him on three occasions in the Pyrrhus (17.7,
21.12, 27.8), always on points of detail. Plutarch’s description of Demetrius’ beauty and
bearing (n. 2.2.3), the claim that Demetrius ignored the wise counsel of his advisers prior
to the debacle at Gaza (n. 5.2.2), the dimensions of a remarkable siege tower at Rhodes
(21.1.2), the description of the clement treatment of the recalcitrant Thebans (39.4.3), and

                                                                                                                       
151 Hieronymus also appears as a historical actor in the Eumenes, but he is not there described as

“the historian” (pace Lamberton 15).

152
Landucci-Gattinoni (2008) xv makes the same point regarding Diodorus’ dependence on
Hieronymus.
153
So Hornblower 69: “Hieronymus or a version of Hieronymus was clearly used for the main
part of the historical narrative.”

  47  
many of the details from Demetrius’ final expedition to Asia (n. 51.1.1) probably all
derive from Hieronymus.154 Plutarch may in fact have relied more extensively on
Hieronymus; but Plutarch’s reluctance to name his sources, the exiguous remains of
Hieronymus’ work, and the often tenuous resemblance of the parallel accounts of
Diodorus and Plutarch make the extent of that reliance impossible to determine.

V.2 Philochorus of Athens

Plutarch presents Demetrius’ tumultuous relationship with the Athenians as an

index of the king’s shifting fortunes and moral dissipation, and, despite the fact that
Demetrius’ career took him from the Black Sea to Egypt, and from Babylonia to Corcyra,
the Life has a decidedly Athenocentric cast. Sweet, noting that Plutarch often narrates
events in Athens from an Athenian perspective, and preserves both Attic place names and
the exact date of Demetrius’ arrival in Athens in 307, argued that he relied on an Attic
source for events in Athens, and identified that source as Philochorus.155 Philochorus of
Athens (c. 340–261), priest and historian, was the last and most influential of the
Atthidographers. He is credited with at least twenty-seven works, most notably his
monumental Atthis, a history of Athens from mythological times down to his own day in
seventeen books. Sweet’s identification of Philochorus as Plutarch’s Athenian source is
plausible and attractive. Philochorus served as an important religious official in
Athens,156 and his fragments suggest that he, like Plutarch, was a ritual expert and
champion of traditional values.157 Plutarch was familiar with his work and relied heavily
on Philochorus in the Theseus, where he is cited seven times. Several of the surviving
fragments from the Atthis refer explicitly to Demetrius and correspond closely with
Plutarch’s version of the same events: Philochorus seems to confirm the renaming of a
month in the Attic calendar to honor Demetrius (F 166), an innovation that is not
mentioned by Diodorus and seems to be contradicted by the epigraphic record (ns. 12.2.1,
                                                                                                                       
154
On Plutarch’s probable use of Hieronymus for events after Ipsus, cf. Manni (1953) xvii, xix;
Hornblower 69; Flacelière-Chambry 12; Marasco (1981) 48–51; Santi Amantini xxiii and n. 5.
155
Sweet 178; some 230 fragments of Philochorus are extant (FGrH 328).
156
As hieroskopos, Philochorus was responsible for inspecting and interpreting the entrails of
sacrificial victims. Cf. Polyb. 32.2.6; Dion. Hal. 2.2.2; Diod. 32.12.
157
On the shared values and ritual expertise of Philochorus and Plutarch, see Kuhn 265; cf. Nic.
23.8, where Plutarch, citing Philochorus, claims that Nicias misinterpreted the meaning of an
eclipse, thus sealing his fate at Syracuse.

  48  
46.2.1); he noted Demetrius’ irregular initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries (F 70), and
seems to have expressed strong disapproval with the proceedings (F 69B; n. 26.3.2);
Plutarch presents the events of Demetrius’ first Greek campaign in an order that agrees
with a fragment of Philochorus (F 65), but is at odds with Diodorus (n. 9.4.4). All of this
suggests that at least some of Plutarch’s narrative of events in Athens derives from
Philochorus.158

V.3 Duris of Samos

Duris of Samos (c.330–c.260), the author of a Macedonian history covering the

reign of Philip II down to the death of Lysimachus in at least twenty-three books, is a
shadowy figure. The biographical information is meager in the extreme, but a corrupt
passage in Pausanias (6.13.5) seems to show that he was born at some point during the
period of Samian exile (366/5–322/1), when Athenian cleruchs occupied the island. Duris
and his family returned to Samos after Perdiccas enforced the Exiles Decree of
Alexander.159 At some point after the Samian restoration, Duris’ father Caius160
subsequently became tyrant of Samos, and was duly succeeded by his son.161 The
chronology for the tyrannies of Caius and Duris is uncertain, with some scholars holding
that Caius ascended to the tyranny soon after returning to the island,162 while others
would place the tenure of both Caius and Duris in the early third century.163 Since the
Antigonids controlled the Aegean for much of this period, the latter date seems more
probable: Antigonus and Demetrius consistently promoted the cause of Greek freedom
until the death of the former in 301 (n. 8.1.2), and tolerating a Samian tyranny would

                                                                                                                       
158
Manni 1951 xxi; Flacelière and Chambry 11; Marasco [1981] 58–64; Santi Amantini xxiv;
Paschidis (2013) 138 n. 22.
159
Diod. 17.109.1, 18.8.2–5.
160
The unusual name Καῖος, probably a transliteration of the Latin praenomen Gaius, suggests a
family connection of some sort with Italy (Pownall in BNJ 76).
161
For an account of Duris’ life based on what can be gleaned from the testimonia, see Landucci-
Gattinoni (1997) 9–38
162
E.g. J. Barron, ‛‘The Tyranny of Duris of Samos,” CR 12 (1962) 189–92; Kebric 7–8.
163
E.g. G. Shipley, A History of Samos, 800–188 BC (Oxford: 1987) 178–80; Billows (1990)
335–6.

  49  
have undermined their propaganda efforts.164 This view is supported by Duris’ own work:
there is nothing in the thirty-six surviving fragments of Duris’ Macedonian history (F 1–
15 and 35–55) to suggest that Duris was favorable to the Antigonids.165 On the contrary,
what we have of Duris’ work exhibits a general hostility to all of the Successors.

The surviving fragments of his work are remarkable for both their heavy-handed
moralizing and “the sensationalism and almost baroque nature of the narrative.”166
Readily evident is the marked tendency to reduce the stature of great personalities by
stories of scandal and private vice. Duris’ dramatic style, love of poetic quotations, and
emphasis on reversals of fortune, costumes, and moral lessons has often been dubbed
“tragic history.”167 The term is derived from Polybius’ prolonged and scathing
denunciation (2.56–63) of the emotional and sensational elements he detected in the work
of Phylarchus, a historian who was heavily influenced by Duris. Polybius explores the
genre distinctions between history and tragedy and equates Phylarchus’ historiographical
methods to the techniques of the tragic poets. And while the associated theory that Duris
was the originator and prime exponent of a “tragic” school of historiography adapting
Peripatetic theories of tragedy to history writing was debunked long ago by Frank
Walbank,168 who demonstrated that “tragic” elements were a fixture of Greek historical
writing from its inception, the theatrical quality of Duris’ surviving fragments is
undeniable.

Not surprisingly, Duris’ work elicited wildly divergent reactions in antiquity:

Phylarchus imitated his style and mined his work for material on the Successors,169 but

                                                                                                                       
164
Kebrick (4–6) argues that Caius and Duris enjoyed close relations with the Antigonids, who
acted as de facto sponsors of their tyrannies, but this is wholly conjectural and unsupported by the
remains of Duris’ work.
165
Billows (1990) 335–36; Pownall (2013) 49–50.
166
Pownall (2013) 43.
167
So Jacoby FGrH 2C 117–18. The term “tragic history” is derived from Polybius’ prolonged
and scathing denunciation (2.56–63) of the emotional and sensational elements he detected in the
work of Phylarchus. Polybius equates Phylarchus’ historiographical methods to the techniques of
the tragic poets.
168
F.W. Walbank, “Tragic History: a reconsideration,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical
Studies 2 (1955) 4–14; id. “History and Tragedy,” Historia 9 (1960) 216–34; cf. R. Rutherford,
“Tragedy and history,” in J. Marincola (ed.), A companion to Greek and Roman historiography
(Malden, MA: 2007) 504–14; Pownall in BNJ 76.
169
Jacoby in FGrH 81; Kebrick 11.

  50  
Polybius never mentions him; Didymus criticizes him for “indulging in marvels,” while
Cicero lauded Duris as a homo in historia diligens.170 Plutarch was firmly in the camp of
the detractors. In a discussion of Alexander’s demand that the Athenians surrender
prominent anti-Macedonian demagogues after the fall of Thebes (Dem. 23.4), he
contrasts Duris’ account with those of “the more reliable authorities” (δοκιµώτατοι τῶν
συγγραφέων), while those who say that Eumenes had ties of guest friendship with
Philip II “give a more plausible version” (εἰκότα λέγειν µᾶλλον) than Duris, who
claimed humble origins for Eumenes (Eum. 1.1–3). Most damning is Plutarch’s
devastating critique of Duris’ reliability in the Pericles. He claims that Duris “adds the
stuff of tragedy” (ἐπιτραγῳδεῖ) in his account of the aftermath of the Samian revolt of
440, and “appears not to speak the truth” (ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀληθεύειν ἔοικεν, Per. 28.2) when
he accuses Pericles and the Athenians of carrying out atrocities on Samos. None of this
comes as a surprise for Plutarch, however, since “it is not the wont of Duris, even in cases
where he has no private and personal interest, to hold his narrative down to the
fundamental truth, it is all the more likely that here, in this instance, he has given a
dreadful portrayal of the calamities of his country, that he might calumniate the
Athenians.”171

Despite his low estimation of Duris’ methodology and reliability, Plutarch cited
him as a source in the Lives,172 and it seems certain that he is an unacknowledged source
for the Demetrius—Plutarch’s description of Demetrius’ fabulous wardrobe, including a
cloak emblazoned with the signs of the zodiac (41.6–8) corresponds almost exactly with a
passage from the 22nd book of Duris’ history preserved in Athenaeus (FGrH 76 F 14 =
Athen. 12.535E–536A; on this passage, see n. 41.6.2). Given that Plutarch draws this
passage from Duris, it seems reasonable to assume that he does so elsewhere in the Life.
Duris, like Plutarch, refers to the renamed Dionysia as the Demetria, when epigraphic
evidence demonstrates that the renamed festival was known as the Dionysia and

                                                                                                                       
170
Didym. de Demosth. 12.50 = BNJ 76 T 7; Cic. ad Att. 6.1.18 = BNJ 76 T 6.
171
Δοῦρις µὲν οὖν οὐδ' ὅπου µηδὲν αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν ἴδιον πάθος εἰωθὼς κρατεῖν
τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, µᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα δεινῶσαι τὰς τῆς πατρίδος συµφορὰς
ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.
172
In addition to the passages cited above, see Alc. 32.2; Lys. 18.3; Alex. 15.2, 46.2; Phoc. 4.3;
Dem. 17.10, 19.3.

  51  
Demetrieia (n. 12.2.3); Plutarch’s preoccupation with Demetrius’ clothing suggests the
influence of Duris (ns. 9.7.1, 44.9.3); the account of Demetrius’ final days may rely in
part on Duris (FGrH 76 F 15), who seems to have claimed that Demetrius drank himself
to death in captivity (n. 52.5.2); Plutarch’s description of Demetrius’ funeral ceremony
off Corinth strongly resembles an account of the dramatic return of Alcibiades to Athens
(Alc. 34.2 = FGrH 76 F 76), which Plutarch attributes to Duris (n. 53.1.1).

We might safely go further still. Frances Pownall has highlighted Duris’ moral
program and shown that he consistently links luxury, extravagant display, and excessive
drinking with both political and military failure.173 The correspondences between the
Demetrius and what survives of Duris’ Macedonian history are too tenuous to prove
beyond doubt that Duris was the principal source for the Life, but the suggestion is not
implausible.174 In both tone and recurring themes, the Demetrius resonates powerfully
with the surviving fragments of Duris, and it seems almost certain that Plutarch’s
depiction of Demetrius owes much to the Samian historian.

V.4 Philippides of Cephale

Comedy and comic poets figure heavily in the Demetrius, a Life that features the
striking and persistent use of theatrical language and imagery. Plutarch mentions Lynceus
of Samos (n. 27.3.3), the author of diverse works including comedies, and recounts jokes
ridiculing Lamia written by Demochares of Soli (n. 27.4.2), and an anonymous poet (n.
27.4.1). Much more prominent is Philippides of Cephale, a comic poet of some renown, a
caustic critic of Stratocles, Demetrius’ most influential partisan in the Athenian assembly,
and a friend and courtier of Lysimachus, Demetrius’ most bitter rival. Philippides was a
prominent historical actor during and after Demetrius’ period of predominance in Athens
(n. 12.6.1), and Plutarch seems to have gleaned material drawn from his comic work to
illustrate the discontent of both the Athenians and the gods with the divine honors voted
Demetrius in Athens. In the midst of his discussion of these honors Plutarch describes the
manifold signs of divine displeasure that purportedly attended them: the sacred peplos of
Athena, on which the images of Antigonus and Demetrius had been woven, is ripped in

                                                                                                                       
173
Pownall in BNJ 76.
174
Kebrick 50–55; Chaniotis (2013) 68.

  52  
two by a freak storm during the Panathenaic procession; a great quantity of hemlock
suddenly grows up around the altars of the Saviors; an unseasonable cold spell forces the
cancellation of the Dionysia and ruins the harvest (12.3–5). This litany of calamities must
be drawn from a source hostile to the Antigonids, and a likely candidate is readily at
hand: Plutarch immediately cites the play of Philippides in which Stratocles’ impiety is
blamed for the late frost that spoiled the harvest and the storm that tore the peplos (12.7),
and it is at least possible that the play was Plutarch’s source for the entire series of
catastrophes (n. 12.3.2). At the climax of a lengthy section (23.5–26.5) that begins with
Demetrius taking up residence in the Parthenon and ends with Stratocles’ manipulation of
the calendar, Plutarch cites Philippides again, noting that the poet ridiculed Stratocles as
“the man who abridged the whole year into a single month”175 and Demetrius as “the man
who took the acropolis for an inn,/ and introduced his hetairai to the virgin goddess.”176
Both of these bookend events are well attested elsewhere, but it is possible that some of
the intervening material is also derived from Philippides—Plutarch’s description of the
suicide of the noble Democles is redolent of the comic stage, and almost certainly not
based on a historical episode (n. 24.2.2).

V.5 Phylarchus

Phylarchus (c 272–188) was the author of a history covering the period from
Pyrrhus’ expedition to the Peloponnese in 272 down to the death of his hero, the Spartan
king Cleomenes III, in 219. He seems to have been an Athenian, but other traditions
make him a native of Naucratis or Sicyon (Suda s.v. Φύλαρχος, Adler Φ 828). Plutarch
was familiar with his work, citing him four times in the Agis and Cleomenes, and once
each in his biographies of Themistocles, Demosthenes, Pyrrhus, and Aratus.177 As we
have seen, Phylarchus was censured for the dramatic qualities of his narrative, and
Plutarch added his voice to the chorus of Phylarchus’ critics. He derides Phylarchus for
introducing a purportedly fictional character to add tragic coloring to his account of the
fate of the remains of Themistocles, in terms that recall his criticism of Duris: “as if in a

                                                                                                                       
175
ὁ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συντεµὼν εἰς µῆν' ἕνα,
176
ὁ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν πανδοκεῖον ὑπολαβών,/
καὶ τὰς ἑταίρας εἰσαγαγὼν τῇ παρθένῳ.
177
Ag. and Cl. 9.3, 26.3, 49.2, 51.3; Them. 32.4; Dem. 27.2; Pyrr. 27.8; Arat. 38.12.

  53  
tragedy, he all but erects a theatrical machine for this story, and brings into the action a
certain Neocles” (ὥσπερ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ µονονοὺ µηχανὴν ἄρας καὶ
προαγαγὼν Νεοκλέα τινὰ, Them. 32.4 = FGrH 81 F 76). The chronological range of
Phylarchus’ history makes it unlikely that he was a major source for the Demetrius, but
he clearly made reference to earlier events and personalities, as the citations in the
Themistocles, the Demosthenes, and the Pyrrhus demonstrate. Indeed, Plutarch may have
drawn from Phylarchus both the mocking toast, in which one of Demetrius’ courtiers
hails his patron as king, but assigns derisive epithets to his rivals, and the exchange of
insults illustrating the mutual antipathy of Demetrius and Lysimachus that follows (ns.
25.7.5, 25.9.1): both the toast and the insults appear in nearly identical form in fragments
of Phylarchus preserved by Athenaeus (6.261B=FGrH 81 F 31; Athen. 14.614F–615A =
FGrH 81 F 12). Plutarch’s version of the toast, however, includes an additional royal
rival—Agathocles, “Lord of the Isles.” Athenaeus may simply have omitted Phylarchus’
reference to the Sicilian tyrant, but the difference could also be an indication that Plutarch
did not derive his material from Phylarchus, but that the two authors are instead relying
on a common source.

V.6 Conclusions

As the excerpt from the Pericles that serves as an epigraph to this section shows,
Plutarch was fully alive to the fact that contemporary sources were often biased, and
recognized the obstacles that biased sources placed in the way of historical research. In
addressing the abusive stories Antiphon told about Alcibiades, one of Plutarch’s most
morally ambiguous subjects, he claims that “the stories of a man who admitted to speak
ill out of personal enmity are perhaps not worthy of belief.”178 No such sensitivity is
evident in the Demetrius. Plutarch, in contrast to his usual practice, presents Demetrius as
an explicitly negative example; this departure seems to have been accompanied by a
corresponding deviation from his usual historiographical approach. He uncritically
includes material drawn from Philippides, a friend and courtier of Demetrius’ most bitter
rival, and is clearly reliant, perhaps heavily so, on Duris of Samos, an authority whose
objectivity and commitment to the truth he finds sorely lacking elsewhere. For many
                                                                                                                       
178
Alc. 3.2.

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modern commentators, this is at best methodological inconsistency, at worst bald
hypocrisy. Eduard Meyer and Friedrich Leo both censured Plutarch for ambivalence.179
Waldo Sweet protested that “a man of Plutarch's unquestioned integrity would not have
made extensive and unacknowledged use of an author whom he knew to be unreliable”:
he argued that Plutarch must have used Duris unwittingly.180 Robert Kebrick agreed,
declaring that if Plutarch consciously relied on Duris, “then his credibility as a historical
critic must be severely challenged.”181 But such accusations would not have given
Plutarch a moment’s pause: his primary goals were ethical and didactic, not historical,
and the scandalous anecdotal material that originated in the screeds of Demetrius’
enemies and the propaganda pamphlets of his rivals suited his purposes perfectly. In
crafting a portrait of a man “conspicuous for badness” Plutarch quite naturally sought out
material highlighting Demetrius’ vices. If he found this material in the work of authors
whom he had censured elsewhere, so be it. Subjecting his sources to the degree of
scrutiny he applies in other Lives with different goals could only undermine his primary
aims—the same could be said for acknowledging sources that he had deemed unreliable
elsewhere. An instructive analogue can be found in the Solon (27.1), where Plutarch
includes an account of Solon’s meeting with Croesus, even though he is well aware that it
was a chronological impossibility. He argues that the apocryphal episode is worthy of
inclusion because “the story is so famous and so well-attested, and, more importantly,
since it comports so well with the character of Solon, and is so worthy of his
magnanimity (µεγαλοφροσύνη) and wisdom (σοφία).”182 Plutarch might justify his
inclusion of the most scurrilous material in the Demetrius—the Democles episode springs
readily to mind—with just such an argument, even if he himself doubted its historicity.
To Plutarch’s mind, the story is emblematic of the relationship between Demetrius and
Athens, a relationship that both revealed and exacerbated Demetrius’ primary flaws—his
lack of self-control (σωφροσύνη) and inability to exhibit true virtue (ἀρετή). If such

                                                                                                                       
179
E. Meyer, Forschungen zur alten Geschichte v. 2 (Halle: 1899) 66–67; F. Leo, Die griechisch-
römische Biographie nach ihrer litterarischen Form (Leipzig: 1901) 175–77.
180
Sweet 181.
181
Kebrick 60.
182
ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον ἔνδοξον οὕτω καὶ τοσούτους µάρτυρας ἔχοντα καὶ (ὃ µεῖζόν ἐστι)
πρέποντα τῷ Σόλωνος ἤθει καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου µεγαλοφροσύνης καὶ σοφίας ἄξιον, οὔ µοι δοκῶ
προήσεσθα…

  55  
scandalous stories inspire Plutarch’s readers to emulate the virtues of his more
praiseworthy subjects, he will have achieved his goal—the question of whether or not
they actually happened is far less important.

It seems clear that Plutarch bases his portrait of Demetrius on material that
ultimately derives from contemporary sources. Despite the paucity of preserved
Hellenistic historiographical material, there is every indication that Hellenistic historians
sought to arouse the emotions of the reader, and were preoccupied with changes of
fortune, extravagant display, and illusion.183 All of these elements are readily evident in
the Demetrius, and Plutarch must have found in his sources abundant material to support
his vision of Demetrius as a flamboyant tragic actor buffeted by fate. Barring further
discoveries, however, the exact relationship of the Demetrius to these primary historians
must remain an intractable problem.

VI. A Note on Chronology

The chronology of the years 322–311 B.C. presents thorny and abiding problems.
The chronological confusion is embedded in the most detailed surviving literary source,
books 18–20 of Diodorus’ Library of History. Diodorus evidently had difficulty
reconciling the Athenian archon years, his own principle chronological marker, with the
summer-winter campaign seasons utilized by his primary annalistic source for the period,
generally assumed to be the history of Hieronymus of Cardia. The evidence of coins,
inscriptions, Babylonian historical documents, and dated Aramaic ostraca provides some
help in establishing a chronological framework, but integrating all the available evidence
in a coherent narrative has proved elusive. The pernicious nature of the problem is best
illustrated by the fact that scholars have developed two mutually exclusive dating systems
for the period, generally referred to as the “High” and “Low” chronologies, both of which
can feasibly be accommodated by the extant evidence and account for a number of
historical fixed points.184 The competing chronologies, which are in complete accord for

                                                                                                                       
183
Chaniotis (2013).
184
For an overviews of the problem and the relevant scholarship, see P. Wheatley “An
Introduction to the Chronological Problems in Early Diadoch Sources and Scholarship,” in W.
Heckel, L. Tritle, and P. Wheatley (eds.) Alexander’s Empire: Formulation to Decay (Claremont,

  56  
most of 319 and 318, revolve around key events in the three so-called Diadoch Wars. The
“High” chronology, initially developed by K. Julius Beloch, places the deaths of Craterus
and Perdiccas and the subsequent conference at Triparadisus in 321, the battle of Gabiene
in winter 317/6, and the battle of Gaza in spring 312,185 while the “Low” chronology of
Eugenio Manni downdates these events by a year, with the exception of the battle of
Gaza which is placed in the autumn of 312.186 In recent years, both P.J. Stylianou and
Tom Boiy have argued for an ingenious “Mixed” chronology that follows the “Low”
chronology for the events of 323–320 and the “High” chronology for 319–311, excluding
the Battle of Gaza, which retains its “Low” date of autumn 312.187 In my opinion, the
“Mixed” chronology best maps the array of available evidence onto a coherent historical
framework for the period. It has attracted numerous adherents, and I have duly
incorporated the scheme into the commentary.188 In any case, the Battle of Gaza and
affairs consequent on that battle mark the earliest events in the historical narrative
presented in the Demetrius, and the vexed chronological problems that complicate study
of the preceding decade figure only occasionally and tangentially in analysis of the
Life.189 Moreover, the vast majority of scholars, including many who vehemently

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
California: 2007) 179–92; Landucci-Gattinoni (2008) xxiv-xlvi; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel
8–22.
185
K.J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, vol. 3.2 (Berlin: 1904) 187–201; Beloch (1925) 235–49;
A.B. Bosworth, “Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors,” Chiron 22 (1992)
55–81; cf. Wheatley (1998). The fixed historical points embedded in the evidence are
conveniently assembled in a table by Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel (11).
186
E. Manni, “Tre note di cronologia ellenistica,” Rendiconti della Classe di scienze morali,
storiche e filologiche dell'Accademia dei Lincei 8 (1949) 53–61; Manni (1951) 67–81; R.
Errington, “From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323–320 B.C.,” JHS 90 (1970) 49–77; id., “Diodorus
Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi,” Hermes 105 (1977) 478–504; Anson
(2004); id. (2006); id. (2014) passim.
187
The “Mixed” chronology was originally developed by Stylianou (1994), in a paper that was
long overlooked by the scholarly community. Boiy (2007) arrived independently at much the
same conclusion.
188
e.g. Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel; Meeus (2012); Wallace (2014).
189
I have nothing new to contribute to the ongoing debate over the date of the battle, and a full
discussion is beyond the scope of the present work. The evidence currently available strongly
suggests that the battle took place in autumn 312. For a brief discussion of the evidence, see n. V:
The Battle of Gaza.

  57  
disagree about the chronology of earlier events, now agree that Demetrius was defeated at
Gaza in the autumn of 312.190

The chronology of the period 311–302 is relatively well established, with the
dates for only a few events engendering any scholarly controversy. Among these is
Demetrius’ initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries, an event that was staged exclusively
for his benefit and required an extraordinary manipulation of the Athenian calendar.
Ironically, scholars have long placed this feat of chronological meddling in the wrong
year. And for good reason: the accounts of both Diodorus and Plutarch give the
impression that Demetrius was initiated after the Hellenic League, an alliance of Greek
cities under Antigonid leadership, was formally constituted at the Isthmian Games in the
spring of 302. The recent publication of an enigmatic Athenian inscription (SEG 36.165),
however, demonstrates that the reorganization of the calendar that allowed Demetrius to
be initiated took place in 304/3 (n. 26.1.1). The revelation that Demetrius’ initiation took
place while he was rallying support for an alliance of Greek cities under Antigonid
leadership, and not after the formal inauguration of the Hellenic League in 302, allows
the events of these years to be reconstructed with greater precision, and may help explain
Demetrius’ motivations in requesting irregular initiation (n. 26.2.1).

Diodorus’ narrative technique may have created all manner of chronological

confusion, but the loss of his annalistic account of events subsequent to 302/1 leaves us
without any continuous account of the history of the third century. Since establishing an
accurate chronology of the period was not among Plutarch’s priorities when he composed
the Demetrius, and since relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the
chronology of the early 3rd century, chronological considerations are afforded
considerable attention in the commentary. Any attempt to establish a chronographic
scheme for the last two decades of Demetrius’ life must be based on the available fixed
points for the period. These include the death of Cassander in May 297, the fall of Athens
in the spring of 295, and the Pythian Games held in Athens in the late summer of 290.
Fixed or potential ranges of dates for individual events are addressed progressively in the

                                                                                                                       
190
E.g. Billows (1990) 125; Wheatley (2003); Boiy (2007) 115–17, 124–29; Wheatley (2009b)
328 n. 22, with further bibliography; Meeus (2012) 88; Anson (2014) 160.

  58  
notes, but for the sake of convenience, it seems advisable to include a timeline of the
chronological framework established herein. The epigraphical testimonia represent the
prime evidence for the chronology of this period, and the following scheme, which is
provisional and often speculative, is presented in full awareness of W.B. Dinsmoor’s
admonition that “new inscriptions may demolish one or more sections of a carefully
reared chronological structure, of which many connecting links are based upon
deduction.”191

Spring 303: Demetrius initiated into Eleusinian Mysteries (n. 24.1.1).

August/September 301: Battle of Ipsus (29.4.1).

Winter 301/0: Demetrius in Corinth (n. 31.2.2).

300: Demetrius raids the Thracian Chersonese (n. 31.2.5).

Late 300/Early 299: Wedding of Seleucus and Stratonice at Rhossus (n. 32.4.1).

Spring 299: Demetrius occupies Cilicia (n. 32.4.1).

299: Lysimachus and Demetrius at Soli (ns. 20.8.3, 32.4.1).

298: Demetrius and Ptolemy make peace (32.6.1).

Spring 297: Lachares establishes a tyranny in Athens (33.1.4).

May 297: Death of Cassander (n. 36.1.1)

296/5: Demetrius sacks Samaria (32.6.2).

296/5: Demetrius returns to mainland Greece (n. 33.2.2).

Late March/Early April 295: Athens falls to Demetrius (ns. 34.1.1, 34.4.2).

295–294: Demetrius in the Peloponnese (ns. 35.1.1, 35.2.1).

Autumn 294: Demetrius crowned king in Macedonia (n. 37.2.3).

294/3–293/2: Olympiodorus serves consecutive terms as eponymous archon in Athens (n.

34.5.4).
                                                                                                                       
191
W.B. Dinsmoor The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge, Mass.: 1931) viii.

  59  
Early 293: Demetrius invades Boeotia (n. 39.1.3).

Late 293/Early 292: First Boeotian revolt (n. 39.2.3); Hieronymus installed as military
governor in Boeotia (n. 39.4.2).
292: Demetrius invades Thrace, Second Boeotian Revolt (39.6.3).

Spring 291: Pyrrhus invades Thessaly (40.1.1).

Fall 291: Demetrius takes Thebes for a second time (n. 40.5.4).

Fall 291/Spring 290: Demetrius marries Lanassa in Corcyra (n. 40.7.1).

August/September 290: Pythian Games in Athens (n. 40.7.1).

September/October 290: Demetrius in Attica for Eleusinian Mysteries (40.8.1).

Winter 290/89: Demetrius in Macedonia (n. 41.1.1).

Spring 289: Demetrius invades Aetolia (n. 41.2.1).

289: Demetrius invades Epirus (n. 41.3.1).

Summer/Autumn 289: Pyrrhus invades Macedonia (n. 43.1.2); Demetrius signs treaty
with Pyrrhus (n. 43.2.2).
November/December 289: Demetrius signs treaty with Aetolians (n. 43.2.2).

Spring/Summer 288: Allied invasion of Macedonia (n. 44.3.1).

Autumn 288: Demetrius at Thebes (n. 45.2.1).

Spring 287: Demetrius at Corinth (n. 46.2.1)

Spring 287: Revolt in Athens (n. 46.2.1).

Summer 287: Demetrius besieges Athens (n. 46.2.4).

Winter 287/6: Multi-lateral negotiations in Athens (n. 46.4.1).

Spring 286: Demetrius invades Caria and Lydia (n. 46.4.2).

Winter 286/5: Demetrius winters in Cataonia (ns. 48.1.2, 48.1.4).

Spring/Summer 285: Demetrius surrenders to Seleucus (ns. 48.1.2, 49.9.5)

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Early 282: Demetrius dies in Apamaea (n. 52.5.3).

June/July 282: Demetrius’ funerary cavalcade at Corinth and burial at Demetrias in

Thessaly (n. 53.5.1).
VII: A Historical Commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius

Plutarch’s Life of Demetrius is one of the few literary sources through which we
can glimpse the Age of the Successors (323–281 B.C.), the bloody and chaotic four
decades that followed the death of Alexander; but the nature of Plutarch’s biographical
project in general, and the ethical and didactic aims that shape the Demetrius/Antony pair
in particular, can cloud and distort that vision. The scholar who would seek to recover the
historical Demetrius Poliorcetes is challenged at every turn by Plutarch’s moralizing
biography: as we have seen, the Life provides a thrilling, but often unreliable, vantage
point from which to view the man and his time. As yet there is no full-scale commentary
on the Demetrius in any language.192 The present work is an attempt to fill that need.

The absence of a commentary on Plutarch’s biography is but one example of the

curious lack of scholarship on the life and career of Demetrius himself. Of those who
contended for the empire of Alexander, Antigonus, Eumenes, Ptolemy, Lysimachus,
Cassander, and Seleucus have all been the subject of recent scholarly monographs.193 Not
so Demetrius. In 1951 Eugenio Manni produced a little monograph devoted solely to
Demetrius (Demetrio Poliorcete), but this slim volume, long out of print, was aimed
primarily at Italian schoolboys and hardly represented the definitive account of his
subject six decades ago, much less now.194 Richard Billows’ Antigonos the One-Eyed
(1990) deals only peripherally with the son in a work focused on the father, and
Demetrius is decidedly the lesser figure in Claude Wehrli’s Antigone et Démétrios
(1968). The treatment of Demetrius in both works is representative of the broader
scholarly tendency to accept Plutarch’s portrait of Demetrius more or less at face value,
                                                                                                                       
192
There are three Italian editions of the Demetrius—Manni (1953), Andrei (1989), and Santi
Amantini, Carena, and Manfredini (1995). Each of these comes equipped with brief, and often
helpful, running notes, but none represents an attempt at a full commentary.
193
Seibert (1969); Mehl (1986); Billows (1990); Grainger (1990); Lund; Landucci-Gattinoni
(1992, 2003); Anson (2004).
194
In his review of Demetrio Poliorcete, P.M. Fraser (CR 3, 1953: 208) notes Manni’s lack of
critical analysis and concludes that the monograph “will not be the final estimate of Demetrius,
based even on the material now available, but it is a sensible interim report.”

  61  
despite the fact that the Life is explicitly presented as a negative example, and crafted
from material drawn from patently hostile sources. Billows goes to great lengths to
defend Antigonus from the harsh criticism of ancient and modern commentators, and
while he is often successful in rehabilitating his subject, his denigration of Demetrius
betrays precisely the same credulity that he criticizes in the detractors of Antigonus. For
Billows, Demetrius is every bit the incompetent degenerate familiar from Plutarch’s Life,
and he consistently lays responsibility for the late-career failures of Antigonus at the feet
of his son.195 For his part, Wehrli is content to accept Plutarch’s account of Demetrius’
purported sexual misadventures in Athens without any comment at all.196

However, the last two decades have seen a surge in scholarship devoted to the
social, political, religious, and military history of the Hellenistic period in general, and
the tumultuous decades that followed the death of Alexander in particular. This
commentary has benefitted immensely from Christopher Pelling’s (1988) commentary on
the Antony, Christian Habicht’s (1997) magisterial history of Hellenistic Athens, A.B.
Bosworth’s (2002) set of essays devoted to various aspects of the history and
historiography of the Successor era, the religious surveys of Jon Mikalson (1998) and
Robert Parker (1996, 2011), Paschalis Paschidis’ (2008) prosopographical study
exploring the intricate web of relationships linking the Greek cities with the Hellenistic
kings, and William Murray’s illumination of the development of Hellenistic naval
warfare (2012), to name just a few. Most importantly, a series of articles by Pat Wheatley
have given new impetus to the study of the life and career of Demetrius. His influence on
the present work will be readily evident.

While I have devoted the majority of this Introduction to a discussion of

Plutarch’s technique as he shaped Demetrius’ career into a cautionary tale about the
dangers of excessive flattery, improper imitation, and unbridled ambition, the historical
analysis in the Commentary that follows represents an attempt to recover some of what
was altered, obfuscated, or lost in the process. A variety of evidence can be marshaled to

                                                                                                                       
195
See, e.g. Billows (199) 186: “For if our sources show one thing, it is that the failures of
Antigonos’s later career were for the most part due to the excessive trust he placed in the abilities
of Demetrios, brilliant though Demetrios was capable of being on occasion.”
196
E.g. Wehrli 126.

  62  
this end. The ancient literary assemblage is woefully deficient, particularly for the last
twenty years of Demetrius’ life, after the relatively detailed narrative of Diodorus breaks
off: Plutarch’s biography of Pyrrhus adds only a little to the narrative of events in the
Demetrius; there is much of value in the salient passages in Pausanias, but he was often at
the mercy of his guides and sometimes confused, chronologically or otherwise;
Polyaenus preserves a handful of stratagems deployed by Demetrius and his rivals, but
their historical context is often elusive; Athenaeus collects a fascinating array of near-
contemporary anecdotal material that is largely devoted to Demetrius’ proverbially
luxurious lifestyle and dalliances with famous courtesans.

The rich variety of extant material evidence, much of which was not available for
earlier commentators, is sometimes more helpful. Inscriptions, coins, and architecture
often speak where Plutarch is silent, or hint at how he shapes his source material to his
own ends. The epigraphic record provides the principal supplement to the literary
evidence. Although the data is often difficult to interpret and always governed by the
caprice of survival and discovery, the extant material is rich, varied, and continually
augmented by new finds. Thanks to the admirable Athenian epigraphic habit of prefacing
state decrees with elaborate dating formulae, many events that impacted Athens or
Athenians can be more or less precisely dated, depending on the degree of preservation of
the decrees in question. Most notable among these events are Demetrius’ initiation into
the Eleusinian Mysteries in 304/3 (n. 26.1.1), the battle of Ipsus in 301/0 (n. 29.4.1), the
expulsion of Lachares from Athens in 296/5 (n. 34.1.1), the imposition of a government
with recognizably oligarchic features in 294/3 (n. 34.5.4), and the expulsion of
Demetrius’ garrison from Athens late in 288/7 (n. 46.2.1).

The first of these has long been both misdated and misunderstood, but the
epigraphical record illuminates both the logistics of Demetrius’ highly irregular initiation
and helps explain his motivations in seeking it. An enigmatic decree dated to the ninth
day of “second Anthesterion” in 304/3 (SEG 36.165) confirms Plutarch’s account of the
calendrical manipulation that facilitated Demetrius’ irregular initiation into the Eleusinian
Mysteries, but shows that the initiation took place during Demetrius’ campaign to liberate
the Peloponnesian cities occupied by Cassander, and not, as was previously thought, after

  63  
the formal inauguration of the Hellenic League, an alliance of Greek states under
Antigonid leadership formed in 302 for the express purpose of destroying Cassander.197
The revelation that Demetrius’ Eleusinian initiation preceded the formation of the League
helps explain Demetrius’ motivations: initiation conferred a potent sanction of
Demetrius’ Hellenism and ritual purity at a time when he was seeking to build support for
an alliance of free Greek states and paint Cassander as a foreign occupier and enemy of
Greek freedom tainted by his role in the murder of Alexander’s mother, wife, and son.
The special attention Demetrius paid to Demeter’s Eleusinian sanctuary threw
Cassander’s earlier attacks on Eleusis into sharp relief, and must have burnished
Demetrius’ credentials as the potential leader of a Greek alliance that aimed to destroy
him (n. 26.1.1).

The substantial corpus of surviving Athenian decrees also reveals the prodigious
legislative activity of Demetrius’ partisans in the period 307–301. Preeminent among
them was Stratocles, the most prolific proposer of decrees in Athenian history and the
most influential figure in the city in the years following the expulsion of Demetrius of
Phalerum near the end of 308/7 (n. 11.1.1). At least twenty-six and perhaps as many as
twenty-nine decrees proposed by Stratocles are extant,198 an astonishing figure that
renders Plutarch’s account (10.1–11.1, 12.1–2) of his feverish activity on behalf of the
Antigonids wholly plausible, even if some of the specific proposals Plutarch attributes to
Stratocles and his allies merit skepticism. Plutarch cites a decree forbidding the
introduction of Demetrius’ letters into debate in the Assembly as evidence of a backlash
against the ascendancy of Antigonid partisans (27.1–3), but the extant decrees offer only
tantalizing hints of the activities of Stratocles’ political opponents prior to the expulsion
of Demetrius’ garrison from the Athenian asty in 287 (n. 27.4.2). After Demetrius
departed Athens for the final time, the Athenians began the process of honoring those
who had contributed to the liberation of the city. Honorific decrees especially those for
Demochares (Mor. 851D-F), Callias (SEG 28.60), and Philippides (IG II2 657),
supplement Plutarch’s brief account of the revolt and the siege and negotiations that
                                                                                                                       
197
On the inauguration of the League, probably at the Isthmian Games in the spring of 302, see n.
25.1.4.
198
The decrees proposed by Stratocles are conveniently assembled by Paschidis (2008, 80); cf.
Tracy (2000).

  64  
followed it, and show that the new regime characterized its predecessor as κατάλυσις
τοῦ δήµου199 and ὀλιγαρχία (ns. 12.6.1, 30.4.3, 46.2.1, 51.1.1).

Inscriptions from outside Athens shed light on Demetrius’ Peloponnesian

campaign of 303 (ns. 25.31, 24.7.2), including the refoundation of Sicyon as Demetrias
(n. 25.3.1), and Demetrius’ subsequent attempts to harness panhellenic festivals as
vehicles for Antigonid propaganda: a fragment from a Nemean monument (SEG 26.357),
perhaps erected during the Nemean Games in the summer of 303, seems to record the
contributions of Demetrius’ Greek allies to the cause of Greek freedom (n. 25.2.1), and a
fragmentary copy of the charter of the Hellenic League found at Epidaurus (IG IV2. 1.68)
reveals much of the structure and institutions of that alliance (n. 25.4.1). Demetrius’
movements after the disaster at Ipsus are very poorly documented, but a Delian inventory
(IG XI 2.146) records that he took up residence for a time in the Temple of Apollo (n.
30.4.1), and an inscribed list of Milesian magistrates (Syll.3 322 = Miletos I 3, 123) sheds
some light on the vexed question of the extent of Demetrius’ territorial possessions in the
early years of the 3rd century (30.2.5). The recent discovery at Delphi of an inscription
(SEG 48.588) detailing the terms of a peace Demetrius negotiated with the Aetolians
reveals that Demetrius’ successfully freed Delphi from Aetolian control in 289, and
seems to confirm that Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia that same year (ns. 43.1.2, 43.2.2).
Another relatively recent find, a fragmentary letter from Demetrius to the Caunians (I
Caunus 1), suggests that it was Caunus, and not Miletus, that served as the bridgehead for
Demetrius’ final Asian invasion in 286 (n. 46.4.2).

Numismatic evidence illustrates Demetrius’ efforts in the realm of divine self-

fashioning: the depiction of Demetrius with the bull’s horns of Dionysus (or perhaps
Poseidon, n. 2.3.6) may be the earliest coin portraits of a living ruler (n. 30.2.5), and his
coins often featured an image of a striding Poseidon that seems to have been adopted as
an emblem by mercenaries in Demetrius’ service (n. 17.1.4). A coin hoard found near
Corinth suggests that control of the city passed from Ptolemy to Cassander soon after the
battle of Salamis in 306 (n. 25.1.5), while a hoard from New Halos strengthens the

                                                                                                                       
199
The language echoes Philippides’ comedy, in which he ridiculed Stratocles for proposing
divine honors for Demetrius: ταῦτα καταλύει δῆµον, οὐ κωµῳδία (12.7).

  65  
historical arguments linking Demetrius to the foundation of that city in 302 (n. 28.2.1).
After the death of Antigonus Demetrius began minting in his own name on Cyprus,
issuing the famous series of coins featuring a winged Nike alighting on the prow of a ship
(n. 17.1.4). The iconography of these coins illuminates Demetrius’ propaganda efforts
after Ipsus, as he sought to remind potential allies and enemies of his abiding strength at
sea, while the impressive size of the issues confirms the importance of the mint at
Cypriote Salamis and illustrates the staggering costs associated with the large-scale troop
mobilizations and the naval arms race that characterized the era (ns. 17.1.4, 30.2.5,
32.6.2, 43.4.1). Indeed, the extraordinary naval building program that provoked
Demetrius’ rivals to ally against him and drive him from Macedonia was funded by an
increase in production by the mints at Chalcis and Pella, and a mammoth issue from
Amphipolis (n. 43.4.1).

Archaeological evidence from all over mainland Greece and the Aegean
demonstrates that Demetrius deserves renown not just as a besieger of cities, but as a
founder, fortifier, and benefactor of them (ns. 17.1.4, 23.1.1, 23.3.2, 25.3.1, 39.1.1). The
comprehensive renovation of the Athenian fortifications overseen by Demochares in
307/6 must have been sponsored, at least in part, by Demetrius (n. 23.1.1). Excavations at
Sicyon confirm Plutarch’s account of the metoikesis of the Sicyonians (n. 25.3.1), and
recent work in Thessaly suggests that Demetrius was much more active in that region
than has previously been realized. Indeed, nearly a decade before work began on
Demetrias, his magnificent Thessalian capital, Demetrius was probably responsible for
the foundation of New Halos, and perhaps nearby Kastro Kallithea as well (ns. 28.2.1,
39.1.1). Corinth was the prime beneficiary of Demetrius’ euergetism, and it is clear that
the Isthmian metropolis was every bit as central to Demetrius’ plans and aims as Athens
(ns. 31.2.2, 31.2.5, 33.8.1, 40.7.1, 43.4.1, 44.4.1, 45.2.1, 46.4.2, 53.4.1), a fact obfuscated
by the Athenocentrism of the extant sources. Among the benefits the Corinthians derived
from their close and abiding relationship with Demetrius were a flourishing economy and
a building boom: the fortifications of the acropolis and the lower town were
comprehensivly overhauled, and the city was adorned with a host of new public buildings
and amenities (n. 31.2.2). The so-called Neorion on Delos, built to commemorate
Demetrius’ naval victory at Salamis, was probably the most lavish of Demetrios’ many

  66  
dedications in panhellenic sanctuaries. The monument was built to house an entire votive
warship and featured an elaborate decorative scheme, including engaged columns with
capitals sculpted in the shape of bulls protome (n. 17.1.4).

In his elegant introduction to Plutarch’s life and work, Robert Lamberton

observed, “Plutarch’s villains are undeniably more attractive than his rather priggish
heroes.”200 Indeed, the Demetrius Poliorcetes that emerges from the pages of Plutarch’s
Life is a captivating figure despite, or perhaps because of, his many flaws. It is my hope
that the present work goes some distance towards an understanding of the historical
Demetrius, a no less compelling figure. Demetrius was a charismatic and inspiring
commander who developed into a capable and creative tactician. His flamboyance and
the purported excesses of his personal life must have some basis in reality, but the
propaganda efforts of his enemies and the embroideries of Plutarch and his sources did
much to shape that tradition. Important too is the realization that Demetrius’ actions were
not simply the products of his own character and ambition, but were shaped by the
pressures and challenges of negotiating the emerging idioms of Hellenistic kingship and
ruler cult. In approaching the events that are presented in the Life, I have asked first, “did
it happen?,” and, if so, “did it happen like this?” The “whens,” “wheres,” and “whys”
followed naturally. Despite the advantages of new finds and the superb scholarly
contributions to the history of the Successors that have appeared in recent years, the
available evidence for many of the events of Demetrius’ career remains scanty in the
extreme, so that my analysis often proceeds, as it must, on an ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων basis,
arguing, as so many fourth-century orators did, from contextual probability. I hope the
work will provide an impetus for further study of Plutarch’s treatment of the Successors,
and further exploration in a fascinating era that for too long remained undeservedly
underserved by modern scholarship.

                                                                                                                       
200
Lamberton 131.

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 TEXT

ΠΛΟΥΤΑΡΧΟΥ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ

1.1.1 Οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς τέχνας ἐοικέναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν

ὑπολαβόντες οὐχ ἥκιστά µοι δοκοῦσι τὴν περὶ τὰς κρί-
σεις αὐτῶν κατανοῆσαι δύναµιν, ᾗ τῶν ἐναντίων ὁµοίως
ἑκατέρῳ γένει πεφύκαµεν ἀντιλαµβάνεσθαι. τοῦτο γὰρ
1.1.5 αὐταῖς κοινόν ἐστι· τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὰ τέλη τῶν κρινοµένων
1.2.1 ἀναφορᾷ διαλλάττουσιν. ἡ µὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐδέν τι
µᾶλλον ἐπὶ λευκῶν ἢ µελάνων διαγνώσει γέγονεν, οὐδὲ
γλυκέων ἢ πικρῶν, οὐδὲ µαλακῶν καὶ εἰκόντων ἢ σκληρῶν
καὶ ἀντιτύπων, ἀλλ' ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἑκάστοις ἐντυγχάνουσαν
1.2.5 ὑπὸ πάντων τε κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινουµένην πρὸς τὸ φρο-
1.3.1 νοῦν ἀναφέρειν ὡς πέπονθεν. αἱ δὲ τέχναι µετὰ λόγου
συνεστῶσαι πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ λῆψιν οἰκείου τινός, φυγὴν
δὲ καὶ διάκρουσιν ἀλλοτρίου, τὰ µὲν ἀφ' αὑτῶν καὶ
προηγουµένως, τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ φυλάξασθαι κατὰ συµβεβη-
1.3.5 κὸς ἐπιθεωροῦσι· καὶ γὰρ ἰατρικῇ τὸ νοσερὸν καὶ ἁρµο-
νικῇ τὸ ἐκµελές, ὅπως ἔχει, σκοπεῖν συµβέβηκε πρὸς τὴν
1.4.1 τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπεργασίαν· αἵ τε πασῶν τελεώταται τε-
χνῶν, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις, οὐ καλῶν
µόνον καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὠφελίµων, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερῶν καὶ
αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἀδίκων κρίσεις οὖσαι, τὴν ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν κα-
1.4.5 κῶν καλλωπιζοµένην ἀκακίαν οὐκ ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀβελ-
τερίαν ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἄγνοιαν ὧν µάλιστα γινώσκειν προς-
1.5.1 ήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς βιωσοµένους. οἱ µὲν οὖν παλαιοὶ Σπαρ-
τιᾶται τοὺς εἵλωτας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς πολὺν ἀναγκάζον-
τες πίνειν ἄκρατον εἰσῆγον εἰς τὰ συµπόσια, τοῖς νέοις
οἷόν ἐστι τὸ µεθύειν ἐπιδεικνύντες· ἡµεῖς δὲ τὴν µὲν
1.5.5 ἐκ διαστροφῆς ἑτέρων ἐπανόρθωσιν οὐ πάνυ φιλάν-

  68  
 θρωπον οὐδὲ πολιτικὴν ἡγούµεθα, τῶν δὲ κεχρηµένων
ἀσκεπτότερον αὑτοῖς καὶ γεγονότων ἐν ἐξουσίαις καὶ
πράγµασι µεγάλοις ἐπιφανῶν εἰς κακίαν οὐ χεῖρον ἴσως
ἐστὶ συζυγίαν µίαν ἢ δύο παρεµβαλεῖν εἰς τὰ παρα-
1.5.10 δείγµατα τῶν βίων, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονῇ µὰ Δία καὶ δι-
αγωγῇ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ποικίλλοντας τὴν γραφήν,
1.6.1 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Ἰσµηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος ἐπιδεικνύµενος τοῖς
µαθηταῖς καὶ τοὺς εὖ καὶ τοὺς κακῶς αὐλοῦντας εἰώθει
λέγειν “οὕτως αὐλεῖν δεῖ” καὶ πάλιν “οὕτως αὐλεῖν οὐ
δεῖ”, ὁ δ' Ἀντιγενείδας καὶ ἥδιον ᾤετο τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀ-
1.6.5 κροᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους αὐλητῶν, <ἤν τ>ινα καὶ τῶν φαύ-
λων πεῖραν λαµβάνωσιν, οὕτως µοι δοκοῦµεν ἡµεῖς
προθυµότεροι τῶν βελτιόνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ
µιµηταὶ βίων, εἰ µηδὲ τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγοµένων ἀν-
ιστορήτως ἔχοιµεν.
1.7.1 Περιέξει δὴ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον τὸν Δηµητρίου τοῦ Πολιορ-
κητοῦ βίον καὶ τὸν Ἀντωνίου τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ἀνδρῶν
µάλιστα δὴ τῷ Πλάτωνι µαρτυρησάντων, ὅτι καὶ κακίας
1.8.1 µεγάλας ὥσπερ ἀρετὰς αἱ µεγάλαι φύσεις ἐκφέρουσι. γε-
νόµενοι δ' ὁµοίως ἐρωτικοὶ ποτικοὶ στρατιωτικοὶ µεγαλό-
δωροι πολυτελεῖς ὑβρισταί, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τύχην ὁµοιότη-
τας ἀκολούθους ἔσχον. οὐ γὰρ µόνον ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ
1.8.5 µεγάλα µὲν κατορθοῦντες, µεγάλα δὲ σφαλλόµενοι, πλεί-
στων δ' ἐπικρατοῦντες, πλεῖστα δ' ἀποβάλλοντες, ἀπρος-
δοκήτως δὲ πταίοντες, ἀνελπίστως δὲ πάλιν ἀναφέροντες
διετέλεσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατέστρεψεν ὁ µὲν ἁλοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
πολεµίων, ὁ δ' ἔγγιστα τοῦ παθεῖν τοῦτο γενόµενος.
2.1.1 Ἀντιγόνῳ τοίνυν δυοῖν υἱῶν ἐκ Στρατονίκης τῆς
Κορράγου γενοµένων, τὸν µὲν ἐπὶ τἀδελφῷ Δηµήτριον,
τὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῷ πατρὶ Φίλιππον ὠνόµασεν. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ

  69  
 τῶν πλείστων λόγος. ἔνιοι δὲ τὸν Δηµήτριον οὐχ υἱόν,
2.1.4 ἀλλ' ἀδελφιδοῦν γενέσθαι τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου λέγουσιν· ἐπὶ
νηπίῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ παντάπασι τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτήσαντος,
εἶτα τῆς µητρὸς εὐθὺς τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ γαµηθείσης, υἱὸν
2.2.1 ἐκείνου νοµισθῆναι. τὸν µὲν οὖν Φίλιππον οὐ πολλοῖς
ἔτεσι τοῦ Δηµητρίου νεώτερον ὄντα συνέβη τελευτῆσαι.
Δηµήτριος δὲ µεγέθει µὲν ἦν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐλάττων, καίπερ
ὢν µέγας, ἰδέᾳ δὲ καὶ κάλλει προσώπου θαυµαστὸς καὶ
2.2.5 περιττός, ὥστε τῶν πλαττόντων καὶ γραφόντων µηθένα
τῆς ὁµοιότητος ἐφικέσθαι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ χάριν καὶ βάρος
καὶ φόβον καὶ ὥραν εἶχε, καὶ συνεκέκρατο τῷ νεαρῷ καὶ
ἰταµῷ δυσµίµητος ἡρωική τις ἐπιφάνεια καὶ βασιλικὴ
2.3.1 σεµνότης. οὕτω δέ πως καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπεφύκει πρὸς ἔκ-
πληξιν ἀνθρώπων ἅµα καὶ χάριν. ἥδιστος γὰρ ὢν συγ-
γενέσθαι, σχολάζων τε περὶ πότους καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ διαί-
τας ἁβροβιώτατος βασιλέων, ἐνεργότατον αὖ πάλιν καὶ
2.3.5 σφοδρότατον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐνδελεχὲς εἶχε καὶ
δραστήριον· ᾗ καὶ µάλιστα τῶν θεῶν ἐζήλου τὸν Διόνυ-
σον, ὡς πολέµῳ τε χρῆσθαι δεινότατον, εἰρήνην τ' αὖθις
ἐκ πολέµου τρέψαι [καὶ] πρὸς εὐφροσύνην καὶ χάριν
ἐµµελέστατον.
3.1.1 Ἦν µὲν οὖν καὶ φιλοπάτωρ διαφερόντως· τῇ δὲ
περὶ τὴν µητέρα σπουδῇ καὶ τὸν πατέρα τιµῶν ἐφαί-
νετο δι' εὔνοιαν ἀληθινὴν µᾶλλον ἢ θεραπείαν τῆς δυ-
3.2.1 νάµεως. καί ποτε πρεσβείᾳ τινὶ τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου σχολά-
ζοντος, ἀπὸ θήρας ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐπέστη, καὶ προσελθὼν
τῷ πατρὶ καὶ φιλήσας, ὥσπερ εἶχε τὰς βολίδας ἐκάθισε
παρ' αὐτόν. ὁ δ' Ἀντίγονος ἀπιόντας ἤδη τοὺς πρές-
3.2.5 βεις ἔχοντας τὰς ἀποκρίσεις µεγάλῃ φωνῇ προσαγορεύ-
σας, “καὶ τοῦτο” εἶπεν “ὦ ἄνδρες ἀπαγγέλλετε περὶ

  70  
 ἡµῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως ἔχοµεν”, ὡς ἰσχύν τινα
πραγµάτων βασιλικῶν καὶ δυνάµεως ἐπίδειξιν οὖσαν
3.3.1 τὴν πρὸς υἱὸν ὁµόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν. οὕτως ἄρα πάντῃ
δυσκοινώνητον ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ µεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας,
ὥστ' ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν µέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδό-
χων καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ὅτι µὴ φοβεῖται τὸν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ
3.4.1 προσίεται τὴν λόγχην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώµατος πλησίον. οὐ
µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ µόνος ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁ οἶκος οὗτος ἐπὶ πλεί-
στας διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσε, µᾶλ-
λον δ' εἷς µόνος τῶν ἀπ' Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν
3.5.1 υἱόν. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἅπασαι διαδοχαὶ πολλῶν µὲν
ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ µητέρων φόνους καὶ γυναι-
κῶν· τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἀδελφοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωµέ-
τραι τὰ αἰτήµατα λαµβάνουσιν, οὕτω συνεχωρεῖτο, κοινόν
3.5.5 τι νοµιζόµενον αἴτηµα καὶ βασιλικὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.
4.1.1 Τοῦ µέντοι καὶ φιλάνθρωπον φύσει καὶ φιλέται-
ρον γεγονέναι τὸν Δηµήτριον ἐν ἀρχῇ παράδειγµα τοιοῦ-
τόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. Μιθριδάτης ὁ Ἀριοβαρζάνου παῖς
ἑταῖρος ἦν αὐτοῦ καὶ καθ' ἡλικίαν συνήθης, ἐθεράπευε
4.1.5 δ' Ἀντίγονον οὔτ' ὢν οὔτε δοκῶν πονηρός. ἐκ δ' ἐν-
4.2.1 υπνίου τινὸς ὑποψίαν Ἀντιγόνῳ παρέσχεν. ἐδόκει γὰρ µέγα
καὶ καλὸν πεδίον ἐπιὼν ὁ Ἀντίγονος ψῆγµά τι χρυσίου
κατασπείρειν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ πρῶτον µὲν ὑποφύεσθαι θέρος
χρυσοῦν, ὀλίγῳ δ' ὕστερον ἐπελθὼν ἰδεῖν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ
4.2.5 τετµηµένην καλάµην· λυπούµενος δὲ καὶ περιπαθῶν
ἀκοῦσαί τινων λεγόντων, ὡς ἄρα Μιθριδάτης εἰς Πόν-
τον Εὔξεινον οἴχεται τὸ χρυσοῦν θέρος ἐξαµησάµενος.
4.3.1 ἐκ τούτου διαταραχθεὶς καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁρκώσας σιωπήσειν,
ἔφρασε τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῷ καὶ ὅτι πάντως τὸν ἄνθρωπον
4.4.1 ἐκποδὼν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ διαφθείρειν ἔγνωκεν. ἀκούσας δ' ὁ

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 Δηµήτριος ἠχθέσθη σφόδρα, καὶ τοῦ νεανίσκου καθάπερ
εἰώθει γενοµένου παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ συνόντος ἐπὶ σχολῆς,
φθέγξασθαι µὲν οὐκ ἐτόλµησεν οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ κατειπεῖν
4.4.5 διὰ τὸν ὅρκον, ὑπαγαγὼν δὲ κατὰ µικρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων,
ὡς ἐγεγόνεσαν µόνοι καθ' αὑτούς, τῷ στύρακι τῆς λόγχης
κατέγραψεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ὁρῶντος αὐτοῦ· “φεῦγε Μιθρι-
δάτα”. συνεὶς δ' ἐκεῖνος ἀπέδρα νυκτὸς εἰς Καππαδοκίαν,
καὶ ταχὺ τὴν Ἀντιγόνῳ γενοµένην ὄψιν ὕπαρ αὐτῷ συν-
4.5.1 ετέλει τὸ χρεών· πολλῆς γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθῆς ἐκράτησε χώρας,
καὶ τὸ τῶν Ποντικῶν βασιλέων γένος ὀγδόῃ που διαδοχῇ
παυσάµενον ὑπὸ Ῥωµαίων ἐκεῖνος παρέσχε. ταῦτα µὲν
οὖν εὐφυΐας δείγµατα τοῦ Δηµητρίου πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν
4.5.5 καὶ δικαιοσύνην.
5.1.1 Ἐπεὶ δ', ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἐµπεδοκλέους στοιχείοις
διὰ τὸ νεῖκος ἔνεστι διαφορὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πόλεµος,
µᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀλλήλων ἁπτοµένοις καὶ πελάζουσιν, οὕτω
τὸν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντα
5.1.5 συνεχῆ πόλεµον αἱ τῶν πραγµάτων καὶ τῶν τόπων συν-
άφειαι πρὸς ἐνίους ἐποίουν ἐπιφανέστερον καὶ µᾶλλον
ἐξέκᾳον, ὥσπερ Ἀντιγόνῳ τότε πρὸς Πτολεµαῖον, αὐτὸς
µὲν Ἀντίγονος ἐν Φρυγίᾳ διέτριβε, Πτολεµαῖον δ' ἀκούων
ἐκ Κύπρου διαβάντα πορθεῖν Συρίαν καὶ τὰς πόλεις
5.2.1 [ἀπ]ἄγειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι, κατέπεµψε τὸν υἱὸν Δηµήτριον,
δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν ὄντα καὶ στρατείας τότε πρῶτον
5.3.1 αὐτοτελῶς ἐπὶ πράγµασι µεγάλοις ἁπτόµενον. οἷα δὲ νέος
καὶ ἄπειρος ἀνδρὶ συµπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου παλαί-
στρας, ἠθληκότι πολλοὺς καὶ µεγάλους καθ' αὑτὸν ἀγῶνας,
ἐσφάλη περὶ πόλιν Γάζαν ἡττηθείς, ὀκτακισχιλίων ἁλόν-
5.4.1 των καὶ πεντακισχιλίων ἀποθανόντων. ἀπέβαλε δὲ καὶ
σκηνὴν καὶ χρήµατα καὶ ὅλως σύµπασαν τὴν περὶ τὸ

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 σῶµα θεραπείαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν αὐτῷ Πτολεµαῖος ἀπ-
έπεµψε µετὰ τῶν φίλων, εὐγνώµονα καὶ φιλάνθρωπον
5.4.5 ἀνειπὼν λόγον, ὡς οὐ περὶ πάντων ἅµα, περὶ δόξης δὲ
5.5.1 καὶ ἀρχῆς πολεµητέον ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς. Δηµήτριος δὲ δεξά-
µενος ηὔξατο τοῖς θεοῖς µὴ πολὺν χρόνον ὀφειλέτην
Πτολεµαίῳ γενέσθαι χάριτος, ἀλλὰ ταχέως ἀµείψασθαι
5.6.1 διὰ τῶν ὁµοίων. καὶ πάθος οὐ µειρακίου παθὼν ἐν ἀρχῇ
πράξεων ἀνατραπέντος, ἀλλ' ἐµβριθοῦς στρατηγοῦ κεχρη-
µένου πραγµάτων µεταβολαῖς, ἀνδρῶν τε συλλογῆς καὶ
κατασκευῆς ὅπλων ἐπεµελεῖτο, καὶ τὰς πόλεις διὰ χειρὸς
5.6.5 εἶχε καὶ τοὺς ἀθροιζοµένους ἐγύµναζεν.
6.1.1 Ἀντίγονος δὲ τὴν µάχην πυθόµενος, Πτολεµαῖον µὲν
ἀγενείους νενικηκότα ἔφη νῦν αὖθις ἀγωνιεῖσθαι πρὸς
ἄνδρας, τοῦ δ' υἱοῦ τὸ φρόνηµα καθελεῖν καὶ κολοῦσαι µὴ
βουλόµενος, οὐκ ἐνέστη πάλιν αἰτουµένῳ µάχεσθαι καθ'
6.2.1 αὑτόν, ἀλλ' ἐφῆκε. καὶ µετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἀφῖκτο
Κίλλης Πτολεµαίου στρατηγὸς µετὰ λαµπρᾶς δυνάµεως,
ὡς ἐξελάσων Συρίας Δηµήτριον ἁπάσης, τῷ προηττῆσθαι
6.3.1 καταφρονούµενον. ὁ δ' ἐξαίφνης ἐπιπεσὼν οὐ προαισθο-
µένῳ καὶ φοβήσας, ἔλαβεν αὐτῷ στρατηγῷ τὸ στρατό-
πεδον, καὶ στρατιώτας µὲν ἑπτακισχιλίους ζῶντας εἷλε,
6.4.1 χρηµάτων δὲ παµπόλλων ἐκυρίευσεν. ἔχαιρε δὲ νικήσας
οὐχ οἷς ἕξειν, ἀλλ' οἷς ἀποδώσειν ἔµελλε, καὶ τῆς νίκης
οὐ τὸν πλοῦτον οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν δόξαν ὡς τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ
φιλανθρωπεύµατος ἐκείνου καὶ τὴν χάριν ἠγάπησεν. οὐ
6.4.5 µὴν αὐτογνωµόνως ταῦτ' ἔπραξεν, ἀλλ' ἔγραψε τῷ πατρί.
6.5.1 δόντος δ' ἐκείνου καὶ κελεύσαντος ὃν βούλεται πᾶσι
χρήσασθαι τρόπον, αὐτόν τε τὸν Κίλλην καὶ <τοὺς> φίλους
αὐτῷ δωρησάµενος ἀφθόνως ἀπέπεµψε. τοῦτο τὸ πά-
θος Συρίας ἐξήλασε Πτολεµαῖον, Ἀντίγονον δὲ κατ-

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6.5.5 ήγαγεν ἐκ Κελαινῶν χαίροντα τῇ νίκῃ καὶ ποθοῦντα
θεάσασθαι τὸν υἱόν.
7.1.1 Ἐκ τούτου δὲ τῶν Ἀράβων τοὺς καλουµένους Να-
βαταίους ὑπαγαγέσθαι πεµφθεὶς ὁ Δηµήτριος, ἐκιν-
δύνευσε µὲν εἰς τόπους ἀνύδρους ἐµπεσών, τῷ δὲ µὴ
διαταραχθῆναι µηδ' ἐκπλαγῆναι καταπληξάµενος τοὺς
7.1.5 βαρβάρους, λείαν τε λαβὼν πολλὴν καὶ καµήλους ἑπτα-
κοσίας παρ' αὐτῶν ἀνεχώρησεν.
7.2.1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ Σέλευκος ἐκπεσὼν µὲν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου τῆς
Βαβυλωνίας πρότερον, ὕστερον δ' ἀναλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν
δι' αὑτοῦ καὶ κρατῶν ἀνέβη µετὰ δυνάµεως τὰ συν-
οροῦντα τοῖς Ἰνδοῖς ἔθνη καὶ τὰς περὶ Καύκασον ἐπαρ-
7.3.1 χίας προσαξόµενος, ἐλπίζων Δηµήτριος ἔρηµον εὑρήσειν
τὴν Μεσοποταµίαν καὶ περάσας ἄφνω τὸν Εὐφράτην, εἰς
τὴν Βαβυλῶνα παρεισπεσὼν ἔφθη, καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας ἄκρας
– δύο γὰρ ἦσαν – ἐκκρούσας τὴν Σελεύκου φρουρὰν
7.3.5 καὶ κρατήσας, ἰδίους ἐγκατέστησεν ἑπτακισχιλίους ἄνδρας.
7.4.1 ἐκ δὲ τῆς χώρας ὅσα φέρειν ἢ ἄγειν ἠδύναντο τοὺς στρα-
τιώτας ὠφελεῖσθαι καὶ λαµβάνειν κελεύσας, ἐπανῆλθεν
ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, βεβαιοτέραν Σελεύκῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπών·
ἐξίστασθαι γὰρ ἐδόκει τῷ κακοῦν ὡς µηκέτι προσήκου-
7.4.5 σαν αὐτοῖς.
7.5.1 Πτολεµαίου µέντοι πολιορκοῦντος Ἁλικαρνασόν, ὀξέως
βοηθήσας ἐξήρπασε τὴν πόλιν.
8.1.1 Ἐνδόξου δὲ τῆς φιλοτιµίας ταύτης γενοµένης, ὁρ-
µὴ παρέστη θαυµάσιος αὐτοῖς ἐλευθεροῦν τὴν Ἑλλάδα,
πᾶσαν ὑπὸ Κασσάνδρου καὶ Πτολεµαίου καταδεδουλω-
8.2.1 µένην. τούτου πόλεµον οὐδεὶς ἐπολέµησε τῶν βασιλέων
καλλίω καὶ δικαιότερον· ἃς γὰρ ἅµα τοὺς βαρβάρους
ταπεινοῦντες εὐπορίας συνήγαγον, εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὑπὲρ

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8.3.1 εὐδοξίας καὶ τιµῆς ἀνήλισκον. ὡς δὲ πρῶτον ἐδόκει πλεῖν
ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, τῶν φίλων εἰπόντος τινὸς πρὸς τὸν
Ἀντίγονον, ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἂν ἕλωσι κατέχειν
δι' αὑτῶν, ἐπιβάθραν τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὖσαν, οὐ προσέσχεν
8.3.5 ὁ Ἀντίγονος, ἀλλ' ἐπιβάθραν µὲν ἔφη καλὴν καὶ ἀσάλευτον
εἶναι τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰς δ' Ἀθήνας, ὥσπερ σκοπὴν τῆς
οἰκουµένης, ταχὺ τῇ δόξῃ διαπυρσεύσειν εἰς ἅπαντας
8.4.1 ἀνθρώπους τὰς πράξεις. ἔπλει δὲ Δηµήτριος ἔχων ἀργυρίου
πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα καὶ στόλον νεῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ
διακοσίων ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, τὸ µὲν ἄστυ Δηµητρίου τοῦ
Φαληρέως Κασσάνδρῳ διοικοῦντος, ἐν δὲ τῇ Μουνυχίᾳ
8.5.1 φρουρᾶς καθεστώσης. εὐτυχίᾳ δ' ἅµα καὶ προνοίᾳ χρησά-
µενος ἐπεφαίνετο τῷ Πειραιεῖ πέµπτῃ φθίνοντος Θαργη-
λιῶνος, προαισθοµένου µὲν οὐδενός, ἐπεὶ δ' ὤφθη πλησίον
ὁ στόλος, ἁπάντων ὡς Πτολεµαϊκὰς τὰς ναῦς ὑποδέχε-
8.5.5 σθαι παρασκευαζοµένων. ὀψὲ <δὲ> συµφρονήσαντες ἐβοή-
θουν οἱ στρατηγοί, καὶ θόρυβος ἦν οἷον εἰκὸς ἐν ἀπρος-
δοκήτῳ πολεµίους ἀποβαίνοντας ἀναγκαζοµένων ἀµύ-
8.6.1 νεσθαι. τοῖς γὰρ στόµασι τῶν λιµένων ἀκλείστοις ἐπι-
τυχὼν ὁ Δηµήτριος καὶ διεξελάσας, ἐντὸς ἦν ἤδη κατα-
φανὴς πᾶσι, καὶ διεσήµηνεν ἀπὸ τῆς νεὼς αἴτησιν ἡσυχίας
8.7.1 καὶ σιωπῆς. γενοµένου δὲ τούτου κήρυκα παραστησά-
µενος ἀνεῖπεν, ὅτι πέµψειεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ,
<τοὺς> Ἀθηναίους ἐλευθερώσοντα καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν
ἐκβαλοῦντα καὶ τοὺς νόµους αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν πάτριον
8.7.5 ἀποδώσοντα πολιτείαν.
9.1.1 Ἀναρρηθέντων δὲ τούτων οἱ µὲν πολλοὶ παραχρῆµα
τὰς ἀσπίδας θέµενοι πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν ἀνεκρότησαν, καὶ
9.2.1 βοῶντες ἐκέλευον ἀποβαίνειν τὸν Δηµήτριον, εὐεργέτην
καὶ σωτῆρα προσαγορεύοντες· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φαληρέα

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 πάντως µὲν ᾤοντο δεῖν δέχεσθαι τὸν κρατοῦντα, κἂν
µηδὲν ὧν ἐπαγγέλλεται µέλλῃ βεβαιοῦν, ὅµως δὲ πρέσβεις
9.2.5 δεοµένους ἀπέστειλαν, οἷς ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐντυχὼν φιλαν-
θρώπως συνέπεµψε παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν πατρῴων φίλων τὸν
9.3.1 Μιλήσιον Ἀριστόδηµον. τοῦ δὲ Φαληρέως διὰ τὴν µετα-
βολὴν τῆς πολιτείας µᾶλλον τοὺς πολίτας ἢ τοὺς πολεµίους
δεδοικότος οὐκ ἠµέλησεν ὁ Δηµήτριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
δόξαν αἰδεσθεὶς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἀνδρός, εἰς Θήβας
9.3.5 αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἐβούλετο µετ' ἀσφαλείας συνεξέπεµψεν.
9.4.1 αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν µὲν πόλιν οὐκ ἂν ἔφη καίπερ ἐπιθυ-
µῶν ἰδεῖν πρότερον ἢ παντάπασιν ἐλευθερῶσαι, τῆς
φρουρᾶς ἀπαλλάξας, τῇ δὲ Μουνυχίᾳ χαράκωµα καὶ
τάφρον περιβαλών, διὰ µέσου Μεγάροις ἐπέπλευσεν ὑπὸ
9.4.5 Κασσάνδρου φρουρουµένοις.
9.5.1 Πυθόµενος δὲ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Πολυπέρχοντος γε-
νοµένην γυναῖκα Κρατησίπολιν ἐν Πάτραις διατρίβου-
σαν οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς γενέσθαι µετ' αὐτοῦ, περιβόητον
οὖσαν ἐπὶ κάλλει, καταλιπὼν τὴν δύναµιν ἐν τῇ Μεγα-
9.6.1 ρικῇ προῆλθεν εὐζώνους τινὰς ἔχων σὺν αὑτῷ, καὶ τούτους
πάλιν ἀποστρέψας ἀπεσκήνωσε χωρὶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν
τὴν γυναῖκα συνελθοῦσαν αὐτῷ. τοῦτό τινες αἰσθόµενοι
9.7.1 τῶν πολεµίων ἐξαίφνης κατέδραµον ἐπ' αὐτόν. ὁ δὲ
φοβηθεὶς καὶ λαβὼν χλαµύδιον εὐτελὲς δρόµῳ φεύγων
ἐξέφυγεν, ὀλίγου δεήσας αἰσχίστην ἅλωσιν ἐξ ἀκρασίας
ἁλῶναι. τὴν δὲ σκηνὴν µετὰ τῶν χρηµάτων ᾤχοντο
9.7.5 λαβόντες οἱ πολέµιοι.
9.8.1 Τῶν δὲ Μεγάρων ἁλόντων καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐφ'
ἁρπαγὴν τραποµένων, Ἀθηναῖοι παρῃτήσαντο τοὺς Μεγα-
ρεῖς πολλῇ δεήσει, καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐκβαλὼν
9.9.1 ἠλευθέρωσε τὴν πόλιν. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο πράττων τοῦ φιλοσό-

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 φου Στίλπωνος ἐµνήσθη, δόξαν ἔχοντος ἀνδρὸς ᾑρηµένου
πως ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καταβιῶναι. µεταπεµψάµενος οὖν αὐτὸν
ἠρώτα, µή τις εἴληφέ τι τῶν ἐκείνου. καὶ ὁ Στίλπων “οὐ-
9.9.5 δείς” εἶπεν· “οὐδένα γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιστάµαν ἀποφέροντα.”
9.10.1 τῶν δὲ θεραπόντων σχεδὸν ἁπάντων διακλαπέντων,
ἐπεὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐφιλοφρονεῖτο καὶ τέλος
ἀπαλλαττόµενος εἶπεν· “ἐλευθέραν ὑµῶν ὦ Στίλπων
ἀπολείπω τὴν πόλιν”, “ὀρθῶς” ἔφη “λέγεις· οὐδένα
9.10.5 γὰρ ἁµῶν δοῦλον ἀπολέλοιπας.”
10.1.1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάλιν ἐπανελθὼν πρὸς τὴν Μουνυχίαν
καὶ στρατοπεδεύσας ἐξέκοψε τὴν φρουρὰν καὶ κατ-
έσκαψε τὸ φρούριον, οὕτως ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων δεχο-
µένων καὶ καλούντων παρελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ συν-
10.1.5 αγαγὼν τὸν δῆµον ἀπέδωκε τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, καὶ
προσυπέσχετο παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῖς ἀφίξεσθαι σίτου
πεντεκαίδεκα µυριάδας µεδίµνων καὶ ξύλων ναυπηγη-
10.2.1 σίµων πλῆθος εἰς ἑκατὸν τριήρεις. Ἀθηναῖοι δ' ἀπο-
λαβόντες τὴν δηµοκρατίαν ἔτει πεντεκαιδεκάτῳ, τὸν
διὰ µέσου χρόνον ἀπὸ τῶν Λαµιακῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ Κραν-
νῶνα µάχης λόγῳ µὲν ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ἔργῳ δὲ µοναρχι-
10.2.5 κῆς καταστάσεως γενοµένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως
δύναµιν, οὕτως λαµπρὸν ἐν ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις καὶ µέγαν
φανέντα τὸν Δηµήτριον ἐπαχθῆ καὶ βαρὺν ἐποίησαν
10.3.1 τῶν τιµῶν ταῖς ἀµετρίαις ἃς ἐψηφίσαντο. πρῶτοι µὲν
γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων τὸν Δηµήτριον καὶ Ἀντίγονον
βασιλεῖς ἀνηγόρευσαν, ἄλλως ἀφοσιουµένους τοὔνοµα,
[καὶ] τοῦτο δὴ µόνον τῶν βασιλικῶν ἔτι τοῖς ἀπὸ Φιλίπ-
10.3.5 που καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου περιεῖναι δοκοῦν ἄθικτον ἑτέροις καὶ
10.4.1 ἀκοινώνητον· µόνοι δὲ σωτῆρας ἀνέγραψαν θεούς, καὶ
τὸν ἐπώνυµον καὶ πάτριον ἄρχοντα καταπαύσαντες,

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 ἱερέα σωτήρων ἐχειροτόνουν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν, καὶ
τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῶν ψηφισµάτων καὶ τῶν συµβολαίων προέγρα-
10.5.1 φον. ἐνυφαίνεσθαι δὲ τῷ πέπλῳ µετὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοὺς
ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅπου πρῶτον ἀπέβη τοῦ
ἅρµατος καθιερώσαντες καὶ βωµὸν ἐπιθέντες Δηµητρίου
10.6.1 Καταιβάτου προσηγόρευσαν· ταῖς δὲ φυλαῖς δύο προς-
έθεσαν, Δηµητριάδα καὶ Ἀντιγονίδα, καὶ τὴν βουλὴν τῶν
πεντακοσίων πρότερον ἑξακοσίων ἐποίησαν, ἅτε δὴ φυλῆς
ἑκάστης πεντήκοντα βουλευτὰς παρεχοµένης.
11.1.1 Τὸ δ' ὑπερφυέστατον ἐνθύµηµα τοῦ Στρατοκλέους
(οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων καὶ περιττῶν καινουρ-
γὸς ἀρεσκευµάτων)· ἔγραψεν ὅπως οἱ πεµπόµενοι κατὰ
ψήφισµα δηµοσίᾳ πρὸς Ἀντίγονον ἢ Δηµήτριον ἀντὶ
11.1.5 πρεσβευτῶν θεωροὶ λέγοιντο, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθοῖ καὶ
Ὀλυµπίαζε τὰς πατρίους θυσίας ὑπὲρ τῶν πόλεων ἀν-
άγοντες ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς ἑορταῖς.
11.2.1 Ἦν δὲ καὶ τἆλλα παράτολµος ὁ Στρατοκλῆς, καὶ βεβιω-
κὼς ἀσελγῶς καὶ τῇ βωµολοχίᾳ καὶ βδελυρίᾳ τοῦ παλαιοῦ
Κλέωνος ἀποµιµεῖσθαι δοκῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆµον
11.3.1 εὐχέρειαν. ἔσχε δὲ τὴν ἑταίραν Φυλάκιον ἀνειληφώς, καί
ποτ' αὐτῷ πρὸς δεῖπνον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς πριαµένης ἐγκε-
φάλους καὶ τραχήλους “παπαί” εἶπε “τοιαῦτά γ' ὠψώ-
11.4.1 νηκας οἷς σφαιρίζοµεν οἱ πολιτευόµενοι.” τῆς δὲ περὶ
Ἀµοργὸν ἥττης τῶν νεῶν συµβάσης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις,
φθάσας τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντας εἰσήλασεν ἐστεφανωµένος διὰ
τοῦ Κεραµεικοῦ, καὶ προσαγγείλας ὅτι νενικήκασιν
11.4.5 εὐαγγέλια θύειν ἔγραψε καὶ κρεωδαισίαν τινὰ κατὰ φυ-
11.5.1 λὴν ἐποίησεν. ὀλίγῳ δ' ὕστερον τῶν τὰ ναυάγια κοµι-
ζόντων ἀπὸ τῆς µάχης παραγενοµένων καὶ τοῦ δήµου
πρὸς ὀργὴν καλοῦντος αὐτόν, ἰταµῶς ὑποστὰς τὸν θό-

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 ρυβον “εἶτ'” ἔφη “τί πεπόνθατε δεινόν, εἰ δύο ἡµέρας
11.5.5 ἡδέως γεγόνατε;” τοιαύτη µὲν ἡ τοῦ Στρατοκλέους
θρασύτης.
12.1.1 Ἦν δ' ἄρα καὶ πυρὸς ἕτερα θερµότερα κατὰ τὸν
Ἀριστοφάνη· γράφει γάρ τις ἄλλος ὑπερβαλλόµε-
νος ἀνελευθερίᾳ τὸν Στρατοκλέα, δέχεσθαι Δηµήτριον ὁσά-
κις ἂν ἀφίκηται τοῖς Δήµητρος καὶ Διονύσου ξενισµοῖς, τῷ
12.1.5 δ' ὑπερβαλλοµένῳ λαµπρότητι καὶ πολυτελείᾳ τὴν ὑποδοχὴν
12.2.1 ἀργύριον εἰς ἀνάθηµα δηµοσίᾳ δίδοσθαι. τέλος δὲ τῶν
τε µηνῶν τὸν Μουνυχιῶνα Δηµητριῶνα καὶ τῶν ἡµερῶν
τὴν ἕνην καὶ νέαν Δηµητριάδα προσηγόρευσαν, καὶ τῶν
12.3.1 ἑορτῶν τὰ Διονύσια µετωνόµασαν Δηµήτρια. ἐπεσήµηνε δὲ
τοῖς πλείστοις τὸ θεῖον· ὁ µὲν γὰρ πέπλος, ὥσπερ ἐψηφί-
σαντο µετὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς προσενυφηναµένων
Δηµήτριον καὶ Ἀντίγονον, πεµπόµενος διὰ τοῦ Κεραµει-
12.4.1 κοῦ µέσος ἐρράγη θυέλλης ἐµπεσούσης. περὶ δὲ τοὺς
βωµοὺς τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐξήνθησεν ἡ γῆ κύκλῳ πολὺ κώνειον,
12.5.1 µηδ' ἄλλως τῆς χώρας πολλαχοῦ φυόµενον. ᾗ δ' ἡµέρᾳ τὰ
τῶν Διονυσίων ἐγίνετο, τὴν ποµπὴν κατέλυσαν ἰσχυρῶν
πάγων γενοµένων παρ' ὥραν, καὶ πάχνης βαθείας ἐπι-
πεσούσης οὐ µόνον ἀµπέλους καὶ συκᾶς ἁπάσας ἀπέκαυσε
12.5.5 τὸ ψῦχος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σίτου τὸν πλεῖστον ἐν χλόῃ δι-
12.6.1 έφθειρε. διὸ καὶ Φιλιππίδης ἐχθρὸς ὢν τοῦ Στρατοκλέους
ἐν κωµῳδίᾳ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐποίησε ταῦτα·

12.7.1 δι' ὃν ἀπέκαυσεν ἡ πάχνη τὰς ἀµπέλους,

δι' ὃν ἀσεβοῦνθ' ὁ πέπλος ἐρράγη µέσος,
ποιοῦντα τιµὰς τὰς [τῶν] θεῶν ἀνθρωπίνας.
ταῦτα καταλύει δῆµον, οὐ κωµῳδία.

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12.8.1 ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλιππίδης Λυσιµάχου φίλος, καὶ πολλὰ δι'
αὐτὸν ὁ δῆµος εὖ ἔπαθεν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἐδόκει δὲ
καὶ πρὸς πρᾶξιν αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς στρατείαν εὐσύµβολος
ἀπαντήσας εἶναι καὶ ὀφθείς. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἦθος
12.8.5 εὐδοκίµει, µηθὲν ἐνοχλῶν µηδ' αὐλικῆς περιεργίας ἀνα-
12.9.1 πιµπλάµενος. φιλοφρονουµένου δέ ποτε τοῦ Λυσιµάχου
πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ εἰπόντος “ὦ Φιλιππίδη, τίνος σοι τῶν ἐµῶν
µεταδῶ;” “µόνον” ἔφη “βασιλεῦ µὴ τῶν ἀπορρήτων”.
τοῦτον µὲν οὖν ἐπίτηδες ἐκείνῳ παρεθήκαµεν, τῷ ἀπὸ
12.9.5 τοῦ βήµατος τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς θυµέλης.
13.1.1 Ὃ δὲ µάλιστα τῶν τιµῶν ὑπερφυὲς ἦν καὶ ἀλλόκοτον,
ἔγραψε Δροµοκλείδης ὁ Σφήττιος, ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀσπίδων
ἀναθέσεως εἰς Δελφοὺς παρὰ Δηµητρίου λαβεῖν χρησµόν.
13.2.1 αὐτὴν δὲ παραγράψω τὴν λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσµατος οὕτως
ἔχουσαν· “ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ· δεδόχθαι τῷ δήµῳ, χειροτονῆσαι
τὸν δῆµον ἕνα ἄνδρα ἐξ Ἀθηναίων, ὅστις ἀφικόµενος
πρὸς τὸν Σωτῆρα καὶ καλλιερησάµενος ἐπερωτήσει
13.2.5 [Δηµήτριον] τὸν Σωτῆρα, πῶς <ἂν> εὐσεβέστατα καὶ
κάλλιστα καὶ τὴν ταχίστην ὁ δῆµος τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν
13.3.1 ποιήσαιτο τῶν ἀναθηµάτων. ὅ τι δ' ἂν χρήσῃ, ταῦτα
πράττειν τὸν δῆµον.” οὕτω καταµωκώµενοι τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που, προσδιέφθειραν αὐτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλως ὑγιαίνοντα τὴν
διάνοιαν.
14.1.1 Ἀλλ' ἔν γε ταῖς Ἀθήναις τότε σχολάζων ἠγά-
γετο χηρεύουσαν Εὐρυδίκην, ἣ Μιλτιάδου µὲν ἦν ἀπό-
γονος τοῦ παλαιοῦ, συνοικήσασα δ' Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ Κυρή-
νης ἄρξαντι, µετὰ τὴν ἐκείνου τελευτὴν ἀφίκετο πάλιν
14.2.1 εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας. οἱ µὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν γάµον τοῦτον
εἰς χάριν ἔθεντο καὶ τιµὴν τῆς πόλεως· ἄλλως δ' ὁ
Δηµήτριος εὐχερής τις ἦν περὶ γάµους καὶ πολλαῖς ἅµα

  80  
 συνῆν γυναιξίν, ὧν ἀξίωµα µέγιστον εἶχε καὶ τιµὴν
Φίλα δι' Ἀντίπατρον τὸν πατέρα καὶ διὰ τὸ προσυν-
ῳκηκέναι Κρατερῷ, τῷ πλείστην εὔνοιαν αὑτοῦ παρὰ
14.3.1 Μακεδόσι τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων ἀπολιπόντι. ταύ-
την ὡς ἔοικε κοµιδῇ νέον ὄντα τὸν Δηµήτριον ἔπειθεν
ὁ πατήρ, οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτῷ καθ' ὥραν ἀλλὰ πρεσβυτέραν,
λαβεῖν· ἀπροθύµως δ' ἔχοντι λέγεται πρὸς τὸ οὖς τὸ
Εὐριπίδειον εἰπεῖν (Phoen. 395)·

14.3.5 ὅπου τὸ κέρδος, παρὰ φύσιν γαµητέον,

14.4.1 ὁµοιόπτωτόν τι τῷ “δουλευτέον” εὐθυρρηµονήσας. τοι-

αύτη µὲν οὖν τις ἦν ἡ τοῦ Δηµητρίου τιµὴ πρός τε Φίλαν
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας γαµετάς, ὥστε πολλαῖς µὲν ἀνέδην ἑταίραις,
πολλαῖς δ' ἐλευθέραις συνεῖναι γυναιξί, καὶ µάλιστα δὴ
14.4.5 περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τότε βασι-
λέων.
15.1.1 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὸν ἐκάλει Πτολεµαίῳ περὶ
Κύπρου πολεµήσοντα, πείθεσθαι µὲν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον,
ἀχθόµενος δ' ὅτι τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πόλεµον ὄντα
καλλίω καὶ λαµπρότερον ἀπολείπει, προσέπεµψε Κλεω-
15.1.5 νίδῃ τῷ Πτολεµαίου στρατηγῷ φρουροῦντι Σικυῶνα
καὶ Κόρινθον, χρήµατα προτείνων ὥστ' ἐλευθέρας ἀφεῖ-
15.2.1 ναι τὰς πόλεις. οὐ προσδεξαµένου δ' ἐκείνου, διὰ ταχέων
ἀναχθεὶς καὶ προσλαβὼν δύναµιν ἐπέπλευσε Κύπρῳ, καὶ
Μενέλαον µὲν ἀδελφὸν Πτολεµαίου µάχην συνάψας εὐθὺς
15.3.1 ἐνίκησεν· αὐτοῦ δὲ Πτολεµαίου µετὰ δυνάµεως πεζικῆς
ἅµα καὶ ναυτικῆς µεγάλης ἐπιφανέντος, ἐγένοντο µὲν
ἀπειλαί τινες καὶ διάλογοι κοµπώδεις, τοῦ µὲν ἀποπλεῖν
Δηµήτριον κελεύοντος πρὶν ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάµεως πάσης

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15.3.5 ἀθροισθείσης καταπατηθῆναι, Δηµητρίου δ' ἐκεῖνον
ἀφεῖναι φάσκοντος, ἂν ὁµολογήσῃ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον
15.4.1 ἀπαλλάξειν τῆς φρουρᾶς. ὁ δ' ἀγὼν οὐ µόνον αὐτοῖς
ἐκείνοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι δυνάσταις πολλὴν
εἶχε προσδοκίαν τῆς ἐπικρεµαµένης ἀδηλότητος, ὡς οὐ
Κύπρον οὐδὲ Συρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ µέγιστον εὐθὺς εἶναι πάντων
15.4.5 τῷ κρατοῦντι τῆς νίκης προστιθείσης.
16.1.1 Αὐτὸς µὲν οὖν ὁ Πτολεµαῖος ἐπέπλει πεντήκοντα
καὶ ἑκατὸν ναῦς ἔχων, ἐκ δὲ Σαλαµῖνος ἐκέλευσε Μενέλαον
ἑξήκοντα ναυσίν, ὅταν µάλιστα σύστασιν ὁ ἀγὼν ἔχῃ,
προσφερόµενον τὰς Δηµητρίου κόπτειν ἐξόπισθεν καὶ
16.2.1 διαταράττειν τὴν τάξιν. Δηµήτριος δὲ ταῖς µὲν ἑξήκοντα
ταύταις ἀντέταξε δέκα ναῦς – τοσαῦται γὰρ ἤρκουν
στενὸν ὄντα τοῦ λιµένος ἐµφράξαι τὸν ἔκπλουν – , αὐτὸς
δὲ τὸ πεζὸν ἐκτάξας καὶ τοῖς ἀνατείνουσιν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν
16.2.5 ἀκρωτηρίοις περιχεάµενος, οὕτως ἀνήχθη ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν
16.3.1 ὀγδοήκοντα· προσµείξας δὲ ῥώµῃ καὶ βίᾳ πολλῇ, κατὰ
κράτος ἐτρέψατο τὸν Πτολεµαῖον, αὐτὸν µὲν ὡς ἐνικήθη
διὰ ταχέων φυγόντα ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ µόναις – τοσαῦται γὰρ
ἐκ πασῶν περιεσώθησαν, τῶν δ' ἄλλων αἱ µὲν ἐν τῇ
16.3.5 ναυµαχίᾳ διεφθάρησαν, ἑβδοµήκοντα δ' ἥλωσαν αὔταν-
16.4.1 δροι – , τοῦ δ' ἐν ὁλκάσι παρορµοῦντος ὄχλου θεραπόντων
καὶ φίλων καὶ γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὅπλων καὶ χρηµάτων καὶ
µηχανηµάτων, ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν ἐξέφυγε τὸν Δηµήτριον, ἀλλ'
16.5.1 ἔλαβε πάντα καὶ κατήγαγεν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον. ἐν δὲ
τούτοις ἡ περιβόητος ἦν Λάµια, τὴν µὲν ἀρχὴν σπουδα-
σθεῖσα διὰ τὴν τέχνην – ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐλεῖν οὐκ εὐκατα-
φρονήτως – , ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λαµπρὰ γενο-
16.6.1 µένη. τότε γοῦν ἤδη λήγουσα τῆς ὥρας καὶ πολὺ νεώτερον
ἑαυτῆς λαβοῦσα τὸν Δηµήτριον, ἐκράτησε τῇ χάριτι καὶ

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 κατέσχεν, ὥστ' ἐκείνης εἶναι µόνης ἐραστήν, τῶν δ'
16.7.1 ἄλλων ἐρώµενον γυναικῶν. µετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυµαχίαν οὐδ'
ὁ Μενέλαος ἀντέσχεν, ἀλλὰ τήν τε Σαλαµῖνα παρέδωκε
τῷ Δηµητρίῳ καὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὸ πεζόν, ἱππεῖς τε χιλίους
καὶ διακοσίους καὶ µυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας.
17.1.1 Οὕτω δὲ λαµπρὰν καὶ καλὴν τὴν νίκην γενοµένην
ἔτι µᾶλλον ἐπικοσµῶν ὁ Δηµήτριος εὐγνωµοσύνῃ καὶ
φιλανθρωπίᾳ, τοὺς νεκροὺς τῶν πολεµίων ἔθαψε µεγαλο-
πρεπῶς καὶ τοὺς αἰχµαλώτους ἀφῆκεν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ
17.1.5 χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας ἀπὸ τῶν λαφύρων ἐδωρήσατο
πανοπλίας.
17.2.1 Αὐτάγγελον δὲ τῆς νίκης τῷ πατρὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Ἀρι-
στόδηµον ἔπεµψε, πρωτεύοντα κολακείᾳ τῶν αὐλικῶν
ἁπάντων, καὶ τότε παρεσκευασµένον ὡς ἔοικε τῶν κο-
17.3.1 λακευµάτων τὸ µέγιστον ἐπενεγκεῖν τοῖς πράγµασιν. ὡς
γὰρ ἐπέρασεν ἀπὸ τῆς Κύπρου, προσέχειν µὲν οὐκ εἴασε
τῇ γῇ τὸ πλοῖον, ἀγκύρας δ' ἀφεῖναι κελεύσας καὶ κατὰ
ναῦν ἔχειν ἀτρέµα πάντας, αὐτὸς ἐµβὰς εἰς τὸ ἐφόλκιον
17.3.5 ἐξῆλθε µόνος καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἀνέβαινε, µετέωρον
ὄντα τῇ προσδοκίᾳ τῆς µάχης καὶ διακείµενον ὡς εἰκός
ἐστι διακεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ πραγµάτων τηλικούτων
17.4.1 ἀγωνιῶντας. τότε γε µὴν ἀκούσας ἐκεῖνον ἥκειν, ἔτι
µᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἔσχε ταραχωδῶς, καὶ µόλις µὲν αὑτὸν
οἴκοι κατεῖχεν, ἄλλους δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἔπεµπεν ὑπηρέτας
καὶ φίλους πευσοµένους τοῦ Ἀριστοδήµου περὶ τῶν
17.5.1 γεγονότων. ἀποκριναµένου δὲ µηδὲν αὐτοῦ µηδενί, βάδην
δὲ καὶ συνεστῶτι τῷ προσώπῳ µετὰ πολλῆς σιωπῆς
προσιόντος, ἐκπλαγεὶς κοµιδῇ καὶ µηκέτι καρτερῶν ὁ
Ἀντίγονος ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἀπήντησε, πολλοῦ παραπέµ-
17.5.5 ποντος ἤδη τὸν Ἀριστόδηµον ὄχλου καὶ συντρέχοντος

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17.6.1 ἐπὶ τὸ βασίλειον. ὡς οὖν ἐγγὺς ἦλθεν, ἐκτείνας τὴν δε-
ξιὰν ἀνεβόησε µεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ· “χαῖρε βασιλεῦ Ἀντίγονε,
νικῶµεν [βασιλέα] Πτολεµαῖον ναυµαχίᾳ, καὶ Κύπρον
ἔχοµεν καὶ στρατιώτας αἰχµαλώτους µυρίους ἑξακισχιλί-
17.6.5 ους ὀκτακοσίους.” ὁ δ' Ἀντίγονος “καὶ σὺ νὴ Δία χαῖρε”
εἶπεν· “οὕτω δ' ἡµᾶς βασανίσας δίκην ὑφέξεις· βράδιον
γὰρ ἀπολήψῃ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.”
18.1.1 Ἐκ τούτου πρῶτον ἀνεφώνησε τὸ πλῆθος Ἀντί-
γονον καὶ Δηµήτριον βασιλέας. Ἀντίγονον µὲν οὖν εὐθὺς
ἀνέδησαν οἱ φίλοι, Δηµητρίῳ δ' ὁ πατὴρ ἔπεµψε διάδηµα
18.2.1 καὶ γράφων ἐπιστολὴν βασιλέα προσεῖπεν. οἱ δ' ἐν Αἰ-
γύπτῳ τούτων ἀπαγγελλοµένων καὶ αὐτοὶ βασιλέα τὸν
18.3.1 ὑφίεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἧτταν. ἐπενείµατο δ' οὕτως τὸ πρᾶγµα τῷ
ζήλῳ τοὺς <ἄλλους> διαδόχους· καὶ γὰρ Λυσίµαχος ἤρξατο
φορεῖν διάδηµα, καὶ Σέλευκος ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν,
ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε βαρβάροις <καὶ> πρότερον οὗτος ὡς βασιλεὺς
18.4.1 ἐχρηµάτιζε. Κάσσανδρος δέ, τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸν βασιλέα
καὶ γραφόντων καὶ καλούντων, αὐτὸς ὥσπερ πρότερον
18.5.1 εἰώθει τὰς ἐπιστολὰς ἔγραφε. τοῦτο δ' οὐ προσθήκην
ὀνόµατος καὶ σχήµατος ἐξαλλαγὴν εἶχε µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὰ φρονήµατα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκίνησε καὶ τὰς γνώµας ἐπῆρε,
καὶ τοῖς βίοις καὶ ταῖς ὁµιλίαις αὐτῶν ὄγκον ἐνεποίησε
18.5.5 καὶ βαρύτητα, καθάπερ τραγικῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἅµα τῇ
σκευῇ συµµεταβαλόντων καὶ βάδισµα καὶ φωνὴν καὶ
18.6.1 κατάκλισιν καὶ προσαγόρευσιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐγίνοντο καὶ
περὶ τὰς δικαιώσεις βιαιότεροι, τὴν εἰς πολλὰ παρέχουσαν
αὐτοὺς ἐλαφροτέρους καὶ µαλακωτέρους τοῖς ὑπηκόοις
18.7.1 πρότερον εἰρωνείαν τῆς ἐξουσίας ἀφελόντες. τοσοῦτον
ἴσχυσε κόλακος φωνὴ µία καὶ τοσαύτης ἐνέπλησε τὴν
οἰκουµένην µεταβολῆς.

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19.1.1 Ἀντίγονος δὲ τοῖς πεπραγµένοις ὑπὸ Δηµητρίου
περὶ Κύπρον ἐπαρθείς, εὐθὺς ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Πτολε-
µαῖον, αὐτὸς µὲν ἄγων πεζῇ τὴν δύναµιν, Δηµητρίου δὲ
19.2.1 µεγάλῳ στόλῳ συµπαραπλέοντος. ὃν δὲ τρόπον ἤµελλε
κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγµατα, Μήδιος Ἀντιγόνου φίλος ὄψιν
εἶδε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους. ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτὸν Ἀντίγονον ἀγω-
νίζεσθαι µετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἁπάσης δίαυλον, εὐρώστως
19.2.5 καὶ ταχὺ τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτα κατὰ µικρὸν ἐνδιδόναι τὴν
δύναµιν αὐτῷ, καὶ τέλος ὡς ἔκαµψεν ἀσθενῆ γενόµενον
19.3.1 καὶ µεστὸν ἄσθµατος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἀναφέρειν. αὐτός τ' οὖν
ἐντυχὼν κατὰ γῆν πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις, καὶ Δηµητρίου χει-
µῶνι µεγάλῳ καὶ κλύδωνι κινδυνεύσαντος εἰς τόπους
ἀλιµένους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκριφῆναι, πολλὰς δὲ τῶν νεῶν
19.3.5 ἀπολέσαντος, ἐπανῆλθεν ἄπρακτος.
19.4.1 Ἦν δὲ τότε µικρὸν ἀπολείποντα γεγονὼς ἔτη τῶν
ὀγδοήκοντα· µεγέθει δὲ καὶ βαρύτητι σώµατος µᾶλλον ἢ
διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἐπὶ τὰς στρατείας γεγονὼς δυσπαρακό-
µιστος, ἐχρῆτο τῷ παιδί, καὶ δι' εὐτυχίαν καὶ δι' ἐµπει-
19.4.5 ρίαν ἤδη τὰ µέγιστα καλῶς διοικοῦντι, τρυφὰς δὲ καὶ
19.5.1 πολυτελείας καὶ πότους αὐτοῦ µὴ βαρυνόµενος. εἰρήνης
γὰρ οὔσης ἀφύβριζεν εἰς ταῦτα, καὶ σχολάζων ἐχρῆτο
πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀνειµένως αὑτῷ καὶ κατακόρως, ἐν δὲ
19.6.1 τοῖς πολέµοις ὡς οἱ φύσει σώφρονες ἔνηφε. λέγεται δὲ
τῆς Λαµίας ἀναφανδὸν ἤδη κρατούσης τὸν Ἀντίγονον
ὑπὸ τοῦ Δηµητρίου καταφιλούµενον ἥκοντος ἀπὸ ξένης
εἰπεῖν ἅµα γελῶντα· “δοκεῖς Λάµιαν ὦ παῖ καταφιλεῖν.”
19.7.1 πάλιν δέ ποτε πλείονας ἡµέρας ἐν πότοις γενοµένου, καὶ
πρόφασιν λέγοντος ὡς ῥεῦµα διοχλήσειεν αὐτόν, “ἐπυθό-
µην,” φάναι τὸν Ἀντίγονον, “ἀλλὰ πότερον Θάσιον ἢ
19.8.1 Χῖον ἦν τὸ ῥεῦµα;” πυθόµενος δ' αὖθις ἀσθενῶς ἔχειν

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 αὐτὸν ἐβάδιζεν ὀψόµενος, καὶ τῶν καλῶν τινι περὶ θύρας
ἀπήντησεν· εἰσελθὼν δὲ καὶ καθίσας παρ' αὐτὸν ἥψατο
τῆς χειρός· ἐκείνου δ' εἰπόντος ὅτι νῦν ὁ πυρετὸς ἀπο-
19.8.5 κεχώρηκεν, “ἀµέλει παιδίον” ἔφη “καὶ ἐµοὶ νῦν περὶ
19.9.1 θύρας ἀπιὼν ἀπήντηκε.” ταῦτα δ' οὕτω πράως ἔφερε τοῦ
19.10.1 Δηµητρίου διὰ τὴν ἄλλην πρᾶξιν. οἱ µὲν γὰρ Σκύθαι
πίνοντες καὶ µεθυσκόµενοι παραψάλλουσι τὰς νευρὰς τῶν
τόξων, οἷον ἐκλυόµενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀνακαλούµενοι
τὸν θυµόν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τὰ µὲν ἡδονῇ διδοὺς ἁπλῶς ἑαυ-
19.10.5 τόν, τὰ δὲ σπουδῇ, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων ἄκρατα µετα-
χειριζόµενος, οὐχ ἧττον ἦν δεινὸς ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πολέµου
παρασκευαῖς.
20.1.1 Ἀλλὰ καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι δύναµιν ἢ χρήσασθαι
βελτίων ἐδόκει στρατηγὸς εἶναι, πάντα µὲν ἐκ περιουσίας
ὑπάρχειν βουλόµενος ἐπὶ τὰς χρείας, τῆς δὲ περὶ τὰς ναῦς
καὶ τὰ µηχανήµατα µεγαλουργίας καὶ καθ' ἡδονήν τινα
20.2.1 τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἀπλήστως ἔχων. εὐφυὴς γὰρ ὢν καὶ θεωρη-
τικός, οὐκ εἰς παιδιὰς οὐδ' εἰς διαγωγὰς ἀχρήστους
ἔτρεψε τὸ φιλότεχνον, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι βασιλεῖς αὐλοῦντες
20.3.1 καὶ ζωγραφοῦντες καὶ τορεύοντες. Ἀέροπος γὰρ ὁ Μακεδὼν
τραπέζια µικρὰ καὶ λυχνίδια τεκταινόµενος ὁπότε σχολάζοι
διῆγεν. Ἄτταλος δ' ὁ Φιλοµήτωρ ἐκήπευε τὰς φαρµακώ-
δεις βοτάνας, οὐ µόνον ὑοσκύαµον καὶ ἐλλέβορον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
20.3.5 κώνειον καὶ ἀκόνιτον καὶ δορύκνιον, αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς βασι-
λείοις σπείρων καὶ φυτεύων, ὀπούς τε καὶ καρπὸν αὐτῶν
ἔργον πεποιηµένος εἰδέναι καὶ κοµίζεσθαι καθ' ὥραν.
20.4.1 οἱ δὲ Πάρθων βασιλεῖς ἐσεµνύνοντο τὰς ἀκίδας τῶν βελῶν
20.5.1 χαράττοντες αὐτοὶ καὶ παραθήγοντες. ἀλλὰ µὴν Δη-
µητρίου καὶ τὸ βάναυσον ἦν βασιλικόν, καὶ µέγεθος ἡ
µέθοδος εἶχεν, ἅµα τῷ περιττῷ καὶ φιλοτέχνῳ τῶν ἔρ-

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 γων ὕψος τι διανοίας καὶ φρονήµατος συνεκφερόντων,
20.5.5 ὥστε µὴ µόνον γνώµης καὶ περιουσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειρὸς
20.6.1 ἄξια φαίνεσθαι βασιλικῆς. µεγέθει µὲν γὰρ ἐπέπληττε
καὶ τοὺς φίλους, κάλλει δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους ἔτερπε·
20.7.1 τοῦτο δ' ἔτι µᾶλλον ἀληθῶς ἢ κοµψῶς εἴρηται. καὶ τὰς
µὲν ἑκκαιδεκήρεις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς πεντεκαιδεκήρεις
ἐθαύµαζον ἑστῶτες οἱ πολέµιοι παρὰ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν
πλεούσας, αἱ δ' ἑλεπόλεις ὡς θέαµα τοῖς πολιορκουµέ-
20.8.1 νοις ἦσαν, ὡς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγµατα µαρτυρεῖ. Λυσίµαχος
µὲν γάρ, ἔχθιστος ὢν Δηµητρίῳ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ
πολιορκοῦντι Σόλους τοὺς Κιλικίους ἀντιτεταγµένος,
ἔπεµψε παρακαλῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι τὰς µηχανὰς αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς
20.9.1 ναῦς πλεούσας· ἐπιδείξαντος δὲ θαυµάσας ἀπῆλθε. Ῥό-
διοι δὲ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πολιορκηθέντες, ἐπεὶ
κατελύσαντο τὸν πόλεµον, ᾐτήσαντο τῶν µηχανῶν ἐνίας,
ὅπως ὑπόµνηµα τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάµεως ἅµα καὶ τῆς αὑ-
20.9.5 τῶν ἀνδραγαθίας ἔχωσιν.
21.1.1 Ἐπολέµησε δὲ Ῥοδίοις Πτολεµαίου συµµάχοις
οὖσι, καὶ τὴν µεγίστην ἑλέπολιν τοῖς τείχεσι προσήγαγεν,
ἧς ἕδρα µὲν ἦν τετράγωνος, ἑκάστην ἔχουσα τοῦ κάτω
πλαισίου πλευρὰν ὀκτὼ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα πηχῶν, ἓξ δὲ
21.1.5 καὶ ἑξήκοντα πηχῶν ὕψος εἶχεν, εἰς κορυφὴν συννεύ-
21.2.1 ουσα ταῖς ἄνω πλευραῖς στενοτέραν τῆς βάσεως. ἔνδο-
θεν µὲν οὖν στέγαις διεπέφρακτο καὶ χώραις πολλαῖς,
τὸ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους αὐτῆς µέτωπον ἀνέῳκτο [καὶ]
καθ' ἑκάστην στέγην θυρίσιν, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐξέπιπτε
21.2.5 βέλη παντοδαπά· µεστὴ γὰρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν µαχοµένων πᾶσαν
21.3.1 ἰδέαν µάχης. καὶ τὸ µὴ κραδαινόµενον αὐτῆς µηδὲ κλι-
νόµενον ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν, ἀλλ' ὀρθὸν ἐν ἕδρᾳ καὶ ἀσά-
λευτον ἰσορρόπως ἅµα ῥοίζῳ καὶ τόνῳ πολλῷ προχω-

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 ροῦν θάµβος ἅµα τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ χάριν τινὰ τῇ ὄψει τῶν
21.4.1 θεωµένων παρεῖχε. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεµον αὐτῷ
καὶ θώρακες ἐκοµίσθησαν ἐκ Κύπρου δύο σιδηροῖ, µνῶν
21.5.1 ὁλκῆς ἑκάτερος τεσσαράκοντα. δυσπάθειαν δὲ καὶ ῥώµην
αὐτῶν ἐπιδεικνύµενος ὁ τεχνίτης Ζωίλος ἐκέλευσεν ἐξ
εἴκοσι βηµάτων ἀφεῖναι καταπελτικὸν βέλος, οὗ προς-
πεσόντος ἀρραγὴς διέµεινεν ὁ σίδηρος, ἀµυχὴν δὲ µόλις
21.6.1 ἔσχεν ἀµβλεῖαν οἷον ἀπὸ γραφείου. τοῦτον αὐτὸς ἐφόρει,
τὸν δ' ἕτερον Ἄλκιµος ὁ Ἠπειρώτης, ἀνὴρ πολεµικώτατος
τῶν σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ ῥωµαλεώτατος, ὃς µόνος ἐχρῆτο διτα-
λάντῳ πανοπλίᾳ, τῶν ἄλλων χρωµένων ταλαντιαίᾳ, καὶ
21.6.5 µαχόµενος ἐν Ῥόδῳ περὶ τὸ θέατρον ἔπεσεν.
22.1.1 Εὐρώστως δὲ τῶν Ῥοδίων ἀµυνοµένων, οὐδὲν ἄξιον
λόγου πράττων ὁ Δηµήτριος ὅµως ἐθυµοµάχει πρὸς
αὐτούς, ὅτι Φίλας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτῷ γράµµατα καὶ
στρώµατα καὶ ἱµάτια πεµψάσης, λαβόντες τὸ πλοῖον
22.1.5 ὥσπερ εἶχε πρὸς Πτολεµαῖον ἀπέστειλαν, καὶ τὴν Ἀθη-
22.2.1 ναίων οὐκ ἐµιµήσαντο φιλανθρωπίαν, οἳ Φιλίππου πο-
λεµοῦντος αὐτοῖς γραµµατοφόρους ἑλόντες, τὰς µὲν ἄλ-
λας ἀνέγνωσαν ἐπιστολάς, µόνην δὲ τὴν Ὀλυµπιάδος οὐκ
ἔλυσαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἦν κατασεσηµασµένη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον
22.2.5 ἀπέστειλαν.
22.3.1 Οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σφόδρα δηχθεὶς ὁ
Δηµήτριος εὐθὺς παρασχόντας λαβὴν οὐχ ὑπέµεινεν
22.4.1 ἀντιλυπῆσαι τοὺς Ῥοδίους. ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὁ Καύνιος
Πρωτογένης γράφων τὴν περὶ τὸν Ἰάλυσον διάθεσιν,
καὶ τὸν πίνακα µικρὸν ἀπολείποντα τοῦ τέλος ἔχειν ἔν
22.5.1 τινι τῶν προαστίων ἔλαβεν ὁ Δηµήτριος. πεµψάντων δὲ
κήρυκα τῶν Ῥοδίων καὶ δεοµένων φείσασθαι καὶ µὴ
διαφθεῖραι τὸ ἔργον, ἀπεκρίνατο τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἂν

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 εἰκόνας ἐµπρῆσαι µᾶλλον ἢ τέχνης πόνον τοσοῦτον. ἑπτὰ
22.5.5 γὰρ ἔτεσι λέγεται συντελέσαι τὴν γραφὴν ὁ Πρωτογένης.
22.6.1 καί φησιν Ἀπελλῆς οὕτως ἐκπλαγῆναι θεασάµενος τὸ
ἔργον, ὥστε καὶ φωνὴν ἐπιλιπεῖν αὐτόν, ὀψὲ δ' εἰπεῖν
ὅτι “µέγας ὁ πόνος καὶ θαυµαστὸν τὸ ἔργον”, οὐ µὴν
ἔχειν γε χάριτας δι' ἃς οὐρανοῦ ψαύειν τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
22.7.1 γραφόµενα. ταύτην µὲν οὖν τὴν γραφὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ ταῖς
ἄλλαις συνωσθεῖσαν ἐν Ῥώµῃ τὸ πῦρ ἐπενείµατο.
22.8.1 Τῶν δὲ Ῥοδίων κατεξανισταµένων τοῦ πολέµου, δεό-
µενον προφάσεως τὸν Δηµήτριον Ἀθηναῖοι παραγενό-
µενοι διήλλαξαν ἐπὶ τῷ συµµαχεῖν Ῥοδίους Ἀντιγόνῳ
καὶ Δηµητρίῳ πλὴν ἐπὶ Πτολεµαῖον.
23.1.1 Ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸν Δηµήτριον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, Κας-
23.2.1 σάνδρου τὸ ἄστυ πολιορκοῦντος. ὁ δὲ ναυσὶν ἐπιπλεύσας
τριακοσίαις τριάκοντα καὶ πολλοῖς ὁπλίταις, οὐ µό-
νον ἐξήλασε τῆς Ἀττικῆς τὸν Κάσσανδρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
φεύγοντα µέχρι Θερµοπυλῶν διώξας καὶ τρεψάµενος,
23.2.5 Ἡράκλειαν ἔλαβεν ἑκουσίως αὐτῷ προσθεµένην καὶ τῶν
Μακεδόνων ἑξακισχιλίους µεταβαλοµένους πρὸς αὐτόν.
23.3.1 ἐπανιὼν δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Πυλῶν Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρου, καὶ
Βοιωτοὺς ἐποιήσατο συµµάχους, καὶ Κεγχρέας εἷλε· καὶ
Φυλὴν καὶ Πάνακτον, ἐπιτειχίσµατα τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὑπὸ
Κασσάνδρου φρουρούµενα, καταστρεψάµενος ἀπέδωκε
23.4.1 τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. οἱ δὲ καίπερ ἐκκεχυµένοι πρότερον εἰς
αὐτὸν καὶ κατακεχρηµένοι πᾶσαν φιλοτιµίαν, ἐξεῦρον
ὅµως καὶ τότε πρόσφατοι καὶ καινοὶ ταῖς κολακείαις
23.5.1 φανῆναι. τὸν γὰρ ὀπισθόδοµον τοῦ Παρθενῶνος ἀπέδειξαν
αὐτῷ κατάλυσιν, κἀκεῖ δίαιταν εἶχε, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς λεγο-
µένης ὑποδέχεσθαι καὶ ξενίζειν αὐτόν, οὐ πάνυ κόσµιον
23.6.1 ξένον οὐδ' ὡς παρθένῳ πράως ἐπισταθµεύοντα. καίτοι

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 τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον αἰσθόµενός ποθ' ὁ πατὴρ ἐν
οἰκίᾳ καταλύοντα τρεῖς ἐχούσῃ νέας γυναῖκας, πρὸς
ἐκεῖνον µὲν οὐδὲν ἐφθέγξατο, παρόντος δ' ἐκείνου τὸν
23.6.5 σταθµοδότην µεταπεµψάµενος “οὗτος” εἶπεν, “οὐκ
ἐξάξεις µου τὸν υἱὸν ἐκ τῆς στενοχωρίας;”
24.1.1 Δηµήτριος δέ, τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτῷ προσῆκον εἰ δι'
ἄλλο µηδὲν ὥς γε πρεσβυτέραν ἀδελφὴν αἰσχύνεσθαι
(τοῦτο γὰρ ἐβούλετο λέγεσθαι), τοσαύτην ὕβριν εἰς παῖδας
ἐλευθέρους καὶ γυναῖκας ἀστὰς κατεσκέδασε τῆς ἀκροπό-
24.1.5 λεως, ὥστε δοκεῖν τότε µάλιστα καθαρεύειν τὸν τόπον, ὅτε
Χρυσίδι καὶ Λαµίᾳ καὶ Δηµοῖ καὶ Ἀντικύρᾳ ταῖς πόρ-
24.2.1 ναις ἐκείναις συνακολασταίνοι. τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα σαφῶς
ἀπαγγέλλειν οὐ πρέπει διὰ τὴν πόλιν, τὴν δὲ Δηµο-
κλέους ἀρετὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἄξιόν ἐστι µὴ παρελθεῖν.
24.3.1 ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἦν ἔτι παῖς ἄνηβος, οὐκ ἔλαθε δὲ τὸν Δη-
µήτριον ἔχων τῆς εὐµορφίας τὴν ἐπωνυµίαν κατήγορον·
24.4.1 ἐκαλεῖτο γὰρ Δηµοκλῆς ὁ καλός. ὡς δὲ πολλὰ πειρών-
των καὶ διδόντων καὶ φοβούντων ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἡλίσκετο,
τέλος δὲ φεύγων τὰς παλαίστρας καὶ τὸ γυµνάσιον εἴς
τι βαλανεῖον ἰδιωτικὸν ἐφοίτα λουσόµενος, ἐπιτηρήσας
24.5.1 τὸν καιρὸν ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐπεισῆλθεν αὐτῷ µόνῳ. καὶ ὁ
παῖς ὡς συνεῖδε τὴν περὶ αὑτὸν ἐρηµίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην,
ἀφελὼν τὸ πῶµα τοῦ χαλκώµατος εἰς ζέον ὕδωρ ἐνήλατο
καὶ διέφθειρεν αὑτόν, ἀνάξια µὲν παθών, ἄξια δὲ τῆς
24.6.1 πατρίδος καὶ τοῦ κάλλους φρονήσας, οὐχ ὡς Κλεαίνετος
ὁ Κλεοµέδοντος, ὃς ὠφληκότι τῷ πατρὶ δίκην πεντήκοντα
ταλάντων ἀφεθῆναι διαπραξάµενος, καὶ γράµµατα παρὰ
Δηµητρίου κοµίσας πρὸς τὸν δῆµον, οὐ µόνον ἑαυτὸν
24.7.1 κατῄσχυνεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν συνετάραξε. τὸν µὲν γὰρ
Κλεοµέδοντα τῆς δίκης ἀφῆκαν, ἐγράφη δὲ ψήφισµα

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 µηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Δηµητρίου κοµίζειν.
24.8.1 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀκούσας ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἤνεγκε µετρίως, ἀλλ'
ἠγανάκτησε, δείσαντες αὖθις οὐ µόνον τὸ ψήφισµα
καθεῖλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰσηγησαµένων καὶ συνειπόντων
24.9.1 τοὺς µὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δ' ἐφυγάδευσαν· ἔτι δὲ προσεψη-
φίσαντο, δεδόχθαι τῷ δήµῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν
ὁ βασιλεὺς Δηµήτριος κελεύσῃ, τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς
24.10.1 ὅσιον καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δίκαιον. εἰπόντος δέ
τινος τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν µαίνεσθαι τὸν Στρατοκλέα
τοιαῦτα γράφοντα, Δηµοχάρης ὁ Λευκονοεὺς “µαίνοιτο
24.11.1 µέντἂν” εἶπεν “εἰ µὴ µαίνοιτο”. πολλὰ γὰρ ὁ Στρατοκλῆς
ὠφελεῖτο διὰ τὴν κολακείαν. ὁ δὲ Δηµοχάρης ἐπὶ τούτῳ
24.12.1 διαβληθεὶς ἐφυγαδεύθη. τοιαῦτα ἔπραττον Ἀθηναῖοι,
φρουρᾶς ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἔχειν δοκοῦντες.
25.1.1 Δηµήτριος δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς Πελοπόννησον, οὐ-
δενὸς ὑφισταµένου τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ φευγόντων καὶ
προϊεµένων τὰς πόλεις, προσηγάγετο τήν τε καλου-
µένην Ἀκτὴν καὶ Ἀρκαδίαν πλὴν Μαντινείας, καὶ Ἄρ-
25.1.5 γος καὶ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ἐλύσατο, τάλαντα δοὺς
25.2.1 ἑκατὸν τοῖς φρουροῦσιν. ἐν Ἄργει µὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν
Ἡραίων ἑορτῆς καθηκούσης ἀγωνοθετῶν καὶ συµπανη-
γυρίζων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἔγηµε τὴν Αἰακίδου θυγατέρα
τοῦ Μολοττῶν βασιλέως, ἀδελφὴν δὲ Πύρρου, Δηιδά-
25.3.1 µειαν. Σικυωνίους δὲ φήσας παρὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖν τὴν
πόλιν, ἔπεισεν οὗ νῦν οἰκοῦσι µετοικίσασθαι· τῷ δὲ τόπῳ
καὶ τοὔνοµα τὴν πόλιν συµµεταβαλοῦσαν ἀντὶ Σικυῶνος
25.4.1 Δηµητριάδα προσηγόρευσεν. ἐν δ' Ἰσθµῷ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου
γενοµένου καὶ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων συνελθόντων, ἡγεµὼν
ἀνηγορεύθη τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὡς πρότερον οἱ περὶ Φίλιππον
25.5.1 καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον· ὧν ἐκεῖνος οὐ παρὰ µικρὸν ἐνόµιζεν

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 ἑαυτὸν εἶναι βελτίονα, τῇ τύχῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καὶ τῇ
25.6.1 δυνάµει τῶν πραγµάτων ἐπαιρόµενος. Ἀλέξανδρος γοῦν
οὐδένα τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων ἀπεστέρησε τῆς ὁµωνυµίας
οὐδ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνεῖπε βασιλέων βασιλέα, καίτοι πολλοῖς
25.7.1 τὸ καλεῖσθαι καὶ εἶναι βασιλέας αὐτὸς δεδωκώς· ἐκεῖνος
δὲ χλευάζων καὶ γελῶν τοὺς ἄλλον τινὰ πλὴν τοῦ πατρὸς
καὶ αὐτοῦ βασιλέα προσαγορεύοντας, ἡδέως ἤκουε τῶν
παρὰ πότον ἐπιχύσεις λαµβανόντων Δηµητρίου βασιλέως,
25.7.5 Σελεύκου δ' ἐλεφαντάρχου, Πτολεµαίου δὲ ναυάρχου,
Λυσιµάχου δὲ γαζοφύλακος, Ἀγαθοκλέους δὲ τοῦ Σικε-
25.8.1 λιώτου νησιάρχου. τούτων δὲ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐκφερο-
µένων, οἱ µὲν ἄλλοι [βασιλεῖς] κατεγέλων, Λυσίµαχος δ'
ἠγανάκτει µόνος εἰ σπάδοντα νοµίζει Δηµήτριος αὐτόν·
ἐπιεικῶς γὰρ εἰώθεισαν εὐνούχους ἔχειν γαζοφύλακας.
25.9.1 ἦν δὲ καὶ πάντων ἀπεχθέστατος ὁ Λυσίµαχος αὐτῷ, καὶ
λοιδορῶν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα τῆς Λαµίας ἔλεγε νῦν πρῶτον
ἑωρακέναι πόρνην προερχοµένην ἐκ τραγικῆς σκηνῆς·
ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος ἔφη τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόρνην σωφρονεστέραν
25.9.5 εἶναι τῆς ἐκείνου Πηνελόπης.
26.1.1 Τότε δ' οὖν ἀναζευγνύων εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔγραψεν,
ὅτι βούλεται παραγενόµενος εὐθὺς µυηθῆναι καὶ τὴν
τελετὴν ἅπασαν ἀπὸ τῶν µικρῶν ἄχρι τῶν ἐποπτικῶν
26.2.1 παραλαβεῖν. τοῦτο δ' οὐ θεµιτὸν ἦν οὐδὲ γεγονὸς πρό-
τερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ µικρὰ τοῦ Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἐτελοῦντο, τὰ
δὲ µεγάλα τοῦ Βοηδροµιῶνος· ἐπώπτευον δὲ τοὐλάχιστον
26.3.1 ἀπὸ τῶν µεγάλων ἐνιαυτὸν διαλείποντες. ἀναγνωσθέντων
δὲ τῶν γραµµάτων, µόνος ἐτόλµησεν ἀντειπεῖν Πυθόδωρος
ὁ δᾳδοῦχος, ἐπέρανε δ' οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ Στρατοκλέους γνώµην
εἰπόντος, Ἀνθεστηριῶνα τὸν Μουνυχιῶνα ψηφισαµένους
26.3.5 καλεῖν καὶ νοµίζειν, ἐτέλουν τῷ Δηµητρίῳ τὰ πρὸς

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26.4.1 Ἄγραν· καὶ µετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐξ Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ὁ
Μουνυχιὼν γενόµενος Βοηδροµιὼν ἐδέξατο τὴν λοιπὴν
τελετήν, ἅµα καὶ τὴν ἐποπτείαν τοῦ Δηµητρίου προσεπι-
26.5.1 λαβόντος. διὸ καὶ Φιλιππίδης τὸν Στρατοκλέα λοιδορῶν
ἐποίησεν·
ὁ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συντεµὼν εἰς µῆν' ἕνα,
καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Παρθενῶνι κατασκηνώσεως·
26.5.5 ὁ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν πανδοκεῖον ὑπολαβών,
καὶ τὰς ἑταίρας εἰσαγαγὼν τῇ παρθένῳ.
27.1.1 Πολλῶν δὲ γενοµένων ἐν τῇ πόλει τότε πληµµε-
ληµάτων καὶ παρανοµηµάτων ἐκεῖνο µάλιστα λέγεται
λυπῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτι διακόσια καὶ πεντήκοντα
τάλαντα πορίσαι ταχὺ καὶ δοῦναι προσταχθὲν αὐτοῖς,
27.1.5 καὶ τῆς εἰσπράξεως συντόνου καὶ ἀπαραιτήτου γενοµένης,
ἰδὼν ἠθροισµένον τὸ ἀργύριον ἐκέλευσε Λαµίᾳ καὶ ταῖς
27.2.1 περὶ αὐτὴν ἑταίραις εἰς σµῆγµα δοθῆναι. ἡ γὰρ αἰσχύνη
τῆς ζηµίας καὶ τὸ ῥῆµα τοῦ πράγµατος µᾶλλον ἠνώχλησε
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔνιοι δὲ τοῦτο Θετταλοῖς, οὐκ Ἀθηναίοις,
27.3.1 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συµβῆναι λέγουσι. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων αὐτὴ καθ'
ἑαυτὴν ἡ Λάµια τῷ βασιλεῖ παρασκευάζουσα δεῖπνον
ἠργυρολόγησε πολλούς, καὶ τὸ δεῖπνον οὕτως ἤνθησε
τῇ δόξῃ διὰ τὴν πολυτέλειαν, ὥσθ' ὑπὸ Λυγκέως τοῦ
27.4.1 Σαµίου συγγεγράφθαι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κωµικῶν τις οὐ
φαύλως τὴν Λάµιαν Ἑλέπολιν ἀληθῶς προσεῖπε. Δηµο-
χάρης δ' ὁ Σόλιος τὸν Δηµήτριον αὐτὸν ἐκάλει Μῦθον·
27.5.1 εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ Λάµιαν. οὐ µόνον δὲ ταῖς γαµεταῖς,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τοῦ Δηµητρίου ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον
27.6.1 εὐηµεροῦσα καὶ στεργοµένη παρεῖχεν. ἀφίκοντο γοῦν
τινες παρ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρεσβείαν πρὸς Λυσίµαχον, οἷς
ἐκεῖνος ἄγων σχολὴν ἐπέδειξεν ἔν τε τοῖς µηροῖς καὶ

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 τοῖς βραχίοσιν ὠτειλὰς βαθείας ὀνύχων λεοντείων, καὶ
27.6.5 διηγεῖτο τὴν γενοµένην αὐτῷ µάχην πρὸς τὸ θηρίον,
27.7.1 ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου συγκαθειρχθέντι τοῦ βασιλέως. οἱ δὲ
γελῶντες ἔφασαν καὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βασιλέα δεινοῦ θηρίου
27.8.1 δήγµατα φέρειν ἐν τῷ τραχήλῳ, Λαµίας. ἦν δὲ θαυµαστόν,
ὅτι τῆς Φίλας ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ µὴ καθ' ἡλικίαν δυσχεραίνων,
ἥττητο τῆς Λαµίας καὶ τοσοῦτον ἤρα χρόνον ἤδη παρ-
27.9.1 ηκµακυίας. Δηµὼ γοῦν ἡ ἐπικαλουµένη Μανία, παρὰ δεῖ-
πνον αὐλούσης τῆς Λαµίας καὶ τοῦ Δηµητρίου πυθοµέ-
27.10.1 νου “τί σοι δοκεῖ;” “γραῦς” εἶπεν “ὦ βασιλεῦ.” πάλιν
δὲ τραγηµάτων παρατεθέντων, κἀκείνου πρὸς αὐτὴν
εἰπόντος· “ὁρᾷς ὅσα µοι Λάµια πέµπει;” “πλείονα” ἔφη
“πεµφθήσεταί σοι παρὰ τῆς ἐµῆς µητρός, ἐὰν θέλῃς καὶ
27.11.1 µετ' αὐτῆς καθεύδειν.” ἀποµνηµονεύεται δὲ τῆς Λαµίας
καὶ πρὸς τὴν λεγοµένην Βοκχώρεως κρίσιν ἀντίρρησις.
27.12.1 ἐπεὶ γάρ τις ἐρῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τῆς ἑταίρας Θώνιδος
ᾐτεῖτο συχνὸν χρυσίον, εἶτα κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους δόξας
αὐτῇ συγγενέσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυµίας ἐπαύσατο, δίκην ἔλαχεν
27.13.1 ἡ Θῶνις αὐτῷ τοῦ µισθώµατος. ἀκούσας δὲ τὸν λόγον
ὁ Βόκχωρις ἐκέλευσε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅσον ᾐτήθη χρυσίον
ἠριθµηµένον ἐν τῷ ἀγγείῳ διαφέρειν δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε τῇ
χειρί, τὴν δ' ἑταίραν ἔχεσθαι τῆς σκιᾶς, ὡς τὴν δόξαν
27.14.1 τῆς ἀληθείας σκιὰν οὖσαν. οὐκ ᾤετο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν
κρίσιν ἡ Λάµια δικαίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπέλυσεν ἡ σκιὰ τῆς
ἐπιθυµίας τοῦ ἀργυρίου τὴν ἑταίραν, τὸ δ' ὄναρ ἔπαυσεν
ἐρῶντα τὸν νεανίσκον. ταῦτα µὲν οὖν περὶ Λαµίας.
28.1.1 Τὴν δὲ διήγησιν ὥσπερ ἐκ κωµικῆς σκηνῆς πάλιν
εἰς τραγικὴν µετάγουσιν αἱ τύχαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ
28.2.1 ἀνδρὸς ὃν διηγούµεθα. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων βασιλέων ἁπάν-
των συνισταµένων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ συµφερόντων

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 εἰς ταὐτὸ τὰς δυνάµεις, ἀπῆρεν ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλά-
δος, καὶ τῷ πατρὶ συµµείξας φιλοτιµουµένῳ παρ' ἡλικίαν
28.3.1 πρὸς τὸν πόλεµον, ἔτι µᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἐπερρώσθη. καίτοι
δοκεῖ γ' Ἀντίγονος, εἰ µικρῶν τινων ὑφεῖτο καὶ τῆς ἄγαν
φιλαρχίας ἐχάλασε, µέχρι παντὸς ἂν αὑτῷ διαφυλάξαι
28.4.1 κἀκείνῳ καταλιπεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι. φύσει δὲ βαρὺς ὢν
καὶ ὑπερόπτης καὶ τοῖς λόγοις οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τοῖς πράγµασι
τραχύς, πολλοὺς καὶ νέους καὶ δυνατοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξηγρίαινε
28.5.1 καὶ παρώξυνε· καὶ τήν γε τότε σύστασιν καὶ κοινωνίαν
αὐτῶν ἔλεγεν ὥσπερ ὀρνίθων σπερµολόγων συνδροµὴν
28.6.1 ἑνὶ λίθῳ καὶ ψόφῳ συνδιαταράξειν. ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς µὲν
ἑπτακισµυρίων πλείους, ἱππεῖς δὲ µυρίους, ἐλέφαντας
δ' ἑβδοµήκοντα πέντε, τῶν ἐναντίων ἐχόντων πεζοὺς
µὲν ἑξακισµυρίους καὶ τετρακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεν-
28.6.5 τακοσίοις τῶν ἐκείνου πλείονας, ἐλέφαντας δὲ τετρα-
28.7.1 κοσίους, ἅρµατα δ' ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι. γενοµένῳ δ' ἐγγὺς
αὐτῶν τροπὴν ἔσχεν ἡ διάνοια τῆς ἐλπίδος µᾶλλον ἢ τῆς
28.8.1 γνώµης. ὑψηλὸς γὰρ εἶναι καὶ γαῦρος εἰωθὼς ἐν τοῖς
ἀγῶσι, καὶ χρώµενος φωνῇ τε µεγάλῃ καὶ λόγοις σοβα-
ροῖς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῷ παρασκῶψαί τι καὶ γελοῖον εἰπεῖν
τῶν πολεµίων ἐν χερσὶν ὄντων ἐπιδειξάµενος εὐστάθειαν
28.8.5 καὶ καταφρόνησιν, τότε σύννους ἑωρᾶτο καὶ σιωπηλὸς
τὰ πολλά, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέδειξε τῷ πλήθει καὶ συνέστησε
28.9.1 διάδοχον. ὃ δὲ µάλιστα πάντες ἐθαύµασαν, ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ
µόνος διελέχθη πρὸς αὐτόν, οὐκ εἰθισµένος ἔχειν οὐδὲ
πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀπορρήτους κοινολογίας, ἀλλ' ἴδιος ὢν
γνώµῃ, εἶτα προστάττων φανερῶς καὶ χρώµενος οἷς βου-
28.10.1 λεύσαιτο καθ' ἑαυτόν. λέγεται γοῦν µειράκιον ἔτι ὄντα
τὸν Δηµήτριον αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, πότε µέλλουσιν ἀνα-
ζευγνύειν· τὸν δ' εἰπεῖν πρὸς ὀργήν· “ἀγωνιᾷς µὴ µόνος

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 σὺ τῆς σάλπιγγος οὐκ ἀκούσῃς;”
29.1.1 Τότε µέντοι καὶ σηµεῖα µοχθηρὰ κατεδουλοῦτο τὴν
29.2.1 γνώµην αὐτῶν. Δηµήτριος µὲν γὰρ ἔδοξε κατὰ τοὺς
ὕπνους Ἀλέξανδρον ὡπλισµένον λαµπρῶς ἐρωτᾶν, ὁποῖόν
τι σύνθηµα διδόναι πρὸς τὴν µάχην µέλλουσιν· αὐτοῦ δὲ
φήσαντος “Δία καὶ Νίκην”, “ἄπειµι τοίνυν” φάναι “πρὸς
29.2.5 τοὺς ἐναντίους· ἐκεῖνοι γάρ µε παραλαµβάνουσιν.”
29.3.1 Ἀντίγονος δὲ παραταττοµένης ἤδη τῆς φάλαγγος ἐξιὼν
προσέπταισεν, ὥστε πεσεῖν ὅλος ἐπὶ στόµα καὶ διατεθῆναι
χαλεπῶς· ἀναστὰς δὲ καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνατείνας πρὸς τὸν
οὐρανόν, ᾐτήσατο νίκην παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἢ θάνατον ἀναί-
29.4.1 σθητον πρὸ τῆς ἥττης. γενοµένης δὲ τῆς µάχης ἐν χερσί,
Δηµήτριος ἔχων τοὺς πλείστους καὶ κρατίστους τῶν ἱπ-
πέων Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ Σελεύκου συνέπεσε, καὶ µέχρι τροπῆς
τῶν πολεµίων λαµπρῶς ἀγωνισάµενος, ἐν τῇ διώξει σο-
29.4.5 βαρᾷ καὶ φιλοτίµῳ παρὰ καιρὸν γενοµένῃ τὴν νίκην
29.5.1 διέφθειρεν. αὐτὸς µὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔσχε πάλιν ἀναστρέψας
συµµεῖξαι τοῖς πεζοῖς, τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐν µέσῳ γενοµένων,
τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα γυµνὴν ἱππέων κατιδόντες οἱ περὶ Σέ-
λευκον οὐκ ἐνέβαλον µέν, ὡς δ' ἐµβαλοῦντες ἐφόβουν
29.6.1 καὶ περιήλαυνον, µεταβάλλεσθαι διδόντες αὐτοῖς. ὃ καὶ
συνέβη· πολὺ γὰρ µέρος ἀπορραγὲν ἑκουσίως µετεχώρησε
29.7.1 πρὸς ἐκείνους, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐτράπη. φεροµένων δὲ πολ-
λῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον, καί τινος τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν εἰπόν-
τος· “ἐπὶ σὲ οὗτοι βασιλεῦ” “τίνα γάρ” εἶπε “<πλὴν>
ἐµοῦ σκοπὸν ἔχουσιν; ἀλλὰ Δηµήτριος ἀφίξεται βοηθῶν.”
29.8.1 καὶ τοῦτο µέχρι παντὸς ἐλπίζων καὶ περισκοπῶν τὸν υἱόν,
ἅµα πολλῶν ἀκοντισµάτων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφεθέντων ἔπεσε,
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολιπόντων ὀπαδῶν καὶ φίλων µόνος
παρέµεινε τῷ νεκρῷ Θώραξ ὁ Λαρισσαῖος.

