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PLEYTO v. LOMBOY
G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 A head-on collision between a bus and a car along McArthur Highway in Gerona,
Tarlac happened on May 16, 1995 at around 11:30am.

 Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc (PRBL), bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur at
the time of the accident, is engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare
servicing various routes in Central and Northern Luzon. Its driver was Ernesto
Pleyto.

 Ricardo Lomboy was a passenger to a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Arnulfo

Asuncion, Ricardo’s brother-in-law. Carmela, the daughter of Ricardo, also a
passenger to said car, suffered injuries requiring hospitalization. But her father
Ricardo Lomboy died.

 Ricardo’s heirs filed an action for damages against Pleyto and PRBL.

 A witness and one of the bus passengers, Rolly Orpilla, testified that Pleyto tried
to overtake a tricycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved in to the left
opposite lane and smashed the Manila-bound car killing Arnulfo and Ricardo
Lomboy while the other passengers, Carmela and friend Rhino Daba suffered
injuries.

 According to Pleyto, the tricycle suddenly stopped without warning to which

Pleyto stepped on the brakes and bus lost speed but swerved to the other lane
to avoid hitting the tricycle. Unfortunately, it collided with the Manila-bound
Mitsubishi car.

 The trial court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs awarding

P1,642,521.00 for lost earnings of Ricardo Lomboy. It found that Pleyto is
negligent and lacked precaution when he overtook the tricycle disregarding
completely the approaching car in the other lane. Pleyto should have been more
prudent in overtaking considering the slippery road. The court held that Pleyto
violated traffic rules and regulations and was negligent under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code and PRBL liable as owner of the bus and as employer of Pleyto under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code for its failure to observe the required diligence in its
supervision of its employees and the safe maintenance of its buses.

JEFFREY P. REYES LLB 1

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 CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification in the award of damages
reducing the award for loss of earning capacity to P1,152,000.00 and took note
of the amounts that were duly supported by receipts only.

 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PRBL is vicariously liable as employer to the negligence of its

driver Pleyto.

HELD:

YES, under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the
selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome
only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. In fine,
when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.

Indeed, the testimony of the said two witnesses of the PRBL would impress one
to believe that the PRBL has always exercised the strictest standard of selecting its
employees and of maintaining its vehicles to avoid injury or damage to the life and limb
of people on the road whether of its own passengers or pedestrians or occupants or
other vehicles. It has not however, shown to the satisfaction of the Court that it has
maintained proper supervision of its employees, especially drivers while in the actual
operation of its buses. While it has a list of procedures and testing when it comes to
recruitment and another list of what should be done with its buses before they are
allowed to run on the road, it has no list of procedures and duties to be followed by a
driver while he is operating a vehicle to prevent injury to persons and damage to
property. Neither has it proved to the Court that there are people employed by it to
supervise its drivers so that it can be seen to it that all the safety procedures to prevent
accident or damage to property or injury to people on the road have been in place. It is
in this aspect of supervising its employees where this Court has found the defendant
PRBL deficient.

JEFFREY P. REYES LLB 2

 March 23,
CASE DIGEST IN TORTS AND DAMAGES
2018

CHATO v. FORTUNE TOBACCO

G.R. No. 141309, December 23, 2005

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.

 On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be
less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a
rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by
Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands
were already covered.

 In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.

 For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has
no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

 The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed
the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

 Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office.

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code

JEFFREY P. REYES LLB 3

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HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without
its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In
Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions
of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence;
or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one,
without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in
tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tort feasor, and
there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the
act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right;
that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.

JEFFREY P. REYES LLB 4

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HABANA v. ROBLES
G.R. No. 131522, July 19, 1999

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 Pacita Habana et al., are authors and copyright owners of duly issued of the
book, College English for Today (CET). Respondent Felicidad Robles was the
author of the book Developing English Proficiency (DEP). Petitioners found that
several pages of the respondent's book are similar, if not all together a copy of
petitioners' book. Habana et al. filed an action for damages and injunction,
alleging respondent’s infringement of copyrights, in violation of P.D. 49.

 They allege respondent Felicidad C. Robles being substantially familiar with the
contents of petitioners' works, and without securing their permission, lifted,
copied, plagiarized and/or transposed certain portions of their book CET.

 On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her own
intellectual creation, and was not a copy of any existing valid copyrighted book
and that the similarities may be due to the authors' exercise of the "right to fair
use of copyrighted materials, as guides."

 The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any liability.

 Later, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondents Robles

and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. In this appeal, petitioners submit that the
appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether Robles committed infringement in the production of DEP.

HELD:

YES, Robles committed infringement in the production of DEP.

A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if
not identical with the text of CET. In several other pages the treatment and manner of
presentation of the topics of DEP are similar if not a rehash of that contained in CET.
The similarities in examples and material contents are so obviously present in this case.
How can similar/identical examples not be considered as a mark of copying? Robles’ act
of lifting from the book of Habana et al substantial portions of discussions and
examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of
Habana et al’s copyrights.

JEFFREY P. REYES LLB 5

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2018

The Supreme Court also elucidated that in determining the question of

infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important
consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a
large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially
and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to
constitute piracy.

JEFFREY P. REYES LLB 6