ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V.
SOLEDAD ESCRITOR existence of and potential for intervention by a god — over the contrary theological
Topic: Benevolent Neutrality Approach on the Separation of Church and State
FACTS:
Estrada requested the RTC Judge of Las Pinas City to investigate Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Escritor testified that she has been a widow since 1999, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.
But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and
has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her
congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful
and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable, the Court had
to determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor is to be held administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes, Escritor is still administratively liable. The theory of benevolent neutrality or
accommodation is premised on a different view of the "wall of separation," associated
with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is
meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from
the state.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life
of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict
neutrality, pose Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of "In
God We Trust" on American currency; the recognition of America as "one nation under
God" in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Court's time-honored
practice of opening oral argument with the invocation "God save the United States and
this Honorable Court"; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying
a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in
prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological viewpoint — the
viewpoint of atheism. Church and government agencies also cooperate in the building of
low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and
drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral
dimension.
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. In the ideal world, the
legislature would recognize the religions and their practices and would consider them,
when practical, in enacting laws of general application. But when the legislature fails to
do so, religions that are threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for protection.
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its "burdensome effect," whether by the legislature or the courts. Most of
the free exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for exemption, not invalidation of
the facially neutral law that has a "burdensome" effect.
Having established that benevolent neutrality-accommodation is the
framework by which free exercise cases must be decided, the next question then turned
to the test that should be used in ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious
freedom.
At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent
neutrality- accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. Although benevolent
neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the
interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the
purpose of the test — to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden
religious exercise.
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution.It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,"
in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state's interest is
important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred.
The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances,
respondent Escritor's conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms —
including religious freedom — may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe
to the Infinite.
SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA
Topic: nature of agreements which cover presence of foreign military personnel
FACTS:
· The petitions before SC question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the PH and the US.
· This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016,
wherein SC ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.
· Petitioners allege that respondents (the Executive Dept.) committed gadalej when
they entered into EDCA with the U.S. in the form of an executive agreement, claiming
that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.
· Petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with
the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on
foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.
· Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of
the VFA and MDT because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military
bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.
· Respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the
legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial
precedents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
HELD:
· NO, it is an executive agreement. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an
executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it
purports to implement.
· Petitioners claim that the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following
provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
· We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of
these provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably
categorize it as an executive agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by
the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction
· As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme
Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve
arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
· The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or
legislative authorizations.
· The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in
international agreements.
· International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of
international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which
connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified
forms that no longer necessitate ratification.
· An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol,
agreement, concordat, compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration,
exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement,
modus vivendi, or some other form.
· Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations.
· However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing
treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere
variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is
demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important
features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into
terms of art in the domestic setting.
· First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied
authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these
precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious
question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the
laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these
rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are
not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
· Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive
agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike
executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a
statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over
one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements
that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types
of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution.
· Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s
validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and
MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate
the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA
deserves treaty status under the law.
· We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various
military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petitions.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN JR
Topic: Promotion of health (Art. II, Sections 15-16 and Art. XIII, Sections 11-13)
FACTS:
- The controversy begun as Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before the RTC of
Makati City Branch 66.
- The principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources.
- The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
- The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests."
- The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about
the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court."
- The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."
- It is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs. and
(3) granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.
- The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species
of flora and fauna may be found.
- These rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial.
- Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses.
- The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
- Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the
same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
- On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause
of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
- In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
- On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned
motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the
complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question —
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of
the land.
- Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and asked the Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
Petitioners:
o Contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment, the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide
and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation.
o Rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
o It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse
of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for
logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
o Non-impairment clause does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
o Even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that
they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Respondents:
o Aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not
reveal a valid cause of action.
o They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
o As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or
other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
Issue/s:
- Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. (YES)
Ruling:
- The instant Petition is granted, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge is
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY:
- The complaint focuses on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).
- This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the Section 15 of
the same article.
- While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter.
- Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
- As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
- If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not
be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable
of sustaining life.
- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
- The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
- Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
- Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.
No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment
and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos."
- This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the
same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however,
it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority.
- Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
- On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities
of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
- Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.
- A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
MMDA, DENR, DECS, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PNP
MARITIME GROUP AND DILG v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay (GR Nos.
171947-48)
FACTS:
· On 29 January 1999, concerned citizens of Manila Bay (respondents) filed a
complaint before the RTC of Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among
them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection of Manila Bay.
· Respondents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by Presidential Decree No. 1152 (PD 1152) of the Philippine
Environment Code. The continued neglect of the petitioners in abating the pollution in
Manila Bay constitutes a violation of numerous environmental laws. Thus, respondents
pray that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and to submit a concrete plan of
action for the purpose.
· The RTC ordered petitioners to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay. The
dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
above named defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for
swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-
agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months
from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a
consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and
restoration of the bay.
· Before the CA, petitioners contend that the provisions of the Environment Code
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. Also, cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled
by mandamus.
· CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE
1. WON the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act of petitioners
that can be compelled by mandamus
2. WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general
RULING
1. Yes. Petitioners argue that MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal system necessarily involves policy evaluation and the
exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned.
On the other hand, respondents alleges that the statutory command for the petitioners is
clear and their duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law
does not require the exercise of discretion
The petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and
how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal,is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003),
but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot
be characterized as discretionary, for discretion presupposes the power or right given by
law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience. A
discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to
perform or not to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not
to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal
basis.
The Petitioners’ enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to their obligations and mandate. The Court need not belabor the issue that
their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
2. No. The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure
to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against
the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
Section 16 of the Clean Water Act amended Section 20 of the Environment Code in this
wise:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations .Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26
hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the
applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up
any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have
been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event
emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately
undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses
incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused
such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the
cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other
funds where said disbursements were sourced.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern
themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed
to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read
alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations
and accidental spills, as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants
discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that
result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their
narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening
water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are
correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the
definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not
hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and
accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said
section is found.
The Court ruled that respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not
in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves
to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state
will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to
meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the
quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it
is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters
who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned
government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of
the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the
rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase.
It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and
the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to
perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving
the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus. the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The petition is denied. The RTC decision is affirmed with modifications.
BORACAY FOUNDATION v. PROVINCE OF AKLAN
Topic: Promotion of health (Art. II, Sections 15-16 and Art. XIII, Sections 11-13)
FACTS:
More than a decade ago, Respondent Province of Aklan built the Caticlan Jetty Port and
Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay. It also built
the corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal to be the receiving end for
tourists in Boracay.
In 2005, Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc., a registered, non-stock domestic
corporation dedicated to environment-conscious development of Boracay Island,
participated in the Boracay 2010 Summit with representatives from the national
government, LGUs and others from the private sectors. In the Summit, there was a
consensus that government support was lacking, infrastructure was poor, and, the influx
of tourists to Boracay was increasing. Hence, Respondent Province of Aklan
conceptualize the expansion of the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan and submitted an
application for the foreshore lease of areas along the shorelines of Barangay Caticlan.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Respondent, Province of Aklan, approved and allowed
the provincial governor of Aklan to send a letter to Respondent Philippine Reclamation
Authority (respondent PRA) formerly PEA, and expressing its intent to reclaim the
foreshore land.
However, Both the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Malay opposed the applications. That the foreshore lease practically
covered almost all the coastlines of said barangay, diminishing its territorial jurisdiction,
and depriving right of preference in the utilization of the natural resources, and that it
was for proprietary or business purpose and at the expense of the local government of
Malay.
Thereafter, The Provincial Governor submitted an Environmental Performance Report and
Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, as an initial step for securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province deliberated on the
possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty
(40) hectares.
On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province of Aklan ECC for Phase 1
of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan
side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, respondent Province entered into a MOA with respondent PRA after
PRA approved its application.
Later on June 17, 2010, Province called for "public consultation meeting" and
presented the Reclamation Project and only then detailed the actions that it
had already undertaken, particularly: the issuance of the Caticlan Super
Marina Bonds to fund the project expansion; the execution of the MOA with
respondent PRA; the alleged conduct of an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) study for the reclamation project; and the expansion of the project to
forty (40) hectares from 2.64 hectares.