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30.1.1 Οὕτω δὲ κριθείσης τῆς µάχης, οἱ µὲν νενικηκότες
βασιλεῖς τὴν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ Δηµητρίῳ πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν
ὥσπερ µέγα σῶµα κατακόπτοντες ἐλάµβανον µερίδας, καὶ
προσδιενείµαντο τὰς ἐκείνων ἐπαρχίας αἷς εἶχον αὐτοὶ
30.2.1 πρότερον. Δηµήτριος δὲ µετὰ πεντακισχιλίων πεζῶν καὶ
τετρακισχιλίων ἱππέων φεύγων καὶ συντόνως ἐλάσας εἰς
Ἔφεσον, οἰοµένων ἁπάντων ἀποροῦντα χρηµάτων αὐτὸν
οὐκ ἀφέξεσθαι τοῦ ἱεροῦ, φοβηθεὶς τοὺς στρατιώτας µὴ
30.2.5 τοῦτο ποιήσωσιν, ἀνέστη διὰ ταχέων καὶ τὸν πλοῦν ἐπὶ
τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐποιεῖτο, τῶν λοιπῶν ἐλπίδων ἐν Ἀθηναίοις
30.3.1 ἔχων τὰς µεγίστας. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ναῦς ἐκεῖ καὶ χρήµατα
καὶ γυναῖκα Δηιδάµειαν ἐτύγχανε καταλελοιπώς, καὶ
βεβαιοτέραν οὐκ ἐνόµιζε καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοῖς πράγµασι
30.4.1 τῆς Ἀθηναίων εὐνοίας. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ γενοµένῳ περὶ τὰς
Κυκλάδας αὐτῷ πρέσβεις Ἀθηναίων ἀπήντησαν, ἀπέχε-
σθαι τῆς πόλεως παρακαλοῦντες, ὡς ἐψηφισµένου τοῦ
δήµου µηδένα δέχεσθαι τῇ πόλει τῶν βασιλέων, τὴν δὲ
30.4.5 Δηιδάµειαν εἰς Μέγαρα ἐξέπεµψαν µετὰ τιµῆς καὶ ποµ-
πῆς πρεπούσης, τοῦ καθεστηκότος ἐξέστη δι' ὀργὴν [αὐ-
τοῦ], καίπερ ἐνηνοχὼς ῥᾷστα τὴν ἄλλην ἀτυχίαν καὶ
γεγονὼς ἐν τοιαύτῃ µεταβολῇ πραγµάτων οὐ ταπεινὸς
30.5.1 οὐδ' ἀγεννής. ἀλλὰ τὸ παρ' ἐλπίδα διεψεῦσθαι τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων, καὶ τὴν δοκοῦσαν εὔνοιαν ἐξεληλέγχθαι τοῖς πράγ-
µασι κενὴν καὶ πεπλασµένην οὖσαν, ὀδυνηρὸν ἦν αὐτῷ.
30.6.1 τὸ γὰρ φαυλότατον ὡς ἔοικεν εὐνοίας ὄχλων βασιλεῦσι
καὶ δυνάσταις τεκµήριόν ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ τιµῶν, ἧς ἐν
τῇ προαιρέσει τῶν ἀποδιδόντων ἐχούσης τὸ καλὸν ἀφ-
αιρεῖ τὴν πίστιν ὁ φόβος· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ δεδιότες ψηφί-
30.7.1 ζονται καὶ φιλοῦντες. διόπερ οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες οὐκ εἰς
ἀνδριάντας οὐδὲ γραφὰς οὐδ' ἀποθεώσεις, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον

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 εἰς τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποβλέποντες,
ἢ πιστεύουσιν ὡς τιµαῖς, ἢ ἀπιστοῦσιν ὡς ἀνάγκαις·
30.8.1 ὡς οἵ γε δῆµοι πολλάκις ἐν αὐταῖς µάλιστα ταῖς τιµαῖς
µισοῦσι τοὺς ἀµέτρως καὶ ὑπερόγκως καὶ παρ' ἀκόντων
λαµβάνοντας.
31.1.1 Ὁ γοῦν Δηµήτριος τότε δεινὰ µὲν ἡγούµενος
πάσχειν, ἀδύνατος δ' ὢν ἀµύνασθαι, προσέπεµψε τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις ἐγκαλῶν µετρίως, ἀξιῶν δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολαβεῖν,
31.2.1 ἐν αἷς ἦν καὶ ἡ τρισκαιδεκήρης. κοµισάµενος δὲ παρ-
έπλευσεν εἰς Ἰσθµόν, καὶ τῶν πραγµάτων αὐτῷ κακῶς
ἐχόντων – ἐξέπιπτον γὰρ ἑκασταχόθεν αἱ φρουραὶ καὶ
πάντα µεθίστατο πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους – , ἀπολιπὼν ἐπὶ
31.2.5 τῆς Ἑλλάδος Πύρρον, αὐτὸς ἄρας ἐπὶ τὴν Χερρόνησον
31.3.1 ἔπλευσε, καὶ κακῶς ἅµα ποιῶν Λυσίµαχον, ὠφέλει καὶ
συνεῖχε τὴν περὶ αὑτὸν δύναµιν, ἀρχοµένην ἀναλαµβάνειν
31.4.1 καὶ γίνεσθαι πάλιν οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητον. ὁ δὲ Λυσίµαχος
ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων ἠµελεῖτο, µηδὲν ἐπιεικέστερος
ἐκείνου δοκῶν εἶναι, τῷ <δὲ> µᾶλλον ἰσχύειν καὶ φοβερώ-
τερος.
31.5.1 Οὐ πολλῷ δ' ὕστερον Σέλευκος ἐµνᾶτο πέµπων τὴν
Δηµητρίου καὶ Φίλας θυγατέρα Στρατονίκην, ἔχων µὲν
ἐξ Ἀπάµας τῆς Περσίδος υἱὸν Ἀντίοχον, οἰόµενος δὲ τὰ
πράγµατα καὶ διαδόχοις ἀρκεῖν πλείοσι καὶ δεῖσθαι τῆς
31.5.5 πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οἰκειότητος, ἐπεὶ καὶ Λυσίµαχον ἑώρα τῶν
Πτολεµαίου θυγατέρων τὴν µὲν ἑαυτῷ, τὴν δ' Ἀγαθοκλεῖ
31.6.1 τῷ υἱῷ λαµβάνοντα. Δηµητρίῳ δ' ἦν ἀνέλπιστος εὐτυχία
κηδεῦσαι Σελεύκῳ, καὶ τὴν κόρην ἀναλαβὼν ἔπλει ταῖς
ναυσὶ πάσαις εἰς Συρίαν, τῇ τ' ἄλλῃ γῇ προσέχων ἀναγ-
καίως καὶ τῆς Κιλικίας ἁπτόµενος, ἣν Πλείσταρχος εἶχε,
31.6.5 µετὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον µάχην ἐξαίρετον αὐτῷ δοθεῖ-

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 σαν ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων· ἦν δὲ Κασσάνδρου Πλείσταρχος
31.7.1 ἀδελφός. ἀδικεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν χώραν αὑτοῦ νοµίζων ὑπὸ
Δηµητρίου κατὰ τὰς ἀποβάσεις καὶ µέµψασθαι βουλό-
µενος τὸν Σέλευκον, ὅτι τῷ κοινῷ διαλλάττεται πολεµίῳ
δίχα τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων, ἀνέβη πρὸς αὐτόν.
32.1.1 Αἰσθόµενος δὲ τοῦτο Δηµήτριος ὥρµησεν ἀπὸ
θαλάσσης ἐπὶ Κυΐνδων, καὶ τῶν χρηµάτων εὑρὼν ἔτι
λοιπὰ χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα, ταῦτα συσκευασάµενος
32.2.1 καὶ φθάσας ἐµβαλέσθαι διὰ ταχέων ἀνήχθη. καὶ παρούσης
ἤδη Φίλας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτῷ περὶ Ῥωσσὸν ἀπήντησε
Σέλευκος, καὶ τὴν ἔντευξιν εὐθὺς ἄδολον καὶ ἀνύποπτον
καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐποιοῦντο, πρότερον µὲν Σέλευκος ἑστιάσας
32.2.5 ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ Δηµήτριον, αὖθις δὲ
32.3.1 Δηµήτριος ἐκεῖνον ἐν τῇ τρισκαιδεκήρει δεξάµενος. ἦσαν
δὲ καὶ σχολαὶ καὶ κοινολογίαι καὶ συνδιηµερεύσεις
ἀφρούρων καὶ ἀνόπλων, ἄχρι οὗ Σέλευκος τὴν Στρατονί-
κην ἀναλαβὼν λαµπρῶς εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν ἀνέβη.
32.4.1 Δηµήτριος δὲ Κιλικίαν κατέσχε, καὶ Φίλαν τὴν γυ-
ναῖκα πρὸς Κάσσανδρον ἔπεµψε τὸν ἀδελφόν, ἀπολυσο-
32.5.1 µένην τὰς Πλειστάρχου κατηγορίας. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Δηι-
δάµεια πλεύσασα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ
συγγενοµένη χρόνον οὐ πολύν, ἐξ ἀρρωστίας τινὸς
32.6.1 ἐτελεύτησε. γενοµένης δ' <αὐτῷ> πρὸς Πτολεµαῖον διὰ
Σελεύκου φιλίας [αὐτῷ], ὡµολογήθη Πτολεµαΐδα τὴν
32.7.1 Πτολεµαίου θυγατέρα λαβεῖν αὐτὸν γυναῖκα. καὶ ταῦτα
µὲν ἀστεῖα τοῦ Σελεύκου. Κιλικίαν δ' ἀξιῶν χρήµατα
λαβόντα παραδοῦναι Δηµήτριον, ὡς <δ'> οὐκ ἔπειθε
Σιδῶνα καὶ Τύρον ἀπαιτῶν πρὸς ὀργήν, ἐδόκει βίαιος
32.7.5 εἶναι καὶ δεινὰ ποιεῖν, εἰ τὴν ἀπ' Ἰνδῶν ἄχρι τῆς κατὰ
Συρίαν θαλάσσης ἅπασαν ὑφ' αὑτῷ πεποιηµένος, οὕτως

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 ἐνδεής ἐστιν ἔτι πραγµάτων καὶ πτωχός, ὡς ὑπὲρ δυεῖν
πόλεων ἄνδρα κηδεστὴν καὶ µεταβολῇ τύχης κεχρηµένον
32.8.1 ἐλαύνειν, λαµπρὰν τῷ Πλάτωνι µαρτυρίαν διδούς, δια-
κελευοµένῳ (leg. 5, 736e) µὴ τὴν οὐσίαν πλείω, τὴν δ'
ἀπληστίαν ποιεῖν ἐλάσσω τόν γε βουλόµενον ὡς ἀληθῶς
εἶναι πλούσιον, ὡς ὅ γε µὴ παύων φιλοπλουτίαν [οὗτος]
32.8.5 οὔτε πενίας οὔτ' ἀπορίας ἀπήλλακται.
33.1.1 Οὐ µὴν ὑπέπτηξε Δηµήτριος, ἀλλὰ φήσας οὐδ'
ἂν µυρίας ἡττηθῇ µάχας ἄλλας ἐν Ἴψῳ γαµβρὸν ἀγα-
πήσειν ἐπὶ µισθῷ Σέλευκον, τὰς µὲν πόλεις ἐκρατύνατο
φρουραῖς, αὐτὸς δὲ πυθόµενος Λαχάρη στασιάζουσιν
33.1.5 Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιθέµενον τυραννεῖν, ἤλπιζε ῥᾳδίως ἐπιφα-
33.2.1 νεὶς λήψεσθαι τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τὸ µὲν πέλαγος ἀσφαλῶς
διεπεραιώθη µεγάλῳ στόλῳ, παρὰ δὲ τὴν Ἀττικὴν
παραπλέων ἐχειµάσθη, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀπέβαλε τῶν
νεῶν, καὶ συνδιεφθάρη πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ὀλίγον.
33.3.1 αὐτὸς δὲ σωθεὶς ἥψατο µέν τινος πολέµου πρὸς τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, ὡς δ' οὐδὲν ἐπέραινε, πέµψας ναυτικὸν αὖθις
ἀθροίσοντας, αὐτὸς εἰς Πελοπόννησον παρῆλθε καὶ
33.4.1 Μεσσήνην ἐπολιόρκει. καὶ προσµαχόµενος τοῖς τείχεσιν
ἐκινδύνευσε, καταπελτικοῦ βέλους εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον
33.5.1 αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ στόµα διὰ τῆς σιαγόνος ἐµπεσόντος. ἀνα-
ληφθεὶς δὲ καὶ πόλεις τινὰς ἀφεστώσας προσαγαγόµενος,
πάλιν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐνέβαλε, καὶ κρατήσας Ἐλευσῖνος
καὶ Ῥαµνοῦντος ἔφθειρε τὴν χώραν, καὶ ναῦν τινα λαβὼν
33.5.5 ἔχουσαν σῖτον καὶ εἰσάγουσαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐκρέµασε
τὸν ἔµπορον καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην, ὥστε τῶν ἄλλων
ἀποτρεποµένων διὰ φόβον σύντονον λιµὸν ἐν ἄστει
33.6.1 γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ λιµῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπορίαν. ἁλῶν
γοῦν µέδιµνον ὠνοῦντο τετταράκοντα δραχµῶν, ὁ δὲ τῶν

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33.7.1 πυρῶν [µόδιος] ὤνιος ἦν τριακοσίων. µικρὰν δὲ τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις ἀναπνοὴν παρέσχον ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα νῆες
φανεῖσαι περὶ Αἴγιναν, ἃς ἔπεµψεν ἐπικούρους αὐτοῖς
33.8.1 Πτολεµαῖος. εἶτα Δηµητρίῳ πολλῶν µὲν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου,
πολλῶν δ' ἀπὸ Κύπρου νεῶν παραγενοµένων, ὥστε
συµπάσας ἀθροισθῆναι τριακοσίας, ἔφυγον ἄραντες οἱ
Πτολεµαίου, καὶ Λαχάρης ὁ τύραννος ἀπέδρα προέµενος
33.8.5 τὴν πόλιν.
34.1.1 Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, καίπερ ψηφισάµενοι θάνατον εἰ
µνησθείη τις εἰρήνης καὶ διαλλαγῆς πρὸς Δηµήτριον,
εὐθὺς ἀνεῴγνυσαν τὰς ἐγγὺς πύλας καὶ πρέσβεις ἔπεµπον,
οὐδὲν µὲν ἀπ' ἐκείνου χρηστὸν προσδοκῶντες, ἐκβιαζο-
34.2.1 µένης δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας· ἐν ᾗ δυσχερῶν πολλῶν συµπεσόντων
λέγεταί τι καὶ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι· πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἐν
οἰκήµατι καθέζεσθαι τὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀπεγνωκότας, ἐκ
δὲ τῆς ὀροφῆς µῦν νεκρὸν ἐκπεσεῖν, τοὺς δ' ὡς εἶδον
34.3.1 ἀναπηδήσαντας ἀµφοτέρους διαµάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. τότε
καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον Ἐπίκουρον ἱστοροῦσι διαθρέψαι τοὺς
συνήθεις κυάµους πρὸς ἀριθµὸν µετ' αὐτῶν διανεµόµενον.
34.4.1 οὕτως οὖν τῆς πόλεως ἐχούσης, εἰσελθὼν ὁ Δηµήτριος καὶ
κελεύσας εἰς τὸ θέατρον ἀθροισθῆναι πάντας, ὅπλοις µὲν
συνέφραξε τὴν σκηνὴν καὶ δορυφόροις τὸ λογεῖον περιέλα-
βεν, αὐτὸς δὲ καταβὰς ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ διὰ τῶν ἄνω
34.4.5 παρόδων, ἔτι µᾶλλον ἐκπεπληγµένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τὴν
34.5.1 ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου πέρας ἐποιήσατο τοῦ δέους αὐτῶν. καὶ
γὰρ τόνου φωνῆς καὶ ῥηµάτων πικρίας φεισάµενος,
ἐλαφρῶς δὲ καὶ φιλικῶς µεµψάµενος αὐτοῖς διηλλάσσετο,
καὶ δέκα µυριάδας σίτου µεδίµνων ἐπέδωκε, καὶ κατέστη-
34.6.1 σεν ἀρχὰς αἳ µάλιστα τῷ δήµῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν. συνιδὼν
δὲ Δροµοκλείδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπὸ χαρᾶς τὸν δῆµον ἔν τε

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 φωναῖς ὄντα παντοδαπαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήµατος
ἐπαίνους τῶν δηµαγωγῶν ἁµιλλώµενον ὑπερβαλέσθαι,
34.6.5 γνώµην ἔγραψε Δηµητρίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸν Πειραιᾶ παρα-
34.7.1 δοθῆναι καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν. ἐπιψηφισθέντων δὲ τούτων
ὁ Δηµήτριος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ προσενέβαλε φρουρὰν εἰς τὸ
Μουσεῖον, ὡς µὴ πάλιν ἀναχαιτίσαντα τὸν δῆµον ἀσχολίας
αὐτῷ πραγµάτων ἑτέρων παρασχεῖν.
35.1.1 Ἐχοµένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, εὐθὺς ἐπεβούλευε τῇ
Λακεδαίµονι, καὶ περὶ Μαντίνειαν Ἀρχιδάµου τοῦ βασι-
35.2.1 εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐνέβαλε, καὶ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ Σπάρτῃ
πάλιν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἑλὼν πεντακοσίους καὶ διαφθείρας
διακοσίους, ὅσον οὔπω τὴν πόλιν ἔχειν ἐδόκει, µέχρι τῶν
χρόνων ἐκείνων ἀνάλωτον οὖσαν.
35.3.1 Ἀλλ' ἡ τύχη περὶ οὐδένα τῶν βασιλέων ἔοικεν οὕτως
τροπὰς λαβεῖν µεγάλας καὶ ταχείας, οὐδ' ἐν ἑτέροις πράγ-
µασι τοσαυτάκις µικρὰ καὶ πάλιν µεγάλη, καὶ ταπεινὴ
µὲν ἐκ λαµπρᾶς, ἰσχυρὰ δ' αὖθις ἐκ φαύλης γενέσθαι.
35.4.1 διὸ καί φασιν αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς χείροσι µεταβολαῖς πρὸς τὴν
Τύχην ἀναφθέγγεσθαι τὸ Αἰσχύλειον (fr. 259 N.29)
σύ τοί µε φυσᾷς, σύ µε καταίθειν µοι δοκεῖς.
35.5.1 καὶ γὰρ τότε τῶν πραγµάτων οὕτως εὐπόρως αὐτῷ πρὸς
ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναµιν ἐπιδιδόντων, ἀγγέλλεται Λυσίµαχος
µὲν πρῶτος ἀφῃρηµένος αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις, Κύπρον
δὲ Πτολεµαῖος ᾑρηκὼς ἄνευ µιᾶς πόλεως Σαλαµῖνος, ἐν
35.5.5 δὲ Σαλαµῖνι πολιορκῶν τοὺς παῖδας αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν µητέρα
35.6.1 κατειληµµένους. οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Τύχη, καθάπερ ἡ παρ'
Ἀρχιλόχῳ γυνὴ

τῇ µὲν ὕδωρ ἐφόρει

δολοφρονέουσα χειρί, θἠτέρῃ δὲ πῦρ,

  102  
35.6.5 δεινοῖς αὐτὸν οὕτω καὶ φοβεροῖς ἀγγέλµασιν ἀποστήσασα
τῆς Λακεδαίµονος, εὐθὺς ἑτέρας πραγµάτων καινῶν καὶ
µεγάλων ἐπήνεγκεν ἐλπίδας ἐκ τοιαύτης αἰτίας.
36.1.1 Ἐπεὶ Κασσάνδρου τελευτήσαντος ὁ πρεσβύτατος
αὐτοῦ τῶν παίδων Φίλιππος οὐ πολὺν χρόνον βασιλεύ-
σας Μακεδόνων ἀπέθανεν, οἱ λοιποὶ δύο πρὸς ἀλλήλους
ἐστασίαζον, θατέρου δ' αὐτῶν Ἀντιπάτρου τὴν µητέρα
36.1.5 Θεσσαλονίκην φονεύσαντος, ἅτερος ἐκάλει βοηθοὺς ἐκ
µὲν Ἠπείρου Πύρρον, ἐκ δὲ Πελοποννήσου Δηµήτριον.
36.2.1 ἔφθασε δὲ Πύρρος ἐλθών, καὶ πολὺ µέρος Μακεδονίας
ἀποτεµόµενος τῆς βοηθείας µισθόν, φοβερὸς µὲν ἦν ἤδη
36.3.1 παροικῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ· Δηµητρίου δ' ὡς ἐδέξατο τὰ γράµ-
µατα µετὰ τῆς δυνάµεως προσιόντος, ἔτι µᾶλλον ὁ νεα-
νίας τοῦτον φοβηθεὶς διὰ τὸ ἀξίωµα καὶ τὴν δόξαν,
ἀπήντησεν αὐτῷ περὶ Δῖον, ἀσπαζόµενος µὲν καὶ φιλο-
36.3.5 φρονούµενος, οὐδὲν δὲ φάσκων ἔτι τῆς ἐκείνου δεῖσθαι
36.4.1 τὰ πράγµατα παρουσίας. ἦσαν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὑποψίαι
πρὸς ἀλλήλους αὐτοῖς, καὶ βαδίζοντι Δηµητρίῳ πρὸς
δεῖπνον ὑπὸ τοῦ νεανίσκου παρακεκληµένῳ µηνύει τις
ἐπιβουλήν, ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πότῳ µελλόντων αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν.
36.5.1 ὁ δὲ µηδὲν διαταραχθείς, ἀλλὰ µικρὸν ὑφεὶς τῆς πορείας
ἐκέλευσε τοὺς µὲν ἡγεµόνας ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις τὴν στρατιὰν
ἔχειν, ἀκολούθους δὲ καὶ παῖδας ὅσοι περὶ αὐτὸν ἦσαν –
ἦσαν δὲ πολὺ πλείους τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου – συνεισελθεῖν εἰς
36.6.1 τὸν ἀνδρῶνα καὶ παραµένειν ἄχρι ἂν ἐξαναστῇ. τοῦτο δεί-
σαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκ ἐτόλµησαν ἐπιχειρῆ-
σαι· καὶ ὁ µὲν Δηµήτριος οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτῷ τὸ σῶµα ποτι-
36.7.1 κῶς σκηψάµενος, διὰ ταχέων ἀπῆλθε. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ περὶ
ἀναζυγὴν εἶχε, πράγµατα νεώτερα προσπεπτωκέναι φά-

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 µενος αὐτῷ, καὶ παρῃτεῖτο συγγνώµην ἔχειν τὸν Ἀλέξ-
ανδρον εἰ τάχιον ἀπαίρει· συνέσεσθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ µᾶλλον
36.8.1 ἄλλοτε σχολάζων. ἔχαιρεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς οὐ πρὸς
ἔχθραν, ἀλλ' ἑκουσίως ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπαίροντος αὐτοῦ,
36.9.1 καὶ προέπεµπεν ἄχρι Θετταλίας. ἐπεὶ δ' εἰς Λάρισσαν
ἧκον, αὖθις ἀλλήλοις ἐπήγγελλον ἑστιάσεις ἀντεπιβου-
λεύοντες· ὃ δὴ µάλιστα τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὑποχείριον
36.10.1 ἐποίησε τῷ Δηµητρίῳ. φυλάττεσθαι γὰρ ὀκνῶν, ὡς µὴ
κἀκεῖνον ἀντιφυλάττεσθαι διδάξῃ, παθὼν ἔφθασε, † δρᾶν
µέλλοντος αὐτοῦ µὴ διαφυγεῖν ἐκεῖνον †, ὃ ἐµηχανᾶτο.
36.11.1 κληθεὶς γὰρ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἦλθε πρὸς τὸν Δηµήτριον. ὡς δ'
ἐκεῖνος ἐξανέστη µεταξὺ δειπνῶν, φοβηθεὶς ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος
συνεξανέστη καὶ κατὰ πόδας αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς θύρας
36.12.1 συνηκολούθει. γενόµενος οὖν ὁ Δηµήτριος πρὸς ταῖς
θύραις καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δορυφόρους καὶ τοῦτο µόνον
εἰπών· “κόπτε τὸν ἑπόµενον”, αὐτὸς µὲν ὑπεξῆλθεν, ὁ δ'
Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπ' ἐκείνων κατεκόπη καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ
36.12.5 προσβοηθοῦντες, ὧν ἕνα λέγουσι σφαττόµενον εἰπεῖν, ὡς
ἡµέρᾳ µιᾷ φθάσειεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Δηµήτριος.
37.1.1 Ἡ µὲν οὖν νὺξ οἷον εἰκὸς θόρυβον ἔσχεν. ἅµα δ'
ἡµέρᾳ ταραττοµένοις τοῖς Μακεδόσι καὶ φοβουµένοις τὴν
τοῦ Δηµητρίου δύναµιν, ὡς ἐπῄει µὲν οὐδεὶς φοβερός, ὁ
δὲ Δηµήτριος ἔπεµπε βουλόµενος ἐντυχεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν
37.1.5 πεπραγµένων ἀπολογήσασθαι, θαρρεῖν παρέστη καὶ δέχε-
37.2.1 σθαι φιλανθρώπως αὐτόν. ὡς δ' ἦλθεν, οὐ µακρῶν ἐδέησεν
αὐτῷ λόγων, ἀλλὰ τῷ µισεῖν µὲν τὸν Ἀντίπατρον φονέα
µητρὸς ὄντα, βελτίονος δ' ἀπορεῖν, ἐκεῖνον ἀνηγόρευσαν
βασιλέα Μακεδόνων καὶ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς κατῆγον εἰς
37.3.1 Μακεδονίαν. ἦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς οἴκοι Μακεδόσιν οὐκ ἀκούσιος
ἡ µεταβολή, µεµνηµένοις ἀεὶ καὶ µισοῦσιν ἃ Κάσσανδρος

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37.4.1 εἰς Ἀλέξανδρον τεθνηκότα παρηνόµησεν. εἰ δέ τις ἔτι
µνήµη τῆς Ἀντιπάτρου τοῦ παλαιοῦ µετριότητος ὑπελεί-
πετο, καὶ ταύτην Δηµήτριος ἐκαρποῦτο, Φίλᾳ συνοικῶν
καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἐκείνης υἱὸν ἔχων διάδοχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἤδη τότε
37.4.5 µειράκιον ὄντα καὶ τῷ πατρὶ συστρατευόµενον.
38.1.1 Οὕτω δὲ λαµπρᾷ κεχρηµένος εὐτυχίᾳ, πυνθάνεται
µὲν περὶ τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῆς µητρὸς ὡς µεθεῖνται, δῶρα
καὶ τιµὰς Πτολεµαίου προσθέντος αὐτοῖς, πυνθάνεται
δὲ περὶ τῆς Σελεύκῳ γαµηθείσης θυγατρός, ὡς Ἀντιόχῳ
38.1.5 τῷ Σελεύκου συνοικεῖ καὶ βασίλισσα τῶν ἄνω βαρβάρων
38.2.1 ἀνηγόρευται. συνέβη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐρα-
σθέντα τῆς Στρατονίκης νέας οὔσης, ἤδη δὲ παιδίον
ἐχούσης ἐκ τοῦ Σελεύκου, διακεῖσθαι κακῶς καὶ πολλὰ
ποιεῖν τῷ πάθει διαµαχόµενον, τέλος δ' ἑαυτοῦ κατα-
38.2.5 γνόντα δεινῶν µὲν ἐπιθυµεῖν, ἀνήκεστα δὲ νοσεῖν, κε-
κρατῆσθαι δὲ τῷ λογισµῷ, τρόπον ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ βίου
ζητεῖν καὶ παραλύειν ἀτρέµα καὶ θεραπείας ἀµελείᾳ καὶ
τροφῆς ἀποχῇ τὸ σῶµα, νοσεῖν τινα νόσον σκηπτόµενον.
38.3.1 Ἐρασίστρατον δὲ τὸν ἰατρὸν αἰσθέσθαι µὲν οὐ χαλεπῶς
ἐρῶντος αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' οὗτινος ἐρᾷ δυστόπαστον ὂν ἐξ-
ανευρεῖν βουλόµενον ἀεὶ µὲν ἐν τῷ δωµατίῳ διηµερεύειν, εἰ
δέ τις εἰσίοι τῶν ἐν ὥρᾳ µειρακίων ἢ γυναικῶν, ἐγκαθ-
38.3.5 ορᾶν τε τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Ἀντιόχου καὶ τὰ συµπάσχειν
µάλιστα τῇ ψυχῇ τρεποµένῃ πεφυκότα µέρη καὶ κινή-
38.4.1 µατα τοῦ σώµατος ἐπισκοπεῖν. ὡς οὖν τῶν µὲν ἄλλων εἰς-
ιόντων ὁµοίως εἶχε, τῆς δὲ Στρατονίκης καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν
καὶ µετὰ τοῦ Σελεύκου φοιτώσης πολλάκις ἐγίνετο τὰ
τῆς Σαπφοῦς ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν πάντα,
38.4.5 φωνῆς ἐπίσχεσις, ἐρύθηµα πυρῶδες, ὄψεων ὑπολείψεις,
ἱδρῶτες ὀξεῖς, ἀταξία καὶ θόρυβος ἐν τοῖς σφυγµοῖς, τέλος

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 δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ κράτος ἡττηµένης ἀπορία καὶ θάµβος
38.5.1 καὶ ὠχρίασις, ἐπὶ τούτοις προσλογιζόµενον τὸν Ἐρασίστρα-
τον κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρας ἐρῶν βασιλέως υἱὸς
ἐνεκαρτέρει τῷ σιωπᾶν µέχρι θανάτου, χαλεπὸν µὲν
ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φράσαι ταῦτα καὶ κατειπεῖν, οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ
38.5.5 πιστεύοντα τῇ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν εὐνοίᾳ τοῦ Σελεύκου παρα-
κινδυνεῦσαί ποτε καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔρως µὲν εἴη τοῦ νεα-
38.6.1 νίσκου τὸ πάθος, ἔρως δ' ἀδύνατος καὶ ἀνίατος. ἐκπλα-
γέντος δ' ἐκείνου καὶ πυθοµένου πῶς ἀνίατος, “ὅτι νὴ
Δία” φάναι τὸν Ἐρασίστρατον “ἐρᾷ τῆς ἐµῆς γυναικός.”
38.7.1 “εἶτ' οὐκ ἄν” εἰπεῖν τὸν Σέλευκον “ἐπιδοίης Ἐρασίστρατε
τῷ ἐµῷ παιδὶ φίλος ὢν τὸν γάµον, καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶν ἡµᾶς
ἐπὶ τούτῳ µόνῳ σαλεύοντας;” “οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν σύ” φάναι
“τοῦτο πατὴρ ὢν ἐποίησας, εἰ Στρατονίκης Ἀντίοχος
38.8.1 ἐπεθύµησε.” καὶ τὸν Σέλευκον “εἴθε γὰρ ἑταῖρε” εἰπεῖν
“ταχὺ µεταστρέψαι τις ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ µεταβάλοι θεῶν ἢ
ἀνθρώπων τὸ πάθος· ὡς ἐµοὶ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφεῖναι
38.9.1 καλὸν Ἀντιόχου περιεχοµένῳ.” ταῦτ' ἐµπαθῶς σφόδρα
τοῦ Σελεύκου καὶ µετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων λέγοντος, ἐµ-
βαλόντα τὴν δεξιὰν αὐτῷ τὸν Ἐρασίστρατον εἰπεῖν, ὡς
οὐδὲν Ἐρασιστράτου δέοιτο· καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ καὶ ἀνὴρ
38.9.5 ὢν καὶ βασιλεὺς αὐτὸς ἅµα καὶ ἰατρὸς εἴη τῆς οἰκίας
38.10.1 ἄριστος. ἐκ τούτου τὸν Σέλευκον ἐκκλησίαν ἀθροίσαντα
πάνδηµον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι βούλεται καὶ διέγνωκε τῶν ἄνω
πάντων τόπων Ἀντίοχον ἀποδεῖξαι βασιλέα καὶ Στρατο-
38.11.1 νίκην βασιλίδα, ἀλλήλοις συνοικοῦντας· οἴεσθαι δὲ τὸν
µὲν υἱὸν εἰθισµένον ἅπαντα πείθεσθαι καὶ κατήκοον
ὄντα µηθὲν ἀντερεῖν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν γάµον· εἰ δ' ἡ γυνὴ
τῷ µὴ νενοµισµένῳ δυσκολαίνοι, παρακαλεῖν τοὺς φίλους,
38.11.5 ὅπως διδάσκωσιν αὐτὴν καὶ πείθωσι καλὰ καὶ δίκαια τὰ

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38.12.1 δοκοῦντα βασιλεῖ µετὰ τοῦ συµφέροντος ἡγεῖσθαι. τὸν
µὲν οὖν Ἀντιόχου καὶ Στρατονίκης γάµον ἐκ τοιαύτης
γενέσθαι προφάσεως λέγουσι.
39.1.1 Δηµήτριος δὲ µετὰ Μακεδονίαν καὶ Θετταλίαν
ἦν παρειληφώς. ἔχων δὲ καὶ Πελοποννήσου τὰ πλεῖστα
καὶ τῶν ἐντὸς Ἰσθµοῦ Μέγαρα καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἐπὶ Βοιωτοὺς
39.2.1 ἐστράτευσε. καὶ πρῶτον µὲν ἐγένοντο συµβάσεις µέτριαι
περὶ φιλίας πρὸς αὐτόν· ἔπειτα Κλεωνύµου τοῦ Σπαρ-
τιάτου παραβαλόντος εἰς Θήβας µετὰ στρατιᾶς, ἐπαρ-
θέντες οἱ Βοιωτοί, καὶ Πείσιδος ἅµα τοῦ Θεσπιέως, ὃς
39.2.5 ἐπρώτευε δόξῃ καὶ δυνάµει τότε, συµπαρορµῶντος αὐ-
39.3.1 τούς, ἀπέστησαν. ὡς δὲ ταῖς Θήβαις ἐπαγαγὼν τὰς µη-
χανὰς ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐπολιόρκει καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὑπεξῆλθεν
ὁ Κλεώνυµος, καταπλαγέντες οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρέδωκαν
39.4.1 ἑαυτούς. ὁ δὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐµβαλὼν φρουρὰν καὶ πρα-
ξάµενος πολλὰ χρήµατα καὶ καταλιπὼν αὐτοῖς ἐπιµελητὴν
καὶ ἁρµοστὴν Ἱερώνυµον τὸν ἱστορικόν, ἔδοξεν ἠπίως
39.5.1 κεχρῆσθαι, καὶ µάλιστα διὰ Πεῖσιν. ἑλὼν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ-
δὲν κακὸν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαγορεύσας καὶ φιλο-
39.6.1 φρονηθεὶς πολέµαρχον ἐν Θεσπιαῖς ἀπέδειξεν. οὐ πολλῷ
δ' ὕστερον ἁλίσκεται Λυσίµαχος ὑπὸ Δροµιχαίτου, καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτο Δηµητρίου κατὰ τάχος ἐξορµήσαντος ἐπὶ
Θρᾴκην ὥσπερ ἔρηµα καταληψοµένου, πάλιν ἀπέστησαν
39.6.5 οἱ Βοιωτοί, καὶ Λυσίµαχος ἅµα διειµένος ἀπηγγέλλετο.
39.7.1 ταχέως οὖν καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀναστρέψας ὁ Δηµήτριος
εὗρεν ἡττηµένους ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀντιγόνου µάχῃ τοὺς
Βοιωτούς, καὶ τὰς Θήβας αὖθις ἐπολιόρκει.
40.1.1 Πύρρου δὲ Θεσσαλίαν κατατρέχοντος καὶ µέχρι
Θερµοπυλῶν παραφανέντος, Ἀντίγονον ἐπὶ τῆς πολιορκίας
40.2.1 ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸς ὥρµησεν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον. ὀξέως δὲ φυγόντος,

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 ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ καταστήσας µυρίους ὁπλίτας καὶ χιλίους
ἱππεῖς, αὖθις ἐνέκειτο ταῖς Θήβαις καὶ προσῆγε τὴν
λεγοµένην ἑλέπολιν, πολυπόνως καὶ κατὰ µικρὸν ὑπὸ
40.2.5 βρίθους καὶ µεγέθους µοχλευοµένην, ὡς µόλις ἐν δυσὶ µησὶ
40.3.1 δύο σταδίους προελθεῖν. τῶν δὲ Βοιωτῶν ἐρρωµένως
ἀµυνοµένων, καὶ τοῦ Δηµητρίου πολλάκις φιλονικίας
ἕνεκα µᾶλλον ἢ χρείας µάχεσθαι καὶ κινδυνεύειν τοὺς στρα-
τιώτας ἀναγκάζοντος, ὁρῶν ὁ Ἀντίγονος πίπτοντας οὐκ
40.3.5 ὀλίγους καὶ περιπαθῶν “τί ὦ πάτερ” ἔφη “παραναλισκο-
40.4.1 µένους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως τούτους περιορῶµεν;” ὁ δὲ παρ-
οξυνθεὶς “σὺ δέ” ἔφη “τί δυσχεραίνεις; ἢ διάµετρον ὀφεί-
40.5.1 λεις τοῖς ἀποθνῄσκουσιν;” οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλόµενός
γε µὴ δοκεῖν ἑτέρων ἀφειδεῖν µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκιν-
δυνεύειν τοῖς µαχοµένοις, διελαύνεται τὸν τράχηλον
ὀξυβελεῖ. καὶ δεινῶς µὲν ἔσχεν, οὐ µὴν ἀνῆκεν, ἀλλ' εἷλε
40.6.1 τὰς Θήβας πάλιν. καὶ παρελθὼν ἀνάτασιν µὲν καὶ φόβον
ὡς τὰ δεινότατα πεισοµένοις παρέσχεν, ἀνελὼν δὲ τρις-
καίδεκα καὶ µεταστήσας τινάς, ἀφῆκε τοὺς ἄλλους. ταῖς
µὲν οὖν Θήβαις οὔπω δέκατον οἰκουµέναις ἔτος ἁλῶναι
40.6.5 δὶς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ συνέπεσε.
40.7.1 Τῶν δὲ Πυθίων καθηκόντων, πρᾶγµα καινότατον ἐπ-
40.8.1 έτρεψεν αὑτῷ ποιεῖν ὁ Δηµήτριος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ τὰ
περὶ Δελφοὺς στενὰ κατεῖχον, ἐν Ἀθήναις αὐτὸς ἦγε τὸν
ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν, ὡς δὴ προσῆκον αὐτόθι µά-
λιστα τιµᾶσθαι τὸν θεόν, οἷς καὶ πατρῷός ἐστι καὶ λέγε-
40.8.5 ται τοῦ γένους ἀρχηγός.
41.1.1 Ἐντεῦθεν ἐπανελθὼν εἰς Μακεδονίαν, καὶ µήτ'
αὐτὸς ἄγειν ἡσυχίαν πεφυκὼς τούς τ' ἄλλους ὁρῶν ἐν
ταῖς στρατείαις µᾶλλον αὐτῷ προσέχοντας, οἴκοι δὲ ταρα-
χώδεις καὶ πολυπράγµονας ὄντας, ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ' Αἰτω-

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41.2.1 λούς· καὶ τὴν χώραν κακώσας καὶ Πάνταυχον ἐν αὐτῇ
µέρος ἔχοντα τῆς δυνάµεως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἀπολιπών, ἐπὶ
41.3.1 Πύρρον αὐτὸς ἐχώρει, καὶ Πύρρος ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον· ἀλλήλων
δὲ διαµαρτόντες, ὁ µὲν ἐπόρθει τὴν Ἤπειρον, ὁ δὲ
Πανταύχῳ περιπεσὼν καὶ µάχην συνάψας, αὐτὸν µὲν
ἄχρι τοῦ δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν πληγὴν ἐν χερσὶ γενόµενον
41.3.5 ἐτρέψατο, τῶν δ' ἄλλων πολλοὺς µὲν ἀπέκτεινεν, ἐζώγρησε
41.4.1 δὲ πεντακισχιλίους. καὶ τοῦτο µάλιστα Δηµήτριον ἐκά-
κωσεν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως µισηθεὶς ὁ Πύρρος ἀφ' ὧν ἔπρα-
ξεν, ὡς θαυµασθεὶς διὰ τὸ πλεῖστα τῇ χειρὶ κατεργά-
σασθαι, µέγα καὶ λαµπρὸν ἔσχεν ἀπὸ τῆς µάχης ἐκείνης
41.5.1 ὄνοµα παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόσι· καὶ πολλοῖς ἐπῄει λέγειν
τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὡς ἐν µόνῳ τούτῳ τῶν βασιλέων εἴδω-
λον ἐνορῷτο τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τόλµης, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι, καὶ
µάλιστα Δηµήτριος, ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τὸ βάρος ὑποκρίνοιντο
41.5.5 καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ ἀνδρός.
41.6.1 Ἦν δ' ὡς ἀληθῶς τραγῳδία µεγάλη περὶ τὸν Δηµή-
τριον, οὐ µόνον ἀµπεχόµενον καὶ διαδούµενον περιττῶς
καυσίαις διµίτροις καὶ χρυσοπαρύφοις ἁλουργίσιν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ περὶ τοῖς ποσὶν ἐκ πορφύρας ἀκράτου συµπεπιληµέ-
41.7.1 νης χρυσοβαφεῖς πεποιηµένον ἐµβάδας. ἦν δέ τις ὑφαι-
νοµένη χλαµὺς αὐτῷ πολὺν χρόνον, ἔργον ὑπερήφανον,
εἴκασµα τοῦ κόσµου καὶ τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν φαινοµένων·
41.8.1 ὃ κατελείφθη µὲν ἡµιτελὲς ἐν τῇ µεταβολῇ τῶν πραγ-
µάτων, οὐδεὶς δ' ἐτόλµησεν αὐτῇ χρήσασθαι, καίπερ οὐκ
ὀλίγων ὕστερον ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ σοβαρῶν γενοµένων βασι-
λέων.
42.1.1 Οὐ µόνον δὲ τούτοις τοῖς θεάµασιν ἐλύπει τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους ἀήθεις ὄντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφὴν καὶ δίαιταν
ἐβαρύνοντο, καὶ µάλιστα δὴ τὸ δυσόµιλον αὐτοῦ καὶ

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 δυσπρόσοδον· ἢ γὰρ οὐ παρεῖχε καιρὸν ἐντυχεῖν, ἢ χαλεπὸς
42.2.1 ἦν καὶ τραχὺς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν. Ἀθηναίων µὲν γάρ,
περὶ οὓς ἐσπουδάκει µάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἔτη δύο
πρεσβείαν κατέσχεν, ἐκ Λακεδαίµονος δ' ἑνὸς πρεσβευτοῦ
παραγενοµένου, καταφρονεῖσθαι δοκῶν ἠγανάκτησεν.
42.3.1 ἀστείως µέντοι καὶ Λακωνικῶς ἐκεῖνος, εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ
“τί σὺ λέγεις; ἕνα Λακεδαιµόνιοι πρεσβευτὴν ἔπεµψαν;”
42.4.1 “ναί” εἶπεν “ὦ βασιλεῦ, πρὸς ἕνα.” δόξαντος δ' αὐτοῦ
ποτε δηµοτικώτερον ἐξελαύνειν καὶ πρὸς ἔντευξιν ἔχειν
οὐκ ἀηδῶς, συνέδραµόν τινες ἐγγράφους ἀξιώσεις ἀναδι-
42.5.1 δόντες. δεξαµένου δὲ πάσας καὶ τῇ χλαµύδι συλλαβόντος,
ἥσθησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ παρηκολούθουν· ὡς δ' ἦλθεν
ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀξιοῦ γέφυραν, ἀναπτύξας τὴν χλαµύδα πάσας
42.6.1 εἰς τὸν ποταµὸν ἐξέρριψε. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ δεινῶς ἠνίασε τοὺς
Μακεδόνας, ὑβρίζεσθαι δοκοῦντας, οὐ βασιλεύεσθαι, καὶ
Φιλίππου µνηµονεύοντας ἢ τῶν µνηµονευόντων ἀκούοντας,
42.7.1 ὡς µέτριος ἦν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ κοινός. καί ποτε πρεσβυ-
τέρου γυναίου κόπτοντος αὐτὸν ἐν παρόδῳ τινὶ καὶ
δεοµένου πολλάκις ἀκουσθῆναι, φήσας µὴ σχολάζειν,
ἐγκραγόντος ἐκείνου “καὶ µὴ βασίλευε” [εἰπόντος], δη-
42.7.5 χθεὶς σφόδρα καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ γενόµενος, ἀνέστρεψεν
εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, καὶ πάντα ποιησάµενος ὕστερα τοῖς ἐν-
τυχεῖν βουλοµένοις, ἀρξάµενος ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβύτιδος
42.8.1 ἐκείνης, ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡµέρας ἐσχόλασεν. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως
βασιλεῖ προσῆκον ὡς τὸ τῆς δίκης ἔργον. Ἄρης µὲν γὰρ
τύραννος, ὥς φησι Τιµόθεος, νόµος δὲ πάντων
42.9.1 βασιλεὺς κατὰ Πίνδαρόν ἐστι· καὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς
Ὅµηρός φησιν οὐχ ἑλεπόλεις οὐδὲ ναῦς χαλκήρεις, ἀλλὰ
θέµιστας παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς λαµβάνοντας ῥύεσθαι καὶ φυλάς-
σειν, καὶ τοῦ Διὸς οὐ τὸν πολεµικώτατον οὐδὲ

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42.9.5 τὸν ἀδικώτατον καὶ φονικώτατον τῶν βασιλέων, ἀλλὰ τὸν
42.10.1 δικαιότατον ὀαριστὴν καὶ µαθητὴν προσηγόρευκεν.
ἀλλὰ Δηµήτριος ἔχαιρε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν θεῶν ἀνο-
µοιοτάτην ἐπιγραφόµενος προσωνυµίαν· ὁ µὲν γὰρ Πολιεὺς
42.11.1 καὶ Πολιοῦχος, ὁ δὲ Πολιορκητὴς ἐπίκλησιν ἔσχεν. οὕτως
ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑπὸ δυνάµεως ἀµα-
θοῦς ἐπελθὸν συνῳκείωσε τῇ δόξῃ τὴν ἀδικίαν.
43.1.1 Ὁ δ' οὖν Δηµήτριος ἐπισφαλέστατα νοσήσας ἐν
Πέλλῃ, µικροῦ τότε Μακεδονίαν ἀπέβαλε, καταδρα-
µόντος ὀξέως Πύρρου καὶ µέχρι Ἐδέσσης προελθόντος.
43.2.1 ἅµα δὲ τῷ κουφότερος γενέσθαι πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἐξελάσας
αὐτόν, ἐποιήσατό τινας ὁµολογίας, οὐ βουλόµενος ἐµπο-
δὼν ὄντι συνεχῶς προσπταίων καὶ τοποµαχῶν ἧττον εἶ-
43.3.1 ναι πρὸς οἷς διενοεῖτο. διενοεῖτο δ' οὐθὲν ὀλίγον, ἀλλὰ
πᾶσαν ἀναλαµβάνειν τὴν ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ γενοµένην ἀρ-
χήν. καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος ταύτης καὶ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐκ
ἀπελείπετο τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ στρατιᾶς µὲν ἤδη
43.3.5 συνετέτακτο πεζῆς µυριάδας δέκα δισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν
ἀποδεούσας, καὶ χωρὶς ἱππέας ὀλίγῳ δισχιλίων καὶ µυ-
43.4.1 ρίων ἐλάττους. στόλον δὲ νεῶν ἅµα πεντακοσίων κατα-
βαλλόµενος, τὰς µὲν ἐν Πειραιεῖ τρόπεις ἔθετο, τὰς
δ' ἐν Κορίνθῳ, τὰς δ' ἐν Χαλκίδι, τὰς δὲ περὶ Πέλλαν,
αὐτὸς ἐπιὼν ἑκασταχόσε καὶ διδάσκων ἃ χρὴ καὶ συν-
43.4.5 τεχνώµενος, ἐκπληττοµένων ἁπάντων οὐ τὰ πλήθη µόνον,
43.5.1 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ µεγέθη τῶν ἔργων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ εἶδεν ἀν-
θρώπων οὔτε πεντεκαιδεκήρη ναῦν πρότερον οὔθ' ἑκ-
καιδεκήρη· ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τεσσαρακοντήρη Πτολεµαῖος
ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἐναυπηγήσατο, µῆκος διακοσίων ὀγδοή-
43.5.5 κοντα πηχῶν, ὕψος δ' ἕως ἀκροστολίου πεντήκοντα
δυεῖν δεόντων, ναύταις δὲ χωρὶς ἐρετῶν ἐξηρτυµένην

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 τετρακοσίοις, ἐρέταις δὲ τετρακισχιλίοις, χωρὶς δὲ τού-
των ὁπλίτας δεχοµένην ἐπί τε τῶν παρόδων καὶ τοῦ
43.6.1 καταστρώµατος ὀλίγῳ τρισχιλίων ἀποδέοντας. ἀλλὰ θέαν
µόνην ἐκείνη παρέσχε, καὶ µικρὸν ὅσον διαφέρουσα τῶν
µονίµων οἰκοδοµηµάτων, φανῆναι πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν, οὐ
43.7.1 χρείαν, ἐπισφαλῶς καὶ δυσέργως ἐκινήθη. τῶν δὲ Δηµη-
τρίου νεῶν οὐκ ἦν τὸ καλὸν ἀναγώνιστον, οὐδὲ τῷ περιττῷ
τῆς κατασκευῆς ἀπεστεροῦντο τὴν χρείαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τάχος
καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀξιοθεατότερον τοῦ µεγέθους παρεῖχον.
44.1.1 Αἰροµένης οὖν τοσαύτης δυνάµεως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν,
ὅσην µετ' Ἀλέξανδρον οὐδεὶς ἔσχε πρότερον, οἱ τρεῖς
συνέστησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Δηµήτριον, Σέλευκος Πτολεµαῖος
44.2.1 Λυσίµαχος. ἔπειτα κοινῇ πρὸς Πύρρον ἀποστείλαντες,
ἐκέλευον ἐξάπτεσθαι Μακεδονίας καὶ µὴ νοµίζειν σπονδὰς
αἷς Δηµήτριος οὐκ ἐκείνῳ τὸ µὴ πολεµεῖσθαι δέδωκεν,
ἀλλ' εἴληφεν ἑαυτῷ τὸ πολεµεῖν οἷς βούλεται πρότερον.
44.3.1 δεξαµένου δὲ Πύρρου, πολὺς περιέστη πόλεµος ἔτι
µέλλοντα Δηµήτριον. ἅµα γὰρ τὴν µὲν Ἑλλάδα πλεύσας
στόλῳ µεγάλῳ Πτολεµαῖος ἀφίστη, Μακεδονίαν δὲ
Λυσίµαχος ἐκ Θρᾴκης, ἐκ δὲ τῆς ὁµόρου Πύρρος ἐµβα-
44.4.1 λόντες ἐλεηλάτουν. ὁ δὲ τὸν µὲν υἱὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
κατέλιπεν, αὐτὸς δὲ βοηθῶν Μακεδονίᾳ πρῶτον ὥρµησεν
44.5.1 ἐπὶ Λυσίµαχον. ἀγγέλλεται δ' αὐτῷ Πύρρος ᾑρηκὼς πόλιν
Βέροιαν. καὶ τοῦ λόγου ταχέως εἰς τοὺς Μακεδόνας
ἐκπεσόντος, οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ Δηµητρίῳ κατὰ κόσµον εἶχεν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀδυρµῶν καὶ δακρύων καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὀρ-
44.5.5 γῆς καὶ βλασφηµιῶν µεστὸν ἦν τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ
συµµένειν οὐκ ἤθελον, ἀλλ' ἀπιέναι, τῷ µὲν λόγῳ πρὸς τὰ
44.6.1 οἴκοι, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς τὸν Λυσίµαχον. ἔδοξεν οὖν τῷ
Δηµητρίῳ Λυσιµάχου µὲν ἀποστῆναι πορρωτάτω, πρὸς

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 δὲ Πύρρον τρέπεσθαι· τὸν µὲν γὰρ ὁµόφυλον εἶναι καὶ
πολλοῖς συνήθη δι' Ἀλέξανδρον, ἔπηλυν δὲ καὶ ξένον ἄνδρα
44.7.1 τὸν Πύρρον οὐκ ἂν αὑτοῦ προτιµῆσαι Μακεδόνας. τούτων
µέντοι πολὺ διεψεύσθη τῶν λογισµῶν. ὡς γὰρ ἐγγὺς
ἐλθὼν τῷ Πύρρῳ παρεστρατοπέδευσεν, ἀεὶ µὲν αὐτοῦ
τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις λαµπρότητα θαυµάζοντες, ἔκ τε τοῦ
44.7.5 παλαιοτάτου καὶ βασιλικώτατον εἰθισµένοι νοµίζειν τὸν
ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις κράτιστον, τότε δὲ καὶ πράως κεχρῆσθαι
τοῖς ἁλισκοµένοις πυνθανόµενοι, πάντως δὲ καὶ πρὸς
ἕτερον καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ Δηµητρίου
44.8.1 ζητοῦντες, ἀπεχώρουν λάθρα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους τό γε
πρῶτον, εἶτα φανερῶς ἅπαν εἶχε κίνησιν καὶ ταραχὴν
τὸ στρατόπεδον, τέλος δὲ τῷ Δηµητρίῳ τολµήσαντές
τινες προσελθεῖν, ἐκέλευον ἀπιέναι καὶ σῴζειν αὑτόν·
44.8.5 ἀπειρηκέναι γὰρ ἤδη Μακεδόνας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου τρυ-
φῆς πολεµοῦντας. οὗτοι µετριώτατοι τῶν λόγων ἐφαί-
νοντο τῷ Δηµητρίῳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων τραχύτητα, καὶ
παρελθὼν ἐπὶ σκηνήν, ὥσπερ οὐ βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ὑπο-
κριτής, µεταµφιέννυται χλαµύδα φαιὰν ἀντὶ τῆς τρα-
44.10.1 γικῆς ἐκείνης, καὶ διαλαθὼν ὑπεχώρησεν. ὁρµησάντων
δὲ τῶν πλείστων εὐθὺς ἐφ' ἁρπαγὴν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
διαµαχοµένων καὶ τὴν σκηνὴν διασπώντων, ἐπιφανεὶς ὁ
Πύρρος ἐκράτησεν αὐτοβοεὶ καὶ κατέσχε τὸ στρατόπεδον.
44.11.1 καὶ γίνεται πρὸς Λυσίµαχον αὐτῷ συµπάσης Μακεδονίας
νέµησις, ἑπταετίαν ὑπὸ Δηµητρίου βεβαίως ἀρχθείσης.
45.1.1 Οὕτω δὲ τοῦ Δηµητρίου τῶν πραγµάτων ἐκ-
πεσόντος καὶ καταφυγόντος εἰς Κασσάνδρειαν, ἡ γυνὴ
Φίλα περιπαθὴς γενοµένη προσιδεῖν µὲν οὐχ ὑπέµεινεν
αὖθις ἰδιώτην καὶ φυγάδα τὸν τληµονέστατον βασιλέων
45.1.5 Δηµήτριον, ἀπειπαµένη δὲ πᾶσαν ἐλπίδα καὶ µισήσασα

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 τὴν τύχην αὐτοῦ βεβαιοτέραν ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς οὖσαν ἢ
45.2.1 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, πιοῦσα φάρµακον ἀπέθανε. Δηµήτριος δ'
ἔτι τῶν λοιπῶν ναυαγίων ἔχεσθαι διανοηθεὶς ἀπῆρεν
εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ στρατηγοὺς καὶ φίλους
45.3.1 συνῆγεν. ἣν οὖν ὁ Σοφοκλέους Μενέλαος εἰκόνα ταῖς
αὑτοῦ τύχαις παρατίθησιν·
ἀλλ' οὑµὸς ἀεὶ πότµος ἐν πυκνῷ θεοῦ
τροχῷ κυκλεῖται καὶ µεταλλάσσει φύσιν,
45.3.5 ὥσπερ σελήνης δ' ὄψις εὐφρόναις δύο
στῆναι δύναιτ' ἂν οὔποτ' ἐν µορφῇ µιᾷ,
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀδήλου πρῶτον ἔρχεται νέα,
πρόσωπα καλλύνουσα καὶ πληρουµένη,
χὤτανπερ αὑτῆς εὐγενεστάτη φανῇ,
45.3.10 πάλιν διαρρεῖ κεἰς τὸ µηδὲν ἔρχεται,
45.4.1 ταύτῃ µᾶλλον ἄν τις ἀπεικάσαι τὰ Δηµητρίου πράγµατα
καὶ τὰς περὶ αὐτὸν αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις καὶ ἀναπληρώ-
σεις καὶ ταπεινότητας, οὗ γε καὶ τότε παντάπασιν ἀπο-
λείπειν καὶ κατασβέννυσθαι δοκοῦντος ἀνέλαµπεν αὖ-
45.4.5 θις ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ δυνάµεις τινὲς ἐπιρρέουσαι κατὰ µικρὸν
45.5.1 ἀνεπλήρουν τὴν ἐλπίδα. καὶ τό γε πρῶτον ἰδιώτης καὶ
τῶν βασιλικῶν κοσµίων ἔρηµος ἐπεφοίτα ταῖς πόλεσι,
καί τις αὐτὸν ἐν Θήβαις τοιοῦτον θεασάµενος ἐχρήσατο
τοῖς Εὐριπίδου στίχοις οὐκ ἀηδῶς (Bacch. 4)·
45.5.5 µορφὴν ἀµείψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτησίαν
πάρεστι Δίρκης νάµαθ' Ἱσµηνοῦ θ' ὕδωρ·
46.1.1 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἅπαξ ὥσπερ εἰς ὁδὸν βασιλικὴν τὴν ἐλ-
πίδα κατέστη, καὶ συνίστατο πάλιν σῶµα καὶ σχῆµα περὶ
αὑτὸν ἀρχῆς, Θηβαίοις µὲν ἀπέδωκε τὴν πολιτείαν·
46.2.1 Ἀθηναῖοι δ' ἀπέστησαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τόν τε Δίφιλον, ὃς ἦν
ἱερεὺς τῶν Σωτήρων ἀναγεγραµµένος, ἐκ τῶν ἐπωνύµων

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 ἀνεῖλον, ἄρχοντας αἱρεῖσθαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἦν πάτριον
ψηφισάµενοι, τόν τε Πύρρον ἐκ Μακεδονίας µετεπέµποντο,
46.2.5 µᾶλλον ἢ προσεδόκησαν ἰσχύοντα τὸν Δηµήτριον ὁρῶντες.
46.3.1 ὁ δ' ὀργῇ µὲν ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς καὶ πολιορκίαν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ
συνεστήσατο καρτεράν, Κράτητος δὲ τοῦ φιλοσόφου
πεµφθέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήµου πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀνδρὸς ἐνδόξου
καὶ συνετοῦ, τὰ µὲν οἷς ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐδεῖτο πει-
46.3.5 σθείς, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἐδίδασκε περὶ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συµφερόντων
46.4.1 νοήσας, ἔλυσε τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ συναγαγὼν ὅσαι νῆες
ἦσαν αὐτῷ, καὶ στρατιώτας µυρίους καὶ χιλίους σὺν
ἱππεῦσιν ἐµβιβάσας, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἔπλει, Λυσιµάχου
46.5.1 Καρίαν καὶ Λυδίαν ἀποστήσων. δέχεται δ' αὐτὸν Εὐρυδίκη
περὶ Μίλητον ἀδελφὴ Φίλας, ἄγουσα τῶν αὐτῆς καὶ
Πτολεµαίου θυγατέρων Πτολεµαΐδα, καθωµολογηµένην
ἐκείνῳ πρότερον διὰ Σελεύκου· ταύτην γαµεῖ Δηµήτριος
46.6.1 Εὐρυδίκης ἐκδιδούσης. καὶ µετὰ τὸν γάµον εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς
πόλεις τρέπεται, πολλῶν µὲν ἑκουσίως προστιθεµένων,
πολλὰς δὲ καὶ βιαζόµενος. ἔλαβε δὲ καὶ Σάρδεις· καί
τινες τῶν Λυσιµάχου στρατηγῶν ἀπεχώρησαν πρὸς αὐ-
46.7.1 τόν, χρήµατα καὶ στρατιὰν κοµίζοντες. ἐπερχοµένου δ'
Ἀγαθοκλέους τοῦ Λυσιµάχου µετὰ δυνάµεως, ἀνέβαι-
νεν εἰς Φρυγίαν, ἐγνωκὼς ἄνπερ Ἀρµενίας ἐπιλάβηται
Μηδίαν κινεῖν καὶ τῶν ἄνω πραγµάτων ἔχεσθαι, πολλὰς
46.8.1 ἐξωθουµένῳ περιφυγὰς καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις ἐχόντων. ἑπο-
µένου δ' Ἀγαθοκλέους, ἐν ταῖς συµπλοκαῖς περιῆν, ἐπι-
σιτισµοῦ δὲ καὶ προνοµῶν εἰργόµενος ἠπορεῖτο, καὶ τοῖς
στρατιώταις δι' ὑποψίας ἦν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀρµενίαν καὶ Μηδίαν
46.9.1 ἐκτοπίζων. ἅµα δὲ µᾶλλον ὁ λιµὸς ἐπέτεινε, καὶ διαµαρτία
τις γενοµένη περὶ τὴν τοῦ Λύκου διάβασιν πλῆθος ἀνθρώ-
46.10.1 πων ἁρπασθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥεύµατος ἀπώλεσεν. ὅµως δὲ τοῦ

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 σκώπτειν οὐκ ἀπείχοντο· προγράφει δέ τις αὐτοῦ πρὸ
τῆς σκηνῆς τὴν τοῦ Οἰδίποδος ἀρχὴν µικρὸν παραλλάξας·
46.10.5 τέκνον τυφλοῦ γέροντος Ἀντιγόνου, τίνας
χώρους ἀφίγµεθα;
47.1.1 Τέλος δὲ καὶ νόσου τῷ λιµῷ συνεπιτιθεµένης ὥσπερ
εἴωθεν, ἐπὶ βρώσεις ἀναγκαίας τρεποµένων, τοὺς πάντας
οὐκ ἐλάσσονας ὀκτακισχιλίων ἀποβαλών, ἀνῆγεν ὀπίσω
47.2.1 τοὺς λοιπούς· καὶ καταβὰς εἰς Ταρσόν, ἐβούλετο µὲν
ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας οὔσης ὑπὸ Σελεύκῳ τότε καὶ πρό-
φασιν ἐκείνῳ µηδεµίαν παρασχεῖν, ὡς δ' ἦν ἀµήχανον,
ἐν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ὄντων ἀπορίαις τῶν στρατιωτῶν, καὶ
47.2.5 τοῦ Ταύρου τὰς ὑπερβολὰς Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἀπετείχισε,
47.3.1 γράφει πρὸς Σέλευκον ἐπιστολήν, µακρόν τινα τῆς αὑτοῦ
τύχης ὀδυρµόν, εἶτα πολλὴν ἱκεσίαν καὶ δέησιν ἔχουσαν,
ἀνδρὸς οἰκείου λαβεῖν οἶκτον, ἄξια καὶ πολεµίοις συναλγῆ-
47.4.1 σαι πεπονθότος. ἐπικλασθέντος δέ πως Σελεύκου καὶ
γράψαντος τοῖς ἐκεῖ στρατηγοῖς, ὅπως αὐτῷ τε τῷ
Δηµητρίῳ χορηγίαν βασιλικὴν καὶ τῇ δυνάµει τροφὴν
ἄφθονον παρέχωσιν, ἐπελθὼν Πατροκλῆς, ἀνὴρ συνετὸς
47.4.5 εἶναι δοκῶν καὶ Σελεύκῳ φίλος πιστός, οὐ τὸ τῆς δαπάνης
ἔφη πλεῖστον εἶναι τῶν Δηµητρίου στρατιωτῶν τρε-
φοµένων, ἀλλ' ἐνδιατρίβοντα τῇ χώρᾳ Δηµήτριον οὐ
καλῶς περιορᾶν αὐτόν, ὃς ἀεὶ βιαιότατος ὢν καὶ µεγα-
λοπραγµονέστατος βασιλέων, νῦν ἐν τύχαις γέγονεν αἳ
47.4.10 καὶ τοὺς φύσει µετρίους ἐξάγουσι τολµᾶν καὶ ἀδικεῖν.
47.5.1 ἐκ τούτου παροξυνθεὶς ὁ Σέλευκος ἐξώρµησεν εἰς Κιλι-
47.6.1 κίαν µετὰ πολλῆς δυνάµεως. ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος ἐκπλαγεὶς
τῇ δι' ὀλίγου µεταβολῇ τοῦ Σελεύκου καὶ φοβηθείς,
ὑπέστειλε τοῖς ὀχυρωτάτοις τοῦ Ταύρου, καὶ διαπεµπόµε-
νος ἠξίου µάλιστα µὲν αὐτὸν περιιδεῖν τῶν αὐτονόµων

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47.6.5 τινὰ βαρβάρων κτησάµενον ἀρχήν, ἐν ᾗ καταβιώσεται
πλάνης καὶ φυγῆς παυσάµενος, εἰ δὲ µή, τὸν χειµῶνα
διαθρέψαι τὴν δύναµιν αὐτόθι καὶ µὴ πάντων ἐνδεᾶ καὶ
γυµνὸν ἐξελαύνειν καὶ προβάλλειν τοῖς πολεµίοις.
48.1.1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ Σέλευκος ταῦτα πάντα ὑποπτεύων ἐκέ-
λευσεν αὐτόν, εἰ βούλεται, δύο µῆνας ἐν τῇ Καταονίᾳ
χειµάσαι, δόντα τοὺς πρώτους τῶν φίλων ὁµήρους, ἅµα
δὲ τὰς εἰς Συρίαν ἀπετείχιζεν ὑπερβολάς, ἐγκλειόµενος
48.1.5 ὡς θηρίον ὁ Δηµήτριος κύκλῳ καὶ περιβαλλόµενος, ὑπ'
ἀνάγκης τρέπεται πρὸς ἀλκήν, καὶ τήν τε χώραν κατ-
έτρεχε καὶ τῷ Σελεύκῳ προσβάλλοντι συµπλεκόµενος ἀεὶ
48.2.1 πλέον εἶχε. καί ποτε τῶν δρεπανηφόρων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφ-
εθέντων, ὑποστὰς τροπὴν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ τῶν εἰς Συρίαν
48.3.1 ὑπερβολῶν τοὺς ἀποτειχίζοντας ἐξελάσας ἐκράτησε. καὶ
ὅλως ἐπῆρτο τῇ γνώµῃ, καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀνατεθαρρη-
κότας ὁρῶν παρεσκευάζετο διαγωνίσασθαι πρὸς τὸν
Σέλευκον ἐπὶ τοῖς µεγίστοις ἄθλοις, ἠπορηµένον ἤδη
48.4.1 καὶ αὐτόν. ἀπέστρεψε µὲν γὰρ τὴν παρὰ Λυσιµάχου
βοήθειαν ἀπιστῶν καὶ φοβούµενος, αὐτὸς δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὸν
ὤκνει τῷ Δηµητρίῳ συνάψαι, δεδιὼς τὴν ἀπόνοιαν αὐτοῦ
καὶ τὴν ἀεὶ µεταβολὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀποριῶν τὰς
48.5.1 µεγίστας εὐτυχίας ἐπιφέρουσαν. νόσος µέντοι βαρεῖα τὸν
Δηµήτριον ἐν τούτῳ καταλαβοῦσα, τό τε σῶµα δεινῶς
ἐκάκωσε καὶ τὰ πράγµατα παντάπασι διέφθειρεν· οἱ µὲν
γὰρ ἀπεχώρησαν πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους, οἱ δὲ διερρύησαν
48.6.1 αὐτοῦ τῶν στρατιωτῶν. µόλις δ' ἐν ἡµέραις τεσσαράκοντα
ῥαΐσας καὶ τοὺς ὑπολοίπους ἀναλαβὼν καὶ ὁρµήσας, ὅσον
ἰδεῖν καὶ δοξάσαι τοὺς πολεµίους, ἐπὶ Κιλικίας, εἶτα νυκτὸς
ἄνευ σάλπιγγος ἄρας ἐπὶ θάτερα καὶ τὸν Ἀµανὸν ὑπερ-
48.6.5 βαλών, ἐπόρθει τὴν κάτω χώραν ἄχρι τῆς Κυρρηστικῆς.

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49.1.1 Ἐπιφανέντος δὲ τοῦ Σελεύκου καὶ ποιουµένου τὰς
καταλύσεις ἐγγύς, ἀναστήσας ὁ Δηµήτριος τὸ στράτευµα
νυκτὸς ἐβάδιζεν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἀγνοοῦντα µέχρι πολλοῦ καὶ
49.2.1 κοιµώµενον. αὐτοµόλων δέ τινων παραγενοµένων καὶ
φρασάντων τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐκπλαγεὶς καὶ ἀναπηδήσας
ἐκέλευσε σηµαίνειν, ἅµα τὰς κρηπῖδας ὑποδούµενος καὶ
βοῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὡς θηρίῳ δεινῷ συµπέπλεκται.
49.3.1 Δηµήτριος δὲ τῷ θορύβῳ τῶν πολεµίων αἰσθόµενος
ὅτι µεµήνυται, κατὰ τάχος ἀπῆγεν. ἅµα δ' ἡµέρᾳ
προσκειµένου τοῦ Σελεύκου, πέµψας τινὰ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν
ἐπὶ θάτερον κέρας, ἐποίησέ τινα τροπὴν τῶν ἐναντίων.
49.4.1 εἶτα µέντοι Σέλευκος αὐτὸς ἀφεὶς τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὸ
κράνος ἀποθέµενος καὶ λαβὼν πέλτην ἀπήντα τοῖς µι-
σθοφόροις, ἐπιδεικνύµενος αὑτὸν καὶ µεταβαλέσθαι παρα-
καλῶν ἤδη ποτὲ συµφρονήσαντας, ὅτι φειδόµενος ἐκείνων,
49.4.5 οὐ Δηµητρίου, χρόνον πολὺν διατετέλεκεν. ἐκ τούτου
πάντες ἀσπαζόµενοι καὶ βασιλέα προσαγορεύοντες µεθ-
49.5.1 ίσταντο. Δηµήτριος δὲ πολλῶν µεταβολῶν αἰσθόµενος
ἐσχάτην ἐκείνην ἥκουσαν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἐκκλίνας ἐπὶ τὰς
Ἀµανίδας ἔφευγε πύλας, καὶ καταβαλὼν εἰς ὕλην τινὰ
συνηρεφῆ µετὰ φίλων τινῶν καὶ ἀκολούθων ὀλίγων
49.5.5 παντάπασιν ὄντων, προσέµενε τὴν νύκτα, βουλόµενος
εἰ δύναιτο τῆς ἐπὶ Καῦνον ὁδοῦ λαβέσθαι καὶ διεκπεσεῖν
ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ θάλασσαν, οὗ τὸν ναύσταθµον εὑρήσειν
ἤλπιζεν. ὡς δ' ἔγνω µηδ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡµέρας ἐφόδιον
49.7.1 ἔχοντας αὐτούς, ἐπ' ἄλλων ἐγίνετο λογισµῶν. εἶτα µέντοι
Σωσιγένης ἐπῆλθεν ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ, χρυσοῦς τετρακοσίους
ὑπεζωσµένος, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐλπίζοντες ἄχρι θαλάσσης
διαγενήσεσθαι, πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐχώρουν σκοταῖοι.
49.8.1 πυρῶν δὲ καιοµένων πρὸς αὐταῖς πολεµίων, ἀπογνόντες

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 ἐκείνην τὴν ὁδὸν αὖθις ἀνεχώρησαν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον,
οὔτε πάντες – ἔνιοι γὰρ ἀπέδρασαν – οὔθ' ὁµοίως οἱ
49.9.1 παραµένοντες πρόθυµοι. τολµήσαντος δέ τινος εἰπεῖν [τι]
ὡς Σελεύκῳ χρὴ τὸ σῶµα παραδοῦναι Δηµήτριον, ὥρµησε
µὲν τὸ ξίφος σπασάµενος ἀνελεῖν ἑαυτόν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι
περιστάντες καὶ παραµυθούµενοι συνέπεισαν οὕτω ποιῆ-
49.9.5 σαι. καὶ πέµπει πρὸς Σέλευκον ἐπιτρέπων ἐκείνῳ τὰ καθ'
ἑαυτόν.
50.1.1 Ἀκούσας δὲ Σέλευκος οὐκ ἔφη τῇ Δηµητρίου
τύχῃ σῴζεσθαι Δηµήτριον, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ, µετὰ τῶν
ἄλλων καλῶν αὐτῷ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος ἐπί-
50.2.1 δειξιν διδούσῃ. καλέσας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιµελητάς, σκηνήν
τε πηγνύναι βασιλικὴν ἐκέλευσε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ποι-
εῖν καὶ παρασκευάζειν εἰς ὑποδοχὴν καὶ θεραπείαν µε-
50.3.1 γαλοπρεπῶς. ἦν δέ τις Ἀπολλωνίδης παρὰ τῷ Σελεύκῳ,
τοῦ Δηµητρίου γεγονὼς συνήθης· τοῦτον εὐθὺς ἐξ-
έπεµψε πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅπως ἡδίων γένηται καὶ θαρρῶν ὡς
50.4.1 πρὸς οἰκεῖον ἄνδρα καὶ κηδεστὴν ἀπαντᾶν. φανερᾶς
δὲ τῆς γνώµης αὐτοῦ γενοµένης, ὀλίγοι τὸ πρῶτον, εἶθ'
οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φίλων ἐξεπήδων παρὰ τὸν Δηµήτριον,
ἁµιλλώµενοι καὶ φθάνοντες ἀλλήλους· ἠλπίζετο γὰρ
50.5.1 εὐθὺς παρὰ τῷ Σελεύκῳ µέγιστος ἔσεσθαι. τοῦτο δ'
ἐκείνῳ µὲν εἰς φθόνον µετέβαλε τὸν ἔλεον, τοῖς δὲ
κακοήθεσι καὶ βασκάνοις παρέσχεν ἀποτρέψαι καὶ δια-
φθεῖραι τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν τοῦ βασιλέως, ἐκφοβήσασιν
50.5.5 αὐτόν, ὡς οὐκ εἰς ἀναβολάς, ἀλλ' ἅµα τῷ πρῶτον ὀφθῆ-
ναι τὸν ἄνδρα µεγάλων ἐσοµένων ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ
50.6.1 νεωτερισµῶν. ἄρτι δὴ τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίδου πρὸς τὸν Δη-
µήτριον ἀφιγµένου περιχαροῦς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπερχο-
µένων καὶ λόγους θαυµαστοὺς ἀπαγγελλόντων περὶ τοῦ

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 Σελεύκου, καὶ τοῦ Δηµητρίου µετὰ τηλικαύτην δυστυ-
50.6.5 χίαν καὶ κακοπραγίαν, εἰ καὶ πρότερον ἐδόκει τὴν παρά-
δοσιν τοῦ σώµατος αἰσχρὰν πεποιῆσθαι, τότε µετεγνω-
κότος διὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν καὶ πιστεύειν ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἦλθε
Παυσανίας ἔχων στρατιώτας ὁµοῦ πεζοὺς καὶ ἱππεῖς
50.7.1 περὶ χιλίους. καὶ τούτοις περισχὼν τὸν Δηµήτριον
ἄφνω, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀποστήσας, Σελεύκῳ µὲν αὐτὸν
εἰς ὄψιν οὐ κατέστησεν, εἰς δὲ Χερρόνησον τὴν Συρια-
50.8.1 κὴν ἀπήγαγεν· ὅπου τὸ λοιπὸν ἰσχυρᾶς φυλακῆς ἐπι-
σταθείσης, θεραπεία µὲν ἧκεν ἱκανὴ παρὰ Σελεύκου, καὶ
χρήµατα καὶ δίαιτα παρεσκευάζετο καθ' ἡµέραν οὐ µεµ-
πτή, δρόµοι δὲ καὶ περίπατοι βασιλικοὶ καὶ παράδεισοι
50.9.1 θήρας ἔχοντες ἀπεδείχθησαν· ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν φίλων τῶν
συµφυγόντων τῷ βουλοµένῳ συνεῖναι, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ
τινες ὅµως ἐπιφοιτῶντες [ἀπὸ τοῦ Σελεύκου] ἧκον, κο-
µίζοντες ἐπιεικεῖς λόγους καὶ θαρρεῖν παρακαλοῦντες,
50.9.5 ὡς ὅταν πρῶτον Ἀντίοχος ἀφίκηται σὺν Στρατονίκῃ
διεθησόµενον.
51.1.1 Ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τύχῃ γεγονώς,
ἐπέστειλε τοῖς περὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀθήνας καὶ
Κόρινθον ἡγεµόσι καὶ φίλοις, µήτε γράµµασιν αὐτοῦ
µήτε σφραγῖδι πιστεύειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τεθνηκότος Ἀντι-
51.1.5 γόνῳ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πράγµατα διαφυλάττειν.
Ἀντίγονος δὲ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς σύλληψιν πυθόµενος, καὶ
βαρέως ἐνεγκὼν καὶ πενθίµην ἀναλαβὼν ἐσθῆτα πρός
τε τοὺς ἄλλους βασιλεῖς ἔγραψε καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν Σέλευ-
κον, δεόµενος καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι λοιπὸν ἦν αὐτοῖς παραδιδούς,
51.2.5 καὶ πρὸ παντὸς ὁµηρεύειν ἕτοιµος ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
51.3.1 πατρός. καὶ συνεδέοντο ταῦτα πόλεις τε πολλαὶ καὶ
δυνάσται πλὴν Λυσιµάχου· Λυσίµαχος δὲ καὶ χρήµατα

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 πολλὰ πέµπων ὑπισχνεῖτο Σελεύκῳ κτείναντι Δηµήτριον.
51.4.1 ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνον µὲν <καὶ> ἄλλως προβαλλόµενος, ἔτι µᾶλλον
ἐπὶ τούτῳ µιαρὸν ἡγεῖτο καὶ βάρβαρον, Ἀντιόχῳ δὲ τῷ
παιδὶ καὶ Στρατονίκῃ φυλάττων Δηµήτριον, ὡς ἐκείνων
ἡ χάρις γένοιτο, παρῆγε τὸν χρόνον.
52.1.1 Ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ τὴν τύχην προς-
πεσοῦσαν ὑπέµεινε καὶ ῥᾷον ἤδη φέρειν εἰθίζετο τὰ παρ-
όντα, πρῶτον µὲν ἁµῶς γέ πως ἐκίνει τὸ σῶµα, θήρας
52.2.1 ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν καὶ δρόµων ἁπτόµενος· ἔπειτα κατὰ µικρὸν
ὄκνου πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ νωθείας ἐπίµπλατο, καὶ φέρων
ἑαυτὸν εἰς πότους καὶ κύβους κατέβαλε, καὶ τοῦ χρόνου
52.3.1 τὸν πλεῖστον ἐν τούτοις διῆγεν, εἴτε τοὺς ἐν τῷ νήφειν
ἀναλογισµοὺς τῶν παρόντων ἀποδιδράσκων καὶ παρα-
καλυπτόµενος τῇ µέθῃ τὴν διάνοιαν, εἴτε συγγνοὺς ἑαυτῷ
τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν βίον, ὃν ἔκπαλαι ποθῶν καὶ διώκων
52.3.5 ἄλλως ὑπ' ἀνοίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ἐπλάζετο καὶ πολλὰ
µὲν ἑαυτῷ, πολλὰ δ' ἑτέροις πράγµατα παρεῖχεν, ἐν ὅπλοις
καὶ στόλοις καὶ στρατοπέδοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητῶν, ὃ νῦν ἐν
ἀπραγµοσύνῃ καὶ σχολῇ καὶ ἀναπαύσει µὴ προσδοκήσας
52.4.1 ἀνεύρηκε. τί γὰρ ἄλλο τῶν πολέµων καὶ τῶν κινδύνων
πέρας ἐστὶ τοῖς φαύλοις βασιλεῦσι, κακῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως
διακειµένοις, οὐχ ὅτι µόνον τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι µηδ' ἥδεσθαι
52.4.5 µηδὲ τρυφᾶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἴσασιν.
52.5.1 Ὁ δ' οὖν Δηµήτριος ἔτος τρίτον ἐν τῇ Χερρονήσῳ καθ-
ειργµένος, ὑπ' ἀργίας καὶ πλησµονῆς καὶ οἴνου νοσή-
σας ἀπέθανεν, ἔτη τέσσαρα καὶ πεντήκοντα βεβιωκώς.
52.6.1 καὶ Σέλευκος ἤκουσέ τε κακῶς καὶ µετενόησεν οὐ µε-
τρίως ἐν ὑποψίᾳ τὸν Δηµήτριον θέµενος τότε, καὶ µηδὲ
Δροµιχαίτην ἄνδρα βάρβαρον Θρᾷκα µιµησάµενος, οὕτω

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 φιλανθρώπως καὶ βασιλικῶς ἁλόντι Λυσιµάχῳ χρησά-
52.6.5 µενον.
53.1.1 Ἔσχε µέντοι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ταφὴν αὐτοῦ τραγικήν
53.2.1 τινα καὶ θεατρικὴν διάθεσιν. ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς Ἀντίγονος ὡς
ᾔσθετο τὰ λείψανα κοµιζόµενα, πάσαις ἀναχθεὶς ταῖς
ναυσὶν ἐπὶ νήσων ἀπήντησε· καὶ δεξάµενος εἰς τὴν
µεγίστην τῶν ναυαρχίδων ἔθετο τὴν ὑδρίαν χρυσήλατον
53.3.1 οὖσαν. αἱ δὲ πόλεις, αἷς προσεῖχον, τοῦτο µὲν στεφάνους
ἐπέφερον τῇ ὑδρίᾳ, τοῦτο δ' ἄνδρας ἐν σχήµατι πενθίµῳ
53.4.1 συνθάψοντας καὶ συµπαραπέµψοντας ἀπέστελλον. εἰς δὲ
Κόρινθον τοῦ στόλου καταπλέοντος, ἥ τε κάλπις ἐκ
πρύµνης περιφανὴς ἑωρᾶτο πορφύρᾳ βασιλικῇ καὶ διαδή-
µατι κεκοσµηµένη, καὶ παρειστήκεισαν ἐν ὅπλοις νεανίσκοι
53.5.1 δορυφοροῦντες. ὁ δὲ τῶν τότ' αὐλητῶν ἐλλογιµώτατος
Ξενόφαντος ἐγγὺς καθεζόµενος προσηύλει τῶν µελῶν τὸ
ἱερώτατον· καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο τῆς εἰρεσίας ἀναφεροµένης
µετὰ ῥυθµοῦ τινος, ἀπήντα ψόφος ὥσπερ ἐν κοπετῷ ταῖς
53.6.1 τῶν αὐληµάτων περιόδοις. τὸν δὲ πλεῖστον οἶκτον καὶ
ὀλοφυρµὸν αὐτὸς Ἀντίγονος τοῖς ἠθροισµένοις ἐπὶ τὴν
θάλασσαν ὀφθεὶς ταπεινὸς καὶ δεδακρυµένος παρέσχεν.
53.7.1 ἐπενεχθεισῶν δὲ ταινιῶν καὶ στεφάνων περὶ Κόρινθον, εἰς
Δηµητριάδα κοµίσας ἔθηκε τὰ λείψανα, πόλιν ἐπώνυµον
ἐκείνου, <συν>οικισθεῖσαν ἐκ µικρῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἰωλκὸν
πολιχνίων.
53.8.1 Ἀπέλιπε δὲ γενεὰν ὁ Δηµήτριος Ἀντίγονον µὲν ἐκ
Φίλας καὶ Στρατονίκην, δύο δὲ Δηµητρίους, τὸν µὲν
Λεπτὸν ἐξ Ἰλλυρίδος γυναικός, τὸν δ' ἄρξαντα Κυρήνης
ἐκ Πτολεµαΐδος, ἐκ δὲ Δηιδαµείας Ἀλέξανδρον, ὃς ἐν
53.9.1 Αἰγύπτῳ κατεβίωσε. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Κόρραγον υἱὸν ἐξ
Εὐρυδίκης αὐτῷ γενέσθαι. κατέβη δὲ ταῖς διαδοχαῖς τὸ

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 γένος αὐτοῦ βασιλεῦον εἰς Περσέα τελευταῖον, ἐφ' οὗ
Ῥωµαῖοι Μακεδονίαν ὑπηγάγοντο.
53.10.1 Διηγωνισµένου δὲ τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ δράµατος, ὥρα
τὸ Ῥωµαϊκὸν ἐπεισαγαγεῖν.

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 COMMENTARY
I. Prologue to the Demetrius-Antony
1.1.1 Οἱ πρῶτοι...ἀπεργασίαν: The ability of the arts and the senses to make
distinctions (τὴν περὶ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτῶν δύναµιν) espoused here bears some similarity
to Democritus’ claim that there is a genuine kind of opinion, presumably intellectual, that
is distinct from sensation: γνώµης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ µὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ
σκοτίης µὲν τάδε σύµπαντα, ὄψις ἀκοὴ ὀδµὴ γεῦσις ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη,
ἀποκεκριµένη δὲ ταύτης (Democritus F 11 = Sextus adv. math. 7.139; Kirk, Raven, and
Schofield 422–23, no. 590). In the Democritean conception, however, the mind, since it
too functions through the motion and collision of atoms, is therefore subject to the same
sort of distortions that plague the senses, and cannot arrive at more than an approximation
of truth: νόµῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόµῳ πικρόν, νόµῳ θερµόν, νόµῳ ψυχρόν, νόµῳ χροιή·
ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτοµα καὶ κενόν... ἡµεῖς δὲ τῷ µὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς συνίεµεν, µεταπίπτον
δὲ κατά τε σώµατος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων
(Democritus F 9 = Sextus adv. math. VII, 135; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 423–24, no.
589). In his Reply to Colotes, Plutarch quotes the latter passage (Mor. 1110E) and
explicitly rejects the notion that perceptions of color and taste exist merely “by
convention” (νόµῳ) as an attack on man’s sovereign ability to employ reason to
determine the appropriate response to the stimulation of the senses. It is this
discrimination that allows man to benefit from both positive and negative examples (cf.
Duff [2004] 272; n. 1.5.1; Intro. 12–13).
1.3.1 αἱ δὲ τέχναι µετὰ λόγου...  ἐπιθεωροῦσι (The arts work in concert with reason to
distinguish what is useful from what is not): The insistence on the primacy of reason and
the ability of the reader who wields it to discern what is useful recalls the prologue to the
Pericles-Fabius. So too does the assimilation of the arts to reason, and the Platonic
assumption that virtue is an art. But the insistence that familiarity with negative examples
can prove beneficial amounts to a revision and expansion of the moral program guiding
Plutarch’s Lives (Intro. 12–13).
1.5.1 οἱ µὲν οὖν παλαιοὶ Σπαρτιᾶται...ἐπιδεικνύντες (Spartan abuse of helots and its
didactic value): The didactic value of the contemplation of bad examples was widely
recognized in antiquity (see e.g. Livy Preface 10–11; Cic. De Offic. 3.73–78; Seneca Ep.
94.62–66; Valerius Maximus devoted the 9th book of his Memorable Deeds and Sayings
to a discussion of vices to be avoided; cf. Duff [1999] 47 and [2004] 273–74), and the
Spartan practice of parading drunken helots in the communal messes of young men as an
object lesson in the dangers of inebriation was often cited as a striking instance of just
such a didactic technique (Mor. 239A; 455E; 1067E; Lycurg. 28.8; Plato Laws 816E;
Clem. Alex. Paed. 3.8 ad init. 41.5; Diog. Laert. 1.103).
1.5.4 ἡµεῖς δὲ τὴν µὲν ἐκ διαστροφῆς ἑτέρων ἐπανόρθωσιν οὐ πάνυ φιλάνθρωπον
οὐδὲ πολιτικὴν ἡγούµεθα (Spartan use of negative examples; philanthropia and its
importance): By voicing his disapproval for this Spartan practice of deliberately creating
negative examples by humiliating miserable helots, Plutarch deftly uses a negative
example to demonstrate how not to use negative examples (Duff [2004] 277). By
describing the practice as “hardly humane or statesmanlike” (οὐ πάνυ φιλάνθρωπον

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οὐδὲ πολιτικὴν), Plutarch establishes his own philanthropia—note the use of the first
person verb (ἡγούµεθα) here and throughout the remainder of the prologue—and, by
extension, that of his readers (Duff [2004] 277). In Plutarch’s hands the anecdote
becomes a subtle captatio benevolentiae and signals that philanthropia, or the lack
thereof, will play an important role in the Life (on the centrality of philanthropia in
Plutarch’s biographical project, see H.M. Martin, “The Concept of Philanthropia in
Plutarch’s Lives,” AJPh 82 [1962] 164–75; Duff [1999] 55–62). Demetrius gives signal
displays of this virtue on several occasions (4.1; 6.4; 9.2; 17.1), but his capacity for
philanthropia vanishes when he assumes the royal title (see Intro. 14–15).
1.6.1 Ἰσµηνιάς ὁ Θηβαῖος: the renowned Theban auletes and perhaps the son of the
Ismenias who, as a polemarch in 383, led the anti-Spartan faction in Thebes and was
imprisoned on the Cadmeia during a Spartan occupation of the city, tried, and put to
death (Xen. Hell. 5.2.29–36; Plut. Mor. 576A; cf. Manni [1953] 4 n.1). Thebes was the
center of the auletic art and produced its most renowned virtuosos, and famed auletai
consistently identified themselves as Θηβαῖος in dedicatory inscriptions (e.g. IG II2 713,
3083, 3106; SEG 26.220; IG VII 3197; cf. Roesch [1982] 445, who notes, “Il est sûr que,
pour un flûtiste célèbre, il était plus glorieux de porter l’ethnique Θηβαῖος qui évoquait
immédiatement pour le lecteur la plus fameuse des écoles de flûte.”; on the Theban
Xenophantus, another famed auletes, see below n. 53.5.1). In the prologue to the
Pericles-Fabius (1.5), Plutarch relates another anecdote involving Ismenias, as here, in a
discussion of the proper objects of imitation. Ismenias appears at several other points in
the Moralia: his playing fails to impress the Scythian king, Anteas (174F, 334B, 1095F);
he performs at a sacrifice (632C-D). For a discussion of the metaphorical significance of
the aulos, see Intro. 30–31; on the role of the aulos in Boeotia and the competing auletic
schools in Thebes, see P. Roesch “L’aulos et les auletes en Béotie,” in H. Beister and J.
Buckler (eds.) Boiotika (Munich: 1989), 203–14.
1.6.4 ὁ δ' Ἀντιγενείδας: Antigeneidas son of Satyrus was another celebrated Theban
musician and poet (Suda s.v. Ἀντιγενίδης, Adler A 2657). Antigeneidas seems to have
been active in the first third of the 4th century—he is named as a collaborator of the
dithyrambist Philoxenus of Cythera (c. 435–c.380) in the Suda—but some anecdotes,
including one related by Plutarch (Mor. 335A), place him in contexts outside of this span.
Theophrastus (Hist. Plant. 4.2.4) refers to Antigeneidas as one of the original
practitioners of the “elaborate style.” Plutarch (Mor. 193E), in an explanatory aside (the
context is a quote attributed to Pelopidas) refers to him as the best auletes (ἦν δ' αὐλητὴς
...ὁ δ' Ἀντιγενίδας κάλλιστος), and the treatise On Music (Ps. Plut. Mus. 21), attributed
to Plutarch (though probably spuriously), names him as the head of a school opposed to
that led by Dorion, a rival auletes patronized by Philip II of Macedon (Athen. 8.337B–
338E). Plutarch (Mor. 335A) claims that his performance of a martial piece once greatly
moved Alexander, but cf. Seneca De Ira (2.6), where Xenophantus is named as the
inspiring auletes, while Dio Chrysostom (Oration I. 1–2) attributes the performance to
Timotheus. Jerome (Adversus Rufinum 2.27) states that Ismenias was the pupil of
Antigeneidas; cf. Cic. Brut. 186–87; see above n. 1.6.1.
1.6.6 ἡµεῖς προθυµότεροι τῶν βελτιόνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ µιµηταὶ βίων, εἰ
µηδὲ τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγοµένων ἀνιστορήτως ἔχοιµεν (Negative examples and

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proper imitation): Plutarch moves from more general reflections on the value of negative
examples to more specific consideration of the utility of such examples in the Lives; such
a narrowing of focus is characteristic of Plutarch’s prologues (Duff [2011b] 219).
Encouraging his readers to imitate the exemplary behavior of his subjects is a
fundamental component of Plutarch’s biographical project (e.g. Per. 1.4), but the hope
that the introduction of negative examples would inspire the reader to imitate Plutarch’s
more praiseworthy subjects is unique.
1.7.1 τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον: The Parallel Lives were published in pairs as a single unit,
which Plutarch occasionally refers to in his prologues (and only in prologues) as a “book”
(Per. 2.5; Dem. 3.1; Alex. 1.1; Duff [2011b] 213–14).

τοῦ Πολιορκητοῦ: “Besieger of Cities” (cf. Diod. 20.92; Phld. Hom. p. 55.). The epithet
probably references Demetrius’ pioneering efforts in the development of siegecraft, most
notably the spectacular, but ultimately unsuccessful siege of Rhodes (ns. 15.2.3, XXI:
The Siege of Rhodes; but cf. n. 25.7.5). On this epithet in particular, and Hellenistic royal
epithets in general, see below ns. 25.7.5, 42.10.3; P. Van Nuffelen, “The Name Game:
Hellenistic Historians and Royal Epithets,” in P. Van Nuffelen (ed.) Faces of Hellenism:
Studies in the History of the Eastern Mediterranean (4th Century B.C.-5th Century A.D.),
(Leuven: 2009) 93–111.

1.7.2 Ἀντωνίου τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος. Plutarch uses autokrator to distinguish Mark

Antony from other Antonii. Cf. Alex. 1.1 and Num. 19.4 where Julius Caesar is called the
“victor over Pompey” (ὑφ' οὗ κατελύθη Ποµπήϊος; Καίσαρος τοῦ καταγωνιςαµένου
Ποµπήϊον Ἰούλιος) to distinguish him from Augustus (called simply ὁ Καῖσαρ). On the
Antony, see esp. Pelling (1988); cf. Duff (1999) esp. 45–49; id. (2004); Beneker 153–94;
Intro. 19–29.
ἀνδρῶν…ἐκφέρουσι (The Platonic conception of “great natures” and their potential for
good and evil): Plutarch seems to refer to a passage in Book 6 (491B–495B) of Plato’s
Republic, where it is argued that men of extraordinary potential go on to accomplish great
deeds if they receive a proper education, or great evils, if they do not (Duff [1999] 48; id.
[2004] 280–81; cf. Andrei 39–40). Plutarch, however, offers here a subtle revision of the
Platonic position by suggesting that those possessed of “great natures” are simultaneously
capable of both great deeds and great evils: similar potential is attributed to Themistocles
(Them. 2.2), Alcibiades (Alc. 9.1), and Coriolanus (Cor. 1.3). For the view that this
reflects Plutarch’s more nuanced, realistic, and sympathetic moral vision, see Duff (2004)
281. On the ancient idea of great natures see, e.g., Xen. Mem. 4.1.4; Plat.Crit. 44D; id.
Gorg. 525E; id. Hipp. Min. 375E; Plut. Them. 2.2; Manni (1953) 4 n. 1; Duff (1999) 47–
49.
II. Preface to the Life of Demetrius
2.1.1 Ἀντιγόνῳ: With the emphatic placement of Antigonus’ name, Plutarch signals his
crucial importance to the Demetrius. Father and son collaborated closely until Antigonus’
death in 301, and, by all accounts, enjoyed a close and trusting relationship (n. 3.1.1).

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 Antigonus (c. 382–301), known as Monophthalmus (“One-Eyed”) after losing an
eye in an unknown battle, served Philip and Alexander as a general. His father, a certain
Philip (Just. 13.4.12; Strabo 12.2.7, 16.2.4; Arr. Anab. 1.29.3; Aelian VH 12.12), is
nothing more than a name to us. Antigonus’ prominent position in the Macedonian army
suggests that he was of aristocratic descent, but the opposing traditions that made
Antigonus either a product of the ruling Argead house (Polyb. 5.10.10) or the descendant
of peasants (Aelian VH 12.43; cf. Diod. 21.1) probably reflect the propaganda of
Antigonus’ descendants and their rivals, respectively (for a lucid discussion, see Billows
[1990] 3 with n. 3; cf. Tarn [1913] 5; Edson passim; Wehrli 139; Wheatley [1999] 2;
Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 89–90). The latter tradition may well have been
preserved by Duris of Samos, who seems to have been fascinated by the purportedly
obscure origins of powerful figures (cf. Eum. 1.1 = Duris FGrH 76 F 53; n. 2.1.4). When
Alexander launched his Asian invasion in 334 Antigonus commanded the allied Greek
infantry contingent (Arr. Anab. 1.29.3). The following year Alexander installed him as
satrap of Phrygia, although the region was imperfectly conquered and it fell to Antigonus
to pacify his satrapy. In this he was entirely successful, taking Celaenae by siege and then
crushing a major Persian counteroffensive in 332 (Curt. 1.34–35; Billows [1990] 43–45).
His family seems to have joined him in Celaenae by 330, at the latest (Berve ii., 364–65
no. 725; Billows [1990] 48; Wheatley [1999] 3).
Antigonus was confirmed in his satrapy after Alexander’s death at Babylon in
323, but subsequently fell afoul of the regent Perdiccas. In 321 together with his family
and friends he fled Asia Minor for Europe in ships provided by the Athenians (Diod.
18.23.4). He joined Craterus and Antipater in Aetolia (n. 14.2.6; cf. 40.8.1), painted an
alarming picture of Perdiccas’ ambitions, and convinced the two to invade Asia. The so-
called First Diadoch War (321–20) ensued, which ended with the death of Perdiccas in
Egypt. Antigonus was named governor of Asia at the conference of Triparadisus in 320
and tasked with destroying the remnants of the Perdiccan faction, most notably the
talented and resourceful Eumenes of Cardia (on Eumenes, see Berve ii., 156–58 no. 317;
Heckel [2006] 120–121; Bosworth [2002] esp. 98–168; E. Anson, Eumenes of Cardia: A
Greek Among Macdonians [Leiden: 2004]).
The death of Antipater in 319 and his decision to pass over his son Cassander (n.
8.1.3) and leave the regency to Polyperchon (n. 9.5.1) led to the Second Diadoch War in
which Cassander, Antigonus, and Ptolemy (n. 5.1.5), allied against Eumenes and
Polyperchon. Antigonus pursued Eumenes across the Iranian plateau, ultimately
defeating him at Gabiene in early 316 (Diod. 19.37–43; n. 5.2.2; on this campaign, see
esp. Bosworth [2002] 98–168). After executing Eumenes and collecting immense sums
from the treasuries at Susa and Ecbatana, Antigonus marched to Babylon where he was
received by Seleucus. Antigonus demanded an account of Seleucus’ revenues, and the
latter fled in fear to Ptolemy in Egypt (Diod. 19.55). The size of Antigonus’ realm, army,
and war chest soon provoked his rivals to ally against him (n. 2.2.1). Emissaries from the
allied dynasts Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus met Antigonus as he marched
towards Syria in 315 and presented him with territorial and financial demands that
essentially amounted to a declaration of war (Diod. 19.57.1; on the ultimatum, see Wehrli
42–45; Seibert [1969] 138–40; Billows [1990] 109–10l; Landucci-Gattinoni [1992] 110–
12; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 220–222). The allies demanded that Antigonus cede

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Cappadocia and Lycia to Cassander, Hellespontine Phrygia to Lysimachus, all of Syria to
Ptolemy, and Babylonia to Seleucus. They also demanded a share of the spoils from the
campaign against Eumenes. The demands of Lysimachus and Ptolemy, amounting to half
of Asia Minor and all of Syria, were particularly inflammatory since they had shared
none of the burden in defeating Eumenes. Antigonus rejected the allied ultimatum (Diod.
19.57.2; App. Syr. 53.271), leading to the 3rd Diadoch War, a conflict in which Demetrius
held his first independent commands (ns. 5–7). In that early stages of the war Antigonus
proclaimed that the Greek cities be free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned, and launched a
series of aggressive campaigns in Asia Minor, the Aegean, and mainland Greece,
ostensibly in pursuit of that goal (n. 8.1.2). On Antigonus, see Kaerst RE s.v. Antigonos
(3); Berve ii. 42–44 no. 87; Wehrli; Briant; E. Anson, “Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia,”
Historia 37 (1988) 471–77; Billows [1990]; Heckel [2006] 32–34.
Στρατονίκης: Little is known of Stratonice, the mother of Demetrius and his brother
Philip. The only earlier attested Stratonice in Macedonia was the sister of King Perdiccas
II (Thuc. 2.101.6), and it is possible that Demetrius’ mother was of royal blood (Edson
226; Billows [1990] 17 and n. 5). Stratonice joined Antigonus at Celaenae c. 330 (n.
2.1.1) and remained in Anatolia until after the battle of Ipsus and the death of Antigonus
in 301 (29.4–8) when Demetrius evacuated her from Cilicia to Cypriote Salamis (Diod.
21.1.4b; n. 30.2.5). Stratonice was captured by Ptolemy when he seized Salamis c. 294
(n. 38.1.2), but released shortly thereafter. What become of her after Ptolemy’s act of
magnanimity is unknown. On Stratonice, see Berve ii. 364–65 no. 725; Macurdy 62, 64–
66; Heckel (2006) 258.
2.1.2 Κορράγου: Corrhagus (the manuscripts all read κορραίου; Corrhaeus is not an
attested Macedonian name; I have adopted the emendation of Sintensis, followed by
Ziegler; see ns. 14.1.2, 53.1.9; for Corrhagus in Macedonian inscriptions, see e.g. IG X,
2.1 188, 189, 250, 259) may well be the Macedonian of that name who served as
strategos for the regent Antipater and whose forces were roundly defeated by an army
under the command of the Spartan king Agis III in 331 (Aes. 3.165), but there is
insufficient evidence to support the identification (cf. Beloch [1925] 135 n.1; Berve ii.
219–20 no. 444; Heckel [2006] 94). The assertion that this Corrhagus was a king of
Macedon (Briant 24 n. 3; Andrei 122 n. 11) is incorrect.
2.1.4 ὁ τῶν πλείστων λόγος…λέγουσιν: Plutarch was evidently aware of multiple
authors who addressed the issue of Demetrius’ paternity, but he does not identify his
sources. The birth of Demetrius must have followed Antigonus’ marriage to the widow of
his brother (also named Demetrius) closely enough to bring about the alternate tradition
of his parentage (Billows [1990] 29). Diodorus (21.1.4b) names Stratonice as the mother
of Demetrius and Philip, and does not report the rumor that Demetrius was the son of her
former husband. The rumor is more likely to reflect the actual uncertainty of ancient
commentators than hostile propaganda circulated by Demetrius’ rivals—Antigonus
certainly raised Demetrius as his son, and the suggestion that Demetrius was actually
Antigonus’ nephew would hardly pose a threat to his legitimacy (Wheatley [1999] 2; cf.
Kaerst RE 4.2 (1901) s.v. Demetrios [33] col. 2769 who rejects the alternate tradition out
of hand). Cf. the patently hostile claims that made Eumenes the son of a wagoner (Eum.
1.1 = Duris FGrH 76 F 53), and Antigonus the son of a peasant (n. 2.1.1).

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2.2.1 Φίλιππον (Demetrius’ brother Philip; the careers of Demetrius’ cousins
Telesphorus and Polemaeus; competition among Antigonus’ marshals): The second son
of Antigonus and Stratonice, born c. 334 in Macedonia (Billows [1990] 420, though
Berve ii. 383 no. 776 suggests he may have been born in Celaenae in Phrygia), and
Demetrius’ only recorded sibling. An inscription commemorating the divine honors
accorded Antigonus for his efforts in securing their freedom by the citizens of Scepsis in
the Troad in 311 also records honorary “crowns” of 50 drachmas awarded to Philip and
Demetrius (OGIS no. 6 l. 30; on Scepsis and the Antigonids, see ns. 8.1.2, 10.1.4). Philip
held his first independent command in 310 when Antigonus sent him to the Hellespont to
counter the rebellion fomented by Phoenix of Tenedos, a former lieutenant of Eumenes of
Cardia (Plut. Eum. 7.1; Diod. 18.40.2–4), who had joined the Antigonid ranks after the
defeat of the Cardian in early 316 (along with the historian Hieronymus [Intro. 43–48],
and the future dynast Mithridates, n. 4.1.3). Diodorus describes Phoenix as “one of the
most faithful friends” of Antigonus’ nephew Polemaeus, who had recently revolted from
Antigonus and gone over to Cassander (Diod. 20.19.2; on Cassander, see below n. 8.1.3).
The rebellion of the talented Polemaeus comes, prima facie, as something of a
surprise given that he had emerged as Antigonus’ right hand man from at least as early as
314, when he operated independently, and with considerable success, in Asia Minor
(Diod. 19.57.4; 60.2–4; 68. 5–7), and subsequently in Greece (Diod. 19.77.2–4; 78.2–5),
culminating in his appointment as Antigonus’ supreme commander in mainland Greece
(στρατηγὸς τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἑλλάδα πραγµάτων, Diod. 19.87.3) in 312. Indeed, T.
Lenschau (RE s.v. Polemaios, col. 1252–55) has adduced a variety of social and military
considerations in attempting to explain the defection. Polemaeus’ motivation, however,
was likely far more simple. The elimination of Eumenes and the subsequent success of
Polemaeus left Antigonus with a war chest of some 35,000 talents (Diod. 19.48.8,
19.56.5), control of territory extending from the Hindu Kush to the Aegean—a domain
that produced an astounding 11,000 talents of annual revenue (Diod. 19.56.5)—and
command of a battle-tested army seemingly capable of realizing his goal of reconstituting
Alexander’s empire. Antigonus’ marshals, like Alexander’s before them, were thus in a
position to achieve extraordinary wealth and power. It was inevitable that the ruthless
competition for the ear and favor of the king in which Alexander’s marshals had engaged
would arise among the chief subordinates and would-be heirs of Antigonus. In 312
another nephew of Antigonus, Telesphorus, furious that he had been supplanted by his
kinsman Polemaeus as the predominant Antigonid strategos in Greece, struck out on his
own (the two were at least cousins, and may even have been brothers; for a discussion,
see Wallace [2014] 238–39 with n. 29; on Telesphorus, see D. Potter, “Telesphoros,
Cousin of Demetrius: A Note on the Trial of Menander,” Historia 36 [1987] 491–495;
Billows [1990] 435–36; Wallace [2014]). He sold the ships under his command, enlisted
volunteers, captured and fortified Elis, and plundered Olympia, using the proceeds to lure
mercenaries (Diod. 19.87.1–2). 312 was an Olympic year, and the damage to the
carefully crafted Antigonid reputation for promoting Greek freedom (n. 8.1.2) must have
been magnified by the temporal proximity of Telesphorus’ crimes to the most prominent
of all Pan-Hellenic festivals. Polemaeus arrived swiftly, restored the freedom of Elis, and
returned the looted treasure to Olympia (Diod. 19.87.3); his ability to reconcile
Telesphorus and Antigonus is indicated by the former’s presence in the entourage of
Demetrius at Athens in 307/06 (Diog. Laert. 5.79). In 310, however, Polemaeus himself

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rebelled. The most likely explanation for the revolt was the emergence of Demetrius as
his father’s clear successor and most trusted commander. It was Demetrius that was
chosen to oppose Ptolemy and Seleucus in Syria in 312 (5.2), and Demetrius that was
tapped to lead both the subsequent campaign against the Nabataean Arabs (7.1), and the
invasion of Babylonia in 311 (7.2). Just as Telesphorus had rebelled when Polemaeus
supplanted him, so too did Polemaeus when it became painfully clear that the chief spoils
of empire would accrue not to him, but to his dashing cousin Demetrius. In 309,
Polemaeus abandoned his short-lived alliance with Cassander, garrisoned Andros and
began negotiating with Ptolemy. When the two met on Cos, however, Ptolemy arrested
Polemaeus and forced him to drink hemlock (cf. n. 20.3.3). Diodorus (20.27.3) suggests
that Polemaeus was eliminated after he began making overtures to Ptolemy’s forces.
The outcome of Philip’s campaign in the Hellespont is not recorded, but his
success is indicated by the foundation of four Antigoneias (Troas, Cyzicena, Dascylium,
and Nicaea) in the region in the period 310–307 (see Billows [1990] 304–05 and 305 n.
29 for a discussion of the chronology of the foundations; on the Hellespontine
Antigoneias, see Cohen [1995] 145–49, 164, 391, 398–400). Demetrius was also
successful in a concurrent operation, driving the Ptolemaic forces from Cilicia (Diod.
20.19.5; Plutarch makes no mention of this campaign, but see n. 7.5.1). Philip died of
unknown causes in 306 (Diod. 20.73.1, where he is erroneously called Phoenix),
depriving his father of a capable lieutenant at a time when Antigonid power had suffered
a series of recent reversals and Antigonus himself, obese and nearly 80 years old (19.4),
was clearly in decline. Plutarch preserves two anecdotes from Philip’s youth (Mor.
182B, 506 C-D. cf. Berve ii. 383 no. 776; Billows [1990] 419–21; Wheatley [1999] 3; ns.
23.6.2; 28.10.1), both of which suggest that Antigonus took especial care and interest in
his younger son’s upbringing and education.
2.2.3 Δηµήτριος…σεµνότης. Plutarch’s description of Demetrius’ bearing and beauty is
corroborated in every detail by that of Diodorus (19.81.4, 20.92.3). Both accounts may be
derived from Hieronymus of Cardia (Hornblower 227). Hieronymus, however, did not
pass into the entourage of Antigonus until the final defeat of Eumenes in 316—when
Demetrius was already 19 or 20—and if Plutarch is relying on Hieronymus, he must here
be retrojecting the historian’s description of the adult on to the youth (Wheatley [1999]
9). The use of regal language (Βασιλικὴ) to describe Demetrius is striking, but the
sources frequently apply the royal title to the Successors anachronistically (in one
extreme example, Diodorus [18.21.9] refers to “King” Ptolemy in relating events that
occurred in 322, more than fifteen years before Ptolemy formally assumed the title; for a
catalogue of such instances, see Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 248–49; for other such
instances in the Demetrius, see ns. 3.2.1, XVIII: The Assumption of the Kingship) and
there is thus no firm basis for dating the description to after 306 when Antigonus and
Demetrius arrogated the royal title for themselves (Wheatley [1999] 6, contra Bosworth
[2002] 278 n. 121). More notable perhaps is the appearance of ἡρωική—Plutarch applies
the term to the subject of a Life only here and in the Themistocles (22.3, cf. Duff [2008]
202).
2.2.5 ὥστε τῶν πλαττόντων καὶ γραφόντων µηθένα τῆς ὁµοιότητος ἐφικέσθαι:
Artists may have had difficulty creating a good likeness of Demetrius, but many certainly

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tried. Portraits and statues are mentioned by Pliny (statue by Teisicrates: NH 34.67.4;
portrait by Theorus: NH 35.144.5), Pausanias (statues at Olympia: 6.15.7, 6.16.3; statue
at Delphi: 10.10.2), and Diodorus (statue in Athens: 20.46.2; statue in Rhodes: 20. 93.6),
and an inscription records the decision of certain Athenians to erect a bronze equestrian
statue of Demetrius (ISE 7 = SEG 25.149; see below n. 24.7.2; for the statue of
Demetrius that was added to the monuments of the Athenian Eponymous Heroes in
Athens and Delphi, see n. 10.6.1; on the various statues erected for Demetrius in Athens,
see esp. “Liberation Honors: Athenian Monuments from Antigonid Victories in their
Immediate and Broader Contexts,” Palagia and Tracy [2003] 194–205. Elsewhere (Cim.
2.3; Alex. 1.3), Plutarch compares the painter and the biographer and suggested that they
faced similar challenges in portraying character. Perhaps we are meant to see in the
failure of artists to do Demetrius justice a reflection of Plutarch’s own struggle to capture
the moral ambiguity of his subject, or perhaps the images of Demetrius that Plutarch saw
simply did not correspond to the descriptions of Demetrius’ beauty that he encountered in
his literary sources. For a discussion of the iconographic evidence for Demetrius’
appearance, see esp. Wheatley (1999) 7–12; cf. Wehrli 223–30.
2.3.6 ᾗ καὶ µάλιστα τῶν θεῶν ἐζήλου τὸν Διόνυσον: Although both Plutarch and
Diodorus (20.92) state that Demetrius adopted Dionysus as his patron deity (Chaniotis
[2011, 170] may well be correct when he argues that Herodian meant to write Demetrius
when he stated that Antigonus imitated Dionysus in every way [Ἀντίγονος δὲ Διόνυσον
πάντα µιµούµενος καὶ κισσὸν µὲν περιτιθεὶς τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀντὶ καυσίας καὶ διαδήµατος
Μακεδονικοῦ, θύρσον δὲ ἀντὶ σκήπτρου φέρων, 1.3.3], since there is no other
indication that Antigonus too was an emulator of Dionysus), it is Poseidon who figures
most prominently on Demetrius’ coinage (the standard catalogue of Demetrius’ coinage
remains Newell [1927]; cf. Mørkholm). Indeed, if those scholars are correct who argue
that the bulls’ horns with which Demetrius is frequently depicted in coin-portraits are a
reference to Poseidon and not Dionysus, then the latter god does not figure at all in the
iconography of Demetrius’ coinage (for the view that the bulls’ horns with which
Demetrius is depicted are a reference to Poseidon see, e.g. Newell [1927] 72–73;
Mørkholm 27; Stewart [1993] 313; B. Brown, Royal Portraits in Sculpture and Coins:
Pyrrhos and the Successors of Alexander the Great [1995: New York] 18–19; K. Ehling,
“Stier Dionysus oder Sohn des Poseidon: Zu den Hornen des Demetrius Poliorketes,”
GFA 3 [2000] 153–60; S. Müller [2009] 42–43; Holton [2014] 377–79; for the view that
Demetrius is depicted with the horns of Dionysus: Wehrli 226 with n. 16, who notes: “s'il
existe de nombreux modèles du Dionysos Tauros imberbe, le type du Poséidon inconnu
dans l'art grec”; R. Smith, Hellenistic Royal Portraits [Oxford: 1988] 64; Wheatley
[1999] 9; Thonemann [2005] 83–84). The painted funerary stele of a Cretan mercenary in
Antigonid service found in Demetrias depicts a shield emblazoned with an image of
Poseidon identical to that found on the reverse of many of Demetrius’ coins and offers
further proof of Poseidon’s prime importance to Demetrius’ iconography (Sekunda 21–
22). While Demetrius’ close connection with Poseidon is undeniable, Dionysus also
played a pivotal role in Demetrius’ self-representation, and the close association of
Demetrius and Dionysus is reflected in many of the divine honors Demetrius received in
Athens (see ns. 12.1.2; 13.1.3; 40.8.1), in his conscious decision to appear to the
Athenians during the City Dionysia in 295, when he addressed the gathered populace
from the stage in the Theatre of Dionysus (see ns. 34.1.1; 34.4.2), in the creation of

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appended festivals for Dionysus and Demetrius in Athens and on Euboea (see below n.
12.2.3), and in the hymn in ithyphallic meter, itself an element of Dionysiac worship,
with which Demetrius was greeted when he returned to Athens in 290 (ns. 13.1.3;
40.8.1). Demetrius assimilated himself to a variety of deities through an elaborate array
of divine associations, and it would be perfectly in keeping with this program to associate
himself with more than one god on the same coin (Thonemann [2005] 83–84; cf. A.
Stewart, Art in the Hellenistic World [Cambridge: 2014] 88 n. 28; on Demetrius’ program
of divine assimilation, see ns. 12.1.2, 12.3.1, 13.1.3, 25.1.4, 40.8.3).
2.3.8 ὡς πολέµῳ τε χρῆσθαι δεινότατον (The martial qualities of Dionysus): The
description of Dionysus as “most terrible when waging war” is unusual, but note that
Plutarch states elsewhere that Dionysus was an outstanding general (τὸν Διόνυσον ὃν
πάντες ἄριστον γεγονέναι στρατηγὸν, Mor. 680B). Christopher Pelling (2002, 198)
has noted that “the Lives richest in Dionysiac allusions and imagery tend to be those most
thought-provoking and problematic in their moral assessment,” and Plutarch’s assertion
that Demetrius patterned himself after Dionysus, regardless of its historicity (cf. n. 2.3.6),
is fundamental to the richly polychromatic characterizations of Demetrius and Antony as
both peerless soldiers and revelers par excellence, for it is Dionysus who enables the
simultaneous possession of characteristics that are seemingly mutually exclusive. For a
poetic litany of Dionysus’ martial exploits in the East, see Seneca, Hercules Furens 467
ff.; for an explicit assertion of Dionysus’ dual roles as soldier and reveler, see Philostr.
VA 2.9.2–4 (ἡµεῖς µὲν γὰρ τὸν Θηβαῖον ἐπ' Ἰνδοὺς ἐλάσαι φαµὲν στρατεύοντά τε καὶ
βακχεύοντα) and cf. Eur. Bacc. 302 where Tiresias asserts that Dionysus “has a share of
Ares’ nature” (Ἄρεώς τε µοῖραν µεταλαβὼν ἔχει τινά).
III
3.1.1 Ἦν µὲν οὖν καὶ φιλοπάτωρ διαφερόντως: For Plutarch, Demetrius’ love and
respect for his father is a sign of his early virtue. The close relationship of father and son
established a paradigm of Antigonid family loyalty that seems to have endured for well
over a century (on the relationship of Antigonus and Demetrius see 6.1; 6.3; 19.1; 19.6;
29.4–5; Billows [1990] 9–10; Wheatley [1999] 4–5; on that of Demetrius and Antigonus
Gonatas see 51.1–2; 53.3; on the proverbial familial loyalty of the Antigonids see below
n. 51.2.1.
3.2.1 καί ποτε πρεσβείᾳ…τὴν πρὸς υἱὸν ὁµόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν: Plutarch gives neither
the setting nor the date for the episode, but, if historical, it probably took place at
Antigonus’ court in Celaenae at some point before Demetrius took up his first
independent command in Syria in 314 (see below n. 5.1.8; on Celaenae see below n.
6.5.4). Plutarch’s use of the adjective βασιλικῶν in no way indicates that the episode
occurred after the Antigonids assumed the royal title in 306, since Plutarch and other
sources for the period frequently use regal language anachronistically with regard to the
Diadochi (Wheatley [1999] 5 n. 19; n. 2.2.3). Antigonus took control of the city in spring
333 (Billows [1990] 41), and his wife and young son seem to have joined him there
shortly thereafter (Wehrli 139; Billows [1990] 48 n. 92; Wheatley [1998] 3; n. 2.1.1).
Xenophon visited the city and mentions the Achaemenid palace and the large hunting
park nearby (παράδεισος µέγας, Anab. 1.2.7); perhaps Demetrius had just returned from

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the latter when he encountered Antigonus and the embassy. On this episode, see esp.
Wheatley (1999) 4–5.
3.4.2 οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ: This conjunction of particles is a particular favorite of Plutarch’s. It
indicates “the surmounting of an obstacle recognized as considerable” (J. Denniston, The
Greek Particles, Oxford [1966] 28–30; cf. Pelling [1988] 136), and appears on five
occasion in the Demetrius (22.3, 35.6, 38.5, 40.5), generally emphasizing Demetrius’
ability to recover from setbacks of varying severity. Here it strongly contrasts the
exceptionally harmonious relations between members of the Antigonid house with the
familial violence common in the other Hellenistic dynasties.
3.4.4. Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν υἱόν: Philip V of Macedon, who killed his son Demetrius in 180
(recorded by Plutarch at Aem. 8.9 and Arat. 54.7; cf. Polybius 23.7; Diod 29.25; Trogus
Prologue 32; Livy 40.20–24; Justin 32.2.2–10).
αἱ δ' ἄλλαι…ἀσφαλείας (Kin-murder in the Macedonian and Hellenistic courts): The
elimination of potential rivals from one’s family was hardly an innovation of the
Successors; the murder of relatives was so common in the Argead house as to be standard
practice. One need not look further than the career of Archelaus, who murdered his uncle,
cousin, and half-brother in a sanguinary (and ultimately successful) attempt to secure his
own accession in 413, for a telling example of the ruthlessness that characterized the
competition for regal power in Macedonia (for an Athenian perspective on Archelaus’
treachery, see Plato Gorg. 471). Among the contemporaries of Demetrius, Antipater, son
of Cassander, murdered his mother, Thessalonice (Plut. Demet. 36), Lysimachus killed
his son Agathocles (Strabo 13.62.3; Justin 17.1.4; App. Syr. 64), Antiochus executed his
son Seleucus (Trogus Prologue 26; John of Antioch F 55, Mariev), and Ptolemy II
Philadelphus executed his brother Argaeus and an unnamed half-brother (Paus. 1.7.1).
Much of the blame for the murderous familial rivalries that plagued the Argeads and the
Hellenistic dynasties can be attributed to the absence of any consistent principles of royal
legitimacy or of methods whereby it might be established within polygamous dynastic
regimes (E. Carney, “Foreign Influence and the Changing Role of Royal Women in
Macedonia,” Ancient Macedonia 5 [1993] 320–21; Ogden ix-x).
IV
4.1.3 Μιθριδάτης ὁ Ἀριοβαρζάνου παῖς ἑταῖρος ἦν αὐτοῦ καὶ καθ' ἡλικίαν συνήθης:
The founder of the Pontic kingdom (called either Euxine Cappadocia or Cappadocia and
Paphlagonia until at least the time of Polybius) was probably Mithradates III of Cius
(modern Gemlik), a member of a Persian family that ruled that city on the Cian Gulf of
the Propontis in the 4th century, though later propaganda variously claimed Cyrus, Darius,
and Alexander as ancestors. Mithridates fought with Eumenes at Gabiene in the winter of
317/6 as a member of an elite cavalry corps (Diod. 19.40.2), and evidently joined
Hieronymus and others in transferring his allegiance to Antigonus after Eumenes’ defeat
(Hornblower 244; Billows [1990] 404; cf. ns. 2.1.1, 5.2.2). Diodorus, in his account of
that battle, notes that Mithridates was “a descendant of one of the seven Persians who
slew the Magus Smerdis and a man notable for his courage and trained from childhood as
a soldier (συνῆν δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ Μιθριδάτης ὁ Ἀριοβαρζάνου µὲν υἱός, ἀπόγονος δ'

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ἑνὸς τῶν ἑπτὰ Περσῶν τῶν συγκαθελόντων τὸν µάγον Σµέρδιν, ἀνὴρ ἀνδρείᾳ
διαφέρων καὶ τεθραµµένος ἐκ παιδὸς στρατιωτικῶς. 19.40.2).
Plutarch’s assertion that Mithridates was coeval with Demetrius may not be
accurate (Billows [1990] 404). According to Diodorus (20.11.4), Mithridates died in 266
after a reign of 36 years, while the Makrobioi, citing “Hieronymus and the other
historians” (Ps. Lucian Makrob. 13 = Hieronymus FGrH 154 F 7), claims that he was 84
when he died. These two notices combine to give Mithridates’ year of birth as c. 350,
which would make him more than a decade Demetrius’ senior, and hardly a neaniskos, as
he is described at 4.4 (τοῦ νεανίσκου). But Bosworth and Wheatley (163) have raised
doubts about both the reliability and the origin of the figure given in the Makrobioi, and it
is possible that the two men were in fact close in age (cf. F. Geyer RE s.v. Mithridates
[7], who places his birth around 338 based on Plutarch’s assertion). In either case,
Mithridates’ lineage and experience rendered him singularly well equipped to serve as
either a companion or a mentor to the young Demetrius, and he could have assumed
either role soon after Gabiene. That the two established a close relationship—the basis for
the later story of Demetrius’ intervention on Mithridates’ behalf (n. 4.2.1)—is entirely
plausible.
At some point (see n. 4.2.1 for a discussion of the chronological difficulties
associated with this episode) Mithridates fled from Antigonus and took refuge in
Cappadocia, emerging to establish an independent kingdom in the turmoil that followed
the death and defeat of Antigonus at Ipsus in 301. Mithridates assumed the royal title in
296, styling himself Mithridates I Ktistes (“founder”), and eventually extended control
over much of northern Asia Minor. By 281 he was strong enough to beat off an attack by
a Seleucid army (Trogus, Prol. 17), and, shortly thereafter, his son and successor
Ariobarzanes seized the city of Amastris (modern Amasra) and gained the first Black Sea
possession for what would later be called the Kingdom of Pontus (Memnon FGrH 434 F
9).
4.2.1 ἐκ δ' ἐνυπνίου τινὸς ὑποψίαν Ἀντιγόνῳ παρέσχεν: Plutarch relates the story of
the golden field dream in shortened form at Mor. 183A, and an alternate version appears
in Appian (Mith. 9), who omits Demetrius’ role. The tale is almost certainly an example
of vaticinium ex eventu, stemming from a tradition that developed after Mithridates’
foundation of the Pontic kingdom in the aftermath of Ipsus (Hornblower 245; Billows
[1990] 404–05; Bosworth and Wheatley 162). Thus, in a sense, he reaped what
Antigonus had sown. Plutarch’s source for the story is a mystery, and Hornblower’s
suggestion (245) that the dream of Antigonus derives ultimately from Hieronymus, the
supposed common source of Appian and Plutarch, seems unlikely, given the very
unfavorable light in which the anecdote paints Antigonus (on Hieronymus’ treatment of
his Antigonid patrons, see Intro. 43–48; cf. Billows [1990] 404–05, for whom the episode
is “doubtless a later embroidery”; Wheatley [2014] 97 suggests that the anecdote was
probably drawn “from another genre of writing”). The context of Mithridates’ flight is
difficult to determine given the muddled chronology of the sources. According to
Diodorus (20.111.4), another Mithridates (probably Mithridates II of Cius, the uncle of
Mithridates Ktistes; Billows [1990] 403–04; Bosworth and Wheatley 161–62), who ruled
Cius and Myrlea as a vassal of Antigonus, was executed in winter 302/01 after a reign of
35 years on the suspicion that he was colluding with Cassander (on the extent of the

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realm of this Mithridates, see Bosworth and Wheatley 155–57). This seems a likely
context for the flight of the younger Mithridates, whose own loyalty to the Antigonid
cause must also have been doubted. If there is any truth to the tradition, Demetrius could
have intervened on behalf of Mithridates when the Antigonids joined their forces in
Phrygia early in 301 (n. XXIX: The Battle of Ipsus). According to Strabo, Mithridates
fled to Cimiata, a stronghold in the rugged Olgassys range of Northern Cappadocia
(Strabo 12.3.41). But Plutarch cites the intervention of Demetrius as evidence of the
humanity and kindness he exhibited “in the beginning” (Τοῦ µέντοι καὶ φιλάνθρωπον
φύσει καὶ φιλέταιρον γεγονέναι τὸν Δηµήτριον ἐν ἀρχῇ παράδειγµα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν
εἰπεῖν), and implies that Antigonus had the fateful dream when he and Demetrius were
still together in Phrygia or Syria, where Demetrius was left to command independently in
314 (Bosworth and Wheatley 163; on Demetrius’ Syrian command, see n. 5.1.8). Further
complicating matters is the testimony of Appian (Mith. 9), who seems to suggest that
Mithridates escaped Antigonus not long after the defeat of Eumenes (in 317/6) and the
expulsion of Laomedon from Syria (wrongly attributed to Antigonus; in fact Nicanor, an
otherwise unattested Ptolemaic commander, ejected Laomedon from his satrapy c.320
[Diod. 18.43.2; for a discussion, see P. Wheatley, “Ptolemy Soter’s Annexation of Syria,
320 B.C.,” CQ 45 [1995] 433–40), but such an early date severs the causal link between
the execution of Mithridates II and the flight of the future Mithridates Ktistes, and
demands that we consign the latter to a Cappadocian limbo for nearly 15 years (cf.
Bosworth and Wheatley 164 who argue that Mithridates spend these years consolidating
his power in Cappadocia). Finally, Appian’s statement that Mithridates established
himself in Cappadocia and was able to attract followers “since the Macedonians were
otherwise occupied” (ἐν τῇδε τῇ Μακεδόνων ἀσχολίᾳ), nicely fits the period when the
Macedonian dynasts were marshaling their forces prior to Ipsus (cf. Hornblower 244; E.
Meyer, Geschichte des Königsreichs Pontus 37 [Leipzig: 1879]; cf. Billows [1990] 405,
who thinks that the passage refers to the period after the death of Antigonus in 301, and
Bosworth and Wheatley 163–64 who suggest that the statement applies equally well to
any point after c.315). Thus, it seems most likely that Appian’s account represents a
telescoping of events that creates the illusion of proximity, and that Plutarch retrojects the
story of Demetrius’ concern for his friend— a fanciful tradition providing color to the
historical flight of Mithridates in 302/01—in the service of his thematic agenda, namely
his leitmotif of Demetrius’ abrupt decline from a promising beginning. If the friendship
between Demetrius and Mithridates persisted in the years following Ipsus, or if the two
had any contact at all, our sources do not record it (but see below, n. 46.9.2).
4.5.1 πολλῆς γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθῆς ἐκράτησε χώρας, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ποντικῶν βασιλέων
γένος ὀγδόῃ που διαδοχῇ παυσάµενον ὑπὸ Ῥωµαίων ἐκεῖνος παρέσχε: Pompey
defeated the famous Mithridates VI, last and greatest of the Pontic kings, in 66 B.C.
Three years later, Mithridates committed suicide when faced with a revolt led by his son,
Pharnaces (Plut. Pomp. 30–41). The Pontic kingdom was reorganized into the Roman
provinces of Bithynia and Pontus.
εὐφυΐας…τοῦ Δηµητρίου: The insistence that Demetrius possessed a “natural goodness”
(εὐφυΐας; cf. 20.2 where he is described as εὐφυὴς) that predisposed him for “equity and
justice” (ἐπιείκειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην) recalls the characterization of another of Plutarch’s

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morally suspect subjects: in the early chapters of the Alcibiades Plutarch repeatedly refers
to the “natural goodness” of his subject (Alc. 1.5.3, 4.1.5, 4.2.7, 6.1.2).
V. The Battle of Gaza
When Antigonus moved into Asia Minor, struggling over the snowy passes of the
Taurus late in 314 to confront an expeditionary force sent into Caria by Cassander,
Demetrius, then but 22 years old, was left in Syria with a strong force and an experienced
cabinet of advisers to face an expected Ptolemaic invasion (Diod. 19.69.1–2). These
advisers—Nearchus of Crete, Pithon, son of Agenor, Andronicus of Olynthus, and a
certain Philip—were all veterans of Alexander’s campaigns, and, at least in the case of
Nearchus and Pithon, accomplished commanders in their own right (on Nearchus, see
Berve ii. 269–72 no. 544; E. Badian, “Nearchus the Cretan,” YCS 24 [1975] 147–170;
Heckel [2006] 171–173. On Pithon, see Berve ii. 310 no. 619; Billows [1990] 415–16;
Heckel [2006] 196–97).
In the autumn of 312, Ptolemy mustered a force of 18,000 infantry and 4,000
cavalry at Alexandria. The core of Ptolemy’s army consisted of Macedonians and
mercenaries of unknown provenance, but included a large group of native Egyptians
(Αἰγυπτίων δὲ πλῆθος, Diod. 19.80.4) employed both as porters—crossing the Sinai
was a logistical challenge of the first order—and as serviceable troops (Griffith [109] and
Devine [33] agree that these native troops were not included in the troop figures Diodorus
provides for Ptolemy’s army). Devine (33) states that the Egyptians “probably functioned
as a light-infantry screen for the phalanx or the heavy cavalry.” Ptolemy led his force to
Pelusium and then marched through the desert and into Coele Syria. Demetrius had
already dispersed his troops to winter quarters, but when he received word of Ptolemy’s
advance, he recalled his troops and took up a position at Old Gaza (19.80.5).

Diodorus gives a detailed description of Demetrius’ troop deployments (19.82.1–

4). The discrepancy in the figures for the forces under Demetrius’ command given by
Diodorus at 19.69 and 19.82 must stem from dispositions made by Demetrius since 314
and the wastage incurred on the forced march to Cilicia (see below n. 5.1.8). Demetrius
pinned his hopes on a strong left wing, where he himself took up position in the midst of
his personal guard of 200 picked cavalry (τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἱππεῖς ἐπιλέκτους
διακοσίους) and his friends and advisors, including Pithon, who had replaced the
deposed Seleucus as satrap of Babylonia and had been appointed by Antigonus as
Demetrius’ co-commander (στρατηγὸς καὶ τῶν ὅλων µέτοχος) for the defense of
Syria. Three troops of cavalry provided an advance guard, and three, supplemented by
100 “Tarentines,” were placed on the extreme flank (“Tarentine” cavalrymen were armed
with multiple javelins and carried a heavy shield, in the fashion of horsemen from
Tarentum; for Antigonus’ use of such troops, see Diod. 19.39.5). The sum of these units
surrounding Demetrius was 500 cavalry armed with the sarissa, and 100 “Tarentines”
(ὥστ' εἶναι τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶµα τεταγµένους ἱππεῖς ξυστοφόρους µὲν πεντακοσίους,
Ταραντίνους δὲ ἑκατόν). The rest of the left wing was composed of 800 “Companion”
cavalry and 1,500 horsemen of varied provenance. Thirty elephants fronted the entire line
with the gaps between them filled with light-infantry (1,000 javelin-men and 500 Persian
archers). In the center, Demetrius drew up his heavy-infantry phalanx of 11,000 men

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(2,000 Macedonians, 8,000 mercenaries of unknown provenance, and 1,000 Lycians and
Pamphylians) fronted by the remaining 13 elephants, with accompanying light infantry.
The right wing was composed of 1,500 cavalry under the command of Andronicus who
was ordered to withhold his force at an angle and refuse battle pending the result of the
clash on the opposite wing (λοξὴν φυλάττειν τὴν στάσιν καὶ φυγοµαχεῖν,
καραδοκοῦντα τὴν δι' αὐτοῦ γινοµένην κρίσιν; on this “oblique” order of attack, see n.
5.2.2). Demetrius placed his faith in his advantage in elephants and the 2,900 cavalry
under his personal command on the left. After the initial cavalry charge, the infantry
phalanx would advance behind a screen of elephants.
Since Demetrius had chosen the battlefield, Ptolemy, clearly basing his own
dispositions on good intelligence, deployed his troops in response to the opposing battle
array. After initially stationing their best troops on the right, Ptolemy and Seleucus, along
with 3,000 cavalry, took a position on the right to counter Demetrius’ strong left wing. In
front of the cavalry a special anti-elephant corps equipped with field obstacles consisting
of iron-tipped spikes linked with chains (χάρακα σεσιδηρωµένον καὶ δεδεµένον
ἀλύσεσιν) and supported by a strong force of missile troops was deployed with orders to
“shoot without ceasing at the elephants and those who were mounted upon them”
(συνεχῶς κατατιτρώσκειν τὰ θηρία καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀναβεβηκότας, Diod.
19.83.1–3). The placement of 3,000 cavalry on the right means that Ptolemy, anticipating
Demetrius’ oblique attack, stationed only 1,000 horse on his left wing (Diodorus does not
detail the disposition of the Ptolemaic center or left wing, but, as we have seen, Ptolemy’s
cavalry force was 4,000 strong). Thus Demetrius commited more troops (1,500) to a wing
he had no intention of employing than Ptolemy did to counter it (1,000), effectively
throwing away his slight advantage in cavalry. The battle began with a clash of picked
cavalry units from the strengthened wing of each force “in which the men of Demetrius
had much the better of it” (Diod. 19.83.3), but repeated charges under Ptolemy and
Seleucus led to a grim struggle in which the combatants on both sides, their spears
shattered, faced off at close range with their swords (Diod. 19.83.5).
In an attempt to break the deadlock, Demetrius deployed his elephants, but the
field obstacles laid by the anti-elephant corps proved to be an effective barrier when
coupled with an unrelenting barrage of missile fire unleashed by Ptolemy’s light infantry.
The beasts, despite the furious goading of their mahouts, were unable to advance, and as
their tender feet were “pierced by the cleverly devised spikes and tormented by their
wounds and by the concentrated efforts of the attackers” (περιεπείροντο τῷ
φιλοτεχνηθέντι χάρακι καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς καὶ πυκνότησι τῶν τιτρωσκόντων,
19.84.2) they began to fall back in disorder. Ptolemy’s missile troops were able to kill the
mahouts, and kill or capture the entire elephant force. The disastrous fate of the elephants
crushed the fighting spirit of Demetrius’ cavalry, most of whom wheeled and fled in utter
panic despite the desperate pleas of their commander (Diod. 19.84.5). The opposing
infantry phalanxes never engaged, and when some of Demetrius’ retreating cavalry
column peeled off in an ill-advised attempt to retrieve their baggage, a chaotic scene at
the city gates ensued. Ptolemy adroitly exploited the confusion, dashing through the open
gates and seizing the city (Diod. 19.84.7–8).

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 With Gaza lost, Demetrius fled through the night to Azotus (some 53 kilometers
to the north). The grim reports that reached his camp that night revealed the scope of the
disaster: at least 500 men (see below n. 5.3.4), including his co-commander Pithon, were
dead; 8,000 had been taken prisoner; his entire elephant force had been captured or lay
dead on the field. As Ptolemy solidified his gains in Coele Syria and advanced as far
north as Sidon and Tyre, and Seleucus prepared to launch the lightning raid that would
regain Babylonia and mark the beginning of the Seleucid Empire in Asia (n. 7.2.1),
Demetrius was forced to withdraw first to Tripolis in Phoenicia, and subsequently to
Cilicia (Diod. 19.85.5–86.5, 19.93.1; n. 5.6.3). The defeat was comprehensive, but it
represented only a temporary blow to Antigonid prestige: with his victory over a
Ptolemaic army the following year, Demetrius nearly recouped his losses and recovered
Coele Syria (ns. 6.1–3). But the defeat at Gaza opened a window for the enterprising
Seleucus to regain Babylonia (n. 7.2.1), a development that would prove disastrous for
the Antigonids in the long term. For ancient accounts of the battle, see Diod. 19.80–85;
App. Syr. 54; Justin 15.1.6; Paus. 1.6.5; for modern treatments, see esp. Wehrli 142–43;
Seibert (1969) 164–75; Devine 31–40; Billows [1990] 124–28; Grainger [1990] 71–73;
Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 225–29.
The chronology of the battle and events consequent on it have long been the
source of controversy, but the available evidence strongly supports dating the battle to
October or November of 312: dated tetradrachms from Sidon demonstrate that Ptolemy
was issuing coinage in Phoenicia for some portion of the Sidonian year 312/1 (the
Sidonian year, like the Macedonian, seems to have begun in our October: E. Newell, The
Dated Coinage of Sidon and Ake [New Haven: 1916] 27–28; Wheatley [2003a] 274–75);
Idumaean ostraca suggest that Ptolemy was in control of that region early in the Julian
year 311; Babylonian documents securely date the return of Seleucus to April 311 (n.
7.2.1; for a trenchant overview of the various evidence, see Anson [2014] 159–60).
Accordingly, the vast majority of scholars now agree that Demetrius was defeated at
Gaza in late 312 (Wheatley [2003] 271–75; id. [2009b] 329–33; Anson [2006] 228–29;
id. (2014) 159; Boiy [2007] 115–17; Meeus [2012] 88), and the “High” date of spring
312 now seems untenable (on the competing chronological schemes for the years 323–11,
see Intro. 56–61).
5.1.1 ἐν τοῖς Ἐµπεδοκλέους στοιχείοις: Empedocles, a philosopher from Acragas in
Sicily, probably lived c. 495–435 (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 281). In his eighth book,
Diogenes Laertius has preserved a number of apocryphal biographical stories from
various sources, most of which are concerned with Empedocles’ passionate support of
democracy, or his death—he was famously said to have hurled himself into the crater of
Etna (Diog. Laert. 8. 69–70). Diogenes (8.77) attributes two poems to Empedocles, On
Nature and Purifications, though assigning the extant fragments to one work or the other
is often difficult. Empedocles reduced all matter to four fundamental elements, which he
called ῥιζὤµατα (στοιχεῖα, used here, is a Platonic term)—earth, water, air, and fire.
These elements are moved by the influence of Love and Strife. Unlike Aristotle, who
adopted them, Empedocles held that the elements were unchangeable. For the fragments,
with translation and commentary, see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 280–321.
5.1.5 πρὸς Πτολεµαῖον: The son of Lagus and Arsinoe, Ptolemy was a childhood friend,
and likely a coeval, of Alexander. Alexander appointed Ptolemy somatophylax in the

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autumn off 330 (Arr. Anab. 3.27.5) and he subsequently held several commands.
Assessing his career under Alexander is complicated by the fact that Ptolemy’s own
history was a key source for the extant accounts of Alexander’s campaigns, particularly
that of Arrian, and the inevitable emergence of counter-traditions which served the
interests of the Ptolemaic court by exaggerating the exploits of its founder, or even
inventing them whole cloth—the claim that Ptolemy saved the life of Alexander in the
battle of the Mallian town, a story that Ptolemy’s own account refutes (Curt. 9.5.21;
Pausanias 1.6.2), is but the most notorious instance of the latter.
He received Egypt as his satrapy in the settlement at Babylon (Curt. 10.10.1;
Diod. 18.3.1; Justin 13.4.10) and engineered a major propaganda coup when he diverted
Alexander’s funeral catafalque to Alexandria (Arr. Succ. 1.25; 24.1; Diod. 18.28.2–3), an
act that earned him the ire of the chiliarch Perdiccas. After Perdiccas’ subsequent
Egyptian invasion ended in utter disaster (Arr. Succ. 1.25; Diod. 18.33.3–6; Just.
13.8.10), Ptolemy set about establishing control over Cyprus and Coele Syria, though
Antigonus, in a grueling campaign—the siege of Tyre dragged on for a full fifteen
months (Diod. 19.61.5)—ejected his Syrian garrisons by 314.
5.1.8 αὐτὸς µὲν Ἀντίγονος…κατέπεµψε τὸν υἱὸν Δηµήτριον: This passage represents
a conflation of the events of 314–312. Antigonus did not send Demetrius from Phrygia;
he had, in fact, left him in Syria in 314 with a strong force, including 5,000 cavalry, and
explicit instructions to prevent any Ptolemaic incursions in the region (Diod. 19.69.1).
Sometime between autumn 313 and winter/spring 313/2 (Boiy [2007] 145; Wheatley
[2009b] 332), Ptolemy launched raids from Cyprus, plundering Poseideium in northern
Syria and the wealthy city of Mallus in Cilicia. In response, Demetrius raced towards
Cilicia with his cavalry and light infantry. Diodorus claims that this force covered an
incredible 24 stathmoi in six days, but when Demetrius arrived—where, exactly, is not
specified—Ptolemy’s forces had already left the area, and in setting such a brutal pace he
succeeded only in ruining “the majority of his horses” (ἀποβεβληκὼς τῶν ἵππων τοὺς
πλείους, 19.80.2). A stathmos or “stage” refers to the distance between posting stations
on the Achaemenid road system. The actual distance varies from stage to stage, but
averages c. 24 km (Geer [1954] 54–55 n. 1; Wheatley [2009b] 332 n. 38). It is highly
unlikely that Demetrius and his troops covered c. 575 km. in six days, but if they even
approached that distance the reported damage to the horses is understandable. Devine
(30) argues that the loss of “perhaps 3,000 trained cavalry horses” left Demetrius at a
distinct disadvantage at Gaza late in 312, but such a figure assumes that Demetrius took
his entire cavalry force on this forced march, which is just as unlikely as the fantastic
distance posited by Diodorus (for trenchant remarks on the distances travelled by cavalry
units of varying size during Alexander’s campaigns, see Engels 154–56; Billows 78–79;
Wheatley [2009b] 332 n. 38 allows for the possibility that Demetrius’ mounted troops
reached Mallus). Nevertheless, the fruitless dash towards Cilicia seems to have had
serious consequences: although he had been left in Syria with 5,000 cavalry in late 314,
Demetrius could muster only 4,400 cavalry for the battle, and it seems unlikely that these
were all experienced horsemen on quality mounts.

5.2.2 δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν ὄντα…αὑτὸν ἀγῶνας: Demetrius was actually 24. He was
born in 336 and was thus 22 when Antigonus left him in Syria two years prior to the

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battle (Diod. 19.69.1; App. Syr. 54.274; Wheatley [1997] 19; n. 5.1.8). Plutarch echoes
Diodorus in emphasizing the youthful inexperience of Demetrius and the
accomplishments of his battle-hardened opponent (Diod. 19.81.1, 81.5). Diodorus also
draws attention to the presence of Seleucus in the Ptolemaic camp, citing his influence as
the source of Ptolemy’s decision to invade Syria and repeatedly referring to “Ptolemy and
Seleucus” as joint commanders (19.83.1, 83.3). Although Gaza did indeed represent
Demetrius’ first independent command, he was hardly unproven in perilous
circumstance. He had previously commanded Antigonus’ companion cavalry at
Paraetacene (Diod. 19.29.4), and his right wing at Gabiene (Diod. 19.40.1), the two major
conflicts in the epic campaign between Eumenes and Antigonus that played out across
the desolate breadth of the Iranian plateau in the winter of 317/16 and featured two of the
most diverse and imposing forces assembled in the years following Alexander’s death
(the definitive analysis of this campaign is Bosworth [2002] 98–168; cf. J. Kromayer and
E. Kahnes, in J. Kromayer and G. Veiths [eds.] Antike Schlachtfelder [Berlin: 1931] iv.
391–434; Wehrli 37–40; Billows [1990] 85–106; Anson [2004] 82–109). Indeed,
Demetrius’ troop disposition prior to Gaza (Diod. 19.82, and see above n. V: The Battle
of Gaza) indicate, as we have seen, a plan of battle based on the oblique order of attack
that Alexander had employed, to devastating effect, in each of his three great battles with
the forces of Darius III (Granicus: Arr. Anab. 1.14.7, Issus: Arr. Anab. 2.11.1 Gaugamela:
Diod. 17.57.6; Curt. 4.15.1). Five years before Gaza, Demetrius had witnessed both
Antigonus and Eumenes adopt the tactic, at Paraetacene (Diod. 19.29.1–7) and Gabiene
(Diod. 19.39.4), respectively. Demetrius’ tactical decisions were thus the products of his
experience and that of his advisors, not an indication of a lack thereof. Indeed, with the
exception of his decision to command from the left (Alexander had commanded from the
right, and his marshals had followed suit), Demetrius’ battle plan was wholly
conventional, and his force was comparable in strength to that of Ptolemy’s (although
Ptolemy had the edge in infantry, Demetrius’ force was slightly superior in cavalry and
boasted 43 elephants to Ptolemy’s none; cf. Billows [1990] 125). And yet both Diodorus
and Plutarch paint the battle as an utter mismatch. Indeed, we find in the account of
Diodorus the claim that the friends of Demetrius (his senior advisers are presumably
among these philoi: “Pithon and all his other friends” [οἵ τε ἄλλοι φίλοι πάντες καὶ
Πίθων] comprised the two hundred select horsemen who formed Demetrius’ personal
guard, Diod. 19.82.2) urged him “not to take the field against so great a general and a
superior force” (τῶν δὲ φίλωναὐτῷ συµβουλευόντων µὴ παρατάττεσθαι πρὸς
ἡγεµόνα τηλικοῦτον καὶ δύναµιν µείζω), a plea that Demetrius confidently ignores
“even though he was very young and about to engage in so great a battle apart from his
father” (καίπερ νέος ὢν παντελῶς καὶ τηλικαύτην µάχην µέλλων ἀγωνίζεσθαι
χωρὶς τοῦ πατρός, Diod. 19.81.4) A description of the “sympathetic anxiety” of his
troops “on account of his youth” (συναγωνιῶντας τῇ νεότητι) follows, as does the
claim that Demetrius was about join battle “not only with more numerous forces, but also
against generals who were almost the greatest” (οὐ µόνον γὰρ πρὸς πλείονας ἤµελλε
διακινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἡγεµόνας σχεδὸν µεγίστους), veterans of Alexander’s
campaigns who “had often led armies independently” and “were unconquered up to this
time” (πολλάκις καθ' αὑτοὺς δυνάµεων ἡγησάµενοι µέχρι τῶν καιρῶν τούτων
ὑπῆρχον ἀνίκητοι, Diod. 19.81.5). These are the exaggerations of a source with an
agenda. While Ptolemy and Seleucus were both battle-hardened commanders neither had

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commanded independently in an engagement of this size; indeed, neither had taken part
in one since the battle of the Hydaspes (Jhelum) River in 326 (noted by Grainger [1990]
71; on the battle, see Arr. Anab. 5.11–18; Curt. 8.14). The assertion that Demetrius’
advisors urged him not to fight is equally misleading. Hornblower (229) suggests that
Hieronymus was “probably among the philoi whose advice was ignored,” but it is
unlikely in the extreme that Demetrius’ advisors ever proffered such advice; after all,
Antigonus had explicitly instructed Demetrius to confront Ptolemy if he attempted to
invade Syria (see above n. 5.1.8). Antigonid control of the region had been too hard-won
to simply abandon without a fight. The insistence that Demetrius, outmanned and
outmatched, rejected the sound advice of his good counselors may represent an attempt
by Hieronymus to absolve himself of any responsibility for the debacle at Gaza (note that
Ptolemy subsequently heeds the warning of his own advisors and withdraws to Egypt
rather than engage the combined armies of Antigonus and Demetrius [Diod. 19.83.6]; for
another possible example of self-serving disinformation in Hieronymus, see below n.
7.1.1). To be sure, Ptolemy out-generalled Demetrius at Gaza—his ability to capitalize on
good pre-battle intelligence, translating information on Demetrius’ line of battle into
creative and timely tactical decisions that effectively countered his opponent’s
advantages in cavalry and elephants, led to a resounding victory—but Ptolemy’s
advantage in numbers and experience are overdrawn in both Diodorus and Plutarch.
5.3.4 ἐσφάλη περὶ πόλιν Γάζαν ἡττηθείς: Here, as so often, Plutarch has radically
compressed his account of a major engagement, preferring instead to focus on Demetrius’
reversals of fortune and fortitude in the face of adversity. Plutarch’s thematic concerns
aside, a more detailed description of the battle was probably rendered unnecessary by the
(possibly eyewitness) account of Hieronymus (cf. the preface to the Nicias-Crassus,
where Plutarch justifies his summary treatment of Nicias’ deeds by referring to the
existing, and definitive, accounts of Thucydides and Philistus, [Nic. 1.5]).
ὀκτακισχιλίων ἁλόντων καὶ πεντακισχιλίων ἀποθανόντων: Diodorus (19.85.3)
confirms that Ptolemy took 8,000 prisoners, but gives 500 as the number of the dead, a
figure which is far more likely than Plutarch’s 5,000, given that the opposing phalanxes
never engaged (cf. Seibert [1969] 175; Devine 35). Plutarch may have exaggerated the
number of dead to emphasize the magnitude of the defeat and Demetrius’ subsequent
recovery, but a simple scribal error is equally likely (Seibert [1969] 174; Billows [1990]
128 and n. 60; Huss 161 n. 528). Nearchus (see n. V: The Battle of Gaza) may have been
among the dead—he is not heard from again (Hornblower 228; Billows [1990] 128
maintains that since Nearchus was not mentioned by Diodorus he must have escaped).
5.4.3 ταῦτα…αὐτοῖς: Ptolemy’s generosity made quite an impression on Demetrius and
prompted several reciprocal displays of magnanimity (6.4, 17.1, 38.1). Note that
Ptolemy’s message is characterized as “considerate and humane” (εὐγνώµονα καὶ
φιλάνθρωπον), anticipating the “consideration and humanity” (εὐγνωµοσύνῃ καὶ
φιλανθρωπίᾳ, 17.1) Demetrius displays in the aftermath of his victory over Ptolemy at
Salamis. On the importance of philanthropia in the Life, see n. 1.5.4, Intro 14–15.
5.6.3 ἀνδρῶν τε συλλογῆς καὶ κατασκευῆς ὅπλων ἐπεµελεῖτο, καὶ τὰς πόλεις διὰ
χειρὸς εἶχε καὶ τοὺς ἀθροιζοµένους ἐγύµναζεν: After the disaster at Gaza, Demetrius

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withdrew first to Tripolis in Phoenicia where he gathered reinforcements from the
Antigonid garrisons in northern Syria and Cilicia (Diod. 19.85.5). As Ptolemy solidified
his gains, besieging the Antigonid garrison at Tyre (the city eventually fell to Ptolemy
when the recalcitrant Antigonid commander Archelaus was betrayed by his troops) and
advancing up the Phoenician coast at least as far as Sidon (Diod. 19.86.1–2), Demetrius
retreated to Cilicia to regroup (according to Diodorus, Ptolemy dispatched his general
Cilles to Syria after he heard that Demetrius had returned from Cilicia, 19.93.1).
Commentators, with the exception of Bosworth ([2002] 230–31) and Boiy ([2007] 146),
have routinely ignored Demetrius’ retreat to Cilicia, but it is evidence of the critical
importance of the region for Demetrius (ns. 6.2.1, 14.2.5, 32.1.1). By summoning the
Antigonid garrisons in Syria and retreating to Cilicia, Demetrius cleared the way for
Seleucus to make the long march to Babylonia in the winter of 312/1 (n. 7.2.1).
VI
6.1.1 Ἀντίγονος…ἄνδρας: In distinguishing between beardless youths and men,
Antigonus likens the struggle with Ptolemy to an athletic contest. Competitors were
divided into three age classes: boys, beardless youths, and men (Plato Laws 833C).
6.2.1 καὶ µετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον: (The date of Demetrius’ return to Syria): Demetrius
was defeated at Gaza late in the Julian year 312 (n. 5.2.2). He subsequently moved into
Cilicia to regroup, and presumably spent the better part winter of 312/1 there. Early the
next year, presumably as soon as the weather allowed him to negotiate the Syrian Gates
(Belen Pass), and cross the southern Amanus range, he returned to Syria (on the Amanus
passes, see ns. 32.6.2, 48.1.4). His army was now bolstered by troops drawn from
Antigonid garrisons in Syria and Cilicia (Diod. 19.93.1), and perhaps by additional
mercenaries from the fertile recruiting grounds of the latter region (ns. 14.2.5, 15.2.2).
Demetrius’ movments cannot be recreated with any certainty, but he probably took up a
position in the ‘Amuq plain east of the Belen pass and sent out scouting parties to
reconnoiter the region (n. 6.3.1).
6.2.2 Κίλλης Πτολεµαίου στρατηγὸς: Cilles, a Macedonian and a friend of Ptolemy’s
(Diod. 19.93.1–2), appears in the sources only in connection with this episode (P.
Schoch, RE s.v. Cilles coll. 902–03; Peremans and Van’t Dack no. 14609).
6.2.2 µετὰ λαµπρᾶς δυνάµεως, ὡς ἐξελάσων Συρίας Δηµήτριον ἁπάσης: Diodorus
(19.93.2) credits Cilles with a “sufficient force” (δύναµιν ἱκανὴν), and confirms that
Ptolemy ordered his general “to drive Demetrius completely out of Syria, or to overtake
and destroy him” (ἐκδιῶξαι τὸν Δηµήτριον τὸ παράπαν ἐκ τῆς Συρίας ἢ
περικαταλαβόντα συντρῖψαι). Cilles was presumably dispatched from Phoenicia,
which Ptolemy had occupied after his victory at Gaza (Diod. 19.86.1)
6.3.1 ὁ δ' ἐξαίφνης ἐπιπεσὼν οὐ προαισθοµένῳ καὶ φοβήσας, ἔλαβεν αὐτῷ
στρατηγῷ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ στρατιώτας µὲν ἑπτακισχιλίους ζῶντας εἷλε,
χρηµάτων δὲ παµπόλλων ἐκυρίευσεν: Diodorus (19.93.2) reports that Demetrius
received intelligence that Cilles had established a camp at Myous in Syria. The location
of Myous is unknown, but the suggestion [Andrei 132 n. 35] that it lay along the Orontes
is reasonable enough. When Demetrius’ scouts reported that Cilles had adopted a rather
cavalier approach to security, he determined to launch a surprise attack. Leaving his

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baggage behind, Demetrius force-marched his lightly equipped troops through the night,
and made an early-morning attack (Diod. 19.9.3.2). Cilles was overwhelmed before he
could muster a defense, and he and his army surrendered without a fight. The 7,000
prisoners very nearly made up for the losses Demetrius sustained at Gaza, and Cilles’
captured treasure (χρηµάτων δὲ παµπόλλων) was a welcome addition to Demetrius’
war chest that made his magnanimity in victory easy to sustain (n. 6.5.2). The suggestion
that Demetrius sent some of the spoils of the battle to Olympia (T. Kruse, “Zwei
Denkmäler der Antigoniden in Olympia: eine Untersuchung zu Pausanias
VI.16.3,”AM 107 [1992] 273–293) is speculative, but compelling: the sanctuary had been
looted by the renegade Antigonid commander Telesphorus the previous year (n. 2.2.1),
and a gesture of continuing Antigonid support for the cause of Greek freedom (n. 8.1.2)
was well-advised.
6.4.1 ἔχαιρε… τὴν χάριν ἠγάπησεν: For Ptolemy’s generousity in the aftermath of his
victory at Gaza, see n. 5.4.3.
6.5.2 αὐτόν τε τὸν Κίλλην…ἀπέπεµψε: This act of magnanimity is recorded only here.
The fate of the 7,000 prisoners is not recorded, but ransoming captive soldiers and
enrolling them in one’s own army were both standard practices for the Diadochi (for a
paradigmatic and near-contemporary example, see Diod. 19.73.19). Demetrius may have
ransomed some of them, but if Plutarch is correct that Demetrius also seized “a great deal
of treasure” (χρηµάτων δὲ παµπόλλων, 6.4), he will have had greater need of men than
money.
6.5.3 τοῦτο τὸ πάθος Συρίας ἐξήλασε Πτολεµαῖον: It was not the defeat of Cilles that
drove Ptolemy to evacuate Phoenicia and Palestine, but the arrival from Phrygia of an
army under Antigonus. After ransoming his remaining captives or incorporating them
into his force (n. 6.5.2), Demetrius encamped, anticipating that Ptolemy would soon
march against him in full strength, sent news of the victory to his father, and requested
reinforcements (Diod. 19.93.3). The location of this camp is uncertain, but Diodorus
describes Demetrius exploiting swamps and marshes to bolster his defensive position,
which suggests the swampy region of the Orontes near the site where Seleucus would
later found the great city of Apamea, and where an Antigonid military colony, Pella, may
already have been planted (Strabo 16.2.10; cf. Billows [1990] 299; Grainger [1990] 124;
Cohen [2006] 94–95; the name of the colony may be an additional indication that the
Antigonids were from Pella: Seleucus founded several Asian colonies named for his
Macedonian hometown Europos, Billows [1990] 18 n. 8; cf. n. 44.5.1). The expected
Ptolemaic response never materialized; and when Antigonus arrived in Syria with a
strong force (Diod. 19.93.6), presumably in early spring 311, as soon as the passes of the
Taurus range cleared (Billows [1990] 129; see Diod. 19.69.2 for the difficulties
Antigonus’ army encountered while trying to cross from Cilicia to Phrygia in winter
314/313; cf. Billows [1990] 129). Ptolemy heeded the counsel of his advisers and elected
to withdraw to Egypt, razing the forts at Ake, Joppa, Samaria, and Gaza along the way
(Diod. 19.93.4–7).
6.5.4 Ἀντίγονον δὲ κατήγαγεν ἐκ Κελαινῶν: Celaenae, at the headwaters of the
Maeander, was the capital of the Persian satrapy of Greater Phrygia. According to
Xenophon (Anab. 1.2.7–9), the city was large and prosperous, featuring a game park and

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a citadel and palace built by Xerxes (cf. n. 3.2.1). The satrapy was not fully subdued in
333 when Alexander allotted it to Antigonus who, in the next two years, crushed a
Persian counter-offensive and stabilized the region (Arr. Succ. 4.1.34–35; Billows [1990]
43–45; Briant 63–66). Celaenae served as the seat of Antigonus’ empire until he founded
Antigoneia in 306 on a strategic site controlling the lower Orontes Valley (Diod. 20.47.5;
n. 17.2.1), after which it remained the center of Antigonid power in Asia Minor (cf.
Billows [1990] 241–42).
χαίροντα…υἱόν: Diodorus (19.93.4) gives a similar account of Antigonus’ joy, adding
that Antigonus thought that Demetrius’ victory proved he was “worthy to be a king”
(βασιλείας ἄξιον). The ultimate source for the joyful reunion of father and son is
probably Hieronymus.
VII
7.1.1 Ἐκ τούτου…ἀνεχώρησεν: The Nabataeans were a pastoral people who migrated
from north-east Arabia to their later homeland in the arid region between Aqaba and the
Dead Sea at some point between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C. By the late 4th century they
had grown wealthy, based on their control of the overland route conveying incense and
spices from southern Arabia to Gaza and the collection and marketing of bitumen from
the Dead Sea (for their early history see A. Negev, “The Early Beginnings of the
Nabataean Realm,” Palestine Exploration Quarterly 8/9 [1976] 125–33; cf. G.W.
Bowersock, Roman Arabia [Cambridge: 1983] 12–18). Diodorus (19.94–100) gives a
much fuller description of the attempt to subjugate the Nabataeans that differs
substantially from what is offered here. His account, which includes a lengthy
ethnographic digression, is almost certainly drawn from Hieronymus of Cardia, whose
history contained the earliest historical references to the Nabataeans (a fragment of
Hieronymus [FGrH 154 F 5] describing the topography of Nabataean lands corresponds
closely to Diod. 2.48 and 19.98; for a full discussion of Hieronymus’ Nabataean
ethnography, see Bosworth [2002] 187–209). In it we find no mention of Demetrius’ cool
negotiation of the forbidding landscape (ἐκινδύνευσε…ἐκπλαγῆναι), nor is there any
reference to the substantial spoils and 700 camels that he seized from the awestruck
Nabataeans (λείαν τε λαβὼν πολλὴν καὶ καµήλους ἑπτακοσίας παρ' αὐτῶν). Instead
we hear of three Antigonid attempts to subjugate the Nabataeans or exploit the resources
of the territory they controlled, of which the expedition led by Demetrius is the merely
unsuccessful central episode bookended by a pair of abject disasters. According to
Diodorus, the invasion led by Demetrius was actually a punitive expedition launched in
response to the Nabataean annihilation of an Antigonid force led by a certain Athenaeus
(see Diod. 19. 95.2–7 for the initial success and ultimate failure of Athenaeus, about
whose career nothing further is known; and 19.96.4, where Antigonus orders Demetrius
to “punish the Arabs in whatever way he could” [κολάσαι τοὺς Ἄραβας καθ' ὃν ἂν
δύνηται τρόπον]). Demetrius fared only a little better. His failure to take the Arabs by
surprise led to the fruitless assault on a Nabataean fortress (the frequent identification of
this fortress with Petra is far from certain; Bosworth [2002, 202–03] mounts a strong
argument for a different site—the rock citadel at Es-Sela, some 50 km. north of Petra,
near the site of ancient Bosra). After hastily concluding a truce, and receiving some
parting gifts from the enemy, Demetrius withdrew (Diod. 19.97), taking note of the

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bitumen harvesting operations on the Dead Sea as he made his way back to Syria.
Antigonus angrily rebuked his son for coming to terms with the Nabataeans but, intrigued
by the possibility of a new source of revenue, he dispatched a force under Hieronymus to
seize control of the Dead Sea bitumen (19.100.1). But Hieronymus too fell prey to the
concerted resistance of the Arabs who gathered together a force of 6,000 and wiped out
Hieronymus’ men with a shower of arrows launched from reed rafts (Diod. 19.100.2).
Antigonus suspended operations in the area and turned to weightier matters, while
Hieronymus seems to have remained in Coele Syria as a regional administrator or
governor (see Diod. 19.100.2 where Antigonus names Hieronymus as his epimeletes; cf.
Hornblower 12–13; Billows [1990] 131, 391; Wheatley [2001b] 9 n. 4).
Subsequent events suggest that the grim catalogue of fiascos found in Diodorus’
account owes much to a sedulous attempt on the part of Hieronymus to attenuate the
severity of his own failure by painting the Nabataeans, both in the ethnography and in a
speech a Nabataean delivers to Demetrius, as passionate defenders of liberty whose
nomadic lifestyle and singular ability to thrive in their unforgiving homeland rendered
them virtually impossible to subjugate (Bosworth [2002] 188–89 notes that the
description of the failure of Hieronymus’ mission is unusually brief and, in this silence,
sees an analogue of Thucydides’ account of the loss of Amphipolis; on bias in
Hieronymus, see also J. Roisman, “Hieronymus of Cardia: Causation and Bias from
Alexander to his Successors,” in E. Carney and D. Ogden [eds.], Philip II and Alexander
the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives [Oxford: 2010] 135–48). For when
Antigonus and Demetrius finally did undertake the invasion of Egypt, a logistical
challenge of extraordinary magnitude, and years in the planning, we find that Antigonus
employed a truly massive camel train “gathered together by the Arabs” (ταῖς καµήλοις
ταῖς ἀθροισθείσαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀράβων) carrying 130,000 medimnoi of grain in addition
to their own fodder (Diod. 20.73.3; one medimnos = c. 40 kg.; on the invasion of Egypt,
see ns. 19.1–3). The availability of these animals suggests that Demetrius’ mission was
not fruitless after all—the 700 camels he led back to Antigonus were signs of things to
come. Indeed, securing the cooperation of the desert Arabs was vital in affecting the
crossing from Gaza to Pelusium, since they alone could provide camels in sufficient
numbers, and could prove a dangerous foe on Antigonus’ unprotected eastern flank if
hostile (cf. Billows [1990] 130; Bosworth [2002] 205; the Persian king Cambyses used
Arab camel trains to set up water dumps in Sinai in advance of his own Egyptian
campaign, see Hdt. 3.4–9).
In this camel train lies the key to what prompted the aggression against the
Nabataeans. Diodorus simply states that Antigonus decided the Arabs were “hostile to his
interests”—and commentators have offered a variety of economic and strategic
considerations, suggesting that the incursions were (a) attempts to gain control of the
lucrative trade in Dead Sea bitumen and/or the caravan routes from southern Arabia to
the Mediterranean coast; (b) preliminary to a planned invasion of Egypt; or (c) designed
to cut communications between Egypt and Babylonia, now that the latter was under the
control of Ptolemy’s ally Seleucus (cf. Mehl [1986] 111–12; Santi Amantini 328; Billows
[1990] 130, 288; Bosworth [2002] 190). The last of these suggestions can safely be
dismissed—so long as Syria was in Antigonid hands, any overland communications
between Egypt and Babylonia would require traversing the Syrian desert. And while

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there is no doubt Antigonus was interested in the incense trade (confirmed by
Theophrastus Hist. Plant. 9.4.8), he was made aware of the Dead Sea bitumen trade only
after the second of the Nabataean expeditions, which suggests that economic motives
were secondary, at least initially. Demetrius’ negotiations with the Nabataeans suggest
that his Arabian campaign was undertaken primarily as a preliminary to a planned
invasion of Egypt and will have taken place very soon after Ptolemy abandoned Palestine
and Coele Syria (n. 6.5.3), most likely in late spring or early summer 311. Seleucus’
remarkable success in Babylonia (n. 7.2.1), however, forced Antigonus to turn his
attention to the east, and the invasion of Egypt would not come for another five years.
Demetrius’ mission proved that Arabian logistical support was negotiable; Hieronymus’
subsequent misadventures proved that access to the bitumen of the Dead Sea was not.
7.2.1 Σέλευκος… κρατῶν: Seleucus was awarded the satrapy of Babylonia in the
distributions at Triparadisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), and ruled in Babylon, where he proved a
generous and popular overlord, until forced to flee to Ptolemy in the face of Antigonid
hostility in 316 (Diod. 19.55.5–6). Demetrius’ withdrawal from Syria in the aftermath of
the debacle at Gaza cleared the way for Seleucus to return to Babylonia at the head of a
small force provided by Ptolemy (Diod. 19. 90.1: c. 800 infantry and 200 cavalry; App.
Syr. 54: 1000 infantry and 300 cavalry). He certainly did not take the direct route across
the Syrian desert (so J. Winnicki, “Militaeroperationen von Ptolemaios I. Und Seleukos I.
In Syrien in den Jahren 312–311,” Ancient Society 20 [1989] 74–78), a difficult crossing
even when travelling at night on camels (Arr. Ind. 43.4–5), a logistical nightmare for
Seleucus’ mixed force of cavalry and infantry. Instead, Seleucus and his men likely
headed north, up the Orontes valley, before turning east to the Euphrates (Grainger
[1990] 74; Bosworth [2002] 232–33). After crossing the Euphrates, he marched into
northern Mesopotamia and convinced a group of Macedonian veterans settled at Carrhae
(modern Harran) to join his cause (Diod. 19.91.1). He then moved into his old satrapy of
Babylonia, where he enjoyed a warm reception from the local populace and received the
services of Polyarchus, the local Antigonid commander (Diod. 19.91.3). This felicitous
defection allowed him to march unimpeded to Babylon by spring 311 (Diod. 19.91.1;
App. Syr. 54). In Babylon, Seleucus besieged the Antigonid garrison that had taken
refuge in one of the city’s two citadels, and re-established control of the city and satrapy
(Diod. 19.91.3–4). Two fragmentary Babylonian historiographical chronicles allow us to
fix the date with more precision: BM 35920, l. 2 records that Seleucus arrived before the
walls of the city in the Babylonian month Nisannu (roughly April), while the well-known
“Diadoch Chronicle” (BCHP 3, rev. ll. 3–4) shows that he instituted a new dating system
based on the regnal years of Alexander IV in Simanu (roughly May; On these documents,
see below n. 7.5.1). The lapse between Seleucus’ arrival and the institution of the new
dating system seems to demonstrate that the Antigonid garrison was finally evicted after
a siege of some weeks (Boiy 2007b, 115–117 and 126–128; cf. Billows [1990] 138).
7.2.3 ἀνέβη…προσαξόµενος: Plutarch here confuses Seleucus’ great eastern anabasis of
307–303, in which he gained control of Bactria and entered into negotiations with the
Indian monarch Chandraguptra, with the events of 311 (the sources for Seleucus’ later
expedition, in which he penetrated as far as the Indus, if not beyond, are scanty in the
extreme: see App Syr. 55; for a modern account see Mehl [1986] 156–93; cf. Grainger
[1990] 100–113). At the time of Demetrius’ invasion of Babylonia in autumn 311 (on the

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date, see Boiy [2007] 127–128; n. 7.3.1), Seleucus was in Media consolidating his control
over the Iranian satrapies (Diod. 19.100.6–7). Diodorus (19.92.5) mentions that he
“easily won over Susiana, Media, and some of the adjacent lands,” most likely Aria,
Persis, and Parthia (cf. Grainger [1990] 79–81; Bosworth [2002] 238)—the fruits of his
victory over a large force led by Nicanor, the Antigonid satrap of Media. In response to
urgent dispatches from the defeated Nicanor, Antigonus sent Demetrius to recover
Babylonia (19.100.3–4). For Seleucus’ daring night attack on the camp of Nicanor, see
Diod. 19.92. 3–4; cf. Bosworth [2002] 236–37; Grainger [1990] 77–79.
7.2.4 Καύκασον: Plutarch mistakenly identifies the Paropamisus (Hindu Kush) range as
the Caucasus, a common error among historians of Alexander (e.g. Arr. Anab. 5.3.3).
7.3.1 ἐλπίζων…ἔφθη: After the conclusion of his Arabian expedition in the summer of
311, Demetrius gathered a substantial force in Damascus (15,000 infantry and 4,000
cavalry: Diod. 19.100.4) and led them into Babylonia, no doubt following a route similar
to that taken by Seleucus earlier that year (n. 7.2.1). The journey of c.800 kilometers must
have taken the better part of a month, if not more (29 days at 32 kilometers per day with 4
halts), and it was probably autumn when Demetrius arrived in Babylonia (on the date, see
Boiy [2007] 127–128). Despite the absence of Seleucus, the satrapy was not undefended.
Seleucus’ deputy Ps was charged with the defense of Babylonia, and he evacuated the
residents of Babylon after he received word of Demetrius’ approach (Diod. 19.100.5).
When Demetrius arrived in Babylon he found the city deserted but for the Seleucid
garrisons holding the citadels (n. 7.3.3). Patrocles himself adopted a delaying strategy,
refusing to join battle with the substantial force led by Demetrius. Instead he moved
about the countryside, exploiting the defensive potential of the numerous marshes, canals,
and other watercourses (Diod. 19.100.5–7; on Patrocles, see ns. 47.4.4, 47.5.1).
7.3.3 ἄκρας…κρατήσας: Diodorus (19.100.7) also speaks of the two “citadels” (τὰς
ἀκροπόλεις) of Babylon, and confirms that Demetrius “took one of these and delivered it
to his own soldiers for plundering” (ὧν τὴν ἑτέραν ἑλὼν ἔδωκε τοῖς ἰδίοις
στρατιώταις εἰς διαρπαγήν). These citadels should probably be identified with the two
royal palaces of Babylon (Boiy [2004] 74–75), known to the German excavators of the
site as the “Südburg” and “summer palace,” respectively. On the topography of
Hellenistic Babylon, see Boiy (2004) 73–98.
7.3.5 ἑπτακισχιλίους ἄνδρας: Diodorus (19.100.7) puts the force at 5,000 infantry and
1,000 cavalry. Plutarch may have arrived at the figure of 7,000 by combining two figures
he found in his source—a reference to 6,000 combined troops and a later mention of
1,000 cavalry (Sweet 178)—but, whatever the cause of the discrepant figures, the
garrison Demetrius left to hold the one citadel and continue the siege of the other proved
insufficient (n. 7.4.2).
7.4.2 ἐπανῆλθεν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν (Demetrius withdraws from Babylonia; the Peace of
311): This mirrors the account of Diodorus, according to which Antigonus imposed a
fixed time limit on the expedition, ordering Demetrius to “come down to the sea quickly”
(καταβαίνειν σθντόµως ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, Diod. 19.100.4) after securing Babylonia. After
capturing one of the two citadels (n. 7.3.4), Demetrius left his lieutenant Archelaus to
oversee the siege of the other, “since the capture required time” (ἐπειδὴ χρόνου

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προσεδεῖτο), while “he himself, the time being close at hand at which he had been
ordered to return, made the march down to the sea with the rest of his army” (αὐτὸς δέ,
τοῦ χρόνου συντρέχοντος ἐν ᾧ συντεταγµένον ἦν τὴν ἄφοδον αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι,
µετὰ τῆς λοιπῆς δυνάµεως τὴν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν κατάβασιν ἐποιεῖτο, Diod. 19.100.7).
The temporal limitations were likely due to the ongoing negotiations between
representatives of Antigonus, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy that eventually
resulted in the so-called Peace of 311 and the end of the Third Diadoch War. If
negotiations broke down and hostilities resumed while Demetrius was in Babylonia,
however, Antigonus would be forced to defend both the Hellespont and Coele Syria with
a weakened force. Thus, Demetrius’ invasion of Babylonia was intended as a lightning
raid, and he was ordered to return quickly to forestall any attempt by Ptolemy to return to
Syria (cf. Bosworth [2002] 238–39).
Late in 311, representatives of Cassander, Lysimachus, and Antigonus agreed to a
treaty that recognized the supremacy of each dynast in his own sphere of influence and
called for the freedom and autonomy of the Greek poleis. Ptolemy, realizing that he could
not hope to fight Antigonos without the aid of his former allies, sent a representative of
his own and succeeded in including himself in the general peace (OGIS 5). Diodorus
summarizes the terms: “it was provided that Cassander be strategos of Europe until the
Alexander born of Roxane comes of age; that Lysimachus be master of Thrace, and
Ptolemy of Egypt and the cities bordering on it in Libya and Arabia; that Antigonus have
command over all Asia; that the Greeks be autonomous” (ἐν δὲ ταύταις ἦν Κάσανδρον
µὲν εἶναι στρατηγὸν τῆς Εὐρώπης, µέχρι ἂν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ ἐκ Ῥωξάνης εἰς ἡλικίαν
ἔλθῃ, καὶ Λυσίµαχον µὲν τῆς Θρᾴκης κυριεύειν, Πτολεµαῖον δὲ τῆς Αἰγύπτου καὶ
τῶν συνοριζουσῶν ταύτῃ πόλεων κατά τε τὴν Λιβύην καὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν, Ἀντίγονον
δὲ ἀφηγεῖσθαι τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης, τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας αὐτονόµους εἶναι). The clause
guaranteeing the freedom of the Greeks was doubtless included at the insistence of
Antigonus, who had posed as the champion of Greek liberty since 315 (on the “Freedom
of the Greeks,” see n. 8.1.2). Seleucus was not represented at the peace talks, and the
accord that was eventually reached left him isolated (Simpson [1954] 29–31; P. Cloché,
“La Coalition de 315–11 av. J.-C,” CRAI [1957] 134–139; Billows [1990] 133 with n. 66;
Bosworth [2002] 239–44). Antigonus now had a free hand to deal with Seleucus, and in
310 he personally led a major invasion of Babylonia, the details of which are almost
entirely lost (n. 7.5.1).
In his brief account of the Peace of 311 (19.105.1–4), Diodorus links the truce,
with its recognition of the signatories as essentially sovereign rulers, to Cassander’s
subsequent elimination of Alexander’s wife Roxane and their son Alexander IV, an act
which ultimately cleared the way for the Successors to arrogate the royal title for
themselves: “For now that there was no one to take over the empire, those who ruled
peoples or cities could each entertain hopes of kingship and controlled henceforth the
territory under their power like kingdoms that had been won by the spear: (οὐκέτι γὰρ
ὄντος οὐδενὸς τοῦ διαδεξοµένου τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸ λοιπὸν ἕκαστος τῶν κρατούντων
ἐθνῶν ἢ πόλεων βασιλικὰς εἶχεν ἐλπίδας καὶ τὴν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν τεταγµένην χώραν
εἶχεν ὡσανεί τινα βασιλείαν δορίκτητον, 19.105.4; on the concept of spear-won land,
see n. 7.4.4). The famous letter Antigonus sent to the Scepsians (OGIS 5 = Austin [2006]
n. 31, pp. 57–59), no doubt one of many sent out to the Greek cities following the

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conclusion of negotiations, provides Antigonus’ perspective on the terms of the Peace
and preserves the tenor of contemporary Antigonid propaganda. In the letter, Antigonus
paints his willingness to recognize the legitimacy of his rivals in their respective realms
as a sacrifice necessary to secure the blessings of liberty for the Greek poleis (OGIS 5, ll.
10–25, 54–65; n. 8.1.2). The reality was rather more prosaic. The temporary cessation of
hostilities with Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy allowed Antigonus to focus his
military resources on an attempt to crush the emergent power of Seleucus (n. 7.5.1).
Indeed, there is ample evidence demonstrating that the treaties and alliances of the
Diadochi were purely matters of expediency, to be jettisoned or renounced the moment
any party felt that a given agreement no longer served his interests (e.g. Plut. Pyrr. 12.7;
n. 28.2.3; cf. ns. 2.2.1, 46.7.1). The Peace of 311 was no exception. According to
Diodorus, “they did not abide by these agreements but each of them, putting forward
plausible excuses, kept seeking to increase his own power” (οὐ µὴν ἐνέµεινάν γε ταῖς
ὁµολογίαις ταύταις, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος αὐτῶν προφάσεις εὐλόγους ποριζόµενος
πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπειρᾶτο, 19.105.1–2). For commentary on the terms and implications of
the treaty, see Simpson (1954); F. Landucci Gattinoni, “La pace del 311 a.C,” CISA 11
(1985) 108–18; Billows (1990) 132–36; Grainger (1990) 85–87; Lund 60–63.
7.4.4 ἐξίστασθαι γὰρ ἐδόκει τῷ κακοῦν ὡς µηκέτι προσήκουσαν αὐτοῖς (“Spear-won
land” and the propaganda of the Successors): The concept of “spear-won land”
(δορίκτητος χώρα or γῆ δορίκτητος) was central to the claims of the Diadochi to rule
over the territories they controlled, and was often invoked in self-justifying propaganda.
Ptolemy and Seleucus, for example, claimed, in correspondence with Demetrius after the
battle of Gaza, that the basis for their grievance with Antigonus was his failure to turn
over to his allies their fair share of the doriktetos chora seized in the campaigns against
Ariarathes and Eumenes (Diod. 19.85.3). In Plutarch’s view, the plundering of the
Babylonian countryside by Demetrius’ troops amounted to a tacit admission of Seleucid
suzerainty in the region, for devastating land was a renunciation of one’s claim to it as
spear-won. For another instance of this prevalent belief, see the angry refusal of Atizyes,
Achaemenid satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, to adopt the scorched earth policy
advocated by Memnon of Rhodes as a means of impeding the advance of Alexander in
334 (Arr. Anab. 1.12.9–10, cf. Bosworth [2002] 242 n. 119). On doriktetos chοra, see
esp. A. Mehl “Δορίκτητος χώρα: Kritische Bemerkungen zum ‘Speererwerb’ in Politik
und Völkerrecht der hellenistischen Epoche,” AncSoc 11/12 (1980–81) 173–212; cf.
Billows (1995) esp. 25–28.
7.5.1 Ἁλικαρνασὸν (The relief of Halicarnassus; Demtrius’ activities in the period 310–
308; Antigonus’ unsuccessful invasion of Babylonia): The short-lived Peace of 311 (n.
7.4.2) was revealed as a temporizing sham in 310/9 when Ptolemy, claiming that
Antigonus had violated the clause guaranteeing the autonomy of the Greek cities by
garrisoning some of them, sent an army under Leonides to invade Cilicia Tracheia and
appealed to Lysimachus and Cassander to resume hostilities with Antigonus (Diod.
20.10.3–4; on Leonides, see Peremans and Van’t Dack vi. no. 15053; n. 15.1.4). After
Demetrius swiftly recovered the Cilician cities (Diod. 20.19.5), Ptolemy himself sailed in
309 for Lycia and Caria, where he stormed Phaselis, Xanthus, and Caunus before moving
on to Cos. There he received, and quickly dispensed with, Demetrius’ dissident cousin
Polemaeus (Diod. 20. 27.1–3; on the executuion of Polemaeus, see n. 2.2.1). Cos

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provides an ideal platform from which to launch an attack on Halicarnassus (modern
Bodrum) in Caria, just to the northeast on the Ceramic Gulf. No other source mentions
this episode, which probably took place in 309, when Ptolemy’s presence in the area is
attested (Diod. 20.27; cf. n. 2.2.1). Unfortunately, it is impossible to reconstruct the
chronology of these years with any precision: Ptolemy may well have withdrawn to Cos
after Demetrius foiled his attempt to seize Halicarnassus (for some discussion on
Demetrius’ activities in the period 310–08, see esp. Wheatley [2001b]; cf. Billows [1990]
142–46). As so often, Plutarch has radically compressed the events of multiple years into
a single sentence, thus creating the illusion of chronological proximity between two
events—Demetrius’ return from the raid on Babylonia and the relief of Halicarnassus—
which were clearly separated by at least a year and a half. For a discussion of Plutarch’s
technique of chronological compression see C. Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his
Source-Material,” JHS 100 (1980) 125–40; cf. Wheatley [2001b], 13).
This brief mention of the rescue of Halicarnassus represents one of only two
references to Demetrius’ activities that can plausibly be attributed to the period 310–308
(three, if an obscure passage in the Suda entry for Demetrius [s.v. Demetrios Adler Δ
431] recording an otherwise unattested alliance between Demetrius and Ptolemy refers to
the terms of a truce reached at Halicarnassus, as S. Bakhuizen, Salganeus and the
Fortifications on its Mountains, [Groningen: 1970] 124–27 argues; the other is Diodorus’
brief account of Demetrius’ successful Cilician expedition). The scant notices of the
activity of the Diadochi, the Antigonids in particular, during these years may well be due
to the fact that Hieronymus was carrying out his duties as Antigonid epimeletes in Coele
Syria and was not present in person to record the actions of Antigonus or Demetrius, thus
depriving Diodorus and Plutarch of a prime source (Hornblower 12–13; Billows [1990]
131, 391; Wheatley [2001b] 9; id. [2002b] 42; n. 7.1.1). But the extremely abbreviated
accounts of Demetrius’ activities in 310–08 may simply reflect the priorities of Diodorus
and Plutarch: Diodorus’ account demonstrates a fascination with contemporary events in
the West—the historical narrative in book 20 runs to 111 chapters, of which fully 55 are
devoted to Agathocles and Sicilian affairs—and Plutarch was doubtless eager to move on
to Demetrius’ dramatic arrival in Athens in 307.
During much of this period Antigonus was engaged in a major, and ultimately
unsuccessful, invasion of Seleucid Babylonia, while Demetrius was hard-pressed to hold
his father’s Anatolian possessions in the face of the repeated depredations of Ptolemy’s
naval forces, (for the concurrent activities of Demetrius’ brother Philip and his renegade
cousin Polemaeus, see n. 2.2.1). Apart from a brief notice in Polyaenus (4.9.1),
Antigonus’ war with Seleucus is recorded only in Babylonian sources—a
historiographical text known as the “Diadoch Chronicle” (BCHP 3, rev. ll. 14–39), and
the astronomical diaries for the years 309 and 308 (BM 34093 + 35758; BM 40591,
detailed records of celestial phenomena and their correlation with contemporary events
kept by Chaldean priests (the texts are now in the British Museum). The Chronicle
records continuous maneuvering and fighting, resulting in widespread devastation in the
period 310–309. Antigonus is credited with capturing part of the city of Babylon in the
Babylonian month of Shebet (January-February 309). The war seems to have wreaked
havoc on the civilian population: the Chronicle more than once records “weeping and
mourning in the land” (BCHP 3, rev. ll. 24, 37), and the incredibly high prices charged

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for barley and dates suggest the onset of famine (BCHP 3 rev. ll. 29–30; cf. BM 40951 ll.
11–13). The last entry relevant to the war indicates a battle in the month Ab (August-
September 309; BCHP 3, rev. left edge l. 2). Polyaenus (4.9.1) records Seleucus’ use of a
time-worn stratagem to gain a victory over Antigonus, a passage which may be linked
with the battle described in the final entry of the Chronicle, but the episode cannot be
dated with any precision (Wheatley [2002] 44–45). That the war ended sometime in 309
or 308 is certain, for Antigonus was apparently coordinating affairs in Asia Minor 308
(Diod. 20.37.3–6). In the years following the failure of his Babylonian invasion,
Antigonus seems to have been content to direct the actions of Demetrius, while he busied
himself with the foundation of Antigoneia, his new capital in Syria (ns. 6.5.4, 17.2.1). On
the war in Babylonia, see Grainger [1990] 89–93; Wheatley (2002); Billows [1990, 141–
47 and 142 n. 13] rearranges the sequence of events given by Diodorus and conflates
Antigonus’ Babylonian invasion with the earlier expedition of Demetrius. On the
Diadoch Chronicle, see A.K. Grayson, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (1975); I.
Finkel and R.J. van der Spek, Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period
(forthcoming; preliminary version available online at http://www.livius.org/cg-
cm/chronicles/bchp-diadochi/diadochi_05.html; on the astronomical diaries, see M.
Geller, “Babylonian astronomical diaries and corrections of Diodorus,” Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies 53 (1990) 1–7; U. Koch-Westenholz,
Mesopotamian astrology. An introduction to Babylonian and Assyrian astrology (1995)
Copenhagen; B. van der Spek, “The Astronomical Diaries as a source for Achaemenid
and Seleucid History,” Bibliotheca Orientalis 50 (1993) 91–101; id., “New Evidence
from the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries concerning Seleucid and Arsacid history,”
Archiv für Orientforschung 44/45 (1997/1998) 167–175.
VIII
8.1.2 ἐλευθεροῦν τὴν Ἑλλάδα (The Antigonids and the “Freedom of the Greeks”): The
freedom of the Greeks of Asia did not constitute an important component of the self-
justificatory rhetoric of Alexander, who preferred to depict his Asian expedition as a
campaign of retribution for the Persian invasions of Greece (Diod. 17.4.9; Arr. Anab.
2.14.4, 3.18.2; E. Badian “Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia,” in Collected
Papers on Alexander the Great (New York: 2012) 124–52; for the only instance of
Alexander asserting the freedom of the Greeks as a motivation for the campaign, see
Diod. 17. 24.1; cf. R. Seager, “The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: from Alexander to
Antiochus,” CQ 31 (1981) 106–112). After the Lamian War, the former regent Antipater
opted to intervene more directly in the internal affairs of the mainland cities than had
Philip or Alexander by installing garrisons and pro-Macedonian oligarchies or tyrannies.
While the monarchical aspirations of the Diadochi were fundamentally incompatible with
the freedom and autonomy of the Greek poleis—a thorny and abiding problem that
proved ultimately insoluble for the whole existence of the great Hellenistic monarchies—
the “freedom of the Greeks” nevertheless emerged as a familiar refrain in the rhetorical
arsenals of the Successors (Dixon [2007]; ib. [2014] 50–67; Wallace [2011] 157–60;
Dmitriev [2011] 112–34 and 139–41; Poddighe 236–38; Meeus [2014] 284–86).
The first step toward a repudiation of the policy of Antipater was taken by his
successor as regent Polyperchon, who, in a bid to win the goodwill of the cities and
secure their cooperation in his bitter struggle with Cassander, issued a royal diagramma

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in the name of Philip III in 319 that called for a restoration of “the peace and the
constitutions” (τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς πολιτείας) established by Philip and Alexander, but
stopped short of proclaiming the freedom and autonomy of the cities (Diod. 18.56.1–8;
Diodorus preserves the diagramma verbatim, perhaps having gleaned it from
Hieronymus; on the document, see esp. Poddighe; cf. K. Rosen, “Political Documents in
Hieronymus of Cardia [323–302 BC],” Acta Classica 10 [1967] 65–71; on Polyperchon,
see n. 9.5.1). Antigonus, however, recognized both the extraordinary propaganda value of
posing as the champion of Greek freedom and the vital necessity of securing the goodwill
and cooperation of the Greek poleis—the cities were not only potential bases for action
against rivals, they were crucial for trade and the recruitment of mercenaries and skilled
labor—and at a general meeting of his soldiers and supporters at Tyre in 315, after
fulminating against Antipater’s son Cassander and staking his own claim as the legitimate
regent, he decreed that all the Greek cities be free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned, and
promptly dispatched messengers to spread the word far and wide (Diod. 19.61.1–3; on
the importance of the Greek poleis to the Successors, see Rostovtzeff i. 525; cf. Simpson
[1959] 387; Green [1990] 25; on Antigonus’ proclamation at Tyre, see Simpson [1959]
389–90; Wehrli 104–105; Billows [1990] 113–116; on Cassander see below n. 8.1.3).
The overwhelmingly positive response of the Greek beneficiaries of this policy is evident
in a letter Antigonus wrote to the citizens of Scepsis in the Troad and a decree they
passed in response (letter and decree [OGIS 5 and 6] were inscribed on two stelai which
have since been lost; for a translation of both documents, see Austin [2006] nos. 38–39,
pp. 85–88). Antigonus’ letter neatly preserves the tenor of his propaganda at the time: he
asserts his continuing commitment to Greek freedom and takes credit for the clause in the
Peace of 311 guaranteeing the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities (n. 7.4.2; cf. n.
2.2.1, 9.2.6). Whether Antigonus’ proclamation was purely a calculated nod to political
expediency or was in some measure motivated by a sincere commitment to Greek
freedom is debatable, but it was a propaganda masterstroke sure to be met with
enthusiasm in the Greek cities of the mainland for whom autonomy was nothing less than
a defining principle, and sure to be a source of acute embarrassment for Antigonus’
rivals, particularly Cassander, whose garrisons in mainland Greece trampled that
autonomy (Simpson [1959] 390; Green [1990] 26; Austin [2006] 29; on these garrisons
see below n. 8.1.3). It should also be noted that both Antigonus and Demetrius continued
to support the cause of Greek autonomy with consistency until Antigonus’ death in 301,
even as they pursued their ultimate goal of consolidating their own power (Green [1990]
26).
8.1.3 Κασσάνδρου: The son of Antipater, Cassander was born c. 355. He seems to have
remained in Macedonia with his father when Alexander departed for Asia in 334. The
rumors that made Cassander a conspirator in a plot to murder Alexander are the product
of hostile propaganda, but the two were evidently not on good terms, and Plutarch
suggests that Cassander remained terrified of the king long after his death (Alex. 72.4–6).
After the death of his father, Cassander secured alliances with Ptolmey and Antigonus in
support of his bid to supplant Polyperchon (n. 9.5.1) as guardian of the kings (Diod.
18.49.3, 18.54.3). He moved into southern and central Greece, gaining control over many
Greek cities, including Athens, where he installed the philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum
(n. 8.4.3) as his puppet ruler in 317 (Diod. 18.74.2–3). That same year he invaded
Macedonia, outmanuevred Polyperchon, and besieged Olympias in Pydna (n. 22.2.3). In

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316 Olympias was forced to surrender, and Cassander gained control over the wife and
young son of Alexander, married the dead king’s sister Thessalonice (36.1.4), and
refounded Thebes, which Alexander had destroyed (n. 40.6.3). On Cassander, see
Stählein, RE s.v. “Cassander (2)”; Berve ii. 201–202 no. 414; Landucci-Gattinoni [2003];
Heckel [2006] 79–81).
πᾶσαν…καταδεδουλωµένην (Ptolemy’s Greek campaign of 308; Macedonian garrisons
in Greece): Immediately after Antigonus’ proclamation at Tyre, Ptolemy too had
professed his support for the freedom of the Greeks, in a manifesto of his own (Diod.
19.62.1). He demonstrated this commitment in a campaign of liberation of Greece in 308,
driving out the garrison on Andros (installed by Polemaeus after his defection from
Antigonus, see above n. 2.2.1) before moving on to the Peloponnese, where he freed
Sicyon and Corinth from the rule of Cratesipolis (see below 9.5.2) and “planned to free
the other Greek cities, thinking that the goodwill of the Greeks would be a great gain for
him in his own undertakings” (Diod. 20.37.1–2). Ptolemy’s bid to assume the mantle of
champion of Greek freedom soon collapsed when the Peloponnesians failed to fulfill their
pledge to contribute food and money, and he responded by making peace with Cassander
and imposing garrisons in Sicyon and Corinth before returning to Egypt (Diod. 20.37.3;
cf. Suda s.v. Δηµήτριος, Adler Δ 431). No doubt Antigonus’ retreat from Babylonia and
reappearance in Syria provided Ptolemy with additional incentive to secure his Egyptian
power center (Wheatley [2002] 46). Despite the setback, Ptolemy did not abandon his
territorial ambitions in Greece: his attempt to prevent Demetrius’ seizure of Athens in
295 was a failure (33.7–8), but he operated with considerable success in the Aegean
beginning in 287 (ns. 44.3.2, 46.2.1; on Ptolemy’s Greek campaign of 308 and the extent
of his ambitions see now Hauben [2014] and Meeus [2014]).
At the time of Demetrius’ first Greek expedition (308/7), Cassander maintained
garrisons in a number of cities in central and southern Greece including Elateia, Athens,
Megara, and Argos (ns. 23.2–6). When Demetrius arrived in Athens in 307, the garrisons
holding Sicyon and Corinth represented the entirety of the Ptolemaic presence on the
Greek peninsula, and by the time of his return in 304 Cassander had gained control of
Corinth (n. 23.1.1).
8.3.1 ὡς δὲ πρῶτον…πράξεις: cf. Plut. Mor. 182 E-F where Antigonus tells Demetrius
that the glory won by the liberation of Greece (not merely Athens) “would spread from
Greece as from a lofty height like beacon fires throughout the world” (ὥσπερ ἀπὸ
σκοπῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς τὴν οἰκουµένην πυρσεύεσθαι).
8.4.1 ἀργυρίου πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα: The talent was a unit of 6,000 drachmas,
amounting to a little over 57 pounds (just under 26 kilograms) of precious metal on the
Attic scale. The variability of wages and prices in antiquity complicates our
understanding of the value of ancient money, but a single talent was sufficient to pay the
monthly wages of the two hundred crew of a trireme in the late-fifth century, and equaled
twenty years worth of wages for a skilled laborer making a drachma a day for three
hundred days a year (on ancient weights and measures see, e.g., T. Martin “Appendix
One: Units of Distance, Currency, and Capacity in Xenephon’s Hellenika” in The
Landmark Xenophon, Pantheon: New York [2009] 369–378). The 5,000 talents
Antigonus allotted Demetrius for his campaign of Greek liberation thus represented a vast

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sum, indicative both of the extraordinary wealth amassed by Antigonus (a war chest of
35,000 talents with annual revenues of 11,000 talents; Diod. 19.48.7–8; 56.4–5) and the
rapid inflation that followed in the wake of Alexander’s release of the truly enormous
reserves of the Achaemenids (some 170,000–190,000 talents by ancient estimates) onto
the market (Diod. 17.64.3, 66.1, 71.1, 80.3; Just. 11.14.9–10, 12.1.3; Strabo 15.3.1; cf.
Green [1990] 366; F. Holt “Money and Finance in the Campaign’s of Alexander,” in The
Landmark Arrian, Pantheon: New York (2011) 358–60).
8.4.2 στόλον νεῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίων: Diodorus (20.45.1) merely notes that
Demetrius had a “strong force by land and sea” (δύναµιν ἁδρὰν πεζικήν τε καὶ
ναυτικήν), and a well equipped siege train.
8.4.3 τὸν Φαληρέα: The son of Phanostratus, Demetrius of Phalerum (born c. 350) was a
Peripatetic philosopher, an accomplished scholar, and a statesman. After studying under
Theophrastus, he entered political life by 325/24, when he is mentioned in connection
with the arrival of Harpalus, the former treasurer of Alexander turned fugitive, in Athens
(Diog. Laert. 5.75). In 322, he was among the ambassadors sent to negotiate terms with
the Macedonians after the defeat of Athens in the Lamian War (Psuedo-Demetr. Eloc.
289), though it is uncertain if he was included for his pro-Macedonian tendencies or his
renown as a philosopher and rhetorician (for discussion and further bibliography see
O’Sullivan [2009a] 24–25). He remained loyal to Cassander when Alexander, the son of
Polyperchon laid siege to Athens in 318, an act which was rewarded the following year
when Cassander recovered Athens and named Demetrius as his “overseer of the city”
(ἐπιµελητὴν τῆς πόλεως, Diod. 18. 74.3). Demetrius’ ten-year reign in Athens was
marked by relative peace and prosperity, and, if the 300 statues with which he was
honored in the city are any indication, he was the focus of a personality cult (all but one
were melted down after his departure from Athens in 307, Nepos Miltiades 6.2–4; Pliny
HN 34.12.27; Plut. Mor. 820E; IG II2 2971; Parker [1996] 258). His legislative platform
included sumptuary laws and legislation limiting military and other types of state service,
and he oversaw the reshaping of the bureaucratic functions of Athenian democracy along
oligarchic lines. As eponymous archon in 308, he organized the spring festival of the
Dionysia in magnificent fashion. Poems recited in his honor hailed Demetrius as
heliomorphos “sunlike” (Duris of Samos ap. Athen. 12.542E = BNJ 76 F10), a signal
honor that anticipated those later heaped on Demetrius Poliorcetes (ns. 10.3.1–11.1.7,
12.1.2–12.3.5., 13.1.1–13.3.2). Recent scholarship has focused on the relative influence
of Demetrius’ Peripatetic ideas and political expediency on his legislative program. For
the surviving fragments of Demetrius, see Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf; on Demetrius
see E. Bayer Demetrius Phalereus der Athener. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft (1941); H. Gehrke “Das Verhāltnis von Politik und Philosophie im
Wirken des Demetrius von Phalerum.” Chiron 8 (1978): 149–93; Habicht [1997] esp. 53–
66; Paschidis [2008] esp. 58–65; O’Sullivan (2009a).
8.4.4 Μουνυχίᾳ: A steep hill in Piraeus initially fortified by the tyrant Hippias in the last
quarter of the 6th century (Arist. Ath. Pol. 19.2). Antipater installed a Macedonian
garrison on Munychia hill in 322, after the defeat of Athens in the Lamian War (Phoc.
28.1). Cassander sent his agents to seize control of the garrison immediately after the
death of his father in 319 (Phoc. 31.1–3). Munychia hill overlooked the naval stations in

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Zea and Munychia harbors and commanded the seaward approaches to all three Piraeus
harbors, making the fortress on its peak the ideal command post for the surveillance of all
sea traffic approaching Piraeus from both Sunium, at the southern tip of the Attic
peninsula, and the Cyclades (Blackman, Rankov, et al. 201; on Piraeus and its harbors
see below ns. 8.5.2, 8.6.1).
8.5.1 εὐτυχίᾳ…Θαργηλιῶνος: Thargelion was the penultimate month of the Athenian
year and 26 Thargelion accords with early June, 307. The date is significant. On the day
before Demetrius’ arrival the Athenians had begun the celebration of the Plynteria, a
festival in honor of Athena Polias and the heroine Aglaurus. During the festival the
temple of Athena was closed and the garments and adornments of her cult statue were
removed and ritually cleaned. Since Athens was, in a sense, deprived of her protecting
deity, 25 Thargelion was regarded as especially infelicitous and no business was
conducted in the city (Plut. Alc. 34.2.1–2; Pollux 8.141; Mikalson [1975] 160–61; Parke
152–55; Burkert 79; Parker [1996] 307–08; id. [2011] 185–86; on the festival see esp.
Sourvinou-Inwood 135–220). Plutarch’s readers were familiar with his memorable
account of Alcibiades’ triumphant return to Athens on 25 Thargelion 408/7, exactly one
hundred years and one day before that of Demetrius. According to Plutarch, many
Athenians viewed the timing of Alcibiades’ return (ὁ τῆς καθόδου καιρός, Alc. 34.1.2)
as an ill omen anticipating his imminent fall from grace. He notes that “the goddess,
therefore, did not appear to welcome Alcibiades with favor and good will, but rather to
veil herself from him and repel him” (οὐ φιλοφρόνως οὖν οὐδ' εὐµενῶς ἐδόκει
προσδεχοµένη τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἡ θεὸς παρακαλύπτεσθαι καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἑαυτῆς; Alc.
34.2.2–4; Xenophon [Hell. 1.4.12] also records that Alcibiades arrived in Athens on the
inauspicious day of the Plynteria). Demetrius, on the other hand, arrived on the notably
auspicious second day of the festival when the cult statue of the goddess was carried in
procession to Phalerum to be ritually washed in the sea (on the second day of the festival
see Sourvinou-Inwood 160–76; Hesychius s.v. ἡγηταρία; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 64;
IG II2 1011.11). The goddess was subsequently reinstalled, cleansed and re-robed, in her
temple. The timing was exquisite. Demetrius arrived to topple the hated regime of
Demetrius of Phalerum amid the sense of purification and renewal, of a bright new start,
that accompanied the completion of the Plynteria (on the joyful aftermath of the Plynteria
see Parker [2011] 186, 197; Sourvinou-Inwood 176). Just as some Athenians observed
that the goddess had not welcomed Alcibiades, it will not have escaped notice that she
quite literally went down to the sea to greet Demetrius as his fleet sailed directly past
Phalerum on the way to Piraeus. The auspicious day of Demetrius’ arrival may well have
contributed to the extraordinary enthusiasm with which he was received by the
Athenians, who subsequently bestowed a series of unprecedented honors on their
liberator (ns. 10.3.1–11.1.7, 12.1.2–12.3.5, 13.1.1–13.3.2).
8.5.2 τῷ Πειραιεῖ: Piraeus, the naval and commercial port of Athens, occupies a
peninsula c. 7 km. southwest of the metropolis. The three fortified harbors of Piraeus,
Cantharus on the northwest of the peninsula, and Zea and Munychia on the eastern side,
are linked by a series of broad avenues in the port city’s Hippodamian plan. Cantharus,
by far the largest of the harbors, served as the principal commercial harbor, while Zea
and the smaller Munychia served primarily as naval bases, though all three featured the
shipshed complexes that housed the Athenian fleet (on the shipsheds, see Lovén and

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Schaldemose passim; Blackman, Rankov, et al. 420–488). All of the harbors were
included within the Piraeus fortification circuit, and each could be closed by the erection
of various sorts of physical barriers (kleithra) across the harbor mouth (on these barriers,
ranging from chains strung between towers or buoys to floating barriers created by
yoking warships or smaller vessels together, see Murray 135–36, 140–41; Blackman,
Rankov, et al. 220). None of the various accounts of Demetrius’ attack on Piraeus
identifies which of the three harbors he initially targeted (but see n. 8.6.1).
8.5.3 προαισθοµένου µὲν οὐδενός…  παρασκευαζοµένων: It is unclear why Demetrius
of Phalerum and the Athenians would be willing to receive a Ptolemaic fleet in Piraeus.
Ptolemy had professed his commitment to expelling Cassander’s garrisons from Greece
as recently as the previous year (Diod. 20.37.1–2; see above n. 8.1.3), and, although the
two had subsequently reached a peace confirming the territorial status quo, their
agreement would hardly warrant the reception of Ptolemaic warships in the harbor of
Cassander’s most important Greek possession (Paschidis [2008] 62–63; cf. Fortenbaugh
and Schütrumpf 71 n. 2 where it is claimed that the agreement between Ptolemy and
Cassander meant that a Ptolemaic fleet “would have belonged to allies of the
Athenians”). If Plutarch’s account is accurate, this episode may well be evidence that
Demetrius of Phalerum had independently entered into negotiations with Ptolemy as a
hedge against Athenian discontent with his patron Cassander (Paschidis [2008] 62–63).
8.5.5 ὀψὲ…  ἀµύνεσθαι: Plutarch, Diodorus, and Polyaenus give variant accounts of the
seizure of Piraeus that are difficult to harmonize, but it seems clear that Plutarch has
minimized the military nature of what was a complex amphibious operation. Polyaenus
(4.7.6) also describes the confusion in Piraeus as Demetrius’ fleet approached. He records
a stratagem in which Demetrius concealed most of his fleet off Cape Sunium, while his
twenty swiftest ships sailed towards Salamis in the Saronic Gulf. Demetrius of Phalerum,
catching sight of the ships from the Athenian acropolis, assumed they were a Ptolemaic
detachment headed for Corinth (a Ptolemaic garrison held Corinth, see above n. 8.1.3),
and when Demetrius’ ships turned suddenly towards Piraeus, they took the defenders
completely by surprise and sailed into an unspecified harbor before the fortifications
could be manned and the protective kleithron could be raised (on the harbors of Piraeus
and their defenses see ns. 8.5.2; 8.6.1). While this initial attack was taking place the rest
of the fleet sailed down from Sunium in great numbers and “seized the fortifications and
the harbor” (κατελάβοντο τοὺς πύργους καὶ τὸν λιµένα; Poly. 4.7.6.13). Diodorus’
account (20.45.1–5) of the episode also suggests that Demetrius’ assault on Piraeus met
with far greater resistance than Plutarch would have us believe. He makes no mention of
Demetrius of Phalerum’s difficulty in establishing the allegiance of the approaching fleet,
but describes an all out assault from multiple directions in which a detachment of
Poliorcetes’ men breached the fortifications at some point along the southern coast of
Piraeus (the men who initially stormed the fortifications attacked κατὰ τὴν ἀκτὴν
[20.45.3]: Acte is the name of the southern promontory of Piraeus). These troops then
admitted their fellows and forced Dionysius, the commander of Cassander’s garrison, to
withdraw with his troops to the citadel on Munychia hill.
8.6.1 τοῖς…σιωπῆς: The various accounts suggest that Demetrius’ fleet, or at least the
advance squadron that he personally commanded, made their initial assault on Zea

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harbor. The Hippodamian agora of Piraeus was probably situated immediately to the
north of Zea, making the harbor an ideal site for Demetrius’ heralds to address the troops
mustering to contest the attack (on the location of the agora and its use as a mustering
space, see Blackman, Rankov, et al. 197–99). Prioritizing the capture of Zea was also a
tactically sound decision. Like the other Piraeus harbors, Zea was situated within the port
city’s fortification circuit, and ships were forced to pass through a fortified sea-gate
consisting of maritime towers to enter the harbor. But the approach to Zea was rendered
especially daunting by the construction of artificial moles that forced ships to negotiate
several turns in a narrow sea corridor lined on both sides by walls and towers. When
these defenses were properly manned they created a formidable and extended gauntlet
which hostile forces would have to run while exposed to artillery fire in order to gain
access to the harbor (on the Zea defenses, see Lovén and Schaldemose). Demetrius’
surprise attack was a brilliant success: not only did he gain access to Zea before the
harbor’s defenses could be fully arrayed against him, he then minimized further
resistance by winning over the majority of the Athenian defenders with his public
promise to restore the city’s freedom after fifteen years of occupation (n. 8.7.2; Antipater
installed the Munychia garrison in 322, n. 8.4.4).
8.7.2 ὅτι…πολιτείαν: The democratic constitution that had been abolished in 317 when
Cassander installed Demetrius of Phalerum as epimeletes was restored (Diodorus
[20.45.5] confirms the restoration; for Demetrius’ restoration of the Theban politeia, see
below n. 46.1.2). Some of the legislation introduced by Demetrius of Phalerum that was
incompatible with the restored democracy, including his new census classes, was
revoked, while his sumptuary laws were retained (Habicht [1997] 67). The process of
regime change was largely bloodless as the Phalerean and his key associates opted for
exile and, although some of his lower-level supporters who stayed in Athens were
brought up on charges, all were eventually acquitted (FGrH 228 F 52–57; cf. Habicht
[1997] 67–68; O’Sullivan [2009a] 297).
IX
9.1.1 οἱ µὲν πολλοὶ…εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα προσαγορεύοντες: The spontaneous
acclamation of Demetrius as soter (“savior”) and euergetes (“benefactor”) by the
Athenian masses is crucial to assessing the subsequent decrees that awarded divine
honors to Demetrius and Antigonus (ns. 10.3.1–11.1.7, 12.1.2–12.3.5, 13.1.1–13.3.2).
Indeed, to dismiss the divine honors as merely carefully calibrated acts of sycophancy
ignores the fact that they must have enjoyed widespread popular support. The epithets
soter and euergetes were later both commonly attributed to Hellenistic monarchs in
recognition of their benefactions and achievements. The kings, like the gods, were
honored for the protection they granted, and the epithet soter was attributed to a number
of gods, Zeus in particular (Chaniotis [2011] 433). Note Plutarch’s censure of Demetrius
(n. 42.10.3) for reveling in the epithet Poliorcetes, rather than patterning himself after
Zeus Polieus or Poliouchos (“protector of the city”).
9.2.6 τὸν Μιλήσιον Ἀριστόδηµον: the son of Parthenius and a trusted friend and adviser
of Antigonus who carried out a variety of diplomatic and military missions for that
dynast. In 315 he was sent to the Peloponnese with 1,000 talents and instructions to
undermine the influence of Cassander in southern Greece and pursue Antigonus’ policy

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of bringing freedom and autonomy to the Greek poleis (Diod. 19.57.5; n. 8.1.2).
Aristodemus executed this mission with considerable success, enlisting Polyperchon as
Antigonus’ general of the Peloponnese and enrolling 8,000 mercenaries, no doubt from
the great mercenary depot at Taenarum in Laconia (Diod. 19.60.1; cf. Billows [1990]
372; on Taenarum as a rallying point for mercenaries, see Griffith 159–60). Later he
played an important role in the negotiations that led to the Peace of 311 (OGIS, no.5, line
49; n. 7.4.2) and secured the withdrawal of Demetrius of Phalerum after the liberation of
Athens in 307 (a service for which he was honored by the Athenian people; IG II2 459).
Plutarch’s contemptuous dismissal of this accomplished diplomat as a mere flatterer is
wholly undeserved (17.2.1–3). Elsewhere (Mor. 182D) Plutarch recounts an anecdote in
which Aristodemus offers financial advice to Antigonus. On Aristodemus, see esp.
Billows [1990] 371–373; ns. 16.7; 17.2.2.
9.3.3 εἰς Θήβας αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἐβούλετο µετ' ἀσφαλείας συνεξέπεµψεν: Diodorus
confirms that Demetrius of Phalerum first sought refuge in Thebes before making his
way to the court of Ptolemy in Alexandria (20.45.4). For a time, he enjoyed the status of
favored advisor, and one tradition credits him with a pivotal role in the foundation of the
Library at Alexandria (Demetrius of Phalerum FGrH 228 F 58). He foolishly supported
Ptolemy Ceraunus’ unsuccessful bid for the throne of Egypt, and was banished (Diog.
Laert. 5.78) or executed (Cic. Pro Rab. Post. 9.23) after the ascension of Ptolemy
Philadelphus.
9.4.4 Μεγάροις ἐπέπλευσεν: According to Diodorus, Demetrius sailed for Megara only
after capturing Munychia, razing its fortress, and coming to terms with the Athenians
(20.45.5–46.3). Some scholars (e.g. Billows [1990] 149 n. 27, followed by Murray 104 n.
73) prefer the order of events in Diodorus, but Plutarch’s knowledge of the exact day of
Demetrius’ arrival in Piraeus (see above n. 8.5.1) demonstrates that he is working from a
source intimately familiar with the chronology of this campaign, and his testimony
should be preferred to that of Diodorus, who seems to have described the capture of
Piraeus and the siege of Munychia consecutively in the interest of narrative economy (on
Plutarch’s use of Athenian sources for events in Athens, see Intro. 40–43). Plutarch’s
chronology is corroborated by two independent sources: the Marmor Parium (FGrH 239
b 20–21) places the capture of Piraeus and departure of Demetrius of Phalerum in 308/07
and the razing of Munychia in 307/306; the Atthidographer Philochorus (FGrH 328 F
66), who was probably in Athens at the time, places the capture of the Munychia fortress
after the liberation of Megara in the first days of the archonship of Anixicrates (307/6; on
the siege of Megara see below n. 9.8.1; on Philochorus, see Intro. 48–49).
9.5.1 Πολυπέρχοντος: A Macedonian from Tymphaea, Polyperchon commanded an
infantry taxis at Gaugamela (Arr. Anab. 3.11.9; Heckel 226) and was subsequently tasked
with defending Bactria from rebel incursions. He worked closely with Craterus in the
Indian campaign (Arr. Anab. 4.23–27), and emerged as the right hand of the great
marshal in subsequent years. When Alexander sent Craterus at the head of 10,000
discharged veterans to replace Antipater as Macedonian regent, Polyperchon
accompanied him as second in command (Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; this force had advanced
only as far as Cilicia when Alexander died). After the death of Alexander, Craterus and
Polyperchon led this veteran force to Europe, where they contributed to the defeat of the
rebellious Greeks at Crannon (n. 10.2.3) and then invaded Aetolia (ns. 14.2.6, 41.2.1).

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When Craterus and Antipater departed once again for Asia, Polyperchon was left in
control of Macedonia (Just. 13.6.9). His position was confirmed by the dying Antipater,
who bypassed his own son, Cassander, and named Polyperchon guardian of the kings
Alexander IV and Philip Arrhidaeus (Diod. 18.47.4). This did not sit well with
Cassander, who formed alliances with in the hope of displacing Polyperchon and
assuming the royal guardianship for himself (n. 8.1.3). Polyperchon sought to rally
support in the Greek poleis by issuing the famous royal diagramma in the name of Philip
Arrhidaeus (n. 8.1.2), but was soon displaced in Macedonia by Cassander (n. 8.1.3).
Polyperchon played only a minor role in subsequent events, and his activities were
largely confined to the Peloponnesus until 309. In that year Polyperchon mounted a last
bid for power, pinning his hopes on Heracles, the illegitimate son of Alexander. He
invaded Macedonia at the head of a substantial army, but was persuaded to murder
Heracles and accept a position subordinate to Cassander in the Peloponnesus (Diod.
20.28.1–5). On the career of Polyperchon, see Berve ii. 325–26 no. 654; Lenschau, RE
s.v. Polyperchon (1); Heckel (2006) 226–31; Paschidis (2009); E. Carney, “Successful
Mediocrity: The Career of Polyperchon,” Syllecta Classica 25 (2014) 1–31.
9.5.2 Κρατησίπολιν: Cratesipolis was the widow of Polyperchon’s son Alexander, who
was murdered by a treacherous citizen of Sicyon (Diod. 19.67.1) in 314. Plutarch has
reduced her to a lovely non-entity notable only for her beauty, but Cratesipolis did not
retain control of Sicyon and Corinth, cities with large and restive populations, for more
than five years on the strength of her looks. Her reputation for sagacity and kindness
allowed Cratesipolis to rally Alexander’s mercenary army and crush a Sicyonian
liberation movement that sprang up in the wake of her husband’s murder (Diod. 19.67.1–
2). After ruthlessly re-establishing control of Sicyon, she governed it, along with Corinth,
until 308, when Ptolemy gained control of both cities (Diod. 20.37.1; see above, n. 8.1.3).
Polyaenus (8.58) preserves a different tradition in which Cratesipolis arranges for
Ptolemy to seize Acrocorinth by convincing her mercenaries that Ptolemy’s troops are in
fact allied reinforcements arriving from Sicyon. Macurdy (106) suggests that Cratesipolis
cooperated with Ptolemy in the hope that he might marry her, but, if so, her efforts came
to naught. On Cratesipolis, see Macurdy 106, 233; Carney (2000) 229; Wheatley (2004);
n. 9.5.2).
ἐν Πάτραις…αὐτόν: This episode is recorded only here, and although most
commentators have accepted it at face value, the meeting, if historical, certainly did not
take place in Patrae (see, e.g. Beloch [1925] 444; Manni [1951] 19; Andrei 141; Santi
Amantini 332; cf. Wheatley [2004] for skeptical analysis, and further bibliography).
Plutarch’s source for the episode is clearly hostile to Demetrius, and the elusive Duris of
Samos has often been suggested (Sweet 44; Kebrick 57–58; Hornblower 225–26;
Wheatley [2004] 3; on Duris, see Intro. 49–52). Patrae, a city in western Achaea on the
Corinthian Gulf, was separated from Megara by some 150 kilometers of territory
occupied by hostile forces. The suggestion that Demetrius traversed that distance,
accompanied by only a small, light-armed force, to frolic with Cratesipolis while his
troops were engaged in simultaneous sieges of Muncyhia and Megara is implausible, to
say the least (Wheatley [2004] 1–2). Plutarch’s account is credible if we accept the
emendation of Πάτραις to Παγαῖς, first proposed by Johann Kaltwasser in an early
German translation of the Lives (Vitae parallelae. Vergleichende Lebensbeschreibungen,

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10 Bände, [Magdeburg: 1799–1806])  and noted in the critical apparatus of the latest
Teubner and Budé editions; Wheatley [2004] 3–4 convincingly defends the emendation).
Pagae, one of Megara’s western ports on the Gulf of Corinth, is but 15 kilometers
northwest of Megara (on the Megarid, see n. 9.8.1), and thus readily accessible from the
city. Pagae also makes a plausible residence for Cratesipolis given her long association
with nearby Corinth and Sicyon (see above n. 9.5.2). It is also possible that Plutarch has
achronically inserted the episode in the context of the siege of Megara in support of his
fundamental contentions, expressed in the prologue, that Demetrius, like Antony, was
notable both for his virtues and his vices, and his successes were invariably followed by
setbacks (1.8; cf. Wheatley [2004] 4). Thus, the glorious liberation of Athens and Megara
are undermined by a personal failing, in this case lust, even before they are completed
(see below n. 9.7.1).
Demetrius and Cratesipolis may well have arranged to meet at some point for
reasons personal, political, or both (cf. Macurdy 106), and Demetrius passed through the
Megarid on a number of occasions after 307 (Wheatley ([2004] 6–8). But the narrow
escape described by Plutarch only fits comfortably in the historical context of Demetrius’
campaigns of 307 and 303—after the success of the latter campaign Demetrius seems to
have controlled the Megarid firmly (ns. 30.4.5, 31.2.5). Cratesipolis is not attested in the
sources after this point.
9.7.1 ὁ δὲ φοβηθεὶς…ἁλῶναι: Note the richly ironical juxtaposition of the shabby cloak
Demetrius dons to make good his escape from the ill-advised assignation with
Cratesipolis and the Athenian decision to weave his image into the sacred peplos of the
virgin goddess Athena in the following chapter (n. 10.5.1). The episode also anticipates
Demetrius’ final retreat from Macedon, when, “as if he were not a king but an actor”
(ὥσπερ οὐ βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ὑποκριτής, 44.9) he exchanges his flamboyant royal robes
for a simple dark cloak and steals away. An important component of the tragic tenor of
the Life is Plutarch’s preoccupation with Demetrius’ clothing, which may reflect the
influence of Duris of Samos (cf. ns. 41.6.2, 44.9.3, and see Intro. 49–52). Also notable
here is the attribution of Demetrius’ foolish decision to akrasia (ἐξ ἀκρασίας), a vice that
is identified as the common failing of Demetrius and Antony in the concluding synkrisis
(Comp. 4.6; cf. Intro. 13).
9.8.1 Μεγάρων…ἠλευθέρωσε τὴν πόλιν (The liberation of Megara): A small state
whose territory was confined to the eastern part of the Isthmus that links the Peloponnese
with central Greece, Megara could not compete with her immediate neighbors—Athens,
Boeotia, and Corinth—in terms of terms of population or arable land (Legon 24; Smith
5–7). The city’s position on the Isthmus and harbors on both the Saronic Gulf and the
Gulf of Corinth gave it a strategic importance mirroring that of Corinth and account for
its attractiveness to Demetrius, whose military strength at the time was primarily naval
(cf. n. 25.1.5).
Since Demetrius arrived in Piraeus late in Thargelion (8.5.1) and surrounded
Munychia hill with a trench and palisade before departing for Megara (9.4.3–4), he must
have sailed into Nisaea, the Megarian harbor on the Saronic Gulf, at some point in
Skirophorion (June/July), the final month of the Athenian archon year 308/7. Our sources
preserve no details of the assault, but the Antipatrid garrison occupying the Megarid was

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probably insufficient to effectively man the long walls linking Nisaea to Megara, and
Demetrius was able to storm the city (Diod. 20.46.3) after a siege lasting no more than a
few weeks at most (the city fell in the last days of 308/7 or the opening days of 307/6, see
above n. 9.4.4; the Megarian Long Walls, razed during the Peloponnesian War, were
rebuilt in the 340s [Plut. Phoc. 15.2], and survived well into the Hellenistic period [Legon
188]).
The unidentified Athenians who interceded with Demetrius on behalf of the
Megarians may well have been volunteers who joined with Demetrius after the liberation
of Athens. Despite their efforts, it seems that Demetrius’ soldiers engaged in at least
some plundering after the city was stormed (see below n. 9.10.4).
9.9.1 τοῦ φιλοσόφου Στίλπωνος: The head of the so-called Megarian School, Stilpo
(c.380–370–c.290–280) counted Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, and Menedemus, the
founder of the Eretrian School among his many pupils. He purportedly authored over
twenty dialogues, nine of which were extant when Diogenes Laertius made Stilpo the
subject of a biography (2.113–120). In metaphysics, Stilpo rejected all distinctions
between the universal and individual, but his teaching was largely devoted to ethical
concerns, and he was renowned for overcoming his natural appetites for wine and women
by sheer force of will (Cic. De fato 10). Small wonder then that Plutarch makes no
mention of the tradition, recorded by Diogenes Laertius (2.115), that Stilpo spoke with
Demetrius on the subject of euergesia with such power that the Besieger became a
follower of the philosopher (Καὶ αὐτῷ διαλεχθεὶς περὶ ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίας οὕτως
εἷλεν ὥστε προσέχειν αὐτῷ), for central to Plutarch’s characterization of Demetrius is
the contention that he rejected the counsel of the wise, but fell prey to the seductive
blandishments of flatterers (on the role of flatterers in the Life, see Intro. 36–39).
Wheatley ([2004] 2) suggests that Plutarch juxtaposed Cratesipolis and Stilpo to make a
moral point: “Demetrius’ possessions are material, and subject to plunder, while the
philosopher’s knowledge is abstract, and cannot be violated.” This is doubtless true, but
Plutarch’s didactic program goes further. The juxtaposition of the Cratesipolis and Stilpo
episodes allows Plutarch to contrast implicitly the reckless behavior of Demetrius with
the proverbial self-control of the philosopher. There is also an analogue in the Life of
Alexander. Ancient purveyors of anecdotal material relished purported meetings between
philosophers and conquerors, and there is a strong resonant symmetry between this
episode and the most famous example of the motif, Alexander’s exchange with the Cynic
philosopher Diogenes in Corinth (related by Plutarch on no less than four occasions:
Alex. 14.1–3; Mor. 331F–332A; 605D; 782A).
Elsewhere Plutarch records Stilpo’s cheerful acceptance of his daughter’s
licentiousness (Mor. 467F–468A; cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 11) and praises the philosopher’s
unimpeachable honesty (Mor. 536A-B; cf. Sen. Constant. 5.6). On Stilpo, see K.
Praechter, s.v. Stilpon, RE III A 2 (1929) col 2525–2533; on the possible political
repercussions of Demetrius’ respect for Stilpo, see Paschidis [2008] 453; for the
influence of the Megarian school on Zeno and Stoicism, see A. Long, Hellenistic
Philosophy: Stoics, Cynics, Epicureans [Berkeley: 1986, 2nd ed.] 111.
9.10.4 “ὀρθῶς” ἔφη “λέγεις· οὐδένα γὰρ ἁµῶν δοῦλον ἀπολέλοιπας.” (Stilpo’s
witticism; the fate of Megara): In his biography of Stilpo, Diogenes Laertius (2.115)

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records that Demetrius’ soldiers plundered some of Stilpo’s property and that the
philosopher refused Demetrius’ attempt to restore it. The degree of the plundering
engaged in by Demetrius’ soldiers is difficult to determine. Megara’s woolen industry
was flourishing in the late 4th century and seems to have been heavily dependent on slave
labor, but the extent of the slave population is uncertain. K. Beloch’s suggestion of
20,000 (Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt [Leipzig: 1886] 173–74) is
almost certainly too high (cf. Legon [1981] 282). Legon ([1981] 300–01) suggests that
Megara’s slave population was indeed carried off by the troops of Demetrius, an act that
crippled the Megarian woolen industry and plunged the Megarian economy into a
downward spiral from which it never fully recovered. The ancient sources are at odds.
Plutarch’s contention (Mor. 5F) that Demetrius enslaved the population and razed the city
to the ground (Δηµήτριος ἐξανδραποδισάµενος τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἔδαφος κατέβαλε)
represents one, utterly fallacious, extreme. Theocritus (12.27), on the other hand, writing
perhaps a generation after Demetrius’ “sack” of Megara, can still refer to the Megarians
as “champions of the oar” (Νισαῖοι Μεγαρῆες, ἀριστεύοντες ἐρετµοῖς), which would
seem to indicate that Megarian naval commerce was still extensive. The “remarkable
honors” (τιµῶν ἀξιολόγων, Diod 20.46.3), the Megarians granted him after the
liberation of the city, and the subsequent Megarian loyalty to Demetrius, even after his
defeat at Ipsus (n. 31.2.5), also suggest that the Megarian economy was not dealt a
devastating blow at this time. On Demetrius’ relationship with Stilpo, cf. Seneca Dial.
2.5.6; id. Epist. Mor. 9.18–19; Mor. 475C.
X
10.1.2 στρατοπεδεύσας…φρούριον: Diodorus reports that the garrison surrendered
only after Demetrius’ forces, fighting in shifts, battered the fortress for two days with an
unremitting hail of artillery fire from land and sea that ultimately drove the defenders
from the walls and allowed Munychia’s formidable defenses to be breached (20.45.6–7).
The fortress was well beyond the range of artillery mounted on ships in Munychia harbor;
perhaps Diodorus refers to artillery emplacements on both the seaward and landward
sides of the Munychia hill. The subsequent destruction of the citadel (Diod. 20.46.1),
which had housed a Macedonian garrison since 322 (see above, n. 8.4.4), was a pretty
piece of propaganda—a compelling demonstration of the Antigonid commitment to
Athenian freedom. Philochorus (FGrH 328 F66 = Dion. Hal. Din. 3) confirms that the
Munychia garrison surrendered in the first days of the archon year 307/6 (July/August
307; n. 9.4.4).
10.1.6 Προσυπέσχετο…τριήρεις: 150,000 medimnoi of grain amounts to c. 6,000,000
kg, or monthly rations for more than 300,000 people (assuming annual consumption of
230 kg; for various estimates of annual consumption rates, see Oliver [2007] 19; cf. n.
34.5.4). Diodorus (20.46.4) confirms that Antigonus followed through on his promise to
deliver the grain and the timber, though he simply writes “ships” (ναυσὶν) rather than
triremes. Plutarch seems to be using trireme in its generic sense of “warship,” for when
Demetrius sailed for Cyprus in 306 his fleet included 30 Athenian quadriremes, perhaps
constructed with the timber supplied by Antigonus (Diod. 20.50.3; cf. Billows [1990] 150
n. 31; Paschidis [2008] 79 n. 6).

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10.2.3 τῶν Λαµιακῶν…Κραννῶνα: The Macedonian victory at Crannon in Thessaly in
August 322 (7 Metageitnion, according to Plutarch, Cam. 19.5) crushed the struggle for
Greek freedom known as the Lamian War that erupted after the death of Alexander, and
ensured continued Macedonian control of Athens and the Greek poleis. For accounts of
the battle, see Diod. 18.17; Phoc. 26.1–2; Dem. 28.1; Paus. 7.10.4; Arr. Succ. 1.12; on the
Lamian War see Ferguson [1911] 11 ff.; O. Schmitt, Der Lamische Krieg [Bonn: 1992];
Will [1979] 27–30; Habicht [1997] 22–46; Anson [2014] 28–41; for detailed
bibliography, see Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 120).
10.2.6 οὕτως λαµπρὸν…ἐψηφίσαντο: The first articulation of one of the leitmotifs of
the Life: the destructive effects of flatterers on Demetrius’ character (cf. 13.3; 17.2; 18.7;
see Intro. 36–39).
10.3.1 πρῶτοι…ἀκοινώνητον: This contradicts Plutarch’s later assertion that it was
Aristodemus of Miletus who first hailed Antigonus as king while bringing news of
Demetrius’ victory at Salamis, after which “the multitude for the first time hailed
Antigonus and Demetrius as kings” (πρῶτον ἀνεφώνησε τὸ πλῆθος Ἀντίγονον καὶ
Δηµήτριον βασιλέας; Flacelière and Chambry 194; n. 18.1.2). No extant epigraphic
source, from Athens or elsewhere, refers to Antigonus or Demetrius as king before 306
(Paschidis [2013] 125). Nor is it likely that Antigonus and Demetrius, or any of the
Successors for that matter, would have refrained, had the Athenians so hailed them, from
arrogating the royal title out of scrupulous adherence to the prerogatives of the Argead
house (τοῖς ἀπὸ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου), which, in any case, had ceased to exist
after the murders of Alexander’s half-brother Philip III, son Alexander IV, and alleged
son Heracles (Alexander’s sister Cleopatra was murdered on orders from Antigonus, n.
22.2.3; his half-sister Thessalonice married Cassander and survived until she was
murdered by her son Antipater, n. 36.1.3). With the Argead line snuffed out, it was
inevitable that one or more of the Successors would assume the royal title; ultimately,
Demetrius’ signal victory at Salamis in 306 provided a suitable occasion (see n. XVIII:
The Assumption of the Kingship).
10.4.1 µόνοι… παρεχοµένης (Divine honors for the Antigonids in Athens and the
development of Hellenistic ruler-cult): The array of divine honors granted Antigonus and
Demetrius in gratitude for the restoration of the democracy was extraordinary but not
entirely without precedent. Lysander had been offered divine honors on Samos in 404 (I.
Samos 413; Plut. Lys. 18.5–6; Athen. 15.696E) and several Greek poleis in Asia Minor
had paid similar honors to Alexander after he liberated them from Persian control
(Erythrae and Miletus recognized Alexander as the son of Zeus after his pilgrimage to
Siwah: Callisthenes, FGrH 124 f 15 = Strabo 17.1.43; cults of Alexander are
epigraphically attested in Priene, Ephesus, and Erythrae, although the cults may not have
been established until after Alexander’s death; for the evidence see Habicht [1970] 17–
20). In Athens, Demades had proposed legislation recognizing Alexander as the 13th
Olympian (Aelian VH 5.12), and divine honors for the king were at least debated and
probably approved (Habicht [1970] 28–36; Parker [1996] 257; cf. Din. 1.94; Hyp. contra
Dem. fr. 7 col. 31). Antigonus was voted divine honors by the citizens of Scepsis in the
Troad in gratitude for his policy of Greek freedom. He received a sacred precinct, with
altar and image, as well as an annual festival (OGIS 6; n. 8.1.2).

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 In his account of the Athenian reaction to their liberation, Diodorus reports
uncritically that the Athenians instituted games, complete with a procession and sacrifice.
This annual festival, presumably dubbed the Soteria, was probably held on the
anniversary of Demetrius’ initial arrival in the Athenian asty in Skirophorion 308/7 or
Hekatombaion 307/6 (on the date, see n. 10.1.2). Diodorus also notes the consecration of
an “altar of the saviors,” and the creation of golden statues of Antigonus and Demetrius
that were erected in a chariot near the statues of the tyrannicides, Harmodius and
Aristogeiton (Diod. 20.46.2). Although the list Plutarch produces here is misleading since
it is partially anachronistic (the honors described in chapters 10–13 are presented
thematically, not chronologically, and should be viewed as a summary of all the honors
Demetrius received from Athens in the period 307–c.290, not just those decreed after his
initial liberation of the city in 307), possibly inaccurate (the contention that the priest of
the Soteres replaced the traditional archon as eponymous magistrate is not supported by
the epigraphical record, n. 10.4.2), and certainly incomplete (cf. Diod. 20.46.2; n. 10.6.1),
the Athenian reaction to their liberation ushered in a new era in which mortals could be
rewarded for exceptional achievement with honors that had hitherto been reserved for the
gods, and a similar procedure was followed in a host of cities for virtually every
Hellenistic monarch (for a full discussion, see Habicht [1970] 44–55; cf. Chaniotis [2003]
436; Mikalson [1998] 75–104).
These honors represent too the depth of the Athenians’ relief at their liberation
and the gratitude toward their liberators. Athens had, after all, endured Macedonian
occupation since Antipater installed a garrison on Munychia on 20 Boedromion, 322—a
date carefully calculated to strike with maximum force at the Athenian passion for
eleutheria since it coincided both with the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the
anniversary of the Greek victory at Salamis in 480 (Plut. Phoc. 28.1–3; Cam. 19.3; Green
[1990] 12; n. 26.1.1). No less welcome was the wheat and timber Demetrius promised
(see above n. 10.1.6), benefactions an Athenian delegation promptly set out to secure
from Antigonus, who fulfilled the pledge and magnanimously returned Imbros to the
Athenians (Diod. 20.46.4; in 305 Antigonus dispensed further benefactions: timber,
money, and control of Lemnos; Paschidis [2008] 88–89). Demetrius and Antigonus were
thus in a very real sense both “saviors” and “benefactors” of the highest order, and their
unprecedented service called for unprecedented honors from a sincerely grateful populace
(cf. Paschidis [2008] 79). The honors were thus “within the existing ideological
framework of benefaction” (Paschidis [2008] 77) and “extensions of Athenian religious
tradition” (Mikalson [1998] 78). Plutarch, however, is consistently hostile to the
assumption of divine honors and flamboyant titles by the Hellenistic kings (Ag./Kleom.
34.13.3, 37.16.7; Mor. 338A-C; 360C-D; cf. Lys. 19.1–4; Price 115–16; Duff [1999]
116), and his depiction of these divine honors as both the genesis of Demetrius’ supposed
descent into megalomania and despotism and the final blow to the dignity of the
Athenians established a topos to be recapitulated by commentators ancient and modern
(cf. n. 11.3.3). By compressing the chronology of the honors (and perhaps exaggerating
their extent), Plutarch emphasizes their insidious effect on the character of Demetrius
(Intro. 14–15, 37–38).
10.4.2 τὸν ἐπώνυµον…προέγραφον: That the priest of the Saviors served as the
eponymous Athenian magistrate is not at all implausible—to give two near-contemporary

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examples, the priests of the cults of Lysimachus and Seleucus served as the eponymous
officals of Cassandreia (Syll.3 380 = SEG 29.600; M. Hatzopoulos, “Un donation du roi
Lysimaque” [Athens: 1988] 17–54) and Dura-Europos (Chaniotis [2003] 439),
respectively—but plentiful epigraphical evidence demonstrates that the Athenian
eponymous archon was never officially replaced as the eponymous officer by a priest of
the Savior-Gods, although the cult continued to exist as late as the 230s B.C. (see Habicht
[1970] 45 n. 12 for the epigraphic testimonia). It is possible that the error arose when
Plutarch confused the name of the priest of the eponymous gods of the two new tribes,
Demetrias and Antigonis, with that of the eponymous archon (K. Scott 141; cf. Dreyer
[1998]; on the new tribes see below n. 10.6.1). It is also possible that Plutarch’s source
knew of an alternate, informal system designed to flatter Antigonus and Demetrius by
referring to the priest of the Saviors as the eponymous magistrate, and by otherwise
incorporating Demetrius into the sacred and civil calendars of Athens (see below, ns.
10.4.1, 10.5.2, 12.2.1, 46.2.1).
10.5.1 ἐνυφαίνεσθαι…ἐψηφίσαντο: The sacred robe (peplos) of Athena, which literary
evidence shows was decorated with images of Zeus and Athena leading the Olympians to
victory in the gigantomachy, was carried in procession to the Acropolis and presented to
the statue of Athena Polias by members of the Praxiergidae, an Athenian clan tasked with
this duty, in the annual Panathenaea, held late in Hekatombaion, the first month of the
Attic year (July/August). The east frieze of the Parthenon seems to depict this ceremony
(on the festival, see Ziehn s.v. Panathenaea, RE XVIII 3 [1949], coll. 460–63; Parke 33–
50; J. Niels [ed.], Goddess and Polis [Princeton: 1992]; J. Shear [2001]; on the peplos,
see Mansfield [1985]; Barber; S. Aleshire and S. Lambert “Making the Peplos for
Athena: A New Edition of IG II2 1030 + IG II2 1036, ZPE 142 [2003] 54–86; Sirvinou-
Inwood 263–70; n. 12.3.2). The Antigonids had been hailed as savior gods akin to Zeus
and Athena (n. 10.4.1); now they joined those gods in the archetypal war of civilization
against barbarism (Simon 39; Buraselis [2008] 216).
10.5.2 τὸν τόπον…προσηγόρευσαν: Clement of Alexandria relates a slightly different
version of this event. In his account, the Athenians erected a temple for Demetrius
Kataibates on the spot where he dismounted from his horse after entering the city (καὶ
ἔνθα µὲν ἀπέβη τοῦ ἵππου Ἀθήναζε εἰσιών, Καταιβάτου ἰερόν ἐστι). The testimony of
Plutarch, a priest and ritual expert, is to be preferred (cf. Mor. 338A, where Plutarch
states simply that Demetrius allowed himself to be called Kataibates). Indeed, the epithet
Καταιβάτης “the Descender” was commonly applied to Zeus as the god of lightning,
and the actual sites of lightning strikes were sometimes enclosed and declared a Διὸς
καταιβάτου ἄβατον. Annual sacrifices were subsequently performed on the anniversary
of the strike (R. Parker, “Festivals of the Attic Demes,” in T. Linders and G. Nordquist
[eds.] Gifts to the Gods. Uppsala Seminars 1985 [Uppsala: 1987] 144–145; on the
epithet, see M. Nilsson, “Zeus Kataibates,” Rheinisches Museum, XLIII [1908] 315 ff.;
Burkert [1985] 126 and n. 11). This altar was probably consecrated in 304/3, after
Demetrius drove Cassander from Attica (n. 23.1.1), and thus was not among the initial
round of honors that immediately followed the liberation of the city in 307 (Habicht
[1970] 48–49; on Plutarch’s thematic presentation of divine honors for Demetrius in
Athens, see n. 10.4.1). It seems likely that annual sacrifices were performed at this altar
on the anniversary of Demetrius’ arrival in Athens in 304; yet another instance in which

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Demetrius’ benefactions were enshrined in the Athenian calendar (ns. 10.4.1, 12.2.1,
46.2.1).
10.6.1 ταῖς δὲ φυλαῖς…παρεχοµένης: The creation of the new tribes had significant
ramifications, both civic and religious. A new dispensation of the deme structure in place
since the Cleisthenic reforms in 508 was undertaken, and the Council was duly expanded
from five to six hundred to accommodate the new tribal contingents. The secretary cycle,
which seems to have been abolished under Demetrius of Phalerum (Tracy [1995] 36;
O’Sullivan [2009a] 120–21), was restored, and, in a graceful compliment to Poliorcetes,
the secretary for 307/6 was drawn from tribe Demetrias (the secretary was from Diomeia,
the deme of Stratocles [n. 11.1.1], and one of the demes allotted to tribe Demetrias; for
the secretary, see e.g. IG II2 458). The expansion of the council meant that substantially
more Athenians would participate in the democratic governance of the city, and each
citizen could now reasonably expect to serve a term on the council during his lifetime
(Osborne [2012] 55; cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 62.3). The pedestal that supported the statues of
the eponymous founders of the Athenian tribes in the Agora was enlarged to make way
for new statues of Antigonus and Demetrius (T.L. Shear, “The Monument of the
Eponymous Heroes in the Athenian Agora,” Hesperia 39 [1970] 171–76). There was also
a practical consideration in the expansion of the Athenian tribal system: the two
additional tribes, bringing the total number to twelve, meant that the prytanies could now
correspond to the months of the year, allowing for a synchronization of the sacred and
secular calendars (Ferguson [1911] 96; cf. Bayliss [2011] 166). In addition to the honors
listed here, the Athenians dedicated two new sacred triremes—the Antigonis and the
Demetrias—named for the dynasts (Philochorus, FGrH 328 F 48; cf. Billows [1990] 150
n. 30; Habicht [1979] 45 n. 10).
XI
11.1.1 Στρατοκλέους: Stratocles, the son of Euthydemus, was the scion of a wealthy
family from the deme of Diomeia. He emerged as the undisputed leader of the restored
Athenian democracy in 307, and immediately embarked on a legislative spree of
unprecedented scope (at least 27 decrees proposed by Stratocles survive, making him the
most prolific statesman in the history of the Athenian democracy; cf. Tracy [2000] 228;
Paschidis [2008] 80). His father served as a trierarch in 348 and as choregos for the
victors in the boys’ dithyramb at the Dionysia in 342/41 (IG II2 2318; IG II2 3041) while
Stratocles himself won the boys’ pentathlon at the Amphiareia in 335/34 (IG VII 414, 26;
cf. Bayliss [2011] 154). He displayed remarkable precocity as an orator, taking part in the
prosecution of Demosthenes in the wake of the Harpalus affair while still in his mid-
twenties. His speech is lost, but it is certain that he spoke at some point before Dinarchus
(Din. 1.1), and the second-century philosopher Agatharchides of Cnidus praised his
clarity of expression and ability to arouse the emotions of the jury (Photius 447a; on
Stratocles’ role in the proceedings, see I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on
Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Late-4th Century Athens [Ann Arbor: 1992] esp.
125–27; Bayliss [2011] 154). No doubt this speech contributed to the antipathy of
Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, towards Stratocles (ns. 12.6.1, 24.10.3) What
role Stratocles played in the Lamian War is uncertain, but his complete absence from the
sources for the period 322–307 indicates that he was no friend of the Macedonian
sponsored oligarchy (Paschidis [2008] 78).