Petitioner Boracay Foundation transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010,
registering its opposition to the reclamation project to Respondents Province of Aklan,
PRA, DENR-EMB, the National Economic Development Authority Region VI, the Malay
Municipality, and other concerned entities. It allege despite the Malay Municipalitys
denying respondent Provinces request for a favorable endorsement of the foreshore
lease, and strong opposition by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner Boracay Foundation,
respondent Province still continued with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.
On June 1, 2011, Boracay Foundation filed a Petition for Environmental Protection
Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus and on June 7, 2011, this Court
issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO).
Petitioners argued to the court that:
1) Province of Aklan failed to comply with relevant rules and regulations in the
acquisition of an ECC because:
a) its approval of Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the
existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project;
b) Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
c) The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies; and
d) The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation project to
the environment.
2) The reclamation of land bordering the strait between Caticlan and Boracay shall
adversely affect the frail ecological balance of the area
Issue:
 WON Province of Aklan complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations;
Rulling: NO
The EIA report Submitted by Province of Aklan did not cover the impact of the new
constructions and building on the reclaimed land to the surrounding environment. A
significant portion of the reclaimed area would be devoted to the construction of a
commercial building, and the area to be utilized for the expansion of the jetty port
consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m).
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in
the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public
consultation and approval of local government units for the projects described therein.
Even if the project proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA
which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to
undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to
go through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRAs authority to
reclaim was delegated to respondent Province.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the
Local Government Code provisions.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent
either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
In this case, respondent Province had already filed its ECC application before it
met with the local government units of Malay and Caticlan.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on
February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay on February
28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of
respondent Province.
It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of
tourism in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial
hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of this decision, we mentioned that there
are common goals of national significance that are very apparent from both the
petitioners and the respondents respective pleadings and memoranda.
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth
resolution of these issues would benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Provinces
cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated review of the proper
classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of utmost
importance.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al.
FACTS:
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). The studies included surface
geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. Geophysical
and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine the area’s underwater composition. During the 2 nd sub-phase of the project,
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well. Since the same was to be drilled in the
marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact
Assessment requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled
“Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes.”
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of the latter’s
application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. From 16 November 2007 to 8
February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth of 3,150 meters near
Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution. The
petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also
impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R.
No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence
fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions
are:
· A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
· The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
· SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform
terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction
· FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer
radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of
Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS)
as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations are:
· The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition.
· SC-46 is constitutional.
· The ECC was legally issued.
· The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.
ISSUES
a. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
b. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING
1. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action
and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may
publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish
all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure
may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective,
the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in
the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
2. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:
“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.”
(Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the
Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified
of such contract, renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments
and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service
contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE,
obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a
guide for the Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area,
having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the
2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means
that no environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were
conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon
Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN v. RAMOS
Topic: Promotion of health
FACTS
● On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals
from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
● On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to
"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral
resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining
operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical
assistance agreements.
● On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya
and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.
Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the
President entered into an FTAA with Western Mining Corporation Philippines(WMCP)
covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and
North Cotabato.
○ The FTAA was later transferred to Sagittarius Mines Inc., as well as some shares of
WMCP pertaining to the Tampakan mining project
● On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s.
1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
● On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,
giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to
respond or act on petitioners' letter.
● Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
○ (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial
or Technical Assistance Agreements;
○ (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;
○ (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act
contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative
issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and(d) Cancelling the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as
unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
ISSUES:
1.)What is the proper interpretation of ‘Financial and Technical Agreements’?
2.)Whether or not the FTAA entered into by the Philippine Government and
WMCP is void
HELD:
1.) The Supreme Court after going into the Con-Com deliberations interpreted
“Financial and Technical Assistance Agreements” to be service contracts but
different from the definition provided by the 1973 Constitution.
The new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand;
and on the other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new
service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical
know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB),
actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are
these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement
and interpose timely objections, if any.
Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners’ contention that that RA 7942, as well
as its Implementing Rules and Regulations, makes it possible for FTAA contracts to cede
full control and management of mining enterprises over to fully foreign-owned
corporations, with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive regulator
dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak review and audit powers.
There are sufficient guarantees to the compliance of the contractor which vest control
supervision to the government
In RA 7942, such is provided in provisions including: Sec. 8. Sec. 9, Sec. 66, Sec. 35, Sec.
53 and 54, and 59.
DENR Departmental Order-96, the IRR of RA 7942, also provides for such strict
requirments, such as:
● Approved mining project feasibility study (Section 53-d, DAO 96-40)
● Approved three-year work program (Section 53-a-4, DAO 96-40)
● Environmental compliance certificate (Section 70, RA 7942)
● Approved environmental protection and enhancement program (Section 69, RA
7942)
● Approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Bayan/Barangay (Section 70, RA 7942;
Section 27, RA 7160)
● Free and prior informed consent by the indigenous peoples concerned, including
payment of royalties through a Memorandum of Agreement
The foregoing gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed
upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners'
contention. The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the
role of a "passive regulator" dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary,
the government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence,
to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding
minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and
utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away
with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the
enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than
a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
Baseless are petitioners' sweeping claims that RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations make it possible for FTAA contracts to cede full control and management of
mining enterprises over to fully foreign owned corporations. Equally wobbly is the
assertion that the State is reduced to a passive regulator dependent on submitted plans
and reports, with weak review and audit powers and little say in the decision-making of
the enterprise, for which reasons "beneficial ownership" of the mineral resources is
allegedly ceded to the foreign contractor.
As discussed hereinabove, the State's full control and supervision over mining operations
are ensured through the following provisions in RA 7942: Sections 8, 9, 16, 19, 24, 35[(b),
(e), (f), (g), (h), (k), (l), (m) and (o)], 40, 57, 66, 69, 70, and Chapters XI and XVII; as well
as the following provisions of DAO 96-40: Sections7[(d) and (f)], 35(a-2), 53[(a-4) and
(d)], 54, 56[(g), (h), (l), (m) and (n)], 56(2), 60, 66, 144, 168, 171 and 270, and also
Chapters XV, XVI and XXIV.
2.) The FTAA with WMCP is not void. However, certain provisions were struck
down.
The assailed provisions of the WMCP FTAA, far from constituting a surrender of control
and a grant of beneficial ownership of mineral resources to the contractor in question,
vest the State with control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations
of the FTAA contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses,
and the disposition of mineral products.
There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions of the
WMCP FTAA. Clause 8.2 provides a mechanism to prevent the mining operations from
grinding to a complete halt as a result of possible delays of more than 60 days in the
government's processing and approval of submitted work programs and budgets. Clause
8.3 seeks to provide a temporary, stop-gap solution in case a disagreement between the
State and the contractor (over the proposed work program or budget submitted by the
contractor) should result in a deadlock or impasse, to avoid unreasonably long delays in
the performance of the works.
The State, despite Clause 8.3, still has control over the contract area, and it may, as
sovereign authority, prohibit work thereon until the dispute is resolved, or it may
terminate the FTAA, citing substantial breach thereof. Hence, the State clearly retains full
and effective control.
Clause 8.5, which allows the contractor to make changes to approved work programs
and budgets without the prior approval of the DENR secretary, subject to certain
limitations with respect to the variance/s, merely provides the contractor a certain
amount of flexibility to meet unexpected situations, while still guaranteeing that the
approved work programs and budgets are not abandoned altogether. And if the secretary
disagrees with the actions taken by the contractor in this instance, he may also resort to
cancellation/termination of the FTAA as the ultimate sanction
Invalid provisions of the FTAA: 7.9 and 7.8(e)
While Section 7.7 gives the government a 60 percent share in the net mining revenues of
WMCP from the commencement of commercial production, Section 7.9 deprives the
government of part or all of the said 60 percent. Under the latter provision, should
WMCP's foreign shareholders -- who originally owned 100 percent of the equity -- sell 60
percent or more of its outstanding capital stock to a Filipino citizen or corporation, the
State loses its right to receive its 60 percent share in net mining revenues under Section
7.7.
Evidently, what Section 7.7 grants to the State is taken away in the next breath by
Section 7.9 without any offsetting compensation to the State. Thus, in reality, the State
has no vested right to receive any income from the FTAA for the exploitation of its
mineral resources. Worse, it would seem that what is given to the State in Section 7.7 is
by mere tolerance of WMCP's foreign stockholders, who can at any time cut off the
government's entire 60 percent share. They can do so by simply selling 60 percent of
WMCP's outstanding capital stock to a Philippine citizen or corporation. Moreover, the
proceeds of such sale will of course accrue to the foreign stockholders of WMCP, not to
the State.
The sale of 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding equity to a corporation that is 60 percent
Filipino-owned and 40 percent foreign-owned will still trigger the operation of Section
7.9. Effectively, the State will lose its right to receive all 60 percent of the net mining
revenues of WMCP; and foreign stockholders will own beneficially up to 64 percent of
WMCP, consisting of the remaining 40 percent foreign equity therein, plus the 24 percent
pro-rata share in the buyer-corporation.84
In fact, the January 23, 2001 sale by WMCP's foreign stockholder of the entire
outstanding equity in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. -- a domestic corporation at least
60 percent Filipino owned -- may be deemed to have automatically triggered the
operation of Section 7.9, without need of further action by any party, and removed the
State's right to receive the 60 percent share in net mining revenues.
At bottom, Section 7.9 has the effect of depriving the State of its 60 percent share in the
net mining revenues of WMCP without any offset or compensation whatsoever. It is
possible that the inclusion of the offending provision was initially prompted by the desire
to provide some form of incentive for the principal foreign stockholder in WMCP to
eventually reduce its equity position and ultimately divest in favor of Filipino citizens and
corporations. However, as finally structured, Section 7.9 has the deleterious effect of
depriving government of the entire 60 percent share in WMCP's net mining revenues,
without any form of compensation whatsoever. Such an outcome is completely
unacceptable.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents' and the intervenors'
Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's January 27, 2004
Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring
CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Law), (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
9640 -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred
to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution; and (3) the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 executed by the
government and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP), except Sections
7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to
public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTEC
APPLICATIONS, INC v. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA, PH
Topic: General Principles – Promotion of Health – Precautionary Principle
FACTS: (All caps and bold)
The case stemmed from the Petition of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan filed
by Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Greenpeace) and others against International Service for
the Acquisition of Agri-Biotec Applications, Inc (ISA) and others.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking entered into by ISA, and UP Foundations of
Los Banos and Mindanao, field trials for “bioengineered eggplants” known as the “BT
Talong” was conducted. This BT Talong contained crystal toxin genes, which produces a
certain type of protein that is toxic to target insect pests. From 2007-2009, UPLB
conducted a contained experiment on BT Talong. Upon the completion of the experiment,
the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) issued a Certificate
stating, among others, that all biosafety measures were complied with. In 2010, after the
finding that UPLB’s field test proposal satisfactorily completed the biosafety risk
assessment for field testing, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued 2-year Biosafety
Permits for the field testing of BT Talong. Consequently, field testing proceeding in
various approved trial sites.
As mentioned above, Greenpeace filed a petition for continuing mandamus and writ of
kalikasan alleging that the BT Talong field trials violated their constitutional right to
health and a balanced ecology, as the BT Talong was presumed by the regulations to be
harmful to human health and environment. Since the scientific evidence as to the safety
of BT Talong remained insufficient or uncertain, the said presumption stands. Because of
this presumption, he precautionary principle should be applied, eventually praying that
the field trials be enjoined.
The Writ of Kalikasan was granted in 2012, and the case was remanded to the CA for
hearing. During the pendency of the hearing, the field trials concluded, and the Biosafety
Permits expired, prompting ISA to move that the petition be dismissed on the ground of
mootness. However both the CA and the SC still exercised judicial review, noting that the
precautionary principle applies “since the risk of harm from the field trials of BT Talong
remains uncertain and there exist a possibility of serious irreversible harm”. In the
December 2015 Decision of the SC, it was held that:
(a) The case is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved
(b) The case is likewis capable of repetition yet evading review.
The Court permanently enjoined the BT Talong field testing.
ISSUE:
Was the application of the Precautionary Principle proper, justifying the review even
though the case was mooted by supervening circumstances? No, the subject of the
case did not involve paramount public interest, as no perceivable benefit to
the public may be gained by the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan.
HELD:
Upon a closer scrutiny of the arguments, the Court reconsiders its ruling and now finds
merit in the assertion that the case should have been dismissed for being moot and
academic, and that the aforesaid exceptions to the said rule should not have been
applied.
Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining whether a
case involves paramount public interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a
survey of cases would show that, as a common guidepost for application, there should be
some perceivable benefit to the public which demands the Court to proceed with the
resolution of otherwise moot questions.
The petition for Writ of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed expiration of the
Biosafety Permits and the completion and termination of the BT Talong field trials. These
incidents effectively negated the necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents in their
petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin.
As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks
related to propagation were pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Any
future threat to the right of herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and
balanced ecology is therefore more imagined than real.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 8, 2015 of the Court, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated May
17, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00013, is hereby SET ASIDE for the reasons above-explained. A new one is
ENTERED DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of
Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) filed by respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), Magsasaka at
Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunladng Agrikultura, and others on the ground of mootness.
IMBONG v. OCHOA
Topic: The Family as a Basic Autonomous Social Institution
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
ISSUE:
Whether or not The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

HELD:
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid
as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-
surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
In its relationship with its co- equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation
of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their
functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the
Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation
- but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality
or grave abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution. Twin principles of anti-abortion and non-coercion in the national population
program of the government.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
Topic: Enforceability in the Philippines of Final Judgments of Foreign Courts
FACTS:
· The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
o A prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
o Aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until
their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
· Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
o Provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of
the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
o Provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
· Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the
following: (reasons)
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their
retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE:
1. WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws – NO
2. WON R.A. 1180 is a reasonable exercise of legislative prerogative - YES
HELD:
Concept of Equal Protection Clause
· It does not demand absolute equality among residents; merely acquires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced
· Not infringed by legislation which applies only to persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons falling within the such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
The rule in general is as follows:
“Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.”
The objectionable characteristics of the exercise of retail trade by the aliens,
which are actual and real, are sufficient grounds for legislative classification of
retail traders into nationals and aliens
· Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of
the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the
enactment of the Act.
· The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Philippines where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times
of crisis or emergency.
· While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
· The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people
on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
Scope of the Exercise of Police Power and its limitations
· Police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has become almost impossible to
limit its sweep
· Derives its existence from the very existence of the State and need not be
expressed in defined scope
· Co-extensive with self-preservation and survival, and as such, it is the most
positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable
· Field and scope has become boundless just as the field of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human
foresight
· LIMITATIONS:
(a) Due process of law
(b) Equal protection clause
R.A NO. 1180 is a reasonable exercise of legislative prerogative
Classification is real and reasonable, all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in
duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within legitimate prerogative
Concept of due process in the exercise of police power was applied in this case
· The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction
· Test of Reasonableness: Appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of
the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect
· The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective – to free national economy from alien control and dominance
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED
ROY v. SEC CHAIRPERSON HERBOSA
Topic: Art. XII National Economy and Patrimony
FACTS:
● 9 January 2013, Gamboa became final and executory
● The Supreme Court in the Gamboa decision that the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the
total outstanding capital stock
● 20 May 2013, SEC through Chairperson Herbosa issued SEC-MC No. 8. Section 2
thereof reads:
○ Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or
statutory ownership requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the
required percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number
of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the
total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the
election of directors. Corporations covered by special laws which provide specific
citizenship requirements shall comply with the provisions of said law.
● Petitioner, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed a petition before the SC assailing the
validity of Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8. The said issuance was not in conformity with the
Gamboa decision
● Arguments of (intervenors) Gamboa, PLDT:
○ The doctrine of hierarchy of court was not followed by petitioner Roy
○ The petition is premature because it did not exhaust administrative remedies
● Respondents Chairperson Herbosa and the SEC filed a comment, they sought
dismissal of the petition on the following grounds:
○ (1) the petitioners do not possess locus standi to assail the constitutionality of
SEC-MC No. 8;
○ (2) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the appropriate and proper remedy
to assail the validity and constitutionality of the SEC-MC No. 8;
○ (3) the direct resort to the Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
○ (4) the SEC did not abuse its discretion;
○ (5) on PLDT's compliance with the capital requirement as stated in the Gamboa
ruling, the petitioners' challenge is premature considering that the SEC has not yet
issued a definitive ruling thereon.