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11.1.3 οἱ πεµπόµενοι… θεωροὶ λέγοιντο: Ambassadors sent out by a polis to announce
an upcoming festival, and members of official delegations sent by poleis to festivals or to
consult oracles could all be called theoroi (on theoroi, see M. Dillon, Pilgrims and
Pilgrimages in Ancient Greece [Routledge: 1997]). According to Arrian (Anab. 7.23.2)
embassies from the Greek poleis that visited Alexander in Babylon arrived “as theoroi”
(ὡς θεωροὶ). Plutarch’s indignation notwithstanding, once the Athenians had hailed
Antigonus and Demetrius as Soteres and established a cult in their honor, the suggestion
that Athenian delegations to Antigonus and Demetrius be called theoroi required no great
imaginative or theological leap (cf. Athen. 13.607C where the members of an Arcadian
embassy to Antigonus Gonatas are described as theoroi). That said, Plutarch states only
that Stratocles proposed (ἔγραψεν) the motion, not that it was approved (cf. 12.1.2;
13.1.1).
11.2.3 Κλέωνος: The son of a wealthy tanner, Cleon (c. 446–422) was one of the first of
a new breed of Athenian politicians whose influence depended not on office-holding but
on displays of oratorical prowess in the Assembly and law courts. He first appears in
Thucydides as the chief proponent of a degree calling for the execution of the male
population of rebellious Mytilene in 427 (Thuc. 3.36–40). He was subsequently elected
strategos multiple times, and in 425 he and his colleague Demosthenes engineered the
stunning surrender of a Spartan force marooned on the island of Sphacteria (Thuc. 4.30–
39). In 422 he was defeated and killed before Amphipolis in a battle with a force led by
the Spartan Brasidas (Thuc. 5.6–10).
Cleon’s background, character, and policies were ridiculed and attacked by his
implacable enemy, the comic playwright Aristophanes, most notably in Knights (see
below n. 12.1.1) and Wasps, and Plutarch clearly saw in the enmity between the poet and
the statesmen an analogue for Philippides’ attacks on Stratocles (on the mutual antipathy
of Cleon and Aristophanes, see I. Storey, “Wasps 1284–91 and the Portrait of Cleon in
Wasps,” Scholia 4 [1995] 3–23; H. Lind, Der Gerber Cleon in den “Rittern” des
Aristophanes: Studien zur Demagogenkomödie. Studien zur klassischen Philologie 51
[Frankfurt am Main: 1990]; on Philippides, see below, ns. 11.3.1; 11.3.3; 12.1.2; 12.2.1;
12.6.1). It is almost certain, however, that Plutarch was not the first to see Stratocles as
heir to the dubious legacy of Cleon, and Philippides as a latter-day Aristophanes, hurling
indignities at a demagogue from the comic stage, but that Stratocles was explicitly
assimilated to Cleon by his enemies, including Philippides and other comic poets; they
too seemed to have harnessed Aristophanic allusions in making the comparison. W.E.
Major (“Menander in a Macedonian World,” GRBS 38 [1997] 48) suggests that a
fragment of Philemon, a contemporary of Philippides, addressed to a “Cleon” should be
applied to Stratocles, and Mastrocinque ([1979b] 267) notes a number of instances of
Aristophanic language in the sources dealing with Stratocles; for a possible instance in
the Demetrius, see below n. 11.3.3.
11.3.1 Φυλάκιον: Athenaeus (13.70.13–15), citing Gorgias’ work on hetairai, gives the
name Leme (“eyesore”) to Sratocles’ mistress and claims she was nicknamed Parorama
(“mistake”) since she made herself available to any and all comers for two drachmas.
Two drachmas was the maximum price that common prostitutes could charge for their
services (Arist. Ath. Pol. 50.1–5), and to call a sophisticated hetaira, in effect, a “two

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dollar whore” was quite the insult. For Plutarch, Stratocles’ relationship with Phylacium
is further evidence of his shameful licentiousness (βεβιωκὼς ἀσελγῶς), a fundamental
flaw that makes him a singularly well-suited sycophant for Demetrius, many of whose
worst excesses involved hetairai (14.4; 26.5; 27.2). In his treatise On Love (750E)
Plutarch names Stratocles—citing a play in which Philippides attacked the orator (PCG
vii F 26), and may even have brought him on stage as a character (O’Sullivan [2009b] 68
with n. 34—as a paradigm of the man who “endures an evil, unloving woman not for
gain, but for lust and sex” (ὁ µὴ διὰ κέρδος ἀλλ' ἀφροδισίων ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας
ὑποµένων γυναῖκα µοχθηρὰν καὶ ἄστοργον). Choosing a partner for reasons sexual
rather than practical is precisely the mistake Antigonus warned Demetrius not to make
when, according to Plutarch, he urged him to marry Phila with a slightly modified verse
of Euripides (on Phila see below n. 14.2.5; for Antigonus’ riff on Euripides, see below n.
14.3.6).
11.3.3 τοιαῦτά γ' ὠψώνηκας οἷς σφαιρίζοµεν (Comic features of Plutarch’s
characterization of Stratocles): A verse of iambic trimeter, strongly suggesting that
Plutarch has drawn Stratocles’ quip, and likely the entire episode, from a comedy. The
language, too, is characteristic of the comic stage—forms of the verb opsonein and its
compounds occur chiefly in comedy. The play of Philippides that Plutarch cites at 12.7
seems a likely source (Franz 671; Kassel 352; and see below, n. 12.7.1), and the line may
allude to Aristophanes’ Wasps 495, where it is remarked, albeit with a healthy dose of
comic exaggeration, that, in the politically charged atmosphere of Athens during the
ascendancy of Cleon, a man’s shopping habits might be interpreted as evidence of his
designs on a tyranny (οὗτος ὀψωνεῖν ἔοιχ' ἅνθρωπος ἐπὶ τυραννίδι). The language and
concerns of the episode, and indeed of Plutarch’s characterization of Stratocles as a
whole, are strongly reminiscent not only of comedy, but also of the Characters of
Theophrastus, Aristotle’s prolific successor and a contemporary of Philippides. Plutarch
states that Stratocles recalled Cleon in his “buffoonery and repulsiveness” (τῇ
βωµολοχίᾳ καὶ βδελυρίᾳ τοῦ παλαιοῦ Κλέωνος ἀποµιµεῖσθαι δοκῶν, 11.2.1) and
Theophrastus devoted a sketch to “The Repulsive Man” (ὁ βδελυρὸς). Such men,
Theophrastus assures us, are wont to buy delicacies (ὀψωνεῖν), hire music girls
(αὐλητρίδα µισθοῦσθαι), and display the fruits of their shopping excursion to all
passersby (δεικνύειν δὲ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι τὰ ὠψωνηµένα, 11.7.1). Theophrastus’
stereotyped figures strongly resemble the stock characters of New Comedy; of the three
“characters of comedy” (ἤθη κωµῳδίας)—“buffoons, braggarts, and tricksters”
(βωµολοχικά, ἀλαζονικά, and εἰρωνικά)—that appear in section XII of the so-called
Tractatus Coislinianus, a theoretical work on comedy with Peripatetic affinities, the latter
two appear in Theophrastus (1, 23), and the first, buffoonery, is the other trait shared by
Cleon and Stratocles (on the comic affinities of Theophrastus’ sketches, see R. Hunter,
The New Comedy of Greece and Rome [Cambridge: 1985] 148–51; the authorship of the
Tractatus Coislinianus is a matter of dispute, though H. Nesselrath, Die attische mittlere
Komödie: ihre Stellung in der antiken Literaturkritik und Literaturgeschichte [Berlin:
1990] has suggested Theophrastus). Clearly, Plutarch’s damning portrait of Stratocles is
much indebted to the efforts of that politician’s literary enemies who successfully
characterized him as a slavish buffoon and shameless demagogue. Subsequent
commentators have followed suit, condemning Stratocles as the archetype of the cringing

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sycophant and a symbol of Athenian decline. On the tendency of modern scholars to be
influenced, consciously or otherwise, by Plutarch’s portrait in assessing Stratocles, see F.
Muccioli, “Stratocle di Diomeia e la redazionetrezenia del ‘decreto di Temistocle,” in B.
Virgilio (ed.) Studia Hellenistici XX (Pisa: 2008) 123; Xenophontos 609–11; on the
consequences of the perceived similarity between Stratocles and Cleon for subsequent
scholarship, see O’Sullivan (2009b); see Bayliss (2011), esp. 152–157 for a survey of
modern reactions to Stratocles).
11.4.1 τῆς δὲ περὶ Ἀµοργὸν ἥττης (The naumachia near Amorgos): A Macedonian fleet
under Cleitus crushed the Athenian navy off the island of Amorgos in the Cyclades in
July, 322 (Marmor Parium, FGrH 239 B, 9). The defeat proved to be the decisive naval
blow in the Lamian War that ended with the Macedonian victory at Crannon the
following month (on the naval battles of the Lamian War, see B. Bosworth, “Why did
Athens Lose the Lamian War?,” in O. Palagia and S. Tracy (eds.) The Macedonians in
Athens 322–229 B.C. (2003) 14–23; G. Wrightson, “The Naval Battles of 322 B.C.E.,” in
H. Hauben and A. Meeus (eds.) The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the
Hellenistic Kingdoms, 323–276 B.C. (2014) 517–38; on Crannon and the Lamian War,
see above n. 10.2.3).
11.4.4 τοῦ Κεραµεικοῦ: A large district in northwest Athens, originally based on the
potters’ quarter. Classical authors generally use Ceramicus to refer to the extramural
cemetery beyond the Sacred and Dipylon gates (on the Ceramicus, see U. Knigge, The
Athenian Kerameikos: History, Monuments, Excavations [Athens: 1991]; Camp [2001]
261–63).
11.5.4 εἶτ'” ἔφη “τί πεπόνθατε δεινόν, εἰ δύο ἡµέρας ἡδέως γεγόνατε: cf. Mor. 799F–
800A, where Plutarch cites this anecdote as evidence of the hybris and buffoonery (ὕβριν
καὶ βωµολοχίαν, cf. n. 11.3.3) of Stratocles, although in that telling Stratocles’ ruse
results in three days of happiness for the Athenians, rather than two.
XII
12.1.1 κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη: The reference is to Knights (382), which carried off top
honors at the Lenaea in 424. Aristophanes skewered Cleon in the comedy, exacting a
measure of revenge for Cleon’s prosecution of the playwright on charges of slandering
the polis stemming from the production of Babylonians in 426, and fulfilling the promise
he made “to cut Cleon up into shoe leather for the Knights” (Acharnians 301: κατατεµῶ
τοῖσιν ἱππεῦσι καττύµατα; the line is given to the chorus; on Cleon, see above ns.
11.2.3, 11.3.3). The animus between demagogue and playwright anticipates the
analogous relationship of Stratocles and Philippides (see below, n. 12.6.1). In Knights the
line refers not to the demagogue Paphlagon (the character clearly modeled on Cleon), but
to his successor as darling of the Demos, the repulsive Sausage Seller who, like the
Athenian who surpasses Stratocles, remains nameless. Thus, the citation is particularly
felicitous in this context (cf. Duff [2012]; Xenophontos 609).
12.1.2 γράφει…ξενισµοῖς: The close ritual association of Demeter and Dionysus dates
back to at least the 5th century. Pindar (Pyth. 7.3–5) describes Dionysus as the god
“enthroned beside Demeter,” and the two were honored as paredroi (partner deities) in

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Attica and elsewhere (Paus. 9.8.1, 9.22.5, 9.24.1). Xenismos was a widespread ritual in
which the conventions of entertaining a guest were extended to divine figures—the
concept of hospitality towards men and gods was fundamental to Greek culture (on the
rituals of xenismos, see Jameson [1994]). Dionysus and Demeter were received with
prayers, hymns, and sacrifices, and the famous Ithyphallic Hymn with which Demetrius
was greeted on his return to Athens in 290 is an extraordinary example of the extension
of a Dionysiac xenismos to Demetrius (Mikalson [1998] 92; Chaniotis [2011] 166–171;
on the hymn, see ns. 2.3.6, 13.1.3; 40.8.1). The proposal was certainly a well-designed
piece of flattery: Demetrius prominently identified himself with Dionysus, and, in his
demonstrated ability to control the grain supply of Athens he assumed the role of
Demeter, into whose mysteries he was initiated with spectacular irregularity in 303 (on
Demetrius and Dionysus, see n. 2.3.6; on Demetrius’ initiation into the Eleusinian
Mysteries, see below n. 26.1.1). The onomastic connection with the goddess—Demetrius
is, of course, a theophoric name derived from Demeter—complemented the functional
connection in the prolonged and complex campaign undertaken by Demetrius and his
supporters designed to lend legitimacy to Demetrius’ own claims to divinity by
assimilating him to a variety of gods (Thonemann [2005]; Kuhn 273–76; Versnel 451–
55; Chaniotis [2011]; ns. 2.3.6, 12.3.1, 13.1.3, 25.1.4, 40.8.3). The connection with
Demeter has led scholars to place the proposal in the period after Demetrius’ successful
siege of Athens in 295, when the Athenians received a painful demonstration of
Demetrius’ control over grain imports (Habicht [1970] 50–55; Mikalson [1998] 92; on
the siege, see below ns. 33.5.3; 33.5.5; 33.6.2), but there is no independent evidence to
confirm that the proposal was approved, and Plutarch merely states that the nameless
flatterer “proposed” (γράφει) the honor (cf. 11.1.3; 13.1.1). Jacoby (FGrH 328 F 166)
suggests that the honor was proposed as early as Demetrius’ first stint in Athens in 307
and rejected as too extreme, but the Ithyphallic hymn demonstrates Dionysiac xenismoi
were extended to Demetrius by 290 at the latest (on the hymn, see ns. 2.3.6, 13.1.3;
40.8.1).

12.2.1 τέλος…προσηγόρευσαν: The renaming of Mounichion is seemingly

corroborated by Philochorus (FrGH 328 F 166), but the fragment, derived from the
scholiast on Pindar Nem. 3, hardly inspires confidence, and contemporary Athenian
inscriptions do not support this claim (for another instance where Plutarch’s testimony is
seemingly contradicted by the epigraphical record, see above n. 10.4.2). IG II2 471 refers
to the month as Mounichion in 306/05 (as does IG II2 644 a decade later), and a host of
decrees proposed by Stratocles from this period (IG II2 456, 471, 486, 495, 496 + 507;
SEG 16.58, 36.164) continue to refer to the last day of the month as “the old and the
new” (ἕνη καὶ νέα) rather than “Demetrias” (cf. Habicht [1970] 52; Mikalson [1998] 93).
Athenian decrees also seem to rule out the suggestion that these honors were accorded by
the pro-Demetrian oligarchy that ruled Athens after Demetrius’ return in 295 (IG II2 649
demonstrates that the Athenian assembly met on the last day of Mounichion—Demetrias
of Demetrion, if the honorific name changes had actually been carried out—in 293/2; two
other decrees are restored to give this day, IG II2 472, and B. Meritt Hesperia 7 [1938]
97–100 no. 17; on the oligarchic regime, see n. 34.4.2), but is possible that the name
change was simply a one-time honor, and Mounichion is not yet epigraphically attested
for 307/6, the most likely year for the honorific month name (Thonemann [2005] 76 n.

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46). If the day and month were never formally renamed for Demetrius, several factors
could account for the confusion of Plutarch or his sources. The calendar of nearby Oreus
on Euboea certainly was altered to include an honorary month called Demetrion (C.
Trümpy, Untersuchungen zu den altgriechischen Monatsnamen und Monatsfolgen
[Heidelberg: 1997]; Buraselis [2012] 250), and it would only be surprising if a tradition
transferring the honor to Athens, where the king was honored so effusively, had not
developed. Another possibility is that Mounichion was mockingly referred to as
“Demetrion” after Stratocles infamously altered the name of that month twice to
accommodate Demetrius’ request that he be expeditiously initiated into the Eleusinian
Mysteries in 303 (Ferguson [1911] 122 n.1; on the date of the initiation, see below n.
26.1.1). Immediately after relating this highly irregular initiation, Plutarch cites a comic
fragment of Philippides criticizing the action in no uncertain terms (26.1–5). The
chronological meddling of Stratocles is corroborated by literary and epigraphic evidence
(n. 26.1.1), but Philippides may have used it as the historical springboard for a comic
exaggeration—the renaming of Mounichion. If so, Plutarch, not for the first time,
presents comic invention as historical fact (on Plutarch’s use of material derived from
comedy, see Intro. 40–43, 48–49; O’Sullivan [2009b]; cf. Aristophanes’ Clouds 1178–
1205, where a character [Philippides, remarkably] mounts a rhetorical attack on the very
existence of the “Old and New” in an attempt to outwit debt collectors).

12.2.3 καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν τὰ Διονύσια µετωνόµασαν Δηµήτρια: The City Dionysia was
a festival celebrated in honor of Dionysus from 10–14 Elaphebolion (late March),
marking the arrival of the god from Eleutherae and featuring a splendid procession and
sacrifices followed by several days of musical and dramatic competitions (on the
Dionysia, see A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens. Oxford:
Clarendon [1968]; Mikalson [1975] 125–29; id. [1998]; Simon 89–104; Parke 125–36;
Parker [1996] esp. 92–95). Plutarch is not entirely correct in his claim that the Athenians
called the City Dionysia the Demetria at this point: inscriptions (SEG 45.101; IG II2 649
= Dinsmoor [1931] 8 line 42) show that the name “Demetrieia” was simply added to the
name “City Dionysia” at some point after Demetrius took Athens by siege in 295,
possibly at the time of the Dionysia (the earliest evidence for the celebration of the
appended festival [IG II2 649] dates to 293/2; for the possibility that Demetrius entered
Athens in 295 during the Dionysia, see Thonemann [2005] 78–79, and below n. 34.5.2).
This slip suggests that Plutarch may here be drawing on Duris, who also refered to the
festival as the Demetria (FGrH 76 F 14 = Athen. 12.536A: γινοµένων δὲ τῶν
Δηµητρίων ᾽Αθήνησιν).  The festival was henceforth called the City Dionysia and
Demetrieia, an amalgamation that neatly complemented Demetrius’ attempts to present
himself as a new Dionysus by creating a cultic partnership between god and divine king
(on Demetrius’ Dionsyiac self-fashioning, see above n. 2.3.6; on the date of the
modification of the festival, see Habicht [1970] 50; Thonemann [2005]; on festivals
devoted to more than one deity in general, and the Dionysia and Demetrieia in particular,
see Buraselis [2012]). Whether the ritual aspects of the festival were altered to honor
Dionysus/Demetrius is unknown (Habicht [1970] 53 suggests that the festival may have
been extended by a day to celebrate Demetrius; cf. Mikalson [1998] 93; Buraselis [2012]
246), but Duris’ claim that a painting of Demetrius astride the inhabited world like a
colossus adorned the proscenium during this festival is a compelling argument that it was

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(FGrH 76 F 14 = Athen. 12.50: Γινοµένων δὲ τῶν Δηµητρίων Ἀθήνησιν, ἐγράφετο
ἐπὶ τοῦ προσκηνίου ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκουµένης ὀχούµενος). At any rate, the changes were
short-lived: after Demetrius lost control of Athens in 287/86, the festival appears without
the addition of “Demetrieia” in inscriptions (IG II2 653, 654, 657).
Festivals in honor of Demetrius were not confined to Attica: a coalition of
Euboean cities celebrated an appended Dionysia/Demetrieia annually in each member
city in turn (IG XII 9, 207); a festival in honor of Antigonus and Demetrius was
celebrated on Samos (I. Samos 55, 8); a founder-cult and annual festival were instituted
for Demetrius in Sicyon (Diod. 20.102.3; see below n. 25.3.1) and in his homonymous
foundation in Thessaly (Mili 199–201). A fragmentary decree (IG XI.4 1036) of the
alliance of Aegean islands known as the Nesiotic League provides for the inauguration of
a Demetrieia festival alongside a preexisting Antigoneia. These festivals were long
connected with Monophthalmus and Poliorcetes, but it now seems more likely that
Antigonus Gonatas and his successor Demetrius II were the honorands (A. Meadows,
“The Ptolemaic League of Islanders,” in K. Buraselis, M. Stefanou, and D. Thompson
(eds.) The Ptolemies, the Sea and the Nile: Studies in Waterborne Power [Cambridge:
2014] 19–27).
12.3.1 ἐπεσήµηνε δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις τὸ θεῖον: This is a rare use of the verb episemainein
in a negative sense, “to disapprove of” (LSJ s.v. IV.3). In the Sulla (14.7.6), Plutarch uses
similar language to express divine approval: καὶ τὸ δαιµόνιον εὐθὺς ἐπεσήµηνε (the
context is the surrender of the Athenian tyrant Arisition in 86 B.C.). Plutarch’s readiness
to accept that the gods themselves actively disapproved of the ritual innovations
assimilating Demetrius to various gods and allowing him to be honored in the manner of
the gods follows naturally from his own religious conservatism and priestly status (n.
40.7.1; Intro. 15).
12.3.2 ὁ µὲν γὰρ πέπλος…ἐµπεσούσης: J. Mansfield (5–7 and passim) has suggested
that the peplos for the Greater Panathenaea, a far grander version of the annual festival
celebrated every four years, was a much larger peplos. Unlike the smaller garment woven
by select Athenian women for the olivewood statue of Athena Polias (Eur. IT. 222–24; IG
II/III2 1036b), professional weavers may have created the large cloth, which was either
draped around the statue of Athena Parthenos or hung on the rear wall of the Parthenon
cella (Mansfield 54–55; Sourvinou-Inwood 267–68; but cf. Parker [2005] 268–69 who
adopts the view that a peplos was only offered to the goddess during the Great
Panathenaea). The peplos for the Great Panathenaea seems to have served as the sail for
the so-called Panathenaic ship, a wheeled replica of an Archaic, 30-oared galley that
featured prominently in the procession of the Greater Panathenaea (on the ship and its
sail, see Mansfield 68–78; J. Shear [2001] 143–154; Sourvinou-Inwood 268; S.
Wachsmann, “Panathenaic Ships: The Iconographic Evidence” Hesperia 81 n. 2 [2012]
237–66). The consistent representation of the ship as an Archaic triakontoros (thirty-
oared ship) suggests that the Panathenaic ship has its origins in the 6th century
(Wachsmann 262) and thus the intriguing suggestion that the ship was introduced to the
festival in 306 by Demetrius cannot stand (N.J. Norman, “The Panathenaic Ship,”
ArchNews 12 [1983] 45). The peplos torn by a freak storm that Plutarch describes here
suggests the larger cloth, indicating that the earliest the incident could have taken place

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was the Greater Panathenaea in Hekatombaion 306/5 (July/August 306). An Athenian
decree (IG2 657) in honor of the poet Philippides states that Demetrius’ enemy
Lysimachus, on the instigation of Philippides, donated a new mast and spar for the peplos
during the archonship of Euctemon in 299/8 (διελεχθη δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ κεραίας καὶ ἰστοῦ,
ὅπως ἄν δοθῇ τῇ θεῷ εἰς τὰ Παναθήναια τῷ πέπλῳ; on Philippides see below n.
12.6.1; on Lysimachus see below n. 12.8.1), and it is commonly claimed that the gifts
were meant to replace parts damaged in the storm described by Plutarch; thus the storm,
if historical, must have occurred during the festival of 302 since the damage would have
been repaired much earlier had it occurred in 306 (Mastrocinque [1979b] 262, with
earlier bibliography; Shear [1978] 36 n. 89; Mikalson [1998] 99; J. Shear [2001]
suggests that there was not sufficient time to change the design of the peplos for the Great
Panathenaea in 306/5, although they took place fully a year later; the production of the
peplos for the annual festival was a nine-month process begun in the Attic month
Pyanepsion [Suda s.v. Χαλκεῖα, Adler Χ 35]; there is no evidence to suggest the time
required to weave the larger cloth). This theory purports to reconcile the epigraphic and
literary evidence, but it should be noted that Plutarch does not mention any damage to the
ship, while the decree does not claim that Lysimachus donated a new peplos, but the mast
and spar on which it was displayed (pace Paschidis [2008] 118–20). In fact the weaving
of a new peplos was a cultic imperative symbolizing the relationship of reciprocity
between the city and her poliadic deity (Sirvinou-Inwood 268–70). Torn or not, the
peplos had to be replaced. Paschidis ([2008] 119–20) has mounted a strong argument
against the historicity of the storm, noting that Plutarch’s source for the tearing of the
peplos and the other phenomena indicating divine displeasure with the honors accorded
Demetrius was almost certainly the comedy of Philippides cited at 12.7 and 26.5. Thus
the freak storm, the spontaneous outbreak of hemlock, and the bitter and unseasonable
cold that ruined the harvest and marred the Dionysia are all likely to be exaggerations or
comic inventions (Marasco [1981] 63–64, does not question the veracity of the omens,
but suggests that Plutarch may have accessed Philippides through a source, perhaps
Duris, that presented comic excerpts in their historical context; on Plutarch’s sources, see
Intro. 40–56). The comic quotations are indicative of Philippides’ vehement opposition to
the divinization of Demetrius and his hostility to Stratocles, the architect of that
divinization, while both Plutarch (12.8) and the “career” decree in honor of Philippides
(IG II2 657; n. 12.6.1) demonstrate that the poet was a friend and courtier of Demetrius’
mortal enemy Lysimachus (on the enmity of the two kings, see 20.8, 25.9, 51.3). In the
absence of other evidence for these omens, Philippides’ claims are more likely to be
comic reflections of the anti-Antigonid propaganda that circulated after Ipsus than
historical reality, and the mast and spar Lysimachus donated for the Panathenaea should
be seen as sacred dedications to complement his more practical benefaction of grain—a
demonstration of his euergetism after the ouster of Demetrius, the onetime savior and
benefactor of the Athenians. Significantly, Ptolemy II made a similar benefaction for the
Greater Panathenaea of 278, the first following the death of Lysimachus in 281 (SEG
28.60).
12.6.1 Φιλιππίδης: An Athenian comic playwright from the deme Cephale, Philippides
was likely born in the mid-4th century (the Suda places his floruit in the 111th Olympiad
[336–332] which yields a birth date of c.375, certainly too high; for a discussion, see
Paschidis [2008] 116 n. 2). The anonymous author of On Comedy (15) lists Philippides,

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along with Philemon, Menander, Diphilus, Poseidippus, and Apollodorus, as the most
notable poets of New Comedy. The Suda (s.v. Φιλιππίδης, Adler Φ 346) credits him
with 45 plays, and 15 titles are known. After the “liberation” of Athens in 307/06,
Philippides emerged as a prominent critic of Stratocles and his policy of awarding
extraordinary honors to Demetrius and his supporters. Much of what is known of the life
of Philippides stems from the preservation of a “career decree” (IG II2 657) voted him in
283 at the instigation of Niceratus, a demesman of the poet. According to the decree, the
poet left Athens for the court of Lysimachus in Thrace sometime before the battle of
Ipsus in 301, most likely in 303/02 when a period of intense stasis led to the exile, official
or self-imposed, of leading members of the democratic faction opposed to Stratocles,
including Demochares the nephew of Demosthenes (see below n. 24.10.3; Mor. 851e; on
the date see, Ferguson [1911] 144; T.L. Shear [1978] 49; Mastrocinque [1979b] 263;
Lund 86; Paschidis [2008] 117). There is no evidence that Philippides was officially
banished, and he may well have chosen exile (Sonnabend 311; I. Kralli, “Athens and her
Leading Citizens in the Early Hellenistic Period (338–261 B.C.): The Evidence of the
Decrees Awarding the Highest Honours,” Archaiognosia 10 [1999–2000] 151; Paschidis
[2008] 117). The “career decree” catalogues a number of occasions in which Philippides
intervened on behalf of his native city, obtaining significant benefactions from his friend
Lysimachus in the aftermath of Ipsus and again in the period following the end of
Demetrius’ second rule in Athens in 287. The poet returned to Athens in 284/3, when he
was elected agonothetes, financing the traditional public contests and establishing a new
contest in honor of Demeter and Kore, in remembrance of the freedom of the demos.
Evidently this courtier of Lysimachus had become extremely wealthy during his period of
exile. When the decree in his honor was passed a year later, however, Philippides had
returned to the court of Lysimachus, and there is no indication that he ever permanently
resettled in Athens (Paschidis [2008] 117–18).
The fragments preserved by Plutarch (12.7, 26.5; Mor. 750f) in which Philippides
mounted attacks on Stratocles and Demetrius are a striking exception to the conventional
wisdom holding that there was little place for explicit political commentary in New
Comedy. Clearly the comic stage could and did provide a forum for vigorous expressions
of political dissent and personal attack in the early Hellenistic period (on Philippides as a
political poet, see G. Philipp, “Philippides ein politischer Komiker in hellenistisher Zeit,”
Gymnasium 80 [1973] 493–509; O’Sullivan [2009b]; cf. n. 27.4.1). Indeed, a few years
earlier the comic poet Archedicus, a friend of Antipater and presumably a supporter of
Cassander and the Macedonian backed regime of Demetrius of Phalerum, attacked
Demochares in one of his plays, charging him with moral offenses that scandalized later
writers, though the specifics have not come down to us. These and other charges against
Demochares were duly passed on by his contemporary, the Sicilian historian Timaeus,
who lived and worked in Athens in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries (Timaeus FGrH
F35B = Polyb. 12.13.1–3). In the second century, however, Polybius sprang to the
defense of Demochares. He proclaimed Demochares “guiltless of all such offenses,”
citing his lineage, accomplishments, and the fact that Archedicus’ attacks were
supposedly not repeated by other political opponents of Demochares, including
Demetrius of Phalerum (12.13.7). Timaeus is censured for spiteful rumor-mongering and
relying on the testimony of a “comic poet of no repute” (12.13.3). The dispute, in which a
politically active poet and client of a Macedonian dynast (Archedicus) attacks the

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character of his patron’s implacable rival (Demochares) on the comic stage anticipates in
many of its particulars Philippides’ attacks on Demetrius. Unlike Demochares, Demetrius
never found his Polybius (see below n. 24.2.2).
12.7.1 δι' ὃν ἀπέκαυσεν…οὐ κωµῳδία: cf. PCG vii. 357. When Philippides’ comedy (or
comedies: the verses cited at 12.7 and 26.5 may come from more than one play) attacking
Stratocles and Demetrius was produced is unknown, though most commentators have
settled on the years immediately following Ipsus, when neither Demetrius nor Stratocles
were in a position to retaliate, as a likely period (see, for example, Mastrocinque (1979b)
265–67; Bielman 78; Sonnabend 275 n. 13; Paschidis [2008] 117). Philippides need not
have been present in Athens for the didaskalia of his plays (O’Sullivan [2009b] 66 n. 31).
12.8.1 Λυσιµάχου: A somatophylax of Alexander (Arr. Anab. 6.28.4), Lysimachus was
the son of the Thessalian Agathocles, a native of Crannon (Eusebius/Porphyry FGrH 260
F 3). He first appears in the sources in connection with a lion hunt in Sogdiana in 328,
during which he attempted to protect the king from a charging lion (Curt. 8.1.13–17; n.
27.6.1). He was assigned control of Thrace at the settlement in Babylon in 323 (Curt.
10.10.4; Diod. 18.3.2; Arr. Succ. 1.7), perhaps as strategos rather than satrap—a
subordinate position which could explain his absence from the sources in the accounts of
the subsequent settlement at Triparadisus in 320 (Lund 54; Heckel [2006] 155).
Lysimachus married Nicaea, daughter of Antipater, at some point before the older man’s
death in 319. Diodorus (20.37.4) records that he, like many of the Successors, sought the
hand of Cleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, but he did not marry again until 302,
when he wed Amastris of Heraclea (n. 28.2.3). On his subsequent marriage to Arsinoe,
and the dynastic strife that followed, see n. 31.5.5. On the career of Lysimachus, see
Geyer, RE s.v. Lysimachos (1); Lund; Landucci-Gattinoni (1992); Heckel [2006] 153–55;
Carney (2013) 41–49.
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13.1.1 Ὃ δὲ µάλιστα τῶν τιµῶν ὑπερφυὲς ἦν καὶ ἀλλόκοτον: cf. 11.1.1 where
Plutarch describes Stratocles’ proposal that the members of embassies sent to Antigonus
and Demetrius be called theoroi as his “most monstrous invention” (ὑπερφυέστατον
ἐνθύµηµα; for other honors Plutarch deems hyperphues, see Marc. 23.11, where the
adjective seems to be used in the positive sense of “extraordinary”). Unlike the proposed
honors mentioned by Plutarch at the beginning of each of the two preceding chapters (see
ns. 11.1.3; 12.1.2), Plutarch claims that this proposal was actually approved by the
Assembly, and gives the actual text of the decree by way of confirmation.
13.1.2 Δροµοκλείδης ὁ Σφήττιος: Little is known of the career of Dromocleides, but
Plutarch clearly conceived of him as a demagogue in the mold of Stratocles, bent on
exploiting his public influence for private gain. Indeed, at Mor. 798E, Plutarch condemns
“Stratocles and Dromocleides and their associates” (οἱ περὶ Στρατοκλέα καὶ
Δροµοκλείδην) for just such actions and claims that they referred to the speaker’s
platform as “the Golden Harvest” (τὸ χρυσοῦν θέρος, τὸ βῆµα… ὀνοµάζοντες). On
Dromocleides, see Kirchner, RE s.v. Dromokleides, (2); Paschidis (2008) 129–131;
Bayliss {2011} and see below ns. infra, 34.6.2.

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ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀσπίδων ἀναθέσεως εἰς Δελφοὺς: The decree moved by Dromocleides
should be dated to 291 or 290 (Habicht [1979] 35; Green [2003] 260 n.11; Paschidis
[2008] 129) and probably reflects Athenian concern for the safety of these shields
following the seizure of Delphi by the Aetolians who subsequently denied the Athenians
access to the sanctuary (see below, n. 40.8.1; for an analysis of the political aspects of the
decree, see esp. Habicht [1979] 34–44). Delphi, like many Greek sanctuaries, was a
repository of dedicated arms and armor on an industrial scale, so it is not possible to
know precisely which shields are referred to here. Historical considerations, however,
suggest that they are most likely the golden shields the Athenians made from Persian
booty after the battle of Plataea in 479 and subsequently dedicated to Apollo at Delphi
(Aesc. 3.116; Habicht [1997] 93; Mikalson [1998] 97; Kuhn 278). The shields were
remounted in 340 on the architrave of the new Temple of Apollo, finally nearing
completion after its destruction in 373. According to Aeschines (In Ctes. 3.116), the
provocative dedicatory inscription that accompanied the reconsecrated shields, “The
Athenians from the Medes and the Thebans, when they fought against the Greeks”
(Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε τἀναντία τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐµάχοντο),
enraged the Thebans who forced one of their subject allies to bring suit against the
Athenians. At the time of Dromocleides’ decree, the Thebans were allied with the
Aetolians and doubtless eager to see the shields, hated reminders of their collaboration
with the Persians, removed (on the alliance of Aetolia and Boeotia, see Flacelière 51;
Gullath 193–96; on the spoils of the Persian Wars, see M. Miller, Athens and Persia in
the 5th Century B.C.: A Study in Cultural Receptivity [Cambridge: 1997] 29–62). The
Thebans may have convinced the Aetolians to remove the shields for a time, but if so
they were subsequently reinstalled, since they were still in place when Pausanias visited
the sanctuary in the 2nd century AD, (Paus. 10.19.4; he mistakenly identifies them as the
spoils of Marathon; cf. Habicht [1979] 37; Bosworth [2002] 250–51 n. 20 and 253,
apparently following Pausanias, states that the shields were spoils from Marathon and
erroneously places them on the Treasury of the Athenians; Flacelière and Chambry 196
claim that these shields were drawn from the 1,200 panoplies Demetrius sent to Athens
after the battle of Salamis in 306, but there is no reason to believe that any of those arms
were golden, nor is there any indication that any of them were dedicated at Delphi [on
these panopolies, see below n. 17.1.4]).
13.1.3 παρὰ Δηµητρίου λαβεῖν χρησµόν: Since the matter of the dedications could not
be referred to Apollo, the Athenians consulted their own resident deity, the savior
Demetrius, who seems to have been granted the role of the oracular Apollo Pythios
(Mikalson [1998] 97; on Demetrius’ assumption of this role in administering the Pythian
games in Athens in 290/89, see below n. 40.8.2; on the efforts to strengthen Demetrius’
own claims to divinity by a program of divine association and assimilation, see ns. 2.3.6,
12.1.2, 12.3.1, 25.1.4, 40.8.3). Plutarch dismisses the honor as a monstrous act of flattery
and most modern scholars have concurred, focusing their attention on the motivations,
both political and self-serving, of its mover. But the decree, written in language suitable
only for consulting the divine, was likely both a pragmatic and carefully calibrated
attempt to persuade Demetrius to rid the Athenians of the Aetolian menace in the north,
and an expression of the genuinely religious sentiment of a significant portion of
Athenians at a time when the concept of divine kingship was becoming increasingly
palatable; the two were not mutually exclusive (for a political analysis of the decree see

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Habich [1979] 34–44; see Green [2003] for a discussion of the evolution of popular
attitudes towards divine kingship; on Dromocleides’ motives, see Paschidis [2008] 130).
Indeed, although the prevailing view that divine honors represented an inevitable and
cynical escalation of the honorific stakes by ambitious citizens eager to gain influence at
a time when the traditional responses to euergetism were no longer sufficient (see e.g.
Paschidis [2008] 131; cf. Mikalson [1998] esp. 82–86; Green [2003]), there is ample
evidence for spontaneous expressions of belief in Demetrius’ divinity and ability to
deliver benefactions on a superhuman scale. The hoi polloi hailed Demetrius as savior
and benefactor in 307 and he responded with regal munificence (9.1, 10.1–2). In 304 the
Savior again delivered Athens in her hour of need, driving Cassander from Attica (23.1–
3). By the late 290s—after the Athenians had seen Athena stripped of her treasures by the
tyrant Lachares, and Demetrius responded to the futile attempt to resist his return to the
city not with vengeful anger, but with a lavish gift of grain that alleviated the famine
resulting from the prolonged siege (on the purported crimes of Lachares, see P.Oxy.
17.2082 = FGrH 257a; Paus. 1.29.16, and see below n. 33.1.4)—that the king could
deliver benefits on a divine scale and deserved divine honors was a matter of course for
many Athenians. This is best illustrated by the ithyphallic hymn with which Demetrius
was greeted as he returned in triumph to Athens (probably in 290, though 292 and 291
have also been suggested; on the hymn and the date of its performance, see below n.
40.7.1) after marrying Lanassa, the estranged wife of Pyrrhus, who brought the Ionian
islands of Leucas and Corcyra as her dowry (Demochares [FGrH 75 f 2 = Athen. 6.253B-
D] gives a memorable description of the scene; Duris [FGrH 76 f 13 = Athen. 6.253
preserves the text of the ithyphallic paean; for the date see Ferguson 144 n. 2; cf. Green
[2003] 260, and n.11 for a catalogue of alternative dates). Processional choruses moved
through the welcoming crowds, proclaiming Demetrius as the son of Poseidon and
Aphrodite, beautiful and mighty. The other gods, they sang, were absent, indifferent, or
simply imaginary, but Demetrius was present, genuine, and generous. An appeal to
eliminate the Aetolians, who are likened to a ravenous Sphinx, concluded the hymn (on
the ithyphallic hymn, see V. Ehrenberg, Aspects of the Ancient World [Oxford: 1946]
179–98; Habicht [1979] 35–41; Mikalson [1998] 94–97; Green [2003]; Chaniotis [2011];
Versnel 444–56). Once prayers for aid in areas that were traditionally the domain of the
gods—safety in war, food, and prosperity (Mikalson [1998] 82)—began to be directed to
kings, and once kings showed the ability to deliver, cynical political opportunism and
genuine religious sentiment could, and did, coalesce and coexist. For Dromocleides’
earlier proposal—the context is Demetrius’ recapture of Athens in 295—to hand over
Piraeus and Munychia to Demetrius, see below n. 34.6.2.
13.2.1 αὐτὴν δὲ παραγράψω τὴν λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσµατος οὕτως ἔχουσαν: The
claim to reproduce a decree of the assembly word for word (τὴν λέξιν) is unique in the
Lives. On Plutarch’s use of documentary evidence, see Intro. 40–41.
13.2.2 ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ: Although it appears sporadically as early as the middle of the 5th
century, it is not until the democratic restoration of 307 that ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ becomes the
regular propitiatory formula in Athenian public decrees—a development that both mirrors
the fascination with tyche that characterizes the Hellenistic period and corresponds with
the earliest evidence for actual worship of the goddess Agathe Tyche —but it appears in
that capacity in the Plutarchan corpus only here (on the use of ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ in Athenian

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decrees, see Woodhead [1981] 361–362; see Green [1990], esp. 400–01 for the
importance of tyche in the Hellenistic period; on the connection between the epigraphical
habit and the worship of the goddess, see S. Tracy, “IG II2 1195 and Agathe Tyche in
Attica,” Hesperia 63 [1994] 243). When Plutarch put this phrase in Demetrius’ mouth at
8.7.2, it may well have been with full appreciation of the delicious irony of having the
same words that accompanied Demetrius’ announcement that he had been sent by his
father to liberate the Athenians (πέµψειεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ, <τοὺς>
Ἀθηναίους ἐλευθερώσοντα) preface what Plutarch saw as the worst example of
Athenian servility (ἀνελευθερία, see above n. 13.1.1). For Plutarch’s claim to use
documentary evidence, including inscriptions, to illuminate character, see, e.g., Nic. 1.5;
on the sources of the Demetrius, see Intro. 40–56.
13.3.2 οὕτω καταµωκώµενοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, προσδιέφθειραν αὐτόν: For the
deleterious effects of these honors on Demetrius’ character, see Intro. 14–15, 37–38.

13.3.3 οὐδ' ἄλλως ὑγιαίνοντα τὴν διάνοιαν: The suggestion that Demetrius was
somehow predisposed to mental instability sits awkwardly with Plutarch’s assertion that
he was εὐφυὴς (“of good natural disposition,” 20.2.1).
XIV
14.1.2 χηρεύουσαν Εὐρυδίκην: Little is known of this Eurydice, except that she was a
descendant of the famous Miltiades (cf. Diod. 20.40.5). Even her name is uncertain—
Diodorus (20.40.5) calls her Euthydice. Her first husband Ophellas (see below, n. 14.1.3)
died in 308 (Diod. 20.42. 5). She bore Demetrius a son named, most likely, Corrhagus
(53.1; the mansucripts are confused, and the boy is named alternately as Κορραβός and
Κοράβας, but, if we accept Κόρραγος as the name of Demetrius’ maternal grandfather
[see above n. 2.1.2], it is reasonable to assume that the child was named for him). On
Eurydice, see H. Willrich, s.v. Eurydike (17) RE VI I (1909), col. 1327; Macurdy 62–63;
Ogden 173–77; Carney (2000) 166.
Μιλτιάδου: An Athenian and a member of the influential Philaid clan, best known for
his role in the famed Athenian victory over the Persians at Marathon in 490 (see esp. Hdt.
6.102–120). Shortly thereafter he was seriously wounded in a futile attempt to storm
Paros, a failure for which he was convicted and heavily fined. He was imprisoned and
died after his wound became gangrenous (Hdt. 6.132–136). The rehabilitation of his
image and the emergence of a tradition that made Miltiades chiefly responsible for both
the Athenian decision to give battle at Marathon and the tactics they employed so
successfully no doubt owed much to the subsequent prominence of his son Cimon.
Demetrius’ marriage to an Athenian wife of such celebrated lineage is evidence of both
his characteristic enthusiasm for marriage as a means of building or strengthening
alliances and bolstering his own prestige (on his first marriage to Phila, daughter of
Antipater, see below n. 14.2.5), and the Antigonid commitment to maintaining long-term
ties with Athens (on Antigonid ambitions in Cyrene as a possible further incentive to this
marriage, see below n. 14.1.3). On Miltiades, see esp. M.M. Austin,“Greek tyrants and
the Persians, 546–479 BC,” CQ 40 (1990) 289–306; H. Berve, Miltiades: Studien zur

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Geschichte des Mannes und seiner Zeit (Berlin: 1937); K. Kinzl, Miltiades-Forschungen
(Vienna: 1968); L. Scott, Historical commentary on Herodotus Book 6 (Leiden: 2005).
14.1.3 Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ Κυρήνης ἄρξαντι: A Macedonian from Pella and a veteran of
Alexander’s campaigns (Arr. Ind. 18.3; Arr. Succ. 1.17; Diod. 20.40.1), Ophellas either
accompanied Ptolemy to Egypt in 323, or arrived shortly thereafter. At the behest of
wealthy Cyrenaean exiles, Ptolemy sent a substantial force under Ophellas to Cyrene,
where he defeated an army made up of Cyrenaeans and the mercenary forces of the
Spartan adventurer Thibron (Diod. 18.19–21). Cyrene, then an independent state, was
subsequently annexed by the Ptolemaic kingdom. Ophellas likely stayed on to administer
the region for Ptolemy, though he is absent from the sources until 309/08, when he was
persuaded by Agathocles of Syracuse to join an invasion of Carthage. Ophellas’ envoys
successfully recruited mercenaries in Greece—their efforts were particularly fruitful in
Athens, where Ophellas enjoyed a good reputation that stemmed in part from his
marriage to the Athenian noblewoman Eurydice (see above n. 14.1.2)—and he led a
magnificently equipped army to the vicinity of Carthage where he was promptly betrayed
and killed by his erstwhile ally Agathocles (Diod. 20.40.1–42.5; cf. Just. 22.7.5–6).
Demetrius’ marriage to Eurydice may have been motivated in part by a desire to establish
a claim on Cyrene (Billows [1990] 151 implies as much; Ogden 175 argues that the
marriage “constituted a claim to Cyrene via levirate”), but he never realized this
ambition, though his son Demetrius the Fair (he evidently had inherited his father’s
looks) did so briefly (on the younger Demetrius see below n. 53.8.3; Just. 26.3.2–8). On
Ophellas see Berve ii. 296 no. 598; Heckel [2006] 184–85.
14.2.1 ἄλλως…γυναιξίν: Demetrius was both the most prolific bridegroom of all the
Successors and the first to take multiple wives, but the practice of polygamy was well-
established among the Argeads of Macedon, among whom Philip II was particularly
notable in his enthusiasm for diplomatic marriage as an instrument of empire building (on
Philip’s marriages, see Satyrus F 21 [Kumaniecki] = Athen. 13.557 b-e; Plut. Alex. 9; on
Argead polygamy, see W. Greenwalt “Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia,”
Arethusa XXII [1989] 19–45; E. Carney “The politics of polygamy: Olympias,
Alexander and the murder of Philip.” Historia XLI [1992] 169–189; Ogden esp. 3–40).
Indeed, Plutarch (Comp. Demet. Ant. 4.1) states clearly that polygamy was sanctioned by
the marriages of Philip and Alexander and duly adopted by the Successors: Ἔτι
Δηµήτριος µέν, οὐ κεκωλυµένον, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου γεγονὸς ἐν
ἔθει τοῖς Μακεδόνων βασιλεῦσιν, ἐγάµει γάµους πλείονας ὥσπερ Λυσίµαχος καὶ
Πτολεµαῖος (“Demetrius took many wives, a thing that was not only not forbidden but
established as a custom for the Macedonian kings by Philip and Alexander”). In the
Pyrrhus (9.1), Plutarch offers a pithy assessment of the utility of polygamy as practiced
by Philip, Alexander, and the Successors that is very much to the point: Γυναῖκας δὲ
πραγµάτων ἕνεκα καὶ δυνάµεως πλείονας ἔγηµε (“he [Pyrrhus] married several wives
so as to increase his power and further his political interests”).
14.2.5 Φίλα: The eldest daughter of Antipater (Diod. 18.18.2), Phila was around forty
and already twice widowed when she wed the teenaged Demetrius shortly after the
settlement at Triparadisus in 320 (for a convincing argument that Phila was born c.360,
see A.B. Bosworth, “A New Macedonian Prince,” CQ 44 [1994] 57–65; for the date of

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the marriage, see C. Dunn and P. Wheatley, “Craterus and the Dedictation Date of the
Lion Monument,” AHB 26 [2012] 42). Diodorus—probably following Hieronymus who
would have known Phila well (Hornblower 180)—pays her a special tribute (19.59.3–6),
praising her sagacity, judiciousness, and kindness. Her father, Diodorus tells us,
recognized Phila’s considerable talents early, and often sought her counsel on matters of
the most serious import when she was still quite young (Diod. 19.59.4–5). Her abilities
made her a valuable asset in camp, where she had a gift for quelling the concerns of
discontented soldiers, and in the realm of international diplomacy, as evidenced by the
mission to her brother Cassander she undertook on Demetrius’ behalf. As the daughter of
the former regent Antipater and widow of Craterus (see below, n. 14.2.6), one of the most
popular and accomplished of Alexander’s marshals, Phila brought considerable prestige
to the union with her young husband who was, unlike his principal rivals, not a veteran of
the campaigns of Alexander. Plutarch does not mention her first marriage to Balacrus, a
somotaphylax of Alexander (Arr. Anab. 2.12.2), and perhaps also of Philip II (Heckel
[2006] 69), but that union too likely benefited Demetrius. Balacrus was appointed satrap
of Cilicia after the battle of Issus in 333 (Arr. Anab. 2.12.2) and served in that capacity
until his death in 324 (Diod. 18.22.1). In the years she spent with Balacrus in Cilicia,
Phila doubtless established a network of patronage that Demetrius was able to call upon,
and Cilicia subsequently proved to be an invaluable base of operations, a fruitful
recruiting ground, and a place of refuge (Diod. 19.85.5, 19.93.1, 20.47.1; ns. 5.6.3,
32.1.1; cf. Bosworth [2002] 263–66). Phila certainly strengthened Demetrius’ claim to
Cilicia (as she would subsequently add legitimacy to his claim to the Macedonian throne;
see below n. 37.4.3; cf. Carney [2000] 164), and it should be noted that when Pleistarchus
(brother of Cassander and Phila) complained to Cassander after Demetrius occupied
Cilicia, it was Phila whom Demetrius sent to counter his arguments (n. 32.4.1; on
Pleistarchus, see ns. 20.8.3, 23.3.3, 25.1.1, 25.1.4, 26.1.1, 28.2.3, 30.1.1, 31.6.3, 32.4.1).
For all his notorious gynecomania, it is indicative of the esteem in which Demetrius held
Phila that the Athenians established cults in her honor. A fragment of the poet Alexis
suggests she was toasted in symposia as Phila Aphrodite (Athen. 6.254A) and
Adeimantus of Lampsacus, a key Antigonid aid, purportedly erected a temple, known as
the Philaeon, in her honor (Athen. 6.255C; on Adeimantus, see esp. Wallace [2013]; ns.
23.1.1, 43.2.2). Demetrius took no other wives until 307, when Phila was well into her
fifties and likely past her childbearing years (Ogden 175). On Phila, see Berve ii. 382 no.
772; Macurdy 58–69; Wehrli “Phila, fille d'Antipater et épouse de Démétrius, roi des
Macédoniens,” Historia 13 (1964) 140–146; Carney (2000) esp. 165–69; Ogden 173–77.
14.2.6 Κρατερῷ: Perhaps the most talented and accomplished of Alexander’s marshals,
Craterus retained the respect and affection of the king despite his commitment to
traditional Macedonian values and opposition to Alexander’s adoption of the trappings of
Persian despotism (Plut. Eum. 6.2). Shortly before Alexander’s death, Craterus was
ordered to return to Macedon at the head of 10,000 discharged veterans, and take up the
roles of regent of Macedon and epimeletes of Greece that had long been held by
Antipater (Arr. Anab. 7.12.4), but when Alexander died and his “final plans” were
cancelled, Craterus had advanced only as far as Cilicia, where he found Phila, recently
widowed (see above n. 14.2.5). After being named the guardian of the new king, the
mental defective Arrhidaeus (Arr. Succ. 1.3), Craterus arrived in Macedon in time to
reinforce the beleaguered forces under Antipater. The decisive Macedonian victory of the

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Lamian War at Crannon in August, 322 followed (see above, n. 10.2.3) and a garrison
was placed in Munychia (see above, n. 26.1.1). Craterus’ wedding to Phila soon
followed, as did a campaign to bring the perpetually troublesome Aetolians to heel (Diod.
18.24–25; on the Aetolian menace, see below n. 40.8.1). Before the Aetolian campaign
could be completed, however, Antigonus arrived, bearing word of the rise of Perdiccas
(Arr. Succ. 1.24). In the spring of 320, Craterus departed once again for Asia where he
was killed in a fierce cavalry encounter with the forces of Perdiccas’ ally Eumenes (Plut.
Eum. 7.5–6; Arr. Succ. 1.27; Nepos Eum. 4.3–4; Diod. 18.30.5). Craterus’ extraordinary
popularity with the Macedonian rank and file, perhaps best illustrated by the elaborate
precautions Eumenes took to conceal Craterus’ identity from his own Macedonian troops
for fear that they would promptly desert to his adversary (Plut. Eum. 6.4, 7.1), made his
widow an attractive prospect for any ambitious Diadoch. Phila’s desirability, of course,
was further enhanced by her eminent father and her considerable personal qualities (see
above, n. 14.2.5) On Craterus, see Geyer, RE Supplbd IV s.v. “Craterus” (1a)”; Berve ii.
220–27 no. 446; Heckel (1992) 107–33; Heckel [2006] 95–99.
14.3.5 ὅπου τὸ κέρδος, παρὰ φύσιν γαµητέον: Antigonus riffs on Phoenissae, 395:
ἀλλ' ἐς τὸ κέρδος παρὰ φύσιν δουλευτέον (where Jocasta queries Polyneices on the
nature of exile; Plutarch quotes from their exchange in his de Exilio, Mor. 605F).
Antigonus evidently had a fondness for the works of Euripides; Plutarch (Mor. 182E)
preserves another anecdote in which he rebukes a hapless orator with a line from
Iphigenia Among the Taurians (for other examples of Antigonus’ wit, see below 19.6–8;
cf. Billows [1990] 9–10, 21). Lucian (Apologia 3.14) manages to allude to both
Euripides’ original and the adaptation of Antigonus: ὅπου τὸ κέρδος, παρὰ φύσιν
δουλευτέον. On the various factors that made Phila a plum dynastic catch, and which
Antigonus clearly recognized, see above n. 14.2.5.
14.3.3 οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτῷ καθ' ὥραν ἀλλὰ πρεσβυτέραν (Plutarch on marrying an older
woman): Phila was nearly twice the age of Demetrius, who was approximately sixteen
when the two wed. There is no indication of disapproval in Plutarch’s account of the
unorthodox pairing. Cf. the Amatorius, where Plutarch’s father is made to claim that there
is no reason to “be offended with those that marry women elder than themselves;
knowing, as we do, that even Heracles himself gave his own wife Megara, being then
three and thirty years old, to Iolaus his son, being no more than sixteen years of age” (µὴ
δυσχεραίνειν τῷ παρ' ἡλικίαν τοῦ γάµου, γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι κἀκεῖνος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
γυναῖκα Μεγάραν Ἰολάῳ συνῴκισεν ἑκκαιδεκαέτει τότ' ὄντι τρία καὶ τριάκοντ' ἔτη
γεγενηµένην, Mor. 754D).
14.4.1τοιαύτη µὲν οὖν τις ἦν ἡ τοῦ Δηµητρίου τιµὴ…βασιλέων (On Demetrius’
reputation for pleasure addiction; the propaganda of the Diadochi): This runs contrary to
Plutarch’s assertion in the concluding synkrisis (Comp. 4.1) that Demetrius “held all his
wives in honor” (ἔσχε δὲ διὰ τιµῆς ὅσας ἔγηµεν). The extraordinary wealth of anecdotal
material detailing Demetrius’ dalliances with all manner of women must have some basis
in reality, but his rivals, and those seeking their favor, certainly exploited the propaganda
value of Demetrius’ promiscuity, and the more outrageous stories (see, for example,
below ns. 24.1–6) should be viewed with some suspicion. Typically, a commonly
acknowledged weakness or character flaw was seized upon and endlessly elaborated and

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exaggerated by opportunistic and creative courtiers who realized that executing character
assassination on the rivals of one’s patron could prove as rewarding a form of
sycophancy as flattery. Thus, Antigonus had an unquenchable thirst for universal
dominion, Lysimachus was unspeakably cruel, Demetrius utterly debauched. The level of
interest paid to Demetrius’ amatory adventures is highly unusual, for Plutarch, in the
Lives at least (the Moralia are another matter entirely), displays little interest in the sex
lives of his subjects, frequently omitting sexual material he certainly had at his disposal
(cf. Duff Lives 94–97). On those rare occasions when Plutarch delves into the sexuality
of his subjects, it is often to celebrate the triumph of self-control in the face of
overwhelming temptation (e.g. Alex. 21.1–22.6). No doubt the special nature of the
biography—of all the Lives, the Demetrius and its pair, the Antony, famously provide the
only explicitly negative exempla—is partially responsible for the prominence accorded
Demetrius’ sexuality, but other factors are in play, notably the synkritic nature of
Plutarch’s biographical project. Demetrius’ sexual misadventures anticipate those of
Antony, just as his consuming passion for Lamia (see below n. 16.5.2) mirrors Antony’s
for Cleopatra (Intro. 10–11. The example of Alexander too, looms large (see Intro. 33–
35), and, as so often, Demetrius suffers in comparison: when their power was such that
virtually everyone was sexually accessible, Alexander resisted, thinking it “more worth
of a king to subdue his own passions than to conquer his enemies” (Alex. 21.7), while
Demetrius indulged. Finally, Plutarch’s reliance on anecdotal sources, with their
preoccupation with sex scandals, for his characterization of Demetrius in his “off-duty”
moments (see Intro. 40–56) must play a role in the prominence accorded Demetrius’ sex
life. Cf. n. 24.2.2.
XV-XVI: The Battle of Salamis
If the battle of Gaza (n. V: The Battle of Gaza) was rather unremarkable, featuring
as it did relatively small forces, wholly conventional preliminary dispositions, and
opposing commanders who were ill-matched in terms of experience, the subsequent naval
clash off Cypriote Salamis was nothing less than the most important sea-battle ever
contested by the fleets of the Diadochi (Hauben [1976] 1). Demetrius’ overwhelming
victory secured Antigonid occupation of Cyprus, wrested control of the eastern
Mediterranean from Ptolemy, and provided the basis for the assumption of the royal title
by Antigonus, who subsequently conferred it on his son (n. XVIII The Assumption of the
Kingship). In addition, the preliminary land assault on Salamis was the first of several
great sieges that earned Demetrius the epithet Poliorcetes, “Besieger of Cities,” and the
crucial role of large warships in the naval battle anticipated and precipitated the
development of the truly colossal galleys that were the naval hallmark of the early
Hellenistic Age. For ancient accounts of the battle, see Diod. 20.49–52; Polyaen. 4.7.7;
Paus. 1.6.6; App. Syr. 54.275; Marmor Parium, FGrH 239 F B21; Justin 15.2.6–9; Oros.
3.23; cf. Alexis ap. Athen. 6.254A; for modern treatments, see Seibert (1969) 190–206;
Hauben (1976); Billows (1990) 151–55; Wheatley (2001a); Yardley, Wheatley, and
Heckel 237–40; Murray 105–112
15.1.1 περὶ Κύπρου: Cyprus provides easy access to both the southern coast of Asia
Minor and the northern coast of Syria, and thus commands the important shipping lanes
between Egypt, Anatolia, Syria, and the Aegean. Its position, of course, also made it an
ideal staging ground for raids on Antigonid possessions in the eastern Mediterranean, as

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repeatedly demonstrated by Ptolemy after he began establishing control over the island in
315 (see, e.g. Diod. 19.62.3–6, 19.79.4–7). The island, known for its numerous harbors,
was a center of shipbuilding as well as an important source of copper and timber (Strabo
14.6.5). On the strategic importance of Cyprus, see esp. H. Hauben, “Cyprus and the
Ptolemaic Navy.” Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus (1987) 213–226.
15.1.3 ἀχθόµενος…ἀπολείπε: The repeated emphasis on the nobility of the Antigonid
war of Hellenic “liberation” is striking (see above, n. 8.1.2) and has been cited, along
with supposed parallels with Diodorus’ account of events at Salamis, in support of the
theory that Hieronymus was Plutarch’s source for the battle (Hornblower 39; Santi
Amantini 339–40). This is unlikely. Plutarch and Diodorus give contradictory figures for
the number of ships destroyed and prisoners seized and, despite the fact that his account
is far less detailed than that of Diodorus, Plutarch nevertheless includes details not found
there, including the presentation to the Athenians of 1,200 panoplies selected from the
booty (see below n. 17.1.4), which would seem to indicate an Atthidographic source
(Sweet 177–81; Wheatley [2001a] 134–135 and 135 n. 5; Intro. 40–41). The interest of
Athenian sources in the battle is certain, since Demetrius’ fleet included 30 Athenian
quadriremes (Diod. 20.50.3; ns. 10.1.6, 16.3.1).
15.1.4 Κλεωνίδῃ: all of the manuscripts read Cleonides, but the Suda (s.v. Δηµήτριος,
Adler Δ 431) identifies the Ptolemaic commander as Leonides and some commentators
have adopted the emendation (e.g. Kaerst RE s.v. Demetrios [33] col 2774; Santi
Amantini 340). If Leonides is indeed correct, as seems probable, then we have here the
same man who commanded the Ptolemaic offensive in Cilicia Trachea in 309 (Andrei
158 n. 108; Wheatley [2001a] 136–37 n. 13). In that campaign he enjoyed considerable
early success, but was eventually defeated by Demetrius (Diod. 20.19.5; see above n.
7.5.1), and the rivalry between the two no doubt complicated these negotiations, which
probably took place early in the year 306 (on the chronology, see Wheatley [2001a]).
After Ptolemy’s campaign of Greek liberation in 308 ended in failure (n. 8.1.3) he
installed Leonides as his commander in the Peloponnese (Suda s.v. Δηµήτριος, Adler Δ
431). An inscription from Aspendus in Pamphylia (SEG 17.639), which dates from 304 at
the earliest (Ptolemy is given the royal title) and probably belongs to the early 3rd century,
honors mercenaries led by the Ptolemaic officers Leonides and Philocles, suggesting that
Leonides continued on in Ptolemy’s service for some time (on the date, see Paschidis
[2013] 127–29; on the decree, see n. 32.6.2).
15.1.6 Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον: The cities had been handed over to Ptolemy by
Cratesipolis in 308 (Diod. 20.37.1; see above, n. 9.5.2), and were occupied by troops of
either Ptolemy or Cassander until early 303 when Demetrius stormed both cities (see ns.
25.1.1, 25.1.4).
15.2.1 διὰ ταχέων: This adverbial phrase appears five times in the Demetrius (cf. 16.3.3,
30.2.5, 32.2.1, 36.7.1) out of a total of sixteen occurrences in the entire Plutarchan
corpus. The repeated use of the phrase, generally in situations where Demetrius or one of
his rivals flees a defeat or narrowly escapes a perilous situation, provides a nice
illustration of the centrality of sudden reversals of fortune to the Life.

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15.2.2 προσλαβὼν δύναµιν ἐπέπλευσε Κύπρῳ: After leaving Athens, Demetrius first
sailed for the Carian coast and attempted to enlist the aid of the Rhodians. His overtures,
however, were rebuffed—the Rhodians preferred to remain neutral, a stance that
prompted Antigonid retribution the following year (see n. XXI–XXII: The Siege of
Rhodes)—and Demetrius moved on to Cilicia where he assembled additional ships and
soldiers before sailing for Cyprus (Diod. 20.46.6; on the importance of Cilicia as a
recruiting ground and place of refuge for Demetrius, see ns. 14.2.5). Artybius, the Persian
commander tasked with crushing a large Cypriote revolt, had also crossed from Cyprus to
Cilicia before marching on Salamis in 497 (Hdt. 5.108.2; cf. n. 15.2.3). The exact
chronology of Demetrius’ Cypriote campaign is difficult to determine: both Diodorus and
the Marmor Parium place the events in the archon year 307/06, and Pausanias’ claim
(1.6.6) that Demetrius sailed to Cyprus “when the winter was over” (διελθόντος δὲ τοῦ
χειµῶνος) inspires little confidence since (a) Pausanias’ narrative makes it seem that the
winter in question was that which followed the battle of Gaza in 312, and (b) it precedes
the assertion that it was the defeat of Menelaus in a naval-battle (ναυµαχιᾳ; the
engagement took place on land, see n. 15.2.3) that led to the arrival of Ptolemy (cf.
Kaerst RE s.v. Demetrios [33] col. 2774–2775; Wheatley [2001a] 135–36). Even if
Pausanias is correct, it is unclear whether he refers to Demetrius’ initial departure from
Athens or the crossing from the Cilician coast to Cyprus.
15.2.3 Μενέλαον…  µὲν ἀδελφὸν Πτολεµαίου: Menelaus son of Lagus held the overall
command of Ptolemaic forces on Cyprus (Diod.19.62.4, 20.21.1, 20.47.2–4; Paus. 1.6.6).
Little is known of his career after Salamis, but he may have outlived both Demetrius and
Ptolemy; in 284/83 he held the eponymous priesthood of Alexander for the fifth time
(P.Hib. 1.84a; P.Eleph. 2; Ptolemy died in 282; on the death of Demetrius, probably also
in 282, see below n. 52.5.3). The date of Menelaus’ death is unknown. On Menelaus, see
Berve ii. 256 no. 505; Geyer, RE s.v. Menelaos (6) col. 830–31; Heckel [2006] 164.
µάχην...ἐνίκησεν: After landing near Karpasia, on the north side of the Karpass peninsula
that comprises the northeastern extremity of the island, Demetrius demonstrated a
prudent deliberation that demonstrated how far he had come as a commander since the
debacle at Gaza in 312. He fortified his camp with ditch and palisade and dragged his
ships out of the water (νεωλκήσας τὰ σκάφη, Diod. 20.47.2), presumably directly onto
the beach or on hastily constructed slipways. By keeping his ships out of the water while
he operated on land, he reduced waterlogging, which added weight and diminished speed
and maneuverability (on the effects of waterlogging, see Lovén and Schaldemose 2): the
consequent boost in performance may well have made a difference in the subsequent
battle. Demetrius then took Karpasia and neighboring Urania by storm and marched
southeast towards Salamis (Diod. 20.47.2). Menelaus, at the head of a force of 12,000
infantry and 800 cavalry, met Demetrius and his army at a distance of forty stades (a bit
under six and a half kilometers) from the city (Diod. 20.47.3). Although the two forces
were roughly an even match, at least numerically (Demetrius landed on Cyprus with
15,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, but left an “adequate guard” [τὴν ἱκανὴν φυλακὴν] to
watch over his fleet near Karpasia; Diod. 20.47.1), Menelaus’ army was quickly routed,
and Demetrius, chased the fleeing enemy into the city, took 3,000 prisoners and killed
about a thousand (Diod. 20.47.4). The victory was one of the most significant of
Demetrius’ checkered career as a commander on land, since a defeat would likely have

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scuttled the entire campaign in Cyprus, and the army led by Menelaus was the largest
documented force Demetrius ever defeated in a land battle. After the battle Menelaus sent
urgent dispatches to Ptolemy in Egypt and both sides prepared for a siege (Diod.
20.47.8). The ability of Menelaus’ messengers to sail from Salamis suggests that
Demetrius did not immediately effect a naval blockade of Salamis harbor, but his fleet
soon arrived from Karpasia, no doubt sailing around the Karpass peninsula in emulation
of the Phoenician fleet supporting Artybius in 497 (Hdt. 5.108.2; n. 15.2.2).
Plutarch omits the assault on Salamis from his account of the campaign,
preferring instead to concentrate on the more celebrated siege of Rhodes in 305, but
Diodorus’ account of the siege showcases Demetrius’ innovative and ambitious approach
to poliorcetics, including the first documented appearance (Diod. 20.48.2–3) of one of his
celebrated siege-towers, the helepolis (“city-taker”; on these towers, see ns. 21.1.2,
21.3.1, 27.4.1, 40.2.5, 40.5.4, 42.1.3, 43.5.1). Divided into nine stories, the helepolis
towered above the city wall of Salamis at a height of 135 feet (Diodorus gives a height of
90 cubits. The standard Attic cubit was equivalent to approximately 11/2 feet). The lower
levels bristled with artillery, the largest of which were capable of hurling stones of up to
three talents (c.ro180 pounds) and the upper levels featured a variety of lighter catapults
and stone-throwers. Two hundred men manned the helepolis and operated its associated
artillery. In support of the siege-tower, Demetrius constructed two massive battering rams
sheltered by protective covers (on the siege equipment, see Marsden i. 105 and ii. 84–90).
While the heavy artillery and battering rams shook the walls of Salamis, the lighter
catapults and stone-throwers unleashed a barrage that swept Menelaus’ troops from the
battlements. When large sections of the wall were on the verge of being breached,
Demetrius’ troops nearly took the city by storm, but Menelaus succeeded in burning
much of the siege equipment in a daring night sortie (Diod. 20.48.6). Displaying
characteristic fortitude in the face of adversity, Demetrius “even so did not stop but
pushed the siege persistently by both land and sea, believing that he would overcome the
enemy in time” (ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος ἀποσφαλεὶς τῆς ἐλπίδος οὐδ' ὣς ἔληγεν, ἀλλὰ
προσεκαρτέρει τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, νοµίζων τῷ χρόνῳ
καταπολεµήσειν τοὺς πολεµίους, Diod. 20.48.8). The beleaguered defenders of Salamis
received a reprieve when word reached Demetrius that Ptolemy had landed at Paphos on
the southwestern corner of the island with a large force (n. 15.3.1). With Ptolemy rapidly
approaching, Demetrius abandoned the siege and prepared his own fleet.
15.3.1 αὐτοῦ δὲ Πτολεµαίου…ἐπιφανέντος: Ptolemy’s initial landing on Cyprus was at
Paphos (20.49.1). After receiving additional ships from allied cities, he sailed for Citium,
on the opposite side of Cape Pedalium from Salamis, with a fleet of 140 (Diod. 20.49.2;
Polyaenus 4.7.7) or 150 quadriremes and quinqueremes, and more than 200 transport
vessels ferrying 10,000 infantry (Diod. 20.49.2). Seibert ([1969] 194) suggests that the
majority of Ptolemy’s warships craft were quinqueremes.

15.3.6 Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀπαλλάξειν τῆς φρουρᾶς: This exchange of pre-battle
rodomontade is a colorful detail not found in Diodorus’ account, as is Demetrius’ concern
for the freedom of Corinth and Sicyon. Despite Demetrius’ insistence that Ptolemy
withdraw his garrisons, he installed his own garrison after storming Corinth in 304 (n.
25.1.4).

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15.4.1 ὁ δ' ἀγὼν…προστιθείσης: The victory at Salamis in late summer 306 (on the
date, see Wheatley [2001a] ushered in a period of Antigonid thalassocracy, provided the
basis for the arrogation of the royal title by Antigonus and Demetrius, and elevated
Demetrius, for a time, to a position of prominence unsurpassed by any of his rivals, but
the “absolute supremacy” (τὸ µέγιστον…πάντων )—if by this Plutarch means control
of Alexander’s empire—hardly hung in the balance, as subsequent events would amply
demonstrate. Diodorus’ assessment of the stakes, and the anxiety of the combatants just
before the battle, is much to be preferred (20.51.1): “The dynasts, since they were about
to fight for their lives and their all, were in much anxiety” (οἱ δὲ δυνάσται, ὡς ἂν περὶ
τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν ὅλων µέλλοντες διακινδυνεύειν, ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ πολλῇ καθειστήκεισαν;
for an estimation of the significance of the battle for the Antigonids, see Wheatley
[2001a] esp. 134–35).
XVI
16.1.1 Αὐτὸς…ἔχων: on the Ptolemaic fleet, see above n. 15.3.1.
16.1.2 ἐκ δὲ Σαλαµῖνος ἐκέλευσε Μενέλαον ἑξήκοντα ναυσίν…τὴν τάξιν: When
Ptolemy arrived at Citium he was forced to send messengers overland to inform
Menelaus of his presence and ask that he send his 60 ships if he was able to do so (Diod.
20.49.3), indicating that Demetrius already had a naval blockade in place during his siege
of the city (Murray 108). The ability of Menelaus’ ships to participate in the battle was,
of course, contingent on their ability to escape the harbor.
16.2.1 Δηµήτριος…τὸν ἔκπλουν: Salamis is situated on a broad, sandy bay. Her natural
harbor was prone to silting even in antiquity—the capital of Egyptian Cyprus was moved
to Paphos as early as 200 B.C. because of precisely this problem—and its mouth must
have been narrow indeed if Demetrius was able to affect a blockade for any length of
time with such a small squadron (cf. Diod. 20.50.1: ἔχοντος τοῦ λιµένος στενὸν τὸν
ἔκπλουν). Still, assigning only 10 ships—quinqueremes under the command of the
admiral Antisthenes (Diod. 20.50.1)—for such a vital task was a bold move (Billows
[1990] 153–54; Wheatley [2001a] 144 and n.40; cf. Seibert [1969] 200). Demetrius
gambled that he could decide the issue based on the numerical superiority of his fleet
before Menelaus could break the harbor blockade, take Demetrius’ fleet in the rear, and
turn the tide in favor of Ptolemy. In the end, Demetrius’ tactical gamble paid off: in a
fierce engagement at the harbor mouth, Menoetius, the Ptolemaic commander appointed
by Menelaus, and his 60 ships eventually overwhelmed Antisthenes’ token squadron with
the sheer weight of their superior numbers, forcing them to withdraw to Demetrius’
camp. But by then the main issue had been decided. After discovering the main Ptolemaic
force in headlong flight, Menoetius returned to Salamis and Menelaus surrendered to
Demetrius shortly thereafter (Diod. 20.52.5).
16.2.5 ἀνήχθη ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν ὀγδοήκοντα: Diodorus (20.50.2) credits Demetrius with
108 ships plus the 10 allotted to maintain the harbor blockade before the battle, but the
figure is almost certainly corrupt: Demetrius’ fleet was 163 strong when he arrived on
Cyprus (Diod. 20.47.1) and was bolstered by subsequent reinforcements (Diod. 20.50.2),
while Polyaenus (4.7.7) asserts that Demetrius had 170 ships. Thus, it is likely that
Demetrius had a fleet of 170–180 ships when he met Ptolemy off Salamis (for a lucid

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discussion of the textual problems and the qualitative and quantitative strength of the
rival fleets, see Hauben [1976]).
16.3.1 προσµείξας…Πτολεµαῖον: Just as at Gaza (n. V: The Battle of Gaza), Ptolemy
drew up his own battle array in response to Demetrius’ pre-battle dispositions. This time,
however, he chose not to take up a position directly opposite Demetrius. The two fleets
mirrored one another, with both dynasts stationing their best ships on their respective left
wings where they commanded in person (Diod. 20.50.3–6; Polyaenus 4.7.7). Demetrius’
fleet was both quantitatively and qualitatively superior, boasting seven massive,
Phoenician-built “sevens,” 10 “sixes,” 10 quinqueremes, and 30 Athenian quadriremes
massed on the left in a double line, with lighter craft making up the center and right wing
(Diod. 20.50.3–4; on Ptolemy’s fleet, see above n. 15.3.1; the qualitative superiority of
Demetrius’ fleet is confirmed by Hauben [1976] 5 n. 35, who calculates fleet strength
based on the average manpower of the various vessels that comprised the opposing battle
arrays). By pinning his hopes on a heavily reinforced left wing, Demetrius adapted for a
sea-battle the tactics he had employed on land at Gaza six years earlier (these were, of
course, the shock tactics developed by Epaminondas, perfected by Philip and Alexander,
and duly adopted by the Diadochi, see above n. 5.2.2). This is not to suggest, however,
that Demetrius’ larger craft were merely floating fighting platforms designed purely for
boarding and grappling actions. Diodorus (20.51.3) describes the use of frontal ramming
by both fleets, a technique that Demetrius’ largest polyremes no doubt employed with
devastating effectiveness due to their superior weight. Their superiority in height too was
telling, allowing Demetrius’ marines and ship-based artillery to rain down missile fire on
the smaller Ptolemaic ships and their crews, particularly when vessels became wedged
together after an initial collision (Diod 20.51.4; see esp. Murray’s [107–112] recent
treatment of the battle and the role of Demetrius’ larger vessels).
These dispositions meant that the battle became a contest in which each strong
left wing raced to rout the weaker forces opposing them and turn the enemy center before
the opposing wing could do likewise. Demetrius, of course, was under additional pressure
to secure a quick victory, since, given a protracted engagement, an eventual breakthrough
by the 60 vessels under Menoetius, and with it the loss of numerical superiority, was
inevitable (see above n. 16.2.1). Fighting heroically— Diodorus’ [20.52.1] account of the
individual heroism of Demetrius resembles a Homeric aristeia— Demetrius
overwhelmed Ptolemy’s right wing and turned on his center, at which point Ptolemy fled
back to Citium (Diod. 20.52.3). The battle ended in an overwhelming victory for
Demetrius, and one for which he deserves much of the credit—the tactical creativity he
displayed in arranging his fleet was matched by his use of ship-mounted artillery and his
own individual brilliance in combat. The victory not only brought control of Cyprus and
solidified the Antigonid thalassocracy—Demetrius would act with relative impunity at
sea for the rest of his career (on the significance of the victory for Antigonid sea-power,
see Murray 112)—it also provided a suitable trigger for the Antigonid assumption of the
kingship (see below n. XVIII: The Assumption of the Kingship).
16.3.3 ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ µόναις…  αὔτανδροι (Ptolemy’s losses): Diodorus (20.52.6) records
that Ptolemy escaped with twenty ships, a figure that seems more likely than Plutarch’s
figures, especially since Diodorus accounts for 120 of Ptolemy’s ships, leaving 20 or 30
unaccounted for, while Plutarch’s figures (80 captured and 8 escaped from an original

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total of 140–150) suggest that 72 of Ptolemy’s ships were utterly destroyed—a virtual
impossibility given that ancient warships were virtually unsinkable (for the respective
strength of the two fleets, see above n. 16.3.1; on the superior credibility that should be
accorded the figures in Diodorus, see Billows [1990] 154–55 n.39; Wheatley [2001a] 149
and n. 54; Murray 111; cf. Seibert [1969] 202; on the remarkable buoyancy of ancient
warships see Morrison et al. 127–28 and cf. Diod. 20.52.6 where 80 of Ptolemy’s ships
are towed back to Demetrius’ camp “full of seawater” [πλήρεις οὔσας θαλάττης]). In
either case, Ptolemy lost at minimum 120 worships, 100 transports, with 8,000 soldiers,
and many of his friends and aides (Wheatley [2014] 93). This last group may have
included one of Ptolemy’s sons: Justin (15.2.7) includes Leontiscus, son of Ptolemy and
the hetaira Thaïs, among the captured. On Leontiscus, see Peremans and Van’t Dack vi.
no. 14528.
16.5.2 Λάµια: A celebrated hetaira, daughter of the Athenian Cleanor. The name,
identical with that of a man-eating vampire of myth, is probably a professional one,
meant to summon up an air of danger and mystery for potential patrons (a homonymous
hetaira in the time of Themistocles is attested by Athenaeus, 13.576c; cf. Ogden 249;
Wheatley [2003b] 30–31; on the monstrous Lamia, see Diod. 20.41.3–6; Strabo 1.2.8;
Horace Ars Poetica 340). Diogenes Laertius (5.76), citing Favorinus, states that Lamia
was involved with Demetrius of Phalerum, but this is likely one of the many cases of
onomastic confusion involving the two Demetrioi (Geyer col. 547; Ogden 232; Wheatley
[2003b] 31 and n. 9; O’Sullivan [2009a] 9 n. 1). How or when Lamia made her way to
the Ptolemaic court is unclear, though the suggestion that she returned to Egypt with a
member of Ptolemy’s entourage after his Greek campaign of 309/08 is plausible
(Wheatley [2003b] 31 with n. 11; cf. S. Müller [2009] 44 n. 43). Her presence in
Ptolemy’s armada at Salamis does not indicate that she was involved with Ptolemy
himself, nor does Plutarch make such a claim (pace Ogden 241, who imagines that Lamia
was ensconced in a “floating palace”).
The aura of mystery and glamour that Lamia and her fellow hetairai were at pains
to cultivate, as well as their relationships with kings and other political and literary
luminaries, made them objects of intense fascination, and, perhaps inevitably, the richly
varied material concerning hetairai in the literary tradition, particularly Lamia and the
other courtesans associated with the court of Demetrius, is laced with exaggeration and
outright invention to such a decree that extracting historical information is fraught with
difficulty (on hetairai, see C. Faraone and L. McClure [eds.] Prostitutes and Courtesans
in the Ancient World [Madison: 2006]; Davidson passim; on the various problems with
the anecdotal evidence, see Ogden 218–19; on the historicity of the Lamia anecdotes in
the Demetrius, see below ns. 16.6.1, 27.1.1). On Lamia, see Geyer s.v. Lamia (5) RE XII
v.1 (1924), coll. 546–47; Peremans and Van’t Dack, vi. no. 14727; Ogden passim;
Wheatley (2003b).
τὴν µὲν ἀρχὴν...ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λαµπρὰ γενοµένη (Lamia’s talents):
Lamia’s descent from decent beginnings mirrors that of Demetrius. Originally respected
for her art (σπουδασθεῖσα διὰ τὴν τέχνην) she becomes notorious for her erotic exploits
(τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λαµπρὰ γενοµένη; cf. 1.8 where both Demetrius and Antony are
described as ἐρωτικός). Note too the litotes (ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐλεῖν οὐκ

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εὐκαταφρονήτως)—even these grudging words of praise are rendered faint by the
construction. On the importance of the aulos for the Life, see Intro. 30–31.
16.6.1 πολὺ νεώτερον…ἑαυτῆς (Lamia’s age; the trope of the aging courtesan): This
may be an exaggeration, since Athenaeus (13.577C) states that Lamia bore Demetrius a
daughter, and Demetrius was already in his early 30s when he met Lamia. The girl was
named, provocatively, Phila, though Plutarch does not include this child in his list of
Demetrius’ offspring (Ogden 176 suggests that Plutarch merely overlooked her). Perhaps
Plutarch was misled into believing that Lamia was considerably older than Demetrius by
the jokes (related at 27.10 and attributed to the hetaira Mania) that made light of Lamia’s
old age (Ogden 240ff.; see below n. 27.9.1). Cruel jibes at the expense of aging women,
particularly aging courtesans, appear as least as early as Archilochus (F 119), feature
heavily in the Palatine Anthology, and formed part of the stock-in-trade of Roman
epigrammists (for a survey of poems of the moecha senescens type, see Cokayne, 140–
44). The tendency of the various purveyors of anecdotal material to place the same
witticism in the mouth of different courtesans, and to make different women the subject
of a stock hetaira anecdote, raises the possibility that Plutarch, or his source,
misinterpreted a stock aging-courtesan joke as proof that Lamia was indeed well past her
prime when Demetrius fell for her. Still, Demetrius’ devotion to Phila (after initial
misgivings; see above n. 14.2.5), and passion for Lamia indicate that he may indeed have
developed a taste for older women.
16.6.2 ἐκράτησε τῇ χάριτι καὶ κατέσχεν: A remarkable passage and not just for the
appearance of such potent verbs with Lamia as their subject: at 44.10.3–4 Demetrius’ loss
of his Macedonian kingdom is described in precisely the same terms. Just after
Demetrius, his army deserting in droves, exchanges his royal robes for a dark cloak and
flees Macedon, Pyrrhus appears, masters Demetrius’ camp, and takes possession of it
(ἐπιφανεὶς Πύρρος ἐκράτησεν αὐτοβοεὶ καὶ κατέσχε τὸ στρατόπεδον). Pyrrhus
deprives Demetrius of his kingdom without a blow (αὐτοβοεὶ), just as Lamia
overwhelms him with her charm (τῇ χάριτι).
16.6.3 ὥστ' ἐκείνης εἶναι µόνης ἐραστήν, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐρώµενον γυναικῶν: A
variant of the standard erastes/eromenos pairing normally used to describe the respective
roles of partners in a pederastic relationship (cf. Beneker 159 where he argues that
Plutarch simply means that Demetrius “was actively pursuing a relationship with Lamia
while he simply took advantage of the attraction that other women felt for him”).
Plutarch’s own accounts of Demetrius’ sexual escapades with a host of varied partners
weakens this claim, though the notion that Lamia exercised considerable control over
Demetrius and was in part responsible for the descent into debauchery and solipsism that
made him an international laughing-stock and ultimately cost him his kingdom has
proved persistent (see, e.g. 19.6, 24.1, 25.9, 27.1–10; cf. Wheatley [2003b] 36). If the
honors purportedly accorded the hetaira by various Greek poleis are any indication,
Lamia’s contemporaries too thought that she wielded some degree influence with
Demetrius. Demochares (BNJ 75 F 8 = Athen. 6.253A) reports that the Athenians sang
paeans in her honor, and that both the Athenians and the Thebans erected temples to
Lamia Aphrodite, actions he explicitly connects with efforts to flatter her royal lover (on
the temples erected to Demetrius’ wife Phila, see above n. 14.2.5). In addition to these

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divine honors, Lamia’s ability to finance the construction of the famous painted stoa at
Sicyon (Athen. 13.577C; probably shortly after Demetrius refounded the city in 303, see
below n. 25.3.1) suggests that her association with Demetrius was, at the very least, an
extremely lucrative one.
16.7.1 µετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυµαχίαν…ὁπλίτας: cf. 17.6 where Aristodemus announces that
16,800 prisoners have been taken (Perrin’s Loeb translation erroneously renders µυρίους
ἑξακισχιλίους ὀκτακοσίους as 12,800). This figure must include the remaining
Ptolemaic garrisons on the island that surrendered soon after the battle, and it accords
almost exactly with that given by Diodorus, who puts the total number of prisoners at
16,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (for the capitulation of the garrisons and the total number
of prisoners, see Diod. 20.53.1).
XVII
17.1.3 εὐγνωµοσύνῃ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ: This is the first and only time that Demetrius is
credited with “courtesy” (eugnomosyne), and the last we see of his “humanity”
(philanthropia). Cf. ns. 1.5.4, 5.4.3, 22.2.1, 52.6.1.
17.1.4 τοὺς αἰχµαλώτους ἀφῆκεν (The fate of the Ptolemaic prisoners of war): This
display of magnanimity recalls Demetrius’ generosity in the aftermath of the victory over
Ptolemy’s general Cilles in 311 (an act that was inspired by Ptolemy’s own grace in
victory following the battle of Gaza; see above ns. 5.4.3, 6.3.1). Demetrius returned
Ptolemy’s friends and relatives (Justin 15.2.7), but almost certainly ransomed the captive
soldiers or enrolled them in his own ranks. Later in this chapter, Aristodemus announces
to Antigonus, “we hold Cyprus and 16,800 soldiers as prisoners of war” (Κύπρον ἔχοµεν
καὶ στρατιώτας αἰχµαλώτους µυρίους ἑξακισχιλίους ὀκτακοσίους, 17.6.3–5).
Ἀθηναίοις δὲ χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας ἀπὸ τῶν λαφύρων ἐδωρήσατο πανοπλίας (A gift
for the Athenians from the spoils of Salamis; commemorating Salamis in various media):
With this magnificent gift, Demetrius both emulated and surpassed Alexander, who had
dedicated 300 panoplies from the spoils of the victory at the Granicus River in 334 to
Athena at the Panathenaea (Arr. Anab. 1.16.7; Plut. Alex. 16.17). The significance of the
number 1,200 is unclear: Demetrius may simply have desired to surpass Alexander’s
earlier gift by a significant margin, but the suggestion that Demetrius chose 1,200
panoplies as a deliberate reference to the 1,200 Persian ships traditionally recorded as
having been present at the battle of Salamis in 480 is not wholly implausible (Holton 10);
the contention that Alexander’s earlier gift to the Athenians referenced the heroics of the
300 Spartans at Thermopylae most certainly is (Holton 11).
Panoplies were traditionally dedicated at the festival by Athenian allies and
colonists in a ritual commemorating the key mythological event in the aetiology of the
Panathenaea, the defeat of the Giants by Zeus, Athena, and the other Olympian gods (J.
Shear [2001] 571; for the depiction of Antigonus and Demetrius fighting alongside the
Olympians on the peplos of Athena see above n. 10.5.1). In keeping with Alexander’s
precedent, Demetrius probably sent these panoplies to Athens in time for the penteric
festival of 306/05 in which members of the two new tribes named for him and his father
participated for the first time in the procession and athletic competitions (J. Shear [2001]

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579; for the dedication of a panoply to Athena by another Alexander, the son of
Polyperchon, at the Panathenaea of 318, see IG II2 1473 11.6–8). The gift was
simultaneously a gesture of thanks for the aid Athens had rendered to her Savior and
eponymous phyle god (30 Athenian quadriremes fought with Demetrius at Salamis, Diod.
20.50.3), a reminder of Demetrius’ formidable military power, and a powerful blow in
the ongoing propaganda war with Ptolemy: Demetrius and the Athenians assumed the
roles of the champions of Athena and the Olympians, while the Lagid and his forces were
cast as the humbled Giants (for the analogous symbolism associated with Alexander’s
dedication of Persian booty, see J. Shear [2001] 571). At the time of Demetrius’
dedication the Athenians were embroiled in a bitter and protracted conflict with
Cassander, the so-called “Four Years’ War,” that began shortly after Demetrius’
departure for the Cyprus campaign (on this conflict see below n. 23.1.1), and it seems
likely that at least some of the panoplies were not dedicated to the goddess but put to
practical use by Athenian soldiers (P. Themelis, “Macedonian Dedication on the
Acropolis,” in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.) The Macedonians in Athens: 322–229
B.C. [Oxford: 2003] 162; R. van den Hoff, “Tradition and innovation: portraits and
dedications on the early Hellenistic Akropolis,” in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.) The
Macedonians in Athens: 322–229 B.C. [Oxford: 2003] 174).
The propaganda value of the battle was not lost on Demetrius, who
commemorated the victory with a series of ostentatious displays in various media. The
first of these took place immediately after the battle as Demetrius adorned the bows and
sterns of his ships with spolia and proceeded triumphantly back to his camp with the
captured Ptolemaic vessels in tow (Diod. 20.52.4), Some time after sending the captured
panoplies to Athens, perhaps in 304 when he visited the Cyclades (IG XI.2.146; cf. Diod.
20.100.5; on Demetrius’ Greek campaign of 304 see below ns. 23.1–4), Demetrius
arranged for the construction of the lavish and architecturally unique edifice in the
sanctuary of Apollo on Delos now knows as the Neorion. This long, narrow building
featured a ship, likely a captured Ptolemaic “five,” in its principal gallery (on the
Neorion, once known as the Monument of the Bulls for its remarkable engaged columns
featuring bulls protome, see Tréheux; Wescott; n. 30.4.1), and commemorated the victory
at Salamis on a monumental scale. An inventory list (I. Delos 1403) demonsrates that the
Neorion featured an elaborate decorative program including sculpted Nikai and displays
of captive arms (for revisions and commentary on the text of I. Delos 1403, see Tréheux;
cf. G. Roux, “L’inventaire 1403 du Néôrion délien,” BCH 113 (1989) 261–275). The
erection of ship monuments became a relatively common means of commemorating
naval victories from this point onward (for a number of examples, see Lehmann 192–98),
culminating in the magnificent Victory of Samothrace which was once connected to
Demetrius but now seems almost certainly to be a product of the second century B.C. (on
the date of the monument, see now O. Palagia, “The Victory of Samothrace and the
Aftermath of the Battle of Pydna,” in O.Palagia and B. Wescott [eds.] Samothracian
Reflections: Essays in Honor of James R. McCredie [Oxford: 2010] 154–64). After the
victory, Demetrius assumed the royal prerogative of issuing coinage from the (former
Ptolemaic?) mint at Salamis. At the very end of the 4th century and the beginning of the
3rd, Demetrius began issuing coinage in his own name for the first time (n. 30.2.5), most
notably a famous series of coins featuring a winged Nike alighting on the prow of a ship
on the obverse and a striding Poseidon brandishing a trident on the reverse (Newell

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[1927] 24 ff.; Mørkholm 77–78). The official seal of Demetrias featured a heroically
nude warrior, perhaps Demetrius himself, on the prow of a ship, as did a large marble
ship monument found in the palace there (Batziou-Efstathiou 27–28; on the identity of
the warrior, see U. Kron, and A. Furtwängler, “Demetrios Poliorketes, Demetrias, und die
Magneten,” Archaia Makedonia 3 [1983] 147–68; for a ship monument at Epidaurus that
may also be connected with Demetrius, see n. 25.1.4). The painted funerary stele of
Chaeronides, a Cretan mercenary in Antigonid service who died in Demetrias, depicts a
shield with a Poseidon identical to that found on the coins as its blazon, indicating that
the Poseidon Promachos adorned the shields of at least some of Demetrius’ soldiers (on
the stele, see Sekunda 19–22). The shared iconography of coins, seals, and monuments
created a commemorative nexus that simultaneously evoked the victory at Salamis and
advertised the continuing potency of Demetrius’ naval forces in the aftermath of the
disaster at Ipsus in 301 (on the coinage and its message, see Newell [1927] 30–32; on
Ipsus, see below ns. 28.2.1–29.8.4).
17.2.1 τῷ πατρὶ: Antigonus was engaged in the foundation of his new capital
Antigoneia on the Orontes (Diod. 20.47.5–6). The exact site of the city has not been
definitively established, but it was likely northeast of the later site of Antioch, near the
confluence of the Karasu (known to the Greeks as the Teleboas) and the Orontes
(Downey Ancient Antioch 29–39; Billows [1990] 297; Cohen [2006] 77). The site was of
outstanding strategic importance: Diodorus describes the locations as “naturally well-
suited for watching over Babylon and the upper satrapies and also for keeping an eye
upon lower Syria and the satrapies near Egypt” (20.47.5; n. 47.6.2), and the proximity of
the site to Cyprus must also have contributed to Antigonus’ commitment to seize the
island from Ptolemy.
17.2.2 πρωτεύοντα κολακείᾳ τῶν αὐλικῶν ἁπάντων (Aristodemus the “arch-
flatterer”): This characterization is patently unfair, a product of Plutarch’s belief that the
insidious effects of flattery played a key role in Demetrius’ decline; Aristodemus was in
fact one of the most senior, experienced, and trusted Antigonid advisors (see above n.
9.2.6; on the role of flatterers in the Life see Intro. 36–39).
17.3.1 ὡς γὰρ ἐπέρασεν ἀπὸ τῆς Κύπρου… τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.” For abbreviated accounts
of this episode, see Diod. 20.53.1; Just. 15.2.10. Aristodemus was not dispatched to
Antigonus until Demetrius had secured control over all of Cyprus, and it is thus a virtual
certainty that Antigonus had already received word of the victory. This, coupled with the
fact that Antigonus’ friends had a diadem at hand, suggests a carefully orchestrated affair
designed to create a riveting spectacle appropriate for Antigonus’ assumption of the
kingship (Gruen 255–57; Billows [1990] 157; Sherwin White and Kuhrt 120; Wheatley
[2001a] 151–56; Strootman [2014a] 228–30). Indeed, though the exact location of
Antigoneia (and thus the basileion where Antigonus awaited the arrival of Aristodemus)
is unknown (see above, n. 17.2.1), it was almost certainly some distance inland:
Aristodemus may have proceeded in silence for some 20 kilometers (Grainger [1990]
[1990] 38; Wheatley [2001a] 152 n. 63; Cohen [2006] 76–79).
XVIII: The Assumption of the Kingship

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 The Antigonid assumption of the kingship marked a pivotal moment in
Hellenistic history. Despite the tendency of ancient authors to refer to the Diadochi in
regal terms in earlier contexts (a perfectly understandable mistake given that after the
death of Alexander the most prominent of the Diadochi did indeed operate as de facto
kings in their respective spheres: Billows [1990] 155; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel
248; Paschidis [2013] 129), it was not until Demetrius’ victory at Salamis, several years
after the assassinations of Alexander IV and Heracles, Alexander’s purported bastard son,
that any of the Macedonian dynasts moved to formally lay claim to the vacant title (the
numerous anachronistic references to the Diadochi as kings are collected in Yardley,
Wheatley, and Heckel 248–49, and see above n. 10.3.1 for Plutarch’s claim that the
Athenians were the first to hail Antigonus and Demetrius as kings in 307). Several factors
account for the caution of the Diadochi: Cassander’s fear for the loyalty of his troops
when Polyperchon arrived in Epirus with Heracles in tow (Diod. 20.28.1–4) and the
attempts to manipulate Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, are illustrative of the lingering
regard for the remnants of the Argead house, even after the elimination of Alexander’s
only legitimate heirs, Philip III and Alexander IV. Support for Alexander IV had
comprised a key component of the propaganda of all the rival dynasts. An attempt to
claim the title too soon after the young king’s death would diminish the credibility of any
would-be successor (Gruen 253); the relatively balanced power of the Diadochi meant
that none had established sufficient preeminence to justify the initial assumption of the
title before 306 (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 248). These factors necessitated a
cautious approach and created a climate in which Antigonus and Demetrius were
worshipped as gods before they were formally crowned as kings—Scepsis in the Troad
had offered divine honors to Antigonus before 311 (ns. 8.1.2, 10.4.1) and the Athenian
apotheosis of Demetrius and Antigonus (as both Soteres and eponymous phyle-gods, see
above ns. 10.4.1, 10.6.2) preceded their arrogation of the royal title by fully a year.
Salamis, however, changed everything. Antigonus had won great victories earlier
in his career, but all of them came, crucially, before the liquidation of the Argeads
(Billows [1990] 156). Demetrius’ smashing defeat of Ptolemy upset the balance of power
and established the primacy of the Antigonids. The creation of the first Hellenistic
monarchies upon a foundation of military victory— Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander
too would point to military success to justify their own royal claims—accounts for the
personal and charismatic nature of Hellenistic kingship, which was predicated upon
individual achievement rather than claims to any specific territory (Green [1990] 31).
These new personal monarchies were also improvisational and idiosyncratic:
improvisational, because of the need to establish new dynasties in the wake of the
extinction of the Argeads, who had provided the kings of the Macedonians for nearly four
hundred years; idiosyncratic, since the power bases of all the dynasts save Cassander lay
outside of Macedonia and it was necessary to alloy the mos Macedonum with local
traditions. For ancient accounts of the coronation of the Diadochi, see Diod. 20.53.2–4;
Justin 15.2.10–14; App. Syr. 54; Nepos Eum. 13.2–3; Parian Mable = FGrH 239 F B23;
Heid. Epit. = FGrH 155 F 1.7; for modern treatments, see Seibert [1983] 136–40, with
earlier bibliography; Gruen [1985]; Billows [1990] 155–60; Yardley, Wheatley, and
Heckel 241–49, with further bibliography.

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18.1.1 Ἐκ τούτου…βασιλέας: The crowd that hailed Antigonus and Demetrius as kings
at Antigoneia likely consisted of the inhabitants of the incipient capital as well as
Antigonus’ assembled troops (cf. Appian [Syr. 54] where, “the army hailed both
Antigonus and Demetrius as kings”:  γενοµένῳ ὁ στρατὸς ἀνεῖπεν ἄµφω βασιλέας,
Ἀντίγονόν τε καὶ Δηµήτριον; Diod. 20.53.2; Justin 15.2.10). The presence of these
soldiers created an approximation of the traditional Macedonian military assemblies that
were convoked, always on an ad hoc basis, to demonstrate popular support for a decision
of a king or to acclaim the ascension of a new one, and lend a semblance of legitimacy to
the proceedings (on the Macedonian Assembly, see R.A. Lock, “The Macedonian Army
Assembly in the Time of Alexander the Great,” CP 72 [1977] 91–107; Hatzopoulos 263–
66; Yardley and Heckel 76–78, with further bibliography; Paschidis [2013] 126, 128
18.1.2 Ἀντίγονον…οἱ φίλοι: The fact that Antigonus’ friends had a diadem at hand
suggests that the entire affair was carefully orchestrated (see above n. 17.3.1).
18.1.3 διάδηµα: The diadem refers to the regal band worn by the Great King of Persia
around his tiara (Xen. Cyr. 8.3.13) which was subsequently adopted by Alexander
(Arrian Anab. 7.22.2) and his Successors (Diod. 20.53.2–3).
Ἀντιγονον…προσεῖπεν: By conferring the kingship of Demetrius, Antigonus
demonstrated his intent to establish a new dynasty in place of the defunct Argead house
(Billows [1991] 156–57; Wheatley [2001a] 151, 155–56). Demetrius’ own son,
Antigonus Gonatas (born, c. 319), was already a teenager, or nearly so, and the line of
succession for the new house seemed secure for generations to come.
18.2.1 οἱ δ' ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ…διὰ τὴν ἧτταν: Although Plutarch’s account gives the
impression that Ptolemy took the royal title as a direct and immediate response to the
assumption of the diadem by the Antigonids (as does Diod. 20.52.3), both the Marmor
Parium (FGrH 239 B 23) and an array of Egyptian sources (Ptolemy of Alexandria’s
Canon, as well as chronographic and numismatic materials; see Yardley, Wheatley, and
Heckel 244–45 for the sources and secondary literature) confirm that he did not do so
until 305 or 304, by which time his repulse of an Antigonid invasion of Egypt and key
role in foiling Demetrius’ siege of Rhodes (for which he was subsequently granted divine
honors by the Rhodians, Diod. 20.100.3–4) provided him with sufficient support for his
own regal claims (Gruen 257–58; on the abortive Egyptian invasion of 306, see below ns.
19.1–3; on the siege of Rhodes, see below ns. XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes-22.8; on
the possibility that Ptolemy took the title during the siege rather than after it, see below n.
22.1).
18.3.2 Λυσίµαχος…διάδηµα: Lysimachus and Cassander often worked in concert in this
period and it is generally assumed that the two adopted the royal title at approximately
the same time, in 305 or 304 (for the association of the two, see Diod. 20.106.2–3; Lund
55–57; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 246 on the date, see below, n. 19.4.1–3). The
numismatic evidence supports this date: coins bearing Lsyimachus’ characteristic
emblem, the forepart of an attacking lion, and inscribed ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΛΥ, were struck at
his new capital Lysimacheia between 306/5 and 301/0 (M. Thompson, “The Mints of
Lysimachus,” in C.M. Kraay and G.K. Jenkins [eds.] Essays on Greek coinage Presented

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to Stanley Robinson [Oxford: 1969] 165, 168; Mørkholm 60–61; Yardley, Wheatley, and
Heckel 247).
18.3.3 Σέλευκος…ἐχρηµάτιζε: Seleucus is given the royal title in Babylonian cuneiform
texts beginning in 305/04 (Boiy JCS 52 [2000] 115–21; id. [2007] 84–5). At roughly the
same time, Seleucid coinage began to feature the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΣΕΛΕΥΚΟΥ
(Mørkholm 71; A. Houghton and C. Lorber, Seleucid Coins: A Comprehensive
Catalogue. Part 1: Seleucus I to Antiochus III [New York: 2002] 35–6; Wheatley [2009a]
62; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 247).
18.4.1–3 Κάσσανδρος…ἔγραφε: If Plutarch suggests here that Cassander did not
assume the royal title, the epigraphic (SIG3 332; SEG 34.620), numismatic (B.V. Head,
Historia Numorum, 2nd ed. [London: 1911] 228), and literary (Diod. 20.53.4) evidence
proves otherwise. All of the evidence, however, eludes secure dating and Cassander may
well have encountered impediments to his arrogation of the royal title stemming from
political conditions in his Macedonian power base. Certainly his central role in the
elimination of the Argead line meant that he had to pursue his own designs on the
kingship (evident as early as 316 when he founded Cassandreia; Landucci-Gattinoni
[2003] 124–37) with as much or more caution than his rivals, and he generally appears
last on the list of royal claimants (Diod. 20.53.4; Nepos Eum. 13.3; Wheatley [2009a] 62;
Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 246). Like Lysimachus (n. 18.3.2), Cassander probably
did not formally assume the royal title before Demetrius lifted the siege of Rhodes in 304,
after which the grateful Rhodians erected statues of King Cassander and King
Lysimachus (Diod. 20.100.2; O. Müller 102–103).
18.5.5 καθάπερ τραγικῶν ὑποκριτῶν: After the brilliant coup de théâtre staged by
Aristodemus and Antigonus leads to the public acclamation of the Antigonids as kings
(see above n. 17.3.1), the language of the Life becomes persistently theatrical (cf. 25.9.3;
28.1.2; 44.10.1; 53.1.1). For the tragic tenor of the Life and for Plutarch’s ambivalence
towards the mimetic arts in general, see Intro. 29–40
XIX: The Invasion of Egypt
The invasion of Egypt was clearly an attempt to capitalize on the victory at
Salamis, eliminate Ptolemy once and for all, and add Egypt to the Antigonid realm. As
such, it was further evidence of Antigonus’ commitment to uniting as much of
Alexander’s shattered empire as he possibly could under the hegemony of the Antigonid
house. This centralist ambition was manifest in the successive attempts in the years 310–
302 to isolate and destroy Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Cassander in turn (on the centrist
ambitions of Antigonus and Demetrius, see esp. Wheatley [2009a] 56–59). The Egyptian
expedition ended in complete failure, though not in disaster—and it dealt a blow to the
prestige that had accrued to the Antigonids after Demetrius’ victory at Salamis and
Antigonus’ subsequent assumption of the kingship. In thwarting the invasion, Ptolemy
did much to restore his own reputation while bolstering his claim to his Egyptian realm,
which he regarded thereafter as spear-won territory (Diod. 20.76.7). The lucid and
detailed account of Diodorus (20.73–76) is by far our best source for the invasion. It has
all the hallmarks of a first-hand account, and it is probably based on Hieronymus, who
almost certainly participant in the expedition (Hornblower 221; Wheatley [2014] 96).

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Plutarch may also have drawn on Hieronymus, but his account is too compressed to allow
for any conclusions. On the abortive expedition, see Diod. 20.73–76; Paus. 1.6.6; Seibert
(1969) 207–24; Hauben (1975/6) 267–71; Hornblower 220–21; Billows (1990) 162–64;
Wheatley (2014).
19.1.2 εὐθὺς ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Πτολεµαῖον: The expedition was launched in late
October 306 on the cusp of the setting of the Pleiades (Diod. 20.73.3), the traditional end
of the sailing season. Undertaking an expedition so late in the year meant that the fleet
under Demetrius was likely to encounter foul weather, as indeed they did (see below, n.
19.3.1), but Antigonus clearly felt the risk was acceptable and he scoffed at the objections
of Demetrius’ pilots who were reluctant to take to the sea so late in the year (Diod.
20.73.3). With Ptolemy out of the picture and the revenues of Egypt swelling their
coffers, Antigonus and Demetrius could move at their leisure to eliminate their remaining
rivals and perhaps even reunite the empire of Alexander under the nascent Antigonid
dynasty. To delay the invasion until the following spring, on the other hand, would give
Ptolemy several extra months to strengthen his defenses (Hornblower 221; Billows
[1990] 162). The stakes were tremendous and Antigonus organized the massive
amphibious invasion accordingly (see below n. 19.1.3).
19.1.3 αὐτὸς…συµπαραπλέοντος: Antigonus amassed an invasion force of 80,000
infantry, nearly 8,000 cavalry, and 83 elephants, while Demetrius’ fleet consisted of 100
transports and 150 warships (Diod. 20.72.2; quadriremes [20.72.1, 20.76.2] and
quinqueremes [20.74.5] are the only classes of warships specifically mentioned by
Diodorus in his account of the expedition). The scope of the expedition is stunning;
neither Philip nor Alexander nor any of the other Diadochi ever put so many infantry in
the field, and Demetrius’ warships alone required, at the absolute minimum, an additional
30,000 rowers, to say nothing of marines or the crews of the transport vessels. To help
supply this army, Antigonus enlisted the aid of Arabs who assembled an immense camel
train purportedly capable of transporting 130,000 medimnoi of grain at Gaza, while
additional supplies were hauled in wagons (Diod. 20.73.3). The amount of grain
transported by the camels is incredible: 130,000 medimnoi amounts to c. 5,200,000 kg.
Even if each of the beasts was laden with 300 kg. of grain, a heavy load, more than
17,300 of the beasts would be required (on the carrying capacity of camels, see Engels
14). A train of such size would dwarf the next largest camel force ever documented in
antiquity, the 5,000 camels that transported the Persian treasure looted from Persepolis,
Susa, and Pasargadae by Alexander (Plut. Alex. 37.5), and it seems probable that the
figure is exaggerated to some degree.
It appears that Antigonus intended to assault Pelusium by land from the east while
Demetrius used his fleet to turn the Ptolemaic defenses, effected a landing at one of the
more westerly mouths of the Nile, and marched his own force to take the Ptolemaic
troops in the rear. With Ptolemy occupied on two fronts, Antigonus would be able to
force a crossing of the river, at which point the numerical superiority of the Antigonid
forces would prove telling (the size of Ptolemy’s army is unknown, but he could not
possibly have matched the Antigonid force, particularly after losing some 20,000 troops
during the Cyprus campaign a few months before; Billows [1990] 163 n. 2, and see above
n. 17.1.4) After seizing Pelusium, the twin Antigonid forces could then march on
Memphis down the Pelusiac branch of the Nile, accompanied by those of their ships

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capable of navigating the river (so Hauben 1975/6 267–71, who estimates that about half
of the Antigonid fleet had a shallow enough draught to do so, followed by Billows [1990]
163 and 164–65 n. 4 who emphasizes the importance of Demetrius’ turning movement;
contra Seibert [1969] 208–220, who argues that the Antigonids intended to march across
the Nile Delta to Alexandria). The strategy was creative, designed to exploit the
numerical superiority of the amphibious Antigonid force, and seemingly informed by
earlier attempts to invade Egypt. Antigonus was certainly familiar with the fate of
Perdiccas, who was murdered by his own troops after he failed to force a crossing of the
Nile at both Pelusium and Memphis in 321 or 320 (Diod. 18.33–36; Arrian Succ. 28–29 =
FGrH 156, 9); Justin 13.8.10; Pausanias 1.6.3; Strabo 17.1.8), and the massive Persian
force of Artaxerxes III, supplemented by Greek mercenaries stormed Pelusium in 343,
but only after the Egyptian pharaoh Nectanebo II foolishly abandoned his strong
defensive position there and retreated to Memphis (Diod. 16.48–49), a mistake that the
wily Ptolemy was certain not to repeat. Dispatching a turning force by sea was an
imaginative response to the difficulty presented by a frontal assault on the Nile, whether
at Pelusium or Memphis, and historical precedent suggests the plan had every chance of
success— the Athenian mercenary commander Iphicrates had successfully outflanked the
formidable Pelusiac defenses of the pharaoh Nectanebo I by effecting a surprise landing
at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, probably in 378 (Diod. 15.43).
19.2.2 Μήδιος Ἀντιγόνου φίλος. Medius, the son of Oxythemis of Larissa and a
hetairos of Alexander, hosted the drinking party in Babylon at which the king took ill for
the final time (Plut. Alex. 75.4; Mor. 124D; cf. Arrian 7.25; Diod. 17.117.1; Curt 10.4;
Justin 12.13.7). Plutarch names him as the arch-flatterer of Alexander (τῶν κολάκων
οἷον ἔξαρχος, Mor. 65C–E), holding him responsible for Alexander’s treatment of
Callisthenes, Philotas, and Parmenio, and his ultimate acquiescence to the repeated
attempts of his courtiers to deify him “like some barbarian idol” (ὥσπερ ἄγαλµα
βαρβαρικόν). His appearance in the narrative directly after Plutarch’s account of the
coronation of Antigonus and its consequences—an event staged by Aristodemus,
Antigonus’ own “arch-flatterer” (πρωτεύοντα κολακείᾳ τῶν αὐλικῶν ἁπάντων; see
above n. 17.2.2; for the unfairness of the charge, see above n. 9.2.6)—is probably no
coincidence (on the destructive role of flatterers in the Life, see Intro. 36–39). Elsewhere
in Plutarch (Mor. 124C; 338D; 472D), Medius appears as a drinking partner of
Alexander.
A partisan of Perdiccas, Medius commanded the mercenary contingent of a force
under Aristonous on an expedition to Cyprus in 320 (Arrian Succ. 24.6 = FGrH 156, 9).
When he entered the service of Antigonus is uncertain; perhaps he was captured on
Cyprus or came over to Antigonus after Perdiccas was killed by a cabal of his own
officers during a disastrous attempt to invade Egypt (Arrian Anab. 7.18.5; Nepos Eum.
5.1). Medius was active commanding Antigonid naval forces off the Levantine coast and
in the Aegean beginning in 313 (Diod. 19.69.3; 75.3–4; 75.7–8). He held an important
command on the left wing of Demetrius’ navy at Salamis (Diod. 20.50.3) and, as this
passage shows, accompanied the abortive Antigonid invasion of Egypt. The anecdote of
the ominous dream that Plutarch relates here may indicate that Medius was among the
Antigonid officers who opposed the timing of the invasion (Diod. 20.73.3; Billows
[1990] 162). Later, he assisted Demetrius in his campaign to drive Cassander from

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Greece in 304, and was subsequently honored by the Athenians for his efforts (IG II2 498,
line 10 ff.). An inscription honoring Medius from Gonnoi in Thessaly likely dates to
Demetrius’ reign as king of Macedon (294–287) and thus indicates that he remained loyal
to Poliorcetes after the debacle at Ipsus (C. Habicht, “Epigraphische Zeugnisse zur
Geschichte Thessaliens unter der makedonischen Herrschaft,” in B. Laourdas and C.
Makaronas [eds.] Archaia Makedonia, v. I [Thessalonike: 1970] 265–69; Billows [1990]
401). His long and successful career in the service of the Antigonids would have made
him a valuable source for his contemporary, the historian Hieronymus (Hornblower 126),
and his nephew Oxythemis was a close associate of Demetrius (on Oxythemis see below
n. 36.9.1). On Medius, see Geyer, RE s.v. Medios (2); Berve ii. 261–62 no. 521; Billows
[1990] 400–401 no. 68; Heckel 158; Paschidis [2008] 110–12.
ὄψιν εἶδε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους: cf. Demetrius’ ominous dream that presages the disaster at
Ipsus (29.1), and the dream of Antigonus that leads to the flight of Mithridates (4.2).
19.2.3 ἀγωνίζεσθαι µετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἁπάσης δίαυλον: The diaulos, or double-
stadion, race was added to the Olympic program in 724 B.C. (Miller [2006] 32).
19.3.1 αὐτός…ἄπρακτος: Antigonus’ march to the Egyptian border from Gaza was
relatively uneventful, though navigating the treacherous quicksands of Barathra, in the
area of the Serbonian lake, proved difficult (Diod. 20. 73.3), just as it had for the invasion
force of Artaxerxes III nearly forty years before (Diod. 16.46.5; on Barathra, see Diod.
1.30.5–9). More troublesome were the sizeable rewards Ptolemy offered to deserters after
Antigonus arrived at Pelusium, and he was reduced to training missile and artillery fire
on those of his own troops who attempted to cross the river and defect to Ptolemy (Diod.
20.75.1–3).
As his pilots had feared (see above n. 19.1.2), Demetrius’ fleet had only sailed as
far south as Raphia when they encountered storms that scattered the warships and sank
some of the transports (Diod. 20.74.1). Soon afterwards they were forced to ride out
another storm for several days at sea in the vicinity of Casium (probably at the western
end of the Serbonian lake). Three quinqueremes were wrecked and the entire fleet nearly
perished from thirst after their supply of drinking water was exhausted (Diod. 20.74.4–5).
Demetrius’ first attempt to land behind the Ptolemaic defenses at Pelusium, first at a
place called Pseudostomos (the location of Pseudostomos is uncertain, but it is probably
one of the artificial mouths of the Nile between Pelusium and the Phatnitic mouth; cf.
Diod. 1.33.8) was foiled by a strong Ptolemaic garrison, and his second, at the Phatnitic
mouth, by yet another storm that scattered his fleet, delaying the landing long enough for
Ptolemy to send reinforcements (Diod. 20.74.4–5). With the possibility of turning
Ptolemy’s defenses at Pelusion lost and supplies for the massive invasion force
dwindling, Antigonus opted to withdraw (Diod 20.76.5). In the end, the expedition failed,
not because it was ill conceived, but because it was ill timed. The strategy hinged on
turning Ptolemy’s Pelusiac defenses by sea, a movement that proved impossible due to
autumnal storms (Billows [1990, 164] characteristically blames Demetrius, but his
defense of Antigonus’ strategy is special pleading).
19.6.2 τῆς Λαµίας ἀναφανδὸν ἤδη κρατούσης: The potency of the language is striking.
Cf. ns. 16.6.2, 27.1.3.

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19.7.3 πότερον Θάσιον ἢ Χῖον ἦν τὸ ῥεῦµα. To reuma, literally “that which flows,” can
be applied equally to a bodily discharge or rheum and any sort of watercourse (cf.
46.10)—in this case a river of Thasian or Chian wine. A memorable fragment of the old
comic playwright Hermippus preserved in Athenaeus (Athen. 29F = Kock I.249)
illustrates the degree to which wines of Thasos and Chios were prized:
Ἕρµιππος δέ που ποιεῖ τὸν Διόνυσον πλειόνων µεµνηµένον· Μενδαίῳ ... µὲν καὶ
ἐνουροῦσιν θεοὶ αὐτοὶ στρώµασιν ἐν µαλακοῖς. Μάγνητα δὲ µειλιχόδωρον καὶ
Θάσιον, τῷ δὴ µήλων ἐπιδέδροµεν ὀδµή,τοῦτον ἐγὼ κρίνω πολὺ πάντων εἶναι
ἄριστον τῶν ἄλλων οἴνων µετ' ἀµύµονα Χῖον ἄλυπον.
Hermippus, I believe, makes Dionysus mention several varieties: “Because of Mendaean
the gods actually wet their soft beds. As for Magnesia’s sweet bounty, and Thasian, over
which floats the smell of apples, I judge it far the best of all wines excepting blameless,
painless Chian.”
19.10.4 ἐκεῖνος δὲ τὰ µὲν ἡδονῇ διδοὺς ἁπλῶς ἑαυτόν, τὰ δὲ σπουδῇ, καὶ θάτερα
τῶν ἑτέρων ἄκρατα µεταχειριζόµενος, οὐχ ἧττον ἦν δεινὸς ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πολέµου
παρασκευαῖς: This description of Demetrius’ extraordinary ability to compartmentalize
echoes that of Diodorus (20.92.4). The stark contrast between Demetrius’ efficiency in
public and dissoluteness in private recalls Plutarch’s portrait of Alcibiades (Plut. Alc.
16.1, clearly following Thuc. 6.15).
XX
20.1.1 Plutarch frequently interrupts his historical narratives for characterizing surveys of
his subjects. Such surveys are often placed in the middle portion of a Life and offer a still-
life portrait of the subject in his prime (Duff 2011b). Here Plutarch focuses on
Demetrius’ passion for designing and constructing awe-inspiring warships and siege
equipment. Some kings pursue useless diversions, but Demetrius’ efforts in these realms
are evidence that he is “gifted and contemplative” (εὐφυὴς γὰρ ὢν καὶ θεωρητικός,
20.2). His work is characterized as “kingly” (βασιλικόν), and the fruits of his labor are
deemed “worthy not only of the mind and resources of the king, but also of his
handiwork” (ὥστε µὴ µόνον γνώµης καὶ περιουσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειρὸς ἄξια φαίνεσθαι
βασιλικῆς, 20.5). Demetrius’ handiwork inspires awe and delight in equal measure, but,
for Plutarch, the magnificence of these creations should not inspire his readers to imitate
their creator, and they may in fact be an indication of Demetrius’ weakness of character.
In the preface to the Pericles-Fabius, Plutarch remarks that labor with one’s own hands is
an indication of “an indifference to higher things,” and “it does not of necessity follow
that, if the work delights you with its grace, the one who wrought it is worthy of your
esteem” (οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ τέρπει τὸ ἔργον ὡς χαρίεν, ἄξιον σπουδῆς εἶναι τὸν
εἰργασµένον, Per. 2.1). A gifted young man (εὐφυὴς νέος) might admire the work of a
sculptor or poet, but he does not aim to be a Phidias or an Archilochus (Per. 2.1). Only
displays of virtue (ἀπ' ἀρετῆς τὰς πράξεις) should excite desire for imitation (Per. 2.3),
and Plutarch’s Demetrius is incapable of arete (see Intro. 29).
20.1.3 τῆς δὲ περὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ µηχανήµατα µεγαλουργίας: On Demetrius’
pioneering efforts in the design of ever-larger ships of war, see below n. 20.7–8; on the

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achievements of Demetrius and his engineers in the realm of poliorcetics, see ns. 15.2.3,
XXI: The Siege of Rhodes, 21.1.2.
20.3.1 Ἀέροπος γὰρ ὁ Μακεδὼν: Originally the regent for his young nephew Orestes,
Aeropus slew the boy and seized the throne, probably in 399 (Diod. 14.37). He reigned
for six years before succumbing to illness and was succeeded by his son Pausanias (Diod.
14. 84.6). He confronted a Spartan force led by Agesilaus when they attempted to force a
passage through Macedonia in 394, but came to terms after being outwitted by the
Spartan king (Poly. 2.1.17) On Aeropus, see J. Kaerst RE s.v. Aeropos (5); Borza (1991)
178.
20.3.3 Ἄτταλος δ' ὁ Φιλοµήτωρ: Attalus III Philometer was the last of the Attalid kings
of Pergamum, and is best known for bequeathing his kingdom to Rome in 133 B.C.
(Strabo 13.4.2). Justin (36.4.3), probably drawing on the same source as Plutarch
(Scarborough [2008] 143), writes that he neglected the administration of his kingdom to
pursue his passions for pharmacology and the cultivation of poisonous plants. In addition
to his research on poisons and their antidotes, Attalus developed a number of beneficial
drugs, some of which were called “Attalids” after their deviser (Pliny NH 32.87; Celsus
de Medicina 5.19.11). On Attalus’ pharmacological pursuits, see Scarborough (2008).
ὑοσκύαµον: Hyoscyamus Niger, commonly called henbane, was prized for its analgesic,
hallucinogenic and toxic properties (Xen. Oec. 1.13.6; Dioscorides de materia medica
4.68ff.; Pliny NH 25.35). Plutarch likens a convivial discussion that is marred by a
dispute and descends into abuse to “henbane mixed with the wine”
(ὑοσκύαµονἐµβαλόντες οἴνῳ, Mor. 621E).
ἐλλέβορον: Helleborus orientalis, or hellebore was a powerful aperient recommended by
Celsus (de. med. 2.12.1). Plutarch (41.7.2) relates that Alexander wrote to the physician
Pausanias with advice on how best to administer hellebore to the ailing Craterus. Pliny
writes (NH 25.47) that the medicinal qualities of hellebore, which included curing
madness, were discovered by the prophet Melampus. On hellebore, see Theophrastus
hist. plant. 9.10.1ff.
κώνειον: Conium maculatum, or hemlock, contains potent alkaloids that can be fatal to
humans in doses of greater than 100 mg. Ingesting hemlock results in ascending muscular
paralysis; death by suffocation follows the paralysis of the respiratory muscles. On the
toxicity of conium maculatum, see L. Schep, R. Slaughter, and M. Beasley, “Nicotinic
Plant Poisoning,” Clinical Toxicology 47 (2009) 771–781; for Socrates’ death by
hemlock poisoning, see esp. Pl. Phaedo 117e-118a; cf. Arist. Ra. 124–27; Demetrius’
cousin Polemaeus also died after drinking hemlock, n. 2.2.1; cf. n. 12.3.2).
ἀκόνιτον: A notoriously deadly poison, aconitum is a genus of the buttercup family.
According to Theophrastus (hist. plant. 9.18.2), quadrupeds were particularly susceptible
to aconitum, and Dioscorides (4.78) relates that it was used to kill dangerous predators,
including panthers and wolves. Ovid (Met. 6.129ff.) describes how Athena transformed
Arachne into a spider by sprinkling her with aconitum, and how Medea contrived to have
Theseus drink from a cup poisoned with the stuff (Met. 7.404ff.)

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δορύκνιον: Dioscorides (4.74) notes the sedative and narcotic properties of dorycnium,
adding that it was sometimes used in aphrodisiacs and could be fatal if ingested in large
doses. Dorycnium has been identified as a type of thornapple, likely datura stramonium
(J. Scarborough, “Thornapple in Graeco-Roman Pharmacology,” CP 107 (2012) 247–
255.
20.7.2 καὶ τὰς µὲν ἑκκαιδεκήρεις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς πεντεκαιδεκήρεις…πλεούσας:
Demetrius’ victory at Salamis was a telling demonstration of the value of large warships
(see above n. 16.3.1), and he subsequently embarked on a naval building program that
produced vessels of unprecedented size. This effort was aided in part by access to the
forests of Cyprus consequent to his victory, and the island doubtless became a hub for
Antigonid shipbuilding. Theophrastus (Hist. plant. 5.8.1) mentions that Demetrius had an
“eleven” remarkable for the size and quality of its Cypriote timbers. When Demetrius
sailed to Rhossus in Syria to marry his daughter Stratonice to Seleucus in 299, he hosted
a banquet on his flagship, a “thirteen” (see below n. 32.2–3)— this ship was among those
that so impressed Lysimachus during the siege of Soli that followed (n. 20.8.3). It was
not until Demetrius began preparations for his final Asian expedition, probably in 289 or
288, that the keels were laid for the massive “fifteen” and “sixteen” mentioned here (see
below ns. 31.2.1, 43.7, 53.2.3). These ships were the largest single-hulled warships ever
constructed (even larger vessels were built by Ptolemy II and his successors [see below
ns. 43. 8–9], but these were almost certainly multi-hulled; Casson [1995] 108–112),
designed primarily for siege and countersiege operations, in which their extraordinary
size and weight could be turned against the artillery emplacements and increasingly
sophisticated barriers deployed at harbor entrances (Murray 176; on the harbor defenses
of the time see, e.g., Diod. 20.85.2; Philo Polior. C 54–55, D 101 and 103).
20.7.5 Λυσίµαχος µὲν γάρ, ἔχθιστος ὢν Δηµητρίῳ τῶν βασιλέων: Lysimachus’
hatred for Demetrius is reiterated at 25.9.1.
20.8.2 αἱ δ' ἑλεπόλεις: on Demetrius’ famous mobile siege-towers, known as helipoleis,
see Diod. 20.48.2–3 and above n. 15.3.1 (siege of Salamis); Diod. 20.91.2, 20.95.1,
20.96.4 and below n. 21.1.2 (siege of Rhodes); 40.2.4 (siege of Thebes); cf. below n.
27.4.2.
20.8.3 Σόλους…ἀντιτεταγµένος (The siege of Soli; the date and nature of a meeting
between Lysimachus and Demetrius there): Soli was a prominent port town on the border
of Smooth and Rough Cilicia. “Solecism,” from Solikismos, stems from the proverbially
poor Greek spoken by its inhabitants, though the city could point to Aratus and
Chrysippus as native sons. Alexander leveled a substantial fine on Soli for Persian
collaboration, part of which he remitted in exchange for naval assistance after 333 (Arr.
Anab. 2.12).
The siege of Soli and encounter with Lysimachus are related only here, and
presumably took place after Demetrius seized Cilicia from Cassander’s brother
Pleistarchus in 300 pr 299 (n. 32.4.1) and before he sailed for Greece in 297/6 (n. 33.2.2),
but the chronology cannot be determined with any precision given our meager evidence
for this episode (on Demetrius’ occupation of Cilicia in this period, see below ns.
31.64.4, 32.4.1, 32.7.2). It is generally assumed that Lysimachus was pressing the claim

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of the dispossessed Pleistarchus, who had taken refuge with him (so Wehrli 159; Marasco
[1983] 38; Lund 89; Landucci-Gattinoni [1992] 166–67), but withdrew after this
demonstration of Demetrius’ superior naval power. Bosworth argues it was later,
“towards the end of Demetrius’ occupation of Cilicia” ([2003] 265), since it seems to him
unlikely that Lysimachus would have invaded before the deterioration of Demetrius’
relations with Seleucus. In Bosworth’s reconstruction, Demetrius was “content to display
his formidable armament and withdrew with his laurels intact. At this point he probably
agreed to vacate Cilicia, perhaps retaining some of the harbors where he could leave
garrisons” ([2003] 266). Such a scenario is unlikely, and not just because it is confounded
by Plutarch’s account. Demetrius’ kingdom after Ipsus consisted of a patchwork of
harbor cities (ns. 30.1.1, 30.2.5), and his Cilician possessions were probably limited to
the coast in the first place. Cilicia’s immense value for Demetrius as a recruiting ground
for mercenaries and a place of refuge in time of trouble is demonstrated time and again in
his career (ns. 14.2.5, 15.2.2; cf. 6.2.1), and it is difficult to believe he would ever
willingly give it up. He rejected out of hand Seleucus’ demand that he sell Cilicia (32.7),
and Lysimachus surely lacked the naval power to drive him from the region before
Demetrius summoned his eastern fleet to Greece in c.294 (n. 33.2.3). Finally, when
Demetrius limped into Cilicia for the last time in 286 it was controlled by Seleucus, not
Lysimachus (n. 47.2.2). Bosworth’s suggestion ([2003] 267 n. 77) that Lysimachus
mounted an invasion of Cilicia, somehow evicted Demetrius from his coastal holdings,
and then promptly ceded the hard-won territory to Seleucus strains credulity, and there is
no compelling reason to reject Plutarch’s account of the affair (cf. n. 32.4.1). Murray
(174–75) plausibly suggests that, after his prudent withdrawal in the face of Demetrius’
superior naval power, Lysimachus promptly set about developing his own capability for
naval siege warfare. The result was the famous Leontophoros, a double-hulled vessel that
was more a massive platform for naval siege operations than a ramming warship (on this
ship, see Memnon FGrH 434 F 8.4–6 = Photius Bibl. 224.226b.14–33; Murray 171–78;
for a different view of the vessel’s purpose, see Tarn [1910] 211; Casson 112). In 294,
while campaigning in Laconia, Demetrius learned that Lysimachus “had deprived him of
his cities in Asia” (35.5), and Ptolemy had taken all Cyprus, save Salamis. This came
only after Lysimachus had developed his own naval siege capacity and when Demetrius
likely had no naval presence to speak of in the East. Seleucus’ occupation of Cilicia
probably dates to the same period (ns. 33.2.2, 35.5.2).
20.9.2 Ῥόδιοι δὲ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πολιορκηθέντες: for Demetrius’ siege of
Rhodes, beginning in 305, see below ns. XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes–22.8.
20.9.4 ᾐτήσαντο…ἔχωσιν: According to Pliny (HN 34.41), the Rhodians collected 300
talents from the sale of Demetrius’ siege equipment and used the proceeds to finance the
construction of a colossal statue of the god Helios, the famed Colossus of Rhodes On the
Colossus, see Strabo 14.2.5; Plut. Mor. 183B; Vitruv. 10.16.8; W. Hoepfner, Der Koloss
von Rhodos und die Bauten des Helios. Neue Forschungen zu einem der Sieben
Weltwunder, [Mainz am Rhein: 2003].

XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes

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The gripping and detailed account given by Diodorus is by far our best source for the
siege, though Vitruvius and Athenaeus Mechanicus provide valuable information on the
remarkable siege equipment Demetrius arrayed against the walls of Rhodes, and
Polyaenus helps illuminate the extent of the economic embargo Antigonus attempted to
impose on the island. A papyrus found in Middle Egypt (P.Berl. 11632) consisting of two
columns of text (49 lines in all) corresponds extremely closely to Diodorus 20.93–94. But
Diodorus and the author of the papyrus both record unique details, so each must be
drawing on a common source, and neither is the source for the other (E.E. Rice,
“Hellenistic Rhodes,” CR 35 (1980), 320–22; Hornblower 30–31; for a detailed
commentary on the papyrus see F. Hiller von Gaertringen, “Aus der Belagerung von
Rhodos 304 v.Chr.: Griechischer Papyrus der Kgl. Museen zu Berlin,” Sitzungsberichte
der preussischen Akademie 36 (1918) 752–63). Diodorus’ detailed account is generally
favorable to the Rhodians and includes a number of details—preparations for the siege
(20.84.2–6); debate in the Rhodian assembly on statues erected for Antigonus and
Demetrius (20.93.6–7); the honors given a loyal mercenary commander (20.94.5)—
demonstrating the intimate familiarity of at least one of his sources with events within the
city during the siege. Diodorus’ account may be informed to some degree by
Hieronymus, his principal source for the period, but it seems certain that he relied heavily
on one or more Rhodian historiographical sources (Seibert [1969] 81–2; Hornblower 56–
60; Billows [1990] 165 n.5; Gabrielson 20–22; H. Wiemer, Rhodische Traditionen in der
hellenistischen Historiographie, Frankfurt [2001] 222–50). The Rhodian historian Zeno,
who wrote in the first half of the second century B.C. and is the only source Diodorus
names for Rhodian material in the Bibliotheke (5.66), seems a likely candidate.
The use of this Rhodian source led Diodorus to include at least one patriotic
fiction (Alexander deposited his testament in Rhodes and honored the city above all
others, 20.81.3; on the patriotic bias of Zeno see Polyb. 16.14; H. Wiemer, “Zenon of
Rhodes and the Rhodian View of History,” in B. Gibson and T. Harrison (eds.), The
World of Polybius: Essays in Honour of F. W. Walbank [Oxford: 2012] 279–306). His
characterization of Rhodian naval strength and success in combating piracy, as well as
the development of her ties with Ptolemaic Egypt, is anachronistic, reflecting the city’s
military and economic heyday in the 3rd and 2nd centuries rather than the late 4th, when
Rhodian naval power was nascent and her economy predicated to a greater degree on
trade with Asia Minor and the Levant (Hornblower 59; Billows [1990] 165–66 n. 5; cf.
Hauben (1977); Berthold 64–67). Indeed, a host of pirates allied themselves with
Demetrius as he descended upon Rhodes (see below), and Antigonus leveled a sweeping
embargo against the city, forbidding the traders of Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia and
Pamphylia to call in Rhodian harbors (Poly. 4.6.16). The special relationship between
Rhodes and Egypt was more a product of the siege than its precipitant.
In the years prior to the siege, relations between the city and the Antigonids had
been both cordial and mutually beneficial. When Demetrius arrived in 306 seeking aid for
his Cypriote campaign, however, he was rebuffed by the Rhodians who, according to
Diodorus, were loath to join in an attack on Ptolemy since their economy was heavily
dependent on the lucrative transshipment of Egyptian grain (Diod. 20.81.4). The rapidly
developing economic and diplomatic ties between Rhodes and Ptolemy were a source of
increasing concern for Antigonus, particularly after the failed invasion of Egypt (ns. 19–

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19.3.1); and when Rhodian warships drove off an Antigonid squadron attempting to
disrupt Rhodian trade with Egypt, he threatened to besiege the city (Diod. 20. 82.1–2).
Alarmed, the Rhodians voted Antigonus and Demetrius signal honors and sent envoys
requesting that they not be forced to campaign against Ptolemy, “contrary to their
agreements” (παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας, Diod. 20.82.2; on the Rhodian alliances, or lack
thereof, prior to the siege, see below n. 21.1.1). Antigonus was not swayed by the
Rhodian envoys and sent Demetrius to the island at the head of a formidable force. His
arrival prompted an abrupt volte face from the Rhodians, who agreed to join the ongoing
Antigonid struggle with Ptolemy. When Demetrius insisted Rhodes provide 100 hostages
and receive his fleet in her harbors, however, the Rhodian envoys balked (20.82.3). Both
sides prepared for a siege.
In the spring of 305 Demetrius marshaled his forces in the Carian city of Loryma
in the Rhodian Peraea (20.82.4) as Conon had done in 394 (Diod. 14.83.4) and as Cassius
would do before his attack on Rhodes in 42 (App. Bell. Civ. 4.72). Neither Conon nor
Cassius assembled a fleet to rival that of Demetrius, which consisted of 200 warships and
170 auxiliary vessels. In addition to the more than 40,000 rowers who manned the
warships, the fleet transported 40,000 soldiers, an undetermined number of cavalrymen
and their mounts (probably not more than a few hundred, since cavalry do not figure in
any account of the siege), provisions, and at least some of the materials that would allow
Demetrius and his engineers and workmen to construct the most fearsome array of siege
equipment yet assembled (Diod. 20.82.4).
The warships, advancing in battle formation with catapults mounted on their
prows, towed the transports to maximize the number of soldiers that could be shuttled
from the mainland to the island on each vessel (Diod. 20.82.4). In their wake followed
nearly 1,000 private ships manned by merchants and pirates hoping to profit from the
coming conflict. The sight of this extraordinary flotilla, larger even than that which
Homer credits to Agamemnon or Herodotus to Xerxes, inspired in the Rhodian defenders
awe and dread in equal measure (Diod. 20.83.2). After the short passage from Loryma,
Demetrius disembarked his force, sent out parties to forage and ravage the region, and
built a fortified camp near the city but out of missile range (Diod. 20.83.4). Since the city
occupied the entire northeastern tip of the island, the camp must have been to the south,
probably on the broad Bay of Ialysus southwest of the city (Berthold 68 notes that the
Ottomans landed here in 1480; Murray 114). If so, the artificial mole that Demetrius set
his entire force to building (20.83.4) will probably have projected into the bay from the
coast north of Ialysus town. There it would provide protection from the prevailing
westerly winds (see below), making the enclosd area of the bay a suitable harbor. No
doubt Demetrius prepared an area where his ships might be hauled from the water, just as
he had during the Cypriote campaign of 306 (n. 15.2.3). With camp and harbor complete,
Demetrius turned his attention to the city.
The city of Rhodes was formed from the amalgamation of the island’s three
principal cities in 408. This new federal capital was laid out according to the
Hippodamian grid plan (perhaps by the aged Hippodamus himself; Strabo 14.2.9). The
site boasted three bays on its eastern shore, and these natural harbors were improved by
the construction of artificial moles. Diodorus mentions only two of these harbors in his
account of the siege: the northernmost, which he calls the “small harbor” (today

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Mandraki) was lined with shipsheds for the Rhodian fleet (Gabrielson 38) and could be
closed off at its mouth by a floating boom (kleithron, Diod. 20.85.4; cf. n. 8.5.2), and the
larger open harbor just to the southeast which Diodorus calls the “great harbor.” The
city’s third harbor, the present Bay of Akandia, does not figure in Diodorus’ account, and
it may not have been regularly used in antiquity since it was rockier and more exposed
than the other harbors (Berthold 56 n. 66; on the Rhodian harbors see Strabo 14.2.5; Dio
Chrys. 31.163; Psd.-Arist. 43 [797–8, 810 D]; cf. K. Lehmann-Hartleben, Die antiken
Hafenanlagen des Mittelmeeres [Leipzig: 1923] 128–29; Murray 113–114). The northern
fortifications of the city followed the shoreline, and the walls between the city and her
harbors, the great harbor in particular, seem to have been rather lower than those that
protected the southern, landward side (Diod. 20.86.3; Murray 114). Demetrius
accordingly focused his initial attacks on the open great harbor: “his whole effort
centered upon capturing this and shutting off the people of the city from their grain
supplies” (πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν ἡ σπουδὴ περὶ τὸ κρατῆσαι τούτου καὶ τῆς σιτοποµπείας
ἀποκλεῖσαι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, Diod. 20.88.1–2).
At his request, Demetrius’ engineers constructed two of the protective sheds for
artillery batteries known as “turtles” (χελῶναι) and mounted each of them on a pair of
yoked cargo ships. Two four-story siege towers that easily surpassed the height of the
harbor fortifications were erected on pairs of yoked vessels and a floating wooden barrier
studded with spikes was deployed to protect the siege works from attack by enemy ships.
In support of this machinery, Demetrius fitted a number of light craft with decks to
support bolt-throwing catapults and missile troops who trained their fire on the Rhodian
defenders working feverishly to raise the height of the harbor walls and install artillery
batteries of their own on the harbor moles and on cargo ships anchored in the harbor
(Diod. 20.85.1–4).
The unwieldy yoked platforms supporting the sheds and towers had to be towed
from the Bay of Ialysus around the northern tip of the island before they could be arrayed
against the Rhodian harbors. This proved a difficult proposition. The proximity of
Rhodes to the mainland canalizes the winds off the island’s northern coast; westerlies
prevail in all seasons, and strong, even gale force diurnal winds are common, particularly
in spring and summer (A. Watts, Wind Pilot v.4: Eastern Mediterranean Coasts
[Lymington, Hampshire: 1975] 544–45). Diodorus’ account suggests that conditions
were similar at the time of the siege. High seas thwarted an initial attempt to deploy the
machinery and it was only by taking advantage of an evening calm that Demetrius
managed to tow the platforms into position in the great harbor (Diod. 20.86.1). At the
same time, his men seized and fortified the northern tip of the harbor mole, where they
established an artillery position. For eight days Demetrius battered the harbor walls and
the Rhodian fortifications on the mole of the great harbor with his floating and mole-
based artillery batteries. This unrelenting barrage failed to gain him access to the city, and
an assault party with scaling ladders was also beaten back (Diod. 20.87.1–3). A daring
Rhodian naval attack then succeeded in sinking two of the floating batteries (Diod.
20.88.3–5). Demetrius responded in characteristic fashion. He constructed an even larger
machine “three times the size of the former in width and height” (τριπλασίαν τῷ ὕψει
καὶ πλάτει τῆς πρότερον, Diod. 20.88). But this mammoth construction was even more
unwieldy than its predecessors and it was promptly toppled by strong winds from the

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south (Diod. 20.88.7). At the same time the Rhodians launched an attack on the
Antigonid force occupying the harbor mole. The winds prevented Demetrius from
dispatching any aid, and the beleaguered soldiers soon surrendered their position (Diod.
20.88.8).
When these assaults on the great harbor failed, Demetrius opted to change tack
and mount an assault by land. Nearly 30,000 craftsmen and laborers were set to work on
an extraordinary array of siege equipment, including mammoth battering rams (Diod.
20.95.1) and a helepolis that dwarfed the tower built for the earlier siege of Salamis
(Diod. 20.91.1–8; n. 21.1.2; on the helepolis at Salamis, see n. 15.2.3), and an elaborate
effort to tunnel under the city walls was begun. Demetrius’ sappers nearly succeeded in
undermining the Rhodian walls, but their efforts were detected and efforts to suborn
mercenaries fighting on behalf of Rhodes failed (Diod. 20.94.1–5; P.Berl. 11632 ll. 26–
34). Repeated assaults on the city walls were also unsuccessful, in large part because
Demetrius was unable to maintain an effective naval blockade, and Ptolemy and other
Rhodian allies, including Lysimachus and Cassander, were able to supply the city
defenders with food and reinforcements. Diodorus records no fewer than four occasions
on which forces friendly to the Rhodians were able to sail into the city harbors (Diod.
20.96.1–3, 20.98.1; on the failed blockade, see esp. Murray 117–18), and morale
remained high within the city (according to the Lindian Chronicle, a lengthy inscription
that includes narrative accounts of three epiphanies of Athena, the goddess repeatedly
appeared in the dreams of an elderly priest in Lindos and demanded that he seek aid from
Ptolemy [D 94–115]; on this epiphany, see C. Higbie, “The Lindian Chronicle and the
Greek Creation of their Past” [Oxford: 2010] esp. 48–49, 149–50). On the one occasion
when Demetrius’ forces did penetrate the city walls, they were wiped out in bitter
fighting in the area of the theatre (Diod. 20.98.4–9; n. 21.6.5).
The failure of the blockade coupled with determined Rhodian resistance doomed
the siege to failure, despite the extraordinary scale and creativity of Demetrius’
preparations. To commemorate the heroism of the city’s defenders, the Rhodians erected
the famous Colossus (n. 20.9.4), as well as the pillar monument featuring an image of
Helios in a golden quadriga which stood in front of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi (D.
Laroche and A. Jacquemin, “La Char d’Or Consacré par le Peuple Rhodien,” Bulletin de
Correspondance Hellénique 110 [1986] 285–307; E.E. Rice, “The Glorious Dead,” in J.
Rich and G. Shipley, War and Society in the Greek World [London: 1993] 240–41).
Demetrius’ rivals were also honored for the aid they supplied the city: a large sacred
precinct demarcated by stoas, the Ptolemaeum, was erected in honor of Ptolemy, while
Lysimachus and Cassander received statues (Diod. 20.100). For accounts of the siege, see
Diod. 20.81–8, 91–100; P. Berl. 11632 = Pack2 2207; Vitr. De arch. 10.16,4–8; Marmor
Parium, FGrH 239 F B23; Athen. Mech. Peri mech. 27.1–6; Lindian Chronicle D 94–
115; Paus. 1.8.6; Poly. 4.6.16; Suda s.v.Πρωτογένης, Adler Π 2963; Wehrli 207–14;
Seibert (1969) 225–30; Hauben (1977) 328–39; Berthold 66–80; Billows [1990] 165–69;
Kern 237–48; Campbell 80–93; Bugh 284–86; Murray 112–118; Martin (2013) 675–76.
21.1.1 Ἐπολέµησε δὲ Ῥοδίοις Πτολεµαίου συµµάχοις οὖσι (Rhodes and her treaty
obligations; Antigonid motivations for the siege): Whether or not Rhodes was formally
allied to Ptolemy or the Antigonids prior to the siege is a vexed question, though it is
clear the Rhodians were intent on maintaining friendly relations with all the rival dynasts

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in the service of their commercial interests (Diod. 20.46.6, 81.4; cf. Hauben [1977] 321–
28; Berthold 66–7). During the 3rd Diadoch War, however, Rhodes had actively
supported the Antigonid cause. As early as 316 Rhodian shipyards constructed vessels in
support of the Antigonid naval building program, though there is no mention of a formal
alliance (Diod. 19.57.3–4, 58.5 (Diod. 19.58.5). These Rhodian-built ships subsequently
took part in the Antigonid siege of Tyre (Diod. 19.61.5). In 313 Rhodes concluded an
alliance (συµµαχία) with Antigonus and sent 10 ships in support of Polemaeus’
campaign to liberate mainland Greece from Cassander (Diod. 19.77.2; cf. Hauben [1977]
323; on this campaign see above ns. 2.2.1, 23.1.1). The expedition against Rhodes was
launched ostensibly because they had refused to actively participate in the Cypriote and
Egyptian campaigns against Ptolemy and had subsequently resisted Antigonid efforts to
disrupt maritime trade between Egypt and the island (Diod. 20.46.6, 20.82.1–2). The
prime motivation of the attack, however, was certainly the desire to deprive Ptolemy of
an increasingly important economic partner and potentially valuable naval ally, should
Ptolemy choose to contest the nascent Antigonid naval supremacy in the eastern
Mediterranean. Even if the Rhodian alliance with the Antigonids obligated the former to
participate only in the latter’s effort to free the Greek cities (so Berthold 65), Antigonus
and Demetrius had assiduously couched their campaigns against Ptolemy in the language
of Hellenic freedom (see above ns. 15.1.5; 15.3.6), and the attack on Rhodes could thus
be presented as a punitive expedition against a negligent ally. The Antigonids were
committed to Greek freedom to an extent (n. 8.1.3), but they expected their allies to fulfill
their obligations and provide men and material support for the campaigns against their
rivals, whom they painted as the enemies of that freedom.
21.1.2 τὴν µεγίστην ἑλέπολιν…  στενοτέραν τῆς βάσεως (The helepolis at Rhodes):
As he had at Salamis (Diod. 20.48.2–3 and see above n. 15.2.3), Demetrius deployed an
armored mobile siege tower known as a helepolis or “city-taker” against the city walls of
Rhodes. This extraordinary structure was built by the engineer Epimachus of Athens. The
degree to which it captured the imagination of ancient authors is illustrated by the fact
that no less than four ancient accounts of the structure have come down to us (Diod.
20.91.1–7; Vitruvius 10.16; Athen. Mech. Peri Mech. 27). Of these, the description of
Diodorus is by far the most detailed. The dimensions Plutarch gives here accord closely
to those of Diodorus and it is likely that both are ultimately drawn from the eyewitness
account of Hieronymus of Cardia, who may in turn have consulted a technical treatise by
Epimachus himself (Hornblower 57–59; cf. Campbell 83; on Diodorus’ sources, see n.
XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes).
According to Diodorus (21.91, the sides of the square undercarriage of this
helepolis measured almost 50 cubits square and the tower tapered as it rose to a height of
nearly 100 cubits (the 66 cubits Plutarch gives is probably a mistake for 96, Campbell
85). The interior crossbeams at the base were left open to allow men standing on the
ground to push against them, helping to propel the tower on its eight iron-plated wheels
from the relative safety of the interior. Diodorus records that no less than 3,400 men of
exceptional strength were assigned to move the helepolis, but the described structure
would not have provided sufficient area for so many men to push against the
undercarriage and wheels at once; perhaps they worked in shifts. Draft animals, some sort
of winching mechanism, or both, may also have been used to propel the tower (Marsden

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I, 107–08, II, 84–85; Campbell 84–85 plausibly suggests that draught animals stationed
behind the tower were used in conjunction with pulleys anchored in front). Like the
helepolis Demetrius deployed at Salamis, the structure was divided into nine stories, and
bristled with catapults, ballistae, and missile troops. Iron plates armored the three
exposed sides of the tower and the missile ports on the front of the structure were
protected by hinged shutters covered with wool-stuffed hides (Diod. 21.91.5–6).
21.3.1 ἰσορρόπως ἅµα ῥοίζῳ καὶ τόνῳ πολλῷ προχωροῦν: cf. the relative
immobility of Demetrius’ helepolis at Thebes (below n. 40.2.5).
21.5.2 ὁ τεχνίτης Ζωίλος: Zoilus has been identified (Marasco [1983a] 221–22) as
Zoilus son of Celaenus of Boeotia, the commander of the Macedonian garrison at
Aegosthena in the Megarid and the recipient of a Megarian honorary decree (IG VII 1).
While the identification is attractive, it is unlikely that a craftsman would possess the
necessary social status for such an important post (Paschidis [2008] 300–01 n.3). The
provenance of the suits of armor, however, does not necessitate the identification of
Zoilus as a Cypriote (pace Billows [1990] 442, and Paschidis [2008] 301 n.3): after
Demetrius drove Ptolemy from Cyprus, the island, and the city of Salamis in particular,
became almost immediately one of the principal arsenals and dockyards of the Antigonid
realm, and craftsmen of diverse origin were doubtless employed there (on the importance
of Salamis see n. 30.2.5; cf. Newell [1927] 17, 42–3; on itinerant craftsmen in the
Hellenistic period, see Horden and Purcell 94). On Zoilus, see K. Ziegler RE s.v. Zoilos
(3); Marsden I: 96–7l; Wehrli 204, 208; Billows [1990] 442–43; Paschidis [2008] 300,
300–01 n.3).
21.5.3 ἀφεῖναι καταπελτικὸν βέλος: Defensive artillery presented formidable danger to
a besieging force and Demetrius’ search for state of the art armament was quite sensible.
During the many sieges he conducted over the course of his career, Demetrius sustained
two grievous wounds from catapult bolts, at Messene in 295 and Thebes in 292 (33.4,
40.5). In those instances, however, even Zoilus’ impregnable breastplate would not have
turned aside the bolts: he was struck in the face and neck, respectively.
21.6.2 Ἄλκιµος ὁ Ἠπειρώτης: Alcimus seems to have played a role in Demetrius’
liberation of Athens in 307, as the surviving prescript of an Athenian decree (IG II2 773)
shows, but the nature of his aid and of the honors he received from the Athenians have
been lost. On Alcimus, see J. Kirchner RE s.v. Alkimos (11); C. Habicht, “Athenisches
Ehrendekret vom Jahre des Koroibos [305/5] für einen königlichen Offizier,” AJAH
(1977) 37–39; Billows (1990) 366–67; Paschidis (2008) 491 n. 1; n. 21.6.5.
21.6.5 µαχόµενος ἐν Ῥόδῳ περὶ τὸ θέατρον ἔπεσεν: Alcimus was one of the
commanders of a picked force of 1,500 men that breached the walls of Rhodes in a daring
night attack in the final days of the siege. Alcimus’ men were to attack the city’s
defenders from within while Demetrius and his troops assaulted the walls from without
by land and sea (Diod.20.98.4–5). The coordinated attack proved a failure, and Alcimus,
his co-commander Mantias, and many of their men were slain in fierce fighting near the
theatre (Diod. 20.98.9 and see above n. XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes). Shortly
thereafter Demetrius came to terms with the Rhodians and the siege was lifted (Diod.
20.99.1–3).

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 XXII
22.1.3 Φίλας…πρὸς Πτολεµαῖον ἀπέστειλαν: According to Diodorus, the captured
vessel carrying Phila’s gifts was a quadrireme sailing from Cilicia. Phila had resided for
many years in Cilicia with her first husband Balacrus (see above n. 14.2.6), and thus it
comes as no surprise to again find her ensconced there, probably in the principal city of
Tarsus, while Demetrius conducted operations in the region. The Rhodian captain
Damophilus sent the captured purple garments to Ptolemy as gifts “proper for a king”
(Diod. 20.93.4), which may be an indication that Ptolemy took the royal title before the
end of the siege (so Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 245), though the evidence should not
be pressed too far given the many anachronistic references to the Diadochi as kings (ns.
2.2.3, XVIII: The Assumption of the Kingship).
22.2.1 Φιλίππου…ἑλόντες: on the Athenian respect for the personal correspondence of
Philip and Olympias, see also Mor. 799e and Apul. Apol. 86. In failing to emulate the
philanthropia of the Athenians, the Rhodians too contribute to the atmosphere of
improper and failed imitation that pervades the Life (ns. 1.5.4, 52.6.1; Intro. 29–40).
22.2.3 Ὀλυµπιάδος: Olympias, a princess from the Molossian tribe of Epirus,
purportedly met Philip of Macedon on Samothrace while still a child (Plut. Alex. 2.2),
married him in 357, and bore him two children, Alexander and Cleopatra. After
Alexander departed for Asia she quarreled with his viceroy Antipater, eventually
returning to Epirus where she resided in regal splendor until 317. She played an
important role in the early struggles of the Diadochi, attempting to marry her daughter
Cleopatra to Leonnatus and Perdiccas in turn, though neither match came to fruition
(Cleopatra, who married three times, but never to any of the Diadochi, was murdered by
Antigonus when he discovered Ptolemy intended to marry her, Diod. 20.37.3–6). After
siding with Polyperchon against Cassander, she returned to Macedonia in late 317, where
she put Philip III and his wife Adea-Eurydike to death (the date is certain, since Philip III
ruled for six years and four months after the death of Alexander in June 323; Diod.
19.11.4–7; Just. 14.5.10; Heid. Epit. T 11 = FGrH 155 F 2.2), and assumed custody of
the remnants of Alexander’s family—his widow Roxanne, son Alexander IV, and his
betrothed, Deidameia (the future wife of Demetrius, see below n. 25.2.4). Olympias
eroded what support she enjoyed in Macedonia by conducting a sanguinary purge of her
political enemies (Diod. 19.11.8–9, 35.1), but it was the emergent power of Cassander
that proved her undoing. When Olympias and her entourage fell into his hands after a
prolonged siege at Pydna, an assembly of Macedonian troops sentenced her to death, and
Cassander handed her over to the families of her victims for execution (Diod 19.51; Just.
14.6.6–12; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 206–13). On Olympias, see Berve ii. 283–88
no. 581; H. Strasburger, RE 18 s.v. Olympias (5) 177–82; Macurdy 22–44; J. O’Neill
“Olympias: ‘The Macedonians will never let themselves be ruled by a woman,’”
Prudentia 31, 1–14; Carney (2000) 62–67, 85–88; id. Olympias, mother of Alexander the
Great (London: 2006); Heckel (2006) 181–83.
22.4.1 ὁ Καύνιος Πρωτογένης...τέχνης πόνον τοσοῦτον. This celebrated painter and
sculptor and friendly rival of Apelles (see below n.), was born in Caunus in Caria (Pliny
HN 35.101; Paus. 1.3.5) or Xanthus in Lycia (Suda s.v Πρωτογένης, Adler Π 2963),
though he appears to have spend most of his life on Rhodes. According to Pliny (NH

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35.106), he also spent time in Athens, where his subjects included Antigonus, and at least
one of his works was displayed in the gallery of the Propylaea. Has masterpiece was the
Ialysus, a portrait of the eponymous founder of the Rhodian city (see below n. 22.4.2). If
the story of Protogenes’ struggle to depict perfectly the foam on a winded dog’s muzzle
is to be believed, the hero was depicted in a hunting scene (Pliny NH 35.102). Plutarch
gives a similar account of this episode at Mor. 183 A-B, while Pliny (HN 35.104) claims
that Demetrius actually raised the siege of Rhodes lest any harm come to the painting. In
the account of Aulus Gellius (NA 15.31.1–5), Rhodian ambassadors convince Demetrius
not to destroy Protogenes’ work.

22.4.2 Ἰάλυσον: Camirus, Lindos, and Ialysus were the three grandsons of Helios, the
principal divinity of the Rhodians, and the mythical founders of the island’s three cities:
Lindos on the east and Camirus and Ialysus on the west coast. Demetrius likely
established his Rhodian camp near Ialysus (see above n. XXI-XXII: The Siege of
Rhodes), by that point merely a suburb of the great city of Rhodes, which was formed by
the synoecism of the three cities in 408. The Ialysus was the most famous work of
Protogenes; on the painting and its nachleben, see ns. 22.5.4, 22.7.1.

22.5.4 ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἔτεσι: Protogenes was famous for the extraordinary care that he
bestowed on his paintings (Quintilian 12.10.6). Aelian (VH 12.41) also claims that the
Ialysus was seven years in the making, while Fronto (11) claims it took eleven years to
complete.

22.6.1 Ἀπελλῆς: Renowned as perhaps the greatest of all Greek painters, Apelles was
born in Colophon (Suda s.v. Ἀπελλῆς, Adler A 3008) or Cos (Pliny NH 35.79) ca. 370.
He painted portraits of Philip, Alexander, and several of Alexander’s marshals, including
Antigonus, whom Apelles depicted in profile to mask his missing eye (Pliny NH 35.90).
Alexander, we are told, was so impressed with Apelles’ work that he once awarded the
artist the princely sum of twenty talents (Cic. Verrine Orations 6.60; Pliny NH 35.92),
and never again allowed another painter the privilege of creating his likeness (Cic. Ad
Familiares 15.12.7; Horace Epistles 2.1.239–40). On Apelles, see Rossbach, RE s.v.
Apelles (13); Berve ii. 53–5 no. 99; Stewart [1993] 33–35; Heckel (2006) 39–40.
22.6.4 χάριτας: By Apelles’ own estimation, it was the ineffable quality of charis
(“grace,” venustas in the Latin sources) that set his work apart and which he alone had
achieved. His admirers agreed (Pliny HN 35.79; Quintil. 12.10.3; Aelian VH 12.41).
22.7.1 ταύτην µὲν οὖν τὴν γραφὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις συνωσθεῖσαν ἐν Ῥώµῃ τὸ
πῦρ ἐπενείµατο (the fate of Protogenes’ Ialysus): Both Cicero (Orat. 2.5) and Strabo
(14.2.5) saw this painting while it was still in Rhodes. Since Strabo wrote during the
reign of Augustus, the tradition (Duff [2012] 612 n. 50) that it was taken to Rome by
Cassius, the assassin of Caesar, after his sack of Rhodes in 42 must be discounted. At
some point in the 70s AD, however, it was shipped to Rome and installed in the temple of
Peace (Pliny HN 35.102), a monument counted by Pliny as one of the most beautiful in
Rome. Vespasian constructed the temple complex to celebrate the capture of Jerusalem in
71 AD (Suet. Vesp. 9), and it was adorned with the spoils of that city as well as a number
of works by famous Greek artists (Joseph. BJ 7.5.7; Pliny HN 34.84; 35.109; 36.27, 58;

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Paus. 6.9.3; Juv. 9.23). The fire that destroyed Protogenes’ Ialysus is generally identified
with the massive conflagration in Rome shortly before the death of Commodus in 191
AD, but that cannot be the case, since the fire was known to Plutarch who died ca. 120
AD, and it must have been consumed in an earlier blaze of which no record has come
down to us. Plutarch’s source for the fire that consumed the temple may well have been
one of his friends in Rome (Marasco [1981] 64–65).
22.8.1 Τῶν δὲ Ῥοδίων…ἐπὶ Πτολεµαῖον: Plutarch has conflated an earlier, and
ultimately unsuccessful, embassy sent by Athens and other Greek cities to urge
Demetrius and the Rhodians to come to terms (Diod. 20.98.2–3) with the Aetolian envoys
who helped negotiate the compromise settlement that finally ended the siege (Diod.
20.99.3). Under the terms of the treaty, Rhodes was formally allied to Antigonus but
exempt from any obligations to fight against Ptolemy. Rhodes was to remain free,
autonomous, and ungarrisoned, and Demetrius was permitted to select 100 Rhodian
hostages, current magistrates excepted, to ensure the continued cooperation of the city.
The hostages were apparently settled in Ephesus, for it was there that they were found
and sent home in 302 by Prepelaus, a trusted general and probably a relative of Cassander
(Diod. 20.107.4; on Prepelaus see ns. 25.1.1, 28.2.1, 28.2.3, 30.2.5).
XXIII
23.1.1 Ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸν Δηµήτριον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, Κασσάνδρου τὸ ἄστυ
πολιορκοῦντος (The Four Years’ War): When Demetrius departed for Cyprus in the
spring of 306, his fleet now accompanied by 30 Athenian quadriremes (Diod. 20.50.2),
the newly liberated Athenians were left to face the inevitable response from Cassander
without their Savior. This is not to say that the Athenians were unprepared or left entirely
to their own devices: extensive preparations had in fact begun almost immediately after
the liberation of the city. The most ambitious of these was the comprehensive overhaul of
the fortification circuits of Athens and Piraeus, and the Long Walls that linked them (on
the fortifications of Athens, see Theocharaki; on the Long Walls, see Conwell). IG II2
463 preserves a decree from the archonship of Anaxicrates showing that work was begun
in 307/06 under the direction of Demochares of Leuconoe (cf. Mor. 851D; on
Demochares, see n. 24.10.3). The strengthening of the fortification circuit was a state
project, but wealthy individuals were also honored for their financial contributions (IG II2
740), and it seems certain that the project, begun while Demetrius was still in the city (the
division of the work into ten tribal segments indicates that the administrative
reorganization required by the expansion to twelve tribes had not yet been completed), at
least received the blessing of the Besieger and likely was undertaken on his initiative and
financed in part by Antigonid funds (the extensive repairs to the fortification circuit of
Corinth under Demetrius provide an instructive parallel; on the Corinthian fortifications,
see Parsons, Corinth III part II [1936], 123; for the extraordinary outlay of capital, in
terms of money and manpower, required for large-scale fortification projects, see Camp
[2000] 46–47; on the expansion of the Athenian tribal system see above n. 10.6.1). In
addition, an Athenian embassy to Antigonus secured the grain and timber Demetrius had
promised after the capture of Munychia (see above n. 10.1.6; Diod. 20.46.1), Demetrius
sent 1,200 panoplies to Athens in 306 (n. 17.1.4), and Antigonus sent an additional
donation of grain and money in 305 (IG II2 1492; Paschidis [2008] 88–89). Demetrius left
behind troops when he departed for Cyprus in 306 (IG II2 469 and 1492b; Billows [1990]

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151 and cf. 389, 430–31, 443) and appointed a key subordinate, Adeimantus of
Lampsacus, to coordinate the defense of Attica in 306/5 and 305/4 (on the appointment of
Adeimantus as strategos ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, see Petrakos [1999] 32–33, 430; Oliver [2007]
117–118; Wallace [2013] 144–47; on Adeimantus, see ns. 14.2.5, 23.1.1 43.2.2).
The expected counter-invasion was not long in coming. Cassander’s invasion of
Attica in the summer of 306 marked the first act in the so-called “Four Years’ War” (the
name is drawn from the honorary decree for Demochares [Plut. Mor. 851e]), a poorly
documented conflict known to us primarily through contemporary inscriptions and
several chronologically confused passages in Pausanias (for various reconstructions of
the conflict, none entirely satisfactory, see Ferguson [1911] 112–118; Beloch [1925] 150
ff.; Gullath 176–79; Habicht [1997] 74–76; Landucci-Gattinoni [2003] 75–78.).
Cassander’s primary goals seem to have been wresting Thebes and the Boeotian League
from the Antigonid alliance, which they had joined in 313 (Diod. 19.75.6), and regaining
control of Athens while Demetrius was engaged in his Cypriot and Rhodian campaigns.
The first of these was achieved readily enough; Thebes and the other Boeotian
cities pursued a foreign policy of pragmatic opportunism in this period, readily switching
their allegiance from one dynast to another when faced with an invading force or when
they sensed an advantage, but there must have been a lingering sense of gratitude, on the
part of the Thebans at least, to Cassander who had refounded their storied city in 316,
some twenty years after it was destroyed by Alexander (Diod. 19.63.4; Paus. 9.7.1; on the
date, see below n. 25.2.1; on the characteristic pragmatism of the Boeotians, see Buck
133). So it was that when Demetrius returned from Rhodes, he found the Boeotians once
more in Cassander’s camp, and in possession of Chalcis and, perhaps, Eretria (Chalcis:
Diod. 20.100.6; Eretria: IG XII.9 192 mentions polemarchs, demonstrating that Eretria
had been incorporated into the Boeotian league, but the chronology is controversial; cf.
Gullath 172 with Knoepfler’s insistence [2001 and 2014, 70] that Thebes had not yet
rejoined the Boeotian league), though they had been nominally allied with the Antigonids
since Polemaeus liberated Thebes and Oropus from Cassander’s garrisons in 313 (Diod.
19.78.3–5; n. 23.3.2). This volte-face, which must have taken place soon after Demetrius
departed for Cyprus in 306, allowed Cassander to invade Attica by land, but the
Athenians, led by the general Olympiodorus and aided by their Aetolian allies, managed
to drive off the Macedonians, who seem to have reached Eleusis and the city walls of
Athens (on the invasion of 306, see IG II2 467, 469, 470, 505, 1954; on the alliance with
the Aetolians, see Paus. 1.26.3; cf. Hauben [1974] 10; Mendels 178; Paschidis [2008]
133; on Olympiodorus, see ns. 34.5.4, 46.2.1).
In 304 Cassander, perhaps emboldened by the Antigonid misadventures in Egypt
and Rhodes (so Ferguson [1911] 116), launched a second invasion, this time apparently
on a much grander scale. Phyle and Panactum, strategic fortified sites on the Attic
frontier with Boeotia, were seized (on the Attic border fortresses, see below, n. 23.3.3),
Cassander’s Boeotian allies extended their power into Euboea, and, if passages in
Polyaenus and Pausanias can be connected with this campaign (so Ferguson [1911] 110–
111; Billows [1990] 169; Habicht [1997] 74), Cassander’s fleet defeated the Athenians in
a naval engagement and captured Salamis (Poly. 4.11.1; cf. Paus. 1.35.2). Although the
recent overhaul of the fortifications proved effective and Cassander was unable to storm
Athens itself, Macedonian and Boeotian control of Euboea, the Attic frontier forts, and

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the Saronic Gulf effectively hemmed in the Athenians, threatening the city’s food supply
and raising the specter of famine. The Athenians who managed to slip past the blockade
and make their way to Demetrius in Rhodes no doubt painted a grim picture of the city’s
imminent fall.
23.2.1 ὁ δὲ ναυσὶν ἐπιπλεύσας τριακοσίαις τριάκοντα καὶ πολλοῖς ὁπλίταις: The
figure must include both transports and warships since it exceeds, by a considerable
margin, the number of warships Demetrius commanded in his naval campaigns of recent
years (for Demetrius’ fleet strength in the Cypriot campaign, see n. 16.2.5; Egyptian
campaign: n. 19.1.3; Rhodian campaign: n. XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes).
23.2.3 ἐξήλασε τῆς Ἀττικῆς τὸν Κάσσανδρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φεύγοντα µέχρι
Θερµοπυλῶν διώξας καὶ τρεψάµενος: Demetrius’ second campaign of liberation in
mainland Greece was an unqualified success, from a military perspective, but the
reticence of our sources hampers a complete reconstruction. Diodorus, clearly
summarizing his source, offers little to supplement Plutarch’s account, relating only that
Demetrius, after leaving Rhodes, passed through the Cyclades, landed at Aulis in
Boeotia, freed Chalcis—just across the Euripus channel—from its Boeotian garrison, and
established alliances with the Boeotians and Aetolians (20.100.5–6). On Demetrius’
pursuit and defeat of Cassander in the area of Thermopylae, and his subsequent eviction
of the Antipatrid garrisons occupying strategic positions in Attica he is silent.
When Demetrius’ fleet arrived at Aulis Cassander was presented with a choice:
risk a potentially decisive confrontation far from his Macedonian power base or
immediately withdraw before Demetrius could cut his line of retreat through Boeotia. In
the event, he chose the latter but was still forced to give battle when he was overtaken
and routed by Demetrius in the area of Thermopylae and Heraclea (see below, n. 23.2.5).
Many scholars omit this engagement in their discussion of the campaign (e.g. Wehrli 65;
Billows [1990] 169; Habicht [1997] 74), but Plutarch’s account admits of no other
interpretation—in the Lives, the subject of τρεψάµενος has invariably just won a
crushing military victory (e.g. Per. 19.3.1, 27.1.3; Alc. 27.5.1; Tim. 18.4.1, 34.1.2; Aem.
6.4.3, 9.2.2; Pyr. 25.6.3). Unless Plutarch is utterly mistaken, the Hot Gates were the
scene of yet another battle in the summer of 304.
23.2.5 Ἡράκλειαν ἔλαβεν ἑκουσίως αὐτῷ προσθεµένην: Heraclea was known as
Trachis until its refoundation as the Spartan colony of Heraclea in Trachis in 426 (Thuc.
3.92–93). The city was strategically located, commanding the heights at the western
mouth of the pass of Thermopylae, just inland from the Malian Gulf (on the strategic
value of the site, see esp. I. Malkin, Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean
[Cambridge: 2003] 219–35).
τῶν Μακεδόνων ἑξακισχιλίους µεταβαλοµένους πρὸς αὐτόν: These soldiers must
have been part of Cassander’s army who transferred their allegiance to Demetrius after
the battle. Perhaps they became separated from the main body of Cassander’s army as he
retreated into Thessaly, for the figure is far too large for a garrison— Cassander would
not have allotted 6,000 men, much less 6,000 Macedonians, for garrison duty in Heraclea.
Indeed, the loss of 6,000 Macedonians troops would represent a devastating blow to
Cassander. In 302 when Demetrius and Cassander squared off in Thessaly (n. 28.2.3), the

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latter was able to muster only 29,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry (Diod. 20.110.3)—half
of whom may not have been native Macedonians (Bosworth [2002] 96), while Demetrius
has a total of 8,000 Macedonian infantry in his force (Diod. 20.110.3). If Plutarch’s
figure is accurate, he probably employs the term “Macedonians” to refer generically to
troops of Cassander, be they Macedonians or mercenaries of varied origins.
23.3.1  ἐπανιὼν δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Πυλῶν Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρου: Chief among the liberated
cities not mentioned here is Elateia in Phocis. The largest of the Phocian cities, Elateia
commands the passes into Boeotia (Strabo 9.3.2; cf. Dem. 18.169–79 for the Athenian
reaction when Elateia fell to Philip of Macedon in 339). Epigrams on a monument
erected for the great Phocian hero Xanthippus at Delphi (FD III 4, 218–221)
commemorate the liberation of Elateia from Cassander’s garrisons on two separate
occasions, the first of which almost certainly took place in the context of Demetrius’
campaign of 304 (Paschidis [2008] 324). Certainly Demetrius would have viewed
Cassander’s continued occupation of such a strategic site as intolerable, though what role,
if any, he and his force played in the expulsion of the garrison is unclear.
23.3.2 καὶ Βοιωτοὺς ἐποιήσατο συµµάχους: This alliance is corroborated by Diodorus
(20.100.6). The vacillations of the Boeotians, however, did not go unpunished. Demetrius
seized Oropus, long a bone of contention between Athens and the Boeotian League, and
handed it over to the Athenians (the royal diagramma issued by Polyperchon in the name
of Philip III in 319 [n. 8.1.2] stipulated that Oropus be independent, but Polemaeus had
returned Oropus to Boeotian control in 313, see above n. 23.1.1; on Demetrius’ seizure of
Oropus, see below n. 23.3.3). At about the same time, however, Demetrius made a
financial contribution to the rebuilding of Thebes, which evidently had been ongoing
since the refoundation of the city by Cassander in 316 (IG VII 2419 ll. 30–4; Holleaux,  i.
1–40; Billows [1990] 226; see n. 40.6.3).
καὶ Κεγχρέας εἷλε: The capture of Cenchreae, Corinth’s harbor on the Saronic Gulf, sits
uneasily in the geographical context of Demetrius’ activities in 304 as established by
Plutarch. Indeed, the entire sequence of events, which takes Demetrius from Attica north
to the area of Thermopylae, then south to the Corinthia, back north to the Boeotian
frontier, and south again to Athens is supremely unlikely, if not untenable. If we can
credit Plutarch’s account at all, we most imagine that he is merely recording the notable
successes of the campaign, and not attempting to establish their actual sequence.
The victory at Heraclea forced Cassander back at least as far as Thessaly and
allowed Demetrius the leisure to turn back and deal with the vacillating Boeotians
(Wehrli 65; for Demetrius’ punishment of the Boeotians, see above n. 23.3.2) before he
methodically evicted Cassander’s garrisons from the fortified demes and border fortresses
along the Attic frontier with Boeotia and returned in triumph to Athens (on the fortified
frontier demes and border forts, see below, n. 23.3.3). Demetrius may have then made an
expedition over the Isthmus to seize Cenchreae and establish a bridgehead in Corinthia
for his full-scale invasion of the Peloponnese in early 303 (on this campaign, see below
ns. 25.1–5), or the capture of the port may have marked the initial act of that campaign
(note that Cassander began his Peloponnesian campaign of 315 by seizing Cenchreae,
Diod. 19.63.4). A stratagem of Polyaenus (4.7.3, and see below n. 25.1.5) seemingly
corroborates Plutarch’s assertion that Demetrius controlled Cenchreae before his attack

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on Sicyon in early 303, but does not confirm that that control was established in 304
rather than early the following year (pace Marasco [1983] 40–41). Diodorus (20.103.2),
on the other hand, suggests that Demetrius did not seize either of Corinth’s harbors until
after he had taken Sicyon. In his account Demetrius was admitted to Corinth under cover
of night in 303, after which he was able to gain control of the city and its harbors
(ἐκράτησε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν λιµένων; on the capture of Corinth, see below n.
25.1.5).
23.3.3 Φυλὴν καὶ Πάνακτον, ἐπιτειχίσµατα τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὑπὸ Κασσάνδρου
φρουρούµενα, καταστρεψάµενος ἀπέδωκε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. A series of fortified sites
stretching from Eleusis to Rhamnous punctuated the Attic land frontier (on the Attic
border forts, see J. Ober, Fortress Attica [Leiden: 1985]; M. Munn, The Defense of
Attica: the Dema wall and the Boeotian War of 378–375 B.C. [Berkeley: 1993]; Camp
[1991]; Oliver [2007]). Among these were the fortified deme of Phyle and the fortress of
Panactum, both of which occupied strategic positions along the main route from Boeotia
to Attica and allowed access to the fertile plains south of Mt. Parnes. Control of these two
sites allowed Cassander to enter Attica from the territory of his Boeotian allies, seriously
disrupt Athenian agricultural production, and secured his retreat when Demetrius arrived
at Aulis with an overwhelming force (on the consequences for Athenian agricultural
production, see Oliver [2007] 116–119; for Demetrius’ landing at Aulis in Boeotia, see
Diod. 20.1005 and above, n. 23.1.1).
Additional evidence indicates that Demetrius’ efforts to secure the northern Attic
frontier and strengthen Athens at the expense of Boeotia were far more extensive than
Plutarch’s account would have us believe. An inscription (ISE 8) reveals that Demetrius
also seized the border town of Oropus from the Boeotians and returned it to Athenian
control. The territory of Oropus was home to the celebrated Amphiareion, an oracular
and healing sanctuary whose popularity exploded during the 4th century; control of
Oropus was disputed between the Athenians and the Boeotians from at least as early as
the 6th century (on the complex history of Oropus and the extensive 4th-century building
program there, see Petrakos [1968], id. [1999]; Camp [1991] 200 n. 27 reviews the
evidence for the various periods of Athenian and Boeotian control; cf. R. Buck, Boiotia
and the Boiotian League: 432–371 [Edmonton, Alberta: 1994] 123–126). Oropus was
seized and garrisoned by Pleistarchus, brother of Cassander in 313, but the Antigonid
general Polemaeus soon ejected the garrison and handed over control of the town to the
Boeotians (Diod. 19.77–78; on the sanctuary, see Hdt. 1.48–53; Paus. 1.34.4; Petrakos
[1968]; on Polemaeus’ Greek campaign of 313, see n. 2.2.1). Plutarch’s account suggests
that Demetrius handed over these frontier sites to the Athenians immediately after his
triumphant return to the city in 304, but epigraphical evidence dates their return to the
spring of 303 (see below n. 26.1.1). Possession of Phyle, Panactum, and Oropus carried
extraordinary value for Athens in the realms of security, economy and prestige, and both
the new round of divine honors voted Demetrius in 304 and the popular acquiescence to
Demetrius’ request that he be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries in highly irregular
fashion the following spring were motivated, at least in part, by the hope, or perhaps the
assurance, that the king would respond by returning these sites to Athenian control (on
these honors, see below ns. 23.5.1; on Demetrius’ irregular initiation see below ns. 26.1–
4 ).

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23.5.1 τὸν γὰρ ὀπισθόδοµον τοῦ Παρθενῶνος ἀπέδειξαν αὐτῷ κατάλυσιν: The
opisthodomos often refers to the rear porch of a Greek temple, the counterpart to the front
porch or pronaos. The opisthodomos of the Parthenon, however, denotes the rear
chamber of the temple that was entered from the west. Inventory lists indicate that this
chamber, featuring four interior columns and, like the rest of the Parthenon, an elaborate
decorative scheme, was used as a treasury in the fourth century (T. Linders, “The
Location of the Opisthodomos: Evidence from the Temple of Athena Parthenos
Inventories,” AJA 111 [2007] 779–80). The secure room was separated from the cella by
a cross-wall, had no windows, and its doors were reinforced with iron bars (M.
Hollinshead, “‘Adyton,’ ‘Opisthodomos,’ and the Inner Room of the Greek Temple,”
Hesperia 68, 211 n. 89). At the close of the Ploutos, performed in 388, one of
Aristophanes’ characters remarks, “now we will place Wealth in the opisthodomos of the
goddess” (1191–93). Iconographic depictions of Ploutos generally show the god holding
a cornucopia bursting with grain and in the company of his mother, Demeter. In 304 the
Athenians installed in the same chamber not the divine personification of wealth, but a
divinized king named for Demeter who had, in a three-year span, twice liberated Athens,
the second time averting a famine in the process, and lavished the city with gifts of
money and grain. The choice of lodgings must have seemed particularly apt.
By living in the Parthenon, Demetrius was literally σύνναος with Athena, though
he does not seem to have received cult in common with the goddess in her temple (Nock
4). The arrangement was unprecedented, but Demetrius seems to have taken to the
comforts of temple living: not long after the battle of Ipsus, he took up residence in the
Temple of Apollo on Delos, where he received an Athenian embassy (IG XI 2 146 l. 76;
see below n. 30.4.2). Demetrius’ temple stays anticipated the cultic partnerships between
the traditional gods of the Greek cities and deified rulers that would become
characteristic of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds (on the phenomenon of temple-
sharing, see esp. Nock). So too did the Athenian decisions to weave the figures of
Antigonus and Demetrius along with the other Olympians into Athena’s peplos (see
above, n. 10.5.1) and append the Demetrieia festival to the existing Dionysia (on this
festival, see above n. 12.2.4; on appended festivals in general, see Buraselis [2012]).
In his Protrepticus, an exhortation to pagans to adopt Christianity, the second-
century theologian Clement of Alexandria records that the Athenians arranged for
Demetrius to marry Athena, “but he scorned the goddess since he could not marry her
statue” (ὁ δὲ τὴν µὲν θεὸν ὑπερηφάνει, τὸ ἄγαλµα γῆµαι µὴ δυνάµενος) and instead
had sex with Lamia in Athena’s temple, “displaying the positions of the young hetaira to
the old virgin” (τῇ παλαιᾷ παρθένῳ τὰ τῆς νέας ἐπιδεικνὺς ἑταίρας σχήµατα).
Clement’s account may indicate that Demetrius and his Athenian partisans arranged a
“sacred marriage” (hieros gamos), in which the Savior of Athens and the city’s patron
goddess were joined in a symbolic union, with Lamia assuming the role of Athena (so
Habicht [1997] 49; Ogden 245, 263–64; cf. S. Müller [2009] who suggests that Lamia
took on the role of Aphrodite, rather than Athena). It is just as likely, however, that
Clement (or his source), aware of the comic poet Philippides’ claim that Demetrius
“introduced his hetaira to the virgin” (τὰς ἑταίρας εἰσαγαγὼν τῇ παρθένῳ, n. 26.5.1)
while he was resident in the Parthenon, conflated the poet’s scathing attack with a later
tradition that the Athenians offered Athena in marriage to none other than Mark Antony

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(O’Sullivan [2008]; on Philippides as the source of the anecdote in Clement, see
Mastrocinque [1979b] 265 n. 29). According to the Elder Seneca (Suasoriae 1.6), “the
Athenians said that they were pledging their Athena to him in matrimony, and they asked
that he marry her; Antony said that he would, but demanded a thousand talents from them
by way of a dowry” (dixerunt despondere ipsos in matrimonium illi Minervam suam et
rogaverunt ut duceret; Antonius ait ducturum, sed dotis nomine imperare se illis mille
talenta). If Clement has conflated the two stories, it would seem that Plutarch’s pairing of
Demetrius and Antony not only influenced his choice of material and resulted in strained
symmetry and occasional distortions (Intro. 19–29), but also led to the later assimilation
of the paired subjects.
κἀκεῖ δίαιταν εἶχε…ἐπισταθµεύοντα: on Demetrius’ behavior while lodged in the
Parthenon in the winter of 304/03, see below ns. 24.1–2.
23.6.2 τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον: on Philip, see above n. 2.1.3.
XXIV
24.1.2 πρεσβυτέραν ἀδελφὴν: As a result of his own efforts and those anxious to flatter
him, Demetrius had acquired a number of divine associations through which he could
claim kinship with Athena. In Athens alone he was honored as Soter, Kataibates, and
eponymous phyle god (on Demetrius’ accumulation of divine associations, see esp.
Versnel 44; ns. 2.3.6, 13.1.3, 23.5.1, 25.1.4; 30.4.1, 40.8.1).
24.1.3 τοσαύτην ὕβριν: In Greek literature kings, tyrants, and those who are suspected
of harboring tyrannical aspirations are uniformly accused of sexually transgressive acts
(H. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus [Cleveland: 1966] 285 n. 135; P. Holt,
“Sex, Tyranny, and Hippias’ Incest Dream,” GRBS 39 [1998] esp. 225–26; for the topos
of the sexually transgressive tyrant, see e.g. Hdt. 1.8–12,1.61.1, 5.92; Isoc. Nicocles 36;
Arist. Pol. 1311a22f, 1314b24–25, Eur. Suppl. 444–445; Xen. Hier. 7, 12; Alciphron
2.35.). For Plutarch, rulers who use their untrammeled power to sexually exploit their
subjects engage in hybris, not eros (ὕβρει µᾶλλον ἢ ἔρωτι, Mor. 251A; ’ὕβρις τάδ' οὐχὶ
Κύπρις ἐξεργάζεται’, quoting a tragic fragment, Mor. 768E). Thus his condemnation of
Demetrius’ purported treatment of the Athenian youth Democles (n. 24.2.2).
24.1.6 Χρυσίδι: Hetairai named Chrysis appear in Timarchus’ Orestautokleides (Athen.
13. 567f) and the Kolax of Menander (Koch fr. 295 = Athen. 13.587E), while the similar
Chryseis is a commonly attested name for hetairai (Ogden 181). The convention by
which hetairai assumed traditional “working names” frequently results in confusion in
the sources, stemming from the adoption of the same name by different women (see
below, and n. 27.9.1). This onomastic confusion is compounded in the case of Demetrius,
since interest in courtesans is attributed to other Demetrioi, including Demetrius of
Phalerum and his grandson, another Demetrius. Poliorcetes’ own grandson, Demetrius II
Aetolicus, kept and may have married a Thessalian war-captive named Chryseis, the
mother of his heir Philip V (Porphyry/Eusebius FGrH 260 F3. 13–14 = Eusebius Chron. I
237–38).
Λαµίᾳ: on Lamia, see ns.16.5.2–16.6.3, 27.1.1, 27.3.1.

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Δηµοῖ: A hetaira of this name is also associated with Antigonus Monophthalmus and
Demetrius’ son Antigonus Gonatas (Monophthalmus: Athen. 13.578A-B = Heracleides
Lembos FGrH 168 F4; Gonatas: id. = Ptolemy of Megalopolis FGrH 161 F4). That the
same hetaira enjoyed the favor of three generations of Antigonid kings seems highly
unlikely and the sources must refer to more than one Demo. Athenaeus (13.578 a-b),
citing Heraclides of Lembus and Ptolemy of Megalopolis, relates that a hetaira called
Demo was both the mother of Gonatas’ son Halcyoneus (= Ptolemy of Megalopolis
FGrH 161 F4) and a bone of contention between Monophthalmus and Demetrius, who
both desired her (= Heraclides Lembus FGrH 168 F4). As a result of this feud, Antigonus
executed Demetrius’ companion Oxythemis and Demo’s servants. The story is
anachronistic, however, since Oxythemis is attested as Demetrius’ agent long after
Monophthalmus fell at Ipsus (Athen. 14. 614f; Diod. 21.15, 16.5), and the Antigonus in
question cannot be Gonatas (contra Billows [1990] 414), since he is explicitly called
Demetrius’ father (τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Ἀντίγονον), and Oxythemis is executed for
conspiring with Demetrius (ἀποκτεῖναι Ὀξύθεµιν ὡς καὶ πολλὰ συνεξαµαρτάνοντα
τῷ Δηµητρίῳ; on Oxythemis, see n. 36.9.1).
καὶ Ἀντικύρᾳ: a hetaira named Anticyra is mentioned in the Kolax of Menander (Athen.
13.587E). Anticyra seems to be a professional name since it could refer to hellebore
(Suda s.v. Ἀντικυρίας σοι δεῖ, Adler A 2676) deriving, presumably, from the Phocian
city of the same name where the plant flourished (Paus.10.36.7; on hellebore, see n.
20.3.3; on the professional names adopted by hetairai, see above ns. 24.1.6). On
Anticyra, see J. Kirchner RE s.v. Anticyra (4).
ταῖς πόρναις ἐκείναις: Pornai are technically slave prostitutes (Glazebrook 35) though
the term is commonly used for a range of sex workers, from streetwalkers to brothel
workers to aulos-girls. In Athens, they were subject to taxes and legal constraints and
legally bound to have sex with whoever was willing to pay their fee. Hetairai such as
Lamia, however, were free to accept or decline the advances of their suitors, and their
ability to exercise discretion was an important component of their allure (Davidson 125–
27; on the distinction between hetairai and pornai, see Kurke 178–87; McClure [2003]
11–18). Despite these important distinctions, both pornai and hetairia exchanged sex for
some form of payment and there was often “slippage” between the terms (Kurke 178;
McClure [2003] 11). Whether a hetaira is referred to as such or is insultingly labeled a
porne depends largely on the speaker’s intentions. Pornai is here a term of opprobrium,
an indication of Plutarch’s disgust with Demetrius’ behavior during his stint in the
Parthenon. Plutarch expresses this disgust even more explicitly in the synkrisis (4.1–4.4),
where Demetrius’ behavior is labeled a sacrilege (ἀσέβηµα), he is accused of treating
many Athenian women as prostitutes (τῶν ἀστῶν κατεπόρνευσε πολλάς), and his
hetairai are again called pornai and likened to bitches—animals that couple
indiscriminately and were thus barred from the Athenian Acropolis (cf. Philochorus
FGrH 328 F67). The ban, as any recent visitor to Athens can attest, is no longer enforced.
24.2.2 Δηµοκλέους ἀρετὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἄξιόν ἐστι µὴ παρελθεῖν: Democles is
known only from this passage and Comp. 4.5, where Plutarch strongly condemns
Demetrius’ treatment of the youth, citing Democles’ death as a tragic consequence of the
king’s relentless pursuit of pleasure (cf. Intro. 17, 38–39. 53. 55). The tale of a youth

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whose name means “glory of the people,” who is given the epithet kalos but no
patronymic, who embodies the sovereign virtues of sophrosyne and arete, who is stalked
by a depraved king bent on sexual conquest, and who prefers to suffer a horrible death
rather than submit to the king’s advances makes for a potent allegory, but it is almost
certainly not historical (cf. A. van Hooff, From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-Killing in
Classical Antiquity [London: 1990] 119 who accepts the historicity of this episode
without comment). Plutarch’s source for the story cannot be identified, but the allegorical
triumph of the “glory of the people” over a tyrant suggests a comedy. The character
Demos in Aristophanes’ Knights is the classic example of the use of allegorical character
names in comedy (note that Demos emerges as kalos at the end of the play, Knights
1321). Demetrius’ pursuit of Democles recalls an earlier tradition regarding another of
Plutarch’s most morally ambiguous subjects: Alcibiades, while still a boy, purportedly
ran away from the home of Pericles to live with one of his older admirers, a certain
Democrates (Alc. 3.1–2 = Antiphon F66, Thallheim). This apocryphal story, which
Plutarch found in Antiphon, is almost certainly an allegorical prefiguration of Alcibiades’
future political style (V. Wohl, “The Eros of Alcibiades,” Cl. Ant. 18 [1999] 370; S.
Verdegem, Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades: Story, Text and Moralism [Leuven: 2010] 130
n. 69). Plutarch duly relates the tale, but notes, “these things are perhaps unworthy of
belief, coming as they do from one who admits that he hated Alcibiades, and abused him
accordingly” (τούτοις µὲν οὐκ ἄξιον ἴσως πιστεύειν, ἅ γε λοιδορεῖσθαί τις αὐτῷ δι'
ἔχθραν ὁµολογῶν εἶπεν, Alc. 3.2). This conclusion applies equally well to the story of
Democles, but Plutarch evinces no doubt in its authenticity (on the standards of scrutiny
Plutarch applies to his sources for the Demetrius, see Intro. 54–56)
Demetrius and his Athenian supporters were viciously parodied on the comic
stage in the periods when the gates of the city were barred to him (301–295, after 287) —
the fragments of Philippides that Plutarch cites at 12.7 and 26.5 indicate as much—and
Plutarch may have drawn this episode from a comedy or from a historical work that
included comic fragments and their historical context (see above n. 12.3.2; Marasco
[1981] 63–4 suggests the history of Duris of Samos as a likely source; cf. Paschidis
[2008] 119; on comic treatments of Demetrius, see O’Sullivan [2009b]; Intro. 52–53).
Demetrius was not the only contemporary figure targeted for abuse from the comic stage
at this time: the comic poet Archedicus accused Demochares of indecent behavior in a
play of unknown title (Polyb. 12.13.3, 7; ns. 12.6.1, 24.10.3); Menander’s Nomothetes
parodied Demetrius of Phalerum after his expulsion from the city (Lape 19. n. 54); the
playwright Demetrius lampooned Lachares after he was driven from the city by
Poliorcetes in 295 (Demetrius II F 1; on Lachares see below n. 33.1.4). Whether Plutarch
is deliberately presenting comic material as historical or was misled by his source cannot
be determined, but note that the signs of divine displeasure with the honors voted
Demetrius are presented as historical, although they probably derive from a comedy of
Philippides, and should be regarded with skepticism (n. 12.2.3).
The purported setting for the gruesome suicide of Democles also militates against
the historicity of the episode. Private bathing complexes (like the βαλανεῖον ἰδιωτικὸν
mentioned here) featuring large tubs equipped with hypocaust systems and supplied by
large boilers do not seem to have been introduced in Greece until at least the 3rd century
B.C. (M. Trümper [2014] 217), although Eyptian papyri from the Roman Imperial period

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mention cauldrons or boilers (χαλκεία) of bronze or lead that were used to heat large
amounts of hot water, and the potential danger that such vessels presented to customers
(M. Trümper [2014] 241). Perhaps Plutarch had access to a (comic?) tradition in which
Democles committed suicide in a bath, and he simply fleshed out the story with details
appropriate to his own cultural milieu—contemporary Imperial bathing culture.
In its depiction of a beautiful youth’s heroic resistance to the advances of a
depraved autocrat, Plutarch’s account of the death of Democles anticipates an alternative
account of the death of Hadrian’s favorite Antinoöus. The author of the Historiae
Augustae (Hadr. 14.7) records the rumor that the young man hurled himself into the Nile
rather than endure the repeated degradations of the Emperor (cf. Cicero’s charge that
virgins from the best families of Byzantium hurled themselves into wells to escape the
advances of the proconsul Lucius Calpurnius Piso, De prov. cons. 6).
24.6.1 Κλεαίνετος ὁ Κλεοµέδοντος: Cleaenetus is known only from this episode, but he
was almost certainly a descendant of the demagogue Cleon, whose father bore the name
Cleaenetus (Thuc. 3.36; 4.21; on Cleon see above ns. 11.2.3, 11.3.3, 12.1.2). He may be
the same Cleaenetus who participated in an embassy to Antigonus in 306/5 and returned
to Athens with 140 silver talents donated by the king (IG II2 1492 l. 100: the patronymic
is missing). The appearance of the episode at this point in Plutarch’s narrative seems to
indicate that it took place while Demetrius was in Athens during the winter of 304/03, but
the royal letter Cleaenetus produced in the Assembly suggests that Demetrius was not in
the city. Early 303, when Demetrius was campaigning in the Peloponnese (see below ns.
25.1), is the most likely context for the remission of Cleomedon’s fine.
24.6.3 γράµµατα παρὰ Δηµητρίου κοµίσας πρὸς τὸν δῆµον: Demetrius’ actions on
behalf of Cleaenetus implicitly invite comparison with Alexander, and, as so often,
Demetrius is found wanting (Intro. 33–35). In agreeing to write on behalf of Cleaenetus,
Demetrius fails to emulate the praiseworthy example of Alexander, who had refused to
write to the Athenians with a request that they rescind a fine levied on the playwright
Athenodorus. Instead, Alexander paid the fine himself (Plut. Alex. 29.5).

24.7.2 ἐγράφη δὲ ψήφισµα… ψήφισµα καθεῖλον: Plutarch does not explicitly state that
the proposal was ratified, but since it was later rescinded (ψήφισµα καθεῖλον) it must
have been approved (Thucydides uses identical language in recording the debate
surrounding the famous Megarian Decree, 1.39.2, 1.39.4, 1.140.3, 1.140.4). This decree
is telling evidence of the power struggle between Stratocles and his adherents in the
Assembly and the radical democrats led by Demochares (Marasco [1984]; Paschidis
[2008] 95–98). Cleaenetus’ use of a royal letter to sway the Assembly was, for
Demochares and his allies at least, a chilling portent of rule by royal fiat and thus an
existential threat to Athenian democracy. This episode is recorded nowhere else, but
extant decrees corroborate Demetrius’ penchant for issuing epistolary instructions to the
Athenians (e.g. IG II2 486; SEG 36.164). The decree barring the introduction of royal
correspondence to meetings of the Assembly has been seen as the centerpiece of a
legislative program in 303 in which widespread popular discontent with Demetrius’
hubristic and dissolute behavior and the honors awarded him is manifest (for this view
and a discussion of the salient evidence, including a decree limiting the maximum value

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of crowns awarded to honorands, see Paschidis [2008] 95–103). The epigraphical
evidence, however, is often ambiguous and difficult to date, and Plutarch’s habitual
disregard for chronological precision complicates attempts to synchronize the extant
decrees with his narrative. Militating against this interpretation is the reaction to
Demetrius’ campaign of liberation in the Peloponnese that began early in 303. In
Elaphebolion (March/April) a decree of the Athenian assembly (Agora 16.114 = SEG
25.141; Woodhead [1981]) vowed annual sacrifices to Athena Nike, Agathe Tyche, and
the Saviors (i.e. Antigonus and Demetrius) in thanks for the safety of Athenian soldiers
serving with Demetrius and in celebration of the restoration of freedom and autonomy to
the Greek cities garrisoned by his rivals. A laudatory inscription (ISE no. 7 = SEG
25.149) set up in 303 by Athenian volunteers serving in the Peloponnese hails
“Demetrius the Great” (Δηµήτριος ὁ µέγας) for the liberation of Athens and many other
Greek cities, and calls for the erection of a temenos and altars for the king, as well as an
equestrian statue to be set up in the Agora near the personified image of democracy. The
feud between Stratocles and Demochares presents a microcosm of the fundamental
incompatibility of the Greek cities’ desire for freedom with the reality of the emerging
Hellenistic monarchies: while Demochares viewed the extension of Antigonid power in
Greece as a threat to Athenian freedom, Stratocles saw Demetrius as its savior and
guarantor. In 303 at least, the position of Stratocles enjoyed greater support in the
Assembly. The decree was quickly rescinded, Demetrius placated, Demochares exiled
(see n. 24.10.3).

24.9.2 ἔτι δὲ προσεψηφίσαντοπᾶν…δίκαιον: The motion to invest Demetrius’ will with

institutional weight in the Athenian Assembly was a nightmare realized for committed
democrats like Demochares, who had worked to limit Demetrius’ ability to rule by
epistolary fiat (n. 24.7.2). Indeed, this decree goes far beyond the earlier decree granting
oracular status to Demetrius’ response to an embassy (13.1.1). Unlike earlier measures
proposing that ambassadors sent to Demetrius and Antigonus be called theoroi (n.
11.1.3), and that ritual greetings appropriate for Dionysus and Demeter be extended to the
king when he arrived in Athens (n. 12.1.2), Plutarch claims that this proposal was
actually approved by the Assembly (προσεψηφίσαντοπᾶν).
24.10.3 Δηµοχάρης ὁ Λευκονοεὺς: the son of Demosthenes’ sister (Cic. Brut. 286),
Demochares, like his uncle, was an accomplished orator and a passionate defender of
Athenian democracy (Plut. Mor 847C). His work of contemporary history in at least 21
books is almost entirely lost (FGrH 75 F1–8), but was a source, probably indirectly and
through the mediation of Duris of Samos, for Plutarch’s biographies of Demetrius and
Demosthenes (Pownall in BNJ 75; see Intro. 49–52). Acording to Cicero (Brut. 286), the
work was more rhetorical than historical, and the surviving fragments include polemical
attacks on the extraordinary honors voted Demetrius and his philoi (F1), and a laudatory
account of the suicide of Demosthenes that credits his painless death to divine
intervention (F3). He seems to have actively opposed Antipater’ demand that the
Athenians surrender their anti-Macedonian orators in 322 (Plut. Mor. 847D), but it was
not until the expulsion of Demetrius of Phalerum in 307 that Demochares came to the
political fore as one of the leaders of the restored democracy. In 307/06 he supervised the
overhaul of the Athenian fortifications and stockpiled weapons in anticipation of the
invasion of Cassander (see above n. 23.1.1), and he secured an Athenian alliance with the

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Boeotians (Plut. Mor. 851D), most likely in 304 after the return of Demetrius from
Rhodes (Marasco [1984] 50, with further bibliography). Demochares was probably the
driving force behind the decree of Sophocles of Sunium that brought the philosophical
schools under the aegis of the Council and Assembly in 306 or 305, though the law was
soon repealed (Pollux 9.42; Athen. 13.610E-F; Diog. Laert. 5.38).
After Stratocles and his pro-Macedonian faction emerged triumphant from their
struggle with the radical democrats (see above n. 24.7.2), Demochares was exiled (24.11;
n. 24.7.2). The suggestion that Demochares, like the poet Philippides, spent his years of
exile at the court of Lysimachus in Thrace is plausible, but lack of evidence precludes
confirmation (Ferguson [1911] 137–38 n. 6; Gabbert 18; cf. Paschidis [2008] 154 with n.
4). Demochares did not return to Athens until 286/5 (the archonship of Diocles), after
Demetrius had departed for his final expedition to Asia (Mor. 851E). The honorary
decree proposed by his son Laches in 271/70 and preserved by Psuedo-Plutarch (Mor.
851D-F) provides most of the evidence for his career after he returned from exile to take
up a leading role in the regime that styled itself “the democracy of all Athenians” (ἡ
δηµοκρατία ἡ ἐξ ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων, SEG 28.60 ll. 82ff.; Osborne [2012] 43–50).
Almost immediately after his return, Demochares participated in no fewer than four
embassies to a variety of rulers (Mor. 851E), including Lysimachus and Ptolemy, and
may have sought an entente with Demetrius’ son Antigonus through the mediation of the
philosopher Zenon (Diog. Laert. 7.14). These actions are telling evidence that even the
most strident opponent of royal interference in Athenian internal affairs eventually came
to terms with the absolute necessity of maintaining close connections with the various
royal courts (on Demochares, see Marasco [1984]; Billows [1990] 337–39; Traill PAA
321970; Paschidis [2008] esp. 153–159; Bayliss [2011] 116–17; Baron esp. 121–25).
24.12.1 τοιαῦτα…δοκοῦντες: The self-delusion of the Athenians anticipates a similar
situation early in the Antony. Despite the reality of Caesar’s autocratic power, the
Romans believe that they are free so long as he does not assume the royal title: “And this
was strange, too, that while the people were willing to conduct themselves like the
subjects of a king, they shunned the name of king as though it meant the abolition of their
freedom” (ὃ καὶ θαυµαστὸν ἦν, ὅτι τοῖς ἔργοις τὰ τῶν βασιλευοµένων ὑποµένοντες,
τοὔνοµα τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔφευγον, Ant. 12.5).
XXV
25.1.1 Δηµήτριος δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς Πελοπόννησον (The Peloponnesian Campaign of
303): This campaign, a pendant to that of the previous year in central Greece (23.2–6),
proved an overwhelming success. The garrisons occupying the central and northern
Peloponnese were driven out and a host of cities were granted their freedom and brought
into the Antigonid alliance. Diodorus succinctly enumerates Demetrius’ several motives:
Δηµήτριος εἶχε πρόθεσιν πρὸς µὲν τοὺς περὶ Κάσανδρον διαπολεµεῖν, τοὺς δ'
Ἕλληνας ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ πρῶτον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διοικεῖν, ἅµα µὲν νοµίζων
δόξαν οἴσειν αὐτῷ µεγάλην τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων αὐτονοµίαν, ἅµα δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ
Πρεπέλαον ἡγεµόνας τοῦ Κασάνδρου πρότερον συντρῖψαι καὶ τότε προσάγειν ἐπ'
αὐτὴν τὴν ἡγεµονίαν…

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Demetrius proposed to carry on his war with Cassander and to free the Greeks; and first
he planned to establish order in the affairs of Greece, for he believed that the freeing of
the Greeks would bring him great honour, and at the same time he thought it necessary to
wipe out Prepelaus and the other leaders and then to aim for supremacy…(Diod.
20.102.1).
Demetrius’ stay in the rear chamber of the Parthenon (see above n. 23.5.1) in the
winter of 304/03 was not an extended one, for all the fodder it provided his enemies.
Indeed, an Athenian decree (SEG 30.69) honoring Demetrius for his military success in
the Peloponnese suggests that the primary goals of the campaign had already been
achieved by the Attic month Elaphebolion (March/April), and by Mounichion
(April/May) he felt confident enough in his position south of the Isthmus to make a brief
return to Athens (see below n. 26.1.1). Since Demetrius and his forces certainly
conducted operations in the Argolid, Achaia, and Arcadia, and may have ventured as far
afield as Elis and Messenia (Elis: IG IV2 1.68 ll. 136–37; Messenia: see below n. 33.4.1;
cf. Plut. Dem. 13.4; Paschidis [2008] 269–70), it seems certain then that Demetrius set
out for the Peloponnese very early in 303 (cf. Woodhead [1981] 365–66; Paschidis
[2008] 93–94).
Of Demetrius’ enemies, only Cassander had significant forces in the Peloponnese.
The garrison at Sicyon represented the entirety of Ptolemy’s presence in mainland Greece
(Corinth, occupied by Ptolemy in 308, had passed to Cassander’s control, see below n.
25.1.4). The elderly Polyperchon (he was likely born in the 380s, Heckel [2006] 226),
persuaded to abandon his gambit with Alexander’s purported bastard Heracles (see above
n. 9.5.1), had accepted a position as Cassander’s strategos in the Peloponnese, but his
whereabouts after the winter of 309/8 are unknown and he may in fact have been dead (P.
Paschidis, “Missing years in the biography of Polyperchon [318/7 and 308 BC
onwards],” Τεκµήρια 9, 233–50, argues plausibly that he died in 308; cf. Diod. 20.28.4).
He does not, at any rate, figure in any account of the campaign and if he was still alive he
was subordinate to Cassander.
The sources do not permit a certain reconstruction of Demetrius’ movements, and
many events, to say nothing of their order, are obscure. Diodorus (20.102.2–103.7)
reports that Demetrius first took Sicyon and Corinth by storm and then proceeded into
Achaea and Arcadia. Two stratagems related by Polyaenus (4.7.3, 4.7.8) complement
Diodorus’ account, preserving tactical details from the assaults on Sicyon and Corinth.
Plutarch has probably not presented events in their proper order (cf. Ferguson [1948]
120–21; Wheatley [2004]), and his account of the manner in which Demetrius expelled
the garrisons occupying Sicyon, Corinth, and Argos minimizes Demetrius’ military
achievement, in contradiction to both literary and epigraphical sources (n. 25.1.4). But
Plutarch’s account does preserve crucial details not mentioned by Diodorus, many of
which are corroborated by epigraphical evidence. Indeed, his assertion that Demetrius
campaigned in Acte and the Argolid is confirmed by inscriptions that attest to the
liberation of Troezen, Epidaurus and Argos (see below, n. 25.1.4). Here too we have the
only literary account of the creation (or revival; see below n. 25.4.1) of the Hellenic
League, and the only evidence of any sort that Demetrius presided at the Argive Heraea
(see below n. 25.2.1).

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 The fact that Prepelaus and Pleistarchus, two of Cassander’s most accomplished
lieutenants (ns. 14.2.5, 22.8.1, 25.1.4), commanded at Corinth and Argos, respectively,
suggests that Antipatrid forces were concentrated primarily in the northeast Peloponnese.
After liberating the Corinthia and Argolid, Demetrius may have undertaken a grand tour
of the Peloponnese, commanding in person as the remaining garrisons in Achaea, Elis,
and Arcadia were expelled, or he may have divided his forces and entrusted subordinates
to lead simultaneous assaults in the various regions of the Peloponnese, a luxury the
overwhelming superiority of his forces would have allowed him (cf. Ferguson [1948]
120).
25.1.3 προσηγάγετο τήν τε καλουµένην Ἀκτὴν: Acte refers here to Argolic Acte, the
rugged, easternmost peninsula of the Peloponnese that divides the Saronic Gulf from the
Argolic Gulf. Inscriptions in honor of two Antigonid officers, Alcaeus of Aenus (IG IV2
1.58) and Zenodotus of Halicarnassus (RIG 452), attest that its two principal cities,
Epidaurus and Troezen, were liberated at this time (on these officers, see Billows [1990]
366 and 440). The expulsion of Cassander’s garrisons in Acte may well have taken place
during the initial phase of the campaign. Accounts of the capture of Sicyon and an
Athenian inscription (Woodhead [1981]; Moretti ISE 5, l. 1) show that the campaign was
amphibious; naval contingents—both Epidaurus and Troezen have well-sheltered
harbors, and both are more readily accessible by sea than land—could have expelled the
garrisons from the cities of Acte before combining with Demetrius’ land forces at
Cenchreae prior to the attack on Sicyon (on the capture of Cenchreae, see above n.
23.3.2; for Sicyon, see below). This would explain the honors for Demetrius’ officers and
accommodate Diodorus’ claim (20.103.1) that, after the capture of Sicyon, Demetrius
marched on Corinth “with his entire force” (cf. Ferguson [1948] 121). It is possible that a
ship monument celebrating a naval victory set up in the great sanctuary of Asclepius near
Epidaurus commemorates the role of Demetrius’ fleet in the expulsion of Cassander’s
garrisons from Epidaurus (this has not been suggested elsewhere, but the monument
probably dates, in its original form, to the late fourth or early third century—it was
appropriated and reinscribed by Mummius in the mid-2nd century; A.L. Ermeti [1981]
L’Agorà di Cirene v. III.1, Rome (1981) 60–22; Lehmann 193; Palagia [2010] 166).
25.1.4 Ἀρκαδίαν πλὴν Μαντινείας: Arcadian Orchomenus is situated on a lofty hill that
dominates the plains northwest of Mantineia along the strategically important route from
Laconia to the northern Peloponnesus (T. Nielsen, “Arkadia,” in Hansen and Nielsen,
523–25. Diodorus’ description (20.1.3.5–7) of the siege of Arcadian Orchomenus is the
only other notice of Demetrius’ activities in the region. Orchomenus was held by a strong
garrison under the command of a certain Strombichus. When Strombichus refused to
surrender, Demetrius brought up his siege engines, breached the walls, and took the city
by storm. After entering Orchomenus, Demetrius crucified the recalcitrant garrison
commander and his closest associates in front of the city and enrolled the rest, some
2,000 mercenaries, in his own force (cf. Cratesipolis’ crucifixion of 30 leaders of a
Sicyonian rebellion against her rule; Diod. 19.67.2). The brutal punishment of
Strombichus and his supporters is at odds with Demetrius’ reputation for clemency (cf.
6.4.1–4; 9.3.3–5; 17.1.1–4; 34.5; 39.4.3–4; 40.6.1–3), but as a calculated act of terror it
proved highly effective. According to Diodorus, the garrisons holding the forts and cities
in the vicinity surrendered en masse after the capture of Orchomenus (20.103.7). It is also

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possible that the severity of the punishment dealt out by Demetrius was influenced in part
by the bitter political rivalries within Orchomenus: for an earlier atrocity resulting from
internecine strife in the city see Diod. 19.63.4).
Demetrius’ failure to secure the allegiance of Mantineia is obscure, but political
consideration may hold the key. The city left the Arcadian League in 362 and resumed
her traditional allegiance to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 7.5.1–3). Mantineia may well have
followed Sparta’s lead in remaining aloof from the Antigonids (cf. n. 35.1.2).
Ἄργος: Diodorus passes over the capture of Argos in silence, but an unpublished
inscription from Argos confirms that a Macedonian garrison occupied that city from 315–
303 (M. Piérart, “Note sur l’alliance entre Athènes et Argos au cours de la première
guerre du Péloponnèse: à propos de Thucydide I 107–108, MH 44 [1987] 177; for
Cassander’s capture of the city and installation of a garrison in 315 see Diod. 19.54.3,
19.63.1–2). Athenaeus (10.414F-415A), citing Amarantus of Alexandria, claims that
Demetrius deployed one of his celebrated city-takers against the walls of Argos, though
the historical context of the anecdote is uncertain and it is possible that Athenaeus or his
source have conflated the siege of Argos with Demetrius’ second assault on Thebes (see
below n. 40). Plutarch’s assertion that Argos was taken in 303 is confirmed by an
inscribed stele set up in the Argive sanctuary of Pythian Apollo. The inscription (Moretti
ISE 39) records that a thiasos dedicated statues of Apollo and Artemis to Leto in
thanksgiving for the liberation of the city from Pleistarchus. Pleistarchus, the brother of
Cassander, was likely in command of the Antipatrid forces in the Argolid (Gregory 18–
19) and had played a major role in Cassander’s attempts to take Athens during the Four
Years’ War. The inscription credits a miraculous nocturnal epiphany of Apollo for the
expulsion of the garrison, which likely took place during a festival of Apollo (Chaniotis
[1991] 137). It has been argued plausibly that the dedicatory inscription assimilates
Demetrius to Apollo (Moretti ISE 39, p. 90), yet another example of the many divine
associations he accumulated at this time (ns. 2.3.6, 12.1.2, 12.3.1, 13.1.3, 40.8.3)
25.1.5 Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον: According to Polyaenus (4.7.3), the Ptolemaic garrison
holding Sicyon were caught off-guard when Demetrius, who was reportedly in a torpor of
luxuriant excess in Cenchreae, suddenly launched a well conceived and coordinated night
assault involving multiple contingents attacking by land and sea (on the capture of
Cenchreae, see above n. 23.3.2). Apparently Demetrius was quite capable of exploiting
his reputation to gain a tactical advantage. At a predetermined hour, a contingent of
soldiers under the command of the mercenary officer Diodorus attacked the western gate
at the same time as Demetrius and the main body of his army attacked from the east, and
a naval contingent sailed into the harbor. It is unclear when Demetrius established a fleet
in the Gulf of Corinth, but if a Megarian decree (IG VII 1) that mentions troops
established at Aegosthena by a King Demetrius refers to Poliorcetes rather than his
grandson, Demetrius II, then Demetrius left behind troops for the defense of the Megarid,
just as he did for Attica, before he departed for Cyprus in 306 (on the arrangements for
the defense of Attica, see above n. 23.1.1). Three years later, a naval squadron stationed
at Aegosthena, a heavily fortified port on the Gulf of Corinth, would have been perfectly
placed to carry out the attack on Sicyon (the identity of the King Demetrius mentioned in
a series of Megarian proxeny decrees [IG VII 1–14] is controversial, and it is possible
that the decrees belong to the reign of Demetrius II, and not Poliorcetes: for a discussion

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of the evidence supporting the competing views, see esp. Robu [2014a]; id. [2014b]; cf.
Paschidis [2008], 295–99; P. Liddell, “The Decree Culture of Ancient Megara,” CQ 59
[2009] 422–25; on Aegosthena, see Legon; P. Smith 45–49; cf. Ober [1983]).
The garrison holding the town was overwhelmed by this initial assault and
withdrew to the acropolis (Diod. 20.102.2). The acropolis of Sicyon occupies a
commanding position, but it was apparently unfortified before Demetrius’ relocation of
the city (see below n. 25.3.1). In the face of Demetrius’ imminent assault, Philip, the
distinguished Ptolemiac general commanding the garrison, recognized that his position
was untenable and surrendered on generous terms. The departure of Philip and his men
for Egypt removed the last remnant of the Ptolemaic presence on mainland Greece and
marked the final failure of Ptolemy’s ambitious policy, begun with such promise in 308,
of extending his influence in the Peloponnese (Diod. 20.37; cf. above n. 8.1.3).
After the capture of Sicyon, Demetrius set out for Corinth with his entire force
(Diod. 20.103.1), his fleet coasting along with the army. In the last moments before the
battle of Salamis in 306 Demetrius was still demanding that Ptolemy remove his
garrisons from Corinth and Sicyon, but Corinth was now held by a garrison commanded
by Cassander’s key lieutenant Prepelaus (pre-battle demands: 15.3.6–8; Prepelaus in
Corinth: Diod. 20.103.1). At some point between 306 and 303, Cassander gained control
of Corinth, but it is not certain when or how. Tarn’s suggestion (CAH vi, 499) that
Ptolemy ceded it to him soon after Salamis is attractive: the two kings had both been
targeted for elimination by the Antigonids and were natural allies. A hoard of 196 silver
coins, of which nearly three dozen are Ptolemaic issues, was buried in Chilimodi in the
southern Corinthia in 306, and may offer further support for a post-Salamis date for the
handover (Dixon [2007] 175 n. 66).
To capture the lower town Demetrius employed tactics similar to those that had
proved so successful at Sicyon. While a diversionary attack on a northern gate drew the
attention of Prepelaus, Demetrius slipped into the city from the south, entering through a
gate opened by a group of Corinthian citizens (Poly. 4.7.8). The gate in question may be
the southern gate mentioned by Pausanias from which the road to Tenea debouched (so
Billows [1990] 171) but Diodorus implies that the gate was a postern, which suggests that
Demetrius and his forces entered though a less prominent gate (Dixon [2014] 99 argues
for the Phliasian gate on the west side of the city; cf. Plut. Arat. 21.1). With the city walls
breached, the garrison fled for high ground, some retiring within the formidable defenses
atop Acrocorinth, others occupying a fortified “place called Sisyphium” (τὸ καλούµενον
Σισύφιον; on the fortifications of Sisyphium, see Diodorus 20.103.2, where he states that
Demetrius deployed his siege machines against the fortresses [προσαγαγὼν µηχανὰς
τοῖς ὀχυρώµασι]). The location of the latter is unknown, but Strabo (8.6.2) mentions a
Sisyphium beneath Peirene, referring to the spring in the southeastern corner of
Acrocorinth (not to be confused with the famous Peirene fountain in the lower city), and
Pausanias too connects the upper Peirene with the mythological Sisyphus (2.5.1). Thus
the Sisyphium was probably somewhere on the southeastern slope of Acrocorinth, but no
trace of the ruined white marble temple or palace that Strabo saw there has been
discovered.

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 Demetrius then turned his siege equipment against Sisyphium, which he stormed
after suffering heavy losses (Diod. 20.103.2. The defenders of Sisyphium withdrew to
Acrocorinth, but the garrison soon surrendered rather than face a siege. Prepelaus was
allowed to withdraw in safety to Cassander (20.103.4), and Demetrius, purportedly at the
request of the Corinthians, established a garrison of his own in Acrocorinth (Diod.
20.103.3; Dixon [2014] 64 argues that the installation of the garrison was “an act of
euergetsim” in response to the Corinthian request; for a skeptical view of Diodorus’
account of Corinthian enthusiasm for this garrison, see Thonemann [2005] 72 n. 37; cf.
Billows [1990] 171).
The capture of Acrocrorinth was one of Demetrius’ greatest accomplishments in
the realm of siegecraft, and Plutarch’s insistence that it (along with the acropoleis of
Sicyon and Argos) was taken by bribery does the Besieger a grave disservice. A
comparison with Plutarch’s breathless account of the capture of Acrocorinth in the Aratus
is instructive. There, both the strategic importance and virtual impregnability of
Acrocorinth are highlighted. When Acrocorinth is controlled by a garrison, Plutarch
writes, “it hinders and cuts off all the country south of the Isthmus from intercourse,
transits, and the carrying on of military expeditions by land and sea, and makes him who
controls the place with a garrison sole lord of Greece” (ὅταν λάβῃ φρουράν, ἐνίσταται
καὶ ἀποκόπτει τὴν ἐντὸς Ἰσθµοῦ πᾶσαν ἐπιµειξιῶν τε καὶ παρόδων καὶ στρατειῶν
ἐργασίας τε κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, καὶ ἕνα κύριον ποιεῖ καὶ ἄρχοντα
τὸνκατέχοντα φρουρᾷ τὸ χωρίον, Arat. 16.5). Attempts to storm the lofty, heavily
fortified site, however, are “hopeless” (φανερῶς ἀνέλπιστος ἦν ἡ ἐπιχείρησις, Arat.
17.1). When Aratus surprises the Macedonian garrison of Antigonus Gonatas and seizes
the citadel in a daring nighttime attack, Plutarch offers an assessment and appreciation of
the deed: “but I should say that this capture of Acrocorinth was the very last and latest
achievement of the Greeks, and that it rivalled their best, not only in daring, but also in
happy results, as events at once showed” (ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πράξεων ταύτην
ἐσχάτην καὶ νεωτάτην φαίην ἂν πεπρᾶχθαι, τοῦτο µὲν τόλµῃ, τοῦτο δὲ τύχῃ ταῖς
ἀρίσταις ἐνάµιλλον, ὡς ἐδήλωσεν εὐθὺς τὰ γινόµενα, Arat. 24.2).
25.2.1 ἐν Ἄργει…ἀγωνοθετῶν καὶ συµπανηγυρίζων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν: The Heraea, an
Argive-administered panhellenic festival in honor of Hera, was celebrated every four
years at the Heraion, the sanctuary of the goddess on the northeastern boundary of the
Argive plain between Mycenae and Argos. Hera was the principal divinity of Argos and
the Argives reckoned their years by the term of her chief-priestess (Thuc. 2.2). The
Argive-administered festival included games that were part of the panhellenic athletic
“circuit” (J. Hall, “How Argive was the ‘Argive’ Heraion: The political and cultic
geography of the Argive plain, 900–400 BC” AJA 99 [1995] 611), and probably took
place in mid- or late-June of the year following the celebration of the Olympic Games (A.
Boethius, “Der Argivische Kalendar,” Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift (1922), 1; Miller
[2004] 106). Demetrius was in Athens in May to be initiated into the mysteries of
Demeter (see below, n. 26.1.1); his haste to return to the Peloponnese in time for the
Heraea illustrates his recognition that panhellenic festivals provided the perfect venue for
burnishing his reputation as a champion of Hellenic freedom and promoting an alliance
of Greek cities under Antigonid leadership (on the inauguration of the Hellenic alliance at
Isthmia in 302, see below n. 25.4.1). The assertion that Demetrius “participated in the

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sacred rites along with the Greeks” (συµπανηγυρίζων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν) probably reflects
these efforts: the member states of the alliance founded at Corinth in 302, which modern
scholars call the Hellenic League, are simply called “The Greeks” (οἱ Ἕλληνες) in a
fragmentary copy of the League charter (IG IV.1.68; see below, n. 25.4.1). Demetrius’
presence at the Nemean Games, administered by Argos in nearby Nemea later that
summer is nowhere explicitly attested, but he was in the area and it seems highly unlikely
that he would have missed this opportunity to make his case for the League in a
panhellenic setting (cf. the actions of Flamininus, who proclaimed the Freedom of the
Greeks at both Isthmia and Nemea in 196, Plut. Flam. 12.2; Livy 34.41; Polyb. 10.26).
The precedent of Cassander provided additional incentive. In 315, during his own
invasion of the Peloponnese, Cassander garrisoned Argos and presided at the Nemean
Games (Diod. 19.64). Cassander had overseen the games while occupying Argos;
Demetrius could do the same as her divine liberator.
The discovery of a fragmentary inscription in a Nemean well (SEG 25.356, 357)
provides additional evidence for an Antigonid presence at Nemea. One fragment (SEG
25.357) mentions Acrocorinth and what seems to be a levy of soldiers from the Cyclades.
Daniel Geagan (Hesperia [1968] 381–85) dated the fragment to the late 4th century and
suggested that it commemorated the contributions of troops from the Islands who
participated in a Peloponnesian campaign led by Demetrius’ cousin Polemaeus in 312. In
that year Ptolemaeus and his troops successfully liberated Elis and Cyllene and restored
the treasure that had been looted from the sanctuary at Olympia by the renegade
Antigonid general Telesphorus (Diod. 19.77; n. 2.2.1). The fragment, according to
Geagan, came from a monument set up to record the contributions of free and
autonomous Greek cities to the cause of Greek freedom at the Panhellenic Nemean
games in the summer of 311. Geagan’s conception of the commemorative program of the
monument is perfectly plausible, but the inscription sits far more comfortably in the
context of Demetrius’ campaign of 303. Demetrius had passed through the Cyclades on
his way to Greece in 304, where he levied troops (Diod. 20.100.5). The mention of
Acrocorinth, which Geagan was unable to account for, no longer gives us any trouble,
since it had recently been liberated by Demetrius’ troops (n. 25.1.5)—a signal
achievement worthy of commemoration. Demetrius was the first Antigonid monarch to
preside at Nemea, but not the last: Antigonus Doson (Polyb. 2.70.4) and Philip V, who
administered both the Argive Heraea and the Nemean Games in 209 (Livy 27.30.6),
would follow his example.
25.2.3 Αἰακίδου…τοῦ Μολοττῶν βασιλέως: The king of the Molossian tribe of
Epirus, nephew of Olympias, and the father of Pyrrhus and Deidameia (n. 25.2.4),
Aeacides supported his aunt and Polyperchon in their bid for power in Macedon in 317/6
(see above n. 22.2.3), but was unable to force a crossing into Macedon to relieve
Olympias at Pydna. He was subsequently ejected from Epirus by his subjects, but was
reconciled to them before 313 when he was defeated and killed by Philip, brother of
Cassander, at Oeniadae (Paus. 1.11.4; Diod. 19.74.4–5). The royal house of the
Molossians, as Aeacides’ name suggests, and as Pindar asserted early in the 5th century
(Nem. 7.30–50), claimed descent from Aeacus, the mythical king of Aegina whose
descendants included Achilles and Ajax.

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Δηιδάµειαν: Demetrius’ third marriage was an advantageous match. Deidameia was an
Aeacid and the sister of the King of Epirus, a cousin of Alexander the Great, and the
betrothed of Alexander’s unfortunate son and heir, Alexander IV, before his murder (see
above n. 22.2.3). In one stroke Demetrius acquired a valuable ally in the ongoing struggle
with Cassander, forged a link with the venerable Aeacids (n. 25.2.3), and positioned
himself as the legitimate heir to the throne of Macedon.
25.3.1 Σικυωνίους…µετοικίσασθαι (The Refoundation of Sicyon): After storming
Sicyon and expelling its Ptolemaic garrison (see above n. 25.1.5), Demetrius relocated
the city from its vulnerable position on the coastal plain to a hill south-west of the coast
that had formerly served as its acropolis (on the topography of the area, see Lolos [2011]
88–90). Diodorus (20.102.3–4) praises the site as well watered and easily defensible, and
states that Demetrius took an active role in building the new Sicyon (τῷ δὲ πολιτικῷ
πλήθει συνεπιλαβόµενος τῆς οἰκοδοµίας), after which he granted the city its freedom
and received divine honors from its inhabitants. For an example of metoikesis, resettling
the inhabitants of an existing city in a new site, Demetrius needed look no further than his
father, Antigonus, who had carried out a similar process when he fundamentally
restructured the city of Colophon. An inscription found there describes the creation of a
panel of ten men to oversee every aspect of the process, from the fortification of the new
site to the layout of streets and the parceling of lots for homes and businesses (B. Meritt,
“Inscriptions at Colophon,” AJPh 56 [1935] 358–97), and it is likely that the new Sicyon
was planned in similar fashion (Lolos [2011] 96). Demetrius certainly saw to the
fortification of the new site—excavation of the Hellenistic walls revealed no trace of an
earlier circuit (Lolos and Gourley 96)—an example of his commitment, previously
demonstrated at Athens and soon to be repeated at Corinth, to strengthening the defenses
of a city he had managed to seize (Athens: n. 23.1.1; Corinth: n. 31.2.2).
τῷ δὲ τόπῳ καὶ τοὔνοµα τὴν πόλιν συµµεταβαλοῦσαν ἀντὶ Σικυῶνος Δηµητριάδα
προσηγόρευσεν (Sicyon/Demetrias): The renaming of Sicyon as Demetrias is confirmed
by Diodorus (20.102.3), and an inscription (IG V.2 351–357) found at neighboring
Stymphalus that records an alliance between that city and Demetrias—almost certainly
referring to Sicyon rather than Demetrius’ later eponymous foundation in Thessaly
(Lolos [2012] 73; on Demetrias in Thessaly, see below n. 39.1.1). The discovery of a
fragmentary inscription (Agora XVI, 182–86, n.115; SEG 41.50) recording an alliance
between Athens and Sicyon is now securely dated to 303/02 (J. Camp, “Excavations in
the Athenian Agora: 1998–2001,” Hesperia 72 (2003), 273–75), indicating that the
change was short-lived. Since Sicyon was still firmly in the Antigonid camp in 303/02, it
seems likely that the change was never intended to be a permanent one, and instead
represented a temporary honor for the man the Sicyonians subsequently worshipped as a
ktistes “founder” (Diod. 20.102.3; on the cult of Demetrius at Sicyon, see Habicht [1970]
74–76).
25.4.1  ἐν δ' Ἰσθµῷ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου…Ἀλέξανδρον (The Hellenic League): As early as
307/6, Antigonus had ordered Demetrius to summon representatives from the allied
Greek cities to discuss common action for the mutual benefit of all parties (Diod. 20.46).
The foundation of the Hellenic League, an alliance of Greek cities under the leadership of
Antigonus and Demetrius, probably at the Isthmian Games in Spring 302, marked the

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culmination of this effort (on the name, see above n. 25.2.1; on the date, see Robert ii.
15–33). The venue for the koinon synedrion that formally established the League was
chosen in conscious imitation of Philip II: in the winter of 338/7 Philip established at
Corinth a Hellenic alliance subject to his personal leadership which modern scholars call
the League of Corinth (IG II2 236; Diod. 16.89; Just. 9.5). Alexander succeeded his father
as hegemon of the League. Ptolemy presided over the Isthmian festival during his
ineffectual Greek campaign of 308 (Suda s.v. Δηµήτριος, Adler Δ 431) and may have
attempted to revive the League under his own leadership (Dixon [2014] 57). If so, he was
unsuccessful.
Plutarch here provides the only explicit literary reference to the League of 302,
but a fragmentary copy of the League charter found at Epidaurus (IG IV2. 1. 68; Staats.
446; ISE 44; for an English translation, see Bagnall and Drerow 16–19) provides a wealth
of detail concerning its structure and institutions (Diodorus omits the foundation, but
clearly acknowledges its existence at 20.107.1). In accord with Antigonus’ proclamation
at Tyre in 315 (n. 8.1.2), the league charter guarantees that the cities of the League be
free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned. Many provisions mutatis mutandis are clearly
borrowed from the alliance fashioned by Philip: the charter calls for joint military action
against common enemies, with Cassander replacing the Persians as the adversary in a
“common war”; both charters call for a common peace and prohibit warfare between
member states; the charter of 302 forbids any attempt to overthrow the kingdoms of
Antigonus, Demetrius, and his descendants, just as the signatories of the original charter
swore to protect the kingdom of Philip and his descendants. A provision in the charter of
302 calling for peacetime meetings of the synedrion at the major Panhellenic festivals
may be an innovation, but the fragmentary nature of both charters does not allow for
certainty in determining what is new and what is simply adapted from the original (on the
Hellenic League, see Patsovos 181–208; Wehrli 122–26; Billows [1990] 172–3, 228–
230; Rhodes and Osborne 379; K. Harter-Uibopou, “Der Hellenenbunddes Antigonos I
Monophthalmos und des Demetrios Poliorketes, 302/1 v. Chr,” in G. Thürand and F.J.
Fernandez-Nieto (eds.), Symposion 1999, Akten der Gesellschaft für griechische
und hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 14 [Cologne: 2003] 315–37; Wallace [2013]
148–52). We do not have a complete list of the member states constituting the League
(only Elis and the Achaean League are preserved in the fragmentary charter), but most of
the important cities in the Peloponnesus (Mantineia and Sparta excepted, see n. 35.1.1)
and central Greece, as well as the Aetolian League seem to have joined the alliance
(Moretti ISE I, 44, p. 116; Billows [1990] 228–30; Mendels 166–72; Scholten 18). The
revival of the League was a major diplomatic triumph for the Antigonids. Demetrius’
ability to harness the considerable military potential of the Greek alliance is demonstrated
by the 25,000 Greek infantry who accompanied the king when he confronted Cassander
in Thessaly in 302 (n. 28.2.1).
25.7.2 χλευάζων…προσαγορεύοντας (An exclusive claim on kingship?): The
Diadochi, including Demetrius, were prepared to accept the royal status of their rivals in
official communications. Indeed, later in the Life Plutarch readily admits that Demetrius
and Seleucus feted one another in royal fashion (τὴν ἔντευξιν…βασιλικὴν ἐποιοῦντο,
see below 32.2.4; cf. Billows [1990] 159–60), when Seleucus married Demetrius’
daughter Stratonice. The ruthless struggle for legitimacy played out in the propaganda

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issuing from the various royal courts, however, was another matter entirely, as this
anecdote vividly illustrates. In the rhetorical war waged to strengthen existing alliances
and attract new allies at the expense of rivals, Demetrius’ supporters championed him as
the one worthy king, and painted his rivals as unworthy pretenders to the legacy of
Alexander. No doubt rhetoric of precisely this sort emanated from the courts of each of
the Successors, with the crucial substitution of the appropriate dynast in the role of
worthy king (Paschidis [2008] 132).
25.7.5 Σελεύκου…νησιάρχου (A Royal Toast): This anecdote, which Plutarch relates
elsewhere (Mor. 823 C-D) seems to derive from Phylarchus: Athenaeus, citing
Phylarchus, gives a nearly identical version of this derisive toast [6.261B=FGrH 81 F31];
see Intro. 53–54), is the subject of some controversy (Hauben [1974] 108–113 argues for
302; followed by Bosworth [2002] 272; Gruen 260–61 suggests a date after Demetrius
ascended the throne of Macedon in 294; cf. Baron 101 and n. 54). It must, however, be
some point after the assumption of the royal title by the various dynasts who are mocked
(c. 304, see above n. XVIII: The Assumption of the Kingship), and before the battle of
Ipsus in 301, since Antigonus is evidently still alive and no courtier of Demetrius would
deride Seleucus as a mere commander of elephants after the pivotal role those beasts
played in that devastating Antigonid defeat in Phrygia (Hauben [1974] 105–17; on the
battle, see below ns. XXIX: The Battle of Ipsus).
The derisive epithets Demetrius’ courtiers give to his rivals would have had
particular resonance in precisely the context in which Plutarch places the episode—the
period after the foundation of the Hellenic League and before Ipsus. The “Elephant
Commander” Seleucus had recently traded the easternmost satrapies of Alexander’s
empire for a force of war elephants (see below n. 28.6.2); Demetrius’ smashing naval
victory over “Admiral” Ptolemy at Salamis still resonated (on the battle, see above ns.
16); the kingdom of Agathocles, “Lord of the Isles,” was still confined to Sicily after his
attempt to conquer Carthage ended in failure in 307 (Hauben [1974] 113–15; Bosworth
[2002] 272). The Lysimachus, on the other hand, had a reputation, perhaps undeserved,
for parsimoniousness: his epithet, “Treasurer,” would have been apt at any point after his
assumption of the kingship (Hauben [1974] 114; Lund 129–31; cf. 51.3.2).
The epithets given the various Diadochi call to mind Demetrius’ own cognomen
Poliorcetes, “Besieger of Cities.” According to Plutarch, Demetrius delighted in the name
(42.10.2–3: ἀλλὰ Δηµήτριος ἔχαιρε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν θεῶν ἀνοµοιοτάτην
ἐπιγραφόµενος προσωνυµίαν·), but this is certainly Plutarch moralizing. Diodorus
insists that Demetrius was dubbed Poliorcetes in admiration of his energetic and
innovative approach to the art of siegecraft:

εὐµήχανος γὰρ ὢν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις καὶ πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν τῶν
ἀρχιτεκτόνων τέχνην παρευρίσκων ὠνοµάσθη µὲν πολιορκητής, τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς
προσβολαῖς ὑπεροχὴν καὶ βίαν τοιαύτην εἶχεν ὥστε δόξαι µηδὲν οὕτως ὀχυρὸν
εἶναι τεῖχος ὃ δύναιτ' ἂν τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῖς πολιορκουµένοις ἀσφάλειαν
παρέχεσθαι.
“For, being exceedingly ready in invention and devising many things beyond the art of
the master builders, he was called Poliorcetes; and he displayed such superiority and

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force in his attacks that it seemed that no wall was strong enough to furnish safety from
him for the besieged” (20.92.2).
But, as Arnold Gomme observed long ago, Demetrius was not dubbed Ekpoliorketes
“taker of cities,” but simply poliorketes, “besieger of cities;” the sobriquet may well have
been ironic (Gomme, cited in Campbell 82; cf. Heckel [1984] 438–40; Wheatley [2001a]
141). Demetrius took many cities by storm over the course of his career but he was best
known for the spectacular, but ultimately unsuccessful siege of Rhodes in 305–04 (21–
22). In just the period when Antigonid courtiers mocked Lysimachus the Treasurer or
Admiral Ptolemy, Demetrius was doubtless the butt of similar jibes within the courts of
his rivals. Indeed, seems to have been something of an Antigonid tradition: Demetrius’
father was Monophthalmus “One-Eyed”; his son was given the obscure epithet Gonatas,
perhaps “Knock-Kneed”; one grandson, another Antigonus, was known as Doson, for his
propensity to make promises that he did not fulfill (Plut. Aem. 8.3), another, Demetrius II,
was known as Aitolikos, probably on account of his repeated failure to subdue the
Aetolians (Strabo 10.2.4; cf. C. Ehrhardt, “Demetrius O Aitolikos and Antigonid
Nicknames,” Hermes 107 [1978] 251–53). Even if Demetrius’ epithet was not originally
given in jest, its comic potential was patent and must have been exploited by the courtiers
of the other Diadochi. On the epithets given Demetrius and other Hellenistic kings, see P.
Van Nuffelen, “The Name Game: Hellenistic Historians and Royal Epithets,” in P. Van
Nuffelen (ed.) Faces of Hellenism: Studies in the History of the Eastern Mediterranean
(4th Century B.C.-5th Century A.D.), (Leuven: 2009) 93–111.
25.9.1 ἦν δὲ καὶ πάντων ἀπεχθέστατος ὁ Λυσίµαχος αὐτῷ…ἐκείνου Πηνελόπης
(Lysimachus and Demetrius exchange insults): As with the toast mocking Demetrius’
royal rivals (n. 25.7.5), this exchange of insults probably derives from Phylarchus. Once
again, the passage of Phylarchus is preserved in Athenaeus (Athen. 14.614F–615A =
Phylarchus FGrH 81 F12). The insults exchanged here are particularly venomous.
Prostitutes (pornai) were a fixture of the comic, not the tragic stage. Calling Lamia, a
sophisticated and accomplished hetaira, a porne was a grievous insult (see above, n.
24.2.1), and by casting her in a tragedy, Lysimachus suggests that Demetrius’ passion for
her would prove his undoing. If Demetrius’ retort is contemporary with the mocking toast
of Demetrius’ courtiers (see above, n. 25.7.5), the faithless “Penelope” is Lysimachus’
first wife Nicaea, another daughter of Antipater (and the sister of Demetrius’ wife Phila).
While Demetrius’ courtiers deride Lysimachus as a penny-pinching eunuch, Demetrius
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the king’s heirs (cf. Bosworth [2002] 272–73).
XXVI: The Eleusinian Mysteries
The Eleusinian Mysteries were Athens’ premier panhellenic festival and the most
famous of the many Greco-Roman mystery festivals (Clinton [1994] 17). The primary
rites were celebrated in the sanctuary of Eleusis, about 20 km. west of central Athens.
The festival was proverbial for secrecy and initiates were forbidden, on pain of death,
from revealing the nature of their experience. The attainment of full initiation was a
three-stage process extending over a period of more than a year and a half. The
preliminary Lesser Mysteries took place in the Attic month Anthesterion
(February/March), the Greater Mysteries in Boedromion (September/October; on the
dates of the component festivals, see IG I3 6B ll. 36–47; n. 26.2.2). Those who had

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undergone these first two stages achieved the status of “mystagogues,” and were then
eligible for full initiation, the epopteia (“seeing”), at the celebration of the Greater
Mysteries the next year. Originally confined to Athenians (Plut. Thes. 33.2; see below n.
26.2.1), the privilege of initiation was extended, by the 5th century, to all willing Greek
speakers who were free from ritual pollution (Libanius Decl. 13.19, 52). Completing the
process thus conferred a potent sanction of the initiate’s Hellenism and purity (for the
political advantages that attended Demetrius’ initiation, see below n. 26.2.1).
What evidence can be cobbled together from literary sources, inscriptions, and
artistic representations suggests that the sacred rites of the Greater Mysteries
incorporated, in some way, a dramatization of the myth of Demeter and Korē, and
constituted an extraordinary religious experience (on the centrality of the experience, see
Aristotle fr. 15 [Rose]). Participants emerged from this experience with the assurance that
they could expect better things in the afterlife than the uninitiated (Isoc. Paneg. 28; cf.
Clinton [2004] 35). On the Eleusinian inscriptions, see Clinton (2006); on the stages of
initiation, see Burkert (1985) 275; K. Clinton, “Stages of Initiation in the Eleusinian and
Samothracian Mysteries,” in M.B. Cosmopoulos (ed.). Mysteria: The Archaeology of
Ancient Greek Secret Cults, (London: 2004); Parker (2007) 250–61; on the experience of
initiation at Eleusis see L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin: 1932) 71–91; Mylonas (1961)
W. Burkert, Homo Necans (Berkeley: 1983) 248–97; Parker (2007) 334–68; Bremmer
(2012); on the sanctuary at Eleusis see below n. 26.2.2.
26.1.1 Τότε δ' οὖν ἀναζευγνύων εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας (Demetrius’ Eleusinian initiation:
Chronology and Intention): Plutarch’s account places Demetrius’ initiation into the
Mysteries after his revival of the Hellenic League, which, according to current scholarly
consensus, took place at the Isthmian Games in the spring of 302 (late in the archon year
303/2; on the date of the Isthmian Games, see above n. 25.4.1). Diodorus who passes
over the revival at Isthmia in silence, but implicitly recognizes the existence of the
League on more than one occasion, places the initiation in his account of the year 302
(20.110.1), just before Demetrius departs for Thessaly. The sequence of events presented
by Plutarch and Diodorus, however, was shown to be untenable by the publication of an
enigmatic Athenian decree of 304/03 (Matthaiou [1986] 19–23; SEG 36.165) dated to the
ninth day of “second Anthesterion” (Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ὑστέρου. ll. 4–5). The repeated
month was explained as intercalary in the initial publication of the decree (Matthaiou
[1986] 20; Posideon is normally the repeated month in an intercalary year), but
Woodhead ([1989] 299), following Merritt ([1964] 7–8) has argued convincingly that
304/03 was a regular year, and that “second Anthesterion” is not an intercalary month,
but is in fact Mounichion renamed—striking epigraphical confirmation of the
manipulation of the Athenian calendar that allowed Demetrius to be initiated into the
Mysteries in record time (see below n. 26.3.4). The decree in question records honors for
an Antigonid general, a certain Medon, in recognition of his contributions to the safety of
Athens and the freedom of the Greeks (on Medon, see Matthaiou [1986] 19–23;
Woodhead [1989] 298; Billows [1990] 401–02; Paschidis [2008] 93, 109, 488–89).
Medon had recently arrived in Athens, having been sent by Demetrius to report on the
king’s decisions “concerning the territory that had been seized by Cassander and
Pleistarchus” (καὶ ν]ῦν ἀπέσταλκεν αὐτ[ὸν]/[ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπαγ]γ̣ελοῦντα τῶι δήµω[ι
τ]-/[ὰ ἀρέσκοντα ἑαυ]τ̣ῶι ὑπέρ τε τῶν χωρί̣[ω]-/[ν, ἃ κατέλαβεν Κάσσα]νδρος καὶ

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Πλείσ̣[τ]-/[αρχος, ll. 18–22), presumably Phyle, Panactum, and Oropus, the strategically
vital sites on the Attic frontier that Demetrius had seized from Cassander and his
Boeotian allies in 304 (Paschidis [2008] 93; on Demetrius’ campaign of 304 and the
return of Oropus and the Attic border forts, see ns. 23.2–6). Woodhead’s arguments have
been widely accepted (Tréheux 397; Thonemann [2005] 75; Paschidis [2008] 92–93;
Chaniotis [2011] 164), but the wider implications of dating Demetrius’ initiation to
304/03 rather than the following year have not been fully examined—the new date
provides another chronological peg that allows Demetrius’ Peloponnesian campaign of
303 to be recreated with more precision, but necessitates a re-evaluation of his motives in
requesting the initiation, and an explanation for the seeming incompatibility of the
sequence of events as established by the literary and epigraphical sources.
Demetrius’ forces invaded the Peloponnese by land and sea very early in the
Julian year 303, and the major objectives of the campaign seem to have been achieved by
March (on the campaign and the dates, see above ns. 25.1–3). The letters, described here
by Plutarch, that Demetrius sent to the Athenians requesting an expedited initiation must
have been sent soon thereafter, for Stratocles had already amended the calendar by the
time Medon arrived in Athens in April or May (Paschidis [2008] 93). Medon announced
Demetrius’ decision to return Phyle, Panactum, and Oropus to Athens, and was duly
honored by the Athenians. Demetrius arrived shortly thereafter, before the end of “second
Anthesterion” (actually Mounichion) in time to undergo initiation into the Lesser
Mysteries at Agrae. The month was then changed to “second Boedromion,” and
Demetrius traveled to Eleusis to receive the remaining rites of initiation. His stay in
Attica was brief: he returned to the Peloponnese in time to preside at the Argive Heraia
and marry Deidameia (probably in June; see above ns. 25.2.1).
Demetrius’ request to undergo initiation has been variously explained as an
example of the king’s “lawless piety” (Parker [1996] 262), as evidence of the regard in
which the Mysteries were held by the Macedonians (Clinton [2003] 78), and as a
“religious whim” “calculated to outrage religious feeling and dispel the goodwill he had
previously acquired in Athens” (Billows [1990] 175). This last suggestion can safely be
dismissed—Demetrius would certainly not deliberately attempt to outrage the Athenians
in the midst of both a military campaign to which the Athenians had contributed troops
and the political effort to revive the Hellenic League for which Athenian support was
vital—but the others deserve further consideration. Demetrius’ eagerness to be initiated
can certainly be seen as an example of his regard for the Mysteries. The Macedonian
garrison that held the fort adjoining the sanctuary at Eleusis in the 3rd century did not
interfere with the Mysteries (Clinton [2003]), but, at the time of Demetrius’ initiation, the
Macedonian connection to Eleusis had been sullied by a number of recent events. After
learning of Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 336, the grieving Athenians cancelled
the remainder of the Greater Mysteries, which were then underway (Plut. Alex. 13.1). In
322, Antipater installed a Macedonian garrison in Piraeus on the very day of the sacred
procession from Athens to Eleusis, an event that was attended, according to Plutarch,
with manifold signs of divine displeasure (Phoc. 28.1–3; Cam. 19.6). As recently as the
Four Years’ War, Cassander was driven off from the walls of Eleusis (see above n.
23.1.1). These negative Macedonian connections to the sanctuary, particularly those of
Cassander, must have inspired Demetrius’ actions, at least in part. The request for rapid

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initiation was highly irregular, but it signaled that his policies would be different (for
Demetrius’ initiation as an expression of moral superiority over Cassander see Landucci-
Gattinoni [1983] 123). He had expelled the garrison from Piraeus and ejected Cassander
from Attica. Cassander had attacked Eleusis; Demetrius became an initiate there. The
literary and epigraphical sources paint Cassander as a foreign occupier, stained by his
murder of Alexander’s wife and son, and bent on enslaving Hellas. Demetrius’ initiation
into the Mysteries, by contrast, brought with it sanction of both his Hellenic bona fides
and his ritual purity. All of this strengthened Demetrius’ case for the establishment of a
Hellenic alliance aimed at destroying Cassander.
26.2.1 τοῦτο δ' οὐ θεµιτὸν ἦν οὐδὲ γεγονὸς πρότερον (Initiation and Demetrius’
program of divine self-fashioning): For Demetrius, a Macedonian who aspired to lead an
alliance of Greek states, becoming an initiate at Eleusis conveyed numerous advantages
(see above n. 26.1.1); for a mortal who aspired to divinity, on the other hand, it was
desirable to be initiated in irregular fashion. The chronological slight of hand that allowed
Demetrius to be initiated was historically unprecedented, but there were in fact several
mythological precedents for irregular initiation. Eleusinian lore held that Dionysus, the
god with whom Demetrius identified himself most prominently (n. 2.3.6), was the lone
Olympian deity to undergo initation at Eleusis (Mylonas [1961] 212–13). Plutarch relates
that the Dioscuri, enraged by Theseus’ abduction of the young Helen, sacked Aphidnae in
northern Attica and marched on Athens at the head of an army. The proto-demagogue
Menestheus (πρῶτος ὥς φασιν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθέµενος τῷ δηµαγωγεῖν καὶ πρὸς
χάριν ὄχλῳ διαλέγεσθαι, Thes. 32.1) convinced the terrified Athenians to receive the
Dioscuri, “since they were the saviors and benefactors of all” (τῶν δ' ἄλλων εὐεργέτας
ὄντας ἀνθρώπων καὶ σωτῆρας), and grant them divine honors (τιµὰς ἰσοθέους
ἔσχον). The Dioscuri, although the Athenians were completely in their power, made only
one demand—that they be initiated into the Mysteries. To circumvent a prohibition on the
initiation of foreigners, the Dioscuri were adopted by the Athenian Aphidnus—a solution
previously devised by Theseus to secure initiation for Heracles (Thes. 30.5). The
traditional accounts of the initiations of Heracles and the Dioscuri were familiar enough
to be cited by a member of an Athenian embassy sent to negotiate peace with Sparta in
371 as evidence of the special and venerable relationship between the two cities (Xen.
Hell. 6.3.6).
The healing god Asclepius too was initiated in irregular fashion. A lengthy
inscription (IG II2 4960) on the shaft of the so-called Telemachus monument in the
Athenian sanctuary of Asclepius celebrates the establishment of the cult of Asclepius in
Athens. The god came by ship from Epidaurus to Piraeus, arriving in the city when the
Great Mysteries were already well underway. Philostratus (VA 4.18) describes how
Asclepius underwent initiation at Eleusis in a ceremony staged exclusively for his benefit
“because he had arrived too late from Epidaurus for the Mysteries.” An annual festival,
the Epidauria, was established in Athens to commemorate the arrival of the god. The
Epidauria was incorporated into the structure of the Great Mysteries, probably on 17
Boedromion (on the date, see Mikalson [1975] 56–58; Clinton [1994]). This festival
within a festival provided mythic justification for the initiation of those who arrived after
the ceremony had begun (R. Garland, Introducing New Gods: The Politics of Athenian
Religion [Ithaca: 1992] 123; for the irregular initation of Augustus, who required the

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mysteries to be celebrated out of their normal time for his second initiation in 19 B.C.,
see Cass. Dio 54.9.7; cf. Sulla 26.1).
Demetrius could thus cite the initiations of Asclepius, Heracles and the Dioscuri
as mythic precedents for his own irregular initiation, and the points of contact between
Plutarch’s account of the initiation of the Dioscuri and that of Demetrius suggest that he
did just that. In both cases a traditional prohibition is circumvented by the intercession of
a demagogue; in both cases the irregular circumstances are justified by the special status
of the would-be initiates as saviors and benefactors of the Athenians.
26.2.2 τὰ µικρὰ τοῦ Ἀνθεστηριῶνος: The Lesser Mysteries were celebrated in
Anthesterion (February/March) on the banks of the Ilissus River in the Attic deme of
Agrae. The rites originally honored the obscure “Mother at Agrae” but came to be
associated with Demeter and, by the mid-5th century, constituted a preliminary to the
Greater Mysteries at Eleusis which followed in Boedromion (September/October; on the
cult of the Mother see Parker [1996] 188–94; on the Lesser Mysteries, see Parker [2005)
341 and 344–45).
τὰ δὲ µεγάλα τοῦ Βοηδροµιῶνος: On 13 Boedromion the Athenian epebes left the city
to bring certain sacred objects to Eleusis (Mikalson [1975] 54). Two days later the
opening of the Greater Mysteries, a festival extending over eight days, was proclaimed in
the Athenian Agora. Events in Athens included ritual purification in the sea and the
preliminary sacrifice of a piglet. On the morning of 19 Boedromion prospective initiates
and mystagogues undertook a sacred procession to the Sanctuary of the Two Goddesses
in Eleusis. The actual initiation process took place in a building called the telesterion
over two consecutive nights and initiation into the epopteia seems to have been reserved
for the second night. On the sanctuary of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis, see F. Noack,
Eleusis: die baugeschichtliche Entwicklung des Heiligtumes; Aufnahmen und
Untersuchungen (Berlin: 1927); G. Mylonas (1961); J. Travlos, “The Topography of
Eleusis” Hesperia 18 (1949), 138–147; E. Lippolis, Mysteria: archeologia e culto del
santuario di Demetra a Eleusi  (Milan: 2006.
26.3.2 Πυθόδωρος ὁ δᾳδοῦχος: Dadouchos (“torchbearer”), as here, usually refers to
the holder of an important gentilitial priesthood of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis, though
the epithet can also be applied to Demeter herself. Pythodoros is known only from this
episode (cf. Gärtner, s.v. 3, RE XXIV [1963], col. 587), but his opposition to Demetrius’
request likely exemplifies the feeling of many religious conservatives in Athens. Among
these we can certainly count the Atthidographer Philochorus, a member of a priestly
family and a ritual expert (on Philochorus, see Intro. 48–49). He reputedly condemned
the manipulation of the calendar that facilitated Demetrius’ abbreviated initiation as an
affront against “all the mystic things and epoptic things” (ἀδικεῖ πάντα τά τε µυστικὰ
καὶ τὰ ἐποπτικά; Suda s.v. Ἀνεπόπτευτον, Adler A 2303 = Philochorus FGrH 328
F69b).
26.3.3 Στρατοκλέους: on Stratocles, see above ns. 11.1.1, 11.2.3, 11.3.1, 11.3.3, 11.5.4,
12.1.2, 12.2.1
26.3.4 Ἀνθεστηριῶνα…προσεπιλαβόντος: The renaming of the month Mounichion
which allowed Demetrius to be initiated out of season and in radically attenuated fashion

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is confirmed by an Athenian decree (SEG 36.165). Statocles’ creative solution to
Demetrius’ request marks the earliest documented instance of willful manipulation of the
calendar outside of a military context, and his actions were subsequently mocked by the
comic poet Philippides (n. 26.5.1). In 419 the Argives, loath to break off a campaign
against Epidaurus, repeated a day towards the end of the month before Karneios to
circumvent a prohibition on military activity in that month (Thuc. 5.54; for similar
Argive activity in 388 see Xen. Hell. 4.7.2–3). An analogous taboo led Alexander to
declare the Macedonian month Daisios to be Artemision before the battle of the Granicus
in 334 (Plut. Alex. 16.1–2). A few years later Alexander again changed the date in order
to uphold the credibility of his favorite seer, the Acarnanian Aristander, who had
predicted that Tyre would fall to the king within a certain time (Plut. Alex. 25.2). Nearly
three centuries after Stratocles’ chronological sleight of hand, Augustus required the
Mysteries to be delayed so that he could undergo initiation for the second time (Dio
54.9.7.). On the manipulation of the calendar in antiquity, see esp. F.M. Dunn,
“Tampering with the Calendar,” ZPE 123 (1993) 213–231.
26.5.1 διὸ καὶ Φιλιππίδης…παρθένῳ: Unlike the fragment of Philippides quoted at
12.7, which details the consequences of the divine honors voted Antigonus and
Demetrius, the events mentioned here are well-attested elsewhere. On Demetrius’ stay in
the opisthodomos of the Parthenon, see n. 23.5.1; for Stratocles’ manipulation of the
calendar, see n. 26.1.1; for Philippides’ use of the comic stage as a venue in which to
attack his political opponents, most notably Stratocles, see ns. 11.2.3–11.3.3, 12.1.1,
12.2.1, 12.3.2, 12.6.1.
XXVII
27.1.1 Πολλῶν δὲ γενοµένων… λέγουσι (Fleecing the Greeks? The financial
obligations of the poleis): This anecdote is an example of the conventional topos of the
profligate tyrant who maintains an extravagant lifestyle on the backs of the people (cf.
Athen. 12. 542B-E; Davidson 282–83). That Plutarch doubted its credibility is indicated
by the use of indirect discourse (λέγεται, λέγουσι) and the admission that his sources
were at variance over whom, exactly, Demetrius fleeced to finance the extraordinary
shopping spree of Lamia and her colleagues (on Plutarch’s use of the conventional
expressions “it is said” and “they say” to express date about the historicity of a given
episode or anecdote, see Hammond [1993] 6–7; cf. B. Cook, “Plutarch’s Use of
ΛΈΓΕΤΑΙ: Narrative Design and Source in Alexander,” GRBS 42 [2001] 329–60).
Although the anecdote is likely spurious, it does raise important questions about the
nature of the financial obligations the Antigonids imposed on the allied Greek poleis.
Aelian (9.9) writes that Demetrius received 1,200 talents in annual revenues from
“the cities,” most of which he employed to maintain his extravagant lifestyle. This claim,
however, as well as the description of his sexual incontinence, vanity, and elaborate
beauty regimen that follows are clearly the result of onomastic confusion: they are drawn,
almost verbatim, from Duris of Samos’ abuse of Demetrius of Phalerum (FrGH 76 F10 =
Athen. 12.542 B-E). The Greek cities were in fact exempt from tribute, at least before the
loss of the tribute-paying territories of Asia in 301 (Billows [1990] 256–58, 258 n. 35; cf.
Wehrli 100–01; Diog. Laert. 2.140). If, however, the apology Antigonus offered to the
Scepsians in 311 for exacting from them “military service and expenses” (OGIS 5, ll. 44–

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45) is any indication, Demetrius likely required the Greek cities to contribute funds for
the prosecution of the “common war” against Cassander in 303 and 302 (they certainly
contributed troops: Diodorus [20.110.4] reports that the army Demetrius led into
Thessaly in 302 included 25,000 Greek hoplites; see below, n. 28.2.1). The lack of
explicit provisions for any financial contributions by individual cities in the surviving
fragments of the Hellenic League charter found at Epidaurus (see above, n. 25.4.1)
suggests that requisitions were made on an ad hoc basis (the charter does specify
monetary penalties for cities who failed to provide troops for the war against Cassander,
IG IV2 I. 68, ll. 95–99). After Demetrius re-established his position in mainland Greece in
295, and during the preparation for his final Asian expedition in particular, he seems to
have imposed a considerable financial burden on both his Macedonian subjects and the
Greek states he controlled, but the size of the contributions demanded from individual
states cannot be determined (Buraselis [1982] 90–91; Hammond and Walbank 227).
Diogenes Laertius (2.140) relates that the philosopher Menedemus led an embassy to
Demetrius and convinced him to reduce Eretria’s contribution to an unspecified war
effort from 200 to 150 talents (on the possible context of the anecdote, see Knoepfler
[1991] 197 n. 171 who suggests the preparations for the final Asian invasion [n. 43.4.1];
Paschidis [2008] 454 n. 4 points to the campaign against the Aetolians in 290 as another
possibility [n. 41.1.4]). But these figures seem incredibly high, given that Eretria was
assessed a tribute quota of three talents in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (on
the Eretrian quotas, see B. Meritt et al., The Athenian Tribute Lists, volume 1
[Cambridge: 1939] 271; H. Mattingly, The Athenian Empire Restored: Epigraphic and
Historical Studies [Ann Arbor: 1996] 59–60).
27.3.1 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων…ἠργυρολόγησε πολλούς (Lamia and the cost of entertaining
a king): The prohibitive, potentially ruinous expense of entertaining a king, Persian or
Macedonian, was proverbial. Herodotus (7.118) reports that hosting Xerxes and his army
cost the Thasians a cool 400 talents, and the cities of the Persian Empire regularly laid
out twenty or thirty talents for a dinner when the Great King visited, according to
Theopompus (FGrH 115 F113 = Athen. 4.145A; cf. Ar. Wasps 665–79; on the “King’s
Dinner,” see D.M. Lewis, “The King’s Dinner,” in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A.
Kuhrt, eds. Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources [Leiden, 1987], 79–87; Davidson
283–85). Plutarch notes that the cost of the magnificent dinners Alexander so enjoyed
grew unabated, eventually necessitating a spending cap lest his hosts be ruined (Plut.
Alex. 23.10). Demetrius, like Alexander, evidently enjoyed dining in regal fashion (on the
Macedonian symposium, see below n. 27.3.3)
Plutarch’s language in describing Lamia’s fund-raising efforts are striking: forms
of the verb ἀργυρολογέω appear only a handful of times in the Plutarchan corpus, but
in every other instance they refer to leaders of imperial powers levying funds from allied
or subject cities for military purposes (Alc. 30.3, 35.6; Ant. 25.1; Mor. 846A; cf. Lys. 6.3
where the Spartan Callicratidas is praised for refusing to levy money from the Greek
cities of Asia Minor). Elsewhere Plutarch’s language likens Lamia to Pyrrhus (n. 16.6.2);
here she is assimilated to Alcibiades, Demosthenes, and Antony.
27.3.3 τὸ δεῖπνον…ὑπὸ Λυγκέως τοῦ Σαµίου συγγεγράφθαι (Lynceus of Samos and
the Macedonian Symposium): Lynceus was the brother of the Samian tyrant and historian

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Duris (see Intro. 49–52). A student (Athen. 8.337D) and associate (Suda s.v. Λυγκεύς,
Adler Λ 776) of Theophrastus, Lynceus was a versatile writer who produced letters,
treatises on a variety of topics, from Menander to the art of haggling with fish-mongers,
and at least one comedy. His work survives only in a handful of citations in Athenaeus,
and he is mentioned only here in Plutarch (on Lynceus, see M.P. Funaioli “Linceo di
Samo,” in E. Cavallani [ed.] Samo: storia, letteratura, scienza: atti delle giornate di
studi: Ravenna, 14–16 novembre 2002 [Pisa/Roma: 2004] 197–208; for the collected
fragments with commentary, see A. Dalby, “Lynceus and the anecdotists,” in D. Braund
and J. Wilkins, Athenaeus and his world: reading Greek culture in the Roman Empire
[Exeter: 2000] 372–394. Lynceus’ description of Lamia’s famous meal is lost, but it was
apparently contained in a letter to a Macedonian friend and correspondent by the name of
Hippolochus (otherwise unknown, cf. Athen. 14.614); the two had an arrangement to
record and exchange the particulars of any extravagant dinner-party either attended
(Athen. 4.128A). Athenaeus makes reference to the dinner on two occasions (3.101E;
4.128A-B), but offers few details beyond the fact that the guests were served an
abundance of fish and meat. He does, however, preserve a letter (4.128G-130D) from
Hippolochus to Lynceus that provides a fascinating glimpse into the sympotic practices
of contemporary Macedonian elites, and may have been written in response to Lynceus’
report on the dinner Lamia prepared for Demetrius in Athens (Athenaeus [4.128B]
confirms the location of Lamia’s banquet, and Hippolochus’ letter seems to be written in
response to a letter describing a dinner in Athens [4.130D]). Hippolochus’ description of
the wedding-banquet of Caranus that featured an array of performance artists, the finest
wines, an extraordinary profusion of exotic foods, and lavish parting gifts of gold and
silver for the guests gives some idea of the sort of evening Lamia might have arranged for
Demetrius if she feted the king in the Macedonian style to which he was accustomed.
Macedonian elite sympotic practices were distinct from those of the Southern Greek
poleis in many respects, including their scale, splendor, and use of drinking vessels made
from precious metals, particularly after the extraordinary infusion of wealth that attended
the conquests of Alexander. These differences were frequently cited by Greek authors as
signs of barbaric excess, and Demetrius’ enemies in Athens and elsewhere doubtless
adduced his drinking and dining habits as evidence of his lack of self control (on the
distinctive nature of the Macedonian symposium and its depiction in Greek literary
sources, see O. Murray, “Hellenistic Royal Symposia,” in P. Bilde et al. (eds.) Aspects of
Hellenistic Kingships [Aarhus: 1996] 15–27; E. Carney, “The Unmixed Life: Symposia
and the Macedonian Elite,” Syllecta Classica 18 [2007] 129–180; N. Sawada “Social
Customs and Institutions,” in J. Roisman and I. Worthington [eds.], A Companion to
Ancient Macedonia [Chicester, U.K.: 2010] 392–408).
27.4.1 διὸ καὶ τῶν κωµικῶν τις οὐ φαύλως τὴν Λάµιαν Ἑλέπολιν ἀληθῶς προσεῖπε
(Lamia as fodder for the comic poets): In much that same way that contemporary wits
exploited the comic possibilities of Demetrius’ cognomen Poliorcetes, “Besieger of
Cities” (see n. 25.7.5), Lamia is likened to one of Demetrius’ famous siege engines, the
helepolis (“city-taker”) a machine which might bring about the ruin of a city (on the
helepolis, see 20.7, 21.1, 40.2, 42.9). The identity of the comic poet responsible for the
witticism cannot be identified, but Lynceus (Mastrocinque [1979b] 264) and, more
plausibly, Philippides (T. Webster, Studies in Later Greek Comedy [Manchester: 1970,
2nd ed.] 106; cf. Marasco [1981] 36 n.6) have been suggested. Other contemporary poets,

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including Alexis and Machon, mention Demetrius in their work, but both the broader
context of the references within the individual plays and the political orientation of the
poets cannot be determined (on references to Demetrius in New Comedy, see G. Weber,
“Herrscher, Dichter und Hof,” Historia 44 (1995) 301–03; Lape 61–67). It seems most
likely that Plutarch, quoting from memory, could summon the joke but not the poet. The
joke is apt but not original: the epithet was earlier applied to Helen (Aes. Ag. 689; n.
42.1.3) and Iphigenia (Eur. IA 1476,1511).
27.4.2 Δηµοχάρης δ' ὁ Σόλιος: Demochares of Soli (either in Cilicia or on Cyprus) is
otherwise unknown and it has been suggested that Plutarch refers here to Demochares of
Leuconoe and that Soli represents an error on Plutarch’s part or a textual corruption
(Billows [1990] 338 n. 23; O’Sullivan [2009] 69). Neither explanation inspires
confidence: Plutarch demonstrates on several occasions (Mor. 847C, 847D, 850F, 851D;
Demetr. 24.10.3) that he is quite familiar with Demochares’ demotic, and Λευκονοεὺς
seems unlikely to be mistaken for Σόλιος. It seems more plausible that we have here a
mention of an otherwise unknown comic poet (so Andrei 190 n.186).
27.4.3 τὸν Δηµήτριον αὐτὸν ἐκάλει Μῦθον·…αὐτῷ καὶ Λάµιαν: on the mythical
Lamia, see below n. 27.7.1.
27.6.1 Λυσίµαχον,,,λεοντείων: The story of Lysimachus encaged with a lion survives in
numerous variations (cf. Just. 15.3.7; Seneca de Ira 3.17.2, de Clem 1.25; Pliny NH 8.54;
Paus. 1.9.5); it was especially popular with Roman rhetoricians, who cited the episode,
along with the murders of Cleitus and Callisthenes, as evidence of Alexander’s cruelty
(e.g. Val Max. 9.3. ext. 1; cf. Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 259–60). A more credible
account is given by Curtius (8.1.17), who claims that Lysimachus was wounded during a
lion hunt in Syria. Whatever the truth of his leonine encounter, Lysimachus did not fail to
exploit the propaganda value of the various stories in circulation, and versions that
emphasized Lysimachus’ heroism doubtless originated in his court (Lund 6–8). He
adopted the lion as his personal emblem, and many of his coins featured a distinctive lion
monogram on the reverse (E. Newell, Royal Greek Portrait Coins [New York: 1937] 37;
Mørkholm 81–82, 178–82; Stewart [1993] 318) and dubbed his flagship the
Leontophoros (“lion-bearer”; on this ship, see esp. Murray 171–78; ns. 20.8.3, 32,4,1).
27.7.1 οἱ δὲ γελῶντες…Λαµίας: Lamia was also the name of a mythical, child-
devouring female monster (on the monstrous Lamia, see Diod. 20.41; Strabo 1.2.8;
Horace Ars 340; Duris [FrGH 76 F17 = Suda s.v. Λαµία, Adler Λ 84], gives a
rationalized explanation for her monstrous appearance). Demetrius’ ambassadors might
also have joked that their king had battled his own lion: the comic poet Machon (ap.
Athen. 13.577D) mentions a comely rival of Lamia’s for Demetrius’ affections, a hetaira
called Leaina (“lioness”); she may have been a native of Corinth (Suda s.v. Ἑταῖραι
Κορίνθιαι, Adler E 3266).
27.8.2 τῆς Φίλας ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ µὴ καθ' ἡλικίαν δυσχεραίνων: On Demetrius’ marriage to
Phila and his initial discomfiture with her age see 14.2–3.
27.8.3 ἥττητο τῆς Λαµίας καὶ τοσοῦτον ἤρα χρόνον ἤδη παρηκµακυίας: On Lamia’s
age, see above n. 16.6.1.