● Arguments of intervenors PSE are as follows:
○ the Gamboa ruling, "capital" refers only to shares entitled to vote in the election
of directors, and excludes those not so entitled; and the dispositive portion of the
decision is the controlling factor that determines and settles the questions presented in
the case. The PSE further argued that adopting a new interpretation of Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution violates the policy of conclusiveness of judgment, stare decisis,
and the State's obligation to maintain a stable and predictable legal framework for
foreign investors under international treaties; and adopting a new definition of "capital"
will prove disastrous for the Philippine stock market. The Court granted the Motion to
Intervene filed by PSE.
ISSUE: Whether or not SEC-MC No. 8 is unconstitutional
HELD:
● SEC-MC No.8 is deemed not unconstitutional
● The Supreme Court applied the full beneficial ownership test and the control test
in determining whether or not the Constitutional requirements and other statutory
requirements have been complied with.
● For the most part of the Gamboa Resolution, the Court, after reviewing SEC and
DOJ Opinions as well as the provisions of the FIA and its predecessor statutes, reiterated
that both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national" and that a "Philippine
national," as defined in the FIA and all its predecessor statutes, is "a Filipino citizen, or a
domestic corporation "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote," is owned by Filipino citizens. A domestic
corporation is a "Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by
Filipino citizens." he Court also reiterated that, from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, it is evident that the term "capital" refers to controlling
interest of a corporation,and the framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to
be majority Filipino-owned and controlled.
● Beneficial ownership test:
○ Given that beneficial ownership of the outstanding capital stock of the public
utility corporation has to be determined for purposes of compliance with the 60% Filipino
ownership requirement, the definition in the SRC-IRR can now be applied to resolve only
the question of who is the beneficial owner or who has beneficial ownership of each
"specific stock" of the said corporation. Thus, if a "specific stock" is owned by a
Filipino in the books of the corporation, but the stock's voting power or
disposing power belongs to a foreigner, then that "specific stock" will not be
deemed as "beneficially owned" by a Filipino.
● Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 clearly incorporates the Voting Control Test or the
controlling interest requirement. In fact, Section 2 goes beyond requiring a 60-40 ratio in
favor of Filipino nationals in the voting stocks; it moreover requires the 60-40 percentage
ownership in the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or not. The
SEC formulated SEC-MC No. 8 to adhere to the Court's unambiguous pronouncement that
"[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with
60 percent of the voting rights is required."79 Clearly, SEC-MC No. 8 cannot be said to
have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
● Ultimately, the key to nationalism is in the individual. Particularly for a public
utility corporation or association, whether stock or non-stock, it starts with the Filipino
shareholder or member who, together with other Filipino shareholders or members
wielding 60% voting power, elects the Filipino director who, in turn, together with other
Filipino directors comprising a majority of the board of directors or trustees, appoints and
employs the all-Filipino management team. This is what is envisioned by the Constitution
to assure effective control by Filipinos. If the safeguards, which are already stringent,
fail, i.e., a public utility corporation whose voting stocks are beneficially owned by
Filipinos, the majority of its directors are Filipinos, and all its managing officers are
Filipinos, is proalien (or worse, dummies), then that is not the fault or failure of the
Constitution. It is the breakdown of nationalism in each of the Filipino shareholders,
Filipino directors and Filipino officers of that corporation. No Constitution, no decision of
the Court, no legislation, no matter how ultranationalistic they are, can guarantee
nationalism.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the Petition and Petition-in-
Intervention.
IDEALS, INC. vs. PSALM
Topic: Art. XII National Economy and Patrimony
FALLO: “WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s is PARTLY GRANTED.
The following DISPOSITIONS are in ORDER:
1. The bidding conducted and the Notice of Award issued by PSALM in favor of the
winning bidder, KOREA WATER RESOURCES CORPORATION (K-WATER), are declared
VALID and LEGAL;
2. PSALM is directed to FURNISH the petitioners with copies of all documents and
records in its files pertaining to K-Water;
3. Section 6 (a), Rule 23, IRR of the EPIRA, is hereby declared as merely
DIRECTORY, and not an absolute condition in all cases where NPC-owned hydropower
generation facilities are privatized;
4. NPC shall CONTINUE to be the HOLDER of Water Permit No. 6512 issued by the
National Water Resources Board. NPC shall authorize K-Water to utilize the waters in the
Angat Dam for hydropower generation, subject to the NWRB's rules and regulations
governing water right and usage. The Asset Purchase Agreement and Operation &
Management Agreement between NPC/PSALM and K-Water are thus amended
accordingly. Except for the requirement of securing a water permit, K-Water remains
BOUND by its undertakings and warranties under the APA and O & M Agreement;
5. NPC shall be a CO-PARTY with K-Water in the Water Protocol Agreement with
MWSS and NIA, and not merely as a conforming authority or agency; and
6. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on May 24, 2010 is hereby
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.” ARGUMENTS
PETITIONERS
FACTS
Respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is a Right to information
GOCC created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power violated à PSALM did not
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly release to the public
sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other critical information
disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of regarding the bidding
liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal
manner, which liquidation is to be completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.
In August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) Angat PSALM violated CC 498 à
Hydro-electric Power Plant (AHEPP), forming part of the Angat Complex, which includes PSALM did not offer the
the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area. This is partly owned sale of AHEPP to MWSS,
by respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). The Angat Dam its co-owner, before
and AHEPP are utilized for power generation, irrigation, water supply and flood control selling to an outsider
purposes. Because of its multi-functional design, the operation of the Angat Complex
involves various government agencies, namely: (1) NPC; (2) National Water Resources PSALM violated Consti
Board (NWRB); (3) MWSS; (4) respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA); and (5) and Water Code à K-
Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAG- Water is a foreign
ASA). corporation
On December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for NPC gives up its authority
the privatization of the AHEPP. The two auxiliary units owned by MWSS were excluded to extract or utilize water
from the bid. Pertinent portions of the Bidding Package include: “The priority of water from the Angat River
usage under Philippine Law would have to be observed by the Buyer/Operator. The
Winning Bidder/Buyer shall be requested to enter into an operations and maintenance Right to water was
agreement with PSALM for the Non-Power Components…the Buyer will be required to violated by bidding
enter into the said water protocol agreement as a condition to the award of the Asset.” process à State has an
obligation to ensure
Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) had the winning bid and was consequently water security for its
given the Notice of Award. people
The present petition was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Angat Dam provides 97%
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS), Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), AKBAYAN of Metro Manila's water
Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN) and Alliance of Progressive Labor, seeking to --> PSALM should
permanently enjoin the sale of the AHEPP to K-Water. SC issued Status Quo Ante Order. prioritize domestic use of
water over power
generation
MWSS (respondent, but seems to side with P)
RESPONDENTS
Conducted the bidding in an open and transparent
manner, through a series of events in accordance
with the governing rules on public bidding -->
IDEALS’ request for information about the winning
bidder, as contained in its letter dated May 14,
2010, the same was already referred to respondent
K-Water’s counsel for appropriate action
MWSS’s contribution in the funds used for the
construction of the AHEPP did not give rise to a
regime of co-ownership as the said funds were
merely in exchange for the supply of water that
MWSS would get from the Angat Dam
The utilization of water by a hydroelectric power
plant does not constitute appropriation of water
from its natural source considering that the source
of water (dam) that enters the intake gate of the
power plant is an artificial structure
PSALM is mindful of the State’s duty to protect the
public’s right to water when it sold the AHEPP. In
fact, such concern as taken into consideration by
PSALM in devising a privatization scheme for the
AHEPP whereby the water allocation is continuously
regulated by the NWRB and the dam and its
spillway gates remain under the ownership and
control of NPC
· MWSS has supervision and control over the Angat Dam given that the Angat
Reservoir supplies approximately 97% of the water requirements of Metro Manila. MWSS
has incurred expenses to maintain their upkeep, improve and upgrade their facilities.
· After the enactment of EPIRA, MWSS had expressed the desire to acquire
ownership and control of the AHEPP so as not to leave the operation of the Angat
Reservoir to private discretion that may prejudice the water allocation to MWSS as
dictated by NWRB rules.
1) The AHEPP is in dire danger of being wholly-owned by a Korean corporation which
probably merely considers it as just another business opportunity
ISSUES
1. W/N petitioners’ right to information was violated
2. W/N privatization of the power generation process of AHEPP amounted to a
violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution
3. W/N it violated Water Code provisions on the grant of water rights
HELD
FIRST ISSUE
PSALM advised petitioners that their letter-request was referred to the counsel of K-
Water. Such action was insufficient to comply with the constitutional requirement and
inconsistent with the policy under EPIRA to implement the privatization of NPC assets in
an “open and transparent” manner. PSALM’s evasive response to the request for
information was unjustified because all bidders were required to deliver documents such
as company profile, names of authorized officers/representatives, financial and technical
experience.
AHEPP is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy through NPC. PSALM was
authorized to take title to and possession of, those assets transferred to it. EPIRA
mandated that all such assets shall be sold through public bidding with the exception of
Agus and Pulangui complexes in Mindanao, the privatization of which was left to the
discretion of PSALM in consultation with Congress.
The operation and maintenance of a hydroelectric power plant is not among the
statutorily granted powers of MWSS. Since the sale of AHEPP by PSALM merely
implements the legislated reforms for the electric power industry through schemes that
aim “to enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the
power generation, transmission and distribution sectors,” the proposed transfer to MWSS
which is another government entity contravenes that State policy.
SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES
The Water Code limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical
entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private
corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos. In the case of Angat
River, the NWRB has issued separate water permits to MWSS, NPC and NIA.
Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business affected with public
interest, was opened to private sector. Power generation shall not be considered a public
utility operation, and hence no franchise is necessary. Foreign investors are likewise
allowed entry into the electric power industry. However, there is no mention of water
rights in the privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities.
Operation of a Hydroelectric Power Plant
Hydroelectric energy is produced by the force of falling water. The capacity to produce
this energy is dependent on both the available flow and the height from which it falls.
Building up behind a high dam, water accumulates potential energy. This is transformed
into mechanical energy when the water rushes down the sluice and strikes the rotary
blades of turbine. The turbine's rotation spins electromagnets which generate current in
stationary coils of wire. Finally, the current is put through a transformer where the
voltage is increased for long distance transmission over power lines.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be said to
be “appropriating” our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and
converts the same into electricity through artificial devices. Since the NPC remains in
control of the operation of the dam by virtue of water rights granted to it, there is no
legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of electric
power using waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of water permit.
There is no provision in the EPIRA itself authorizing the NPC to assign or transfer its water
rights in case of transfer of operation and possession of multi-purpose hydropower
facilities. Since only the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the operation of the
non-power components such as the dam and reservoir, including the maintenance of the
surrounding watershed, should remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which
continue to be a government corporation. There is therefore no necessity for NPC to
transfer its permit over the water rights to K-Water. Pursuant to its purchase and
operation/management contracts with K-Water, NPC may authorize the latter to use
water in the dam to generate electricity.
NPC shall continue to be the holder of the water permit even as the operational control
and day-to-day management of the AHEPP is turned over to K-Water under the terms and
conditions of their APA and O & M Agreement, whereby NPC grants authority to K-Water
to utilize the waters diverted or collected in the Angat Dam for hydropower generation.
Further, NPC and K-Water shall faithfully comply with the terms and conditions of the
Memorandum of Agreement on Water Protocol, as well as with such other regulations
and issuances of the NWRB governing water rights and water usage.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Topic: Communication and information in Nation-Building
FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented
by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral
domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area
of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in
the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop,
and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP
and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It
further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal
framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the
respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as
well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters
of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded
from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August
2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from
formally signing the MOA-AD.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the President has the power to pursue reforms that would
require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people’s right to information on
matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991).
3. Whether or not the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
4. Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional.
5. Whether or not the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
HELD:
1. YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary
changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as
unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to
propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct
peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any
way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
2. YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify
the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the
peace agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is
replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and
for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations
from peace partners and concerned sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before
any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples (ICC/IP).
3. YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and
in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way
to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions
thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in
the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.
5. NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even
if nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power
to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to
the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination
of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of
its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes
the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most
extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend
the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As
long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration
only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to
the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its
statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to
the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in
peculiar circumstances.
CALALANG v. WILLIAMS
Topic: Definition of social justice
FACTS:
· Maximo Calalang, as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before
this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public
Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio
Rodriguez, as Mayor of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
· The NTC, with A.D. Williams, recommended to Vicente Fragante and Sergio Bayan
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the designated roads at
certain times in a resolution on July 17, 1940.
· The next day, NTC chairman recommended the adoption of the measure proposed
in the resolution to the Director of Public Works in pursuance of CA 548, which authorized
the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations for the use and control
of traffic on national roads.
· The case was brought before the SC as a question of constitutionality of CA. 548
raised by Maximo Calalang, who prayed for the writ of prohibition of said act.
· Calalang, contended that
o CA 548 was unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
o the rules and regulations promulgated by respondents pursuant to CA 548
§ constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
§ infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
ISSUE:
Whether or not C.A. No. 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people
HELD:
· “Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."”
· The creation of C.A. No. 548 aimed “to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest.”
· CA 548 is constitutional and observes social justice on the principle of salus populi
est suprema lex.
· Social justice, as the Supreme Court defined, is the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
· It must be founded therefore on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among all units of society, and the protection offered should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.”
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO
N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR
Topic: Aspects of Social Justice; Urban land reform and housing, Art. XIII, Sections 9-10;
Choice of site for public housing
Facts:
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a complaint
for expropriation against the respondents. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3)
adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the
respondents, located at Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. On a portion of the 3
lots, respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had
since leased out to tenants until the present.
In 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban
land reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result
of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land
from respondents, but the latter refused to sell.
On November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the
Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of
Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and construction
of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land;
On January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents offering to purchase the
said property at P3,000.00 per square meter. Respondents did not answer the letter.
Thus, petitioner prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just
compensation.
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having
received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the
expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the
subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while
petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market value
of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, respondents prayed
for damages of P21 million.
On 5 November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional
defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his
heirs. The City also excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby reduced the
area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling
1,636 square meters.The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court.
The trial court dismissed the Amended Complaint after declaring respondents as "small
property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279.
The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for petitioner's
failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. RTC denied the motion. Hence this petition.
Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same
from expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be within
the Area for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to Presidential Decree No.
1517. This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso
facto, regardless of the area of the land.
Issues:
Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of private
persons, but which is within the Areas for Priority Development (APD). - No.

Whether or not the respondent who is a small property owner is exempt from
expropriation under Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279. - Yes.
Held:
City of Mandaluyong failed to exhausted the other modes of acquisition in
Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots
Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President
Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human
communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development
and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare.
Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire Metro
Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended
in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and
specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land
Reform Zones.
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the
law. Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in
the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public
domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the
declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet
been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6)
privately owned lands.
Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other
provisions of the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands
for socialized housing under RA 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these
modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, 3) land
assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government;
(6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only
when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of
land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the
type of lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their acquisition. Section 10 deals with
the modes of land acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing.
These are two different things. They mean that the type of lands that may be acquired in
the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes authorized under
Section 10. In other words, land that lies within the APD may be acquired only in the
modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
Argument of petitioner: City claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of
land acquisition for socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the
acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state with
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law
before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall
be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." The
City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. The
City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the Aguilars but
the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has
been made. Not even Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property
states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
Respondents Aguilars are small property owners, thus exempted from
expropriation
Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small property
owners. Argument of petitioner: eminent domain not conditioned on size of lands; that
only a few can benefit does not diminish its public use character.
Supreme Court adheres to notion of public use. RA 7279 introduced a limitation on size of
land sought to be expropriated FOR SOCIAL HOUSING for small property owners. RA
7279, Sec 3 (q) – small property owners are (1) owners of real property whose
property consists of residential lands with an area not > 300 sq. m. in highly
urbanized cities and 800 sq. m in other urban areas, (2) do not own real
property other than the same.
The properties of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 sq. m. rule in RA 7279. There
was also no evidence to the contrary that the co-owners owned other real properties.
They may live in different housings, but that was no proof from the petitioner.
Respondents presented claims by presenting certifications from offices of the City and
Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17. 1998 and
December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City in SCA No. 1427
are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
Topic: Right to Quality Education, Art. XIV, Sec. 1
FACTS:
· Some members of the Mirriam College community described the contents of the
school paper and magazine for the September-October 1994 issue as "obscene,"
"vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid
of all moral values," particularly the fictional story entitled “Kaskas” which told the
experience of a group of young male combo players. The magazine’s Foreword written
by Jerome Gomez entitled “Foreplay” discussed the various reactions readers and the
articles written by women and passed on to the editors boldly tackled sexuality and
other experiences.