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27.9.1 Δηµὼ γοῦν ἡ ἐπικαλουµένη Μανία (The hetaira Mania): The comic poet
Machon also associates Demetrius with a hetaira called Mania (“madness”), but claims
that her given name was Melitta, not Demo. In fact, three generations of Antigonids are
connected with Mania, suggesting that the nickname was popular among courtesans,
perhaps because it summoned up the effect they had, or claimed to have, on men (on the
confusion arising from different hetairai adopting the same name, see above n. 24.1.6; on
Mania, see esp. Ogden 247–51). Mania’s jokes about Lamia’s age are examples of the
cruel and ubiquitous jibes at the expense of aging courtesans (on such jokes, see above n.
16.6.1)
27.11.2 Βοκχώρεως: Bakenranef, an Egyptian king of the 24th dynasty who ruled Lower
Egypt for five or six years in the last quarter of the 8th century (I. Shaw [ed.] The Oxford
History of Ancient Egypt [Oxford: 2000] 482) is consistently referred to as Bocchoris by
Greco-Roman authors (Diod. 1.45, 1.65, 1.79, 1.94; Plut. Mor. 354B, 529E; Athen.
10.418E; Ael. de nat. animal. 11.11). Despite the brevity of his reign, Diodorus (1.94)
includes Bocchoris in his list of the six most important Egyptian lawgivers, and Tacitus
(Hist. 5.3), citing “many authors,” claims that he was responsible for expelling the Jews
from Egypt in response to the outbreak of a devastating plague. His relative prominence
in Greek sources and the discovery of a scarab-seal bearing his name in an 8th century
Greek grave on Ischia suggest that Greeks had contact with Bocchoris (R. Lane Fox,
Travelling Heroes: In the Epic Age of Homer [New York: 2008] 31, 146, 325), but there
is no direct evidence. Bocchoris’ judgment in the case of Thonis and her admirer is also
related by Clement (Strom. 4.18.115), who does not give the name of the courtesan.
τῆς ἑταίρας Θώνιδος: The courtesan Thonis is mentioned only here.
XXVIII
28.1.1 Τὴν δὲ διήγησιν ὥσπερ ἐκ κωµικῆς σκηνῆς πάλιν εἰς τραγικὴν διηγούµεθα: On
the use of explicitly theatrical language in the Life, see Intro. 29–40.
28.2.1 τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων βασιλέων…τὰς δυνάµεις (The revival of the anti-Antigonid
alliance; the Thessalian campaign of 302): Plutarch omits Cassander’s invasion of
Thessaly in the summer of 302 as well as the complex preliminary movements of the
various Successor armies that culminated in the battle of Ipsus in the Spring of 301,
events precipitated by Demetrius’ success in Southern Greece (on Demetrius’ Greek
campaigns, see above ns. 23.2–6; Diod. 20. 106–13; Just. 15.2.15–17; on the early stages
of the Ipsus campaign, see below n. 28.2.3). The Hellenic League, proposed by
Antigonus in 307/6 (Diod. 20.46.5), championed by Demetrius during his campaigns of
Greek liberation in 304 and 303, and formally revived under Antigonid leadership in the
Spring of 302, posed an existential threat to Cassander (on the League, see above, n.
25.1.4). Indeed, a copy of the League charter found at Epidaurus reveals that the
immediate aim of the alliance was the continued prosecution of the “common war”
against Cassander (IG IV2 1. 68 ll. 71–72). Ever the pragmatist, Cassander attempted to
open negotiations with Antigonus, probably in winter of 303/02 (Billows [1990];
Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 251), but his emissaries were summarily rebuffed (Diod.
20.106.2). Cassander turned in desperation to his old ally Lysimachus, and the two were
subsequently able to convince Seleucus and Ptolemy, each of whom had narrowly

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escaped destruction at the hands of the Antigonids, that Antigonus and Demetrius posed a
common threat requiring common action (Diod. 20.106.2–5). The coalition that had
opposed the Antigonids in the 3rd Diadoch War (see above, n. 2.1.1) was revived, and the
four kings prepared to launch the 4th (the Ipsus campaign is not generally termed the 4th
Diadoch War, but it can be regarded as such; Billows [1990] 174; Yardley, Wheatley,
and Heckel 251). The coalition adopted a sound strategy: Lysimachus, Seleucus, and
Ptolemy would converge on Antigonus in Syria, while Cassander fought a holding action
against Demetrius in Thessaly until the latter was inevitably recalled to Asia to aid his
father (Wehrli 67; Billows [1990] 174; Lund 71; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 251–
252).
Cassander acted immediately. After dispatching troops under his general
Prepelaus to bolster the invasion force Lysimachus was assembling at the Hellespont (see
below, n. 28.2), he moved south into Thessaly (Diod. 20.107.1), where he strengthened
his garrisons occupying key cities, sent troops to occupy Thermopylae (Diod. 20.110.2),
and awaited the response of Demetrius and his Greek allies who were mustering at
Chalcis. Both kings reputedly made contact with the renegade Spartan commander
Cleonymus (Diod. 20.107.5), who had occupied Corcyra with a strong force, but he was
evidently not receptive to the overtures of either (on Cleonymus, see ns. 39.2.2, 39.3.2).
Rather than attempt to force Thermopylae, Demetrius avoided the pass altogether
by embarking his army on ships at Chalcis and sailing up the Euboean Gulf and into the
narrow strait separating Northern Euboea from Phthiotis, where he landed his army in the
port of Larisa Kremaste (Cassander had avoided an Aetolian force holding Thermopylae
in identical fashion in 317, Diod. 19.35.2; cf. Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 252; an
Eretrian decree [IG XII. 9, 210] honoring Antigonid officers for assisting “the citizens
serving on the ships” with Demetrius refers either to this campaign or to the subsequent
campaign of Ipsus (Paschidis [2008] 451; cf. Billows [1990] 175). Larisa Kremaste, 2.5
kilometers from the sea in the foothills of Mt. Othrys, was garrisoned by Cassander, but
Demetrius seized the town, took the acropolis by siege, and imprisoned the garrison
(Diod. 20. 110.2). Demetrius then proceeded up the coast of Phthiotis, where he won over
the small towns of Antrones and Pteleon (Diod. 20.110. 3) before establishing a camp
near the site of Old Halos at the southern edge of the Crocus (mod. Almiros) plain.
Situated on a beach ridge overlooking the Gulf of Pagasae, Halos was abandoned after it
was sacked by a Macedonian army under Parmenion in 346 and its territory handed over
to Pharsalus (Strabo 9.5.8). Demetrius chose an expanse of flat ground southeast of the
abandoned city between a spur of Mt Othrys and a saltwater swamp bordering the Gulf of
Pagasae for his camp. The site commanded the narrow coastal route from the Crocus
plain into Central Greece and offered ready access to a good harbor on Sourpi Bay
(10,000 Greek hoplites landed here before the abortive attempt to halt the advance of
Xerxes at Tempe in 480; Hdt. 7.173). The strategic value of the location was not lost on
Demetrius, who elected to refound Halos on the site. Demetrius’ army provided a ready
supply of labor and erected a formidable enceinte of nearly five kilometers encompassing
the camp and the adjacent hill that would serve as the acropolis of New Halos (for a
discussion of the numismatic and architectural evidence dating the foundation of New
Halos to this period, see H. Reinders, New Halos: A Hellenistic Town in Thessalia,
Greece [Utrecht: 1988]; id., “Beginning and End of the Occupation of New Halos,” in

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H.R. Reinders and W. Prummel (eds.), Housing in New Halos: A Hellenistic Town in
Thessaly, Greece [Lisse: 2003], 231–247; A. Bakkers, A. and H. Reinders,
“Tetradrachmen en Tetrobolen; Een Muntvondst in Nieuw Halos,” Paleo-Aktuel 7
[1996], 66–69.)
Meanwhile Cassander was strengthening his position north of the Crocus plain.
He initially centered his defense on the city of Phthiotic Thebes, but after Demetrius
somehow prevented his attempt to transplant the populations of neighboring towns into
the city, Cassander strengthened his garrisons at Thebes and Pherae, moved south with
his army, and took up a position opposite Demetrius (Diod. 20.110.3). Excavations at
modern Kastro Kallithea on a hill at the western edge of the Almiros plain have revealed
a strongly fortified site that seems to be contemporary with New Halos and may be linked
to Demetrius’ efforts in opposition to Cassander’s attempted synoecism at Phthiotic
Thebes (for some preliminary results of the ongoing excavations, see M. Haagsma, S.
Karapanou, T. Harvey, and L. Surtees, “A New City and its Agora: Results from
Hellenic-Canadian Archaeological Work at the Kastro of Kallithea in Thessaly, Greece,”
in The Agora in the Mediterranean from Homeric to Roman Times [Athens: 2011] 197–
209). Half a century after Philip II crushed the Phocian condottierie Onomarchus (Diod.
16.35.4–5), two formidable armies again faced off in the Crocus plain.
Cassander led an army of 29,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, while Demetrius had
assembled 1,500 cavalry and a massive infantry force of 56,000 men—25,000 Greek
allies, 15,000 Greek mercenaries, 8,000 Macedonians, and 8,000 light-armed brigands
and opportunists of all stripes (ψιλικὰ δὲ τάγµατα καὶ πειρατῶνπαντοδαπῶν τῶν
συντρεχόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς πολέµους καὶ τὰς ἁρπαγὰς, Diod. 20.110.4). Despite the fact
that the opposing armies were repeatedly drawn up in battle formation, a decisive
encounter never materialized. According to Diodorus (20.110.5), the two armies did not
engage because both kings were awaiting the outcome of events in Asia, and Demetrius’
dispatch of troops to Abydus shows that he was closely monitoring Lysimachus’ actions
in the area of the Hellespont (Diod. 20.107.3; cf. OGIS 9; on Lysimachus’ invasion of the
Troad, see below n. 28.2.3). Still, Demetrius’ failure to exploit his clear numerical
superiority in infantry is puzzling, and he has been censured for a “culpable lack of
energy” (Billows [1990] 175; cf. Hammond and Walbank 178; Yardley, Wheatley, and
Heckel 252). Perhaps Demetrius was simply dilatory or perhaps, intimidated by the
superior quality of Cassander’s Macedonian infantry, his nerve simply failed him (W.L.
Adams, Cassander, Macedonia, and the Politics of Coalition 323–301 B.C. [PhD
Dissertation, University of Virginia, Charlottesville: 1979] 177–79), but neither of these
explanations inspires confidence. In fact, Diodorus’ account suggests that Demetrius did
intend to exploit his advantage in infantry by dividing his forces and engaging Cassander
simultaneously on two fronts (cf. 19.2.2 for the Antigonid plan to employ similar tactics
in the invasion of Egypt).
While the two armies lay encamped on the Crocus plain, Demetrius responded to
appeals from the citizens of Pherae and sailed for Pagasae, the port of Pherae, with part of
his force (Diodorus does not specify Demetrius’ route, but with Cassander’s army
interposed the only practicable passage was by sea; it was likely at this point that
Demetrius took note of the strategic promontory in the Gulf of Pagasae on which he
would later found Demetrias, n. 39.1.1). From Pagasae, Demetrius marched on Pherae,

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entered the city (presumably admitted by sympathetic citizens), took the city’s formidable
acropolis by storm, and expelled Cassander’s garrison (Diod. 20.110.6). Cassander was
now caught between Demetrius’ two armies, his supply lines from Macedonia cut. All
that remained was for Demetrius to move south on Thebes, eject Cassander’s garrison,
and descend from the hills in the rear of his enemy. Cassander was saved only by the
arrival of envoys who conveyed Antigonus’ urgent summons to Demetrius (Diod.
20.111.1–2; cf. Bosworth [2002] 96). The two kings patched up a hastily arranged peace,
although neither had any intention of abiding by its terms which were, in any case,
explicitly contingent on subsequent approval by Antigonus (Diod. 20. 111.2–3; Marmor
Parium FGrH 239b 26; on the fraudulent nature of the peace, see Martin [1998]; cf.
Billows [1990] 179; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 252). Demetrius mustered his forces
at Chalcis on Euboea and sailed immediately for Ephesus (he certainly did not march
through Macedonia and Thrace to the Hellespont, pace Paschidis [2008] 103 n. 2; on the
Thessalian campaign, see now T. Rose, “Demetrios Poliorketes and the Thessalian
Campaign of 302 B.C.,” in H.R. Reinders et al. The City of New Halos and its Southeast
Gate [Groningen: 2014] 199–204).
28.2.3 ἀπῆρεν ὁ Δηµήτριος ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Prelude to Ipsus): Early in 302,
Lysimachus invaded Asia Minor (Diod. 20.107.1; Marmor Parium, FrGH 239F B 25) at
the head of an army of over 40,000 men (Burstein [1976] 81), perhaps a quarter of whom
were provided by Cassander and led by his trusted lieutenant Prepelaus (Yardley,
Wheatley, and Heckel 253). Lysimachus led his force into the Troad, accepted the
allegiance of Lampsacus and Parium, and stormed Sigeium, whose inhabitants remained
loyal to Antigonus (Diod. 20. 107.2). After installing a garrison in Sigeium, Lysimachus
divided his force, sending Prepelaus south with 7,000 troops to secure the coastal cities of
Aeolis and Ionia while he himself laid siege to Abydus. After reinforcements sent by
Demetrius arrived in time to save Abydus, Lysimachus moved into Phrygia where he
suborned the Antigonid commander at Synnada and availed himself of the royal treasury
housed there (Diod. 20.107.4; Paus. 1.8.1). Meanwhile Prepelaus was enjoying
considerable success, most notably seizing Ephesus, a key Antigonid naval base. After
burning the ships in the harbor, he established a new government dominated by his
partisans and backed by a garrison (Diod. 20.107.4; I Ephesus 5, 1449; cf. L. Robert
Hellenica, Recueil d'épigraphie, de numismatique et d'antiquités grecques, v. III (Paris:
1946) 79–85; Billows [1990] 176). The subsequent arrival of Antigonid naval contingents
at Clazomenae and Erythrae forced him to turn inland to Sardis, where he succeeded in
seizing the city, but not the formidable acropolis (Diod. 20.107.2–5).
Word of these reverses in Western Asia Minor reached Antigonus in Antigoneia,
where he was involved in preparations for a spectacular festival celebrating the
foundation of his new capital. He cancelled the festival, richly compensated the athletes
and artists who had come from all over the Greek world to participate in the athletic and
artistic competitions, and set out immediately for Tarsus in Cilicia. From the nearby
treasury at Cyinda he withdrew sufficient funds to pay his troops three months’ wages in
advance, an act of largesse intended, no doubt, to secure the loyalty of his mercenaries for
the imminent campaign (on the treasury at Cyinda, see Diod. 18.62.2; 19.56.5; below n.
32.1.1). He subsequently headed north into Cappadocia (almost certainly taking the
northern road from Tarsus through the Cilician gates to Tyana) and then made his way to

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Phyrgia, recovering the cities that had deserted to Lysimachus along the way (Diod.
20.108.1–3).
When Lysimachus learned of Antigonus’ rapid advance into Phrygia, he
determined to avoid a battle before the arrival of Seleucus and Ptolemy (Diod. 20.108.5).
He executed a fighting retreat, moving north in stages from Synnada through a series of
fortified camps. Despite Antigonus’ dogged efforts to bring about a decisive encounter,
Lysimachus, in a consummate display of generalship, brought his army safely to Heraclea
on the Black Sea and dispersed his troops to winter quarters in the surrounding plain of
Salonia (on this campaign, see Diod. 20.108.5–108.6; Frontinus 1.4.11; Memnon FGrH
434 F4; Burstein [1976] 81; Lund 74–75; Billows [1990] 177–80; on the Salonian plain,
see Strabo 12.4.7; cf. Billows [1990] 180). In Heraclea, he contracted a marriage alliance
with Amastris, former wife of the Macedonian marshal Craterus, and a niece of Darius
III, the last Achaemenid king of Persia (Diod. 20.108.7; Memnon = BNJ 434 F1). The
match brought with it diverse advantages: a wife from the Achaemenid house might
bolster Lysimachus’ claim to an Asian realm of his own, and the city of Heraclea was
both a valuable source of supplies and a strategic port on the Black Sea that allowed him
to maintain a maritime lifeline to Europe, at least during the sailing season (Lund 75; cf.
Wehrli 67; Billows [1990] 180).
Meanwhile, in late autumn of 302, Demetrius set out from Chalcis and sailed
across the Aegean with a massive fleet of transports and warships. He arrived at Ephesus
and immediately set about the recovery of western Asia Minor. The garrison left by
Prepelaus at Ephesus was evicted, and an Antigonid garrison installed in its place (Diod.
20.111.3; an Ephesian decree honoring the Antigonid officer Apollonides [Syll.3 352] is
probably connected with the recovery of the city; Lund 76; cf. Billows [1990] 370;
Paschidis [2008] 99 n. 7; on Apollonides, see n. 50.3.1). Demetrius then made his way
north to secure the Hellespont and the Bosporus. He recovered Parium and the
Hellespontine cities that had defected to Lysimachus, and seized Lampsacus after
defeating a contingent of Thracian mercenaries stationed there by Lysimachus (Diod.
20.111.3; Poly. 4.12.1; an inscription from Lampsacus [IG XII 354] honoring Nossicus of
Thasos for ransoming citizens of Lampsacus taken prisoner in a naval battle may refer to
this event; cf. Lund 76; Billows [1990] 180). When he reached Chalcedon, Demetrius
stationed 30 warships and 3,000 soldiers at the “shrine of the Chalcedonians” (probably
the famous sanctuary at the entrance of the Black Sea known simply as Hieron: on this
site see below ns. 30.2.5; 31.2.5) to prevent any crossing of the Bosporus, and dispersed
the remainder of his troops to winter quarters in the region (Diod. 20.111.3).
Demetrius’ decision to hold the Bosporus with a strong force soon paid rich
dividends. Cassander, who had methodically reoccupied the cities of Thessaly after
Demetrius departed for Asia, dispatched 12,500 soldiers under the command of his
brother Pleistarchus to reinforce Lysimachus (Diod. 20.112.1; Just. 15.2.17). The
majority of these troops, however, never reached Lysimachus. When Pleistarchus reached
“the entrance to the Black Sea” (τὸ στόµα τοῦ Πόντου [Diod. 20.112.2], presumably
Byzantium), his passage was blocked by Demetrius’ troops. He marched a considerable
distance up the western coast of the Black Sea to Odessus, where he secured ships to
transport his soldiers to Heraclea by sea. Of the three naval contingents sent out from
Odessus only one safely reached Heraclea—Demetrius’ Bosporus squadron intercepted

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one; another was destroyed in a winter squall. Pleistarchus himself was among the
shipwrecked but miraculously survived. He washed ashore clinging to a piece of
wreckage from his flagship and made his way to Heraclea (Diod. 20.112.1–4; cf. Burstein
[1976] 82; Gregory 19 and n. 36; on Pleistarchus, see ns. 20.8.3, 23.3.3, 25.1.4, 26.1.1).
With his lines of communication to his Thracian possessions and Macedonian allies
essentially severed, Lysimachus pinned his hopes on the arrival of Seleucus and Ptolemy.
Seleucus did not disappoint. At the onset of winter 302, he arrived in Cappadocia
at the head of a polyglot army strong in cavalry and featuring an extraordinary elephant
corps (Diod. 20.113.4; on Seleucus’ army, see below n. 28.6.1). Seleucus’ exact route
from Iran (see above n. 28.2.1 for Seleucus’ whereabouts when envoys from Cassander
and Lysimachus reached him) to Anatolia is unknown, but he must have traversed the
mountainous northern route across Armenia to avoid the Antigonid garrisons that held
Mesopotamia and Syria, a logistical feat of the highest order (for the possible routes, see
Grainger [1990] 118; cf. Wehrli 69). If Seleucus’ army spent the winter of 302/01 in
northern Cappadocia on the plain of Phanaroea, as seems likely (Wehrli 69; cf. Lund 77;
on the Phanaroea plain see n. XXIX: The Battle of Ipsus), he could simply have traversed
the Lycus and Amnias valleys to effect a junction with Lysimachus in the Salonia plain
(on this major east-west artery, see n. 46.9.2), but, since Lysimachus was eager to move
from his isolated position, it seems more likely that the two kings met in the area of
Ancyra and then took the Royal Road into Phrygia (Billows [1990] 181). As for Ptolemy,
he duly set out from Egypt with a large army and invaded Coele Syria (Diod. 20.113.1).
He moved methodically northward, installing garrisons in key cities, until his advance
was halted by stubborn resistence from the Antigonid garrison at Sidon. While he was
besieging that city, he received a false report that Lysimachus and Seleucus had been
defeated and Antigonus was advancing on Syria. Ptolemy quickly negotiated a truce with
the Sidonians and withdrew to Alexandria (Diod. 20.113.2). It is impossible to determine
whether Ptolemy was actually deceived by Antigonid misinformation (Wehrli 69; Mehl
[1986] 197–200; Billows [1990] 178; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 253, 298) or simply
seized on the report (or invented it whole cloth) as a convenient pretext for avoiding
battle now that the annexation of Coele Syria—a strategic imperative for every Egyptian
ruler before or since—was all but complete (Seibert [1969] 231–32; Lund 76 with n. 77;
on the strategic importance of Coele Syria for the Ptolemies, see Will [1979] 137–86).
Certainty is not possible, but a cool estimation of Ptolemy’s pragmatism and eye for the
main chance renders the latter interpretation entirely credible.
28.3.1 καίτοι δοκεῖ γ' Ἀντίγονος εἰ µικρῶν τινων ὑφεῖτο…τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι
(Hieronymus and the ambition of Antigonus): Hornblower (170) argues that this criticism
of the aged Antigonus and his “excessive desire for power” (τῆς ἄγαν φιλαρχίας)
derives from Hieronymus, who censured the king’s inability to set aside his perpetual
grasping for greater power, a defect that, in the historian’s characterization, ultimately led
to the king’s destruction. The miserable state of preservation of Hieronymus’ work,
however, does not support such a sweeping conclusion, and it is far from certain that
Hieronymus was ever so overtly critical of his former patron Antigonus (on Hieronymus’
treatment of his Antigonid patrons, see Intro. 43–48).
28.6.1 ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς µὲν ἑπτακισµυρίων…ἅρµατα δ' ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι (The opposing
armies prior to Ipsus): The size and composition of the opposing armies are given only

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here. Diodorus’ narrative breaks off with the armies of Antigonus, Demetrius,
Lysimachus, and Seleucus in their respective winter quarters, leaving Plutarch’s account
as the only surviving narrative of the Ipsus campaign.
Plutarch’s figure for the allied cavalry may be too low: Seleucus had arrived in
Anatolia late in 302 with 12,000 cavalry, including mounted archers (Diod. 20.113.4),
and it seems certain that Lysimachus was able to put substantially more than 500 horse in
the field. Bar-Kochva (107 n. 11) suggests that the text is corrupt and originally read
5,000 more (rather than 500), which would give the allies a total of 17,000 cavalry. The
discreprant figures could just as easily stem from Seleucus’ troop deploments between
the winter of 302/1 and the summer of 301, however, and we need not assume textual
corruption (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 299).
28.6.2 ἐλέφαντας δὲ τετρακοσίους (Seleucus’ elephant corps at Ipsus): In 304, at the
conclusion of his eastern anabasis to the Punjab, Seleucus entered into negotiations with
the Indian monarch Chandragupta Maurya, who held sway over a vast realm in northern
India (on the date, see Beloch [1925] 142 n. 2; Hauben [1974] 109–111; Yardley,
Wheatley, and Heckel 292; cf. Grainger [1990] 112 who places the talks in 303 without
comment). Seleucus reportedly agreed to make no claim on the territories that controlled
the approaches to India—Parapamisadae, Arachosia, and Gedrosia—in exchange for a
force of 500 war elephants (Strabo 15.2.9; Plut. Alex. 62.4). The number of elephants has
often been doubted, in large part because no other Hellenistic army ever fielded an
elephant corps approaching this size. Tarn (“Two Notes on Seleucid History,” JHS 60
[1940] 84–94) argued that the figure 500 was used in contemporary India as a generic
figure to denote large quantities of virtually anything, and that Strabo was taken in by the
propaganda issued by Megasthenes, Seleucus’ ambassador at the Indian court (accepted
by, e.g. H.H. Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, [London: 1974]
122; Hamilton 173; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 12). According to Tarn, Seleucus received
no more than 150 elephants, a force identical in size to the elephant corps fielded by the
later Seleucid monarch, Antiochus III, who, according to Tarn, assembled his elephant
force in emulation of Seleucus. But Tarn’s theory flies in the face of the literary evidence:
both Strabo and Plutarch record that Seleucus received 500 elephants in India; Diodorus
(20.113.4) credits Seleucus with a force of 480 elephants when he entered winter quarters
in late 302; Plutarch states here that Seleucus took the field in the summer of 301 with
400 elephants (according to Strabo [16.7.2], Seleucus later maintained a force of 500
elephants in a special preserve in Syria). The diminishing elephant corps can be explained
by losses on the long march from India after the conclusion of the peace with
Chandragupta, and the effects of the harsh Cappodocian winter in 302/1. Furthermore,
the manner in which Seleucus utilized his elephants on the field at Ipsus suggests he
possessed far more than 150 of the beasts (n. 29.5.1). All of this suggests that Plutarch’s
account is accurate, and Tarn’s arguments should be rejected (Bar-Kochva 107–08; T.R.
Trautman, “Elephants and the Mauryas,” in S. Mukherjee [ed.] India: History and
Thought [Calcutta: 1982] 267–72; Mehl 178–79 n. 71, 200–01; Grainger [1990] 109–11;
Landucci-Gattinoni [1992] 150; Anson [2014] 172–73).
28.6.3 ἅρµατα δ' ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι: Plutarch gives no indication that these chariots figured
in the battle itself, although the broad valley in which the battle was fought (n. 29.4.1)

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would seem to provide an ideal venue for war chariots (cf. Bar-Kochva 108). On the use
of scythed chariots in Achaemenid and Seleucid armies, see n. 48.2.1.
28.7.1 γενοµένῳ…καθ' ἑαυτόν (Antigonus before Ipsus): This portrait of Antigonus as
uncharacteristically subdued and contemplative as the decisive clash approached is likely
ex eventu invention of a piece with the ill omens that supposedly beset both Antigonus
and Demetrius just before the battle (see below ns. 29.1–2). The formal pronouncement
of Demetrius as his successor and the closeted discussions on the future of the Antigonid
realm, on the other hand, seem plausible enough, given Antigonus’ advanced age (he was
at least 80: Diod. 19.4.2; cf. Ps.Lucian Macrob. 11; Eusebius/Porphyry FrGH 260 F32.1)
and the possibility that he would not survive the battle (cf. Billows [1990] 182–83).
28.10.1 λέγεται…ἀκούσῃς (An anecdote illustrating): Plutarch relates this anecdote in
nearly identical form at Mor. 182B, where Demetrius’ younger brother Philip is the
impatient son lambasted by Antigonus, and Mor. 596C, where the son remains nameless.
The insertion of the anecdote at this point in the narrative is interesting. Demetrius is
described as a meirakion, “youth,” which Plutarch normally applies to young men under
twenty-one (cf. n. 37.4.4). In the Lives, stories concerned with the younger days of a
subject rarely appear after the initial chapters, but Plutarch seems to have included this
anecdote to illustrate the character of Antigonus, not his young son (Duff [2011b] 228
and n. 72).
XXIX: The Battle of Ipsus
In the spring of 301 four armies emerged from their respective winter quarters in
various regions of Anatolia. The Antigonids seemingly enjoyed every advantage over
Lysimachus and Seleucus. Demetrius had secured the cities of western Asia Minor and
his fleet had absolute command of the Aegean. He also held both the Hellespont and the
Bosporus, where he had wintered. Troops and supplies from Europe could only reach
Lysimachus via the sea route from Thrace to Heraclea, a perilous passage as Pleistarchus
could attest (see above, n. 28.2.3), and the resources of Heraclea could not support
Lysimachus’ army indefinitely. Antigonus was ensconced in the region around
Dorylaeum in Phrygia (Diod. 20.109.4), the very heart of his empire where he had held
sway for more than thirty years (Alexander left him as satrap in Phrygia in 333: Arr.
Anab. 1.20.3). He had the resources to ensure that his troops were well supplied and, just
as important, well paid. During the Egyptian invasion of 306 Ptolemy had tempted
Antigonus’ mercenary soldiers with generous rewards for desertion (Diod. 20.75.1);
Antigonus could now do the same to the troops in Lysimachus’ employ. In this he
enjoyed some success: nearly 3,000 of Lysimachus’ soldiers walked out of their winter
quarters and cast their lot with Antigonus, who did not fail to reward them (Diod.
20.113.3; a passage in Polyaenus [4.12.1], recording Lysimachus’ massacre of 5,000
mercenaries lest they desert to Demetrius is often connected with this episode, but sits
more comfortably in the context of Demetrius’ invasion of the Chersonese in 300;
Bosworth [2002] 248–50, and see below n. 31.2.5). Lysimachus’ situation was
increasingly dire. He faced mounting problems of supply and the risk of wholesale
desertion by his mercenaries, and there were now two Antigonid armies within relatively
short compass of his position.

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 Seleucus too was faced with challenges during the winter of 302/01. Chief among
these was the formidable task of preserving his stable of 480 war elephants through the
Cappadocian winter (for the figure, see Diod. 20.113.4 and above n. 28.6.2). Even when
inactive, elephants require a daily ration of some 45 kg of hay and they are particularly
susceptible to cold (Bosworth [2002] 108, 164). If Plutarch is correct that the allies
arrived at Ipsus with 400 elephants (see above n. 28.6.2), 80 did not survive the winter.
The location of Seleucus’ winter quarters cannot be fixed with certainty, but the logistical
demands of victualing and stabling his elephants must have been the paramount
consideration (on the logistical challenges of feeding elephants, see Bosworth [2002] 108
with n. 41). The suggestion (Wehrli 69; Lund 77; cf. Billows [1990] 181) that Seleucus
wintered in the plain of Phanaroea, south of Amisus (modern Samsun) is plausible: the
region enjoys relatively mild winters and was proverbial in antiquity for its fertility
(Strabo 12.3.30; cf. McGing 6–7). Placing Selecus’ winter quarters so far north seems
prima facie to fly in the face of Diodorus’ contention (20.113.4) that he wintered in
Cappadocia, but Diodorus in fact took a quite expansive view of the region, at one point
explicitly placing Amisus in Cappadocia (19.57.4). If so, the armies of Lysimachus and
Seleucus were separated by some 500 km in the spring of 301. Antigonus and Demetrius,
however, were far closer to Lysimachus’ position, c. 200 and 270 km., respectively.
There is no indication, however, that the Antigonids attempted to converge on
Lysimachus and destroy him before he left his winter quarters in the Salonian plain, south
of Heraclea (see above n. 28.2.3). Despite Antigonus’ determination to bring Lysimachus
to battle the previous autumn, he was now seemingly content to allow Lysimachus to
march unmolested from his winter quarters and join forces with Seleucus. This would
prove a critical error. Lysimachus was no stronger in early 301 than he had been in late
302, when he was desperate to avoid battle with Antigonus—the reinforcements sent by
Cassander that actually reached his winter quarters were very nearly offset by desertions.
Antigonus’ lethargy can only be attributed to his old age and failing health (19.4), for it
was certainly not characteristic of his younger days. In a similar situation in 318/17, he
planned to emerge from his winter quarters and attack Eumenes before the latter could
increase his strength (διενοήθη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Εὐµενῆ διώκειν ἐκ ποδὸς πρὶν
αὐξηθῆναι, Diod. 19.15.6). The following winter he attempted a surprise attack on
Eumenes by striking out across a waterless Iranian desert in the bitterly cold period
around the winter solstice (Diod. 19.37; Plut. Eum. 15.3).
When no Antigonid threat materialized, it seems that Lysimachus marched
southeast and met Seleucus, marching west on the Royal Road, in the vicinity of Ancyra
(Billows [1990] 181; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 299; cf. Bar-Kochva 107 who has
the allies rendezvous in the Salonian Plain). From Ancyra the allies could continue
southwest on the Royal Road to threaten the most important cities of Antigonus’
Anatolian realm, Celaenae and Sardis, a move that explains why the battle was ultimately
fought in central Phrygia (Billows [1990] 181; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 299).
When the Antigonids, who had themselves joined forces at some point early in the year,
learned of the allied advance into Phrygia, they moved south and intercepted them at
Ipsus (on the site of the battlefield, see below, n. 29.4.1).
29.2.1 Δηµήτριος…Ἀλέξανδρον (Demetrius dreams of Alexander; portentous dreams in
Plutarch’s Successor Lives): In the Demetrius, portentous dreams also presage the rise of

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Mithridates (4.1–3) and the failure of the Egyptian expedition (18.2). As in this episode,
dreams involving Alexander figure prominently in each of Plutarch’s biographies of his
Successors: Eumenes dreams of Alexander on the eve of his battle with Neoptolemus
(Eum. 6.8, and see below n. 29.2.4); Eumenes wins the support of his reluctant
Macedonian troops by claiming that Alexander came to him in a dream ordering him to
hold his councils in a royal tent in the presence of the king’s ghost (Eum. 13.5–7);
Alexander appears to Pyrrhus, emboldening the Epirote king before he meets Demetrius
in Macedonia (Pyr. 11.4).
29.2.4 “Δία καὶ Νίκην” (Demetrius chooses the wrong watchword): Demetrius evidently
should have chosen “Alexander and Victory.” When Eumenes dreams of two warring
Alexanders, one aided by Athena the other by Demeter, he interprets the dream correctly
and chooses the proper watchword (“Alexander and Demeter”; Plut. Eum. 6.8 and see
above n. 29.2.1)
29.4.1 γενοµένης δὲ τῆς µάχης ἐν χερσί (The date and location of the Battle of Ipsus):
The battle was fought in 301 central Phrygia near the village of Ipsus. The traditional
date, established by Beloch [1927] 245–47) was challenged by F. Kugler (Von Moses bis
Paulus [Münster: 1922, 305ff.]), who argued that a Babylonian goal-year text (BM
32154) showed the battle was fought in 300, but ultimately confirmed by T. Boiy, who
demonstrates that Kugler’s analysis of the text was flawed (JAOS 121.4 [2001] 645–49;
cf. W.W. Tarn, “The Proposed New Date for Ipsus,” CR 40 (1925) 13–15; Yardley,
Wheatley, and Heckel 298–99). It is frequently asserted that the battle was fought in the
spring or early summer of 301 (e.g. Burstein [1976] 82; Grainger [1990] 120; Errington
[2008] 50; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 299), but this is a bit too early. Stratocles, the
leader of the pro-Demetrian party in Athens, was able to command a majority in the
Assembly on 28 Metageitnion (August/September) in the archonship of Clearchus
(301/0), indicating that word of the Antigonid defeat at Ipsus did not reach Athens until at
least September, 301 (IG II2 640). The partisans and the opponents of Demetrius as well
as the families of the Athenian contingent that took the field with the Antigonids must
have been eagerly awaiting news of the outcome of events in Asia, and it is inconceivable
that there was an interval of much more than a week between the battle and word of its
outcome reaching Athens. The devastating Antigonid defeat resulted in Stratocles’
immediate fall from grace, and Athens adopted a policy of strict neutrality vis-à-vis all of
the kings (30.4). The Battle of Ipsus thus took place in late August or early September, at
the absolute earliest, and Eusebius (ap. Porphyry FGrH 260 F 32.1) is correct to place the
battle in Olympiad 119.4 (301/0; Habicht [1997] 81 and Paschidis [2008] 104 discuss the
decree without mentioning its ramifications for the date of the battle; Ferguson [1911]
123, Tarn [1913] 10, and Downey 56–57 place the battle in late summer but do not
mention the decree: see below n. 30.4.3; only Beloch [1927] 245–47 connects the date of
the decree with that of the battle, concluding that the latter took place in August; cf.
Landucci-Gattinoni [1992] 150).
Of the ancient authorities who refer to the battle, only Appian (Syr. 9.55) and
Plutarch (33.1) preserve the name of the battle site, which has been convincingly
identified with the modern Turkish village of Çayirbagi (formerly known as Sipsin,
preserving traces of the ancient name), about 10 km. north of modern Afyonkarahisar in
the upland valley of the Akar river (E. Honigmann, “Sur quelques évechés d’Asie

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Mineure,” Byzantion 10 [1935], 647–51; for a brief description of this valley, see G.
Radet, “Ipsus et la bataille de 301,” REA 38 [1936] 263; cf. L. Robert Hellenica 7 [1949]
216–19; Bar-Kochva 107–110; the Athenian decree in honor of the comic poet
Philippides [IG II2 657 l. 17] also places the battle at Ipsus). On the battle, see Plut.
Pyrrh. 4.4; Phoc. 29.2; Diod. 21.1.2, 4b; App. Syr. 55 279–80; [Lucian] Macrob. 11 =
Hieronymus, FrGH 154 F8); Polyb. 5.67.6–8; BCHP 7; Paus. 1.6–7; Justin 15.4.21–22;
Tarn (1930) 35–6, 68–9, 96; Mehl 200–07; Bar-Kochva 105–110; Billows (1990) 181–
85; Lund 77–79; Landucci-Gattinoni (1992) 148–63; Grainger (1990) 119–22; Yardley,
Wheatley, and Heckel 297–301; Anson (2014) 173–74.
29.4.2 Δηµήτριος ἔχων τοὺς πλείστους καὶ κρατίστους τῶν ἱππέων (Demetrius
commands the heavy cavalry; Antigonid tactics at Ipsus): The concentration of most of
the heavy cavalry on one flank under Demetrius’ command suggests that the Antigonids
adopted the oblique order of attack (on this tactic, see above n. 5.2.2). If so, the plan was
for Demetrius to drive off the opposing cavalry wing commanded by Antiochus (see
below, n. 29.4.3), and then turn to take the exposed infantry phalanx in the flank and rear
(Bar-Kochva 107; Billows [1990] 183). Alexander employed the oblique order of attack
to devastating effect in each of his three great battles with the forces of Darius III
(Granicus: Arr. Anab. 1.14.7; Issus: Arr. Anab. 2.11.1; Gaugamela: Diod. 17.57.6; Curt.
4.15.1). In emulation of Alexander, Antigonus adopted Alexander’s tactics, albeit less
successfully, at Paraetacene and Gabiene, as did Demetrius at Gaza (Paraetacene: Diod.
19.29; Gabiene: Diod. 19.37; Gaza: n. V: The Battle of Gaza). Thus, the Antigonid battle
plan at Ipsus was, by now, both conventional and entirely predictable (see n. 29.5.1).
29.4.3 Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ Σελεύκου: Antiochus’ mother Apama, the daughter of the Sogdian
warlord Spitamenes, was given in marriage to Seleucus at the famous mass wedding
staged by Alexander at Susa in 324 (Arr. Anab. 7.4.4–5.6). Seleucus was the only
Macedonian who did not repudiate his Iranian bride after the death of Alexander (there
may have been others, but there is evidence only for Seleucus and Apama). Antiochus
must have been born within a few years of the wedding, since he was old enough to be
entrusted with a critical command in 301 (Grainger [1990] 12). For Antiochus’ career
subsequent to Ipsus and his marriage to Demetrius’ daughter Stratonice, see below n
38.1.3.
µέχρι τροπῆς…τὴν νίκην διέφθειρεν (Demetrius commits the classic error of
overpursuit): The language is strongly reminiscent of Plutarch’s account of the death of
Lysander, who stages an “ill-timed” (παρὰ καιρὸν) attack on Haliartus motivated by
anger and ambition (θυµῷ καὶ φιλοτιµίᾳ, Comp. Sulla-Lys. 4.2). While Demetrius
“throws away the victory” (τὴν νίκην διέφθειρεν) Lysander “squanders his own life”
(παραναλώσας ἑαυτόν, Comp. Sulla-Lys. 4.3). The image of defeat snatched from the
jaws of victory also recalls Plutarch’s account of Pompey’s actions at Dyrrhachium. Both
men fight brilliantly (τοῦ Ποµπηΐου λαµπρῶς ἀγωνισαµένου, Pomp. 65.5) up to the
very brink of a glorious victory (µέχρι τροπῆς, Pomp. 65.5). But where Demetrius rashly
overpursues the routed enemy, Pompey’s errs in failing to fully exploit his advantage.
29.5.1 αὐτὸς µὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔσχε πάλιν ἀναστρέψας συµµεῖξαι τοῖς πεζοῖς, τῶν
ἐλεφάντων ἐν µέσῳ γενοµένων (The tactics of the allies at Ipsus): Lysimachus and

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Seleucus answered the tactical conservatism of the Antigonids (see above, n. 29.4.2) with
a creative battle plan that was perfectly suited to the unique composition of their
combined armies, particularly their decisive advantage in elephants. They also knew the
tendencies of their opponents and ruthlessly exploited them. Demetrius was surely eager
to redeem himself for the debacle at Gaza and prove that he was the equal of men who
had served with Alexander—how better than with a glorious cavalry charge worthy of
Alexander himself? Lysimachus and Seleucus were all too happy to give him the
opportunity. Demetrius’ charge may actually have put Antiochus to flight, but it seems
more likely to have been a prearranged retreat designed to draw Demetrius from the
battlefield (Tarn [1930] 68–69; Bar-Kochva 109). Either way, once Demetrius committed
the classic error of over pursuit, the allies were ready, interposing a large force of
elephants that effectively prevented Demetrius from returning to the battle (Antiochus III,
the great-great-grandson of both Seleucus and Demetrius, repeated Demetrius’ error at
Raphia in 217; Polyb. 5.79–85). Based on his survey of the battlefield, Bar-Kochva (108)
concluded that, at minimum, several hundred elephants would have been required for the
decisive maneuver, a figure that adds further credibility to Plutarch’s description of the
elephant corps of Seleucus (n. 28.6.2).
29.6.1 οἱ περὶ Σέλευκον οὐκ ἐνέβαλον…µεταβάλλεσθαι διδόντες αὐτοῖς: It was at this
point in the battle that Seleucus’ large corps of mounted archers (see above, n. 28.2.1)
proved their worth. With Demetrius and his heavy cavalry neutralized, Seleucus led his
own cavalry in a flanking maneuver that took Antigonus’ phalanx in the flank and rear.
Surrounded, harried by missile fire, and unable to engage the enemy, Antigonus’ infantry
had every incentive to desert. More than fifteen years later Seleucus used the same tactic
to induce Demetrius’ harried mercenaries to defect, leading to the final defeat of the latter
in Syria (n. 49.3.2).
29.8.4 Θώραξ ὁ Λαρισσαῖος: Thorax is otherwise unknown, but he may be a descendant
of another Thorax of Larissa, a member of the Aleuad clan mentioned on several
occasions by Herodotus (7.6; 9.1; 9.58;). On the younger Thorax, see Geyer RE s.v.
Thorax, 7; Billows [1990] 438–39.
XXX
30.1.1 Οὕτω…πρότερον: The defeat at Ipsus was fatal for Antigonus and devastating,
though not wholly ruinous, for his son. Of Antigonus’ Asian possessions, Seleucus took
Syria and Mesopotamia, Lysimachus took Asia Minor north of the Taurus, and
Pleistarchus, the brother of Cassander, was given Cilicia (Pleistarchus also ruled for a
time over part of Caria, but the chronology is uncertain; on Pleistarchus’ Carian realm,
see below n. 31.6.3; on the expanded realms of the victors, see App. Syr. 55). Ptolemy
had occupied Coele Syria the year before, and had no intention of yielding it to Seleucus,
despite the latter’s claim that it was his by right of conquest (Diod. 21.1.5; the competing
Seleucid and Ptolemaic claims to the region would be a source of conflict for generations,
cf. Polyb. 5.67.6–10; on the immediate political repercussions of the dispute over Coele
Syria, see below n. 31.4.1). In Europe, Cassander had reoccupied Thessaly as soon as
Demetrius departed (Diod. 20.12.1), and the loyalty of the Greek states of the Hellenic
League was an open question (see below, n. 30.2.2). Demetrius held no contiguous
territory on either the European or Asian mainland, but his fleet was intact and unrivaled,

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and with it he was able to control the seas and cobble together a patchwork realm of
islands and coastal cities (see below, n. 30.2.5). The Besieger could now quite correctly
be dubbed “Lord of the Isles” or “Admiral,” epithets Demetrius’ courtiers had once
applied derisively to Agathocles and Ptolemy, respectively (see above, n. 25.7.5; cf.
Bosworth [2002] 259). No doubt the irony was noted with satisfaction in the courts of
Demetrius’ rivals.
30.2.1: Δηµήτριος δὲ µετὰ πεντακισχιλίων πεζῶν καὶ τετρακισχιλίων ἱππέων
φεύγων: The 9,000 men Demetrius managed to bring safely to Ephesus (n. 30.2.2)
represented less than fifteen percent of the massive Antigonid army that took the field at
Ipsus. The cavalry were likely the picked force Demetrius led in his fateful pursuit of
Antiochus (n. 29.5.1; the young Pyrrhus seems to have been among them, n. 31.2.5); how
he managed to gather the infantry is uncertain, given his flight from the battlefield: they
may have been garrison troops picked up en route to Ephesus (n. 30.2.2). No source gives
casualty figures for either side, and what befell the remaining Antigonid survivors is
largely unknown; presumably the majority had little choice but to join the armies of
Lysimachus or Seleucus (cf. Grainger [1990] 123–25). We have evidence only for the
Athenian soldiers, who were given considerable latitude in determining their future
thanks to the intervention of an influential compatriot. Philippides, the comic poet and
friend of Lysimachus, arranged for the burial of the Athenian dead and ransomed his
countrymen who had been taken captive (IG2 657 ll. 16–25). The more than 300 prisoners
who opted not to join Lysimachus were allowed to go wherever they pleased (οὗ ἕκαστοι
ἠβούλοντο, l. 25), suggesting that these troops were largely mercenaries and not an
official Athenian contingent, which presumably would have returned to Athens
(Paschidis [2008] 120–21 n.4; cf. C. Franco, “Lisimaco e Atene,” in B. Virgilio [ed.]
Studi ellenistici 3 [Pisa: 1990], 115; for an estimate of the size of the Athenian force at
Ipsus, see Habicht [1997] 80–81).
30.2.2 εἰς Ἔφεσον: With his father dead and more than 70,000 troops lost, Demetrius
could still hope to salvage some remnant of the Antigonid realm if he could maintain
control of the sea. He had first to reach it. When Demetrius fled the field at Ipsus, more
than 350 km. separated him from the Ionian coast and the ships and garrison at the key
naval base of Ephesus (Eusebius/Porphyry FrGH 260 F32 confirms that Demetrius fled
to Ephesus after the battle). The route to Ephesus will have taken him past Sardis, where
Demetrius likely collected the Antigonid garrison that held the citadel (Diod. 20.107.5;
see above n. 28.2.3). A certain Philip, probably the homonymous veteran of Alexander’s
campaigns who had advised Demetrius prior to the battle of Gaza, commanded the
garrison at Sardis, and Demetrius will have welcomed his counsel as well as his troops
(Diod. 19.69.1; on this Philip, see Hornblower 123–24; Billows [1990] 421–23).
30.2.3 τοῦ ἱεροῦ: The famous Temple of Artemis at Ephesus was regarded as one of the
seven wonders of the ancient world (Antipater Greek Anthology 9.58). The third temple
on the site, the marble peripteral edifice begun in the 6th century and funded in part by
Croesus of Lydia (Hdt. 1.92; cf. I. Ephesos II no. 1518), was destroyed by arson in 356,
supposedly on 6 Hekatombaion, the day of Alexander’s birth (Plut. Alex. 3. 5–6; Val.
Max. 8.14.5; Aulus Gellius 2.16.8). The Ephesians commenced the erection of a new
temple on the same foundations soon afterwards, but much of the work had not been

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completed when Alexander liberated the city from Persian rule in 334 and offered to fund
the remaining work in exchange for public recognition of his beneficence (the Ephesians
politely refused the offer, Strabo 14.1.22). The temple, which featured 127 columns and
was adorned with works later attributed to Skopas, Apelles, and Praxiteles (Pliny HN
36.21; Strabo 14.1.23), was not completed until the mid-3rd century.
30.2.5 τὸν πλοῦν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐποιεῖτο (Demetrius’ eastern position after Ipsus):
Contrary to Plutarch’s assertion, Demetrius did not sail immediately for Greece, but first
took measures to consolidate his control over key cities in Asia Minor, on Cyprus, and
perhaps in Phoenicia before he crossed the Aegean for mainland Greece. A fragment of
Diodorus (21.1.4) records that Demetrius moved from Ephesus to Cilicia, where he
secured his treasure and evacuated certain members of his family. Demetrius then
transferred his relatives, including his mother Stratonice, and likely his wife Phila as
well—Diodorus names only Stratonice, but Phila had been ensconced in Cilicia as
recently as the siege of Rhodes (n. 22.1.3) and she had long-standing ties to the region
(Diod. 20.93.4, and see n. 14.2.6)—to the relative safety of Salamis, his stronghold on
Cyprus.
Cyprus had been firmly in Demetrius’ hands since he seized it from Ptolemy in
306 and Salamis quickly became one of the principal cities of the Antigonid empire. The
arsenals, dockyards, and, perhaps most importantly, the mint of Salamis made it a natural
destination for Demetrius as he attempted to recover from the defeat at Ipsus (Newell
[1927] 14–43; Mørkholm 77–78; note that the Athenian commander Conon escaped to
Cypriote Salamis after the disastrous defeat at Aegospotami in 405, Diod. 13.106).
Demetrius did not issue any coins in his own name prior to the death of his father, but in
the early years of the 3rd century he minted prolifically in Salamis. This coinage funded
Demetrius’ efforts to rebuild his strength after the disastrous losses at Ipsus, while the
iconography of the coins themselves served an important propaganda function as
Demetrius sought to attract mercenaries (see n. 17.1.4).
Plutarch largely omits these actions in his haste to move on to the dramatic
reversal of the Athenian posture towards Demetrius (Bosworth [2002] 259 n. 51; n.
30.4.1), a silence that makes the extent of Demetrius’ Asian possessions in the immediate
aftermath of Ipsus a vexed question. It is often asserted that he controlled Ephesus,
Miletus, Erythrae, Clazomenae, Abydus, Lampsacus, Parium, Sidon, Tyre, and the cities
of Cyprus (so Newell 44; Manni, [1951] 39; Wehrli 152–53; Santi Amantini 353) but,
with the exceptions of Ephesus, Cyprus, and the Phoenician cities, the evidence is far
from compelling (cf. the more circumspect view of Bosworth [2002] 259).
The epigraphical record (Syll.3 364) coupled with Plutarch’s testimony allows us
to be sure of Ephesus, as does the issue of coins featuring a portrait of Demetrius with the
bull’s horns of Dionysus (or perhaps Poseidon, see n. 2.3.6), the earliest certain
numismatic evidence for the deification of a living ruler (Mørkhom 79). But the case for
Miletus rests solely on an inscribed list of magistrates (Syll.3 322 = I. Miletos I 3, 123)
recording that Demetrius served as the Milesian stephanephoros (eponymous annual
magistrate) six years after Ipsus (295/4). Other dynasts honored in this way, including
Alexander, Asander, and Antiochus I, held the office at the beginning of their rule (S.
Burstein, The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII,

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[Cambridge: 1985], 25 n. 3), suggesting that Demetrius lost control of Miletus after Ipsus
and did not regain it until until 296/5 (he soon lost it to Lysimachus, see below n. 35.5.2).
The numismatic evidence is not conclusive but tends to support the view that Demetrius
was not in control of Miletus in the years immediately following Ipsus. In the years 300–
294 Alexander types in gold and silver were minted in Miletus; nothing was struck in the
name of Demetrius until an “apparently quite small” issue of Nike and Poseidon types
late in the period (Morkhølm 78). Perhaps Demetrius seized control of the city in 296/5
as he made his way from Cilicia to Attica (n. 33.2.2). The status of Erythrae and
Clazomenae in Ionia, and the Hellespontine cities of Abydus, Lampsacus, and Parium is
also uncertain. Diodorus records that all had received strengthened Antigonid garrisons in
302 (Clazomenae and Erythrae: 20.107.5; Abydus: 20.107.3; Lampsacus, and Parium:
20.111.3), but there is no evidence that Demetrius continued to control any of these cities
after his defeat (Abydus had resisted the siege of Lysimachus in 302; Prepelaus had
ravaged the territory of Clazomenae and Erythrae). Demetrius had also constructed a
camp near the famous sanctuary, called simply Hieron, at the mouth of the Black Sea (see
ns. 28.2.3, 31.2.5; on the sanctuary see A. Moreno, “Hieron: The Ancient Sanctuary at
the Mouth of the Black Sea,” Hesperia 77 [2008], 755–709). The site, tucked between the
sea and the rugged mountains of Bithynia, is difficult to reach by land, and features a
sheltered, deep-water harbor. The 30 ships and 3,000 soldiers Demetrius stationed there
were in an ideal position to disrupt both the Black Sea grain trade and the passage
between the European and Asian portions of Lysimachus’ expanded kingdom. From
Hieron, Demetrius could put pressure on Athens and Lysimachus and levy tariffs on
Black Sea shipping. But Lysimachus would have viewed the continued occupation of key
sites both at the Bosporus and in the Hellespont as intolerable, and if Demetrius did not
recall these garrisons as he gathered his remaining forces after Ipsus, Lysimachus must
have moved quickly to suborn or evict them (for Lysimachus’ swift response to the
occupation of Hieron by an Antigonid force in 313, see Diod. 19.73.6–10).
30.4.1 γενοµένῳ περὶ τὰς Κυκλάδας αὐτῷ πρέσβεις Ἀθηναίων ἀπήντησαν: The
Athenian envoys sent to Demetrius likely met with the king on the island of Delos. A
Delian inventory of 301/0 reveals that Demetrius took up residence for a time in the
temple of Apollo (IG XI 2 146 l. 76; Habicht [1970] 197; the dramatic increase in the
price of various commodities on the island at this time probably reflects the strain of
feeding Demetrius’ army [Reger 178]). Tréheux (esp. 180–84) suggests that Demetrius
oversaw the completion of the Neorion, begun in the wake of his victory at Salmis in 306,
during this Delian sojourn (on this monument see n. 17.1.4). Meeting with the Athenians
while he was sunnaos with Apollo (as he had been with Athena while resident in the
Parthenon [see above n. 23.5.1) was a pointed reminder of the divine honors he had
accumulated in Athens, but those honors were granted largely in recognition of the king’s
ability to deliver extraordinary benefactions (n. 13.1.3), something that was not in
Demetrius’ power in the immediate aftermath of Ipsus. A weak god is no god at all, and
the Athenians knew it. The meeting with the Athenian embassy on Delos marks the final
act of the first phase of Demetrius’ policy of cultivating divine associations in an attempt
to render his predominance, and the attenuated eleutheria that accompanied it, more
palatable to the Greek poleis, Athens in particular.

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30.4.3 ὡς ἐψηφισµένου τοῦ δήµου µηδένα δέχεσθαι τῇ πόλει τῶν βασιλέων:
Stratocles, the leader of the pro-Demetrian party in Athens, was able to command a
majority in the Assembly on 23 Metageitnion 301/0, indicating that word of the
Antigonid defeat at Ipsus did not reach Athens until at least September 301 (IG II2 640;
on this decree, which breaks off after the beginning of the motivation clause, see Habicht
[1997] 81; O’Sullivan [2009B] 53; Paschidis [2008] 82 n. 2; on its significance for the
date of the Battle of Ipsus see above n. 29.4.1). When the news arrived, the Athenians
abandoned their alliance with Demetrius and adopted a policy of strict neutrality vis-à-vis
the kings. The maintenance of this neutrality, given the inability of Athens to consistently
secure adequate food supplies in the absence of royal benefactions, required diplomatic
maneuvers of considerable skill and subtlety. Envoys were certainly sent to Cassander
and Lysimachus at the same time as the Athenian embassy met with Demetrius on Delos,
but the earliest epigraphically attested contact with the victors of Ipsus dates to 299. In
that year the poet Philippides secured 10,000 medimnoi of wheat from Lysimachus (IG
II2 657 ll. 13–14), and a delegation returned from the court of “King Cassander,” though
it is unknown if their efforts were successful (IG II2 641 ll. 13–14). Athenian inscriptions
prior to this never grant the royal title to Cassander, who was painted instead as an enemy
of the city bent on enslaving the Greek poleis (cf. Habicht [1997] 82; for mentions of
Cassander without the royal title, see Paschidis [2008] 115 n. 3; id. [2013] 139 n. 33).
Securing sufficient royal benefactions while maintaining neutrality ultimately proved to
be beyond the abilities of Athenian diplomats, and famine and stasis led to the collapse of
the post-Ipsus regime and the rise to power of Lachares (see below n. 33.1.4).
30.4.5 Δηιδάµειαν εἰς Μέγαρα ἐξέπεµψαν: The Megarian reception of Deidameia may
indicate that Megara maintained their allegiance to Demetrius after Ipsus. On Demetrius’
possessions in mainland Greece in this period, see below n. 31.2.5.

XXXI
31.2.1 τὰς ναῦς: Demetrius left ships, money, and his wife Deidameia in Athens when he
sailed for Ephesus in 302 (see above, 30.3.1). When the Athenians adopted a policy of
neutrality after Ipsus, Deidameia was dispatched to Megara (n. 30.4.5). Whether or not
Demetrius was able to retrieve the money is unknown (Buraselis [1982] 58–59, n. 76
thinks it unlikely), but he was desperately short of funds, as his subsequent actions
demonstrate (n. 31.2.5).
ἡ τρισκαιδεκήρης: It seems that the decisive role of Demetrius’ large ships at Salamis in
306 encouraged him to build even larger vessels (Murray 112; see above n. 16.3.1). The
“thirteen” Demetrius left at Athens was almost certainly the largest warship ever
constructed to that point (Murray 280; Demetrius would later build vessels as large as a
“sixteen,” see ns. 20.7.2, 43.5.1, 53.2.3)
31.2.2 εἰς Ἰσθµόν: It seems likely that Demetrius spent the winter of 301/0 in Corinth, the
site of his greatest diplomatic triumph, the inauguration of the Hellenic League in 302 (n.
25.4.1), and the only major Greek city that Demetrius held continuously until his death in
282. Plutarch’s preoccupation with Demetrius’ tumultuous relationship with the
Athenians obscures the vital importance of Corinth to Demetrius’ aims in mainland

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Greece, especially after Ipsus. Acrocorinth, Corinth’s formidable acropolis, commanded
overland traffic between central Greece and the Peloponnese, and, with her twin harbors
on the Saronic Gulf and the Gulf of Corinth, the city was ideally situated as a base for a
naval power with ambitions in both the Aegean and Ionian Seas (for Demetrius’
ambitions in the west, and his purported plan to dig a canal across the Isthmus, see below
n. 40.7.1). Demetrius’ willingness to garrison Acrocorinth even as he swept through the
Peloponnese, expelling the garrisons of his rivals and proclaiming the Freedom of the
Greeks testifies to his appreciation of Corinth’s singular strategic importance (n. 25.1.5;
on the campaign in the Peloponnese, see above ns. 25.1–3). Diodorus’ insistence
(20.103.3) that the garrison was left at the express request of the Corinthians may reflect
Antigonid propaganda aimed at mitigating the potential damage to Demetrius’ reputation
as a liberator, but there is every indication that the Corinthians remained steadfast in their
loyalty to Demetrius, and the archaeological record demonstrates that the relationship
was mutually beneficial.
The late fourth and early third centuries saw an explosion of building activity in
Corinth. A new theater was built, several porticoes, including the ornate and monumental
South Stoa—the largest such building erected up to that time— were constructed, the
fortifications of Acrocorinth and the lower town were overhauled, and the sanctuaries of
Asclepius and Demeter were adorned with new buildings (stoas: Coulton, 55–59, 90; D.
Scahill The South Stoa at Corinth: Design, Construction and Function of the Greek
Phase, PhD dissertation, Univeristy of Bath [Bath: 2012]; D. McPhee and E. Pemberton
Corinth VII.6: Late classical pottery from ancient Corinth: drain 1971–1 in the Forum
Southwest [Princeton: 2012]; fortifications: R. Carpenter and A. Bon, with contributions
by A.W. Parsons Corinth III.2: The Defenses of Acrocorinth and the Lower Town
[Princeton: 1936]; F. Winter, “The Chronology of the Ancient Defenses of Acrocorinth.”
AJA 95 [1991] 109–21; sanctuaries: C. Roebuck Corinth XIV: The Asklepieion and Lerna
[Princeton: 1951]; N. Bookidis and R. Stroud Corinth XVIII.3: The Sanctuary of Demeter
and Kore: Topography and Architecture [Princeton: 1997]). Construction in the
Corinthia was not limited to Corinth: a new stadium was built at Isthmia (E. Genhard and
F. Hemans, “The University of Chicago Excavations at Isthmia 1989: II,” Hesperia 67
[1998], 43) and an elegant stoa erected on the harbor at Perachora (Coulton 56). It is
uncertain whether any of these new constructions were the direct result of royal
benefaction, but Corinth and the Corinthia clearly prospered under Demetrius (see now
Dixon [2014] esp. 75–79, 110–27; for the “stabilizing effect” of Macedonian occupation
on the Corinthian economy, see K. Roberts Corinth Following the Peloponnesian War:
Success and Stability, PhD dissertation, University of Michigan [Ann Arbor: 1989] 233).
A comparison with contemporary activity in Athens throws the benefits of the
Corinthians’ close relationship with Demetrius into sharp relief. Many Athenian houses
that were occupied in the 4th century were abandoned in the 3rd, and, aside from the stoa
in the Asclepieion on the south slope of the Acropolis, virtually no new public
construction can be securely dated to the 3rd century, and the stoa was built in the very
first year of the century (IG II2 1685 confirms the date; see Camp [2004] 167 on the
archaeological remains from this period). By the late 3rd century the city had grown so
shabby that the traveler Heracleides noted that foreigners arriving in Athens for the first
time might reasonably doubt that they were gazing upon the famed city of the Athenians

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(BNJ 369a F1.1.5–7: Ἀπιστηθείη δ' ἂν ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων θεωρουµένη, εἰ
αὐτήἐστιν ἡ προσαγορευοµένη τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις·). While Corinth prospered, the
lot of Athens in the early years of the third century was famine, stasis, tyranny, and
forcible occupation (see below, n. 33.1.4).
31.2.3 αἱ φρουραὶ: Plutarch’s mention of the defection of Demetrius’ garrisons to his
enemies sits strangely in the context of his stay in Corinth. That the Greek poleis should
remain free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned was a core tenet of the Antigonid policy of
Greek freedom first articulated in Antigonus’ famous proclamation at Tyre in 315,
reiterated in the Peace of 311, and trumpeted in subsequent Antigonid propaganda (see
above, ns. 7.4.2, 8.1.2). Antigonus demonstrated a clear preference for winning the
goodwill of the Greeks by frequent benefactions and the establishment of alliances, rather
than attempting to maintain control through the imposition of garrisons after the fashion
of Antipater and Cassander (this is particularly true for the European Greek poleis; for a
lucid discussion of Antigonus’ relations with the Greeks, see Billows [1990] 189–230). In
his Greek expeditions of 307 and 304–303, Demetrius burnished his own credentials as a
liberator by casting out numerous garrisons placed in central and southern Greece by
Cassander and Ptolemy (see above, ns. 23.1.1, 25.1–4). Replacing the troops of his
enemies with his own would only undermine his efforts to present himself in the
strongest possible contrast to Cassander, and sully his reputation as the guarantor of the
freedom of the Greeks. Indeed, this rejection of garrisons as an instrument of control was
enshrined in the Hellenic League charter (n. 25.1.4), which contains a provision for
common action to prevent the imposition of garrisons (IG IV. I 68 ll. 13–15). Demetrius
would adopt a different policy when he returned to mainland Greece in c.296 (see below,
n. 39.2.4), but the only city in mainland Greece for which we have evidence of an
Antigonid garrison at this time is Corinth, and those troops were allegedly installed at the
behest of the Corinthians (Diod. 20.103.3; ns. 25.1.5; 31.2.2). Since Corinth remained
firmly in Demetrius’ hands after Ipsus, Plutarch’s account of the defection of Antigonid
garrisons is either a piece of rhetorical invention designed to demonstrate the nadir of
Demetrius’ fortunes, or he refers to Antigonid garrisons in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Asia
Minor, where Seleucus and Lysimachus were establishing control of regions formerly
subject to Antigonus (for the coastal cities of Asia retained by Demetrius, see above n.
30.2.5).
31.2.4 ἀπολιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος Πύρρον: It has been argued (Bengtson 164–67; cf.
Hammond and Walbank 202), largely on the basis of this passage, that the Hellenic
League of 302 did not evaporate after Antigonus’ death at Ipsus, but continued to exist,
albeit in attenuated form. According to this view, Pyrrhus, who fought at Ipsus in the
picked cavalry unit that escaped the field with Demetrius (Plut. Pyrr. 4.5 see above, n.
30.2.1), was not just the warden of Demetrius’ Greek possessions, but occupied the
official position of strategos of this rump league. While the language here does recall the
office of “strategos appointed by the kings for the common protection” ([τῶι
στρατηγ]ῶι τῶι ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπὶ τῆς κοι[ν]ῆς φυλακῆς καταλελειµµέν[ωι)
mentioned in the Hellenic League charter from Epidaurus (IG IV. I 68, ll. 68–69), the
similarity alone by no means amounts to a verification of the League’s survival, and most
scholars contend that the League was a dead letter after Ipsus (Billows [1990] 230; Green
[1990] 121; Austin [2005] 106; Bagnall and Derow 16; cf. Hammond and Walbank 202:

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“if the league did still survive…it was now no more than a juridical disguise for a handful
of Macedonian possessions”).
Demetrius’ stay on Delos in the autumn of 301 demonstrates his continued control
of the Cyclades (Reger 17; see above, n. 30.4.1), but, with the exception of Corinth, it is
not possible to identify the mainland Greek cities that maintained their allegiance to
Demetrius with any certainty. The willingness of Megara to receive Deidameia (see
above, n. 30.3.1) may indicate that Demetrius continued to control both the Isthmian
cities; and the institutional continuity of the Euboean league in the period 304–290, as
demonstrated by plentiful numismatic and epigraphical evidence, suggests that the cities
of Euboea remained loyal as well (Picard 264–67). Claims that Demetrius continued to
hold various cities in Achaea, Arcadia, and the Argolid, while not implausible, are pure
conjecture (Beloch [1925] 213; cf. Tarn [1913] 11; Wehrli 156–57). Plutarch merely
states that Pyrrhus “watched over the cities in Greece that were entrusted to him” (τὰς ἐν
τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλεις πιστευθεὶς διεφύλαξε, Plut. Pyrr. 4.5).
31.2.5 αὐτὸς…οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητον: Demetrius did not arrive at the Isthmus until late
in 301, and he likely spent the winter at his crucial base in Corinth. No doubt he was busy
recruiting mercenaries in the Peloponnese, perhaps from the great mercenary fair at
Taenarum (on Taenarum as a mustering point for mercenaries, see above n. 9.2.6). An
anecdote related by Polyaenus (4.7.1), in which Demetrius doubles the size of his army
by attracting mercenaries with the promise of rewards to come, fits nicely in this context
(cf. Buraselis [1982] 59 n. 76). Demetrius’ incursion (probably in 300) into the Thracian
Chersonese should probably be seen as an opportunistic pillage and plunder operation
motivated largely by his desperate need for funds to reward and retain these newly
acquired troops and acquire the means to attract more (cf. Wehrli 157; Buraselis [1982]
58; Bosworth [2002] 260). The opportunity to instill confidence in his troops and gain
some measure of revenge against Lysimachus, as Plutarch notes, presented additional
incentive. The Chersonese was singularly well suited for the realization of these goals.
The peninsula was at the heart of Lysimachus’ trans-continental realm, and his new
capital Lysimacheia, founded in 309, overlooked the Aegean from its commanding site
on the isthmus that joined the Chersonese to the Thracian mainland (Diod. 21.29.1; Paus.
1.9.8). Lysimachus’ capital, with its new mint that began issuing gold and silver coinage
after Ipsus, was a natural target (Mørkholm 81–82). So too was the small but important
city of Sestos further to the south. A mint there also issued coinage for Lysimachus
(Mørkholm 81–82), and Sestos boasted the most strategic harbor on the Hellespont,
making it a crucial point on the grain route from the Black Sea. Thucydides called Sestos
“the outpost and garrison of the whole Hellespont” (φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς
Ἑλλησπόντου, 8.62) and Herodotus (9.115), Xenephon (Hell. 4.8.5), Theopompus
(FGrH 115 F390), and Aristotle (Rhet. 3.10.3) all noted the extraordinary strategic value
of the site.
Demetrius’ navy gave him the means to conduct lightning raids, ravage the
territory of Lysimachus, and quickly acquire booty for his troops, but his attacks in the
Chersonese may have been part of a far more ambitious effort to establish control of the
Hellespont and drive a wedge between the European and Asian halves of Lysimachus’
kingdom (Saitta 80–81; Dimitrakos [68–70] suggests, less plausibly, that Demetrius’

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campaign was aimed at punishing Athens by disrupting the flow of Black Sea grain).
This is precisely what Demetrius had done in late 302 when he cut Lysimachus’
communications to Europe by strengthening his garrisons on the Asian side of the strait at
Parium, Lampsacus, and Abydus, and stationed a strong force at Hieron on the Bosporus
(see above, ns. 28.2.3, 30.2.5). Whether any of these garrisons remained loyal to
Demetrius after Ipsus is uncertain (see above, n. 30.2.5), but a stratagem preserved by
Polyaenus (4.12.1) may be an indication that Demetrius did not confine his attacks to the
European side of the straits. According to Polyaenus, 5,000 Illyrian mercenaries in the
service of Lysimachus were defeated and lost all their belongings “in the battle with
Demetrius near Lampsacus” (ἐν τῇ πρὸς Δηµήτριον µάχῃ περὶ Λάµψακον).
Lysimachus subsequently lured the mercenaries from their fortified camp and slaughtered
them to a man lest they desert to Demetrius. These events are generally assigned to 302,
when Demetrius recaptured Lampsacus from Lysimachus in the campaign leading to
Ipsus (Billows [1990] 180; Landucci-Gattinoni [1992] 146 n. 95), but Bosworth (2002,
248–50) points out that the two kings were never present at Lampsacus at the same time
in 302, and argues convincingly that the episode belongs to this campaign. In either case,
Demetrius made no lasting territorial gains establish on either side of the strait: he soon
departed for Syria, and Lysimachus was issuing coinage from mints on both sides of the
Hellespont by c. 299 (Mørkholm 82).
31.4.1 ὁ δὲ Λυσίµαχος…φοβερώτερος: Lysimachus’ erstwhile allies may well have
given Demetrius a free hand in the Hellespont because they feared the growing power
and imperiousness of the new master of most of Asia Minor (for this view see Bosworth
[2002] 260; on Lysimachus’ share of the spoils of Ipsus see above n. 30.1.1), but it is
more likely that they were simply purusing their own, more pressing interests in arenas
far from the Chersonese. For Seleucus and Ptolemy, the ongoing dispute over possession
of Coele Syria (see above n. 30.1.1) certainly took precedence, while Cassander was
engaged in central Greece, where he seems to have re-established control over the
strategic city of Elateia in Phocis in 300, after his attack in 301 was driven off (Paus.
10.18.6, 10.34.3; Hammond and Walbank 202; McInerney 241; n. 36.1.2; Cassander’s
garrison had been evicted from Elateia in 304, see above n. 23.3.1). At any rate, the
alliance of the dynasts had always been driven by self-interest and only a truly existential
threat to one of the allies could spur common action. Demetrius, weakened as he was,
could not mount a serious threat to Lysimachus, and there was nothing unusual in the
decision of the allies to leave Lysimachus to his own devices (Lund 87).
31.5.2 θυγατέρα Στρατονίκην: Stratonice’s extraordinary lineage made her a prime
dynastic catch—her uncle Cassander was a king, her maternal grandfather was
Alexander’s regent Antipater, both her father and paternal grandfather were kings, and
her full brother Antigonus Gonatas was Demetrius’ heir. Seleucus, however, already had
an adult heir: the marriage was primarily a response to the dramatic shifts in the political
landscape following Ipsus (see below, n. 31.5.4).
31.5.3 Ἀπάµας τῆς Περσίδος: Apama was the daughter of Spitamenes, a formidable
Bactrian warlord and a thorn in the side of Alexander. Spitamenes harried Alexander’s
troops in Central Asia for at least two years, leading a highly effective campaign of
guerilla resistance that was crushed only after he was betrayed and killed (on the career

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of Spitamenes, see Berve ii. 359–61 no. 717; Heckel [2006] 254). In the famous mass
wedding at Susa in 324 (Arr. Anab. 7.4.6), Apama was married to Seleucus, reputedly the
only Macedonian officer who did not repudiate his Iranian bride after Alexander’s death.
Like Phila (see above n. 14.2.5), Apama took the title basilissa (I. Didyma 480), but it is
unclear if she was still living when her royal counterpart arrived in Syria for the wedding
of Seleucus and Stratonice (for Phila’s presence at the wedding, see below n. 32.2.1).
Both Seleucus (App. Syr. 57) and Antiochus (Strabo 12.8.15) founded cities named
Apamea in her honor. On Apama, see Berve ii. 52 no. 98; Macurdy 77–78; Grainger
(1997) 38; Heckel (2006) 39.
31.5.4 δεῖσθαι τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οἰκειότητος: The alliance that destroyed Antigonus was
undermined by Ptolemy’s refusal to withdraw his garrisons from Coele Syria, which had
been alotted to Seleucus in the dispensation following Ipsus (see above, n. 30.1.1).
Seleucus, citing his prior friendship with Ptolemy, declined to press his claim by force
and, in any case, he lacked the naval power necessary for such an operation (Diod.
21.1.5–6; cf. Bosworth [2002] 261. When Lysimachus and Ptolemy affirmed their
alliance with a pair of diplomatic marriages (see below, n. 31.5.5), he was forced to cast
about for allies of his own. Demetrius was an old enemy, but Seleucus was nothing if not
a saavy political operator, and he was prepared to forgive old grievances in order to
secure the alliance of the most formidable naval power of the day (on the mutual benefits
of the alliance, see Seibert [1969] 74, 95; Grainger [1990] 132–33; Bosworth [2002]
261).
31.5.5 τῶν Πτολεµαίου θυγατέρων τὴν ἑαυτῷ: In ca. 300 (Carney 2000 174)
Lysimachus set aside Amastris (see above, n. 28.2.3) to marry Arsinoe, the daughter of
Ptolemy and Berenice. The union produced three sons, eventually leading to a ruthless
struggle for the succession that ended with the murder of Agathocles, Lysimachus’ eldest
son by his marriage to Nicaea, daughter of Antipater. Agathocles’ murder set in motion a
chain of events leading to Lysimachus’ defeat and death at Corupedium in 281. Arsinoe
survived to marry her half-brother Ptolemy Ceraunus, and, later, her brother Ptolemy II
Philadelphus. As the wife of Ptolemy II, Arsinoe made lavish benefactions to the
Sanctuary of the Great Gods on Samothrace, enjoyed uprecedented power and influence
in Egypt, and received cult worship both during and after her life. On the fascinating
career of Arsinoe, see Macurdy 111–30; G. Longega, Arsinoë II, Roma (1968); H.
Hauben Arsinoé II et la politique extérieure de l'Égypte, in E. Van’t Dack and P. Van
Dessel (eds.), Egypt and the Hellenistic world (Leuven: 1983) 99–127; Carney (1994), id.
(2000) esp. 174–77; id. (2013).
31.5.6 τὴν δ' Ἀγαθοκλεῖ τῷ υἱῷ λαµβάνοντα: Agathocles married Lysandra, the
daughter of Ptolemy and Eurydice, daughter of Antipater. The rivalry of Berenice and
Eurydice in the court of Ptolemy seems to have been perpetuated in the court of
Lysimachus, as their daughters Arsinoe and Lysandra plotted to ensure that their children
succeeded Lysimachus (Carney [2013] 40–44). Despite Plutarch’s claims, the wedding of
Agathocles and Lysandra cannot have been contemporaneous with that of Lysimachus
and Arsinoe since Lysandra was married to Alexander, the son of Cassander, until he was
killed by Demetrius in 294 (on Lysandra, see Carney [2000] 161; on the date of
Agathocles’ wedding to Lysandra, see S. Dmitriev, “The Last Marriage and Death of

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Lysimachus,” GRBS 47 [2007]; Carney [2013] 40; on the murder of Alexander, see
below n. 36.12.6).
31.6.3 τῇ τ' ἄλλῃ γῇ… αὐτόν: The allotment of Cilicia to Pleistarchus may have been
less a reward for his own rather dubious contributions to the Ipsus campaign than
recognition of the more substantial role played by his brother Cassander (n. 28.2.3).
Pleistarchus does not, in any case, seem to have had sufficient troops to defend his new
province, otherwise he would hardly have failed to oppose Demetrius’ landings and the
appropriation of the treasure stored at Cyinda (see below, n. 32.1.1). Nor did
Pleistarchus’ remonstrations with Seleucus prove effective, as Demetrius’ subsequent
occupation of Cilicia indicates (see below, n. 32.4.1). After Seleucus’ rebuff, Pleistarchus
made subsequent appeals to both Lysimachus and Cassander (see below, n. 32.4.1). It
seems Lysimachus was receptive, for he seems to have granted Pleistarchus a realm in
Caria after Demetrius seized Cilicia: Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Πλεισταρχέια) notes
that the Carian city of Heraclea was renamed Pleistarcheia. Pleistarchus’ Carian
possessions are also attested epigraphically (on the evidence, see Robert (1945); for a
lucid discussion of the chronology, see Gregory, esp. 20–26; on Heraclea see esp.
McNicoll 75–81)
XXXII
32.1.1 Δηµήτριος ὥρµησεν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐπὶ Κυΐνδων: The exact location of Cyinda
is unknown, but it was close by Tarsus in Cilicia (Strabo 14.5.10; see above n. 28.2.3).
Alexander established the fortress as a royal treasury and a way station for Persian gold
destined to be shipped to Macedonia (Diod. 18.62.2), and it continued to function as such
after his death. In 319 Antigonus seized four ships transporting 600 talents from Cilicia
when they put in at Ephesus (Diod. 18.52.7). Four years later he seized the treasury itself,
where he found 10,000 talents remaining (Diod. 19.56.5). During the course of his
journey from Antigoneia to Phrygia prior to Ipsus, Antigonus withdrew three months’
wages for his mercenaries from the treasury—the additional three thousand talents he
carried as a war chest may also have come from Cyinda (Diod. 20.108.3). When
Demetrius travelled to Cilicia after Ipsus (28.2.3), he probably removed additional funds
from the treasury, but clearly a significant sum still remained (32.1.2). A fragment of
Menander demonstrates that the fortress was proverbial for its wealth in the late 4th
century: when an unidentified character describes a fabulous stockpile of luxury items,
gold from Cyinda is mentioned first of all (Menander F24 = Athen. 11.484c). On the
history of Cyinda as a royal treasury, see esp. R. Simpson, “A Note on Cyinda,” Historia
6 (1957) 503–04.
32.2.1 διὰ ταχέων: cf. n. 15.2.1.
παρούσης ἤδη Φίλας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτῷ: Since Phila had probably been living in
Salamis since just after the battle of Ipsus (see above, n. 30.2.5), Demetrius must have
stopped at Cyprus on his way from Cilicia to Syria for the wedding of Seleucus and
Stratonice.
32.2.2 Ῥωσσὸν… δεξάµενος: Rhossus (modern Ulçinar, formerly Arsuz), on the Bay of
Issus in northern Syria, was an appropriate choice for the celebration of the new alliance
of Demetrius and Seleucus. The coastal site at the western extreme of Seleucus’ massive

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empire trumpeted the union of land and sea power, as did the reciprocal displays of
hospitality in Seleucus’ tent and on the deck of Demetrius’ flagship, presumably the
massive “thirteen” Demetrius had retrieved from Piraeus after Ipsus (cf. Bosworth [2002]
262; on this ship, see ns. 20.7.1, 31.2.1, 32.4.1). The magnificent wedding marked the
first stroke in a propaganda campaign undertaken by the new allies that targeted the
Greek cities of Asia Minor for whose allegiance Demetrius and Lysimachus were
competing. An Ephesian decree honors Nicagoras, an emissary of Demetrius and
Seleucus sent to Ephesus and “to the other Greeks” to proclaim the alliance and proclaim
the goodwill of the kings (OGIS 10 = I Ephesus 1453).
32.3.3: εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν (The foundation of Antioch): Seleucus’ new capital on the
Orontes, probably named for his father Antiochus, was across the Amanus range,
southeast of Rhossus (an alternate tradition has the city named for his son, Antiochus
Soter; on the eponym, see Cohen [2006] 85). According to Malalas (8.199), Seleucus
founded the city in the spring of 300 (he gives a precise date of 22 Artemisios, the
seventh month of the Macedonian calendar, corresponding approximately with our
April). The new foundation was populated in part by Athenians and Macedonians
transplanted from nearby Antigoneia, which Seleucus had destroyed after Ipsus (Strabo
16.2.4; Malalas 8.201; cf. Libanios Or. 11.91–92; on Antioch, see Downey; Cohen
[2006] 80–93, with extensive bibliography; on Antigoneia, see n. 17.2.1).
32.4.1 Δηµήτριος δὲ Κιλικίαν κατέσχε: The wedding of Seleucus and Stratonice
probably took place in late 300 or early 299, so Demetrius’ annexation of Cilicia should
be placed in the spring of 299, at the latest (Beloch [1925] 221 n. 5; Buraselis [1982] 24;
Hammond and Walbank 205; Bosworth [2002] 263; attempts to date the wedding to 298,
e.g. Grainger [1990] 132, fail to convince: such a reconstruction requires Demetrius’
campaign in the Thracian Chersonese to have dragged on for two full years). Demetrius
had fallen back on Cilicia after he was defeated at Gaza in 312 and emerged rejuvenated
(see above, n. 6.5.3); he clearly meant to do the same after Ipsus. Soon after that last
defeat he had sailed to Cilicia to evacuate his family and treasure before returning to the
Aegean (n. 30.2.5), but he signaled his continued designs on the region in 300 when he
staged coastal raids and helped himself to the 1,200 talents remaining at Cyinda (n.
32.1.1). Seleucus was loath to offend his new father in law and, in any case, he lacked the
naval power to prevent Demetrius from seizing the coastal cities of Cilicia (as did
Lysimachus; see above n. 20.8.3). The remonstrations of the dispossessed Pleistarchus
(see above, n. 31.6.3) accordingly fell on deaf ears.
Denied aid in Syria, Pleistarchus seems to have made his way to the court of
Lysimachus (n. 31.6.3). Lysimachus had no desire to see his most bitter enemy
ensconced just the other side of the Taurus from his Anatolian possessions, and he led a
force down through the Cilician gates to oppose Demetrius, who was besieging Soli (see
above, n. 20.8.3; Wehrli 159; Marasco [1983] 38; Buraselis [1982] 24; Lund 89;
Landucci-Gattinoni [1992] 166–67). When Lysimachus witnessed the extraordinary
naval siege force Demetrius had brought to bear on Soli, he withdrew “in amazement”
(20.8.1–5; on this episode see esp. Murray 121, 174–75; cf. Tarn [1910] 211; Casson
138; Bosworth’s suggestion [2002, 265–66] that the encounter at Soli took place in 296
and resulted in Demetrius’ withdrawal from Cilicia is wholly conjectural and entirely at
odds with Plutarch’s account; n. 20.8.3). Unable to restore Cilicia to Pleistarchus,

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Lysimachus established Cassander’s brother in Caria, granting him a small territory
centered on the city of Heraclea (Robert [1945] 161; Lawrence 150; Buraselis 25–29;
Lund 89; Gregory 23–24; Bosworth 266 n. 74). It is highly likely that this demonstration
of naval power was the impetus for Lysimachus’ own efforts in the realm of mammoth
ship production, culminating in the construction of his famous flagship, the Leontophoros
(Murray 179; cf. Tarn [1910] 211; ns. 20.8.3, 27.6.1).
Φίλαν…κατηγορίας: Phila’s diplomatic mission to Macedonia is further evidence of
Demetrius’ continued appreciation of her considerable talents (see above, n. 14.5.2). Her
efforts were apparently successful: there is no indication that Cassander acted in any way
to press Pleistarchus’ claim on Cilicia (for the plausible suggestion that Cassander was in
no position to act, since he was already suffering from the disease, probably tuberculosis,
that would claim his life in 297, see Bosworth [2002] 262–63 n. 64).
32.5.1 Δηιδάµεια: on Deidameia, see above, n. 25.2.4
32.6.1 γενοµένης…φιλίας (Seleucus brokers a peace between Demetrius and Ptolemy;
Pyrrhus in Egypt): As a gesture of his good faith, Demetrius sent Pyrrhus, his lieutenant
in Greece (Plut. Pyrr. 4.5; see above, n.), to Alexandria as a hostage (Plut. Pyrr. 4.3).
Since Ptolemy in turn installed Pyrrhus on the throne of Epirus after the death of
Cassander in May 297 (n. 36.1.1), and Pyrrhus was in Alexandria long enough to impress
Ptolemy with his martial prowess, win the favor of Ptolemy’s wife Berenice, and wed
Antigone, Berenice’s daughter from a previous marriage (Plut. Pyrr. 4.4–5), the peace
between Demetrius and Ptolemy should probably be placed in 298, at the latest (thus
Bosworth [2002, 263 n. 63] cannot be correct when he states that “nothing excludes a
date as late as 297”; cf. Lévêque 106–07; Wehrli 160; Seibert [1967] 32; Dreyer [2000]
62–63).
32.6.2 Πτολεµαΐδα…γυναῖκα (The peace proves short-lived; Demetrius sacks
Samaria): Ptolemais was a daughter of Eurydice and thus the niece of Demetrius’ wife
Phila. The period of détente ushered in by Seleucus’ marriage to Stratonice, during which
he was able to broker a peace between Demetrius and Ptolemy, would prove fleeting.
Indeed, the marriage to Ptolemais did not take place, suggesting that Demetrius’
relationship with Ptolemy soured relatively quickly (Demetrius finally wed Ptolemais
more than a decade later, but the marriage is not necessarily an indication of an alliance
with Ptolemy; Seibert [1969] 30–32; see below n. 46.5.1). What brought about a renewal
of hostilities is uncertain, but Plutarch’s declaration (5.1.4–7) that the continual wars of
the Successors “were particularly violent or bitter when the rival interests or disputed
territories happened to lie close to one another” (τὸν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχοις
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντα συνεχῆ πόλεµον αἱ τῶν πραγµάτων καὶ τῶν τόπων
συνάφειαι πρὸς ἐνίους ἐποίουν ἐπιφανέστερον καὶ µᾶλλον ἐξέκᾳον) resonates
powerfully here. Demetrius’ growing strength and his continued possession of Cyprus,
Sidon, and Tyre—all sites with particular strategic importance for Egypt, control of
which was a priority of the first order for Ptolemy and his successors—soon moved
Ptolemy to strike at Demetrius. The details are elusive, but a decree honoring Ptolemaic
troops from Aspendus in Pamphylia probably dates to the early years of the third century
(SEG 17.639) and may represent one element of a Ptolemaic campaign against
Demetrius’ Cilician possessions (on the decree and its date see M. Segre, “Decreto di

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Aspendos,” Aegyptus 14 [1934] 253–68; R.S. Bagnall, The Administration of the
Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt [Leiden: 1976], 111–13; Burstein [1980] 78. n. 58;
Paschidis [2013] 127–29; n. 15.1.4). Demetrius responded in kind. According to Eusebius
(Chron. 2.118 [Schoene]), Demetrius staged a raid into Coele Syria in 296/5 (Olympiad
121, year 1) and sacked the city of Samaria. Corradi (39–40), followed by Wehrli (160),
proposed a date of 298 for the raid, placing it before the peace between Demetrius and
Ptolemy, but there is no reason to assume the attack did not come after relations between
the two kings soured.
The attack on Samaria is telling evidence of Demetrius’ recovery from the nadir
of his fortunes that followed Ipsus. This was not merely a coastal raid akin to his attacks
on the Thracian Chersonese in 300 (see above, n. 31.2.5) and Cilicia in 299 (see above, n.
32.4.1), but an attack deep in Ptolemaic territory—Samaria is c. 60 km from the deep-
water harbor at Stratonos Pyrgos where Demetrius must have landed his invasion force
(Herod later greatly expanded Stratonos Pyrgos, renaming it Caesarea). In the three-plus
years in which he was ensconced in Cilicia, Demetrius’ strength had increased
dramatically. Possession of Cilicia gave him access to the timber of the Amanus range
just as his control of Sidon and Tyre allowed him to exploit the fabled forests of
Lebanon, and the shipyards on Cyprus and in Phoenicia hummed with activity (in 295
Demetrius was able to summon a large fleet from Cyprus; see below n. 35.5.2; on the
timber resources of the Amanus, see Meiggs [1982]; on those of Lebanon, see Meiggs
[1982] 49–87; on the Antigonid shipyards in Phoenicia see Diod. 19.58.2–5). The mints
at Tyre, Tarsus, and especially Cypriote Salamis (Newell 42 notes the “abnormally large
issue of coinage” from Salamis in the period 298–94; cf. Mørkholm 77–78) churned out
the coinage Demetrius needed to hire rowers and mercenary soldiers, and Cilicia, Cyprus,
and the Phoenician cities were fertile recruiting grounds for both (Eumenes, recruiting
these same territories from his Cilician base in 318, collected some 12,000 mercenaries in
a matter of months; Diod. 18.61.4–5; cf. Bosworth [2002] 267). The sack of Samaria
signaled that Demetrius had regained the ability to carry out inland attacks and storm
strongly fortified cities (on the formidable fortifications of Samaria, which were razed by
Ptolemy during his scorched earth evacuation of Syria in 312/11 [Diod. 19.93.7; n. 6.5.3],
but subsequently rebuilt, see J.W. Crowfoot, The Buildings at Samaria [London: 1942]).
32.7.2 Κιλικίαν…Δηµήτριον: Demetrius’ navy, and his control of Cyprus, Sidon, and
Tyre posed the most immediate threat to Ptolemy, as the attack on Samaria shows.
Seleucus’ demand that Demetrius sell him Cilicia, however, shows that he too was
increasingly uncomfortable with the proximity of his father-in-law (cf. n. 20.8.3).
Samaria lay in Coele Syria, a contested region occupied by Ptolemy but claimed by
Seleucus (see above, n. 30.1.1), and the attack on it may well have been deemed a
provocation by Seleucus, leading to his territorial demands.
32.7.4 Σιδῶνα καὶ Τύρον ἀπαιτῶν (The fate of the Phoenician cities after Ipsus): In
302 Ptolemy occupied Coele Syria and moved into Phoenicia, where he laid siege to
Sidon. Unable to capture the city, he agreed to a four-month’s truce with the Sidonians
before returning to Egypt for the winter (Diod. 20.113.1–2). Whether or not Ptolemy
returned in the spring to resume the siege (so Grainger [1990] 122) is uncertain, nor is
there any indication that Ptolemy attempted to dislodge the Antigonid garrison holding
Tyre, c. 45 kilometers to the south of Sidon, although it seems likely that he did (in 312,

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however, Ptolemy, moving up from Gaza, bypassed Tyre, returning only after he had first
taken Sidon; Diod. 19.86.1). Demetrius’ possession of both cities at this time, however,
suggests that Ptolemy was unable to establish control of either.
ἐδόκει βίαιος εἶναι… ἐλαύνειν (The avarice of Seleucus): Plutarch’s condemnation of
Seleucus’ demands is remarkably strong. It has been plausibly suggested (Duff [1999]
117) that Plutarch here establishes Seleucus as a sort of model of the destructive power of
avarice in anticipation of the damage suffered by Demetrius as a result of his own
increasing greed (see, e.g., 44.8).
32.8.1 λαµπρὰν τῷ Πλάτωνι…ἀπήλλακται: A paraphrase of Laws 736e (πενίαν
ἡγουµένους εἶναι µὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω).
XXXIII
33.1.2 γαµβρὸν ἀγαπήσειν ἐπὶ µισθῷ Σέλευκον: on the marriage of Seleucus and
Stratonice, see n. 20.7.2.
33.1.4 Λαχάρη στασιάζουσιν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιθέµενον τυραννεῖν (The mysterious
Lachares and his rise to power): Lachares is one of the more enigmatic figures in
Athenian history. Pausanias (1.25.7), whose sources were extremely hostile to Lachares,
claims that he was once a champion of the people, but was persuaded by Cassander to
establish himself as tyrant. In Pausanias’ judgment, “we know of no tyrant who proved so
cruel to man and so impious to the gods.” And yet we know nothing of Lachares’
background; neither his native deme nor his patronymic have been preserved. Even the
name Lachares is rare and rather mysterious—the tyrant is the oldest among the handful
of Athenians of this name known to us (J. Traill, Persons of Ancient Athens [1994–] v.11,
39–41). The bulk of our meager evidence for the tyranny of Lachares comes from a
fragmentary Olympiad chronicle found in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus (P.Oxy. 17.2082 =
FGrH 257A; the first four fragments deal with Lachares). The anonymous author of the
chronicle records that Lachares, at some point after the battle of Ipsus (see below infra
for the date), first came to power as the legitimately elected Athenian general charged
with commanding the foreign mercenaries in the city’s employ (ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν
ξένον, F 1). Lachares evidently enjoyed considerable public support when a conflict with
several of his colleagues on the Board of Generals, most notably the hoplite general
Charias, led to stasis in Athens (P.Oxy.17.2082 F1). Charias and his allies seized the
acropolis, and forced the Athenians to supply their troops (P.Oxy. 17.2082 F1, as
emended by Thonemann [2003] 123ff.). They were subsequently besieged, dragged from
the Parthenon, where they had taken refuge, and summarily tried and executed by
Lachares and his partisans (P.Oxy. 17.2082 F2; if the restoration of De Sanctis is correct,
Charias and the other strategoi were convicted “in a single verdict,” an illegal proceeding
akin to the mass conviction of the Athenian generals after the defeat at Arginusae; Xen.
Hell. 1.7.34). After the elimination of his rivals, Lachares was able to establish himself as
tyrant. The chronicle then records the death of Cassander (F3), and the extreme measures
taken by Lachares to pay his mercenaries (F4). All of these events are placed before the
heading for the archon year 296/5 and thus antedate the summer of 296.
It follows that Lachares came to power at some point between September 301 (on
the date of Ipsus, see n. 29.4.1) and July/August 296, but a more precise date is difficult

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to pinpoint, and arguments for dates ranging from 300 (e.g. Ferguson [1929]) to 295 (e.g.
Beloch [1925] 247–48; for additional bibliography, see Dreyer [1999] 17–76 and
Paschidis [2008] 125–26 n. 2). Attempts to place the onset of tyranny around the time of
the celebration of the Dionysia in 301/0 rely heavily on a papyrus (P.Oxy. 10.1235) that
preserves what appears to be a summary (περιοκαί) of the plays of Menander (on this
document, see esp. O’Sullivan [2009b]). The anonymous author claims that Menander’s
Imbrians, written in the archonship of Nicocles (302–01), was not performed as planned
at the Dionysia “on account of Lachares the tyrant” (ll.105–112). Since Stratocles was in
power as late as September 301 (n. 29.4.1), however, the festival in question cannot be
that of 302/1. Proponents of this dating accordingly argue that Lachares seized power
shortly after word of the outcome at Ipsus arrived in Athens, and identify the cancelled
Dionysia as that of 301/0 (Feguson [1929] 12–14; Habicht [1997] 83; Osborne [2012]
28), though it is unclear why the author would record the year in which the play was
merely written, and not the year in which the festival was cancelled. O’Sullivan [2009b]
has mounted a convincing argument against the historical reliability of this notice,
demonstrating that the alleged cancellation was most likely a flawed inference on the part
of an Alexandrian scholar attempting to extrapolate historical detail from the text of a
comedy (cf. ns. 11.3.3, 12.2.1, 12.3.2, 24.2.2). Thus, P.Oxy. 10.1235 hardly provides a
reliable chronological peg on which to hang the onset of the predominance of Lachares.
Given the current state of the evidence, the best we can do is to note that Pausanias
(1.25.7) contends that Cassander encouraged Lachares to seize power in Athens, and
P.Oxy. 17.2082 seems to place the civil strife that led to the tyranny of Lachares shortly
before that king’s death. Since the death of Cassander has been conclusively dated to
May 297 (Syncellus [Chron. 320] and Eusebius/Porphyry [FGrH 260 F3.4] each credit
Cassander with a reign of nineteen years [316–297], and P.Oxy. 17.2082 F3 specifies the
Macedonian month of Artemisios; cf. Landucci-Gattinoni [2003]; Yardley, Wheatley,
and Heckel 304), the beginning of the tyranny of Lachares should probably be dated to
the spring of 297, although a date as early as 300 is possible, and he was in power for a
minimum of two years (on the date of his fall, see n. 34.1.1).
The sources are unanimous in labeling Lachares a tyrant, but the actual nature of
the regime he imposed on Athens is uncertain, and the scanty epigraphic evidence shows
no obvious break in the city’s democratic institutions. What power Lachares wielded
stemmed from the mercentary soldiers in his employ, and two early 3rd-century
inscriptions (IG II2 1956, 1957) honoring groups of foreign mercenaries may have been
set up by Lachares in acknowledgment of their role in bringing him to power (Bayliss
[2003] 90). But mercenaries must be paid, and Lachares no doubt was increasingly
desperate to retain their services after Demetrius laid siege to the city in 295. To do so, he
apparently resorted to despoiling the Acropolis of its treaures, including the gold from the
chryselephantine cult statue of Athena (P.Oxy. 17.2082 F 4; Paus. 1.25.7, 1.29.16; Mor.
379D). A character in the Areopagite by the comic poet Demetrius joked, “Lachares
stripped Athena bare, though she never bothered him at all” (Athen. 9.405F).
33.2.2 διεπεραιώθη µεγάλῳ στόλῳ: Athens fell to Demetrius in the spring of 295 (see
below n. 34.1.1) Demetrius returned from Cilicia to operate again in mainland Greece in
296/95 after an absence of six years (Wehrli 162; Will [1979] 89; Habicht [1997] 85).

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33.2.3 ἐχειµάσθη…οὐκ ὀλίγον: This storm delayed, but did not derail, Demetrius’
recovery of Athens (see below, n. 34.1.1). Repercussions in the east were far more
severe: the storm led directly to the near total collapse of Demetrius’ position in the
eastern Mediterranean. The replacement fleet Demetrius summoned to Greece from
Cyprus (33.8.1–3) left his Cypriote and Anatolian possessions denuded of defenders and
vulnerable to attack. Within two years, Ptolemy seized Cyprus, and perhaps Sidon and
Tyre as well, while Lysimachus captured Ephesus and Miletus (n. 35.5.2), and Seleucus
occupied Cilicia (n. 20.8.3).
33.3.3 αὐτὸς  εἰς Πελοπόννησον παρῆλθε: The language suggests that Demetrius
invaded the Peloponnese by land (Hammond and Walbank 211 n. 9), a route enabled by
Demetrius’ control of Megara and Corinth (n. 31.2.5).
Μεσσήνην ἐπολιόρκει: Messene was founded in 369, with help from the Theban
Epaminondas, as the capital of liberated Messenia (Pausanias [9.15.5] names
Epaminondas as the founder [oikestes] of Messene, but his exact role in the foundation is
uncertain; see Luraghi 217). The city, on the slopes of Mt Ithome beneath a lofty
acropolis on the summit, was strategically vital and played a crucial role in the Theban
policy of containing Sparta. In the late 3rd century Demetrius of Pharos described
Messene as one of the two “horns” of the “cow” that was the Peloponnese—the other
being Corinth—and urged Philip V to gain possession of both if he wished to dominate
southern Greece (Strabo 8.4.8). The all-stone fortifications of Messene, still among the
best-preserved in Greece, were proverbial for their strength in antiquity (cf. Plut. Arat.
51.4), and in the 2nd century AD the 9 km enceinte encompassing city and acropolis were
still imposing enough to strike Pausanias with awe (Paus. 4.31.5).
Messene’s strategic importance and Demetrius’ designs on Sparta (n. 35.1.1)
probably account for Demetrius’ attack on the city in 296/5, but a recent alliance between
Lysimachus and the Messenians (SEG 41.322) may also have provided Demetrius with
further incentive (A. Matthaiou, “Δὺο ἱστορικὲς ἐπιγραφὲς τῆς Μεσσήνης,” in V.
Mitsopoulos-Leon (ed.), Forschungen in der Peloponnes, [Athens: 2001] 221–231;  
Luraghi 256). If Plutarch’s account (Dem. 13.4) of Messene’s change of allegiance from
Cassander to Demetrius belongs to 303, as seems likely (see above, n. 25.1.1), then the
outcome of Demetrius’ siege of the city in 296/5 is uncertain (Roebuck 61; Luraghi 256;
cf. P. Themelis, “The Sanctuary of Demeter and the Dioscouri at Messene,” in R. Hägg
[ed.] Ancient Greek Cult Practice from the Epigraphical Evidence [Athens: 1994] 157–
186, who suggests that Demetrius failed to take the city, and that a votive shield found in
the sanctuary of Demeter and the Dioscuri in Messene was dedicated in thanksgiving for
the successful defense of the city). An early third-century decree (IG V, 1 1426) referring
to 30 cavalrymen from a nearby town who were honored with Messenian citizenship may
record honors granted in recognition of aid they provided during Demetrius’ attack on the
city.
33.4.2 καταπελτικοῦ βέλους…ἐµπεσόντος: The first of at least two such wounds that
Demetrius received (cf. n. 40.5.2–3).
33.5.2 πόλεις τινὰς ἀφεστώσας προσαγαγόµενος: The cities whose allegiance
Demetrius was able to regain are unknown; presumably they included certain former

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member states of the lapsed Hellenic League in Arcadia, Achaea, and the Argolid (on the
constituent cities of the Hellenic League, see above n. 25.4.1).
33.5.3 κρατήσας Ἐλευσῖνος καὶ Ῥαµνοῦντος ἔφθειρε τὴν χώραν: Eleusis and
Rhamnous were the coastal termini (western and eastern, respectively) of the Athenian
border defense system (on the Attic border forts and fortified demes, see above n. 23.3.3).
Control of these two crucial fortresses allowed Demetrius to severely impede Athenian
agricultural production (Oliver [2007] 120). Once a replacement fleet had arrived (ns.
33.2.3, 33.8.1) Demetrius was able to seize Aegina and Salamis (Poly. 4.7.5) and tighten
the noose by land and sea. There is no indication that Demetrius attempted to take Athens
by storm, a testament to the effectiveness of the overhaul of the city’s defenses overseen
by Demochares and encouraged by Demetrius himself (see above, n. 23.1.1).
33.5.5 ἐκρέµασε…σύντονον λιµὸν ἐν ἄστει γενέσθαι: Demetrius knew full well that
Athens could not be starved into submission unless he could establish an effective naval
blockade; Rhodes had taught him that much (see above, ns. 20–21). But Rhodes had also
demonstrated the difficulty of the task. If would be blockade-runners could be deterred by
an exemplary act of terror, so much the better. The execution, carried out pour
décourager les autres, had the intended effect: ὥστε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποτρεποµένων διὰ
φόβον. Cf. Diodorus’ account (20.106.3) of Demetrius’ actions at Arcadian Orchomenus
in 303; see above, n. 25.1.4.
33.6.2 ὁ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν [µόδιος] ὤνιος ἦν τριακοσίων (Panic prices for staple
commodities in Athens): A modios is equivalent to one-sixth of a medimnos (roughly
6.67 kg. = 14.67 lbs.); thus the going rate of 300 drachmas for a modios of wheat during
Demetrius’ siege of Athens in 295 works out to 1,800 drachmas per medimnos, a truly
incredible price. In the third quarter of the 4th century, the price of a medimnos ranged
from 5 to 16 drachmas (Dem. 24.39; Garnsey [1988] 154). It is entirely possible that the
text is corrupt and we should read medimnos rather than modios—300 drachmas for a
medimnos during a prolonged siege is very high, but not unbelievably so. In an analogous
situation during Sulla’s siege of Athens in 87/6, Plutarch notes that a medimnos of wheat
fetched 1000 drachmas (χιλίων δραχµῶν ὠνίου τοῦ µεδίµνου τῶν πυρῶν ὄντος ἐν
ἄστει τότε, Sulla 13.2).
33.7.2 ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα νῆες,,,ἔφυγον ἄραντες οἱ Πτολεµαίου (The Ptolemaic
naval recovery): Ptolemy’s navy was virtually wiped out at the battle of Salamis in 306
(n. 16.1.4), but the presence of this fleet in the Aegean indicates that Ptolemy had
successfully restored his naval power in the intervening decade. The attempt to intervene
in the siege of Athens also raises the question of Ptolemy’s relationship with Lachares.
Although Ptolemy could well have sent the fleet in response to entreaties from the tyrant,
it is equally likely that he was acting of his own accord, since the re-establishment of
Antigonid control over Athens certainly did not serve the interests of the king in Egypt
(Paschidis [2008] 128).
33.8.1 Δηµητρίῳ…τριακοσίας: These replacement ships were presumably drawn from
Demetrius’ naval bases at Corinth and Cypriote Salamis (see ns. 17.1.4, 31.2.2).
Transferring so many ships from Cyprus must have undermined Demetrius’ eastern
position (see n. 33.2.3).