· In the said issue, various erotic poems were published and following the
publication of the paper and magazine, the members of the editorial board, and Relly
Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, were required by Dr. Aleli Sevilla,
Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee, to answer in writing the complaints of
the Mirriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student for violations of the
regulations in the student handbook considered to be major and minor offenses.
· Instead of answers, the students requested the transfer to the Regional Office of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which supposedly had
jurisdiction over the case.
· In response to the second letter of Dr. Sevilla, the students reiterated that the
Committee had no jurisdiction over them as they were being disciplined on account of
their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists thus the
applicable law is Republic Act No. 7079 otherwise known as The Campus Journalism Act
and its implementing rules and regulations and the emphasized the partiality of the
members of said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position"
against them.
· The investigation proceeded ex parte and thereafter, the students were meted
sanctions from suspension to expulsion which prompted the students to file a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of
Miriam College over them.
· The RTC denied the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order holding that DECS
Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19, 1992 did not exclude school Administrators from
exercising jurisdiction over cases of the nature involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079
also did not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that DECS
Order No. 94, S. of 1992 merely prescribes for purposes of internal administration which
DECS officer or body shall hear cases arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for
resolution. The said order never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
falling under R.A. 7079.
· Upon motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the expulsion and dismissal of the concerned students but the
suspension and withholding of graduation privileges remained in force and were not
covered by the injunction.
· Later, the RTC due to lack of jurisdiction dismissed the petition without prejudice
to its institution in the proper forum.
· All students, except 3, went to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari
and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining order but it was referred to the Court
of Appeals (CA) for disposition.
· The Court of Appeals granted the students’ petition and declared the RTC Orders
including the students' suspension and dismissal, void.
· Hence, the petition by Mirriam College.
ISSUE/S : well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of
The relevant issues are:
The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students;
The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.
N. B.: The Court did not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of
the penalty imposed or the manner of the imposition thereof since these were not fully
ventilated in the lower courts.
HELD : by the Disciplinary Board in violating disciplinary rules and standards will undermine the
The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
RATIO :
Academic freedom guaranteed in institutions of higher learning
The Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
Academic freedom, its coverage
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:
(1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who
may be admitted to study.
Right to discipline, a necessity to protect students, faculty and property
The right of the school to discipline its students is embodied in "how it shall be taught"
since a school cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. The establishment of an
educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of
an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. These rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Right to discipline is based on the “what to teach” freedom as well
Teaching the student discipline is necessary in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline which likewise finds basis in the freedom "what
to teach."
Right to develop discipline, a constitutional duty
The school has the right and the duty to develop discipline in its students as the
Constitution provides that all educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of
national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties
of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
The Court in an earlier case said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out
its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible,
effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Freedom to determine admission carries the right to exclude or expel as well
as to impose lesser sanctions, form part of discipline
The right to discipline includes "who may be admitted to study." The school’s freedom to
determine whom to admit includes the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as
graduation privileges.
Reinstatement of students found guilty of violating disciplinary rules and
authority, undermine school administration’s authority and impair academic
freedom
In an earlier case, the Court upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of hazing
holding that the reinstatement of students who have been investigated and found guilty
authority of the administration of the school. It will seriously impair academic freedom
which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.
Admission to an institution of higher learning, mere privilege rather than a
right
The Court reiterated that it has consistently upheld the salutary proposition that
admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same
being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the
Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject
to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is
subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.
State’s power to regulate educational institutions does not entail deprivations
of their rights
The Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational institution
however such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. The
Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not
the deprivation of their rights.
Students’ right to free speech, though guaranteed is not absolute
The Court has consistently held that students are entitled to peaceable assembly and
free speech as they enjoy the freedom to express their views and communicate their
thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings.
However, the right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute.
While the Court upheld the right of the students to free expression, it did not rule out
disciplinary action by the school for conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Reconciliation of the provision under the Campus Journalism Act and the
Constitution, imperative
The provision under the Campus Journalism Act providing that a student shall not be
expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the
basis of the performance of his or her duties in the student publication should not be
construed so as to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students or unduly
restrict the right of the students to free speech.
The Court held that the said provision of the Campus Journalism Act simply meant that
the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely based on the articles he or she has
written, except when such article materially disrupts class work or involve substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Power to investigate is adjunct of its power to suspend or expel thus the
school has jurisdiction
The Court held that Mirriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed
against its students. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is necessary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That
power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom
of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN v. CA
Topic: Educational mandate of the State
FACTS:
· Private respondents Ho, Magante, Sancho, So and Cainoy are third year nursing
students of the University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused admission in the
summer classes of 1989 and the last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the
ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing
Practice II with Related Learning Experience).
· A petition for mandamus was filed to command USA to re-admit them.
· USA admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing
course but justified that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing
subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the
following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below
80% performance rating.
· RTC: Petitioned denied. Mandamus will not lie to compel USA to enroll private
respondents because of their academic deficiencies and that the refusal of USA falls
within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause of the Constitution.
· CA: Reversed the RTC. Private respondents possess no academic deficiency and
are not disqualified from readmission to USA’s College of Nursing. While it is true that
they did not obtain a grade of at least 80% in Nursing 104, they passed and did not fail
in said subject and in facts obtained grades of 77% and 78%. It is irrefutable that 75% is
the passing grade in USA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel USA to enroll private respondents?
HELD:
NO, private respondents failed to show that they possess a clear legal right to be
enrolled in USA. Moreover, assuming that USA has an imperative duty to enroll them, the
duty is not merely ministerial; rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion. The
Constitution provides that educational institutions have the discretion or the academic
freedom to deny private respondents admission or re-admission.
· Taking into account the fact that private respondents have already finished their
Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing even before the promulgation of the
questioned decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by events and should therefore
be dismissed. However, even if the case is moot and academic, a statement of the
governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only
of the parries but of others similarly situated.
· Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual
obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of
discretion. Furthermore, the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required.
· In the present case, private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisites of a mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that they
possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in USA. Moreover, assuming that USA has an
imperative duty to enroll them, it does not appear that the duty is merely ministerial;
rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion.
· The Court mentions the following provisions providing for the rights of students:
o Sec. IV, par. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states the
school, after having accepted a student for enrollment in a given course may not expel
him or refuse to re-enroll him until he completes his course, except when he is
academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline.
o Sec. 9(2) of BP 232 (Education Act of 1982) provides that students shall have the
right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency.
o Art. XIV, Sec. 5(3) of the 1987 Constitution affords a similar right, although limited
to citizens. It provides that every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
· As to the rights of educational institutions, the Court mentions the following
provisions allowing schools to pursue their academic freedom and in the process have
the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized:
o Sec. 13(2) of BP 232 provides that schools shall have the right to determine on
academic grounds who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the
subjects of the study and research.
o Sec. 5(2), Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution provides that academic freedom shall
be enjoyed by all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom has been defined as
the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how
best to attain them – free from outside coercion or interference save possible when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
· While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue, since a
contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate
a student would imply a corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and
obey the rules and regulations of the school.
· The Court recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields
of learning. Thus, they are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and
regulations in the admission of students, including setting of academic standards. Within
the parameters thereof, they are competent to determine who are entitled to admission
and re-admission.
· Although private respondents did not flunk in Nursing 104, their performances are
still academically deficient for failure to meet the standards set by USA. Besides, it is
worthy to note that they were apprised fully beforehand about the rules and regulations
of USA. They also signed agreements when they applied for admission to first year at
USA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 23, 1991 and its resolutions dated April 25, 1991 and June 10, 1991 are SET ASIDE.
The order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City dated September 15, 1989 is
REINSTATED.
ATENEO v. CAPULONG
Topic: The Educational System, Art. XIV, Sec. 3, Sec. 4
FACTS:
· Aguila Legis, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites upon
neophytes.
· As a result thereof, one neophyte named Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year
law student,died of serious physical injuries.
· Another freshman student by the name of Bienvenido Marquezwas also
hospitalized for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries
inflictedupon him on the same occasion.
· Dean del Castillo created an investigating committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report regarding the circumstances surrounding thedeath of
Lennie Villa.
· The respondent students were asked to submit their written statementsbut failed
to do so. In the meantime, they were placed in preventive suspension.
· The investigating committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing
the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students
for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
· Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal
charge.
· Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students.
ATENEO BOARD:
· respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules
on Discipline which prohibits participationin hazing activities. However, in view of the
lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the
Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.
· Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on allrespondent
students.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled.
RESP JUDGE CAPULONG: ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said
students
ISSUE/S:
· WON a school is within its rights in expelling students from its
academiccommunity pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards – YES
· WON respondents students were denied due process – NO
· WON the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules. – YES
RULING:
1st Issue: YES.
· As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherentlyendowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered byexternal controls or pressure.
· The SC consistently upheld the salutary propositionthat admission to an institution
of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the samebeing a privilege on the part of
the student rather than a right.
· While under the education Actof 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their
field of study, subject to existing curriculaand to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
o the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
3rd Issue: YES, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students
and therefore it had validly exercised such power.
· The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo
as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on
students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them.
· This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

2nd Issue: NO. KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI HOMES, INC., et al.

· There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Topic: Arts and Culture, Art. XIV, Sections 14-18
· Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to
submit their written statement on the incident. FACTS: In September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot near
· Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila. DMCI-PDI
copies of the charges. secured its Barangay Clearance to start the construction. A Zoning Permit and a Building
· The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' Permit was later obtained, allowing to build a 49-storey with basement and 2 penthouse
notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. level condominium on the property.
· Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant
petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration
In July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of
first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals.
the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI citing that
o It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
“the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion,
remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is
will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of
whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to
our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the
their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
· Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
The opinion of Manila City Legal Officer Dela Cruz was sought by Building Official Balagot
o the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
as to whether the latter is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121. The former stated
accusation against them;
that there is no legal justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit
o that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
issued in favor of DMCI-PDI since the construction lies outside the Luneta Park and is too
assistance of counsel, if desired:
far to be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and
o they shall be informed of the evidence against them
historical significance of the Rizal Monument. He also pointed out that there is no
o they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
showing that the area of subject property has been officially declared as an
anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it been categorically designated by the
National Historical Institute as a heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark
or even a national treasure.
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion of the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the matter. Through letters, NHCP
Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to DMCI-PDI and NHCP Executive
Director III Ludovico D. Badoy addressed to then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, that the
Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the
rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the
National Monument.
An online petition against the Torre de Manila project garnered about 7,800 signatures.
The City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in
Resolution No. 121.
In a letter to Mayor Estrada dated, DMCI-PIDI President Austria sought clarification on the
controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since they were a Zoning
Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the application for the Building Permit, which was also
granted, and did not deem it necessary to go through the process of appealing to the
local zoning board. He expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply with the process if the
City of Manila deemed it necessary.
The Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board
Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application.
Manila’s City Council issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, adopting Zoning Board
Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A, which ratifies and confirms all previously issued permits,
licenses and approvals issued for Torre de Manila.
KOR: In September 2014, Knights of Rizal, an NGO created under RA No. 646, filed a
petition for injunction seeking a TRO (and later, a writ of preliminary injunction) against
the construction of Torre de Manila, arguing that the subject matter of the present suit is
one of transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance
to society, or with far-reaching implication involving the desecration of the Rizal
Monument. It further argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled
to full protection of the law and the government must abate any act or activity that
endangers the nation’s cultural heritage even against the wishes of the local government
hosting it. Also, it argues that the project is a nuisance per se because "the despoliation
of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoys or offends the senses'
of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present,
continuing, worsening and aggravating status or condition. Being a nuisance per se, it
deserves to be abated summarily, even without need of judicial proceeding. Lastly, it
contends that the construction was commenced and continues in bad faith, and is in
violation of the City’s zoning ordinance.
DMCI-PDI: 1. DMCI-PDI argues that the Court has no jurisdiction over the action and that
the action should have been filed with the RTC under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
It contends that the proper forum should be the MZBAA and should the KOR fail there, it
should appeal to the HLURB. It further argues that since the Rizal Monument has been
declared a National Treasure, the power to issue a cease and desist order is with the
appropriate cultural agency under Section 25, RA No. 10066 or the National Cultural
Heritage Act of 2009. An action for injunction is not the property remedy for the
abatement of a nuisance.
2. KOR has no legal right to file the action because it is not a real party in interest since it
has not shown that it suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged
illegal conduct of the City of Manila. If there is injury, the same was caused by the
private conduct of a private entity and not the City.
3. Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. DMCI-PDI obtained all the necessary permits,
licenses, clearances and certificates for the construction of Torre de Manila.
4. DMCI-PDI acted in good faith in constructing Torre de Manila. Bad faith cannot be
attributed to DMCI-PDI since it was within the lawful exercise of its rights. KOR failed to
present proof that it did not follow the proper procedure and zoning restriction of the
City. Even if KOR proffered proof, the Court would still be in no position to declare its acts
as illegal since the Court is not a trier of facts.
5. KOR is not entitled to a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction because KOR failed to
establish a clear and unmistakable right to enjoin the construction of Torre de Manila,
much less request its demolition. To grant KOR’s application for injunctive relief would
constitute an unjust taking of property without due process of law.
6. An action for injunction is not the proper remedy for abatement of a nuisance. It also
assert that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se as it obtained all the necessary
permits, licenses, clearances and certificates for its construction.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the official of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of Torre de Manila. – No.
2. WoN the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per se. – No.
HELD: 1. WoN the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the official of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of Torre de Manila. – No.
A. There is no law prohibiting the construction of Torre de Manila.
· What is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the
act is contrary to morals, customs and I public order. (Manila Electric Company v. PSC).
· It is the law itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) CC, which prescribes that acts not
contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not
contrary to law.
o Here, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is
"contrary to morals, customs, and public order". On the contrary, the City of
Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the
pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
· Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the “development of
historic sites and facilities.” Section 48 regulates “large commercial signage and/or
pylon.”
o There is nothing in both Section that disallows the construction of a building
outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may
affect the background of a historic site.
o Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal
Monument and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument."
o Likewise, Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an
"anthropological or archeological area" or in an area designated as a heritage
zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.
· The National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009 empowers the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order “when
the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important cultural properties
[is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state.”
o Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound the
structure is. The same law does not mention that another project, not itself a
heritage may be the subject of a cease and desist order.
o Thus, it cannot apply to the Torre de Manila project.
B. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
· Mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or
the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
· As there is nothing in Ordinance 8119 or any law prohibiting the said construction,
there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila to consider he standards set under
Ordinance No. 8119, which are standards that can never be applied outside the
boundaries of Rizal Park.
o Mandamus will lie only if the officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial
duty to consider these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can
be no such ministerial duty because these standards are not applicable to
buildings outside of the Rizal Park.
· The exercise of the Court’s extraordinary certiorari power can neither be invoked
as it is limited to actual cases and controversies that necessarily involve a violation of
the Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality or validity of a
governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does not raise the issue
of constitutionality or validity of the statute.
Ø Dissenting Opinion: The City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous construction of its
own Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it
issued permits in DMCI-PDI's favor.
· Such is disproved by the MBZAA Zoning Resolutions.The power of the Court in
mandamus petitions does not extend "to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in
a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either."
o Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or
arbitrarily in issuing the resolution (Fact #8), the Court should respect MZBAA's
exercise of discretion.
Ø Dissenting Opinion: City of Manila should reevaluate, through the CPDO, the permits
previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance with the
standards under Ordinance No. 8119. The circumstances in this case warrant the pro hac
vice conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a "contested case"
necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved.
· The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate
of the law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If
another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be
decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the law.
· In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel
action in matters involving judgment and discretion, only in cases where there has been
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority.
o Here, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had
been negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that
this determination will involve questions of fact.
o Even the KOR could not point to any law that City of Manila had violated and
could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter
which do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
o The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the
preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It is not
a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law.
· Though DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was granted without going through the process
under Ordinance No. 8119, such was rectified when City of Manila ratified the licenses
and permits already given to DMCI-PDI.
 o Said ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its
discretion and well within the authority granted it by law and the City's own
Ordinance No. 8119.
· The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience,
and welfare.
o There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm,
danger, or hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building
allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual
appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists.
o The approval of MBZAA and subsequent ratification by City Council must be
taken as duly authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials.
C. The KOR is Estopped from questioning the Torre de Manila Construction.
· The KOR itself came up with the idea to build a structure right behind the Rizal
Monument that would dwarf the Rizal Monument. It proposed the building of a 129.25
meter high national theater right behind the monument in the mid 1950s. KOR also
proposed to build a Rizal Center on the park as recently as 2013.
· In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park, and to the
rear of the Rizal Monument - approximately 870 meters from the Rizal Monument and 3 0
meters from the edge of Rizal Park.