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 XXXIV
34.1.1 οἱ...ἔπεµπον (Calendrical reform and the restoration of democracy in Athens,
Spring 295): The prescript of an Athenian decree of 296/5 (IG II2 644; nothing of the
decree itself survives) suggests that the capitulation of Athens took place in late March or
early April 295. The decree is dated to 16 Mounichion, the tenth month of the Attic year,
and the seventh day of only the fourth prytany—a remarkable concurrence given that the
prytanies and festival months had been roughly coextensive since 307 when the addition
of two new tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, brought the total to twelve (see above, n.
10.6.1). Equally striking is the application of the epithet hysteros to the eponymous
archon Nicias, indicating either that he held the office twice in the same year, or was the
second of two men to hold the office that year (the former is far more likely; Ferguson
[1929] 7–9; Osborne [2006] 75ff.; id. [2012]31–33; cf. Thonemann [2005] 68–71). In any
case, Nicias’ designation, together with the strange calendrical equation, indicates that the
year was somehow divided. This division is confirmed by the career decree of Phaedrus
of Sphettus (IG II2 682), which records that he served as strategos twice in 296/5, and
another inscription of the same year (Hesperia 11, 281 n. 54) where the second prytany
falls in Elaphebolion. The implication of the preserved inscriptions is the unique
introduction of a miniature prytany year beginning in Elaphebolion in which each of the
twelve tribes was in prytany for approximately nine days. Such a drastic reorganization of
the calendar clearly indicates a change of regime, and there is now a strong scholarly
consensus that this regime change involved the fall of Lachares, and the re-establishment
of democracy by Demetrius (Ferguson [1929] 7–10; Heinen 177–84; Osborne [1982]
144–53; Habicht [1997] 83 n. 58; Woodhead [1997] 237; Thonemann [2005] 71; the
view that the reorganization of the calendar marked the establishment of Lachares’
tyranny was first proffered by Willamowitz [Antigonus von Karystos (Berlin: 1881) 239
ff.]; and subsequently accepted by many scholars [see Shear (1978) 53, with
bibliography], but P.Oxy. 2082 demonstrates that the rise of Lachares antedates 295; see
above, n. 33.1.4; cf. Dreyer [1999] 20–37).
This miniature prytany year was a flamboyant affirmation of democratic
procedures that distanced the new regime from the tyranny of Lachares, and an act of
such novelty, not to mention bureaucratic complexity, that it must have been carried out
with the acquiescence of Demetrius, or, more likely, at his behest (Ferguson [1929];
Osborne [2006] 71). It is almost certainly no coincidence that a secretary from tribe
Demetrias was installed, just as in the previous democratic restoration of 307/6 (n.
10.6.1). Evidently the king still found it expedient, if only for propaganda purposes, to
style himself as a liberator and the champion of Athenian democracy, even after the
Athenians had voted to ban him from the city in 301 (30.4) and, as this passage attests,
decreed death to any citizen who so much as mentioned peace or reconciliation with him.
The cynicism of this nod to Athenian democracy is revealed by the troops that Demetrius
subsequently installed in Piraeus and the asty itself (see ns. 34.7.1, 34.7.2)—proof that
Demetrius, after the fashion of his old enemy Cassander and in sharp contrast to his two
previous campaigns in mainland Greece, would now rely on garrisons to secure his
access to key Greek cities (J. Briscoe, “The Antigonids and the Greek States, 276–196
B.C,” in P. Garnsey and C. Whitaker [eds.] Imperialism in the Ancient World
[Cambridge: 1978] 146; Hammond and Walbank 220; on Demetrius’ use of garrisons

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prior to 301, see above n. 31.2.3). This policy reversal seems to have been linked with
Demetrius’ seizure of the Macedonian throne in 294 (n. 39.2.4). An Athenian decree in
honor of Herodorus (IG II2 646), an Antigonid official who mediated between Demetrius
and the Athenian envoys sent to sue for peace at the conclusion of the siege of 296/5,
indicates that this nominal democracy was still in place in Elaphebolion 295/4, almost
exactly a year after the calendrical reorganization of 296/5, but even the façade was
abandoned in 294/3, when Demetrius seems to have directly intervened in Athenian
affairs by appointing the eponymous archon (see below, n. 34.5.4; on Herodorus see
Habicht [1979] 4–7; Osborne [1982] 144–53; Billows [1990] 389–90; Paschidis [2008]
131–32).
34.3.2 Ἐπίκουρον: Born in 341 on Samos to Athenian cleurchs from the deme
Gargettius, Epicurus traveled to Athens to complete the ephebeia; the poet Menander was
a member of his cohort. Epicurus opened schools in Mytilene and Lampsacus before
returning to Athens shortly after the expulsion of Demetrius of Phalerum in 307. There he
purchased a house with a garden—his school in Athens was known thereafter as “The
Garden”— where he remained until his death in c. 270. He and his students, including
slaves and women, lived communally and modestly, taking no part in public affairs. This
seclusion, coupled with Epicurus’ hedonistic doctrine (“pleasure is the beginning and end
of living happily,” Ep. Men. 128), left Epicureans vulnerable to charges of profligacy,
and members of rival schools leveled all manner of calumny against the founder and his
students (including the charge that he consorted with hetairai).
Epicurus was a prolific writer—according to Diogenes Laertius (10.26) his corpus
ran to some 300 scrolls—producing treatises on epistemology, physics, and, most
importantly, moral philosophy, but little of his work has survived. The bulk of what we
know of Epicurean philosophy stems from Lucretius’ epic Latin poem De Rerum Natura,
and the summary of Epicurean thought that Diogenes of Oenoanda inscribed on the walls
of a stoa in his native Lycia (on this magnificent inscription, which originally occupied
some 260 square meters of wall space, see M.F. Smith, The philosophical inscription of
Diogenes of Oinoanda [Vienna: 1996]). For the surviving works with commentary, see
A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: 1987) 25–154.
34.4.2 τὸ θέατρον… ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ (Demetrius and the Dionysia): Demetrius,
along with the other Successors, is first likened to a tragic actor when he accepts the royal
title (18.5.1–18.7.2), and the comparison recurs several times in the Life (explicitly at
41.5 and 44.9; cf. 28.1; 53.2; see Intro. 29–40). In this remarkable scene, the literary
motif of Demetrius as a tragic actor is manifested in Plutarch’s historical narrative: the
king, “just like the tragic actors,” appears before the assembled Athenians in the Theatre
of Dionysus (De Lacy 170; Thonemann Tragic King 65–66). The fact that the novel
introduction of a miniature prytany year took place between 11 and 16 Elaphebolion (see
above, n. 34.1.1) raises the strong possibility that Demetrius’ appearance in the theatre
occurred during the City Dionysia, perhaps even on one of the days of the festival
devoted to the dramatic competitions—generally assumed to be 11–14 Elaphebolion
(Ferguson [1948] 133–35; Pickard-Cambridge 64–66). Thonemann (2005, passim, esp.
74–80; followed by Chaniotis [2011] 164; Osborne [2012]), argues for just such a
synchronism, suggesting plausibly that the episode in the theatre was the initial act in a
concerted and prolonged effort to control and manipulate the Dionysia, culminating in the

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creation of the appended Dionysia and Demetrieia festival (on this festival, which is first
attested epigraphically in 293/2, though the inaugural festival may have been celebrated
one year earlier, see above n. 12.2.3): just as the Dionysia commemorated the arrival of
Dionysus from Eleutherae, the Demetrieia commemorated Demetrius’ entry into Athens
during the festival of his patron deity (on Demetrius and Dionysus, see ns. 2.3.6, 2.3.8,
12.1.2, 12.2.3).
34.5.4 δέκα µυριάδας σίτου µεδίµνων ἐπέδωκε: This gift was a telling demonstration of
Demetrius’ ability to control the Athenian food supply (for the religious implications of
this power, see above, n. 26.1.1). The degree of Athenian dependence on imported grain
in any period is controversial (see, e.g. Garnsey [1988]; M. Whitby, “The Grain Trade of
Athens in the 4th Century BC,” in H. Parkins and C. Smith [eds.] Trade, Traders, and the
Ancient City [London: 1998] 102–28; A. Moreno, Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian
Grain Supply in the 5th and 4th Centuries BC [Oxford: 2007]), but Demetrius’ naval
embargo effectively closed the Athenian harbors, while his control of Eleusis and
Rhamnous (and perhaps the other Attic border forts, see above, n. 33.5.3) and the
presence of his army before Athens must, at the very least, have seriously disrupted
domestic agricultural production. While the siege brought the Athenians to the brink of
starvation, Demetrius’ largesse immediately replenished the city granaries: 100,000
medimnoi (c. 4,000,000 kg.) of grain could feed more than 200,000 people for a month
(assuming annual consumption of 230 kg; for various estimates of annual consumption
rates, see Oliver [2007] 19; cf. n. 10.1.6).
κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς αἳ µάλιστα τῷ δήµῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν: The ambiguity of
Plutarch’s language has led to considerable scholarly controversy—κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς
can be rendered either “he appointed the officials” or “he established the offices” most
popular with the people. The latter would indicate the restoration of democracy, the
former that Demetrius presided over the installation of a regime that was less than
democratic. Proponents of the view that ἀρχὰς refers to specific officials (Shear [1978]
53; Habicht [1979] 26–33, esp. 28; Thonemann [2005] 65) point to an Athenian decree
(IG II2 649 + Dinsmoor [1931] 18ff.) revealing that a government with recognizably
oligarchic features took power in Athens beginning in 294/3. In that year Olympiodorus,
probably the most prominent Athenian of his generation and a hero of the Four Years’
War served the first of two consecutive terms as eponymous archon (on Olympiodorus,
see ns. 23.1.1, 46.2.1). Clearly the practice of filling the office by sortition had been
abandoned, and Olympiodorus was appointed in some way (that such a luminary could
have acquired the office through sortition even once is unlikely; Osborne [2006]; id.
[2012] 34). Furthermore, this decree and two others from the same year (SEG 45.101;
Agora 16.167) demonstrate that the secretary of the Council was replaced by an
anagrapheus, an office linked to the oligarchic regime of 321/0–319/8 (S. Dow, “The
Athenian Anagrapheis,” HSCP 67 [1963] 37–54). Finally, the judicial scrutiny of
naturalizations, a feature of democratic regimes, was abandoned (Osborne [1982] 154).
The argument that Plutarch’s κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς means that Demetrius “appointed the
officials” and should be linked to the consecutive archonships of Olympiodorus,
however, is undermined by the chronology for the capitulation of Athens to Demetrius
(see above, n. 34.1.1). Olympiodorus did not take up office until the beginning of 294/3,
some fifteen months after Demetrius addressed the Athenians in the Theatre of Dionysus

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in the spring of 296/5, and the decree in honor of Herodoros (IG II2 646; see above n.
34.1.1) confirms that a democratic government was in power in Athens almost exactly
one year later. Thus, Plutarch must refer to the restoration of democratic offices that
followed the ouster of Lachares in 296/5 (Osborne [1982] 149; [2006] 70–71; Habicht
[1997] 87, abandoning his earlier view; Paschidis [2008] 132). The democratic
government, however, was undermined from its inception by the presence of Demetrius’
garrisons, and persisted for only fifteen months before Demetrius intervened directly in
Athenian internal affairs and appointed Olympiodorus to successive archonships,
apparently with extraordinary powers—Diogenes Laertius would later refer to him as
“the representative of the Athenians (ὁ Ἀθηναίων προστατήσας, 6.23; cf. Habicht
[1997] 90, suggesting that Olympiodorus acted as “the king’s commissar or
representative”). Demetrius’ decision to jettison even the pretense of democratic
procedures so soon after their ostentatious affirmation via the calendrical reorginazation
of 296/5 should probably be linked to his need to exercise influence in Athens indirectly
after his departure for Macedonia in 294 (36.3). In 292 the philosopher Theophrastus
convinced Demetrius to permit the repatriation of several oligarchic leaders in exile since
307 (Dion. Hal. Din. 3 = Philochorus FGrH 328 F167).
34.6.2 Δροµοκλείδης ὁ ῥήτωρ: Whether Dromocleides’ resolution was arranged in
advance or was simply an opportunistic attempt to curry favor with Demetrius is
uncertain. In either case, Dromocleides’ action on the king’s behalf was sure to be amply
rewarded (Paschidsis [2008] 130; on Dromocleides, see above n. 13.1.2.)
34.7.1 τὴν Μουνυχίαν: Demetrius had razed the fortress on the hill overlooking
Munychia harbor in 307/6 after expelling the Antipatrid garrison that held it (see above,
n. 10.1.1). A new fortress must have been constructed at this point (on the fortress, see
Strabo 9.1.15; Paus. 1.25.5–6; the surviving fortifications on the north-west side of the
hill likely date to this period: see Goette 35). It is likely that the resolution of
Dromocleides granting control of Piraeus and Munychia simply sanctioned the existing
state of affairs, since Demetrius seems to have gained control of Piraeus before the
capitulation of Athens (Paus. 1.25.7; Poly. 4.5.7; Habicht [1997] 97). The installation of
the garrison marked the beginning of a period of continuous Macedonian control of
Piraeus lasting until 229 (Paschidis [2008] 134–35).
34.7.2 φρουρὰν εἰς τὸ Μουσεῖον: The Museum—the hill of the Muses—is the highest
point of the limestone ridge that runs west of the Athenian Acropolis and includes the
Pnyx and the Hill of the Nymphs. Only slight traces of the Macedonian fort that was
constructed in isodomic masonry to house this garrison remain (on Demetrius’
fortification of the hill, see Paus. 1.25.8; on the remains of the fortress, see Thompson
and Scranton 331, 337; Travlos [1988] 178; Goette 57–58; Theocharaki 125–26; the wall
running along this ridge between the Long Walls, the so-called diatechisma, was once
connected with Demetrius [so Thompson and Scranton 337] but seems to have been
constructed somewhat later; Conwell 174–84 who refers to the structure as the
“Compartment Wall” based on the masonry technique utilized in its construction). The
Museum offers commanding views of the Pnyx, the Areopagus, the Acropolis and the
Agora: a garrison based on the hill was ideally situated for intervening in the heart of the
city, and the installation of this force is telling evidence of Demetrius’ determination to

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control Athens more closely (Dimitrakos 79–80). An Athenian force led by
Olympiodorus ejected Demetrius’ garrison in 287/6, but Antigonus Gonatas reoccupied
the fortress after the Chremonidean war (SEG 28.60; Paus. 1.26.1–3; Shear 87–97;
Habicht [1979] 45–67; Paschidis [2008] 137–39; below n. 46.2.1). Today the hill is
dominated by the funerary monument erected for C. Julius Antiochus Philopappus, a
descendant of the kings of Commagene, and Plutarch’s friend (Philopappus is addressed
in Plutarch’s essay How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend [48E; 66C] and participates in
Table Talk [628A-629A]).
XXXV
35.1.1 εὐθὺς ἐπεβούλευε τῇ Λακεδαίµονι (The Peloponnesian Campaign of 295–94): If
Plutarch is correct in placing Demetrius’ invasion of the Peloponnese immediately
(εὐθὺς) after the fall of Athens, the campaign began in the late spring or early summer of
295 (Wehrli 165–66; on the chronology of the siege of Athens, see above n. 34.1.1). In
303, Demetrius had deemed it necessary to secure key positions in the Peloponnese
before moving against Cassander (see above n. 25.1.1); eight years later it would seem
that he again moved to shore up his position in southern Greece as a preliminary to an
attack on Cassander’s sons. Since Demetrius did not break off his attack on Sparta to
pursue opportunities in Macedonia until 294 (see below, n. 36.1.3), his campaign in the
Peloponnese presumably consumed at least a year and must have involved more than the
hostilities with the Spartans that Plutarch describes. The details of the campaign are lost,
but Demetrius probably sought to secure the allegiance, or at least the quiescence, of
many of the same cities that had drawn his attention in his previous Peloponnesian
campaigns, among them Sicyon, Epidaurus, Argos, and Messene.
Despite Plutarch’s assertion, the subjugation of Sparta was unlikely to have been
the primary aim of the campaign, if it was initially an aim at all. Sparta had chosen to
remain aloof from the Hellenic League constituted under the leadership of Antigonus and
Demetrius in 302 (see above, n. 25.4.1), just as they had shunned the predecessor
organization led by Philip and Alexander. The Antigonids, like the Argeads before them,
tolerated the snub with regal indifference. This apathy was more a product of the
radically diminished power of Sparta, particularly after Antipater crushed the great
rebellion led by Agis III at Megalopolis 331–330 (Aesch. 3.165; Din. 1.34; Diod. 17.62–
63; Curt. 6.1.1–21), than respect for her venerable tradition of martial excellence. In fact,
none of the Macedonian dynasts who campaigned in the Peloponnese in the subsequent
three decades bothered to invade Laconia, much less garrison the city. Sparta was simply
too remote and too weak to command the attention of the Diadochi (Cartledge and
Spawforth 26–7). Given this recent obscurity, the Spartan decision not only to oppose
Demetrius’ invasion but to initiate hostilities by sending an army under Archidamus IV
into Arcadia (see below, n. 35.1.2) marks a radical shift in policy, and it seems likely that
the Spartan volte face was inspired and abetted by one of Demetrius’ rivals anxious to
prevent the re-establishment of his power in Greece. Ptolemy (Manni [1951] 98 n. 37)
and Lysimachus (Cartledge and Spawforth 30–31; cf. Bradford 132) are both plausible
candidates—but a lack of evidence prohibits certainty.
35.1.2 περὶ Μαντίνειαν (The site of Demetrius’ victory over the Spartans): Mantineia
had a long history of close relations with Sparta and was the only Arcadian city not to

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join the Antigonid alliance in the wake of Demetrius’ successful Peloponnesian campaign
of 303 (see above, n. 25.1.4; whether Mantineia offered armed resistance to Demetrius or,
like Sparta, was allowed to remain outside the Hellenic League is uncertain). If
Demetrius intended to pacify the Peloponnese before moving onto Macedonia, Mantineia
was a natural target given her historic Spartan affiliation and recent opposition to the
Antigonids. The appearance near Mantineia of a Spartan army under Archidamus IV can
thus be seen as an attempt to protect the territory of an ally and frustrate Demetrius’
Peloponnesian ambitions. Spartan interests dovetailed with those of Demetrius’ royal
rivals in both respects, and it is likely that Ptolemy or Lysimachus encouraged Sparta to
resist the advance of Demetrius with a contribution of troops and/or money (n. 35.1.1).
A stratagem attributed to Demetrius may allow for a more precise location of the
battle than Plutarch’s vague “near Mantineia.” According to Polyaenus (4.7.9), Demetrius
and the Spartans encountered one another “with Lyrkeion, a mountain of Arcadia,
extending between the two” (ἦν µέσον ἀµφοτέρων ὄρος Ἀρκαδικὸν Λύρκειον).
Confronted unexpectedly and in rugged and unfamiliar terrain, Demetrius’ troops were
uneasy. Demetrius, however, coolly capitalized on a strong north wind that arose at his
back and set fire to the nearby woods. The wind carried the smoke and flames into the
Spartan ranks and they fell back in disorder. Demetrius then led a spirited attack that
resulted in a convincing victory. Mt. Lyrkeion, just a few kilometers northeast of
Mantineia, is the northernmost of the mountains separating the Argolid from Arcadia.
The principal road from the northern Argive plain to Mantineia runs along the Inachos
river valley and over the eastern slope of Mt Lyrkeion via a roughly north-south route
that Pausanias calls Κλῖµαξ, “the ladder” (2.25.4-6, 8.6.4; on this route see esp. I.A.
Pikoulas, Ὁδικό δίκτυο καὶ ἄµυνα: Ἀπὸ τὴν Κόρινθο στὸ Ἄργος καὶ τὴν Ἀρκαδία
[Athens: 1995] 288–90; cf. W.K. Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography. Part
III: Roads, [Berkeley: 1980] 1–54). Before descending into the plain above Mantineia the
route passes through the narrow Portes pass (37°40.15 N, 22° 28.31 E). The pass, at an
elevation of c. 1100 m. is a natural line of defense, particularly for an army that is
outnumbered, as the Spartan force surely was. It seems likely that the Spartans attempted
to hold this pass and deny Demetrius access to Arcadia, but were frustrated by
Demetrius’ clever stratagem. The location and orientation of the pass fits Polyaenus’
narrative and satisfies Plutarch’s claim that the conflict took place near Mantineia.
Ἀρχιδάµου τοῦ βασιλέως: Archidamus IV was a member of the royal Eurypontid house
who succeeded his father Eudamidas c. 300 (Plut. Agis 3.3; Cartledge and Spawforth 30).
His defeat in Arcadia is his only recorded public action and he may well have been killed
in the battle (Bradford 75). If he did survive he was not entrusted with further commands:
in 293 or 292 it was the Agiad regent Cleonymus who led a Spartan force into Boeotia to
oppose Demetrius (see below, n. 39.2.2). On Archidamus, see Bradford 75; Marasco
(1980) 52–53; Cartledge and Spawforth 30–31.
35.2.1 εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐνέβαλε…  τὴν πόλιν ἔχειν ἐδόκει (The date of Demetrius’
attack on Sparta): In his Peloponnesian campaigns of 303 and 296 Demetrius had ignored
Sparta, but it seems that the battle near Mantineia convinced him that Sparta was a threat
that required his attention (on Demetrius’ earlier campaigns, see above, ns. 25.1–4, 33).
If, as Plutarch claims, it was the invitation of Alexander, son of Cassander, that drew

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Demetrius from the walls of Sparta (see below, n. 36), then Demetrius’ invasion of
Laconia did not immediately follow his victory at Mantineia, but took place only after the
winter of 295/4 (Ferguson [1929] 21).
35.2.1 πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ Σπάρτῃ πάλιν ἐκ παρατάξεως (Walls and the Greek polis): City
walls were a defining characteristic for the Greek poleis, but Sparta had remained
famously unfortified throughout much of her history—the proverbial valor of her soldiers
was deemed sufficient protection against any enemy (Plut. Mor. 210E-F, 218E; Plut. Lyc.
19; .4; Epictetus, in Stobaeus, Florilegium, v. iii; Demosthenes de cor. 299; on city walls
and polis identity, see J. Camp, “Walls and the Polis,” in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H.
Nielsen, L. Rubinstein (eds.) Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History.
Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000
[Copenhagen: 2000], 41–57). Apprehension at the prospect of an invasion by Cassander
in 317 led the Spartans to fortify the city for the first time (Just. 14.5.5–7; but cf. Paus.
1.13.6 who suggests that Demetrius’ invasion prompted the fortification of the city), a
development cited by Justin (14.5.7) as evidence of the death of Spartan exceptionalism:
Tantum eos degenerauisse a maioribus, ut, cum multis saeculis murus urbi uirtus ciuium
fuerit, tunc eiues saluos se non existimauerint fore, nisi intra muros laterent (“they had
degenerated so much from their ancestors that, though their wall had been the valor of the
citizens for many centuries, now the citizens felt they would be safe only when hiding
behind actual walls”). If the erection of these fortifications did not signal the nadir of
Spartan power, their nature did: at a time when siege and counter-siege technology was
reaching unprecedented heights, the Spartan defenses consisted of little more than a ditch
and palisade (Paus. 1.13.6; E. Wace, “Excavations at Sparta, 1907: The City Wall,” BSA
13 [1907] 5–16; Cartledge and Spawforth 26–27; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 201–
02).
35.2.4 µέχρι τῶν χρόνων ἐκείνων ἀνάλωτον οὖσαν (Assessing the near-seizure of
Sparta): Demetrius’ invasion of Laconia marked the fourth time in less than eighty years
that a foreign army had breached the borders of the Spartan homeland. Sparta itself had
hitherto remained inviolate: neither Epaminondas, who had invaded Laconia in 370 and
again in 362, nor Philip II, who redrew the Laconian borders in 337, had attempted to
capture it. Indeed, the capture of an enfeebled Sparta would hardly have ranked among
Demetrius’ great achievements, nor would her makeshift fortifications (see above, n.
35.2.1) have given Poliorcetes a moment’s pause. The image of Demetrius on the cusp of
the unprecedented, but denied by a sudden reversal of fortune, however, suits Plutarch’s
characterization of his subject perfectly and must account for his decision to showcase
Demetrius’ dealings with the Spartans to the exclusion of the other events of this
Peloponnesian campaign.
35.3.1 ἡ τύχη: On the Hellenistic obsession with tyche and its prominence in the Life, see
Intro. 17; cf. Polyb. 29.21; Green (1990) 53–55.

35.4.2 σύ τοί µε φυσᾷς, σύ µε καταίθειν µοι δοκεῖς: The passage is from an unknown
play of Aeschylus. At the end of his treatise comparing various types of government, On
Democracy, Monarchy, and Oligarchy (827F), Plutarch claims that Demetrius, in despair
after losing his hegemony, assailed tyche with this quotation (πρὸς τὴν τύχην
ἐχρῆτοΔηµήτριος ὁ πολιορκητὴς ἀποβαλὼν τὴν ἡγεµονίαν).

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35.5.2: ἀγγέλλεται Λυσίµαχος…Σαλαµῖνος (On the date and extent of Demetrius’
losses in the East): No doubt Demetrius’ rivals targeted his Asian possessions the
moment he departed Cilicia to campaign in mainland Greece in 296 (see above, n.
33.2.2). Chief among these was Cypriote Salamis, Demetrius’ principal eastern dockyard,
arsenal, and mint (see above n. 17.1.4). When Demetrius lost the greater part of his
expeditionary fleet in a storm off the coast of Attica and was forced to summon another
from Cyprus (see above, n. 33.8.1), he denuded the island of defenders leaving it, and by
extension his entire eastern position, vulnerable (n. 33.2.3). Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and
Seleucus all moved to exploit this weakness, and each was able to annex Antigonid
territory. Despite stubborn resistance from Antigonid garrisons, Lysimachus was able to
establish control over the Ionian cities, notably Ephesus and Miletus (Frontinus 3.3.7;
Poly. 5.19; Wehrli 167; Hammond and Walbank 214; Lund 91–93), while Seleucus
crossed the Amanus range and seized Cilicia (ns. 20.8.3, 47.2.2; cf. Grainger [1990] 143;
Bosworth [2002] 267 n. 77). The most painful blow, from an Antigonid perspective, was
Ptolemy’s capture not only of all of Cyprus (Salamis was eventually forced to surrender;
see below, n. 38.1.2), but also the Phoenician cities of Sidon and Tyre. The chronology
established by Newell (Tyrus Rediviva [New York: 1923] 15–23; cf. Wehrli 184; Shear,
Jr. [1978] 72) placed Ptolemy’s capture of Sidon and Tyre in 288/7, but the evidence of a
coin hoard from Galilee suggests that the cities actually fell in 295 or 294 (Merker [1974]
119–26; Mørkholm 77), and it seems highly unlikely that Sidon and Tyre could have
resisted Ptolemy for so many years after the fall of Cyprus left them completely isolated
(Buraselis [1982] 88 n. 201; Hammond and Walbank 214).
The collapse of Demetrius’ entire eastern position deprived him of his most
important sources of revenue and human and natural resources. If Demetrius hoped to
maintain his supremacy at sea and his recrudescent European position, to say nothing of
his long-term ambition to reconstitute his father’s Asian realm, he would have to secure
access to manpower and shipbuilding timber. The large population and abundant forests
of Macedonia offered precisely what Demetrius needed most, and the internal strife that
had plagued the kingdom since the death of Cassander (see below, n. 36.1.1) left it
vulnerable (cf. Marasco [1980] 50). When the young king Alexander invited him to
intervene in Macedonia (see below, n. 36.2.1), Demetrius saw his opportunity and seized
it. Sparta remained inviolate for another century, until it was captured by Philopoemon in
192 (Plut. Phil. 15.2; Paus. 8.51.1).
35.6.1 ἡ παρ' Ἀρχιλόχῳ γυνὴ: Archilochus fragment 184 (West). Plutarch also cites
this passage in On the principle of cold (950F) during a discussion of the antipathy of fire
and water, and in Against the Stoics on common perceptions (1070A) where the deceitful
Stoics are likened to the woman in Archilochus.
XXXVI
36.1.1 Κασσάνδρου τελευτήσαντος (The death of Cassander: chronology and manner
of death): Cassander died at Pella in May 297 after ruling in Macedonia for 19 years
(Eusebius/Porphyry [FGrH 260 F3.4] and Syncellus [Chron. 320] agree on the length of
his reign, establishing the year of his death; POxy 2082 specifies the intercalary month of
Artemesios). The ancient sources preserve two conflicting accounts of the manner of his
death. According to Pausanias (9.7.2), Cassander, miserable and worm-eaten, was carried

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off by dropsy—divine retribution for the elimination of Alexander’s family (Paus. 9.7.4).
This hostile tradition should probably be rejected in favor of the variant account in which
Cassander died of phthisis, “wasting disease,” i.e. tuberculosis (Eusebius/Porphyry FGrH
260 F 3.5; Syncellus Chron. 320; cf. Hammond and Walbank 208; Yardley, Wheatley,
and Heckel 304; on the tendency of moralizing historians to inflict phthiriasis, infestation
by worms, on rulers deemed cruel or tyrannical, see T. W. Africa, “Worms and the Death
of Kings,” CA 17 [1982] 1–17). The same disease would soon claim the life of
Cassander’s son Philip IV (see below, n. 36.1.2; tuberculosis is not hereditary [pace
Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 304], but Cassander may have infected his son).
36.1.2 Φίλιππος…ἀπέθανεν (Philip, son of Cassander: his paternity, the chronology of
his reign, his death): Philip is generally assumed to have been the son of Cassander and
Thessalonice, the only wife of Cassander mentioned in literary sources, but it has recently
been suggested that his mother was in fact Cynnana, daughter of Philip II’s homonymous
daughter and the younger sister of Adea Eurydice, wife of Philip III (Palagia [2009],
based on a Macedonian funerary monument for a daughter, also named Adea, of
Cassander and Cynanna). This is an attractive theory: Cassander was well into his thirties
when he married Thessalonice and it seems highly unlikely that the marriage was his first
given that his father Antipater was an acknowledged master of the art of the marriage
alliance. Philip IV died at Elateia in Phocis after ruling for less than a year
(Eusebius/Porphyry FGrH 260 F3.5; P.Oxy. 17.2082 F3 makes it clear that his reign was
measured in months—the passage is normally restored to read four months; cf. Justin
16.1 who states simply that Cassander and his eldest son died in quick succession:
Cassandri regis filiique eius Philippi continuas mortes; cf.; Ferguson [1911] 131;
Hammond and Walbank 210–11; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 304). Pausanias (9.7.3)
attributes his death to tuberculosis, the same disease that killed Cassander (see above, n
36.1.1). Philip’s presence at Elateia seems to confirm that Cassander had recaptured that
strategic city after Ipsus (see above, n. 31.4.1).
36.1.3 οἱ λοιποὶ δύο πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον (An unusual dual kingship in
Macedonia): After the death of Philip IV in the late summer or early autumn of 297 the
two surviving sons of Cassander, Antipater and Alexander, began a period of joint rule.
This arrangement seems to have been instigated by the boys’ mother Thessalonice, who
wielded considerable power even if she was not officially named as regent for her sons
(Hammond and Walbank 210; cf. Lévêque 111; Errington [1978] 126 n. 124; Landucci-
Gattinoni [2009] 264; on Thessalonice, see below n. 36.1.4). The dual kingship seems to
have lasted until the spring of 294 when Antipater, angered that Thessalonice favored his
younger brother, killed his mother and expelled Alexander from Pella (Plut. Pyrr. 6.2;
Just. 16.1; according to Eusebius/Porphyry [FGrH 260 F 3.5–6] the reigns of Philip IV
and his brothers lasted a combined three and a half years). Why Thessalonice
championed the claim of Alexander over his elder brother is unknown.
36.1.4 Θεσσαλονίκην: Thessalonice was the daughter of Philip II and Nicesipolis of
Pherae (Athen. 14. 557C; Paus. 9.7.3; cf. Just. 14.6.13), and the half-sister of Alexander
the Great. Her mother, a niece of Jason of Pherae (Steph. Byz. s.v. Θεσσαλονίκη), died
when Thessalonice was an infant and it seems that her stepmother Olympias subsequently
acted as her guardian. The two fell into the hands of Cassander at Pydna in 317/6 after a

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difficult siege (Diod. 19.35.5; see above, n. 22.2.3). Cassander had Olympias killed and
married Thessalonice (Diod. 19.52.1; Just. 14.6.13; Heid. Epit. = FGrH 155 F2.4),
forging a link with Philip and Alexander. The marriage was an important component of
Cassander’s plan to claim the throne of Macedonia, as was the foundation of a city on the
Thermaic Gulf which Cassander named Thessalonice after his new wife (Strabo 7, frags.
21, 24; see Diod. 19.61.1–5 for Cassander’s regal ambitions; on the foundation of
Thessalonice, see Cohen [1995] 101–05; Landucci-Gattinoni [2003] 96–104). Although
no previous marriage is attested for Thessalonice, she was at least thirty when she wed
Cassander. Her long spinsterhood can perhaps be explained by Olympias’ determination
to prevent the birth of any new Argead males that might contest the succession
(Landucci-Gattinoni [2009] 262; cf. Carney [1988] 388). Of her actions in the two
decades after heρ marriage we know nothing beyond the fact that Thessalonice, despite
her age, bore Cassander at least two sons (on the maternity of Philip IV see above, n.
36.1.2)—she does not appear again in the sources until accounts of the dynastic strife that
claimed her life in 294.
36.2.1 ἔφθασε δὲ Πύρρος…µισθόν (Pyrrhus aids Alexander in exchange for Macedonian
territory): Pyrrhus was in a much better position to respond quickly to the summons of
Alexander than Demetrius, who was engaged in a military campaign in the southern
Peloponnese. He marched from Epirus to Macedonia, perhaps via Aeginium and Beroea
(so Hammond and Walbank 214), ejected Antipater (Plut. Pyrr. 6.5), and seized and
garrisoned the western Macedonian regions of Tymphaea and Parauaea, as well as
several states in western Greece that were subject to Macedonia: Ambracia, Acarnania,
and Amphilochia (Plut. Pyrr. 6.2–3). Alexander had no choice but to acquiesce to the
new dispensation.
While Pyrrhus was installing Alexander as the ruler of a much-diminished
kingdom, the matricide Antipater appealed to his father in law Lysimachus in Thrace
(Plut. Pyrr. 6; Just. 16.2.4). According to Justin (16.1; cf. Plut. Pyrr. 6.8), the feuding
brothers were reconciled at the instigation of Lysimachus, though the terms of the
settlement are not specified and Antipater does not seem to have been present when
Demetrius arrived at Dion to find that Alexander no longer needed his help (see below, n.
36.3.4). For his part, Pyrrhus departed to establish his new capitol at Ambracia (Strabo
7.7.6).
36.3.4 Δῖον: A town in Pieria beneath Mt Olympus situated at the southern entrance to
Macedonia and named for its famous sanctuary of Olympian Zeus. The sanctuary
enjoyed the patronage of Macedonian kings from at least the time of Archelaus (413–
399; for the dramatic festival he instituted at Dion, see Diod. 17.16.3). By the reign of
Philip, who celebrated the destruction of Olynthos at Dion (Diod. 16.15), the sanctuary
had become the site par excellence for the commemoration of Macedonian military
success. Lysippus’ famous statue group, commissioned by Alexander in honor of the
Macedonian cavalry who fell at the battle of the Granicus (Arr. Anab. 1.16.4; on the
group, see esp. Stewart [1993] 123–30), is the most famous of the many lavish
dedications of Macedonian monarchs, including Cassander and Demetrius, that adorned
the sanctuary (D. Pantermalis, Dion: Sacred City of the Macedonians [Thessalonice:
1984] 14). Dion’s location and status must have commended it to Alexander as a venue
for his meeting with Demetrius: the frontier location of the city would keep Demetrius

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and his army far from Pella, and the sanctity of the site might afford some protection if
Demetrius had hostile intentions (although Alexander himself apparently had no
compunction about assassinating Demetrius at Dion, 36.4). Demetrius’ route from the
southern Peloponnese to southern Macedonia—a journey of more than 500 km via the
land route—is not recorded, but it seems likely that he covered at least some of the
distance by sea. Sailing as far the excellent harbor on the Gulf of Pagasae where he later
founded Demetrias (n. 39.1.1), and then marching through the Vale of Tempe to Dion
would have allowed Demetrius to save time and bypass potentially hostile Boeotia (see
below, n. 39.1.3).
36.9.1 Λάρισσαν: One of the principal cities of Thessaly and the seat of the aristocratic
Aleuadae clan, Larissa is situated approximately eighty kilometers south of Dion on the
Peneus river in the middle of the vast, eastern Thessalian plain. At least two of
Demetrius’ closest advisors were natives of Larissa: Medius, the son of Oxythemis, and
his nephew Oxythemis, son of Hippostratus. The former held an important command at
the battle of Salamis (n. 19.2.2), and the latter was a philos and close collaborator of
Demetrius. Oxythemis was awarded Athenian citizenship in first half of 303, probably for
services he rendered the city during the Four Years’ War (IG II2 558; on Oxythemis see
Habicht [1970] 55–58; Osborne [1982] 124–26; Paschidis [2008] 111; ns. 19.2.2, 24.1.6).
No doubt Demetrius’ contacts in the city bolstered his confidence as he planned the
murder of the king of Macedon (see n. 36.12.6).
36.12.6 ἡµέρᾳ µιᾷ φθάσειεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Δηµήτριος (The death of Alexander: murder or
self-defense?): Plutarch gives several conflicting accounts of the events that led to the
death of Alexander. Here he excuses the murder of Alexander as an act of self-defense
(cf. the similar account of Pyrrhus’ murder of his Epirote rival Neoptolemus; Pyrr. 5.5),
but in the Synkrisis (5.5) he notes that “many say” (πολλοὶ λέγουσι) that the accounts of
Alexander’s plot against Demetrius are “false accusations” (ψευδεῖς αἰτίας) concocted
by Demetrius to justify the murder of his young rival (cf. Pausanias [1.10.1, 9.7.3] and
Diodorus [21.7] where the purported plot against Demetrius goes unmentioned; for the
justificatory speech of Demetrius recorded by Justin, see below n. 37). In On Compliance
(530D), Plutarch mistakenly names Antipater as Demetrius’ victim and makes no
mention of a reciprocal plot. Whether Alexander was a blameless victim or was killed
before he could execute his own design is uncertain; the fact that Demetrius lured the
young man away from Macedonia before having him killed, however, suggests that the
murder was carefully planned (Hammond and Walbank 217).
XXXVII
37.2.1 οὐ µακρῶν ἐδέησεν αὐτῷ λόγων…ἐκεῖνον ἀνηγόρευσαν βασιλέα Μακεδόνων
(After the murder of Alexander, Demetrius addresses a Macedonian assembly): Justin
agrees that Demetrius called an assembly of the Macedonians to formally defend the
murder of Alexander (caedem  apud exercitum excusaturus in contionem uocat; 16.1.1),
and gives a digest of his speech that is wholly plausible (Hammond and Walbank 217;
Bosworth [2002] 251–52). The accounts of Justin and Plutarch are not incompatible:
Plutarch claims that there was no need for Demetrius to make a long speech, not that he
did not address the Macedonians (pace Landucci-Gattinoni [2009] 266). In it, Demetrius
claims that he killed Alexander in self-defense (Ibi priorem se petitum ab Alexandro

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adlegat, nec fecisse se, sed occupasse insidias; Justin 16.1.10; cf. above n. 36.12.6) and
argues that he has a stronger claim to rule Macedonia than the sons of Cassander. The
arguments Demetrius marshals in support of his claim demonstrate that establishing
connections with the Argead house was still an imperative for those who aspired to rule
the Macedonians more than a decade and a half after the deaths of Alexander’s heirs.
Indeed, Demetrius does not appeal to his own considerable accomplishments, but
contrasts the faithful service Antigonus provided Philip, Alexander, and Alexander’s
heirs, with Cassander’s elimination of Alexander’s line (Just. 16.1.11–13; cf. Bosworth
[2002] 251–52). The murder of Cassander’s son Alexander is painted as retribution for
the crimes of his father, and Demetrius closes by invoking the shades of the Argeads
(Just. 16.1.17). According to Justin (16.1.18–19), the Macedonians were won over by
Demetrius’ arguments and hailed him as king, while Cassander’s surviving son Antipater
fled to the court of Lysimachus (as did Alexander’s widow Lysandra, who soon married
Lysimachus’ son Agathocles; see n. 31.5.6; Diodorus [21.7] is in error when he makes
Demetrius the murderer of both of the sons of Cassander; Hammond and Walbank 218
with n. 2; Lund 95). The speech, presuming Justin’s digest reflects the general tenor of
Demetrius’ address, makes a fitting conclusion to the bitter intergenerational struggle
between the Antigonids and Antipatrids that had begun with the fulminations of
Antigonus at Tyre more than twenty years prior (see above, n. 8.1.2). The ultimate
victory of the Antigonids in this military and ideological conflict is demonstrated not
only by the ascension of Demetrius to the throne of Macedonia, but by a subsequent
historiographical tradition that is almost unremittingly hostile to Cassander (on this
hostility, see esp. Landucci-Gattinoni [2009]).
37.2.3 ἐκεῖνον ἀνηγόρευσαν βασιλέα Μακεδόνων καὶ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς κατῆγον
εἰς Μακεδονία (On the date of Demetrius’ ascension): The chronology of Demetrius’
ascension was long a matter of controversy, with scholars offering a range of dates in
either 294 or 293 (cf. Ferguson [1929] 21; Manni [1951] 94; Wehrli 169; Habicht [1979]
21; Hammond and Walbank 218). Now that spring 297 has been established as the date
of Cassander’s death at Pella (n. 36.1.1), it follows that Demetrius was proclaimed king
by the assembled Macedonians at Larissa in autumn 294 (Cassander’s sons reigned for a
combined three and a half years; Eusebius/Porphyry FGrH 260 F3.5–6; see above, n.
36.1.3; on the acclamation of kings by the Macedonian assembly, see above XVIII: The
Assumption of the Kingship).
37.3.1 ἦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς οἴκοι Μακεδόσιν οὐκ ἀκούσιος ἡ µεταβολή (The reception of the
new king in Macedonia): The chaotic years following the death of Cassander had seen the
murder of Thessalonice, a period of fratricidal strife, and the annexation of a significant
portion of the Macedonian realm by a foreign king (36.1–3). All of this must have led to
widespread disenchantment with Antipatrid rule and concomitant desire for an energetic
and effective ruler capable of reversing the recent decline in Macedonian power. There is
no reason to doubt Plutarch’s assertion that the “Macedonians at home” accepted the
change of regime willingly (cf. Hammond and Walbank 218; Lund 95; Bosworth [2002]
252).
37.3.2 µισοῦσιν ἃ Κάσσανδρος εἰς Ἀλέξανδρον τεθνηκότα παρηνόµησεν (Cassander’s
crimes against the Argead house): Cassander was responsible for the deaths of

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Alexander’s mother Olympias (Diod. 19.51; Just. 14.6.6–12), his wife Roxane and son
Alexander IV (Diod. 19.105.1–2; Just. 15.2.2–5; Paus. 9.7.2; Heid. Epit. 1–2), and his
purported bastard Heracles (Diod. 20.28; Paus. 9.7.2). Cassander’s crimes against
Alexander’s family added conviction to the persistent rumors linking the Antipatrids with
the death of Alexander himself (Diod. 17.118.1–2; Val. Max. 1.7.ext.2; Arr. Anab.
7.22.1; Just. 12.14.6).
37.4.2 τῆς Ἀντιπάτρου τοῦ παλαιοῦ µετριότητος: The lack of “old-school
moderation” is central to Plutarch’s characterization of Demetrius’ reign in Macedonia,
and the reader is invited to savor the irony of Demetrius benefitting from this quality in
his father-in-law in his effort to secure the throne. Indeed, Plutarch claims that
Demetrius’ excesses prompted his subjects to recall wistfully how “moderate” (µέτριος)
Philip II had been (see below, n. 42.7.4).
37.4.3 Φίλᾳ συνοικῶν: Contrary to Plutarch’s assertion, Phila’s popularity seems to have
had little to do with her paternity. Her own merits were considerable (see above, n.
14.2.5), and she had previously been married to Craterus, whose memory the
Macedonians revered (Plut. Eum. 6.1–3; see above n. 14.2.6). According to Arrian, the
Macedonian rank and file much preferred Craterus to Antipater, whom they reviled for
his savagery and inaccessibility (Arr. Succ. F19 = FGrH 156 F177A; cf. 42.1.3)
37.4.4 υἱὸν ἔχων διάδοχον τῆς ἀρχῆς (Antigonus, son of Demetrius): The first mention
in the Life of Antigonus Gonatas (on the epithtet, see n. 25.7.5), the future king of
Macedonia. Plutarch’s description of Antigonus as a meirakion, “youth,” a term he
generally reserves for young men under the age of twenty one (e.g. Alc. 7.3.6; Pyrr.
4.4.3; Brut. 27) is not entirely accurate—Gonatas was in his mid-twenties when
Demetrius seized the Macedonian throne. Beginning with the elder Antigonus, all the
Successors were careful to designate an heir, thus avoiding the crucial mistake of
Alexander, whose failure to do so had plunged his empire into chaos (cf. n. 38.1.3).
XXXVIII
38.1.1 εὐτυχία: For other examples of Demetrius’ good fortune, see 8.5.1; 19.4.4; 31.6.1;
38.1.1; 48.5.1.
38.1.2 περὶ τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῆς µητρὸς ὡς µεθεῖνται (The fall of Salamis and the fate
and of Demetrius’ family): The release of Demetrius’ mother and children indicates that
Cypriote Salamis had surrendered to Ptolemy (for the Ptolemaic siege of Salamis, see
above n. 35.5.2), giving him control over all of Cyprus and depriving Demetrius of what
had served as his eastern capital since 306 (on the importance of Salamis, see above n.
17.1.4). The island would remain in Ptolemaic hands until it was annexed on behalf of
Rome by the younger Cato in 58 B.C. (Plut. Cato Min. 34–38; Vell. 11.45). Ptolemy’s
generous act was yet another in a series of reciprocal displays by which Ptolemy and
Demetrius vied to outdo one another in displays of magnanimity in victory. As a central
component of this competition, any friends and family of one’s rival who were taken
captive were treated cordially and released in expeditious, and highly visible, fashion (cf.
5.4–5: Ptolemy after Gaza; 6.5.2–3: Demetrius after the defeat of Cilles; 17.1: Demetrius
after Salamis; cf. 22.3 for Plutarch’s censure of the Rhodians for not respecting personal
items sent to Demetrius by his wife Phila). It is unclear which of Demetrius’ children

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were captured and subsequently released: Antigonus Gonatas was with his father (n.
37.4.4); Stratonice was reigning as the queen of Upper Asia (βασίλισσα τῶν ἄνω
βαρβάρων, see n. 38.1.3); Alexander, son of Deidameia, seems already to have been
living in Egypt at this time (n. 53.8.4). The only possible candidates are Demetrius, son
of an unknown Illyrian woman, and Corrhagus, son of Eurydice (53.9.1; Gabbert 13).
38.1.3 πυνθάνεται…ἀνηγόρευται (Antiochus and the administrative innovations of
Seleucus): The crown prince Antiochus was the eldest son of Seleucus and his Iranian
wife Apame (see above, n. 31.5.3). Seleucus’ decision to marry Antiochus to his
erstwhile stepmother Stratonice was, despite the imaginative elaborations and
embellishments of later authors (see below, n. 38.3.1), almost certainly motivated by
political considerations. By granting Antiochus the title and status of king with full
authority over the eastern satrapies of his vast realm and passing on to him a wife whose
own regal pedigree was unmatched (n. 31.5.2), Seleucus addressed the problems inherent
in governing a massive realm and removed all doubt as to his chosen successor.
Antiochus had been serving as a sort of viceroy of the Upper Provinces since the allied
victory at Ipsus and was clearly being groomed for the throne (App. Syr. 62; Kuhrt and
Sherwin-White [1991] 23–24), but Seleucus may have given Stratonice to his son to
avoid the possibility of future dynastic strife—Seleucus and Stratonice had already
produced a daughter (Phila, who would marry her uncle Gonatas; n. 38.2.2), and a male
child could pose a threat to Antiochus, whose mother was not Macedonian (Ogden 121–
22). Seleucus’ decision was both practical and innovative: the presence of the competent
Antiochus in the east freed Seleucus to deal with threats from his rivals in Syria and
Anatolia, and the system of dual kingship, for which there are no known Achaemenid or
Argead precedents, was adopted by subsequent Seleucid monarchs (Kuhrt and Sherwin-
White [1993] 24–25).
38.2.1 συνέβη… σκηπτόµενον: The illicit love of Antiochus for his stepmother
Stratonice was one of the most celebrated romantic tales of antiquity, resonating in both
Eastern and Western literature for more than 1500 years (for a survey, see B.E. Perry,
The Ancient Romances [Berkeley: 1967], 301–02). The story was, in all likelihood, the
embroidery of Hellenistic authors building on the pattern of forbidden love in a royal
court established by Euripides’ Hippolytus, but it is also possible that the marriage was a
love match (for a detailed study of the antecedents and elaborations of this story, see J.
Mesk, “Antiochus und Stratonice,” Rh.M 68 [1913]: 366–94). The story is recounted,
with minor variations, by Valerius Maximus (5.7.ext.1), Pliny (HN 7.123), Appian (Syr.
59–6), Lucian (de Dea Syr. 17–18; cf. de hist. consrib. 35), and Julian (Misop. 347–48;
see also Suda s.v. Ἐρασίστρατος, Adler E 2896).

38.2.2 ἤδη δὲ παιδίον ἐχούσης ἐκ τοῦ Σελεύκου (Phila, daughter of Seleucus and
Stratonice): The child was Phila, the future wife of her uncle Antigonus Gonatas and the
mother of Demetrius II. Aratus of Soli composed a wedding hymn for her marriage to
Gonatas (Suda s.v. Ἄρατος, Adler A 3745), who took no other wife (Carney [2000] 183).
The Philaion, a sacred precinct on Samos, was probably dedicated to this younger Phila
(Robert [1949] 177 n. 4; Carney [2000] 183; but cf. P. Gauthier Nouvelles inscriptions de
Sardes II [Geneva: 1989] who argues that the dedicatee was Demetrius’ wife), and her
statue was erected in the propylaea of the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos (OGIS 216). An

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inscription from Cassandreia (M. Hatzopoulos, “Un Nouveau document du règne
d’Antigone Gonatas,” Ποικίλα 10 [1990] 147–48) showing that Phila acted as a liaison
between various parties and her husband attests to her influence. On the younger Phila,
see Ogden 121–22, 178; Carney (2000) 182–83.

38.3.1 Ἐρασίστρατον δὲ τὸν ἰατρὸν: Erasistratus of Ceos (c. 305–c.240 B.C.) is best
known for his pioneering contributions to the development of human anatomy and
physiology, but the surviving fragments and titles of his works indicate that he engaged
in wide-ranging investigations spanning the entire spectrum of ancient medicine. Unlike
his older contemporary Herophilus, the basic facts of Erasistratus’ life, including where
and exactly when he lived and worked, have not been established with any certainty (V.
Nutton, Ancient Medicine [London: 2004] 135–39). Erasistratus is linked to Aristotle and
the Peripatetics through his alleged teacher Theophrastus (see above, n. 11.3.3), but the
evidence for this tradition is minimal (J. Scarborough, “Erasistratus, student of
Theophrastus?,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 59 [1985] 515–17). Although the
physician Cleombrotus, Erasistratus’ father, probably was active at the court of Seleucus
in Antioch, Erasistratus’ own work seems to have been carried out in Alexandria, and, if
the traditional date of his floruit of 257 (Eusebius Chron. 200 [Karst]; Jerome 131
[Helm]) is at all accurate, Erasistratus will have been too young to have had any
connection to the events surrounding the marriage of Antiochus and Stratonice, even if he
did live for a time in Antioch (Nutton [1979] 195–96). Indeed, the earliest surviving
iterations of the story of the love-sick Antiochus demonstrate that the identity of the wise
doctor who diagnoses the prince’s condition was subject to change based on the
inclination or information available to the author (Nutton [1979] 196; Andrei 220):
Valerius Maximus (5.7) offers either Erasistratus or the otherwise unknown Leptines;
Pliny identifies the doctor as Erasistratus’ father Cleombrotus at one point (HN 7.123), as
Erasistratus himself at another (HN 29.5). The similarity of the accounts of Plutarch,
Appian, Julian, and the Suda, on the other hand, does not amount to confirmation that
Erasistratus lived and worked in Antioch, but simply shows that they derive from a
common source. Galen offers yet another variant of the story as an introduction for an
account of his own diagnosis of a love-sick patient (de Praecognitione 6). In his version,
Antiochus’ beloved is not Stratonice, but one of his father’s concubines, indicating
confusion with another tradition in which Hippocrates discovers that the Macedonian
king Perdiccas pines for the concubine (yet another Phila) of his father (Soranus Vita
Hipp. 1).
38.4.3 τὰ τῆς Σαπφοῦς ἐκεῖνα: A reference to Sappho 31, a fragment of an epithalamion
or enkomion, that was later adapted by Catullus (51). Of all the variant accounts of
Antiochus’ love-sickness, Plutarch gives the longest list of symptoms, and he is the only
author to explicitly link the symptoms to those described by Sappho. Indeed his
description of Antiochus’ symptoms almost amount to a prose transcription of the poem.
A. Zadorojnyi (“Sappho and Plato in Plutarch, Demetrius 38,” in A. Pérez Jiménez, A.
Garcia Lopez, and R Aguilar [eds.] Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles [Madrid: 1999] 516)
identifies this passage with the rhetorical technique of paraphrasis; on this technique, see
Quint. 1.9.2; Theon Progymnasmata 15). Plutarch also cites Sappho 31 at Mor. 81D and
763A.

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 XXXIX
39.1.1 Θετταλίαν ἦν παρειληφώς: Cassander had regained Thessaly after Demetrius’
departure for Asia in late 302 (Diod. 20.112.1). With Macedonia securely in hand,
Demetrius set about establishing control over all of Thessaly, a process that he had likely
begun immediately after the murder of Alexander at Larissa in 294 (see above, n.
36.12.6). The most significant development following Demetrius’ annexation of Thessaly
was his foundation of a new city on the shores of the Pagasitic Gulf, the superb
anchorages of which he had exploited on at least two prior occasions (see above, ns.
28.2.1, 36.3.4). The city, named Demetrias after its founder, was formed by the
synoecism of adjacent Magnesian and Thessalian villages (Strabo 9.5.15) and probably
incorporated the site of Pagasae, the port of Pherae (Batzious-Estathiou, 9). Demetrius
endowed the city with a powerful fortification circuit of some 11 kilometers and
Demetrias rapidly emerged as one of the principal naval bases of his renascent empire
and a potent symbol of its founder’s determination to be a Greek as well as a Macedonian
king (Tarn [1913] 38). The most cosmopolitan of the Thessalian cities, Demetrias
remained thoroughly Macedonian in its political institutions and maintained a cult
devoted to Demetrius as founder (on the government of Demetrias, see F. Stählin et al.,
Pagasai und Demetrias, Beschreibung der Reste und Stadtgeschichte [Berlin: 1934] 184–
87; for the founder cult, see IG IX 2.1099; Y. Bequignon, BCH 59 [1935] 74–77; Mili
201; below n. 53.2.3). The prominence and prosperity of the city reached its peak under
Philip V who treated Demetrias as his southern capital, constructed an elaborate palace
there, and famously described the city—together with Chalcis and Corinth—as one of the
three “fetters of Greece” (App. Syr. 8; Polyb. 18.11.4–7; Livy 32.37.3, 35.31.19). Philip
V may have coined the phrase, but it was Demetrius who first demonstrated the critical
importance of these strategic sites for the control of central and southern Greece. On
Demetrias, see Cohen (1995) 111–13; Batziou-Efstathiou (2002); Lolos (2006);
Kravaritou (2012).
39.1.2 ἔχων δὲ καὶ Πελοποννήσου τὰ πλεῖστα: In his account of Demetrius’ activities
in the Peloponnese in the period 296–294, Plutarch reveals only that Demetrius was
wounded while besieging Messene (33.4; whether the siege was ultimately successful is
unclear), regained control of “certain cities that had revolted” (πόλεις τινὰς ἀφεστώσας
προσαγαγόµενος, 33.5.2), and defeated the Spartans in battle but withdrew from
Laconia before he could capture Sparta itself (35.1–2). The assertion that he controlled
“most of the Peloponnese” at this time (293 or 292, see below n. 39.1.3), however,
suggests that these campaigns yielded considerable success. Beyond Corinth we can only
speculate as to the extent of Demetrius’ Peloponnesian possessions, but it is reasonable to
assume that he targeted Arcadia, Achaea, and the Argolid, just as he had in his previous
Peloponnesian campaign nearly ten years before (see above, ns. 25.1–4). It is likely that
Demetrius installed garrisons in key cities in the Peloponnese (in addition to the garrison
that had occupied Corinth since 303), but our meager evidence does not allow for
certainty (on Demetrius’ use of garrisons in this period, see ns. 39.1.3, 39.2.4).
39.1.3 τῶν ἐντὸς Ἰσθµοῦ Μέγαρα καὶ Ἀθήνας: Demetrius had recovered Athens in 295
(see above, n. 34.1.1). Megara may have been one of the states that did not renounce its
allegiance to Demetrius after Ipsus (see above, n. 31.2.5).

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ἐπὶ Βοιωτοὺς ἐστράτευσε (Demetrius in Phocis and Boeotia, 293): Following the
successive conquests of Attica, most of the Peloponnese, Macedonia, and Thessaly,
Demetrius turned his attention to Phocis and Boeotia, the central Greek regions linking
his northern and southern possessions. If Demetrius encountered any resistance in Phocis
it has left no trace in the sources, and the influence of Xanthippus of Elateia, the most
prominent Phocian leader of the time and a former Antigonid collaborator (see above, n.
23.3.1), may have proved decisive (McInerney 242; Paschidis [2008] 325). Demetrius
probably installed a garrison in the strategically crucial city of Elateia at this time, since
we know that an Antigonid garrison was expelled from the city in the later 280s, probably
soon after word of the capture of Demetrius in 285 reached the city. That expulsion was
engineered by none other than Xanthippus—one of several instances in which former
Antigonid supporters emerged as leaders of resistance to Antigonid rule after Demetrius
abandoned any semblance of support for the freedom and autonomy of the Greek poleis
(cf. ns. 39.2.4, 46.2.1; for Xanthippus’ role, recorded on a monument erected in his honor
at Delphi, see FD III 4, 220; on the date, see Paschidis [2008] 325).
After securing the allegiance of Phocis, Demetrius moved south into Boeotia. A
stratagem recorded by Polyaenus (4.7.11) in which Demetrius terrified the Boeotians into
accepting terms of submission by sending a declaration of war to the Boeotian
magistrates assembled at Orchomenus and then arriving at Chaeronea at the head of an
army on the very next day should probably be assigned to this campaign (Paschidis
[2008] 312 n. 5). It has been suggested that Demetrius’ invasion of Boeotia should be
placed before the end of 294 (Hammond and Walbank 219; Lund 97; Habicht [1997] 91),
but such a date requires an unlikely compression of events: Demetrius was not acclaimed
king of the Macedonians until the autumn of that year, and was subsequently occupied in
Thessaly (see above ns. 37.2.3, 39.1.1). Demetrius’ march through Phocis into Boeotia
fits more comfortably early in 293.
39.2.2 Κλεωνύµου τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου παραβαλόντος εἰς Θήβας µετὰ στρατιᾶς (A
Spartan commander in Thebes): The appearance at Thebes of a friendly army
commanded by the Spartan Cleonymus represents a rather remarkable turn of events for
several reasons: relations between the two cities had been consistently hostile for more
than two centuries (Spawforth and Cartledge 31), Spartan forces had not been active
outside the Peloponnese since Agis III secured Crete for Persia in 332 (for Agis on Crete,
see D. Potter, “IG II2 339: evidence for Athenian involvement in the war of Agis III,”
BSA 79 [1984] 229–35; Spawforth and Cartledge 21; Heckel [2006] 8), and Cleonymus,
passed over for the Agiad throne in favor of his nephew Areus I in 309/08 (Paus. 3.6.2–3;
see n. 39.3.2), had departed for Tarentum in 303 with a mercenary force recruited at
Taenarum and secured with Tarentine funds (Paus. 3.6.2–3). In Italy he began a new
career as a condottiere, independent of the Spartan authorities (Diod. 20.104–105; Livy
10.2; see above, n. 28.2.1). While Cleonymus may have been recalled to act as regent and
lead an official mission of the Spartan army after Demetrius routed the force led by
Archidamus IV near Mantineia (so Bradford 246; Marasco [1980] 51–55; on the defeat of
Archidamus IV, see above n. 35.1.2), it is entirely possible that the rogue commander led
an army into Boeotia on his own initiative (Lévêque 136; Paschidis [2008] 313 n.1), a
scenario that is rendered all the more likely by Cleonymus’ well-established independent
streak and purported disdain for Spartan custom (Diod. 20.104.4–5; Plut. Pyrr. 26.8).

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Even if Cleonymus was operating at the behest of the Spartans, his force must have
consisted largely, if not entirely, of mercenaries, and some scholars suspect that the
encouragement and financial support of Lysimachus prompted the invasion—part and
parcel of a policy aimed at stirring up resistance to Demetrius in central Greece (Holleaux
i. 38 n. 3; Wehrli 174). The theory is attractive but cannot be substantiated. In fact, the
motives and political orientation of Cleonymus at the time of the Boeotian invasion are
entirely unclear (Cleonymus’ activites in the years following his defeat at Patavium in
302 are unknown; for the defeat, see Livy 10.2). In either case, Cleonymus’ march to
Boeotia was facilitated by the emergent Aetolian league, erstwhile members of the
Antigonid alliance (Diod. 20.100.6) but now allied to the Boeotians (SVA III, 463a), who
allowed his army to move freely through their territory (Hammond and Walbank 219;
Spawforth and Cartledge 31; Scholten 20). The hostility of the Aetolians and Boeotians
would keep Demetrius occupied in central Greece for the next several years, and
prevented him from capitalizing on Lysimachus’ disastrous campaign against the Getae
(see below ns. 39.6.2, 39.6.3).
39.2.3 ἐπαρθέντες οἱ Βοιωτοί: The dating of the two Boeotian revolts (on the second,
see ns. 39.6.3, 40.5.4) is a matter of some controversy, but if Plutarch preserves the
proper sequence of events they must both be placed between Demetrius’ annexation of
Thessaly in 293 (see above, n. 39.1.1) and the celebration of the Pythian games in
Athens, securely dated to 290 (see below, n. 40.7.1; on the chronology of the revolts, cf.
Tarn [1913] 39–41; Beloch [1925] 248; Lévêque 136 n.1; Wehrli 174–76; Gullath 189–
91; Hammond and Walbank 219–21; Lund 97; Paschidis [2008] 312 n. 4). The first revolt
cannot antedate 293, since it was almost certainly in that year that Demetrius’ sudden
appearance at Chaeronea prompted the Boeotians to conclude an alliance with him (n.
39.1.3). Since the second revolt was prompted by Demetrius’ departure for Thrace,
generally dated to 292 (Lund 45; n. 39.6.3), the first should be dated either to late 293 or
early 292. On the shifting alliances of the Boeotians since the refoundation of the city by
Cassander in 316, see ns. 23.1, 23.2, 23.3.
39.2.4 Πείσιδος ἅµα τοῦ Θεσπιέως: Peisis son of Charias of Thespiai emerged as a
leader of the Boeotian koinon no later than 313 when Polemaeus, with significant
assistance from the Boeotians, expelled Cassander’s garrisons from Thebes and Oropus
(on Polemaeus, see above n. 2.2.1). Oropus was then restored to the Boeotians and the
grateful Oropians honored Peisis with a statue in recognition of his role in the liberation
of the city (I. Orop. 366 = IG IX I2 1: 170). An epigram at Delphi (CEG 2.789) celebrates
Peisis’ efforts on behalf of the liberation of Opous in Locris, an event that probably dates
to the same campaign (Diodorus [19.78.5] reports that Polemaeus besieged Cassander’s
garrison there, but fails to record the outcome; cf. Gullath 159; Paschidis [2008] 312 n.
3). The emergence of this former Antigonid collaborator as the leader of Boeotian
opposition to Demetrius is paradigmatic of the shift in Greek attitudes after the king
jettisoned the role of champion of Greek freedom. When he returned to mainland Greece
in 296 after an absence of six years, Demetrius, as Cassander had done before him, began
to install garrisons as a means of securing access to key cities. This process began with
the installation of garrisons in Athens and Piraeus in 295, but accelerated after Demetrius
arrogated the Macedonian throne once occupied by Cassander. Other prominent
Antigonid collaborators who eventually abandonded their support of Demetrius include

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the Athenian Olympiodorus (n. 46.2.1) and Xanthippus of Elateia (n. 39.1.3) Like
Cassander, Demetrius relied on the influence of local luminaries to maintain his
increasingly unpopular rule (Tarn [1913] 39–40; Hammond and Walbank 220; Paschidis
[2008] 313–14).
39.3.2 φοβηθεὶς ὑπεξῆλθεν ὁ Κλεώνυµος: After his hasty retreat from Boeotia,
Cleonymus falls out of the sources for more than a decade. Although he apparently led
Spartan forces with some success on Crete (I. Cret. 2.11.1) and at Troezen (Poly. 2.29.1)
and Messene (Paus. 3.24.1) in the early 270s, by 275 the maturity and increasing
assertion of Areus I seems to have driven Cleonymus into the arms of Pyrrhus (a scandal
involving Cleonymus’ wife Chilonis may also have played a role in this defection; Plut.
Pyrr. 26–27; Bradford 247; Spawforth and Cartledge 33). In 274 Pyrrhus invaded
Laconia, ostensibly to press the claim on the Agiad throne of his new protégé, but the
attempt to capture Sparta ended in failure, and Cleonymus is not heard from again.
39.4.1 φρουρὰν καὶ πραξάµενος πολλὰ χρήµατα: See below, n. 39.4.3.
39.4.2 ἐπιµελητὴν καὶ ἁρµοστὴν Ἱερώνυµον τὸν ἱστορικόν: The historian Hieronymus
of Cardia was probably an important source for the Demetrius as well as for Plutarch’s
biographies of Eumenes and Pyrrhus (on Hieronymus and Plutarch’s sources, see Intro.
40–56). The appointment of Hieronymus as military governor of Thebes (the title
epimeletes implies a military role [Hornblower 13 n. 43]) represents something of a
departure from the policy of Cassander, who attempted to control the Greek cities
through local tyrants and factions (see. e.g. n. 8.4.3), and Demetrius’ own recent actions,
most notably the appointments of Olympiodorus as eponymous archon in Athens and
Peisis as polemarch in Thespiae (ns. 39.2.4, 34.5.4). The recent alliance of the Aetolian
and Boeotian leagues (see above n. 39.2.2) was particularly threatening, and Demetrius
evidently felt it necessary to install one of his own trusted subordinates to oversee the city
rather than a local luminary. Although Thebes does not appear to have been formally re-
integrated into the Boeotian koinon by this point (Knoepfler [2001]; id. [2014] 70), it
seems clear that the city was the epicenter of Boeotian resistance and that Demetrius
viewed a quiescent Thebes as imperative for the maintenance of Antigonid hegemony in
central Greece (on Demetrius’ Boeotian policy see P. Treves “Jeronimo di Cardia e la
politica di Demerios Poliorcete,” Riv. Fil. 10 [1932] 194ff). Along with the installation of
Hieronymus, who was unable to prevent a second Boeotian uprising (39.6), Demetrius
may also have established a mint in Thebes about this time (on the coinage issued by this
mint see Newell [1927] 126–28, 130; Mørkholm 80, 86).
39.4.3 ἔδοξεν ἠπίως κεχρῆσθαι…ἀπέδειξεν: Plutarch’s contention that the terms
Demetrius imposed on Thebes after their first revolt were viewed as lenient may be
echoed by a fragment of Diodorus, in which Demetrius’ actions are described as generous
(προσηνέχθη τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς µεγαλοψύχως, 21.14.2), but the fragment is divorced
from its context and may refer to the second revolt (see below, ns. 40.2–6). It is highly
unlikely, however, that either account accurately reflects the sentiment of the Thebans,
who were forced to accept a military governor, a garrison and the imposition of a heavy
indemnity (39.4.1). In their relations with the Hellenistic kings the Greek poleis sought,
above all, to maintain internal autonomy and avoid occupation and the levying of tribute
(Paschidis [2008] 314): the terms handed down by Demetrius denied the Thebans all

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three. The accounts of both Plutarch and Diodorus almost certainly derive from
Hieronymus (Hornblower 13–15; Bosworth [2002] 171–73), Demetrius’ harmost and
epimeletes in Thebes, and may reflect the perspective of Peisis, who will certainly have
been eager to justify his choice to collaborate with Demetrius and minimize the severity
of the terms imposed on the Boeotians after their surrender (Paschidis [2008] 314). On
the other hand, Demetrius’ actions were certainly mild in comparison with those of
Alexander, who had destroyed the city after a revolt in 335. For Demetrius’ treatment of
the Thebans after taking the city for a second time, see below n. 40.6.1.
39.6.2 ἁλίσκεται Λυσίµαχος ὑπὸ Δροµιχαίτου: Dromichaetes was the leader of the
Getae, a powerful Thracian tribe traditionally occupying a territory stretching from the
Haemus Range to the Danube in what is now northeastern Bulgaria. In the second half of
the 4th century the Getai seem to have extended control over territory beyond the Danube,
for Alexander met and defeated a Getic force assembled on the north bank of the river in
335 (Arr. Anab. 1.3.5–4.5; Strabo 7.3.8). The Getic capital of Helis, mentioned by
Diodorus as the site of Lysimachus’ captivity and the only Getic stronghold he describes
as a polis (21.12.1), has been plausibly identified with the large, fortified settlement at
Sveshtari, less than 40 km south of the river (P. Delev, “Lysimachus, the Getae, and
Archaeology,” CQ 50.2 [2000] 396–400).
Lysimachus’ wars with the Getae are mentioned in a variety of ancient sources,
but the surviving accounts are incomplete and often contradictory. Two fragments of
Diodorus (21.11, 21.12) offer the most detailed account of the conflict and suggest two
separate campaigns, both of which ended ignominiously for Lysimachus. In the first,
Lysimachus’ son Agathocles was captured by the Getae, but later released in exchange
for the return of occupied territory. The second ended in a crushing defeat and the capture
of Lysimachus himself. After obtaining further territorial concessions, Dromichaetes
released the captive king. Pausanias adds that Dromochaetes married a daughter of
Lysimachus as one of the terms of the peace treaty that secured the release of Agathocles
(1.9.6), but suggests that the separate captures of Lysimachus and his son were variant
accounts of the same event. According to Polyaenus (7.25), Lysimachus invaded the
territory of the Getae with an army of 100,000 men, but was duped by a Thracian who
gained his trust by feigning desertion and convinced the king to lead his invasion force
into difficult terrain where it was proved impossible to obtain sufficient supplies (cf. Plut.
Mor. 126F where Lysimachus surrenders because he cannot obtain water). Dromichaetes
then attacked Lysimachus’ weakened force, routed them, and took Lysimachus prisoner.
39.6.3 Δηµητρίου κατὰ τάχος ἐξορµήσαντος ἐπὶ Θρᾴκην: Lysimachus’ failure to
intervene on behalf of the sons of Cassander when Demetrius seized the Macedonian
throne is explicitly linked to his war with the Getai (Just. 16.1.9), indicating that the Getic
campaign which ended with Lysimachus’ capture began at least as early as 294 (cf. Plut.
Pyrr. 6.6.2 where Lysimachus is said to have been “occupied”: Λυσίµαχος δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς
αὐτὸς µὲν ἦν ἐν ἀσχολίαις). Demetrius’ invasion of Thrace has been variously dated to
293, 292, or even 291, but the synchronization of the invasion with the second Boeotian
revolt makes 292 the most likely date. The first Boeotian revolt should probably be
placed in late 293 or early 292 (n. 39.1.3) making 293 too early for the second revolt,
while 291 is almost certainly too late: the second Boeotian revolt was crushed only after

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an extended siege, and Demetrius then went on to visit Corcyra and Leucas before
returning to Athens in the autumn of 290 (see below ns. 40.7.1, 40.8.1).
Lysimachus’ defeat and capture, as Plutarch observes, left his Thracian realm
without a king and denuded of defenders; Demetrius saw an opportunity to extend his
own burgeoning realm at the expense of his rival and seized it with characteristic alacrity.
His hopes were dashed by the sudden and unexpected release of Lysimachus. Ironically,
Dromichaetes’ release of Lysimachus may well have been prompted by Demetrius’
Thracian invasion: the elimination of Lysimachus removed any buffer between the Getic
king and Demetrius (Wehrli 175–76).
39.7.2 ἡττηµένους ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀντιγόνου µάχῃ τοὺς Βοιωτούς: This defeat of
the Boeotians is the first recorded independent command of Gonatas. If the Boeotian
cavalry leader Eugnotus of Akraephia fell in this battle, which is probable (P. Perdizet
BCH 24 [1900] 70; Tarn [1913] 40; Hammond and Walbank 200 n. 5), the victory was
hard won. The epigram inscribed on the base of his funerary monument describes bitter
fighting and records that Eugnotus was killed only after leading eighteen cavalry charges
(on the monument, see J. Ma, “The Many Lives of Eugnotos of Akraiphia,” Studi
Ellenistici 16 [2006] 141–191).
XL
40.1.1  Πύρρου δὲ Θεσσαλίαν κατατρέχοντος καὶ µέχρι Θερµοπυλῶν παραφανέντος
(Pyrrhus’ invasion of Thessaly—date and route): Pyrrhus’ annexation of Tymphaea and
Parauaea followed by Demetrius’ conquest of the remainder of Macedonia and all of
Thessaly in 294/3 meant that the two kings now occupied adjacent realms, a state of
affairs that generally resulted in hostility during the Diadoch period (5.1–2). Given the
restless bellicosity and expansionist tendencies of these particular neighbors, conflict was
inevitable (cf. Plut. Pyrr. 7.4). Indeed, the bonds that tied Demetrius to his former
protégé, weakened by the death of Deidameia (32.5), seem finally to have been severed
by Pyrrhus’ stint in Alexandria, where Ptolemy assumed the role of patron to the young
Epirote (n. 32.6.1).
Pyrrhus’ invasion of Thessaly marks the beginning of a protracted and episodic
conflict that ended only after Demetrius’ final departure for Asia in 286 (n. 46.4.2). If
Pyrrhus departed from Ambracia, he probably took the direct route through Athamania
and over the narrow pass to Gomphi on the western frontier of Thessaly (Hammond and
Walbank 220; on the pass separating Athamania from Thessaly, now known as the Portes
pass, see Livy 32.14.1; S. Oost, “Amynander, Athamania, and Rome,” CP 52 [1957] 1–
15). The raid cannot be dated precisely, but the route over the Pindus range is a difficult
one, impassable in winter, and the suggestion that Pyrrhus crossed into Thessaly at the
earliest opportunity in the spring of 291 is plausible (Hammond and Walbank 220; in the
Pyrrhus, Plutarch describes Pyrrhus ravaging Thessaly in similar terms [καταδροµαὶ τῆς
Θεσσαλίας ἐγεγόνεισαν; 7.3.2], but places the raid before Demetrius’ acclamation as
king of Macedonia: this is either an error or a reference to some otherwise unknown
episode).
40.2.1 ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ καταστήσας µυρίους ὁπλίτας καὶ χιλίους ἱππεῖς: These troops
must have been posted along the western approaches to Thessaly (Hammond and

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Walbank 221). Gomphi, which guards both the Portes pass (n. 40.1.1) and the Musaki
pass into Dolopia (Leake 519; cf. n 41.1.4), would have made an ideal base for troops
attempting to prevent incursions from Epirus.
40.2.4 ἑλέπολιν: On these mobile siege towers see above ns. 15.2.3, 20.7, 21.1.2, 21.3.2.
40.2.5 ὡς µόλις ἐν δυσὶ µησὶ δύο σταδίους προελθεῖν: The glacial pace of this siege
tower—one stade per month works out to approximately six meters per day—stands in
stark contrast to the apparent mobility of Demetrius’ siege towers in the assaults on
Salamis and Rhodes (see above ns. 15.2.3, 21.1.2, 21.3.2). Vitruvius (10.16.4–7)
describes an episode in which the defenders of Rhodes arrested the progress of
Demetrius’ helepolis by diverting sewage into its path: the ponderous tower sank into the
resulting muck. The dimensions he gives for the machine vary considerable from those
given for the helepolis at Rhodes by Diodorus and Athenaeus, however, and it is possible
that Vitruvius assigned an event that actually occurred during the siege of Thebes to the
far more famous siege of Rhodes (Campbell 87).
40.4.2 ἢ διάµετρον ὀφείλεις τοῖς ἀποθνῄσκουσιν: Antigonus had conducted siege
operations independently when his father had departed for Thrace (39.6–7). After
Demetrius’ return, Gonatas evidently retained responsibility for the commissariat.
Notable here is the appearance of the noun diametron in its exceedingly rare sense of
“rations.” The word in this sense is found nowhere else in the Lives, suggesting that
Plutarch is quoting directly from his source. It is quite possible that Plutarch drew the
exchange from the eyewitness account of Hieronymus (so Hornblower 229), who had
been appointed military governor of Boeotia after the first siege of Thebes (39.4), but was
unable to prevent a second Boeotian rebellion. The favorable light in which the anecdote
casts Antigonus suggests a graceful compliment from Hieronymus to his patron, and the
implicit criticism of Demetrius is attenuated by his subsequent decision to fight
conspicuously alongside his soldiers (40.5), and the clemency he shows the defeated
Thebans (n. 40.6.1; for other possibly Hieronymean passages that showcase the virtues of
Gonatas, see Pyrr. 31.4, 34.7–11; cf. Hammond and Walbank 221 n. 2).
40.5.3 διελαύνεται τὸν τράχηλον ὀξυβελεῖ: The second such wound sustained by
Demetrius: another catapult bolt pierced his jaw before Messene in 296 (33.4). On the
possible cumulative effects of Demetrius’ various injuries, see n. 52.5.2.
40.5.4 εἷλε τὰς Θήβας πάλιν (Chronology of the second fall of Thebes): The second
siege of Thebes was a protracted affair, dragging on for at least two months after
Demetrius chased Pyrrhus from Thessaly in the spring of 291 (n. 40.1.1; the advance of
the helepolis occupied two months, n. 40.2.5). Since additional time must be allotted for
Demetrius’ injury and subsequent recovery (40.5.3), it follows that Thebes did not fall
until the fall of 291, at the very earliest.
40.6.1 παρελθὼν ἀνάτασιν µὲν καὶ φόβον ὡς τὰ δεινότατα πεισοµένοις παρέσχεν,
ἀνελὼν δὲ τρισκαίδεκα καὶ µεταστήσας τινάς, ἀφῆκε τοὺς ἄλλους (The clemency of
Demetrius after the second fall of Thebes): The terror of the Thebans mirrors that of the
Athenians after their own city fell to Demetrius in 295 (34.5). In both instances,
Demetrius quickly allayed the worst fears of the captured. Two fragments of Diodorus
give mildly conflicting accounts of Demetrius’ treatment of the Thebans after the siege.

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The first (21.14.1), which is explicitly connected to the aftermath of the second siege,
states that he put ten Thebans to death; the second (21.14.2), which may refer to either of
the sieges of Thebes (39.25), puts the number of executed at fourteen. The nature of the
regime Demetrius imposed on Thebes after the second revolt was put down is uncertain,
but his restoration of the Theban politeia in 288 (n. 46.1.2; cf. Roesch [1982] 436–38;
Hammond and Walbank 221; Knoepfler [2014] 70) indicates that it was certainly not
democratic.
40.6.3 ταῖς µὲν οὖν Θήβαις οὔπω δέκατον οἰκουµέναις ἔτος ἁλῶναι δὶς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ
συνέπεσε (Thebes after its destruction by Alexander): Plutarch’s chronology seems prima
facie to be confused: Cassander began the restoration of Thebes in 316 (Diod. 19.52.1;
Paus. 9.7.1; 7.6.9), some twenty-five years before Demetrius took the city for the second
time. But an inscription recording contributions to the rebuilding of the city (IG VII 2419
= Syll.3 337; a new fragment of the inscription has recently been published by K.
Buraselis [2014]) indicates that the reconstruction of the city was a lengthy process
extending over a period of many years (on this process, see Knoepfler [2001]). Among
the donors was Demetrius himself. The donation, a considerable sum for the provision of
olive oil for the gymnasium, must postdate 306, since Demetrius is given the royal title
(IG VII 2419 = Syll.3 337, l. 32), and probably took place when he arrived in Boeotia
from Rhodes in 304 (n. 23.2.3). If M. Holleaux’s restoration (l. 32) of πὰρ Ῥοδ[ίων
λαφύρον] is correct, Demetrius’ donation came from booty taken during the ultimately
unsuccessful siege of Rhodes. The gift can thus be seen in the context of Demetrius’
ongoing propaganda war with his rivals, as the rival kings sought to present themselves
as the champions of the Greek cities (Buraselis [2014] 165). By directing some of the
spoils of the siege of Rhodes to the rebuilding of Thebes, Demetrius sought to minimize
the propaganda blow brought about by the Rhodian campaign and burnish his reputation
as a founder and protector of Greek cities.
40.7.1 Τῶν δὲ Πυθίων καθηκόντων: A penteric festival celebrated in the third year of
an Olympic cycle and lasting five days, the antiquity and prestige of the Pythian games
were exceeded only by those of Olympia among the panhellenic festivals (Miller [2006]
96; cf. 11.1; Dem. 9.32). The festival was celebrated in the Delphic month Boukatios
(CIG 1688), roughly equivalent to Attic Metageitnion (August/September; on the date,
see A. Mommsen, Delphika [Leipzig: 1878] 154–63). If Demetrius preserved the
traditional date for the games, as Plutarch suggests, the Pythian festival was celebrated at
Athens in August or September, 290. This is the one reliable fixed point after Demetrius’
acclamation as king of Macedon in the autumn of 294 (n. 37.2.3), and the chronological
framework for any historical narrative of the period must be fashioned accordingly.
After the second fall of Thebes (40.5.4), and before Demetrius returned to Athens
in 290 (see below infra and n. 40.8.1), he briefly turned his attention to the Ionian island
of Corcyra. This island was seized by the Sicilian king Agathocles in 297 (Diod. 21.2),
and acquired by Pyrrhus two years later when he married Agathocles’ daughter Lanassa,
who brought both Corcyra and neighboring Leucas as her dowry (Plut. Pyrr. 9.2). A few
years later, however, envoys from Lanassa or her father approached Demetrius, offering
him both Corcyra and her hand in marriage (Plut. Pyrr. 10.5; Athen. 6.253C). According
to Plutarch the move was prompted by Lanassa’s distaste for Pyrrhus’ polygamy and the
affection he showered on his barbarian wives. If so, her choice of a notorious philanderer

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as a substitute spouse was a singularly odd one, and the marriage proposal should
probably be seen in the context of her father’s shifting foreign policy objectives rather
than Lanassa’s dissatisfaction with Pyrrhus (Lévêque 139-40; Wehrli 176; Hammond and
Walbank 223; for the view that Lanassa approached Demetrius of her own accord and for
personal reasons, see Seibert [1969] 108). At some point after affairs in Boeotia were
settled, probably in autumn of 291 or early spring 290 (see above n. 40.5.4), Demetrius
sailed for the Ionian islands to accept the offer. He married Lanassa, gained control not
only of Corcyra but also of Leucas, and returned to Athens, probably in time to celebrate
the Pythian Games in the late summer of 290, certainly in time for the Eleusinian
Mysteries the following month, since Demochares confirms that Demetrius arrived for
the festival after marrying Lanassa (Demochares ap. Athen. 6.253C); for varied
reconstructions of the chronology cf. Ferguson [1911] 141; Tarn [1913] 48; Lévêque 141;
Wehrli 177; Hammond and Walbank 223; Green [1990] 126–27; Habicht [1997] 92;
Tracy [2003] 44–5). It is just possible that Demetrius did not depart for Corcyra until
after the celebration of the Pythian games in the late summer of 290, but such a late
departure demands the compression of the voyage from Athens to Corcyra and Leucas
and back into a period of only a few weeks. His point of departure is unknown, but since
he was already in Boeotia he almost certainly sailed from one of the ports he controlled
on the Gulf of Corinth—Creusis, Aegosthena, Pagae, or Lechaeum are all plausible
candidates—and not from Athens or Macedon (pace Hammond and Walbank 223), either
of which would entail a much longer and more perilous voyage around the Peloponnese.
The marriage offered Demetrius a number of advantages, both short and long
term. With the recalcitrant Boeotians quiet for the moment, Pyrrhus and the Aetolians
presented the most pressing threats to Demetrius’ hegemony in Greece, and Corcyra and
Leucas were ideal staging grounds for attacks on either hostile power (cf. Polyb. 5.3–4).
Nor should the possibility that Demetrius relished the opportunity to wound Pyrrhus, his
protégé turned rival, on a more personal level be discarded (Green [1990] 127; cf. Plut.
Pyrr. 10.7). The Ionian islands controlled the trade routes between Corinth and the Greek
cities of southern Italy and Sicily and also provided outposts from which a western
expedition might one day be launched (Ferguson [1911] 141; Treves 171–72; Marasco
[1984] 69–70, 72–74). In the meantime Demetrius and Agathocles cemented their
friendship and alliance (φιλίαν συνθέσθαι καὶ συµµαχίαν, Diod. 21.15.1) with an
exchange of ambassadors (Diodorus states further that Demetrius’ envoy, Oxythemis of
Larissa, was dispatched to gather intelligence for a future Sicilian expedition; on
Oxythemis see above n. 36.9.1). Demetrius may also have established contact with Rome
at about this time. According to Strabo (5.3.5), Demetrius sent an embassy to remonstrate
with the Romans after he captured some Italian pirates operating in Greek waters. He
returned the prisoners, citing the kinship of Greeks and Romans (διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς
Ἕλληνας συγγένειαν), but censured the Romans for honoring the Greek Dioscuri while
sponsoring piratical attacks on their homeland (on this episode see Bispham 234–43; cf.
Tarn [1913] 48 n. 22; relations between Demetrius and Rome might also have been
established in 292 when the Romans, seeking divine relief from a prolonged attack of
plague, sent an embassy to the sanctuary of Asclepius in Epidaurus: Val. Max. 1.8; Ovid
Met. 15.622-7444; Livy 10.47; Plut. Mor. 286D). Demetrius’ plan to cut a canal through
the Isthmus of Corinth may be further evidence of the Besieger’s increasing interest in
facilitating access to the West (so Tarn [1913] 48), but Pliny’s description (HN 4.4) of the

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endeavor provides no historical context from which a date might be adduced. According
to Strabo (1.13.11), Demetrius’ engineers warned that disastrous flooding would attend
the cutting of the canal on account of the differing sea levels of the Saronic and
Corinthian Gulfs and the project was never begun. The successful completion of the
Corinth Canal in the late 19th century AD proved that Demetrius’ engineers were
incorrect.
πρᾶγµα καινότατον: Plutarch himself had an intimate and abiding relationship with the
sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. By his own account he served as epimeletes of the
Amphictyonic Council and agonothete of the Pythian games (Mor. 785C), and an
inscription (CIG 1713 = CID 4.150) confirms his term as epimeletes and indicates that he
held an important priesthood during the reign of Hadrian (for Plutarch’s diplomatic
efforts on behalf of the town and sanctuary, see esp. P. Stadter, “Plutarch: Diplomat for
Delphi?,” in L. de Blois, J. Bons, T. Kessels, and D. Schenkeveld [eds.] The Statesman in
Plutarch’s Works [Leiden: 2004] 19–31). After his death, a statue of Plutarch was set up
in Delphi at the behest of the Delphians and the citizens of his hometown Chaeronea
(CID 4.151). The reaction of this expert in Delphic ritual to Demetrius’ decision to
preside over a rival celebration of the Pythian Games in Athens is thus of considerable
interest, and scholars have detected disapproval in his characterization of the act as a
pragma kainotaton (Parker [1996] 268 n.53; Mikalson [1998] 98; Mari 90 n. 38). The
celebration of the Pythia in Athens did indeed mark a “most unprecedented event” in that
Demetrius’ response to his exclusion from the Delphic festival was entirely novel (see
below n. 40.8.2), and Plutarch’s resistance to the alteration of traditional ritual is well-
established (see Intro. 15). But Plutarch’s language here is ambiguous and hardly
amounts to an explicit condemnation. On two other occasions in the Lives, both in Roman
contexts, Plutarch describes an event as kainotaton: Catiline’s disgraceful role in the
death of his own brother (Sulla 32.2), and the glorious dedication of the spolia opima by
Marcellus (Marc. 8.1).
40.8.1 ἐπεὶ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ τὰ περὶ Δελφοὺς στενὰ κατεῖχον: The pass in question is the
eastern approach to Parnassus through southern Phocis. Aetolian control of this pass
suggests that they had annexed at least a portion of Phocis, and a treaty between the
Aetolians and Boeotians dating to 292 (or perhaps a bit earlier, see above n. 39.2.2) that
mentions “the Phocians who are with the Aetolians” (Φωκεῦσιν τοῖς µετ' Αἰτωλῶν;
SIG3 366.10) confirms that part of the region was subject to Aetolian control (McInerney
242; cf. Grainger [1999] 91; Demetrius does not seem to have been opposed by the
Aetolians, or anyone else, when he marched through northern Phocis and garrisoned
Elateia a few years earlier; see above n. 39.1.3). It is generally assumed that the Aetolians
had also seized the temenos of Apollo by this time (Flacelière 68; Habicht [1979] 34;
Osborne [1982] 158) although there is no explicit evidence for Aetolian occupation of
Delphi itself (Grainger [1999] 91). Despite a clause in their treaty with the Boeotians
calling for joint military action, the Aetolians did not intervene on behalf of their allies
during either of Demetrius’ campaigns in Boeotia in the period 293–91 (see above ns. 39;
40), but when Demetrius departed for Corcyra in 291/0 (on the date see above n. 40.7.1)
the Aetolians staged raids deep into Antigonid territory, penetrating as far as Eleusis
(Ferguson [1911] 141–42). The attack on Eleusis was driven off by the combined efforts
of Athenian troops and the Macedonian garrison (on the epigraphical evidence for the

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attack see Tracy [2003] 38–43), but the ithyphallic hymn with which Demetrius was
greeted when he returned to Athens in 290 demonstrates that the Aetolian menace was a
source of continuing anxiety for Athenians.
The hymn commemorates Demetrius’ presence in Athens at the time of “the
sacred mysteries of Kore” (τὰ σεµνὰ τῆς Κόρης µυστήρια, Athen. 6.253D), almost
certainly the celebration of the Greater Mysteries in the Attic month Boedromion
(September/October; on the performance of the hymn at the time of the Mysteries see
Flacelière 65 n. 1; Chaniotis [2011] 161; Versnel 448 n. 40; the suggestion that the hymn
was sung at the Pythian Games held in Athens in 290 and not the Mysteries [so Lévêque
142 n. 7] seems untenable given the explicit reference to τὰ σεµνὰ τῆς Κόρης
µυστήρια). The year in which the hymn was performed, however, remains controversial,
with most scholars opting for either 291/0 or 290/89 (on the date, see Ferguson [1911]
143; Flacelière 65; Lévêque 139–42; Wehrli 176–79; Marasco [1984] 200; Habicht
[1997] 192; Scholten 22; Kolde [2003] 382–84; Mari 89; Green [2003] 260 n.11; Tracy
[2003] 44; Kuhn 279; on the Eleusinian Mysteries see above ns. 26.1–4). The earlier date
creates an interval of nearly a year without any recorded events, from the Greater
Mysteries of 291/90 to the Pythian Games of 290/89, but this is hardly grounds for its
rejection given the fragmentary state of the evidence for the period. On the other hand,
placing the hymn in 291 does demand an unfeasible, if not impossible, compression of
events, since Demetrius likely did not depart to wed Lanassa until late in 291 at the very
earliest (see above n. 40.7.1), and Demochares (ap. Athen. 6.253C) confirms that the
hymn was performed after he returned from Corcyra and Leucas, perhaps accompanied
by his new bride (it is often assumed that she was with him, but Demochares does not
actually confirm her presence: ἐπανελθόντα δὲ τὸν Δηµήτριον ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος καὶ
Κερκύρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδέχοντο). Accordingly, the hymn must have
been performed at the Mysteries of 290/89, only a month after we know Demetrius was
present in Athens for the celebration of the Pythian Games (see below n. 40.8.2).
The text of the hymn is summarized by Demochares (apud Athen. 6.253C) and
preserved by Duris of Samos (ap. Athen. 6.253D-F; on Duris, see Intro. 49–52). It begins
with a reference to the synchronous arrivals of Demetrius and Demeter (ll. 1–6) and goes
on to associate the divine king with a number of gods, liken him to the sun, and celebrate
his presence, beauty, affability, and power (ll. 7–20; on the many cosmic and divine
associations in the hymn see above n. 13.1.3). The hymn then takes a decidedly terrestrial
turn, imploring Demetrius to demonstrate this power and benevolence by destroying the
Aetolians (ll. 21–34):
πρῶτον µὲν εἰρήνην ποίησον, φίλτατε·
κύριος γὰρ εἶ σύ.
τὴν δ' οὐχὶ Θηβῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν,
Αἰτωλὸς ὅστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήµενος,
ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιά,
τὰ σώµαθ' ἡµῶν πάντ' ἀναρπάσας φέρει,

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 κοὐκ ἔχω µάχεσθαι·
Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
νῦν δὲ καὶ τὰ πόρρω
µάλιστα µὲν δὴ σχόλασον αὐτός· εἰ δὲ µή,
Οἰδίπουν τιν' εὑρέ,
τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἢ κατακρηµνιεῖ
ἢ σποδὸν ποιήσει.
First of all give us peace, O dearest god -
For you are lord of peace -
And crush for us yourself, for you've the power,
This odious Sphinx;
Which now destroys not Thebes alone, but Greece -
The whole of Greece -
I mean the Aetolian, who, like her of old,
Sits on a rock,
And tears and crushes all our wretched bodies.
Nor can we him resist.
For the Aetolians plunder all their neighbours;
And now they stretch afar
Their lion hands; but crush them, mighty lord,
Or send some Oedipus
Who shall this Sphinx hurl down from off his precipice,
Or starve him justly.
The Sphinx of legend once terrorized Thebes, but the new Aetolian Sphinx represents a
far greater threat. The claim that the Aetolians are “lording it over all Greece” (ὅλης τῆς
Ἑλλάδος…περικρατοῦσαν) is prima facie a gross exaggeration of their power (so
Flacelière 65), but the charge is perfectly intelligible in light of their recent disruption of
the panhellenic Pythian Games. The Aetolians also seem to have raided Attica at this
time: the condemnation of the Aetolian seizure of Athenians that follows (τὰ σώµαθ'
ἡµῶν πάντ' ἀναρπάσας φέρει) is probably a reference to a recent attack on Eleusis (the
evidence is an Eleusinian inscription indicating that the Athenians and Demetrius’
garrison at Eleusis cooperated to fight off the attack [SEG 24.156]; on this episode, see
Tracy [2003] 44). The following year (289) Demetrius invaded Aetolia, ravaged the
territory of the Aetolians, and secured a peace that guaranteed access to Apollo’s
sanctuary at Delphi for all (see below n. 41.1.4)
40.8.2 ἐν Ἀθήναις αὐτὸς ἦγε τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν (The Pythian Game in
Athens and the political exploitation of panhellenic festivals): The stephanitic festivals
are justly celebrated for their promotion of panhellenic fellow feeling, but their prestige
and popularity lent them extraordinary propaganda value which could be exploited for
political purposes. The festival sites were filled with monuments celebrating the military
victory of one Greek state over another (for one example, see above n. 13.1.2), and
politically motivated bans and boycotts of the festivals were not infrequent. The

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Athenians themselves were no strangers to such activity, having withheld their customary
deputation to Delphi for the Pythian Games of 346 in protest of the settlement that
concluded the 3rd Sacred War and the selection of Philip II as agonothete (Diod. 16.60;
M. Scott, Delphi: A History of the Center of the Ancient World [Princeton: 2014] 155). In
debarring Demetrius from the Pythian Games of 290, the Aetolians acted in a venerable
tradition of exploiting control of a festival site to exclude a rival. The citizens of Elis
were permanently excluded from the Isthmian Games (the ban was of such long standing
that Pausanias [5.2.1–2] adduces a mythological aition involving a transgression of
Heracles); the Eleans, allies of Athens, charged the Spartans with violating the sacred
truce and banned them from the Olympic Games in 420 (Thuc. 5.49; Paus. 6.2.2); the
Isthmian festival was celebrated twice consecutively by rival Corinthian factions in 390
(Xen. Hell. 4.5.1–2); in 364 the Argives seized Olympia and usurped the Elean privilege
of administering the games, an act that led to armed conflict in the Altis, even as the
athletes competed in the pentathlon (Xen. Hell. 7.4.28; for the crimes of Demetrius’
cousin Telesphorus at Olympia in 312, see n. 2.2.1).
Demetrius’ reaction to this time honored provocation, however, was entirely
novel (πρᾶγµα καινότατον; n. 40.7.1). Holding a concurrent and competing Pythian
festival in Athens allowed those debarred from Delphi to celebrate the traditional rites
and enjoy the athletic and musical competitions. It is unclear if the Aetolians denied
access to the sanctuary to anyone other than Demetrius and the Athenians, or if
Demetrius’ festival in Athens was able to attract attendees at the expense of its Delphic
rival, but the Athenian festival infrastructure was certainly capable of accommodating
large crowds. In particular, both the theatre of Dionysus and the Odeion of Pericles were
admirably well-suited as venues for the musical contests that were an integral component
of the Pythian slate of competitive events (the musical competitions of the Pythian
Games were performed in the theatre at Delphi, but those of the Athenian Panathenaea
took place in the Odeion of Pericles; see Plut. Per. 13). In fact, the penteric Great
Panathenaea had just been celebrated in Athens the month before (J. Shear [2001] 583).
The beginning of 290/89 featured what was surely one of the most remarkable
convergences of great festivals in Greek history, with panhellenic events held in Athens
in each of the first three months of the year: the Great Panathenaea in Hekatombaion
(July/August), the Pythian Games in Metageitnion (August/September), and the Great
Mysteries in Boedromion (September/October).
The festival in Athens served as a potent protest against the Aetolian occupation
of Delphi. In debarring their enemies, the Aetolians deprived the Delphic Pythia of its
fundamental panhellenic character; the rival Athenian festival cast their transgression of
sacred and cherished tradition in sharp relief (Ferguson [1911] 144; Flacelière 76;
Hammond and Walbank 224; Kuhn 272). Philip II had ejected the Phocians from Delphi
and presided over the Pythian Games of 346 (Diod. 16.60; cf. Dem. 9.32); in presiding
over his own Pythian festival in Athens, Demetrius hoped to galvanize support for a
campaign to expel the Aetolians. In this he was evidently successful. The decree of
Dromocleides that called on the Athenians to seek an oracle from Demetrius on the
matter of an Athenian dedication at Delphi threatened by the Aetolian occupation of the
sanctuary must date to precisely this period (see above n. 13.1.3). So too does the
ithyphallic hymn, performed the following month when Demetrius returned to Athens for

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the celebration of the Greater Mysteries, which closes with a passionate appeal for the
destruction of the Aetolians (on the hymn, see ns. 2.3.6, 12,1,2, 13.1.3, 40.8.1). The
chronological propinquity of festival, hymn, and decree is striking, suggesting a
concerted effort on the part of Demetrius and his supporters to cast the imminent Aetolian
campaign as a sacred war and Demetrius as the savior of Delphi (see below n. 41.1.4).
40.8.3 ὡς δὴ προσῆκον αὐτόθι µάλιστα τιµᾶσθαι τὸν θεόν, οἷς καὶ πατρῷός ἐστι καὶ
λέγεται τοῦ γένους ἀρχηγός: The Pythian festival was inextricably tied to Apollo
Pythios and his sanctuary at Delphi, and staging the festival in Athens amounted to a
profound dislocation (Kuhn 270–71). The Athenian Pythia could be justified in political
terms by the Aetolian occupation of Delphi, but Demetrius evidently felt it necessary to
produce mythological legitimization as well. The genealogical myth that makes Apollo
Pythios the ancestral god (πατρῷός) of the Athenians and progenitor of the Ionians
(γένους ἀρχηγός) found dramatic expression in Euripides’ Ion (Mikalson [1998] 98),
and there were cults of both Apollo Patroös and Apollo Pythios in Athens (the one in the
Agora, the other near the Ilissos river; see C. Hedrick, “The Temple and Cult of Apollo
Patroos in Athens.” AJA 92 [1988], 185–210; S. Lambert, The Phratries of Attica [Ann
Arbor: 1993] 211–17). Demetrius may also have cited his own connections with Apollo
Pythios—the decree of Dromocleides according him oracular status assimilated
Demetrius to that god (n.13.1.3)—as further justification for the festival.

XLI
41.1.1 Ἐντεῦθεν ἐπανελθὼν εἰς Μακεδονίαν: Demetrius was occupied in southern
Greece in the late summer and early autumn of 290/89, most notably in Athens where he
presided over the Pythian Games and was greeted with an ithyphallic hymn at the Great
Mysteries. The staging of the former in Athens and the call to arms that concluded the
hymn at the latter suggested that a campaign to eject the Aetolians from Delphi was
imminent (see above n. 40.8.2), but with the year waning the campaign was delayed until
the following spring (on the date and the campaign see below ns. 41.1.4, 41.2.1).
Demetrius instead moved north to winter in Macedonia, where he had spent very little
time since his coronation in the autumn of 294. Indeed, from early 293 to late 290
Demetrius was active in Boeotia, Thessaly, Thrace, Corcyra, and Attica, but there is no
indication that he was ever present in Macedonia.
καὶ µήτ'αὐτὸς ἄγειν…πολυπράγµονας ὄντας: Elsewhere, Plutarch (Pyrr. 12.8.6)
describes the restless nature of Pyrrhus in nearly identical language (ὅλως αὐτὸς οὐκ εὖ
πρὸς ἡσυχίαν πεφυκώς), and claims that he too observed that his Macedonian troops
were far better disposed when on campaign than when idle (βελτίοσι χρώµενος τοῖς
Μακεδόσι στρατευοµένοις ἢ σχολάζουσι). There is doubtless a degree of truth
underpinning the topos, but the events of 290 demonstrate that political and religious
motivations were the driving forces behind the expedition, not caprice (see above n.
40.8.2; cf. Flacelière 73–77; Wehrli 179; Hammond and Walbank 225; Bosworth [2002]
250).

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41.1.4 ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ' Αἰτωλούς: The invasion of Aetolia was probably launched in
the spring of 289 (Flacelière 7; Lévêque 144; Wehrli 179; Hammond and Walbank 224;
Habicht [1997] 94), but the extent of Demetrius’ Aetolian ambitions, the route he took
from Macedonia, and the events of the subsequent Aetolian campaign are nowhere
specified. Nor surprisingly, the lamentable state of the evidence has led to considerable
scholarly controversy and conjectural reconstructions that are frequently at odds with one
another on crucial details. Arguments in favor of any of the several possible routes
Demetrius may have utilized to reach Aetolia from Macedonia follow from the aims
attributed to him in launching the campaign. Those who hold that the primary target of
the expedition was not Aetolia but Epirus have suggested that he moved south as far as
Malis and then followed the Spercheius valley west past the site of modern Karpenisi and
into the northern cantons of Aetolia, where he paused briefly to ravage the land before
moving into Epirus (so Lévêque 144–45; Hammond and Walbank 224; Grainger [1995]
314). Flacelière, who argues that Demetrius pursued a more ambitious agenda in the area
of Pleuron on the Gulf of Corinth (77 n. 3), follows Beloch and posits an even more
southerly route via the valleys of the Cephisus and Daphnus rivers, debouching in the
area of Naupactus (Beloch [1925] 228 n. 1; Flacelière 77). Regardless of the campaign’s
primary objectives, the most direct and least treacherous route for an army marching from
Macedonia follows the valley of the Kampylos (modern Megdovas) from Gomphi in
southwestern Thessaly (on the strategic importance of Gomphi, see above ns. 40.1.1,
40.2.1) through Dolopia and Eurytania to western Aetolia (Scholten 48 n.63). This was
the route taken by Cassander when he invaded Aetolia in 313 (Diod. 19.67.3), and it
seems probable that Demetrius, not for the first time, followed the precedent of his late
rival (cf. n. 28.2.1).
41.2.1 τὴν χώραν κακώσας…  οὐκ ὀλίγον ἀπολιπών: In the Pyrrhus, Plutarch gives a
variant account of the campaign in which Demetrius defeats the Aetolians (Δηµήτριος
µὲν ἐπ' Αἰτωλοὺς στρατευσάµενος καὶ κρατήσας; 7.4.3–4), but it is highly unlikely
that the Aetolians risked a pitched battle (Flacelière 77–78 n. 2; Hammond and Walbank
224 n. 5; Grainger [1999] 91). When Demetrius entered Aetolia with a large army, the
Aetolians probably withdrew to the many mountain redoubts the rugged landscape of the
region affords, just as they had when faced with Macedonian invasions led by Craterus
and Antipater in 322 (Diod. 18.24–25), and Cassander’s son Philip in 313 (Diod.
19.74.6). Philip was content to withdraw from the region after crushing the Epirote king
Aeacides and his Aetolian allies, but Antipater and Craterus, at the head of an army of
30,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Aetolia.
When the Aetolians withdrew to their mountain strongholds, the Macedonians simply
constructed shelters and waited for winter snows or dwindling supplies to force the hand
of their foes. According to Diodorus (18.25.2), the Macedonian occupation presented the
Aetolians with a grim choice: “they had either to come down from their mountains and
fight against forces numbering many times their own and against famous generals, or to
remain and be utterly destroyed by want and cold.” The subjugation of Aetolia was
imminent when Antigonus arrived bearing word of Perdiccas’ designs on supremacy in
Asia, and the Macedonians abruptly withdrew. Antipater and Craterus both died before
they could fulfill their vow to complete the conquest of Aetolia and transfer the
population “to the most distant desert of Asia” (Diod. 18.25.5), but Plutarch’s brief

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account of the Aetolian campaign of 289 suggests that Demetrius was emulating their
tactics (cf. Bosworth [2002] 251).
The mention of ravaging the land (τὴν χώραν κακώσας) indicates that
Demetrius proceeded down the Megdovas and Acheloos valleys into the fertile plains
scattered throughout lower Aetolia, for the rugged north would afford precious little
scope for agricultural devastation (on the topography of Aetolia, W. J. Woodhouse,
Aetolia; its geography, topography, and antiquities [Oxford: 1897] 3–8 remains
fundamental; see also N.G.L Hammond, Epirus: The Geography, the Ancient Remains,
the History, and the Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas [Oxford: 1967] 145;
Bommeljé, Doorn, et al., 13–23). There may have been some preliminary skirmishes in
which Demetrius had the upper hand (perhaps the basis for the account in the Pyrrhus),
but if the Aetolians soon retreated to the mountains in the face of his advance, as seems
likely, the substantial occupation force he left under Pantauchus (n. 41.3.3) was meant to
keep them there until the privations of winter forced them to give battle or come to terms.
After the retreat of the Aetolians, Demetrius was confident enough in his position to
detach part of his army for an attack on Epirus (see below n 41.3.1.)
41.3.1 Πύρρον αὐτὸς ἐχώρει, καὶ Πύρρος ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον: Pyrrhus’ willingness to march to
the rescue of the Aetolians is no surprise: there is no evidence for a formal alliance
between Epirus and Aetolia, but Demetrius’ presence west of the Pindus range threatened
all of northwestern Greece, and cooperation against a mutual enemy was a natural
response to the invasion (Grainger [1999] 92; cf. Hammond and Walbank 224).
Demetrius’ invasion of Epirus with only part of his army, on the other hand, is less
readily explained, particularly if he sought a decisive encounter with Pyrrhus. The total
strength of the army Demetrius led into Aetolia in 289 is unknown, but it is possible that
he entered Epirus with an army that was numerically superior to that of Pyrrhus, even
without the occupation force that remained in Aetolia under Pantauchus (it has been
estimated that Pyrrhus could mobilize a force of 16,000 to 18,000 men, excluding
mercenaries; Tarn [1913] 425; on Pantauchus, see n. 41.3.3). Still, it seems more likely
that Demetrius simply staged a raid into Epirus in an attempt to wound Pyrrhus and
provide some of his troops with an opportunity for enrichment rather than engage his
entire army in the waiting game in Aetolia (see above n. 41.2.1). The decision recalls
Demetrius’ actions in 307 when he left behind a force to continue the investment of
Munychia while he led an expedition into the Megarid (see above n. 9.4.4).
ἀλλήλων δὲ διαµαρτόντες, ὁ µὲν ἐπόρθει τὴν Ἤπειρον: If Demetrius’ incursion was
merely a raiding expedition predicated upon the element of surprise (see above n. 41.3.1),
he almost certainly chose an inland route to Epirus, perhaps marching northwest up the
Inachos valley and then west into the plain of Ambracia, rather than following the well-
trodden coastal road (Lévêque 145 n. 3, assuming that Pyrrhus was the primary target of
the western expedition and that Demetrius did not pursue an active policy in lower
Aetolia, sends him on a meandering route much farther to the north; cf. Hammond and
Walbank 224). It must have been the latter route that Pyrrhus took on his southeast march
from Ambracia to Aetolia via Amphilochian Argos, Lymphaea, and Stratus, with the
result that the two armies missed each other entirely (Lévêque 145; cf. A.R. Burn,
“Helikon in History: A Study in Greek Mountain Topography,” BSA 44 [1949], 314). In
the Pyrrhus (7.5), Plutarch claims that Pyrrhus set out for Aetolia when he received word

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of Demetrius’ advance, but the two armies did not collide “since a mistake occurred
along the route” (γενοµένης δὲ διαµαρτίας καθ' ὁδὸν). Pyrrhus’ intelligence may have
been faulty, but it was still far superior to that of Demetrius, who evidently had not the
slightest notion of Pyrrhus’ movements. Meeting no resistance when he arrived in Epirus,
Demetrius proceeded to ravage the countryside rather than hasten back to aid the
Aetolian arm of his force. The intelligence failure would prove disastrous.
41.3.3 Πανταύχῳ: The identification of Pantauchus as the homonymous officer
mentioned by Arrian (Ind. 18.6) as a trierarch in Alexander’s fleet on the Hydaspes
nearly forty years before (Beloch [1925] 228 n. 1; F. Sandberger, Prosopographie zur
Geschichte des Pyrrhus [Stuttgart: 1970] 175–77 n. 64) is highly unlikely—Pyrrhus
would not have summoned up visions of Alexander for Demetrius’ awestruck troops by
dispatching an old man in single combat. In the Greco-Macedonian tradition names
frequently recur in alternate generations: perhaps Pantauchus was the grandson of
Alexander’s officer. On Pantauchus, see Berve ii. 298 no. 604; cf. Lévêque 144 n. 2;
Heckel (2006) 189.
περιπεσὼν καὶ µάχην συνάψας…ἐτρέψατο: In the Pyrrhus (7.7–7.9), Plutarch
describes this duel in Homeric terms (J.M. Mossman, “Plutarch, Pyrrhus, and
Alexander,” in Stadter [1992] 95; Bosworth [2002] 253–54; on the characteristic features
of Homeric battle, see B. Fenik, Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad: Studies in the
Narrative Techniques of Homeric Battle Descriptions [Wiesbaden: 1968]). After hurling
their spears, the two engage at close range with swords. Pyrrhus receives a wound, but
inflicts two on his opponent, who is pulled to safety by his friends before Pyrrhus can
administer the fatal blow. Plutarch gives Pyrrhus no fewer than four aristeiai in his Life
(7.4–5, 22.5–6, 24.1–4 and 30.5; on these episodes, see G.W. Adams, “The
Representation of Heroic Episodes in Plutarch's Life of Pyrrhus,” Anistoriton 12 [2011]
1–14); Demetrius is afforded no such glorious scenes (cf. n. 16.3.1).
41.3.5 πολλοὺς µὲν ἀπέκτεινεν, ἐζώγρησε δὲ πεντακισχιλίους: The size of the army
commanded by Pantauchus is unknown, but Tarn (1913] 64) estimates that Aetolia could
raise a minimum of 12,000 men (10,000 armed Aetolians resisted the invasion of
Antipater and Craterus in 322/21 and Aetolian power had grown in the subsequent three
decades; Diod. 18.24), and it seems certain that Demetrius left Pantauchus at least as
large a force to occupy Aetolia. Pyrrhus’ victory in single combat may well have inspired
his troops, but he probably enjoyed numerical superiority (Lévêque 145 n. 4; see above n.
41.3.1), an advantage that will have increased significantly if the Aetolians joined the
attack on the Macedonians (for an earlier example of Aetolian and Epirote cooperation
against a Macedonian army led by Cassander’s general Philip, see Diod. 19.74.3–7).
41.4.2 ἐζώγρησε…παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόσι: Cf. n. 43.2.1.
41.5.1 καὶ πολλοῖς ἐπῄει λέγειν…ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τὸ βάρος ὑποκρίνοιντο: The contrast of
Demetrius’ style (and that of the other kings) with Pyrrhus’ substance is certainly
exaggerated. The distortion stems in large part from Plutarch’s characterization of
Demetrius’ decline—at this late stage it would hardly be appropriate to highlight his
martial valor. Also at work is the need to maintain the parallel with Antony (Bosworth
[2002] 254), but the symmetry is overdeveloped. Indeed, the assertion that Pyrrhus “was

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admired for making most of his conquests in person” (θαυµασθεὶς διὰ τὸ πλεῖστα τῇ
χειρὶ κατεργάςασθαι) contrasts him less with Demetrius, “the author of his own
successes” (τῶν µὲν κατορθωµάτων αὐτουργὸς, Comp. 5.5), than with Antony, who
“won his greatest and fairest victories through his generals, on fields where he was not
present” (ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἐν οἷς οὐ παρῆν καλλίστας καὶ µεγίστας διὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν
ἀνῃρεῖτο νίκας, Comp. 5.5). In fact, Demetrius shared the martial qualities of Pyrrhus: he
led conspicuously from the front in every major engagement of his career (although
Plutarch tellingly omits the heroic combat at Salamis that earned him a virtual aristeia in
the account of Diodorus [20.52.1–2]; n.) and consistently exposed his person to danger in
the many sieges he conducted, sustaining serious wounds on at least two occasions (33.4,
40.5).
41.6.1 Ἦν δ' ὡς ἀληθῶς τραγῳδία µεγάλη περὶ τὸν Δηµήτριον: On tragic and
theatrical elements in the Life, see Intro. 29–40.
41.6.2: ἀµπεχόµενον…ἐµβάδας: Plutarch is almost certainly drawing on Duris of
Samos, who was preoccupied with the increasingly extravagant dress and Eastern
affectations of prominent Greeks, a trend that he traced from at least the time of
Pausanias, the Spartan victor of Plataea in 479 (Duris FGrH 76 F12, 14, 50, 60; see Intro.
49–52). Indeed, the resemblance of a fragment of Duris preserved by Athenaeus to this
passage is striking:
Δηµήτριος δὲ πάντας ὑπερέβαλεν. τὴν µὲν γὰρ ὑπόδεσιν ἣν εἶχεν κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ
πολλοῦ δαπανήµατος·. ἦν γὰρ κατὰ µὲν τὸ σχῆµα τῆς ἐργασίας σχεδὸν ἐµβάτης
πίληµα λαµβάνων τῆς πολυτελεστάτης πορφύρας· τούτωι δὲ χρυσοῦ πολλὴν
ἐνύφαινον ποικιλίαν ὀπίσω καὶ ἔµπροσθεν ἐνιέντες οἱ τεχνῖται. αἱ δὲ χλαµύδες αὐτοῦ
ἦσαν ὄρφνινον ἔχουσαι τὸ φέγγος τῆς χρόας, τὸ δὲ πᾶν [ὁ πόλος] ἐνύφαντο
χρυσοῦς ἀστέρας ἔχον καὶ τὰ δώδεκα ζώιδια. µίτρα δὲ χρυσόπαστος ἦν, <ἣ>
καυσίαν ἁλουργῆ οὖσαν ἔσφιγγεν, ἐπὶ τὸ νῶτον φέρουσα τὰ τελευταῖα
καταβλήµατα τῶν ὑφασµάτων.    
“But Demetrius outdid them all; for the very shoes which he wore he had made in a most
costly manner; for in its form it was a kind of half-boot, made of most expensive purple
wool; and on this the makers wove a great deal of golden embroidery, both before and
behind; and his cloaks were of a brilliant tawny color; and, in short, a representation of
the heavens was woven into it, having the stars and twelve signs of the Zodiac all
wrought in gold; and his head-band (mitra) was spangled all over with gold, binding on a
purple broad-brimmed hat (kausia) in such a manner that the outer fringes hung down the
back.” (Athen. 12. 535A–536A = Duris FGrH 76 F14).
The purple color of Demetrius’ hats, cloaks, and shoes trumpeted his regal status
and great wealth. The purple dye derived from shellfish of the muricidae family was
greatly prized in antiquity for its colorfast quality (M. Reinhold, History of Purple as a
Status Symbol in Antiquity [Brussels: 1970]). According to Theopompus (FGrH 115 F
117 = Athen. 12.526C), purple dye was “rare and much sought after by kings”
(βασιλεῦσιν σπάνιον τότ' ἦν καὶ περισπούδαστον) and “worth its weight in silver”
(ἰσοστάσιος γὰρ ἦν ἡ πορφύρα πρὸς ἄργυρον ἐξεταζοµένη). Also of interest is the
revelation that Demetrius, like Alexander, affected a style combining Persian and
Macedonian elements: the broad-brimmed kausia was quintessentially Macedonian, the

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mitra characteristically Persian (B. Kingsley, “The Kausia Diadematophoros,” AJA 88
[1988] 66–68; C. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, “Aspects of Ancient Macedonian Costume,” JHS
113 [1993] 122–47; Pownall in BNJ 76 F14; cf. Athen. 12.537D-F). Furthermore, the
extravagance of Demetrius’ dress was an important element of the king’s Dionysiac self-
fashioning (cf. ns. 2.3.6, 13.1.3, 30.4.1, 40.8.1. A passage in Diodorus demonstrates how
sartorial splendor in general, and the donning of the mitra in particular, might be
employed as an instrument of divine assimilation:
καὶ κατὰ µὲν τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέµοις µάχας ὅπλοις αὐτὸν πολεµικοῖς κεκοσµῆσθαι καὶ
δοραῖς παρδάλεων, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐν εἰρήνῃ πανηγύρεις καὶ ἑορτὰς ἐσθῆσιν ἀνθειναῖς
καὶ κατὰ τὴν µαλακότητα τρυφεραῖς χρῆσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος
οἴνου κεφαλαλγίας τοῖς πίνουσι γινοµένας διαδεδέσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτὸν µίτρᾳ τὴν
κεφαλήν, ἀφ' ἧς αἰτίας καὶ µιτρηφόρον ὀνοµάζεσθαι· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς µίτρας
ὕστερον παρὰ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καταδειχθῆναι τὸ διάδηµά φασι.
“And in the battles which took place during his wars he (Dionysus) arrayed himself in
arms suitable for war and in the skins of panthers, but in assemblages and at festive
gatherings in time of peace he wore garments which were bright-coloured and luxurious
in their effeminacy. Furthermore, in order to ward off the headaches which every man
gets from drinking too much wine he bound about his head, they report, a mitra, which
was the reason for his receiving the name Mitrephorus; and it was this head-band, they
say, that in later times led to the introduction of the diadem for kings” (4.4.4).
41.7.2 τις ὑφαινοµένη χλαµὺς: Note that Duris (n. 41.6.2) records that Demetrius had
more than one of these magnificent cloaks and that he actually wore them. Perhaps the
assertion that Demetrius’ zodiac cloak was unfinished is Plutarch’s own elaboration—the
cloak becomes a metaphor for Plutarch’s Demetrius, a king bent bent on universal
dominion who ultimately achieved nothing of lasting significance.
XLII
42.1.1 Οὐ µόνον δὲ τούτοις τοῖς θεάµασιν…τρυφὴν καὶ δίαιταν ἐβαρύνοντο
(Luxurious display and the Macedonian elite): Regal pomp was hardly unknown in
Macedonia by the early 3rd century. On the contrary, there is abundant archaeological and
literary evidence demonstrating that displays of luxury were de rigueur for the
Macedonian elite. The extraordinary influx of capital brought about by the conquests of
Alexander enabled a new level of luxury for the elite, but lavish offerings, including
elaborately decorated couches and sympotic paraphernalia made from precious metals,
have also been discovered in tombs and burials antedating Alexander’s campaigns
(Carney [2007] 151). At the very least Alexander hosted banquets featuring sumptuous
appointments of gold and silver both before (Diod. 17.16) and during his invasion of Asia
(Chares of Mytilene ap. Athen. 12.538B–539A; cf. Ael. VH 8.7; Plut. Alex. 70.2), and, if
Ephippus of Olynthus is to be believed, he dressed extravagantly, sometimes in imitation
of various gods, and his chambers were redolent of perfume, fragrant wine, and incense
(FGrH 126 F4–5 = Athen. 12.537D–12.538B). Nor were extravagant displays a strictly
royal phenomenon. According to Agatharchides (ap. Athen. 4.155D), Alexander’s friends
served desserts in gold wrappers which they then casually discarded as a conspicuous
display of their immense wealth, and Hippolochus’ account (apud Athen. 4.128C–130E;
see above n. 27.4.1) of an almost unbelievably lavish Macedonian wedding feast thrown

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by a certain Caranus, perhaps during the reign of Demetrius, may be the best illustration
of the penchant for luxurious display among the Macedonian elite (on Macedonian truphe
see esp. Carney [2007]; cf. A. Passerini,“La truphe nella storiografia ellenistica,” Studi
Italiani di Filologia Classica [1934] 35–56; Bosworth [2002] 255–56). Splendid attire
was an important component of this culture of elite display, and while Demetrius may
have surpassed his rivals in the flamboyance of his clothing (Duris BNJ 76 F14 = Athen.
12.533F), even such avatars of Macedonian traditionalism as Craterus (Suda s.v.
Κρατερός, Adler K 2335; Demetr. Eloc. 289) and Polyperchon (Duris BNJ 76 F12 =
Athen. 4.155C) affected elaborate dress. Thus, the insistence that Demetrius’ subjects
were “vexed” (ἐλύπει) by his displays is scarcely credible and probably reflects
Plutarch’s own discomfiture.
Indeed, Demetrius’ increasingly flamboyant lifestyle (δίαιτα) and addiction to
luxury (τρυφή) are central to Plutarch’s depiction of the deterioration of his character,
from a promising young prince equipped with “good natural parts” (εὐφυὴς; 20.2.), to a
harsh and inaccessible autocrat who wages war ceaselessly and support his excesses on
the backs of his subjects. Initially, Demetrius’ refinement and devotion to truphe made
him a singularly pleasant companion (ἥδιστος γὰρ ὢν συγγενέσθαι, σχολάζων τε
περὶ πότους καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ διαίτας ἁβροβιώτατος βασιλέων; 2.3.2–4), and his
various excesses did not distress the elderly Antigonus in the slightest (τρυφὰς δὲ καὶ
πολυτελείας καὶ πότους αὐτοῦ µὴ βαρυνόµενος; 19.4.5). By the time of his reign in
Macedon, however, his truphe and diaita have become oppressive (τρυφὴν καὶ δίαιταν
ἐβαρύνοντο), all the more so because his subjects were allegedly unused to such
luxurious displays. When Demetrius is ultimately deserted en masse by his soldiers in the
face of the simultaneous invasion of Macedonia by Lysimchus and Pyrrhus, they cite
their fatigue with fighting to support his truphe as the reason for their defection
(ἀπειρηκέναι γὰρ ἤδη Μακεδόνας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου τρυφῆς πολεµοῦντας; 44.8.5–6).
Finally, Plutarch intrudes on the narrative to deliver a clear, authorial pronouncement,
condemning Demetrius for his mindless pursuit of pleasure and luxury and failure to
identify and pursue meaningful goals: κακῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως διακειµένοις, οὐχ ὅτι µόνον
τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι µηδ' ἥδεσθαι
µηδὲ τρυφᾶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἴσασιν, 52.4.2–5).
42.1.3 τὸ δυσόµιλον αὐτοῦ: Forms of the adjective dusomilos occur only here and in a
choral passage of Aeschylus’ Agamemenon (746). Plutarch’s δυσόµιλον αὐτοῦ καὶ
δυσπρόσοδον correspond to the description of Helen as δύσεδρος καὶ δυσόµιλος in the
latter passage. Several features of the Aeschylean passage resonate with events in
Demetrius’ life and Plutarch must have had it in mind when he deemed his subject
dusomilos: Indeed before Helen is labelled dusomilos she is called a helepolis, a “city-
taker” (cf. n. 27.4.1); later the chorus wonder how properly to address and honor (or
worship, the verb sebizo can connote either) Agamemnon, “the sacker of cities”
(πτολίπορθ'), without going too far (782–87):
{ – } ἄγε, δή, βασιλεῦ, Τροίας πτολίπορθ',
Ἀτρέως γένεθλον,
πῶς σε προσείπω; πῶς σε σεβίξω

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 µήθ' ὑπεράρας µήθ' ὑποκάµψας
καιρὸν χάριτος;
δυσπρόσοδον…  τραχὺς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν: Demetrius’ luxurious lifestyle was
unlikely to have offended the Macedonians (see above n. 42.1.1), but the same cannot be
said of a king who was harsh, inaccessible, and utterly unresponsive to the will of his
subjects. The Macedonian monarchy was a venerable one and it is clear that the king was
expected to rule according to custom and fulfill the expectations of his subjects (Arr.
Anab. 4.11.6), even if he did not formally swear to do so at his accession (A.B. Bosworth,
A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, vol. 2 [Oxford: 1995] 84; cf.
N.G.L Hammond, The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History [Oxford:
1989] 65–66). To disregard those expectations would be to descend into despotism—
Aristotle’s insistence that kings rule in accordance with law and over willing subjects, but
tyrants rule over unwilling subjects (οἱ µὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόµον καὶ ἑκόντων οἱ δ' ἀκόντων
ἄρχουσιν; Pol. 1285a) is particularly salient here (cf. Plutarch’s citation of Pindar, n.
42.8.3). The anecdotes Plutarch relates to demonstrate the increasingly tyrannical nature
of Demetrius’ rule, however, are either adduced elsewhere with respect to other kings or
reported nowhere else, making it difficult to assess their historicity (on this and similar
anecdotes demonstrating a king’s moral responsibility to grant audience to his subjects,
see Strootman [2014a] 191–95).
42.2.3 ἐκ Λακεδαίµονος δ' ἑνὸς πρεσβευτοῦ…“ναί” εἶπεν “ὦ βασιλεῦ, πρὸς ἕνα”:
According to Plutarch (Mor. 216B), Philip II reacted in identical fashion when a one-man
embassy arrived from Sparta, and received the same reply (cf. Mor. 233E where the
anecdote is repeated with Demetrius again in the role of the offended king). The anecdote
effectively sends up Hellenistic court etiquette, but probably does not reflect a historical
episode (Strootman [2014a] 196; according to Polybius [4.23.4], the Spartans sent ten
envoys to Philip V).
42.5.2 ὡς δ' ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀξιοῦ γέφυραν, ἀναπτύξας τὴν χλαµύδα πάσας εἰς
τὸν ποταµὸν ἐξέρριψε: Pella, the Macedonian capital since the reign of Archelaus (413–
399) is situated in the great alluvial plain formed by the Haliacmon, Loudias, and Axios
rivers (on Pella, see below 43.4.3). The Axios (modern Vardar) flows several kilometers
east of Pella. This incident is not reported elsewhere, and one wonders why petitioners
would follow Demetrius a considerable distance out of town and where, exactly, he was
heading.
42.7.4 “καὶ µὴ βασίλευε”: Demetrius’ excesses may have caused his subjects to wistfully
recall the mildness and accessibility of Philip (42.6.3–4; see above n. 42.2.3), but
Plutarch relates this anecdote elsewhere (Mor. 179C) with Philip as the king rebuked by
an old lady for his inaccessibility (cf. above n. 42.2.3). The same story is also told of
Antipater (Stob. 3.13.48) and Hadrian (Dio 69.6.3).
42.8.1 οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως βασιλεῖ προσῆκον ὡς τὸ τῆς δίκης ἔργον: In the prologue
justice (δικαιοσύνη), self-control (σωφροσύνη), and wisdom (φρόνησις) comprise the
“most perfect arts of all” (πασῶν τελεώταται τεχνῶν). On this passage, see Intro. 18.
For another Plutarchan discourse on justice, see Arist. 6.1–5; cf. n. 42.10.3.

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42.8.2 Ἄρης µὲν γὰρ τύραννος, ὥς φησι Τιµόθεος: Timotheus of Miletus (c. 450–360)
was a lyric poet. In the Agesilaus, Plutarch quotes more of the same line (F 790, Page) in
a strikingly similar context. The Greeks of Asia marvel at Agesilaus, whose self-restraint,
thrift, and moderation (σωφροσύνης αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐτελείας καὶ µετριότητος, 14.1.4)
provide the strongest possible contrast to the odious Persian devotion to wealth and
luxury (βαρεῖς καὶ ἀφόρητοι καὶ διαρρέοντες ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ τρυφῆς, 14.2.5–6), and
many are moved to quote the words of Timotheus: “Ares is a tyrant, but Greece does not
fear gold” ( Ἄρης τύραννος· χρυσὸν δὲ Ἕλλας οὐ δέδοικε, 14.2.12).
A brief examination of the immediate context of the shared quotation in the two
Lives demonstrates Plutarch’s use of resonant symmetries (or asymmetries) to invite
comparison both within pairs of Lives and beyond them, and illustrates the pedagogical
ethics at the heart of Plutarch’s biographical project (see Intro. 19–29). Demetrius is
presented as a sort of anti-Agesilaus, and assimilated to Agesilaus’ Persian foes: the vices
that will prove Demetrius’ undoing—τρυφὰς δὲ καὶ πολυτελείας καὶ πότους (19.5.1)—
correspond inversely to Agesilaus’ sovereign virtues σωφροσύνης αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐτελείας
καὶ µετριότητος. Agesilaus is content with a threadbare cloak (ἐν τρίβωνι περιϊόντα
λιτῷ; Ages. 14.2.8) while Demetrius is gruesomely flamboyant (41.6–8); Demetrius
shamefully consorts with prostitutes and free-born Athenians in the Parthenon (23.1–2),
while Agesilaus is wont to take up solitary quarters in sacred precincts so that the gods
alone might bear witness to his virtues (ἐσκήνου µὲν γὰρ ἀποδηµῶν καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν τοῖς
ἁγιωτάτοις ἱεροῖς; 14.1.5–6); Demetrius neglects his responsibilities to his subjects
(42.4–42.5.4) and plans yet another Asian campaign (43.1–3), while Agesilaus dutifully
abandons his plan to wage a glorious campaign against the Persians when he is called
home to Sparta (Ages. 15.2), an act that prompts Plutarch to reflect sorrowfully that the
conquest of the Persians, which could have been a Greek triumph, fell instead to
Alexander and the Macedonians (Ages. 15.3)
42.8.3 νόµος δὲ πάντων βασιλεὺς κατὰ Πίνδαρόν ἐστι: This fragment of Pindar
(Maehler, F 169.1) is quoted by Plato in the Gorgias (484B), and again by Plutarch at
Mor. 780C.
42.9.2 Ὅµηρός…φυλάσσειν: A reference to Iliad 1.238–239: δικασπόλοι, οἵ τε
θέµιστας/ πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται.
42.9.4 τοῦ Διὸς…προσηγόρευκεν: A reference to Odyssey 19.179, where Minos is
called a “confidant of great Zeus” (Διὸς µεγάλου ὀαριστής).
42.10.3 ἀλλὰ Δηµήτριος…Πολιορκητὴς ἐπίκλησιν ἔσχεν: On the possibility that
Poliorcetes was not a complimentary epithet, but a mocking reference to Demetrius’
failure to take Rhodes by siege, and thus not at all a moniker that he would “revel in”
(ἔχαιρε) see above n. 25.7.5. In the Aristides (6.1–5), Plutarch criticizes the tyrants and
kings who rejoiced in epithets (including Poliorcetes) that celebrate their reputation for
violence and power rather than justice. Cf. Mor. 987C where Odysseus is censured for
taking pride in the epithet Ptoliporthos, “sacker of cities” (cf. Hom. Il. 2.278; n. 42.1.3).

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 XLIII
43.1.1 Ὁ δ' οὖν Δηµήτριος ἐπισφαλέστατα νοσήσας ἐν Πέλλῃ: Plutarch resumes the
historical narrative that he left after his account of Pyrrhus’ smashing victory over
Pantauchus in Aetolia in the spring of 289 (41; on the date see above n. 41.1.4).
Demetrius was ravaging Epirus with part of his army when the force he left in Aetolia
was wiped out (41.3.1), and word of the defeat must have reached him soon after. With
his own strength much depleted, Demetrius evidently returned to Macedonia rather than
risk an encounter against the combined armies of Pyrrhus and the Aetolians. There are
several routes from Epirus over the high Pindus to Macedonia that bypass Aetolia, but the
most direct runs from the plain of Ambracia north to Dodona, east through the Katara
pass near modern Metsovo, then northeast into Macedonia via Grevena, the Siatista pass,
and Kozani (on this route, see esp. Borza [1991] 34–35; cf. Hammond [1931–32] 141;
Demetrius may also have opted for one of the more northerly routes that Pyrrhus seems
to have followed in his subsequent invasion of Macedonia; see below n. 43.1.2). The
nature of Demetrius’ illness is unknown, but it must have been significant and prolonged
if word of his condition reached Pyrrhus in Epirus (see below n. 43.1.2).
43.1.2 καταδραµόντος ὀξέως Πύρρου καὶ µέχρι Ἐδέσσης προελθόντος: In the
Pyrrhus (10.2.1–2), Plutarch states that reports of Demetrius’ illness reached Pyrrhus
“soon after” (ὀλίγῳ δ' ὕστερον) the latter’s victory in Aetolia in 289. Hoping to
capitalize on his rival’s ill health, Pyrrhus launched an expedition to Macedonia.
Although Plutarch’s remark is hardly a meaningful chronological marker (pace Lévêque
147 n. 4)—in the Alexander (50.1), Plutarch uses the same phrase in the context of events
separated by two years; commentators have generally placed this invasion in the same
year (289) as the defeat of Pantauchus and Demetrius’ subsequent withdrawal (Tarn
[1913] 96; Lévêque 147; Wheatley (1997) 21; Lefèvre 136–39; cf. Manni [1951] 56 and
Hammond and Walbank 226 n. 5 who place the expedition in 288). The recent discovery
at Delphi of an inscription detailing the terms of a peace Demetrius negotiated with the
Aetolians seems to confirm that Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia in 289 (SEG 48.588; on the
treaty and its chronological implications see below n. 43.2.2)
If the castra Pyrrhi at the confluence of the Sarantaporos and Aoös rivers west of
modern Konitsa got its name on this occasion (so Hammond and Walbank 225), Pyrrhus
chose one of two routes over the Pindus, both to the north of that taken by Demetrius
when he withdrew from Epirus (see above n. 43.1.1): the route via modern Leskovik,
Körçe, Bilisht, and the high Pisoderi pass to Florina, or the route up the Sarantaporos
river and over the watershed near Kotili down to Lake Orestiada (Hammond and
Walbank 225; cf. Lévêque 148–49 who ignores the evidence of castra Pyrrhi and sends
Pyrrhus on roughly the same route attributed above to Demetrius). Both are impassable in
winter, and Pyrrhus must have departed no later than late summer to ensure that the
passes were clear for the return leg of the more than 700 kilometer (round-trip) journey.
µέχρι Ἐδέσσης προελθόντος: According to the more detailed account given in the
Pyrrhus (10.1–2), the Epirote king’s invasion was originally conceived as nothing more
than a plundering raid, recompense in kind for Demetrius’ ravaging of Epirus (see above
n. 41.3.1), but when Pyrrhus met with no resistance as he advanced through western
Macedonia (his route took him through the highland cantons of Orestis and Eordaea; see

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above n. 43.1.2) he continued east as far as Edessa. Nestled on the terraced western slope
of Mt. Vermion, Edessa overlooks the central Macedonian plain and dominates the Karan
Burun pass, which allows access to its western edge. (The second-century Via Egnatia
runs through Edessa; on the site see Borza [1991] 41; Girtza 60–66). When Pyrrhus
reached Edessa, he was within 45 kilometers of Demetrius’ capital at Pella.
43.2.1 κουφότερος γενέσθαι πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἐξελάσας αὐτόν: Despite Demetrius’ serious
and prolonged illness and the purported discontent of his subjects (see above ns. 42.1.1–
42.7.4), when Pyrrhus advanced to within a day’s march of Pella at the head of an
invading army the Macedonians did not flock to his banner, for all that they supposedly
saw in him, and not Demetrius, the image of the great Alexander (see above n. 41.5.1).
Instead Demetrius rose from his sickbed to lead an army hastily mustered by his friends
and officers. By Plutarch’s own admission, Demetrius’ force fought for their king with
zeal and passion (ἐρρωµένως καὶ προθύµως; Pyrr. 10.3.3–4). Pyrrhus was driven from
Macedonia, losing part of his retreating army to repeated attacks from the Macedonians
(φεύγων µέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀπέβαλε, καθ' ὁδὸν ἐπιθεµένων τῶν Μακεδόνων;
Pyrr. 10.4.2–4).
43.2.2 ἐποιήσατό τινας ὁµολογίας: The terms of the agreement are not recorded, but
the suggestion (Wehrli 180) that the territorial status quo was confirmed is plausible. This
was rendered all the more likely by the discovery at Delphi of five blocks from a
monumental pillar dedicated in the 170s by Perseus, the last of the Antigonid kings and
Demetrius’ great-great-grandson. Two of the blocks are inscribed with a dossier of texts
documenting the history of Delphic-Antigonid relations. The uppermost of these texts
(fragment A; G. Daux, Delphes au IIe et au Ier siècles avant notre ère [Paris: 1936] 351
n. 2 [ed. pr.]), and therefore probably the earliest, records a letter from Adeimantus of
Lampsacus to Demetrius that describes a meeting of the synedrion of the Hellenic League
at Delphi during the Pythian games in the autumn of 302/01 (Wallace [2013] 150; on
Adeimantus see above ns. 14.2.5, 23.1.1; on the Hellenic League see above n. 25.4.1). In
1994 another fragment (fragment B; Lefèvre 1998 [ed. pr.]) was found, preserving the
end of Adeimantus’ letter (or perhaps Demetrius’ reply, the text is highly fragmentary;
Wallace [2013] 149) and, beneath it, a copy of a treaty between Demetrius and Aetolia
(both fragments are published together as CID IV 11 = Lefévre [2002]). The wide-
ranging treaty calls for a five-year period of peace and friendship between the two
contracting parties and confirms the territorial status quo. Crucially, at least from the
standpoint of Demetrius’ propaganda leading up to his Aetolian invasion (see above n.
40.7.1), the pact guarantees all Greeks free access to Delphi and stipulates that the
administration of Apollo’s sanctuary be returned to the Delphic Amphictyony. The
Aetolians had been delivered from the existential threat posed by Demetrius’ invasion
only by the timely intervention of Pyrrhus; once peace was established between Epirus
and Macedonia, the Aetolians must have felt compelled to come to terms with Demetrius
as well (Lefèvre [1998] 136–39; Bosworth [2002] 253 n.26; cf. Flacelière 78). Since the
treaty almost certainly dates to the end of 289—the Macedonian months Apellaios and
Eudunaios, corresponding roughly to November and December, can be supplied to fill the
lacuna in the first line (Lefèvre [1998] 137)—it follows that Pyrrhus’ invasion of
Macedonia, his repulse, and his conclusion of a peace with Demetrius should also be
dated to 289, perhaps in the autumn of that year (see above n. 43.1.2).

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 Demetrius could look back on the events of 289 with some satisfaction. Although
his force occupying Aetolia had been routed, he had ravaged Aetolia and Epirus, survived
a serious illness, and repulsed an attack on Macedonia. He had also secured access to
Delphi for all Greeks, thus fulfilling the primary objective of his Aetolian invasion, a
campaign that had been carefully presented as a Sacred War (n. 40.8.2). Demetrius could
now trumpet himself as the savior of Delphi, just as Philip II had done in 346, while his
supremacy over Macedonia, Thessaly and much of central and southern Greece gave him
a preponderance of power rivaling that of Philip II after Chaeronea (Bosworth [2002]
253). The treaties with Aetolia and Epirus secured, so it seemed, the western border of
Demetrius’ realm, allowing him to turn his attention eastward, to the recovery of his
father’s Asian possessions (43.3.1) and perhaps to the reconstitution of the empire of
Alexander.
43.3.1 διενοεῖτο δ' οὐθὲν ὀλίγον, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ἀναλαµβάνειν τὴν ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ
γενοµένην ἀρχήν: At its height, after the conclusion of the Peace of 311 (Diod.
19.105.1; see above n. 7.4.2), Antigonus’ realm consisted, at least in theory, of the entire
Asian portion of Alexander’s empire. If Plutarch characterizes Demetrius’ irredentist
ambitions accurately, the campaign ultimately targeted Lysimachus’ possessions in Asia
Minor; Coele Syria, which was occupied by Ptolemy; and the entire kingdom of
Seleucus. As Demetrius’ eastern neighbor and most bitter rival, however, it was
Lysimachus who was most immediately threatened by Demetrius’ growing power.
43.3.5 στρατιᾶς…ἐλάττους: An army of 98,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry would
represent the largest Greco-Macedonian force ever assembled, exceeding by a
considerable margin the 80,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry the Antigonids led into Egypt
in 306 (see above n. 19.1.1), and the 75,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry with which they
took the field at Ipsus in 301 (see above n. 28.6.1). Although some commentators suspect
a degree of exaggeration in Plutarch’s figures (Beloch [1925] 229 n.1; Bosworth [2002]
253; Murray 123), they are not beyond the realm of possibility, especially if they do not
represent the size of the army Demetrius was capable of actually putting into the field,
but the total pool of troops at his disposal, including the many thousands required for
garrison duty (Tarn [1913] 70–71 n. 92; Wehrli 182; Marasco [1985] 149). Tarn ([1913]
70) estimates that Demetrius, drawing on the manpower of Macedon, Thessaly, Central
Greece, and the Peloponnese could potentially levy a force of 60,000 to 70,000 men, to
say nothing of mercenaries, and the scale of his preparations must have been immense to
rouse Lysimachus, Pyrrhus, and Ptolemy to common action (Lévêque 151; Grainger
[1990] 160; Lund 98).
43.4.1 στόλον δὲ νεῶν ἅµα πεντακοσίων καταβαλλόµενος (Demetrius’ naval
building program): The size of Demetrius’ fleet when he began mobilizing his Asian
invasion force in the winter of 289/8 is uncertain, but his total naval strength in 295 was
300 ships (n. 33.8.3). Even if Demetrius did not lay the hulls for 500 new ships, but
sought instead to bring his total fleet strength to 500, including his existing vessels, the
building program required to reach a full 500 ships must have been considerable,
especially since at least some of the new vessels were mammoth polyremes (see below n.
43.5.1; cf. Diod. 19.58.5 where Antigonus announces his intention to build a fleet of 500
ships). Building, maintaining, and manning a fleet of large warships was a staggeringly

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expensive proposition (for the naval expenditures of 4th-century Athens, see Gabrielson
240; for those of Ptolemaic Egypt in the 3rd century, see Murray 189–91) and the furious
activity Plutarch describes in the principal dockyards of Macedonia and Greece is
corroborated by a corresponding increase in production by the royal mints at Chalcis,
Pella, and especially Amphipolis (Newell [1927] 110–115, 139). Presumably, increased
financial obligations were placed on the backs of both Demetrius’ Macedonian subjects
and the Greek poleis he controlled (Hammond and Walbank 227 with n. 2), but the
contributions demanded from individual cities cannot be determined (but see n. 27.1.1).
43.4.1 τὰς µὲν ἐν Πειραιεῖ... περὶ Πέλλαν (The shipyards of Demetrius’ naval building
program): Piraeus, Chalcis, and Corinth could all boast of venerable ship-building
traditions, but the inclusion of Pella, or its environs (περὶ Πέλλαν), is curious (Habicht
[1997] 95 ignores Plutarch and omits Pella in his discussion of Demetrius’ ship-building
hubs). Pella now lies more than 30 kilometers from the sea, but in antiquity the navigable
Loudias river made the city accessible from the Thermaic Gulf (according to Strabo
[7.20, 7.23], Pella lay approximately 15 kilometers upriver from the sea, while Herodotus
[7.123] implies that the city was considerably closer to the coast in his day; cf. Greenwalt
160–61). Pella’s fortifed harbor on Lake Loudias (now drained) was readily defensible,
the city was ideally situated to export the substantial timber resources of the region
between the Axios and Haliacmon rivers (Greenwalt 174), and the 110 new triremes that
bolstered the Athenian navy in 406 may well have been constructed in the shipyards of
Pella (Greenwalt 174–76; cf. Borza [1991] 163 n. 9; id. “Timber and Politics in the
Ancient World,” PAPS 131 [1987] 45; for the epigraphical evidence, see Rhodes and
Osborne no. 91). The harbor at Pella, however, was plagued by continual silting from at
least the third quarter of the fourth century, a fact which may explain the preference of
the Argeads and later Antigonids for smaller, lighter craft (Prof. Carol King, pers. comm.
March 2014) but makes it unlikely that any of the massive ships which Demetrius was
constructing in 288 were built there. The extraordinary production at the mint of
Amphipolis at this time suggests shipbuilding activity may well have taken place in that
city (Hammond and Walbank 227), but Amphipolis hardly qualifies as “near Pella.”
43.5.1 οὐδεὶς γὰρ…ἑκκαιδεκήρη: These ships were probably the largest single-hulled
warships ever built (Casson [1971] 107; Murray 176; the “twenty” and “thirty” built by
Ptolemy II and the gargantuan “forty” built by Ptolemy IV were almost certainly double-
hulled vessels; see below n. 43.5.4). Their construction marked the culmination of nearly
two decades of experimentation with ever larger craft, from the “sixes” and “sevens”
Demetrius deployed at Salamis in 306 (see above n. 16.3.1) to the “eleven” mentioned by
Theophrastus (see above n. 20.7.2), and the “thirteen” on which he hosted Seleucus in
299 or 298 (see above n. 32.2.2). While Demetrius’ “sixes” and “sevens” proved
effective in naval combat, his largest ships seem to have been designed to destroy the
increasingly elaborate floating barriers and artillery batteries deployed at the entrances to
fortified harbors (Murray 126, 176). The siege towers placed on yoked freighters that
Demetrius had deployed against such defenses at Rhodes had proved a dismal failure (see
above n. XXI-XXII: The Siege of Rhodes); these new craft were far more maneuverable,
and their massive size allowed artillery attacks to be launched from a great height, an
advantage analogous to that provided by the helepolis on land (Murray 127). These ships
were propelled either by two banks of rowers with seven or eight men pulling each

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massive oar, or by the same number of rowers distributed over the three superimposed
banks familiar from the trireme (Casson [1971] 106–07; the trireme employed only one
man per oar).
43.5.4 τεσσαρακοντήρη Πτολεµαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ…τρισχιλίων ἀποδέοντας: The
dimensions Plutarch gives for Ptolemy Philopator’s “forty” match those in Athenaeus
(5.203E–204B), who preserves the detailed description of this incredible ship in
Callixeinus the Rhodian’s lost History of Alexandria (on Callixeinus, see now P. Keyser
in BNJ 627). A large fighting deck spanned the double hulls of the vessel and it was
evidently rowed at three levels, although the disposition of the oarsmen remains
controversial (cf. Casson [1969] 188–91; id. [1995] 108–112; Basch [1987] 352–53;
Murray 178–85; Blackman, Rankov, et al. 83). The most plausible reconstruction makes
Philopator’s forty consist of two attached three-level “twenties” with the interior oars
removed in the fashion of the joined quinqueremes employed by M. Claudius Marcellus
in 214 at the siege of Syracuse (Livy 24.34.6; Blackman, Rankov, et al. 83).
XLIV
44.1.1 Αἰροµένης οὖν τοσαύτης δυνάµεως…ἔσχε πρότερον (Demetrius’ Asian
expedition and that of Alexander): Plutarch credits Demetrius with a force (98,000
infantry, 12,000 cavalry, 500 ships) that would dwarf the army Alexander led into Asia
(cf. Arr. Anab. 1.11.3; Plut. Alex. 15.1). In fact several Successor armies were larger than
any force ever led by Alexander, most notably the Antigonid force that invaded Egypt in
306 (see above n. 19.1.3), and both the armies that squared off at Ipsus in 301 (see above
n. 28.6.1).
44.1.2 οἱ τρεῖς συνέστησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Δηµήτριον, Σέλευκος Πτολεµαῖος Λυσίµαχος
(The revival of the anti-Antigonid alliance): The coalition that defeated the Antigonids at
Ipsus in 301 had collapsed almost immediately after the victory (see above n. 31.4.1), but
the scale of Demetrius’ preparations was sufficient to prompt its revival (cf. Justin 16.2;
see above n. 43.3.5), with Pyrrhus eventually taking the place of the deceased Cassander
(see below n. 44.2.2). We should perhaps add Audoleon, king of the Paionians to the
ranks of the coalition. A former ally of Cassander (Diod. 20.19.1), Audoleon had married
his daughter to Pyrrhus (Plut. Pyrr. 9), and consistently adopted policies hostile to the
Antigonids (Tarn [1913] 92; Osborne (1982) 160–61). An Athenian decree (IG II2 654)
granting honors to Audoleon in recognition for his gift of 7500 medimnoi of grain after
the ejection of the Macedonian garrison from the Museum in 287 (see below n. 46.2.1)
also mentions other, earlier and unspecified, contributions to the freedom of the city (l.
16), but what role, if any, he played in the expulsion of Demetrius from Macedonia is
unknown (cf. n. 44.3.1).
44.2.1 ἔπειτα κοινῇ πρὸς Πύρρον…βούλεται πρότερον: Pyrrhus’ demonstrated ability
to penetrate the Macedonian heartland from the west made him an extremely attractive
ally (for Pyrrhus’ invasion of 289 see above ns. 43.1.2, 43.2.1; on the allied invasion
plan, see below n. 44.3.1), and Demetrius’ enemies bombarded the Epirote king with
letters and envoys seeking to secure his adherence to the coalition (Pyrr. 10.4). The kings
painted Demetrius as a looming menace who would one day set his sights on Epirus and
mocked Pyrrhus for allying himself to the man who had seized Corcyra and carried off

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Lanassa (Plut. Pyrr. 10.4; see above n. 40.7.1). On the nature of the treaty between
Demetrius and Pyrrhus, see above n. 43.2.2).
44.3.1 δεξαµένου δὲ Πύρρου, πολὺς περιέστη πόλεµος ἔτι µέλλοντα Δηµήτριον: The
allies developed a comprehensive invasion plan: Lysimachus would invade overland
from the east and Pyrrhus from the west, while Ptolemy would send a fleet to the Aegean
and attempt to raise a general revolt of the southern Greek cities, forcing Demetrius to
divide his military resources and divert them to multiple fronts. If Audolean led a force
into Macedonia from Paionia in the north (see above n. 44.1.2), Demetrius would literally
be beset on all sides. The carefully coordinated operation seems to have taken Demetrius
entirely by surprise, and his single-minded focus on his grand preparations and inability
to anticipate that those preparations would rally his rivals to common action proved his
undoing. Despite Plutarch’s earlier assertion that Demetrius had already assembled
(συνετέτακτο; 43.3.5) an army of 98,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, it is now revealed
that his preparations were far from complete (ἔτι µέλλοντα Δηµήτριον; cf. Plut. Pyrr.
11.1.2–3: ἔτι µέλλοντα καὶ παρασκευαζόµενον τὸν Δηµήτριον): there was no grand
army mobilized and ready to meet the near-simultaneous invasions of Lysimachus and
Pyrrhus (ns. 44.4.2, 44.5.1), nor is there any indication that Demetrius’ fleet attempted to
contest Ptolemaic naval activity in the Aegean (n. 44.3.2). The state of Demetrius’
preparations strongly suggests that the allied invasion should be dated to 288 (Tarn
[1913] 92; Edson [1935] 236; Lévèque 153; Wheatley [1997] 21), and not the spring of
the following year (so Habicht [1979] 60; Hammond and Walbank 228, 229 n. 1).
Demetrius and Pyrrhus had come to terms late in 289 (see above n. 43.2.2), at which
point Demetrius had already begun planning his invasion of Asia. If the allied attacks on
Macedonia did not come for nearly a year and a half it is unlikely in the extreme that
Demetrius, who was justly renowned for his logistical talents (20.1), would have been
caught so unprepared. Furthermore, there is strong independent evidence dating the revolt
of the Athenians to the spring of 287 (n. 46.1.2), and Plutarch’s account (45–46.1) makes
it clear that a considerable period of time elapsed between Demetrius’ expulsion from
Macedonia and the uprising in Athens (Wheatley [1997] 21 n. 13; on the Athenian revolt,
see below n. 46.1.2). The allied invasion of Macedonia should thus be placed in the
spring or summer of 288; the mutiny of Demetrius’ army, his subsequent withdrawal, and
the accession of Pyrrhus to the throne of Macedonia in the autumn of that year (288/7, in
the archonship of Cimon in Athens).
44.3.2 τὴν µὲν Ἑλλάδα πλεύσας στόλῳ µεγάλῳ Πτολεµαῖος ἀφίστη: Even if
Demetrius’ naval building program had not yet swelled his fleet to his purported goal of
500 ships, he certainly possessed a navy that was more than capable of matching any fleet
Ptolemy could deploy in the Aegean: in 295 a Ptolemaic fleet of 150 ships turned back
for Egypt when confronted by an Antigonid fleet twice its size (33.7–8). With Demetrius
occupied in Macedonia and Antigonus tasked with maintaining order in mainland Greece,
however, it seems that Ptolemy was allowed to operate with impunity in the Aegean. In a
display of the cautious opportunism that had characterized his activity in recent years,
Ptolemy did not attempt to force a decisive naumachia or assault the Antigonid naval
strongholds of southern Greece, but was content to gather low-hanging fruit in the
Cyclades (cf. Ptolemy’s occupation of Coele Syria prior to Ipsus [n. 28.2.3], and the
patience he displayed in assaulting Cyprus only after Demetrius had returned to Greece

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[n. 35.5.2]). It was probably at this time that Ptolemy seized control of the Nesiotic
League, the alliance of islands through which Antigonus and Demetrius had controlled
the Cyclades since as early as 314 (Diod. 19.62.9; Buraselis 41–44, 60–67; Billows
[1990] 220–25; Reger 16–17; even if, as Meadows [2014, 19–27] argues, the League was
never formally constituted until the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, the Antigonids had
firmly controlled the Cyclades since Demetrius’ campaign of 307, at the very latest). Just
as he had annexed Coele Syria when it was denuded of Antigonid troops in the wake of
the allied invasion of Anatolia in 302, Ptolemy reaped the benefits of coalition action
while assuming virtually none of the risk. A garrison was installed on Andros at some
point in 288, and the mercenaries stationed on the island under the command of the
Ptolemaic officer Callias of Sphettus would play an important supporting role when the
Athenians revolted from Demetrius in 287 (see below n. 46.2.1)
44.4.1 τὸν µὲν υἱὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος: Demetrius was probably overseeing operations at
one of his shipbuilding hubs in Greece—Corinth, Piraeus, and Chalcis (Hammond and
Walbank 228)—or possibly resident at his new southern capital, Demetrias in Thessaly
(Gabbert 17), when word of Lysimachus’ advance reached him. Antigonus, as
Demetrius’ overseer in Greece, was probably based in Corinth (see below 51.1.3; 53.4.2;
on the crucial importance of Corinth to the Antigonids see above n. 31.2.2).
44.4.2 αὐτὸς δὲ βοηθῶν Μακεδονίᾳ πρῶτον ὥρµησεν ἐπὶ Λυσίµαχον: The ease with
which Pyrrhus advanced into Macedonia from Epirus suggests that Demetrius, oblivious
to the threat posed by his supposed ally (n. 44.5.1), moved with all his available strength
against Lysimachus (Lévèque 153–54; Lund 99). According to Pausanias (1.10.2), the
two kings met near Amphipolis where Demetrius dealt Lysimachus a severe defeat. The
historicity of the account has been questioned (Lévèque 153; Hammond and Walbank
228 n. 4), but Pausanias seems to be drawing on a generally reliable source, Hieronymus
of Cardia, whom he explicitly cites (1.9.5) as his source for events in the career of
Lysimachus just before he mentions the battle at Amphipolis (Edson 237 n. 1; on the
reliability of Hieronymus, see Intro. 43–48). If Demetrius did indeed win a victory (so
Edson 237; Lund 99; Tarn [1913, 92] initially rejected Pausanias’ account, but later [in
CAH VII, p. 85] changed his view), that victory did not prove decisive. Lysimachus did
not withdraw from the area, as the subsequent defection of some of Demetrius’ soldiers
to his camp demonstrates (44.6), and, after Demetrius marched west to confront Pyrrhus,
Lysimachus was able to take Amphipolis by suborning a certain Andragathus, the officer
commanding the Antigonid garrison (Lund 99; Polyaenus [4.12.2] reports that
Lysimachus had Andragathus tortured and killed for his efforts shortly thereafter).
Demetrius and Lysimachus would not meet again.
44.5.1  ἀγγέλλεται δ' αὐτῷ Πύρρος ᾑρηκὼς πόλιν Βέροιαν (Pyrrhus’ march on
Macedonia): The possibility that Pyrrhus might be convinced to defect to the enemy
coalition does not seem to have occurred to Demetrius. Indeed, when Pyrrhus advanced
from Epirus he found the western Macedonian frontier entirely undefended, quickly
advancing as far as Beroea (Lévèque 154; Hammond and Walbank 228; Lund 99). Why
Demetrius had such faith that Pyrrhus would hold to the terms of their alliance is
uncertain, but the two must have given strong pledges of mutual fidelity since Pyrrhus
fully expected to meet no resistance in western Macedonia (Plut. Pyrr. 11.3). Demetrius
had miscalculated badly, and the blunder would cost him Macedonia.

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 Pyrrhus probably took the direct route to Beroea via modern Metsovo, Grevena,
and Kozani (Edson 232; Lévèque 148–49, 154 n. 3; Hammond and Walbank 228; for
Demetrius’ route from Epirus in 289, see above n. 43.1.1). Beroea is approximately 45
kilometers south of Edessa on the eastern slope of Mt. Vermion overlooking the central
Macedonian plain. It has been suggested (Edson 237–41) that Beroea was the ancestral
home of the Antigonids and that the enthusiastic welcome given Pyrrhus by her citizens
(see below n. 44.7.6) dealt a fatal blow to the already fragile morale of Demetrius’ army,
but it seems more likely that Demetrius’ forebears were in fact from Pella (Lévèque 156–
57; Billows [1990] 18 n. 8).
44.5.2 καὶ τοῦ λόγου ταχέως εἰς τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐκπεσόντος, οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ
Δηµητρίῳ κατὰ κόσµον εἶχεν (Occupation, propaganda, and the desertion of
Demetrius’ soldiers): Any boost in the morale of Demetrius’ army stemming from the
victory over Lysimachus at Amphipolis (if there was a victory at all; see n. 44.4.2) was
utterly undone by reports that Pyrrhus had taken Beroea and ravaged the environs, and
that his troops were now consolidating control over the region (Plut. Pyrr. 11.3). The
advent of Ptolemy in the Aegean was no doubt common knowledge as well, and there
may also have been rumors of an impending attack from Audoleon and the Paionians (see
above n. 44.1.2). At the very least, Demetrius’ soldiers knew that they were caught
between two hostile armies and that their homes and fields were subject to devastation.
The grim realities of this dual occupation rendered Demetrius’ soldiers increasingly
susceptible to allied propaganda, and the agents of Pyrrhus and Lysimachus ruthlessly
exploited the opening, disseminating a series of messages that played on the hopes and
fears of the Macedonians (see below ns. 44.6.4, 44.7.6).
44.6.1 ἔδοξεν...τρέπεσθαι: Beroea is located approximately 175 km. west of Amphipolis.
44.6.4 συνήθη δι' Ἀλέξανδρον: Demetrius had trumpeted his father’s accomplishments
under Alexander when he seized the throne of Macedonia in 294 (see above n. 37.2.1),
and the tradition stressing the consanguinity of the Argead and Antigonid houses may
have originated in the reign of Demetrius, if not earlier (Edson 216; on Antigonid claims
of kinship with the Argeads, see Polyb. 5.10.10; Plut. Aem. 12), but he was not a veteran
of Alexander’s campaigns (Lysimachus, on the other hand, had served as a somatophylax
of the great conqueror (n. 12.8.1). Stories that emphasized his close relationship to
Alexander including, no doubt, the famous episode of Lysimachus and the lion (see
above n. 27.6.1), were circulated as a key component of Lysimachean propaganda (on
Lysimachus’ propaganda, see Lund 100; Bosworth [2002] 275–77).
44.7.6 τῷ Πύρρῳ παρεστρατοπέδευσεν…πράως κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς ἁλισκοµένοις
πυνθανόµενοι: Pyrrhus was not Macedonian, but he was related to Alexander through
Olympias and sought to capitalize on their kinship in his own propaganda (Olympias and
Pyrrhus’ father Aeacides were first cousins). According to Plutarch (Pyrr. 11.4–5), a
story was circulated that Alexander had appeared to Pyrrhus in a dream on the eve of his
march to Beroea promising that his name alone would aid Pyrrhus in his campaign
against Demetrius. Pyrrhus’ efforts to win the hearts and minds of Demetrius’ subjects
and soldiers were not limited to the dissemination of such stories. He clearly offered
generous terms to defectors, as evidenced by the enthusiastic support he garnered in
Beroea. He also conceived a creative method to shape the reports that reached Demetrius’

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camp: mixed in with the Beroeans who approached Demetrius’ soldiers to endorse
Pyrrhus’ martial prowess, heroic nature, and clemency were agents of the Epirote king
pretending to be Macedonians (Plut. Pyrr. 11.4–5).
44.8.3 τέλος δὲ τῷ Δηµητρίῳ…  τῆς ἐκείνου τρυφῆς πολεµοῦντας: The status of the
soldiers who supposedly advised Demetrius that the Macedonians would no longer fight
to support his extravagances is uncertain, and it has been variously argued that they were
influential members of the nobility (Errington [1978] 128) or common soldiers who
summoned up the courage to approach the king (Hammond and Walbank 228 n. 4).
Plutarch’s preoccupation with the destructive power of truphe (see above n. 42.1.1),
however, suggests rhetorical invention, and the episode recalls the warning Nicias
delivered to the Athenians concerning the ambitions and pleasure addiction of Alcibiades
(Thuc. 6.12): διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, µηδὲ τούτῳ
ἐµπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳἰδίᾳ ἐλλαµπρύνεσθαι.
44.9.3 παρελθὼν ἐπὶ σκηνήν… ἀντὶ τῆς τραγικῆς ἐκείνης: On the tragic elements in
the Life and the explicit comparison of Demetrius to an actor, see Intro. 29–40. The
phrase παρελθὼν ἐπὶ σκηνήν is particularly felicitious since skene can refer both to a
soldier’s tent and to the scene building that served as a backdrop to plays. This episode,
which may be drawn from Duris of Samos (Chaniotis [2013] 68; on Duris, see Intro. 49–
52), inspired Cavafy’s “Ο Βασιλεύς Δηµήτριος”:
Σαν τον παραίτησαν οι Μακεδόνες
κι απέδειξαν πως προτιµούν τον Πύρρο
ο βασιλεύς Δηµήτριος (µεγάλην
είχε ψυχή) καθόλου — έτσι είπαν —
δεν φέρθηκε σαν βασιλεύς. Επήγε
κ’ έβγαλε τα χρυσά φορέµατά του,
και τα ποδήµατά του πέταξε
τα ολοπόρφυρα. Με ρούχ’ απλά
ντύθηκε γρήγορα και ξέφυγε.
Κάµνοντας όµοια σαν ηθοποιός
που όταν η παράστασις τελειώσει,
αλλάζει φορεσιά κι απέρχεται.
His Macedonian troops forsaking him,
and manifest their preference for Pyrrhus, —
Demetrius the King (a great-souled man
he was) did not at all, so people said,
act like unto a King. For he then went
and took off the majestic dress he wore
took off the purple shoes; and hastily
slipped into plain attire, and stole away:
behaving as behaves a common player,
who, having played his part upon the stage,
changes his dress and leaves the theatre.
(trans. John Cavafy)

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44.10.5 καὶ γίνεται πρὸς Λυσίµαχον αὐτῷ συµπάσης Μακεδονίας νέµησις: The Axios
river probably marked the boundary between of this divided kingdom (Beloch [1925] 236
n. 3; Hammond and Walbank 230 with n. 1). Pyrrhus, who was largely responsible for
the expulsion of Demetrius, received the lion’s share of the kingdom (Paus. 1.10.2), but
Lysimachus’ eastern portion included the rich mines in the area of Amphipolis. A large
marble monument found at Beroea that features Macedonian shields carved in relief may
commemorate Pyrrhus’ bloodless victory (M. Markle, “A Shield Monument at Veria,”
Hesperia 68 [1999] 221).
44.10.6 ἑπταετίαν ὑπὸ Δηµητρίου βεβαίως ἀρχθείσης: The dates for both the
inception and the conclusion of Demetrius’ rule as king of Macedonia are controversial,
but the chronology established herein (ns. 37.2.3, 44.3.1) gives Demetrius a reign of
almost exactly six years, from the fall of 294 to the fall of 288. Plutarch may have arrived
at seven years by reckoning from Athenian archon years and including 288/7, even
though Demetrius ruled for only the beginning of the year (294/3–288/7; Wheatley
[1997] 22 n. 18).
XLV
45.1.2 καταφυγόντος εἰς Κασσάνδρειαν: Cassander founded the city by synoecism on
the site of Potidaea in 316, naming it after himself (Diod.19.52.2; Marmor Parium
[FGrH 239 F B14]). Situated at the narrowest point of the Pallene peninsula (the
westernmost of the Chalcidic peninsulas), the new city incorporated Potidaea and the
cities of Pallene, neighboring towns, and some of the survivors of Olynthus (Diod.
19.52.2; Philip II destroyed Olynthus in 348; Dem. 9.11; Diod. 16.53.3; Philochorus
FGrH 328 F156.). After he was abandoned by his troops at Beroea, Demetrius probably
returned to Pella, gathered as many men and ships as he could, and sailed for Cassandreia
(on the port of Pella and the shipbuilding activity there, see above n. 43.4.1; on
Cassandreia, see Cohen [1995] 95–99). From Cassandreia, Demetrius moved into central
Greece, where he was active in Boeotia (n. 46.1.2).
ἡ γυνὴ Φίλα ἀπέθανε (The suicide of Phila): Phila and Demetrius were married for
more than thirty years. When Demetrius lost a kingdom at Ipsus in 301, the indispensable
Phila played a pivotal role in his recovery (see above n. 32.4.1). By the time Demetrius
lost Macedonia in 288 Phila was at least 70 (n. 14.2.5), and in despairing of her
husband’s chances to rally yet again from the brink she displayed considerable
prescience.
45.1.4 τὸν τληµονέστατον βασιλέων Δηµήτριον: Plutarch uses the adjective τλήµων
in the superlative degree on only one other occasion (Dion 57.5.3). In both cases it is
applied to the surviving partner following the death of a spouse: after Dion is
treacherously murdered in Syracuse, the subsequent imprisonment of his pregnant widow
is described as τληµονέστατα (Dion 57.5.3).
45.2.1 Δηµήτριος…συνῆγεν: Demetrius had lost Macedonia to Pyrrhus and Lysimachus
and much of the Aegean to Ptolemy (see above ns. 44.3.2; 44.10.5), but he still controlled
considerable territory in central and southern Greece including Thessaly, Boeotia, Phocis,
Euboea, Attica, and the Corinthia (Hammond and Walbank 233; cf. Wehrli 284–85).
Demetrias, Thebes, Chalcis, Athens, Piraeus, and Corinth were all strongly garrisoned,

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but as word of the debacle in Macedonia spread Demetrius needed to move quickly to
secure the loyalty of his officers and the mercenary forces they commanded. His itinerary
in the months following his expulsion from Macedonia cannot be reconstructed with any
precision, but he certainly visited Thebes (see below n. 46.1.2), and he was in Corinth in
the spring of 287 when word arrived of the revolt in Athens (see below n. 46.2.1),
suggesting that he moved south from Cassandreia and methodically secured each of his
principal bases in turn, gathering his forces all the while. Demetrius probably spent the
winter of 288/7 in Corinth: he had regrouped there after the disaster at Ipsus (n. 31.2.2); it
seems likely that he did the same after losing Macedonia.
45.3.1 ὁ Σοφοκλέους Μενέλαος: The passage (TrGF IV F871) is from an unknown play
of Sophocles. Plutarch quotes the latter part of the passage in Roman questions (Mor.
282B) and On talkativeness (Mor. 517D).
45.5.4 τοῖς Εὐριπίδου στίχοις: Plutarch’s Theban wit adapts a line from Euripides’
Bacchae (4–5). The original reads, “I come” rather than “he comes,” and the speaker is
Dionysus himself. The verse is particularly felicitous given Demetrius’ elaborate program
of Dionysiac self-fashioning and recent fall from grace. The Ismenus and the Dirce are
rivers of Thebes (Paus. 9.10.2; 9.25.3).
XLVI
46.1.2 Θηβαίοις µὲν ἀπέδωκε τὴν πολιτείαν (Thebes and Demetrius’ policy towards
the Greek poleis after his expulsionfrom Macedonia): Demetrius’ measured reaction to
the twin revolts of the Boeotians was prompted at least in part by his desire to exploit the
considerable military potential of the Boeotian koinon (Tarn [1913] 69; the Boeotians
sent 10,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry to hold the Gauls at Thermopylae in 279, Paus.
10.20.3), but the autonomy of the Boeotian cities was compromised by the presence of
garrisons and a Macedonian military governor (39.4; it is uncertain if Hieronymus
continued in the role of harmost and epimeletes of Boeotia after the second revolt was
quelled). After losing an army and the resources of Macedonia in 288 (see above n.
44.3.2), however, Demetrius was desperately short of both money and manpower. Given
his limited means, it seems likely that Demetrius chose to garrison only those coastal
cities crucial to the maintenance of his naval power in central and southern Greece. This
accounts for his decision to withdraw his troops from Thebes and restore the internal
autonomy of that truculent, land-locked city, and for the tenacity with which he sought to
maintain control of Piraeus and the coastal Attic forts even after his troops had been
driven from the Athenian asty (see below 46.2.1; 46.4.1). Demetrius’ restoration of the
Theban constitution should thus be seen primarily as a response to his newly diminished
power, an attempt to win the goodwill of the Boeotians now that he lacked the strength to
enforce their quiescence. Whether or not Demetrius and the Boeotians subsequently
concluded an alliance is uncertain (there is no clear evidence to support Tarn’s claim
[1913, 97] that Demetrius “secured Boeotia by restoring to the Thebans their
constitution”; cf. Roesch [1982] 436–37; Hammond and Walbank 230; Paschidis [2008]
152).
46.2.1 Ἀθηναῖοι δ' ἀπέστησαν αὐτοῦ (The Athenian revolt of 287): Demetrius’
humiliation in Macedonia in 288 must have emboldened Athenians eager to rid

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themselves of his occupying garrisons (on the date of Demetrius’ expulsion from
Macedonia see above n. 44.3.1), but the revolt did not begin in earnest until the spring of
287 (T.L. Shear Jr.’s seminal monograph [1978] on the Callias decree dated the revolt to
286, but a strong scholarly consensus now places the revolt in 287, based on the decree
for Phaedrus of Sphettus [IG II2 682 ll. 38–40] that states he left the city free and
autonomous at the end of his term as hoplite general for 288/7, and on analysis of the
honorary decrees for Callias [SEG 28.60], Zenon [IG II2 650], and Demochares [Plut.
Mor. 851D-F]; on the chronology of the revolt see esp. Habicht [1979] 45–67; Osborne
[1979]; id. [1982]; id. [2012] 36–43; Dreyer [1996]; Wheatley [1997] 21 and n. 12;
Paschidis [2008] 137 and n. 2; D. Knoepfler “Épigraphie et histoire des cités grecques,”
ACF 111 (2010–2011) 442 ff.; cf. J. Shear [2010] who argues for 286, based on the
assumption that the Panathenaea was cancelled that year; cf. n. 51.1.1). The interval of
more than half a year between Demetrius’ flight from Macedonia and the Athenian attack
on the Macedonian garrison occupying the Mouseion has been dismissed as
inconceivable by some commentators (Habicht [1979] 60 n. 63, Hammond and Walbank
229 n. 1, and Paschidis [2008] 137 all place Demetrius’ expulsion from Macedonia in
287 to avoid just such a gap, but it seems clear that Demetrius departed Macedonia in
288; see above n. 44.3.1). In fact the caution of the Athenians is perfectly intelligible.
Demetrius successfully besieged the city in both 307 and 295; on the former occasion he
took the city by storm (8.4–7), and on the latter he starved the Athenians into submission
by enforcing a naval blockade (33.5–8). The grim prospect of a third siege will have
given pause to even the most committed opponents of Macedonian occupation, and the
proximity of the king at this time was an additional inducement for patience. Indeed,
Demetrius almost certainly passed through Attica as he made his way south from Thebes
to Corinth (the main road from Thebes to the Isthmus passes by Eleusis; for Demetrius’
presence at Corinth at the time of the Athenian revolt, see below infra), and it is difficult
to imagine a scenario in which he would not stop in Athens en route, if only to ensure the
continued loyalty of his Attic garrisons and monitor the progress of the shipbuilding
efforts ongoing at Piraeus (perhaps now lapsed due to lack of funds; for Piraeus as one of
the principal hubs of Demetrius’ shipbuilding program, see above n. 43.4.1). After
Demetrius had moved south to the Peloponnese, the Athenians were able to prepare in
earnest for the siege that would inevitably follow an attack on the king’s troops in the city
and open revolt.
The ability of the Athenians to withstand the onset of the Besieger hinged on two
strategic imperatives: securing the grain harvest of 287 and expelling the Macedonian
garrison occupying the Museum hill. In the service of the former, nearly every Athenian
male of military age was mobilized either to harvest the crops or to defend the
agricultural workers from the threat presented by the Macedonian garrisons in Attica, the
troops stationed in Piraeus in particular (Oliver [2007] 122). The decree in honor of
Phaedrus of Sphettus (IG II2 682), a member of a prominent family who had served
previously as the general overseeing military preparations (στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν
παρασκευήν) in 296/5 (see above ns. 33.1.4–33.7.2 for events in Athens during that
turbulent year), confirms that he, as hoplite general, led this effort at harvest time late in
the archonship of Cimon (spring 287; the Attic grain harvest begins in May, see A. Jardé
[1926] Les Céreáles dans l’antiquité grecque 45 n.2; on Phaedrus see esp. Shear Callias;
Osborne [1979]; id. [1981]; Paschidis [2008] 140–45). The intensive activity in the Attic

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countryside led to attacks from Demetrius’ Piraeus garrison and Demetrius himself
mustered an army in the Peloponnese and set out, probably from Corinth, to crush the
revolt (SEG 28.60 ll. 11–17; Shear, Jr. [1978] 16; Hammond and Walbank 231). At this
point Phaedrus’ brother Callias, a mercenary captain in the service of Ptolemy, led a force
of 1,000 picked troops from the Ptolemaic garrison on Andros to relieve the beleaguered
Athenians (SEG 28.60 ll. 18–27; on the Ptolemaic capture of Andros and the installation
of a garrison there see above n.; on Callias see Shear, Jr. [1978]; Osborne [1979] and
[1982]; Paschidis [2008] 145–50). The advent of Callias allowed the Athenians to
continue with the harvest, but, with Demetrius’ arrival imminent, the veteran Athenian
general and erstwhile Antigonid collaborator Olympiodorus mounted a desperate attack
on the Macedonian garrison in the asty—a food supply sufficient for a prolonged siege
would mean very little if the Athenians were forced to contend simultaneously with
Demetrius before the walls of the city and his garrison within them (on the earlier career
of Olympiodorus, see ns. 23.1.1, 34.5.4). Olympiodorus and his motley force of ephebes
and old men—evidently the main army was still engaged with operations in the Attic
countryside (Oliver [2007] 122)—met and defeated the garrison troops somewhere in the
city, forcing them to withdraw to the Macedonian fortress on the Museum (Paus. 1.26.1;
SEG 28.60 ll. 11–14; see above ns. 34.7.1, 34.7.2 for the installation of the garrison on
the Mouseion in 295). Thanks in part to the defection of the Macedonian officer
Strombichus with part of the garrison (IG II2 666 ll. 7–15), Olympiodorus and his troops
stormed the fortress and expelled Demetrius’ troops from the asty (Paus. 1.26.1;
Pausanias [1.29.13] saw the tombs of the thirteen Athenians who died in the attack in the
Demosion Sema). Phaedrus could claim that he “left the city free and autonomous under
the people’s rule and the laws in force to the archons of the following year” (IG II2 682 ll.
38–40) at the end of his term as hoplite general (July 287; Phaedrus was elected to the
same office for 287/6, IG II2 682 ll. 44–45).
Δίφιλον…ψηφισάµενοι (The Priest of the Soteres as eponymous magistrate and other
onomastic honors for Demetrius): After Demetrius regained Athens in 295 he imposed a
regime with marked oligarchic features: the secretaries of the council were replaced by
the anagrapheis, judicial scrutiny of naturalizations was abandoned, Olympiodorus
served two consecutive years (294/3, 293/2) as eponymous archon, probably with
enhanced powers, and in 292 the philosopher Theophrastus convinced Demetrius to
permit the repatriation of several oligarchic leaders in exile since 307 (on this regime, see
above n. 34.5.4; on the return of exiles, see Philochorus FGrH 328 F167 = Dion. Hal.
Din. 3; on Olympiodorus’ role in the Athenian revolt of 287, see below infra). In the last
years of the 290s, however, Demetrius seems gradually to have loosened his grip on
Athenian internal affairs. After the second term of Olympiodorus, the eponymous archon
was again selected by lot, and the office of council secretary was restored in 291
(Paschidis [2008] 136 n. 3). The epigraphic evidence clearly demonstrates that the priest
of the Soteres did not at any point replace the eponymous archon in the official Athenian
dating scheme (Mikalson [1998] 80; Dreyer [1998]; Paschidis [2013] 125; see above n.
10.4.2), and Plutarch’s assertion that Diphilus, priest of the Soteres, was replaced as the
eponymous magistrate may be a confused echo of this abatement of Macedonian control.
Plutarch’s certainty and specificity, however, suggest that a parallel system designed to
flatter the king by referring to the priest of the Soteres as the eponymous magistrate was
actually employed, if only on those rare occasions when Demetrius visited Athens (on the

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various onomastic honors afforded Demetrius in Athens, see above ns. 10.4.2, 12.2.1,
12.2.3). The existence of such a pseudo-system—occasionally in use, but never applied to
official documents—could also account for Plutarch’s contention that the last day of each
month was called Demetrias rather than “the Old and the New” (ἕνη καὶ νέα), and the
name of the month Mounychion was changed to Demetrion, although there is abundant
epigraphical evidence demonstrating that the traditional names of both the day and the
month were never formally altered (see above n. 12.2.1).
46.2.4 τόν τε Πύρρον ἐκ Μακεδονίας µετεπέµποντο…συνεστήσατο καρτεράν:
Demetrius arrived from the Peloponnese in the summer of 287 and laid siege to Athens
for a third time (on the date, see n. 46.2.1). The Athenian resistance was bolstered by the
continued presence of Callias and the Ptolemaic troops from the Andros garrison (see
above n. 46.2.1), and Callias received a wound in the fighting (SEG 28.60 ll. 27–30). In
Macedonia, Pyrrhus was preoccupied by rapidly deteriorating relations with Lysimachus
(Plut. Pyrr. 12.1–3), and he does not seem to have arrived in Athens until, at the earliest,
after Demetrius had raised the siege and begun negotiations in Piraeus with an Athenian
embassy and a Ptolemaic envoy, since the king of Epirus and western Macedonia was
able to proceed freely into the city and offer sacrifice to Athena on the acropolis (Pyrr.
12.4–5; Habicht [1979] 63; Hammond and Walbank 233 with n. 3; Dreyer [1994] 64 and
[1999] 220–21; Wheatley [1997] 23 n. 21; Paschidis [2008] 147). It is unclear if
Demetrius and Pyrrhus were ever present in Attica at the same time (see below n. 46.4.1).
46.3.2 Κράτητος δὲ τοῦ φιλοσόφου: It is often asserted that “Crates the philosopher,” is
Crates son of Antigenes of Thria, a prominent Academic who succeeded Polemon as
head of the school in the 270s (H. von Arnim, RE s.v. Krates [8]; Ferguson [1911] 149;
Shear, Jr. [1978] 77 n. 212; Hammond and Walbank 231; Santi Amantini 366; Andrei
245 n. 326), but there is no evidence connecting the Athenian philosopher with
diplomatic activity of any sort, and Diogenes Laertius (4.22) claims that he and Polemon
were “no friends of the people” (οὐ φιλοδηµώδει), making it unlikely that he undertook
a diplomatic mission on behalf of the most radical democratic elements of the city
(Paschidis [2008] 151; cf. Shear [1978] 77 n. 212). A more attractive candidate is the
Theban Cynic philosopher Crates son of Ascondas (Paschidis [2008] 150–52). Active in
Athens, Crates won a reputation for mediating disputes (Crates F18), and was treated
with respect by both Alexander (Crates F31) and Demetrius of Phalerum (Crates F 33–
34). His diplomatic activity and connections to the Macedonian court aside, Plutarch
frequently mentions Crates the Cynic in the Moralia (69C, 87A, 125F, 141E, 466E,
499D, 546A, 532E, 830C, 831E), and he was the subject of one of a series of encomiastic
biographies of prominent Boeotians (Lamprias catalogue 35–38) that the patriotic
Plutarch wrote, probably for local festive occasions (Geiger [2014] 293). The question of
his identity aside, the decree in honor of Callias reveals that the negotiations leading to
Demetrius’ withdrawal from Athens were far more complex than Plutarch’s cursory
account would have us believe, and it is not at all clear that Crates the philosopher,
whichever Crates he was, played a particularly prominent role in them (Shear, Jr. [1978]
77; Paschidis [2008] 150; see below n. 46.4.1).
46.4.1 ἔλυσε τὴν πολιορκίαν: According to the honorary decree for Callias, Demetrius
was persuaded to lift the siege of Athens not by the remonstrations of the philosopher

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Crates, but as a result of negotiations initiated by Sostratus, a senior official in the
Ptolemaic court who arrived in Piraeus, probably in the autumn of 287 (SEG 28.60 ll. 30–
32; on the date see esp. Dreyer [1999] 219 who notes that since Demetrius besieged the
city for some time before the arrival of Sostratus, negotiations began “im Herbst 287—
frühestens”; cf. Paschidis [2008] 147; on Sostratus see Peremans and Van’t Dack vi. no.
16555; Bringmann and von Steuben 44; Sonnabend 237–43). Demetrius and Sostratus
met in Piraeus, and the latter summoned an Athenian embassy to consult with him on “all
matters pertaining to the peace treaty with Demetrius that will be signed on behalf of the
city” (τὰ περὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς Δηµήτριον, SEG 28.60 ll. 31–32).
The language of the decree (“on behalf of the city”; ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως) and the fact that
Callias—an Athenian citizen, but also a Ptolemaic official—led the Athenian contingent,
indicates that the Athenians wielded little influence over the proceedings (Habicht [1979]
62 n. 65; Buraselis [1982] 97–98; Lund 100; Dreyer [1999] 221–22; Paschidis [2008] 147
with n. 6). Indeed, the signatories of the resulting peace treaty were Ptolemy and
Demetrius, not Demetrius and the Athenians, and the terms of the settlement can hardly
have been popular in Athens: Demetrius agreed to abandon the siege of Athens, but
retained control of Piraeus and the Attic border forts (the decree of 283/2 honoring
Philippides [IG II2 657 ll. 34–7] shows that the recovery of Piraeus and the border forts
remained a primary aim of Athenian policy; cf. Shear, Jr. [1978] 2–4; Habicht [1979] 78
n. 13; Hammond and Walbank 231).
While Demetrius and Sostratus hammered out the terms of the agreement, or
perhaps shortly after the conclusion of the talks, Demetrius also entered into negotiations
with Pyrrhus, for Plutarch states that the two kings reached a peace agreement just before
Demetrius departed for Asia (Plut. Pyrr. 12.8.12; Dreyer [1999] 219; Paschidis [2008]
148; cf. Manni Demetrio 59; Shear [1978] 86 n. 235). When and where these negotiations
took place is obscure, but the Athenians did not begin to honor the principal figures in the
revolt until 286/5, the same year that Demetrius’ bitter foe Demochares returned from
exile, suggesting that the talks involving Demetrius, Sostratus and the Athenians, on the
one hand, and Demetrius and Pyrrhus, on the other, dragged on through the winter of
287/6, and that Demetrius probably did not depart for Asia until early 286 (Dreyer [1996]
64–7 and [1999] 220; Paschidis [2008] 137 n. 2; cf. Mastrocinque [1979a] 55; Marasco
[1985] 153).
46.4.2 συναγαγὼν ὅσαι νῆες…  Λυσιµάχου Καρίαν καὶ Λυδίαν ἀποστήσων: The
invasion force that Demetrius led to Asia in 286 was a far cry from the grand expedition
he had envisioned only a few years before when he could call on the considerable human
and natural resources of Macedonia (on the scale of Demetrius’ preparations see above n.
43.3.5). The full extent of his remaining possessions in central and southern Greece is
uncertain (cf. Hammond and Walbank 233; Gabbert 19), but they included Demetrias and
some other cities in Thessaly (see below ns. 47 and 53), Elateia in Phocis (FD III 4.220),
Chalcis and the cities of Euboea (Picard Chalcis 263–7), Corinth, and Piraeus and the
Attic fortresses (see above n. 46.4.1). What percentage of his total available manpower
Demetrius took to Asia and how many soldiers he left behind on garrison duty or with his
son Antigonus, who was charged with overseeing the Antigonid realm in Greece, is also
obscure. Even if he lost every one of his warships in Macedonian waters to either Pyrrhus
or Lysimachus (so Hammond and Walbank 232), Demetrius must still have possessed a

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formidable fleet (pace Grainger [1990] 168), for he retained control of his major ports
and shipbuilding hubs—Demetrias, Chalcis, Piraeus, and Corinth. The funds to man,
equip, and maintain these ships, the recently constructed “fifteen” and “sixteen” in
particular (see ns. 31.2.2, 43.4.1, 53.2.3), was another matter entirely, and the manner in
which Demetrius conducted his final campaign suggests that his invasion fleet consisted
largely of troop and horse transports (cf. Murray 124–25), and the vast majority of his
warships were laid up in the harbors of his key ports in mainland Greece (Athens during
the Lamian War presents an interesting parallel: although epigraphic records indicate that
more than 400 warships were housed in the Piraeus shipsheds before the war broke out,
the Athenians were unable to secure the manpower necessary to put even half of these
vessels to sea; IG II2 1627; IG II2 1628; P. Green, “Occupation and co-existence: the
impact of Macedon on Athens, 323-307,” in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.) The
Macedonians in Athens, 322–229 B.C. Oxford: 1–7,
(pp. 1-7), [2003a] 1–2; Blackman, Rankov, et al. [2013] 421). Demetrius’ diminished
resources necessitated a commensurate reduction in the scope of the campaign. In 288
Demetrius had aimed at nothing less than the reconstitution of his father’s Asian empire
(43.3.1); two years later his goals were considerably more modest. Without a fully
equipped naval siege force Demetrius could not hope to storm the fortified coastal cities
of Ionia garrisoned by Lysimachus, so he turned instead to softer targets in Caria and
Lydia (cf. Murray 124–25). The expedition should probably be seen as an opportunistic
raid aimed at raising the morale of his troops and acquiring the necessary funds to put his
fleet to sea. Once Demetrius replenished his war chest, he could once again contemplate a
full-scale campaign of conquest. Although the scope of the invasion was much reduced,
Lysimachus remained the immediate target (see above n. 43.3.1). Just as after the disaster
at Ipsus when he ravaged the Thracian Chersonnese, Demetrius aimed to recover his
strength at the expense of his most bitter rival (see above ns. 31.2.5–31.3.2).
Neither Pyrrhus nor Ptolemy would have been averse to the prospect of
Lysimachus and Demetrius wearing each other out in Anatolia (cf. 31.4.1), and both were
presumably eager to speed Demetrius on his way to Asia and go about consolidating their
territorial gains in Macedonia and the Aegean, respectively (on the division of former
Antigonid territory see above n. 44.11.1). Indeed, Lysimachus was not a party to the
agreements Demetrius reached with Pyrrhus and Ptolemy, and they seem to have been
intended to isolate him (Habicht [1979] 64; Marasco [1985]; Hammond and Walbank
232; Lund 101–02; Shear’s [1978, 50] vision of a general peace including Lysimachus
and Seleucus is highly unlikely given that Demetrius moved immediately to attack
Lysimachus). Thanks to the accord with Ptolemy, who now controlled at least part of the
Cyclades (see above n. 44.3.3), Demetrius’ fleet was able to cross the Aegean
unmolested. Although it is often assumed that Demetrius landed first at Miletus (Tarn
[1913] 106 n. 34; Hammond and Walbank 232; Errington [2008] 57; Murray 124) he
may in fact have made for Caunus on the southern Carian coast opposite Rhodes (so
Beloch [1925] 336–37; Manni [1951] 59; Wehrli 190; Mastrocinque [1979a] 55; Marasco
[1985] 153). Plutarch states that Demetrius’ fleet was stationed there, at least in the final,
desperate stages of the campaign (45.5.5–8)—and additional factors may well have
commended the city to Demetrius. Caunus boasted a fine, closed harbor suitable for
Demetrius’ invasion fleet (Strabo 14.2.3), and beginning the campaign in the extreme

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south of Lysimachus’ realm at a time when his forces seem to have been concentrated far
away in Macedonia (Plut. Pyrr. 12.8) afforded Demetrius precious extra time to secure
resources and rally support before his enemy could muster a response. A fragmentary
inscribed letter (I Caunus 1) from Demetrius to the Caunians found in 1999 in the
Temple of Apollo in Caunus seems to confirm that the city was the bridgehead for
Demetrius’ expedition. Demetrius mentions his arrival in the city and thanks the
Caunians for their support in the war with Lysimachus (ll. 4–5). Although the letter could
date to the period when Demetrius occupied Cilicia and clashed with Lysimachus (see
above ns. 20.8.1, 20.8.3), it sits more comfortably in the context of his final campaign (on
Demetrius’ occupation of Cilicia see above ns. 20.8.1; 32.4.1; on this letter, see C. Marek
Die Inschriften von Kaunos [München: 2006] 130–31). If Demetrius did land at Caunus,
it is likely that he marched north through central Caria towards Tralleis, reversing the
route of Antigonus’ Carian campaign of 313/12 (Diod. 19.75.5; on this campaign, see
Billows [1990] 121, erroneously citing Diod. 19.64.1–3), and then followed the
Maeander valley west towards Miletus, where he was met by Ptolemy’s wife Eurydice
(see below n. 46.5.1).
46.5.1 δέχεται δ' αὐτὸν Εὐρυδίκη περὶ Μίλητον ἀδελφὴ Φίλας: The wife of Ptolemy,
Eurydice was, like Demetrius’ first wife Phila, the daughter of Antipater and sister of
Cassander (App. Syr. 62; Paus. 1.6.8). She married Ptolemy in 321/0 and bore him
several children including Ptolemy Ceraunus, Lysandra (see above n. 31.5.5), and
Ptolemais (on the children of Eurydice, see Ogden 68–70). At some point Eurydice was
supplanted by her cousin Berenice as the predominant wife in the Ptolemaic court, and
Ptolemy eventually passed over Ceraunus as his successor, choosing instead his younger
son by Berenice, the future Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Since Plutarch (Pyrr. 4.4) indicates
that Berenice was already the most influential of Ptolemy’s wives when Demetrius sent
Pyrrhus to Alexandria as a hostage (ca. 298; see above n. 32.6.1), it is difficult to discern
if Eurydice, in “giving away” (ἐκδιδούσης, 46.5.5) her daughter Ptolemais to Demetrius,
was acting as Ptolemy’s representative, or if she had abandoned Egypt and was operating
on her own behalf (so Habicht [1979] 64–65; Errington [2008] 57). The recent peace
treaty concluded by Demetrius and Ptolemy (see above n. 46.4.1), and the fact that the
original betrothal of Demetrius and Ptolemais followed in the wake of an earlier
agreement between the two kings (32.7.1–2), suggests that Eurydice was indeed acting as
Ptolemy’s proxy (Buraselis [1982] 102–03; Marasco [1985] 153–54; Ogden 72), and the
marriage was meant to trumpet the resumption of good relations between the Antigonid
and Ptolemaic houses (Hammond and Walbank 232–33). Miletus was ostensibly under
the control of Lysimachus at the time of the nuptials (n. 35.5.2), and the willingness of
the Milesians to open their gates to Demetrius led Lysimachus to level a heavy indemnity
on the city after he regained it (I. Milet. 138; Mastrocinque [1979a] 59; Burstein [1980]
78; Lund 102). Murray [124] argues that since Eurydice received Demetrius “near
Miletus” (περὶ Μίλητον), the city must have denied him entry, but it is far more likely
that Eurydice led a deputation to meet Demetrius as he approached the city (on the
Hellenistic convention of greeting a visiting king outside the city, see Strootman [2014a]
234–41).
46.5.3 Πτολεµαΐδα…διὰ Σελεύκου: Seleucus had arranged the betrothal of Ptolemais to
Demetrius in 300 or 299 (see above n. 32.6.2).

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46.6.1 µετὰ τὸν γάµον εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς..,πόλεις τρέπεται: His frenzied activity in 286
shows that Demetrius did not tarry long with Ptolemais in Miletus, but the marriage was
consummated: Ptolemais bore Demetrius a son, and the child was named after his father
and nicknamed Kalos (“The Fair”; see below n. 53.8.3). Nothing is known of Ptolemais
after her marriage to Demetrius, but her grandson Antigonus Doson ruled as king in
Macedonia from 229–21, and the remarkable scholar Ptolemais of Cyrene, the only
woman in antiquity known to have written about music theory, may be her granddaughter
(F. Levin, Greek Reflections on the Nature of Music [Cambridge: 2009] 233–37).
46.6.1 ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις…βιαζόµενος: Epigraphical evidence supplements Plutarch’s
characteristically vague notice to some extent, but the reaction of the cities of
southwestern Asia Minor to the arrival of Demetrius is largely obscure (cf. the
speculative accounts of Beloch [1925] 336–7; Tarn [1913] 99; Lund 102–03; Grainger
[1990] 169; Errington [2008] 58). Since the primary aim of the campaign was the
acquisition of funds (see above n. 46.4.2), no doubt some cities closed their gates to
Demetrius while others found it more expedient to welcome the Besieger and contribute
to his war chest. Caunus and Miletus seem to have fallen into the latter camp (see above
ns. 46.4.2, 46.5.1) and Sardis was seized (n. 46.6.3), while documents inscribed on the
anta of the Temple of Athena Polias in Priene (I. Priene 14, 15) indicate that neighboring
Magnesia on the Maeander supported Demetrius, while the citizens of Priene maintained
their allegiance to Lysimachus and resisted attempts by Demetrius, or his Magnesian
partisans, to enter the city (whether or not they were successful is uncertain; on these
documents see esp. Sherwin-White [1985] 79–80). The clever ruse by which Lycus,
Lysimachus’ general, seized Ephesus (Poly. 5.19) has been cited as evidence that
Demetrius also took that city (McNicoll 94), but the stratagem probably dates to 295 or
294 (see above n. 35.5.2).
46.6.3 Σάρδεις…στρατιὰν κοµίζοντες: The capture of Sardis, the principal city of
Lydia, is further indication that Demetrius did indeed target Caria and Lydia (see above
n. 46.4.2). The generals and soldiers that defected to Demetrius were probably drawn
from Lysimachus’ garrison at Sardis, and perhaps others in the area. Thus, the meager
evidence that we have suggests that the early stages of the expedition were largely
successful (Marasco [1985] 155; see above n. 46.6.1).
46.7.1 ἐπερχοµένου δ' Ἀγαθοκλέους…εἰς Φρυγίαν: Once Demetrius invaded Anatolia
a response from Lysimachus was inevitable, yet the arrival of Agathocles at the head of a
powerful force seems somehow to have taken Demetrius by surprise. Perhaps Demetrius
expected Lysimachus to continue to commit the bulk of his forces to Macedonia, where
the tenuous power-sharing arrangement with Pyrrhus threatened to collapse under the
weight of mutual suspicion, and, to be sure, the recent peace between Demetrius and
Pyrrhus can only have heightened the tension in Macedonia (for the division of
Macedonia see above n. 44.10.5; on the tension between Pyrrhus and Lysimachus see
Plut. Pyrr. 12.1–3). However, Lysimachus was not about to allow Demetrius to operate
with impunity in Asia Minor: he convinced Pyrrhus to attack Demetrius’ garrisons in
Thessaly (Plut. Pyrr. 12.8.3–4), a diplomatic feat that neatly defused the situation in
Macedonia and freed him to send Agathocles to deal with Demetrius (Marasco [1985]
155). Demetrius had trusted Pyrrhus to honor his agreements in the past and lost his

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Macedonian kingdom as a result (see above n. 44.5.1). Evidently he did not take the
lesson to heart.
Agathocles must have managed to cut Demetrius off from his fleet and lines of
supply, forcing him to withdraw from Sardis into Phrygia (Lund 103; cf. Wehrli 189), but
the movements of Agathocles and the size of his army are lost (cf. Mastrocinque [1979a]
54–56; Hammond and Walbank 234; Lund 103). Demetrius’ choice to withdraw rather
than face Agathocles suggests that the latter led a significantly larger force. An enigmatic
decree from Troezen (IG IV 750) honoring three men for their efforts in securing the
release of prisoners held in Caria may indicate that a battle took place in which soldiers
from a Troezenian contingent in Demetrius’ army were captured by Agathocles, but there
is no mention of Demetrius in the heavily restored inscription, and it is far from certain
that the captives were soldiers (the stele on which the decree was inscribed is now lost,
but the captives seems to have included women and children [l. 3]; cf. Mastrocinque
[1979a] 60 with n. 6; Bielman 69–73; Paschidis [2008] 226–29). Phrygia was the
heartland of the Antigonid empire until Ipsus and Demetrius had resided there, probably
in Celaenae (ns. 3.2.1, 6.5.4), for much of his youth. With his path to the coast blocked
by Agathocles, Demetrius may have hoped to rally support in Phrygia. If so, he was
disappointed and forced to set his sights farther east, where yet more disappointment
awaited. Agathocles was presumably content to see the back of Demetrius, but continued
to monitor his movements. Once he learned that Demetrius had crossed the Taurus range
into Cilicia, Agathocles sent troops to fortify the Cilician Gates, precluding any return
(see below n. 47.2.5).
46.7.2 ἀνέβαινεν…ἐχόντων: Beginning with Polybius (Polyb. 3.6.10), the Asian
provinces east of the Tigris are consistently referred to as the “Upper Satrapies” (Polyb.
3.6.10; 5.40.5–7). Demetrius’ decision to flee Agathocles and make for the “Upper
Satrapies” (here τῶν ἄνω πραγµάτων; Diodorus consistently refers to αἱ ἄνω
σατραπείαι) recalls that of Eumenes, who moved east into Iran in an attempt to tap the
military resources of the Upper Satrapies when Antigonus moved against him with a
superior force in 318 (Diod. 18.73.2–4; 19.12.3; Bosworth [2002] 103–09; Anson [2014]
182; for the diverse force assembled in the Upper Satrapies by Peucestas at that time, see
Diod. 19.14.2–7). Antigonus followed, making his way to Ecbatana in Media, which he
hoped to use as a base “to gain control of the Upper Satrapies” (Diod. 19.19.2).  When
Demetrius devised his own plan to make for Armenia and Media, the ruler of the Upper
Satrapies was Antiochus, husband of Demetrius’ daughter Stratonice (38.1.4–6), but it
seems unlikely that Demetrius expected to be received with enthusiasm when he marched
into the realm of his son-in-law at the head of an army, and his decision to move east
smacks of desperation (see below n. 46.9.2; cf. Marasco [1985] who argues that
Demetrius may have moved east to take refuge with his daughter in the hope that she
could intercede on his behalf with Antiochus and Seleucus).
46.9.2 διαµαρτία τις γενοµένη περὶ τὴν τοῦ Λύκου: Several Anatolian rivers bear the
name Lycus, but Plutarch probably refers either to the modern Kelkit or Germeli Cay, a
tributary of the Iris in Pontus, or to the main tributary of the Maeander in Phrygia. Further
complicating matters is the fact that Demetrius and his force may in fact have crossed
both of these rivers as they retreated from the relentless Agathocles in the summer of 286.

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Polyaenus (4.7.9) also mentions the fording of a Lycus, but his account differs
substantially from Plutarch’s and does nothing to resolve the potential onomastic
confusion. He identifies the Lycus only as “a very rapid river impassable for infantry but
fordable for cavalry,” and describes how Demetrius used his cavalry to attenuate the
force of the current, allowing his infantry to make the difficult crossing (Perdiccas
employed elephants for this purpose while fording the Nile; Diod. 18.35.1). Most
commenators assume that Plutarch refers to the Pontic river (W. Ruge, RE s.v. Lycus [8]
allows for either identification but considers the tributary of the Iris more likely; Manni
[1951] 87, n. 46; Marasco [1985] 162 n. 102; Santi Amantini 370; Andrei 248 n. 338),
but the ramifications of this identification have not been adequately considered.
Plutarch’s description of Demetrius’ withdrawal into Phrygia is vague, but he
probably moved southeast from Sardis into the Maeander valley as he made his way
towards Celaenae, the former seat of his father’s Asian empire and his boyhood home
(ns. 2.1.1, 6.5.4). After reaching the confluence of the Maeander and the Lycus south of
Tripolis, this route continues east up the Lycus valley and then veers northeast to
Celaenae (on the Lycus valley, see the lyrical description in W. M. Ramsey, The cities
and bishoprics of Phrygia: being an essay of the local history of Phrygia from the
earliest time to the Turkish conquest (Band 1,1): The Lycos Valley and South-Western
Phrygia [Oxford: 1895] esp. 4–5). Strabo (12.8.16) calls the Lycus “a river of good size,”
and Demetrius will have had to cross it west of the site where Antiochus II went on to
found Laodicea on the Lycus in the mid-3rd century. If we place the disastrous crossing
here, it follows that Demetrius abandoned his plans to make for the Upper Satrapies (n.
46.7.2) relatively soon after leaving Sardis. In this scenario, he continued on to Celaenae
after losing a great number of men at the Phrygian Lycus; from there his route will have
mirrored that of Alexander in 333: northeast to Gordium and Ancyra, and then southeast
to Tyana and the Cilician Gates (on this route, see n. 47.1.1). But the identification of the
Lycus with the tributary of the Maeander is seemingly precluded by Plutarch’s assertion
that, after the disaster, Demetrius was forced to “retrace his steps” (ἀνῆγεν ὀπίσω)
before he “descended from the interior into Tarsus” (καταβὰς εἰς Ταρσόν, 47.1). This
suggests that he continued northeast from Ancyra across the Anatolian plateau, making
the Lycus in Pontus the more likely candidate. The major East-West road linking
Bithynia and Armenia running through the Lycus valley lends further support to the
identification, since it was the natural route for Demetrius if he was, as Plutarch states,
making for Armenia and Media (on this road, see McGing, 6; Eckert 47).
Despite his longstanding ties to Phrygia, Demetrius was evidently not able to rally
sufficient support risk a full-scale engagement with Agathocles. Demetrius’ army may
have had the upper hand in skirmishes with their pursuers (46.8), but they quickly will
have encountered insuperable problems of supply. Most of Phrygia and Cappadocia is not
suitable for cultivation, and the meager agricultural resources of the Antaolian plateau
were insufficient to support even Demetrius’ relatively small army (on the resources of
the Anatolian plateau see Engels 37–39). Demetrius’ route from Lydia to Pontus is
uncertain (see above n. 46.9.2), but it will have taken more than a month, perhaps
considerably more, to traverse the c. 1100 km (40 days at a marching rate of thirty two
kilometers per day with 6 halts; 56 days at a rate of twenty four kilometers per day with
ten halts). Demetrius was in no position to arrange for the advance depots necessary to

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sustain an army marching through regions where supplies are difficult to obtain, and there
can be no doubt that the suffering in his army was immense (on the necessity of such
depots see Engels 40–41).
Demetrius’ route will have taken him from Celaenae on to Gordium and Ancyra
He could then move northeast across the Anatolian plateau into the Lycus valley in
Pontus, perhaps on the road terminating at Cabira, where Mithridates VI later built a
palace (Strabo 12.3.30). It is possible that Demetrius and his army forded the Lycus near
Cabira, or further east at a bend in the river close to modern Koyulhisar, where the
remains of two ancient bridges can be seen near the modern bridge (on this crossing, see
A. Bryer amd D. Winfield, The Byzantine Monuments and Topography of the Pontos v. 1
[Washington, D.C.: 1985] 118; on the proverbially fertile Phanaroea plain, see n. XXIX:
The Battle of Ipsus). Regardless of exactly where Demetrius forded the Lycus, by the
time he reached this river in Pontus even the least geographically conversant of his troops
will have had good reason to suspect that they were headed for Armenia and Media (τοῖς
στρατιώταις δι' ὑποψίας ἦν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀρµενίαν καὶ Μηδίαν ἐκτοπίζων, 46.8). After the
brutal march from Sardis and the debacle at the Lycus, one wonders if Demetrius still
harbored hopes of reaching the Upper Satrapies. More encouraging, perhaps, was the
possibility that he might find aid and refuge in the nascent Pontic kingdom of his old
friend Mithridates (cf. Beloch [1925] 235 who suggests that Demetrius hoped his
friendship with Mithridates would secure him safe passage to Armenia).
Mithridates had spent the previous 15 years consolidating his control of the
region, had claimed the royal title for more than a decade, and presumably was in a
position to support an old friend who was in desperate need. The sickness and famine that
ravaged Demetrius’ army after the crossing of the Lycus (n. 47.1.1), however, suggest
that he found neither. Nothing is known of the relationship of Demetrius and Mithridates
after the latter’s flight from the camp of Antigonus (see above n. 4.1.3), but it is likely
that the king of Pontus was now allied to Lysimachus (Bosworth and Wheatley 164). To
help Demetrius would be to risk his kingdom, and with Agathocles and his army
operating in Anatolia, Mithridates could hardly afford to intervene. Demetrius was forced
to change course once again, heading south over the Taurus range into Cilicia (see below
n. 47.1.3; he certainly did not advance into Armenia and Media, as Hammond and
Walbank [234] contend).
46.10.5 τέκνον τυφλοῦ γέροντος Ἀντιγόνου, τίνας χώρους ἀφίγµεθα;: A clever
adaptation of the opening lines of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus in which the blind
Oedipus questions his daughter Antigone as they wander in the wilderness: Τέκνον
τυφλοῦ γέροντος, Ἀντιγόνη, τίνας/ χώρους ἀφίγµεθ' ἢ τίνων ἀνδρῶν πόλιν;.
Plutarch has the soldier subtly alter the line so that it refers to Demetrius as the son of the
blind Antigonus, who was in fact blind in one eye (Duff 2012 n. 109).
XLVII
47.1.1 Τέλος…ἀποβαλών: Demetrius arrived in Caria in the spring of 286 with 11,000
infantry and a cavalry force of uncertain size (46.4). Although he seems to have enrolled
additional troops who defected from Lysimachus in Lydia (46.6.3–5), the 8,000 men
Plutarch claims Demetrius lost to famine and disease almost certainly represented the

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majority of his army. The figure may seem fantastically large, but once Agathocles cut
Demetrius off from the coast and forced him east into Phrygia (see above n. 46.7.1), his
army will quickly have encountered insuperable problems of supply. Most of Phrygia and
Cappadocia is not suitable for cultivation and the meager agricultural resources of the
Antaolian plateau were insufficient to support even Demetrius’ relatively small army (on
the resources of the Anatolian plateau see Engels 37–39). Demetrius’ route from Lydia to
Pontus is uncertain (see above n. 46.9.2), but it will have taken more than a month,
perhaps considerably more, to traverse the c. 1000 km (36 days at a marching rate of
thirty two kilometers per day with 5 halts; 48 days at a rate of twenty four kilometers per
day with six halts). Demetrius was in no position to arrange for the advance depots
necessary to sustain an army marching through regions where supplies are difficult to
obtain, and there can be no doubt that the suffering in his army was immense (on the
necessity of such depots, see Engels 40–41).
47.2.1 ἀνῆγεν ὀπίσω…καταβὰς εἰς Ταρσόν: If Demetrius was seeking refuge with
Mithridates in Pontus he did not find it (see above n. 46.9.2), although he must have been
able to secure supplies, perhaps in the fertile Phanaroea plain, before setting out for the
Cilician city of Tarsus (on the fertility of this plain see above n. XXIX: The Battle of
Ipsus). Demetrius had previously regained his strength in Cilicia after the defeats at Gaza
and Ipsus, but if he hoped to do so again he and his remaining troops would have to
complete yet another daunting journey (for Demetrius’ previous stays in Cilicia see above
ns.). As usual the exact route cannot be determined, but he probably moved west (thus
briefly “retracing his steps”; ἀνῆγεν ὀπίσω) to pick up the major trade route running
south from Amisus on the Black Sea to Zela in Pontus and thence to Mazaka in
Cappadocia (on this route, see McGing 4). From Mazaka, Demetrius could move south to
Tyana and then cross the Taurus via the Cilician gates, emulating the route of Alexander
in 333 (for Alexander’s use of this route, see Engels 39). The journey of c. 600 km.,
through some of the most desolate terrain in Anatolia, must have consumed the better
part of a month (22 days at 32 km. per day with three halts; 29 days at 24 km. per day
with four halts), and it was probably well into autumn 286 when Demetrius arrived in
Cilicia.
47.2.2 οὔσης ὑπὸ Σελεύκῳ: Seleucus probably occupied Cilicia at some point soon after
Demetrius withdrew from the region in 296 (see ns. 20.8.3, 32.4.1).
47.2.5 Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἀπετείχισε (The death of Agathocles): In his campaign against
Demetrius in 286, Agathocles proved that he was fully deserving of his father’s trust. He
successfully maneuvered Demetrius out of Lysimachus’ territory without ever risking a
large engagement, ensuring that it was Seleucus who would ultimately be forced to deal
with Demetrius. Despite his obvious abilities, Agathocles would soon fall from grace
amid dynastic strife in the court of Lysimachus (Paus. 1.10.3–4). He was imprisoned by
his father and subsequently murdered, perhaps by Ptolemy Ceraunus, a fugitive son of
Ptolemy I (Memnon FGrH 434 F6.6–7; on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Agathocles see esp. Saitta 139–40; Lund 191–98; Ogden 57–62; Carney [2013] 44–48).
47.3.3 ἀνδρὸς οἰκείου: Demetrius’ daughter Stratonice had married first Seleucus and
then his son Antiochus (see above ns. 32.2.2, 38.1.3).

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47.4.4 Πατροκλῆς…  φίλος πιστός: Patrocles is almost certainly the same key Seleucid
lieutenant that evacuated Babylon and exploited the defensive potential of the
watercourses of the region in the face of Demetrius’ invasion in 311 (Diod. 19.100.5; see
above n. 7.3.1). At some point after Demetrius’ capture, Patrocles explored the Caspian
Sea and reported his findings to Seleucus (Strabo 11.5–7; Pliny HN 6.17.58; on Patrocles
see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt; Grainger [1990] 111; M.F. Williams in BNJ 712).
47.5.1 ὁ Σέλευκος…δυνάµεως: It is possible that Seleucus’ original offer to aid
Demetrius was simply a ploy to allow him time to mobilize this force, and the supposed
role of Patrocles in Seleucus’ change of heart reflects the apologetic invention of a pro-
Seleucid source (Lund 104). In either case, subsequent events show that Seleucus’ arrival
in Cilicia followed soon after that of Demetrius in the autumn of 286 (see below n.
47.6.3).
47.6.3 ὑπέστειλε τοῖς ὀχυρωτάτοις τοῦ Ταύρου: Demetrius could hardly withdraw
into the high Taurus in winter, and his retreat to the mountains and Seleucus’ subsequent
offer to allow Demetrius and his army to winter in Cataonia (see below n. 48.1.2) indicate
that these events took place in late autumn 286.
XLVIII
48.1.2 δύο µῆνας ἐν τῇ Καταονίᾳ χειµάσαι (The winter of 286/5): The chronology is
controversial, but placing everything that transpired from Demetrius’ arrival in Caria to
his surrender in Syria in the campaign season of 286 (so Will 95; H. Bengtson Storia
greca II. La Grecia ellenistica e romana [Bologna: 1988] 162) demands a compression of
events that is unfeasible, if not impossible (Tarn [1913] 100 n. 21 establishes the
essentials of the chronology adopted here; cf. Shear, Jr. [1978] 86 n. 235, with earlier
bibliography; Marasco [1985] 156; Grainger [1990] 171–72; Wheatley [1997] 22–23;
Dreyer [1999] 203; Anson [2014] 182). Demetrius’ ability not only to move freely back
and forth over the Amanus range but also to spend a forty day convalescence in these
same mountains (see below n. 48.5.1) confirms that the final struggle with Seleucus and
Demetrius’ ultimate surrender belong to the spring or summer of 285. Thus, Demetrius
did indeed spend the winter of 286/5 in Anatolia, although Plutarch’s compressed
narrative gives the opposite impression. Where he did this is uncertain, but Demetrius
may in fact have accepted Seleucus’ offer and wintered in Cataonia, a rugged region of
east-central Anatolia whose geographical limits are poorly specified for this period (on
Cataonia, see Briant 711–13; Santi Amantini [370] places the region in northern
Cappadocia, Andrei [250 n. 346] opt for southern Cappadocia; Marasco [1985] accepts
that Demetrius wintered in Cataonia without discussion; Grainger [1990, 171] locates the
region north of the Taurus, notes that “winter in Cataonia is not a pleasant prospect,” and
has Demetrius winter in Cilicia without further discussion). This is the only mention of
the region in Plutarch’s extant corpus, but Strabo’s initial description of Cataonia places
it north of the Taurus, in a level plain amid the rugged mountains of the anti-Taurus range
corresponding roughly to the modern Tufanbeyli district of Adana province, Turkey
(Strabo 12.2.2; cf. Grainger [1990] [170–71]; Santi Amantini [370]). But Anatolia north
of the Taurus was ostensibly in the realm of Lysimachus and could not, in any case, be
reached from Cilicia without passing through the Cilician Gates, which were controlled
by the hostile Agathocles (see above n. 47.2.1). However, Strabo’s conception of

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Cataonia seems to be an expansive one, since he moves on to discuss the city of
Castabala without indicating a change of region (Strabo 12.2.7; Briant 711). Castabala
(near modern Kirmitli) is just south of the Taurus on the Pyramus River in the
northeastern corner of Cilicia. The city is strategically located just west of the Cilician
terminus of the Amanic Gates, one of two key passes controlling passage between Cilicia
and Syria. Polyaenus (4.9.5) also attests Demetrius’ presence in this area in a passage that
is either ignored or attributed to the wrong historical context by modern scholars (Bar-
Kochva 114; Grainger [1990] 172). He describes Seleucus dispatching an officer to
fortify the Amanic Gates lest Demetrius attempt to move into Syria from his camp
beneath the Taurus (Δηµητρίου στρατοπεδεύοντος ὑπὸ τοῖς λόφοις Ταύρου; Bar-
Kochva [114] gets Polyaenus exactly backwards, arguing that Seleucus occupied the
Amanic passes before the final battle in Cyrrhestice, thus preventing Demetrius from
fleeing into Cilicia). If Demetrius wintered in the area around Castabala, Polyaenus and
Plutarch are not at odds on the site of Demetrius’ camp, and Plutarch’s account of the
subsequent struggle for control of that pass is more readily comprehensible (on the
Amanus passes, see n. 48.1.4).
48.1.4 τὰς εἰς Συρίαν ἀπετείχιζεν ὑπερβολάς: The Amanus range runs southwest to
northeast and acts as a border and a barrier separating Cilicia and Syria. Several strategic
passes control access between Anatolia and the plain of Antioch, most notably the Syrian
Gates (Belen pass) and the Amanic Gates (Bahçe pass). The Syrian Gates cross the
southern Amanus, linking the plain of Antioch and the Gulf of Issus, while the Amanic
gates control the route over the northern extension of the range. The passes linking Syria
and Cilicia played important roles in the movements preceding the battle of Issus in 333.
After Alexander’s general Parmenio occupied the Syrian Gates, the Persian King Darius
crossed into Cilicia via the Amanic Gates and descended into the plain of Issus (on the
passes see Xen. Anab. 1.4.4; Polyb. 12.17.2; Cic. ad fam. 15.4; Curt. 3.18; Pliny HN 5.27;
Arr. Anab. 2.4.3; 2.7.1). If Demetrius spent the winter of 286/5 near the western entrance
to the Amanic Gates in Cilicia (see above n. 48.1.2), Seleucus’ decision to fortify the
passes as a precautionary measure was a prudent one.
ὡς θηρίον: The simile appears in this form on only one other occasion in Plutarch. After
his children are treacherously handed over to the Roman forces occupying Samothrace,
the Macedonian King Perseus surrenders “like a wild beast” (ὡς θηρίον) whose young
have been captured (Plut. Aem. 26.6.4). The surrender of Perseus marked the end of the
Antigonid dynasty that had ruled Macedonia for five generations (see below n. 53.2.3; for
similar language likening Demetrius to a wild animal see 49.2 [θηρίῳ δεινῷ]; Comp. 6.4
[καθάπερ τὰ ζῷα]).
48.1.6 καὶ τήν τε χώραν κατέτρεχε: By the time they arrived in Cilicia in 286,
Demetrius’ remaining troops had essentially traversed Anatolia and seen the majority of
their fellows fall victim to hunger and disease. If Plutarch’s figures are remotely
accurate—he claims Demetrius arrived in Caria with more than 11,000 men (46.4.2),
enrolled an unspecified number of additional troops in Lydia (46.1.3–5), and lost at least
8,000 men en route from Lydia to Cilicia (47.1.2–3)—Demetrius emerged from winter
quarters early in 285 with an army that was unlikely to have exceeded 10,000 men and
may in fact have been significantly smaller. These survivors were demoralized, perhaps

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mutinous, and Demetrius may have allowed his troops to plunder Cilicia in an attempt to
raise morale. Alexander and his Successors frequently sought to regain the favor of
exhausted and demoralized soldiers by giving them free rein to plunder the territory of
enemies or rivals (e.g. Diod. 17.94.4 [Alexander]; Plut. Eum. 8.10–11 [Eumenes]; see
below n. 48.6.2; on this practice, see now J. Roisman, Alexander’s Veterans and the
Early Wars of the Successors [Austin, Texas: 2012] 33–34). Plundering Cilicia could
only lead to war with Seleucus, but Demetrius had little choice: if he did not reward the
loyalty of his surviving soldiers he risked losing them to desertion.
τῷ Σελεύκῳ προσβάλλοντι συµπλεκόµενος ἀεὶ πλέον εἶχε: When Seleucus appeared
in Cilicia with a large force in 286, Demetrius immediately withdrew into the Taurus
mountains (47.6). Seleucus presumably withdrew to Syria with his army late in 286 after
granting Demetrius leave to quarter his own troops for the winter in Cataonia (see above
n. 48.1.2). Thus, when Demetrius’ troops began plundering Cilicia early in 285, Seleucus
was probably still east of the Amanus range. It follows that Demetrius’ successes were
achieved not against a royal army led by Seleucus, but against the king’s Cilician
garrisons (Grainger [1990] 171 argues implausibly that Seleucus effectively ceded
Cilicia to Demetrius and withdrew all his troops from the region late in 286. He also
places the skirmishes of early 285 east of the Amanus in Syria, although Plutarch clearly
puts them in Cilicia).
48.2.1 τῶν δρεπανηφόρων: Xenophon (Cyr. 6.1.27) attributes the invention of the
scythed chariot to Cyrus the Great, and they remained a fixture in the armies of the
Persian and Seleucid empires for centuries. Seleucus reportedly brought 120 scythed
chariots to Ipsus in 301, but there is no indication that they figured in the battle (see
above n. 28.6.1; on the performance of scythed chariots in Seleucid armies see Bar-
Kochva 83). The persistent use of these weapons is rather curious considering their
generally dismal record when deployed against disciplined Greek and Roman armies (e.g.
Diod. 17.58.2–5; Curt. 4.15.14–17; Livy 37.41; App. Mith. 12.42), but they were capable
of wreaking havoc on scattered troops involved in foraging (e.g. Xen. Hell. 4.1.17–19).
Perhaps the Seleucid officer who sent the scythed chariots against Demetrius’ troops
hoped to catch them disorganized as they heedlessly plundered Cilicia (see above n.
48.1.6). If so he was mistaken. The ease with which Demetrius avoids the charge of
Seleucus’ chariots recalls Plutarch’s account of the battle of Chaeronea in 89 B.C. in
which Sulla’s Roman troops, after easily repulsing an attack by scythed chariots in the
army of Mithridates, “clapped their hands and laughed and asked for more, just as they
are accustomed to do at the races” (Sulla 18.3.7–9; οἱ Ῥωµαῖοι µετὰ κρότου καὶ
γέλωτος ἄλλα ᾔτουν, ὥσπερ εἰώθασιν ἐν ταῖς θεατρικαῖς ἱπποδροµίαις; Plutarch is
exceptionally well informed on the history of Boeotia in general, and his hometown of
Chaeronea in particular).
48.2.2 τῶν εἰς Συρίαν…ὑπερβολῶν ἐκράτησε: Plutarch must refer here to the major
pass over the northern Amanus, the Amanic Gates (Bahçe pass; see below n. 48.6.2)
48.3.3 παρεσκευάζετο…  ἐπιφέρουσαν: Plutarch greatly exaggerates the degree of
Demetrius’ recovery in order to intensify the drama of his final reversal of fortune. His
success against Seleucus’ troops in Cilicia and seizure of the Amanic Gates may have
emboldened Demetrius and his soldiers, but they did not pose a viable threat to Seleucus,

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who could call on the military resources of an immense empire (Marasco [1985] 156;
Grainger [1990] 170; Tarn [1913, 99] goes Plutarch one better, claiming that Seleucus
“trembled even for his throne, and men flocked to his [Demetrius’] banner believing that
he would win a third kingdom.”).
48.5.1 νόσος…διέφθειρεν: Demetrius had recovered from another serious illness in
Macedonia only a few years prior to this episode, but the nature of the ailment cannot be
identified in either case. Engels (225–26) has argued convincingly that Alexander
contracted malaria in the summer of 333 in Cilicia, a notoriously malarial region until
relatively recently, and it is possible that Demetrius did the same in the spring of 285,
although it should be noted that the majority of pernicious attacks occur during summer
and early autumn (Engels 226; on Alexander’s illness, which debilitated him for more
than a month, see Curt. 3.5.3ff.; Just. 11.8.4; Arr. Anab. 2.4.7–8; Plut. Alex. 19.1–5). In
any case, three decades of nearly constant campaigning, at least two serious wounds
(33.4; 40.5), and a proverbially dissolute lifestyle will have left Demetrius particularly
susceptible to illness (see below n. 52.5.2). On Demetrius’ convalescence, see 48.6.2.
48.6.2 ῥαΐσας…Κυρρηστικῆς: Demetrius’ sudden descent into Syria when Seleucus’
scouts expected him to march on Cilicia confirms that he had gained control of one of the
major passes over the Amanus and maintained that control while he recovered from a
serious illness (n. 48.5.1). This was almost certainly the Amanic Gates (Bahçe pass) since
the Syrian terminus of that pass is in Cyrrhestice, a region of northern Syria between the
Amanus and the Euphrates where Demetrius was active after crossing the mountains (on
the Bahçe pass and the nearby, but considerably more difficult Hasanbeyli pass, see T.A.
Sinclair Eastern Turkey: An Architectural and Archaeological Survey, Volume IV
[London: 1990] 313ff.). Demetrius must have known that he would quickly be confronted
by Seleucus and forced to fight against an army that dwarfed his own if he invaded Syria,
but he was desperate and Cyrrhestice provided a ready source of plunder for his
remaining troops (cf. 48.1.6).
XLIX
49.1.1 Ἐπιφανέντος…ἐγγύς: In the spring or early summer of 285, the two armies were
encamped east of the Amanus in Cyrrhestice (see above n. 48.6.2), perhaps in the vicinity
of the region’s principal city Cyrrhus (Bar-Kochva 114). Founded by either Seleucus or
Antigonus (E. Honnigman RE s.v. Κυρρός col. 191; Cohen [2006] 181), Cyrrhus
occupies a hill overlooking the narrow valley of the Afrin River (modern Nahr ‘Ifrin; see
below n. 49.3.2), a tributary of the Orontes that flows around the city to the north and east
(Grainger [1990] 172 incorrectly places Cyrrhus in the valley of the Labotas).
49.1.2 ἀναστήσας…ἀπῆγεν: The risks involved with attacking an enemy camp by night
were proverbial (see e.g. Thuc. 7.44), but a surprise night attack offered Demetrius
virtually his only chance to inflict a defeat on Seleucus and his much larger army
(Demetrius presumably had only a few thousand men, see above n. 47.1.1). In planning
the attack, Demetrius may even have been inspired by his opponent. In 311 Seleucus,
with an army of only 3,400 men, defeated a force five time larger than his own when he
surprised Nicanor, satrap of Media and an Antigonid partisan, with a perfectly executed
night attack near the Tigris River in Babylonia (Diod. 19.92.1–3). Nicanor escaped but

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virtually his entire army defected to Seleucus (19.92.4). Having obtained a formidable
force in the course of a single night, Seleucus launched a campaign of conquest in the
Upper Satrapies (Diod. 19.92.5; for Demetrius’ purported designs on the Upper Satrapies
see above n. 46.7.2). Demetrius’ hopes of emulating Seleucus were dashed when the
latter received intelligence of the impending attack. According to Polyaenus (4.9.2),
whose account of the abortive night attack largely accords with Plutarch’s but includes
some additional details on military matters (n. 49.3.2), two Aetolian mercenaries in
Demetrius’ service brought word to Seleucus of the impending assault.
49.3.2 ἅµα δ' ἡµέρᾳ… µεθίσταντο: Since Demetrius was able to engage Seleucus’
larger army with some success, at least initially, the engagement probably took place in
the narrow Afrin valley where Seleucus was not able to fully exploit his numerical
advantage (Bar-Kochva 114; on the Afrin see above n. 49.1.1). In Polyaenus’ remarkably
similar account of the battle, Seleucus approaches Demetrius’ dispirited mercenaries at
the head of a picked force, removes his helmet, and exhorts them to abandon Demetrius
(4.9.2). Moved by Seleucus’ speech—no doubt the eight elephants and corps of elite
troops at his back made his arguments all the more persuasive—the majority of
Demetrius’ troops laid down their arms and joined Seleucus (cf. the defection of
Antigonid troops to Seleucus at Ipsus in 301, n. 29.6.1).
49.5.3 Ἀµανίδας ἔφευγε πύλας: To reach the forests of the Amanus Demetrius and the
small band of friends and attendants that fled the field with him had first to negotiate the
hills and defiles around Cyrrhus and then make their way east across the broad valley of
the Labotas river (modern Karasu). It is unclear if Demetrius fled towards the Syrian
gates (Belen pass) to the southwest or the Amanic gates (Bahçe pass) to the northwest—
Plutarch’s Amanidas pylas strongly suggests the latter, but he does not seem to be well
versed in the geography of the region and the appellation could conceivably be given to
any Amanic pass (cf. Strabo 14.5.18; on these passes see above n. 48.1.4). Although
Cyrrhus is roughly equidistant from the eastern termini of both passes, the familiar route
through Cyrrhestice to the Amanic gates will have been the more appealing option for
Demetrius, since he had utilized the pass only a few days before and could reasonably
expect to find it still free of Seleucid troops (see above n. 48.6.2). The journey from
Cyrrhus to the eastern terminus of the Amanic Gates is at least 50 km., much of it
through rugged country. After fighting a battle and covering this distance in a single day,
Demetrius and his companions must have been utterly exhausted when they arrived at the
pass only to find that Seleucus had anticipated their line of retreat (see below n. 49.8.1;
cf. Bar-Kochva 112 who puts Cyrrhus 35 km. from the [unspecified] “Amanus passes”).
49.5.6 Καῦνον…ἤλπιζεν: Demetrius’ final Asian expedition probably began at Caunus,
on the Carian coast opposite Rhodes (see above n. 46.4.2). The fleet that he hoped to find
there does not seem to have played any role in Demetrius’ activities after he was cut off
from the coast by the arrival of Agathocles (see above n. 46.4.2). To reach Caunus
Demetrius would have had to elude Seleucus’ patrols, cross the Amanus range, and then
traverse more than 1,000 kilometers of southern Anatolia; small wonder that his
companions soon counseled surrender (49.9.1–2).
Σωσιγένης: Demetrius’ faithful companion is otherwise unknown. It is just possible that
he is the same Sosigenes who presented a motion for a vote in the Athenian Assembly on

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26 Thargelion 304/3 (IG II2 485 ll.1–6). Only the prescript of the decree is preserved, but
it was passed on the fourth anniversary of Demetrius initial arrival in Piraeus (n. 8.5.1),
an appropriate occasion to honor the king or one of his associates.
49.8.1 πυρῶν…πολεµίων: Seleucus clearly anticipated Demetrius’ line of retreat and
sent troops to occupy the Amanus gates at some point after the latter moved into
Cyrrhestica (see above n. 49.5.3)
49.9.5 πέµπει…καθ' ἑαυτόν: Probably in the late spring or early summer of 285 (on the
date, see above n. 48.1.2; on the surrender of Demetrius, see Paus. 1.10.2; 1.16.1; 6.15.7;
6.16.2; Just. 16.2.6; Eusebius Chron. 1.247; Syncellus Chron. 321.13). Justin criticizes
him for choosing the coward’s way out and preferring captivity to suicide; cf. Plutarch’s
criticism of Perseus, last of the Antigonid kings, for choosing captivity rather than death:
“for this the coward had not the heart, but was made weak by no one knows what hopes,
and became part of his own spoils” (Aem. 34.3–4).
L
50.1.1 Ἀκούσας…διδούσῃ: Over the course of their long rivalry Demetrius and Ptolemy
had elevated the display of conspicuous magnanimity towards a defeated foe to
something of an art form (see 5.4–5: Ptolemy after Gaza; 6.4–5: Demetrius after the
defeat of Cilles; 17.1.3: Demetrius after Salamis; 38.1: Ptolemy after his conquest of
Cyprus). Seleucus was evidently planning a similar display before he was convinced that
welcoming Demetrius into his camp would be a potentially fatal mistake (see below n.
50.5.1).
50.3.1 Ἀπολλωνίδης…συνήθης: This may well be Apollonides, son of Charops, a friend
of Demetrius and a prominent Antigonid officer in the period 307–301. An Athenian
decree honoring Apollonides (IG II2 492) commemorates his role in the liberation of
Athens in 307 and his subsequent actions furthering the cause of Greek freedom. A
decree from Ephesus (Syll3 352) honoring Antigonus and Demetrius records that
Apollonides visited that city to convey the goodwill of the kings and to share good news
with the Ephesians, perhaps a report of Demetrius’ victory over Ptolemy at Salamis in
306 (Billows [1990] 370). The circumstances that prompted Apollonides to transfer his
allegiance to Seleucus are obscure, but it has been plausibly suggested that he was among
the Antigonid soldiers captured at Ipsus in 301 (Wehrli 125 n. 147; Billows [1990] 370;
cf. Andrei 256–57 n. 357).
50.5.1 τοῦτο…βασιλέως (Plutarch’s characterization of Seleucus): In Plutarch’s telling,
Seleucus is particularly susceptible to the influence of his friends and advisers and prone
to sudden changes of attitude that lead to dramatic policy reversals. He is hospitable and
urbane during the festivities leading up to his wedding to Stratonice but soon issues angry
demands for territory that are widely viewed as disgraceful (ἐδόκει βίαιος εἶναι καὶ δεινὰ
ποιεῖν, 32.7–8). His initial response to Demetrius’ request for aid in the aftermath of the
latter’s disastrous march to Cilicia is generous, but he is soon persuaded that Demetrius
represents a serious threat and marches against him with a large army, a volte face that
shocks Demetrius (ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος ἐκπλαγεὶς τῇ δι' ὀλίγου µεταβολῇ τοῦ Σελεύκου;
47.6.1–2). Finally, the obsequiousness of the courtiers who rush to pay court to

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Demetrius turns Seleucus’ compassion into envy (τοῦτο δ' ἐκείνῳ µὲν εἰς φθόνον
µετέβαλε τὸν ἔλεον) in a transformation that caps Plutarch’s characterization of
Seleucus as erratic and provides the final expression of one of the leitmotifs of the
biography— the insidious influence of flatterers on Demetrius and his rivals (cf. 10.2;
13.3; 17.2; 18.7; Intro.)
50.6.8 Παυσανίας: The Seleucid officer is known only from this episode (Lenschau, RE
s.v. Pausanias (9).
50.7.3 Χερρόνησον τὴν Συριακὴν: The “Syrian Chersonese” probably refers to Apamea
on the Orontes. Apamea was also referred to as Chersonese because it occupied a
peninsula created by a bend in the Orontes and a nearby lake (Strabo 16.2.10). This
identification is not inconsistent with a fragment of Diodorus (21.20) that names Pella as
the site of Demetrius’ captivity, since Strabo and a number of other sources confirm that
Pella was an earlier name for Apamea (Strabo 16.2.10; Eustathius Comment. on Dion.
Perig. 918; Stephanus s.v. Apameia; cf. App. Syr. 57). Pella was founded as a
Macedonian military colony (n. 6.5.3), but the identity of the founder is controversial and
arguments have been mounted for Alexander, Antigonus, and Seleucus (see Cohen
[2006] 122–123 with earlier bibliography). Seleucus renamed the city after his Bactrian
wife Apama, and Apamea became one of the principal cities of the Seleucid kingdom.
Demetrius was not unfamiliar with the area: nearly 30 years earlier, in the aftermath of
his victory over Cilles, he had encamped among the swamps and marshes near Apamea
to await the arrival of Antigonus (see above n. 6.5.4). Thus, after his final defeat and
capture, Demetrius declined and died in the same place that he had celebrated his first
victory as an independent commander.
50.9.5 Ἀντίοχος…διεθησόµενον: Seleucus had instituted a joint-kingship when he
appointed Antiochus and Stratonice as rulers of the “Upper Satrapies,” essentially the
eastern portion of the vast Seleucid realm, at some point after 294 (see above ns. 38.1.3,
46.7.2). The location of the seat of this eastern kingdom is uncertain, but Antiochus and
Stratonice seem to have been resident in Media (Diod. 21.20). According to Diodorus
(21.20), Seleucus wrote to Antiochus, advising him that he had decided to release
Demetrius and “restore him with great pomp to his throne, but wanted to give his son
joint credit for this kindness, since Antiochus had married Stratonice, the daughter of
Demetrius and had children with her.” Seleucus, however, evidently changed his mind
once again: there is no indication that Antiochus and Stratonice ever visited Apamea, and
Demetrius died in captivity, probably in 282 (see below n. 52.5.1; on Seleucus’ penchant
for sudden policy reversals see above n. 50.5.1).
LI
51.1.1 Ὁ δὲ Δηµήτριος…φίλοις (Plutarch’s sources for the final years of Demetrius’
life): Plutarch also describes Demetrius’ letter, which amounted to a formal abdication in
favor of his son (Santi Amantini 371; Wheatley [1997] 27), at Mor. 183C, and Gonatas
seems to have formally assumed the royal title before Demetrius’ death (Wheatley [1997]
27). The suggestion that Plutarch’s knowledge of this letter derives from Hieronymus is
entirely plausible (Hornblower 14). Hieronymus must have been at least in his seventies
by this time, and is seems certain that he did not accompany Demetrius to Asia, but

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remained in Greece with Gonatas, whose patronage he would enjoy until his death.
Plutarch’s account of Demetrius’ final campaign displays considerable knowledge of
Demetrius’ plans, considerations, and movements (cf. Bar-Kochva 114), for the period
after Demetrius fled Agathocles into Cilicia in particular (47–51). Plutarch’s source is
also familiar with the roles in the events surrounding the king’s surrender played by a
companion of Seleucus, (Patrocles, ns. 47.4.1, 47.5.1), and a former companion of
Demetrius (Apollonides, n. 50.3.1), preserves the identity of an obscure friend of
Demetrius (Sosigenes, n. 49.5.6) and the staggering amount of gold he carries in his belt,
and names the otherwise unknown Seleucid officer (Pausanias, n. 50.6.8) who took
Demetrius into custody. All of this suggests a first-hand account, and the ultimate source
for this material may be Demetrius himself. The letters Demetrius wrote to his son and
his supporters in Greece surely included an account of the events leading to his
imprisonment in Apamea. No doubt Hieronymus had access to Antigonid
correspondence, and, if his documented use of the commentarii of Pyrrhus is any
indication (Ἱερώνυµος…περὶ Πύρρον ἐν τοῖς βασιλικοῖς ὑποµνήµασιν, Pyrr. 21.12 =
Hieronymus FGrH 154 F12), he will have not have neglected to make use of these letters
for his account of Demetrius’ final years.
τὰς πόλεις… διαφυλάττειν (The position of Gonatas in Greece after the capture of
Demetrius; a failed Athenian attack on Piraeus): Antigonid possessions in Greece at the
time of Demetrius’ abdication amounted to little more than Corinth, Piraeus and the Attic
border forts, Chalcis, and Demetrias (cf. Tarn [1913] 114; Gabbert 19–20). Thus the
position of Gonatas in Thessaly and Attica was hardly secure. Encouraged by
Lysimachus, Pyrrhus attacked unspecified Antigonid garrisons in Thessaly (Plut. Pyrr.
12), but he must not have seized Demetrias, since Antigonus Gonatas buried his father
there in 282 (see below n. 52.5.3). For their part, the Athenians attempted to mount a
surprise attack on the Antigonid garrison in Piraeus at some point after Demetrius
departed for Asia in 286 (Paus. 1.29.10; Polyaenus 5.17.1). They utilized tactics that were
nearly identical to those that helped them eject the Macedonian garrison from the
Museum hill in 287 (n. 46.2.1): an officer of the Piraeus garrison was suborned, and he
agreed to admit an Athenian force by night. This time, however, the plot was betrayed
and the attacking force of 420 men annihilated. The date of this abortive attack is
disputed and dates ranging from 286 to 282 have been suggested (cf. Beloch [1925] 239;
Shear, Jr. [1978] 83; Osborne [1979] 194 n. 41; id. [2012] 45–47), but greater precision
may be possible. According to Polyaenus, the conspiracy to eject the Piraeus garrison
was spearheaded by theAthenian generals Hipparchus and Mnesidemus, who approached
the Carian mercenary officer Hierocles on the banks of the Ilissus, “where the Lesser
Mysteries are celebrated” (οὗ τὸν καθαρµὸν τελοῦσι τοῖς ἐλάττοσι µυστηρίοις,
5.17.1). The Lesser Mysteries were celebrated at Agrae on the Ilissus in the Attic month
Anthesterion (February/March; n. 26.2.2), and it seems likely that these negotiations took
place during the celebration of the festival, an occasion during which a mercenary officer
in Antigonid service could mingle with Athenian generals without incurring undue
suspicion (Shear, Jr. [1978] 83 puts these negotiations “in the dead of night,” but
Polyaenus states only that the attack was to take place at night). According to Polyaenus,
Demetrius was in Lydia (αὐτὸς µὲν ἦν περὶ τὴν Λυδίαν, 5.17.1) when the actual attempt
on Piraeus was made, and thus it seems likely that the meeting at Agrae took place in
Anthesterion 287/6 (February/March 286)—when Demetrius was either finalizing the

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preparations for his final campaign or had just departed, and the abortive attack was
staged within the next few months, while Demetrius was campaigning with some success
in Caria and Lydia (ns. 46.4.2, 46.6.3, 47.1.1).
Relations between the Athenians and the Antigonid forces occupying Piraeus
evidently remained overtly hostile after the failed attack, since the Athenians were forced
to utilize more remote Attic harbors to receive grain imports (IG II2 650, 653, 654, 655).
Oliver (2007, 123–24) and Osborne (2012, 44–45) note the extraordinary measures taken
to facilitate Athenian grain imports at this time, but neither links the hostility of the
Piraeus garrison with the recent attack. Based on his reading of the career decree for
Callias (SEG 28.60), T.L. Shear, Jr. argued that the Great Panathenaea in Hekatombaion
286/5 (July/August 286) was cancelled, and linked the cancellation of the festival to
Demetrius’ ongoing siege of the city (Shear, Jr. [1978]; J. Shear [2010] confirms the
reading after recent autopsy of the stone; but cf. Osborne [2012] 162–63). Since it seems
certain that the siege belongs to 287/6 and not, as Shear, Jr. would have it, 286/5 (n.
46.2.1), it is more likely that the festival was cancelled in response to the Piraeus debacle
rather than to the siege of the preceeding year.
51.2.1 Ἀντίγονος ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατρός: The filial devotion of Gonatas is in keeping with
the proverbial familial loyalty of the Antigonids (see above n. 3.1.1). Antigonus
Monophthalmus was at pains to demonstrate the trust and intimacy that marked his
relationship with Demetrius, and for several generations the Antigonid house was largely
free of the dynastic violence and succession struggles that characterized the other
Hellenistic monarchies (see above n. 3.4.4). The most striking material expression of this
familial bond is the so-called Progonoi monument erected by Antigonus Gonatas in the
sanctuary of Apollo on Delos. The monument, which faces the splendid Neorion built by
Demetrius (n. 17.1.4), consists of a long pedestal supporting some twenty bronze statues
of Gonatas’ ancestors (no traces of the statues remain, but the dedicatory inscription [IG
XI.4, 1095] is partially preserved; on this monument, and on the practice of ancestor
glorification within the Hellenistic royal houses, see esp. Billows [1995] esp. 42–44). Nor
was this Antigonid loyalty limited to fathers and sons: Stratonice, the daughter of
Demetrius and Phila, consistently portrayed herself publicly as an Antigonid, even after
her successive marriages to Seleucus and Antiochus (on these marriages see above ns.
32.2.2, 38.1.3). In a series of inscribed dedications from Delos, Stratonice emphasized
her paternity but made no mention of her Seleucid connections (Tarn [1913] 350–51;
McCurdy 81; Carney [2000] 171–72; on these dedications see esp. E. Kosmetatou, “A
Joint Dedication of Demetrios Poliorketes and Stratonike in the Delian Artemesion,” in
G. Reger, F. Ryan, and T. Winters [eds.] Studies in Greek Epigraphy and History in
Honor of Stephen F. Tracy [Paris: 2010] 213–28).
51.3.2 Λυσίµαχος…Δηµήτριον: According to a fragment of Diodorus (21.20),
Lysimachus offered Seleucus no less than 2,000 talents to kill Demetrius, a figure that is
all the more astonishing given Lysimachus’ reputation for parsimony (see above n.
25.7.5; on Seleucus’ aversion to Lysimachus see 48.4).
51.4.2 Ἀντιόχῳ…χρόνον: See above n. 50.9.5.
LII

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52.3.1 εἴτε…διάνοιαν: Drinking to distort one’s rational faculties (παρακαλυπτόµεν τῇ
µέθῃ τὴν διάνοιαν) and avoid sober consideration of present circumstances (τοὺς ἐν τῷ
νήφειν ἀναλογισµοὺς τῶν παρόντων ἀποδιδράσκων), however harsh those
circumstances, amounts to a cardinal sin for Plutarch, who consistently argues for the
priority of reason (e.g. Mor. 465B; Duff [1999] esp. 78–82, 117; cf. above n. 1.3.1). The
rare word analogismos appears only here in the Lives, but in Advice on Keeping Well
(Mor. 126F) Plutarch declares that the pain of reflecting on one’s mistakes (ὁ γὰρ ἐκ
τῶν τοιούτων ἀναλογισµῶν δηγµὸς) leads to more circumspect living
(εὐλαβεστέρους ποιεῖν περὶ τὴν δίαιταν) and the rejection of immoderate desires
(µεγάλας ἐπιθυµίας) and the sort of overindulgence to which he attributes Demetrius’
death (cf. see below 52.5.1)
52.3.3 εἴτε…παρεῖχεν: In his own voice, Plutarch echoes the judgment on Pyrrhus which
he had attributed to Cineas the Thessalian (Pyrr. 14.4; Marasco [1983] 226–29; Duff
[1999] 118), a trusted adviser of the Epirote king and a former student of Demosthenes
(Pyrr. 14.1–3). Pyrrhus describes to Cineas his plans for a series of wars in Italy, Sicily,
North Africa, Greece, and Macedonia that will humble his rivals and crush all resistance
to his supremacy. Then, the king continues, he and Cineas can enjoy a leisurely
retirement, drinking and enjoying one another’s company. Cineas responds, “surely this
privilege is ours already, and we have at hand, without taking any trouble, those things to
which we hope to attain by bloodshed and great toils and perils, after doing much harm to
others and suffering much ourselves” (εἰ ταῦτ' ἔχοµεν ἤδη καὶ πάρεστιν ἀπραγµόνως,
ἔφ' ἃ δι' αἵµατος καὶ πόνων µεγάλων καὶ κινδύνων µέλλοµεν ἀφίξεσθαι, πολλὰ καὶ
δράσαντες ἑτέρους κακὰ καὶ παθόντες, Pyrr. 14.4).
52.4.1 τί…ἴσασιν: Plutarch concludes his authorial pronouncement with a general
condemnation of “worthless kings” (τοῖς φαύλοις βασιλεῦσι; cf. Lys.-Sulla 2.2.7–8
where Plutarch notes with approval the Spartan practice of deposing kings who were “not
kingly, but worthless” [οὐ βασιλικούς, ἀλλὰ φαύλους]), but his criticism is clearly
directed at the Hellenistic kings in particular. Plutarch is consistently critical of the greed
and discontent of Alexander’s successors (see above ns. 32.7.4–5; Pyrr. 26.1; Mor. 336F-
337A), their passion for grandiose honors and titles (see above ns. 10.2–13, 25.6–8; Mor.
338A-C), and their moral dissipation (ns. 24.1; Mor. 338C). Plutarch’s language suggests
that his criticisms are informed by Hellenistic kingship literature, in particular Aristotle’s
Politics. Aristotle (Pol. 1311A) stressed the distinction between tyranny and royal
government— in pursuing luxury and pleasure rather than arete and “what is noble”
(τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ διώκουσιν), Demetrius and his
rivals cross the line into Aristotelian despotism, since “the aim of tyranny is what is
pleasant, that of royalty what is noble” (ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς µὲν τὸ ἡδύ,
βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν, Pol. 1311a).
52.5.1 ἔτος τρίτον ἐν τῇ Χερρονήσῳ καθειργµένος: On the Syrian Chersonese and
Demetrius’ capture in the late spring or early summer of 285, see above n. 50.7.3.
52.5.2 ὑπ' ἀργίας καὶ πλησµονῆς καὶ οἴνου νοσήσας ἀπέθανεν: Duris of Samos was
probably the source of the tradition that Demetrius’ drank himself to death in captivity
(see esp. Pownall in BNJ 76). Duris is preoccupied with the moral failings of the

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Hellenistic kings, and a fragment (Duris BNJ 76 F15 = Athen. 12.546 C-D) in which the
Samian employs two Homeric exempla to condemn the excessive drinking of
contemporary kings is generally connected with his description of the death of Demetrius
(Kebric 51; Landucci Gattinoni [1999] 131; Pownall in BNJ 76 F15; cf. F12 where
Polyperchon is condemned for drunkenness; on Duris and his hostility to the Hellenistic
kings, see Intro. 49–52). Duris’ account of Demetrius’ death will have appealed to
Plutarch for more than one reason: it is entirely consistent with Plutarch’s
characterization of Demetrius as unwilling and unable to adapt to a life not predicated
upon senseless conquest and the acquisition of empty honors, and it accords nicely with
his account of the king’s Dionysiac self-fashioning. Early in the Life, Plutarch remarks
that Demetrius, like his divine patron Dionysus, was “most terrible in waging war, and on
the other hand most skillful, when war was over, in making peace minister to joy and
pleasure” (2.3.7–9). Deprived of the capacity to make war, of his arms and fleets and
armies (ὅπλοις καὶ στόλοις καὶ στρατοπέδοις), Demetrius, like the kings of old in
Catullus’ famous adaptation of Sappho, is undone by otium (ἀπραγµοσύνῃ καὶ σχολῇ
καὶ ἀναπαύσει; cf. otium et reges prius…perdidit; Cat. 51.15–16; Plutarch references the
poem’s Greek model, Sappho 31, in his description of the love-sickness of Antiochus,
38.4). There is something akin to the “God-hero antagonism”—the phenomenon, long
recognized in epic, in which a hero is undone by the god he most resembles— in
Plutarch’s contention that Demetrius died because of overindulgence in wine, the greatest
of Dionysus’ gifts to man (on Dionysus’ gift see e.g. Eur. Bacc. 279–86; Panyasis ap.
Athen. 2.37A-B; on the antagonism of god and hero see esp. G. Nagy “The Epic Hero,”
in J. Foley (ed.) A Companion to Ancient Epic (Oxford: 2005) 71–89.
Modern commentators generally follow Duris and Plutarch and ascribe
Demetrius’ death to drink (e.g. Tarn [1913] 122; Errington [1990] 154 and [2008] 58;
Pelling [1988] 18; Green [1990] 130; Lamberton 134) and it is entirely possible that
Demetrius, whose fondness for drink was notable even among the proverbially bibulous
Macedonians, succumbed to despair and sought to drown his sorrows in wine. Seleucus,
who knew his prisoner well, may even have orchestrated Demetrius’ luxuriously
provisioned captivity with just such an end in mind (so Green [1990] 130; for the
dilemma the captive Demetrius presented Seleucus, see n. 50.5.1). According to
Cornelius Nepos, however, Demetrius fell victim to disease (periit a morbo, Reg. 3.3), a
variant account of his death that, given the nature of Demetrius’ career and his medical
history, seems at least as likely as that offered by Plutarch. In more than three decades of
near-ceaseless campaigning Demetrius sustained at least two major wounds (33.4; 40.5)
and he had suffered two serious and prolonged bouts of illness in recent years, perhaps
malaria (see above ns. 43.1.1; 48.5.1). Furthermore, Demetrius spent his final years in the
area of Apamea (see above n. 50.7.3), a notoriously malarial region until the draining of
the al-Ghab marshes beginning in 1958 (A. Kibaroglu et al. [eds.] Turkey's Water Policy:
National Frameworks and International Cooperation [Berlin/Heidelberg: 2011] 305).
52.5.3 ἔτη τέσσαρα καὶ πεντήκοντα βεβιωκώς: Demetrius was almost certainly born in
336, probably early in the year (see above n. 5.2.2). Since both Plutarch and the
Armenian text of Eusebius’ Syrian king list (FGrH 260 F32.2) attest that he died aged 54,
Demetrius died in the third year of his captivity near Apamea in Syria in the year 282 (the
chronology is established by Manni [1951] 69 and convincingly reaffirmed by Wheatley

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[1997] 23; for alternate chronologies, see e.g. Kaerst RE s.v. Demetrius 33 col. 2792;
Elkeles 68; Wehrli 191; Hammond and Walbank 234 n. 4).
52.6.1 Δροµιχαίτην…χρησάµενον: The Getic king Dromichaetes defeated and captured
Lysimachus at some point in the late 290s (on the chronology see above n. 39.6.3).
Lysimachus was kept in regal captivity (Diod. 21.12) and released in time to thwart
Demetrius’ invasion of Thrace (see above n. 39.6.2). On Seleucus’ failure to imitate the
philanthropia of Dromichaetes, and the issue of imitation in the Life, see Intro. 29–40; cf.
ns. 1.4.2, 22.2.1.
LIII
53.1.1 Ἔσχε…διάθεσιν: In the Pelopidas (34.1–3), Plutarch is harshly critical of the
lavish funeral of the Sicilian tyrant Dionysius, describing the rites as “the dramatic
conclusion of the great tragedy of his tyranny” (οἷον τραγῳδίας µεγάλης τῆς
τυραννίδος ἐξόδιον θεατρικὸν γενοµένην). Despite the similarity of the language in
these two passages, it is difficult to detect any note of censure here, and the sincerity of
the Corinthians’ pity is not questioned (53.6; cf. Pelop. 34.3). Plutarch’s description of
this funerary spectacle at Corinth recalls in many of its particulars an account of
Alcibiades’ dramatic arrival at Piraeus in 407 that Plutarch attributes to Duris of Samos
(Alc. 32.2 = Duris FGrH 76 F76), and it seems likely that Plutarch is also drawing on the
Samian historian here (note that Duris also gave a moving account of the funeral of
Lysimachus in 281, describing how the king’s faithful dog threw himself onto the funeral
pyre [Pliny HN 8.143 = Duris FGrH F55]; if we can attribute Whether Land or Sea
Animals are Cleverer to Plutarch, then he was familiar with that tradition as well [Mor.
970C]). In the Alcibiades, Plutarch rejects Duris’ account as inappropriate to the
circumstances; here the account is not subjected to such historiographical scrutiny. On
Plutarch’s treatment of his sources in the Demetrius, see Intro. 54–56. On the pageantry
of Demetrius’ funeral, see V. Alonso, “Some Remarks on the Funerals of the Kings:
From Philip II to the Diadochi,” in P. Wheatley and R. Hannah (eds.) Alexander and his
Successors: Essays from the Antipodes [Claremont, California: 2009] 296–98.
53.2.3 ἐπὶ νήσων: Probably the Cyclades, which Plutarch sometimes refers to simply as
“the islands” (e.g. Arist. 5.5.2; Per. 7.8.7; cf. Santi Amantini 372; Andrei 262 n. 367; see
below n. 53.5.1)
τὴν µεγίστην τῶν ναυαρχίδων (Identifying the funerary ship): This ship may well have
been the famous “sixteen” that Demetrius constructed prior to his final invasion of Asia
(ns. 20.7.2, 43.5.1). The vessel perhaps survived to be rowed up the Tiber in triumph by
the forces of Aemilius Paullus after his victory over Perseus at Pydna in 168 put an end to
the Antigonid dynasty (Tarn [1930] 133; F. Walbank, Philip V [Cambridge: 1940] 179;
Casson [1999] 129 n. 12; Blackman, Rankov, et al. [2013] 82; for more skeptical views
cf. D. Blackman, “The Athenian Navy and Allied Naval Contributions in the
Pentecontaetia,” GRBS 10 [1969] 215–16; Murray 281; D. Thompson 188).
Commentators argue that the “sixteen” either fell into the hands of Lysimachus after he
and Pyrrhus divided Macedonia between them in 287 (F. Walbank A Historical
Commentary on Polybius: Commentary on Books vii-xviii [Oxford: 1967] 18.44.6) or was
seized by Ptolemy, perhaps at Caunus, in the aftermath of Demetrius’ capture in Syria in

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285 (Tarn [1930] 133 n.5; Manni [1951] 123; Casson [1995] 139 n. 12). Both of these
scenarios would preclude the identification of Demetrius’ “sixteen” with the ship that
bore his funerary urn, but neither inspires confidence. According to Plutarch, the
“sixteen” was the crowning achievement of the naval building program that Demetrius
initiated prior to his expulsion from Macedonia in 288 (43.5; cf. 20.7). Shipbuilding was
carried out at Demetrius’ hubs in Piraeus, Corinth, Chalcis, and Pella (43.4), none of
which were ceded to Lysimachus in 287 (the first three ports remained in Antigonid
hands; Pyrrhus seized Pella; n. 44.10.5). It is also highly unlikely that Demetrius took the
ship to Asia in 286. He was desperately short of money, and manning and maintaining a
mammoth polyreme like the “sixteen” was prohibitively expensive. The manner in which
Demetrius conducted his final campaign also suggests that his fleet did not include any
such vessels (see above n. 46.4.2), which were designed primarily for assaults on fortified
harbors. The celebrated “sixteen” probably remained in one of the key Greek ports
controlled by Gonatas, perhaps in Piraeus, which had both the harbor facilities and the
shipsheds appropriate for the maintenance and storage of the massive ship (Demetrius left
a “thirteen” in Piraeus when he departed for Asia in 302, see above n. 31.2.1; on the
Piraeus shipsheds see esp. Lovén and Schaldemose.) If so, it would have been available
to Gonatas when he sailed to retrieve the remains of his father.
53.4.1 εἰς δὲ Κόρινθον: Demetrius had maintained excellent relations with the
Corinthians for more than two decades and there is every indication that the city
flourished under Antigonid patronage (n. 31.2.2).
53.5.1 Ξενόφαντος…περιόδοις: Oarsmen aboard Greek warships traditionally timed
their stroke to the rhythmic playing of an auletes (Ar. Ach. 554; IG II2 1951, an Athenian
list of naval personnel from beginning of 4th century includes auletai [ll. 100–1, 335]).
Xenophantus, like many of the auletic virtuosos of antiquity, was a native of Thebes (on
the auletic tradition at Thebes see above ns. 1.6.1, 1.6.4). Contemporary inscriptions
corroborate Plutarch’s account of the prominence of this musician. An inscription (IG XI2
106 l. 16) found near the Neorion in the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos commemorates
Xenophantus’ victory at the Apollonia festival in the year of Cleostratus’ archonship,
probably 282, while a Delian inventory of 279 (IG XI2 161) records that Xenophantus
dedicated a golden crown in the temple of Apollo. At Delphi, the Boeotian honorand of a
Delphic proxeny decree of c. 280 (SEG 32.537), one of about 30 such decrees inscribed
on the so-called “Base of the Boeotians,” has been partially restored to read Xenophantus
son of Abromachus (Ξενοφάν[τωι] Ἀβ̣ρ[οµ]άχου; on this monumental base, see Roesch
[1982], who identifies the honorand of SEG 32.537 with the Theban auletes).
Xenophantus’ victory at the Apollonia of 282 provides a chronological fixed point
that might help establish the date of Demetrius’ funeral and burial more closely. The
festival, also known as the Lesser Delia (the Apollonia were the smaller, annual version
of the penteric Delia), coincided with the Thargelia in Athens, celebrated on Apollo’s
birthday, 7 Thargelion (May/June; on the date of the festivals, see Parke 147). Perhaps
Gonatas visited Delos and secured the services of Xenophantus, the freshly crowned
victor in the Apollonia, when he sailed to the Cyclades to collect the remains of his
father. The maritime funerary display at Corinth and subsequent burial of Demetrius in
Thessaly would then fall in late June or July 282.

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53.7.2 Δηµητριάδα κοµίσας ἔθηκε τὰ λείψανα (The tomb of Demetrius): No tomb of
Demetrius has yet been securely identified in his eponymous foundation on the Gulf of
Pagasae (on the foundation of Demetrias see above n. 39.1.1). Marzolff’s (1987, 1–47
esp. 37–46) suggestion that the remains of a lavishly decorated building in a prominent
position above the theater belong to an elaborate heroön/mausoleum for Demetrius is
attractive, but there is no epigraphic or other evidence to corroborate the identification,
and the structure seems to have been left unfinished (Kravaritou [2012] 263–64; cf. Mili
199). As the founder of Demetrias, Demetrius will certainly have received worship there
(Mili 201).
53.8.2 τὸν µὲν Λεπτὸν ἐξ Ἰλλυρίδος γυναικός: Nothing is known of Demetrius’ Illyrian
paramour or their son, but the boy’s epithet, Λεπτός (“thin” or “weak”) suggests that he
lacked his father’s stature and strength (cf. 2.2.3–4). Perhaps he was given this nickname
to distinguish him from his half-brother Demetrius “the Fair” (Ogden 176; see below n.
53.8.3).
53.8.3 τὸν δ' ἄρξαντα Κυρήνης ἐκ Πτολεµαΐδος: Demetrius “the Fair” was the father of
Antigonus Doson, king of Macedonia (229–221), by his first wife Olympias. He was
presumably conceived in 286, during the brief period that Poliorcetes spent with
Ptolemais before his final expedition took a disastrous turn (n. 46.6.1). We know nothing
of the early life of the handsome son of Demetrius and Ptolemais, but he evidently
resided in Macedonia with his half-brother Antigonus Gonatas (Justin 26.3). In the chaos
that followed the death of Magas king of Cyrene c. 250, the king’s widow Apama, the
daughter of Antiochus I and Stratonice, offered the throne of Cyrene and the hand of her
daughter Berenice to Demetrius the Fair although the girl had previously been betrothed
to the son of Ptolemy II, the future Ptolemy III Euergetes (246–222; Demetrius the Fair,
like Euergetes, was the grandson of Ptolemy I). He accepted the offer with alacrity, but
quickly alienated key figures in the army and the royal court, most notably his wife
Berenice. According to Justin (26.3), Demetrius entered into an affair with his mother-in-
law Apama, (as the daughter of Stratonice, Apama was also the niece of Demetrius the
Fair), and was subsequently murdered at the behest of his jilted bride (on this episode see
Tarn [1913] 449–53; Macurdy 131–34; Carney [2000] 171; Ogden 80–81; on Demetrius
the Fair see Kaerst s.v. Demetrios 36, RE IV2 col. 1437). Berenice went on to marry
Ptolemy III, and her role in organizing the assassination may be the “brave deed”
Callimuchus refers to in his Victory of Berenice (P. Parsons, “Callimachus’ Victoria
Berenicis,” ZPE 25 [1977] 1–50).
53.8.4 ἐκ δὲ Δηιδαµείας Ἀλέξανδρον, ὃς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ κατεβίωσε: Demetrius wed
Deidameia, the sister of Pyrrhus, at the Argive Heraea in June 303 (on the wedding and
the date of the Heraea, see ns. 25.2.1, 25.2.4). Alexander must have been conceived
before Demetrius departed for Asia in late 302, and thus was born either in 302 or 301.
Deidameia joined Demetrius in Cilicia shortly after the wedding of Seleucus and
Stratonice, probably in 299, and died soon thereafter (32.5). The next event in Plutarch’s
narrative after the death of Deidameia is the treaty Seleucus brokered between Demetrius
and Ptolemy. Demetrius agreed to marry Ptolemy’s daughter Ptolemais and Pyrrhus was
sent to Egypt as a hostage (Plut. Pyrr. 4.4). It seems likely that the young Alexander
accompanied his mother to Cilicia and was subsequently sent to Egypt along with his

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uncle Pyrrhus. Although Pyrrhus soon departed to claim the throne of Epirus, Alexander
evidently remained in Egypt. An Egyptian papyrus (P. Lond. Inv. 2087) from early in the
reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes mentions an Alexander “residing in Alexandria as a
hostage,” who may well be the son of Demetrius and Deidameia (E. Webster, “Alexander
the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes,” CP 17 [1922], 357–58). Ogden (175) claims that
Alexander was “captured by Ptolemy in 301 alongside Demetrius’ mother,” intimating
that this was how he came to spend his life in Egypt, but this is demonstrably false.
Stratonice and unspecified “children of Demetrius” were captured by Ptolemy, but in c.
295, not 301, and they were subsequently set free with great fanfare (see above n. 38.1.1).
53.9.1 Κόρραγον υἱὸν ἐξ Εὐρυδίκης: With the exception of Palatinus 283, which
preserves Κὀρραγον, the manuscripts all read either Κόρραβον, Κορράβον, or
Κοράβον. The first is almost certainly correct since this well-attested Macedonian name
was, it seems, borne by Demetrius’ maternal grandfather (see ns. 2.1.2, 14.1.2).
53.9.3 Περσέα…ὑπηγάγοντο: Perseus was utterly defeated by a Roman army under
Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in 168. He briefly escaped to Samothrace but soon surrendered
and was taken to Rome where he was led, along with his children, in the triumph of
Paullus.
53.10.1 Διηγωνισµένου δὲ τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ δράµατος: It is wholly appropriate that
Plutarch concludes the most theatrical of his biographies by explicitly referring to the Life
as a play. On the dramatic and tragic elements of the Demetrius, see Intro. 29–40.
53.10.2 τὸ Ῥωµαϊκὸν: Marcus Antonius, better known as Mark Antony, whose
biography was paired with the Demetrius (Intro. 19–29).

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