2. WoN the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per se. – No.
· Article 694 NCC defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
o 2 Kinds of nuisances:
1) nuisance per se - recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or
safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined
law of necessity.
2) nuisance per accidens - depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be
abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance.
· The Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. It cannot be considered as a “direct
menace to public health or safety.”
o Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-
PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with health and
safety standards set by law.
o DMCI-PDI has also been granted the following permits and clearances: 1)
Height Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority; (2) Development
Permit from the HLURB; (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB; (4) Cert. of
Environmental Compliance Commitment from DENR; (5) Barangay Clearance (6)
Zoning Permit; (7) Building Permit; (8) and Electrical and Mechanical Permit.
DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the
MZBAA and granted by the City Council of Manila.
· Neither is Torre de Manila a nuisance per accidens as now being claimed by KOR.
o The conditions and circumstances determining a nuisance per accidens must
be well established, not merely alleged. The Court cannot simply accept these
conditions and circumstances as established facts.
o The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to
estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus made. The Court is
no such authority and is not a trier of facts.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The TRO
issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.
JOSE A. ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, Perdo Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS:
In the 1935 elections, Jose Angara (Angara) was proclaimed as a member of the National
Assembly, winning over the private respondents. The following are the events that
transpired after the election:
· Nov. 15: Angara took his oath of office
· Dec. 3: the National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the winners of
the election without any protest, and that no other protests may be filed afterwards.
· Dec. 8: Ynsua filed a motion of protest before the Electoral Commission.
· Dec. 9: The Electoral Commission (EC) adopted a resolution fixing December 9 as
the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the protest arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that there is
no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the NA after confirmation.

The EC denied this motion to dismiss, which prompted Angara to file a petition before the
SC for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the EC from taking
further cognizance of the protest, as he was already a member of the NA. He alleged that
the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the EC solely as regards the merits of
contested elections, excluding the power to regulate the proceedings for
contesting/protesting (which necessarily includes the fixing of deadlines), which power
has been reserved to the Legislative Department, the NA. Essentially, Angara is of the
opinion that the question of which between the NA and the EC has jurisdiction over his
situation falls under the SC’s jurisdiction as it involved the interpretation of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Can the SC take cognizance of the Prohibition Petition without interfering or encroaching
upon the functions of the EC? YES, in the system of checks and balances, the SC is the
final arbiter, which effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
functions.
HELD:
Doctrine of Separation of Powers: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other.
Principle of Checks and Balances: The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. The Constitution provided a balance between the three
so as to prevent one branch of government from being too powerful or weaker than the
other, as they are “co-equal branches”.
For example, the President can veto laws that are passed by Congress (but the Congress
can pass the law upon its return to both houses provided that it reaches a ⅔ vote from
each house) and while the President needs the consent of the Senate in order to be a
part of a treaty. The Judiciary through the Supreme Court, is the final arbiter of acts and
laws promulgated by both branches.
Therefore, in cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. This
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of the 1935 Constitution.
PS: In Loazon’s syllabus the doctrine is under the principle of separation of powers, the
SC will have to await the termination of the proceedings before the Electoral Tribunal for
it to take congnizance of the case but this was not in the case itself???
Doctrine of Necessary Implication: Ruling on the merits, the SC held that the EC is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the NA. The express
lodging of that power in the EC is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
NA. Thus, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the EC.
The EC was, therefore, acting the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in
any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe… The petition
for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. VS. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS
THE VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10, 2004
ELECTIONS
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS:
By the present Petition for Prohibition, Senator Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring
null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint
Committee) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die
on June 11, 2004. It corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant
to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
· With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last
regular session, its term terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth
Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence.
· Henceforth, all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of
Congress, relying on legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the
rules of both Houses of Congress.
Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised, SC assumes jurisdiction over the
instant petition pursuant to its power and duty "to determine whether or not there has
been a GADALEJ on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" under
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for
prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
1. His arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as]
borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress.
2. Citing Section 15[1], Article VI of the Constitution, the existence and proceedings of
the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional following the
adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on June 11,
2004.
ISSUE: WON the Joint Committee should cease in completing its tasks assigned following
the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular
session
RATIO: No, the petition has absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must,
therefore, be dismissed.
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent
or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly
contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is
an incumbent member.
· The Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory
recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days
after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move
to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of
former Senate President Jovito Salonga.
1992 Presidential elections: Both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,
1992. On June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and
Vice-President. Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint
public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V.
Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively.
1998 Presidential elections: Both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,
1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-
President on May 27, 1998.[3]cralaw The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public
session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph
Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-
President, respectively.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXISTENCE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did
not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both
Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term
of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day
recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the
President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII Constitution:
"The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election."
Section 7, Article VIII, Constitution:
"The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election."
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth
Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have passed out of
legal existence.
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final
adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-
legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers.
In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it
has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may
change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the
votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the
National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred
the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has
not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to
the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for
the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may
reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
[1] Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for
its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening
of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon (G.R. No. 136760)
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Facts:
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon
Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano
worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of
Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The
Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear
and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition
and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of
General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and
desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court
denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge
Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion
when he dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis.
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to
Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the
Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify
before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement
of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to
prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not
apply in this case. The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case
at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the
inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the legislature. On the
other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the
reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of
enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS:
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196
individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. One Kenny
Dalandag, was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ and was later on
listed as one of the prosecution witness. On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through
counsel request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that
Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn
declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 201019 and
November 2, 2010 but Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the
RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in
the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial
conference and issued a pre-trial order. The respondents questioned the propriety of the
conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. Petitioner also filed
a motion for the production of documents, which the RTC in Manila granted.
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-
124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to
charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
HELD: NO. Respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-
request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or
deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied
the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government
whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to
prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide
range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public
prosecutors.
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of
Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however,
judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed
grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the
Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the
joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple
murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the
accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his
exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag
as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx
against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a
mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a
participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final
order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in
Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DEMETRIA v ALBA
Topic: How principle is violated: interference to and assumption of another branch’s
functions
FACTS:
Petitioners, who are members of the National Assembly as citizens and taxpayers, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of
1977) on the grounds that: (a) it infringes the law by authorizing the illegal transfer of
public moneys, (b) it failed to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed
transfer of funds are to be made and (c) it allows the President to override the
safeguards, form and procedure and approving appropriations, and is a continuous threat
of excess of authority and jurisdiction, thus it amounts to an undue delegation of
legislative powers to the executive.
The Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and argued that
the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution. He further contended that prohibition will not lie from one branch
of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility. He also filed a rejoinder to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the abrogation of Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution, which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.”, allegedly rendered the petition moot and
academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Branch exceeds the scope of its constitutional authority by
the act of approving appropriations in accordance to Sec 44 of PD 1177
HELD: Yes, the Executive Branch exceeds the scope of its constitutional authority by the
act of approving appropriations in accordance to Sec 44 of PD 1177.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere
cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.”
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.”
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and
categorical under the 1973 Constitution. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177
unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in
the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Moreover, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its
authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the
legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government
had assumed to do as void. Respondents are not acting within their sphere of
responsibility and are hence, enjoined form acting under the unconstitutional provision in
question.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
MACALINTAL vs COMELEC
Topic: Illustrations of Application of the Principle of Blending of Powers
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of
this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. The
Court upholds the right of the petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further
buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the
1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad
ISSUE: WON Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, violates the independence of the
COMELEC granted under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution? [YES]
RULING:
Petitioner maintains that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence
of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the
executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority
of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law,
it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested
party, including the legislators.
Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said
Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence
of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It is only on this question that
respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections
19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent
COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article
IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions
such as the COMELEC.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), created under RA 9189 and is
charge of the IRR, violates the Constitution. JCOC composing of members of both houses
is a purely legislative body. As stated in the Constitution, the COMELEC, being an
independent Constitutional Commission, has the power to formulate, regulate and
implement rules and regulations, stated in Art IX-A of the Constitution. The Constitution
does not state, or even imply, the power of the Congress to enforce and administer
election laws with the COMELEC.
Laws mentioned:
1. SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall
issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this
Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
2. SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7)
other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the
House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:
Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress,
four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its
decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into
the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority. Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no
question that the authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and
thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its
decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into
the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Concurring & Dissenting Opinion
PUNO, J.
· Concurs on issue 2 & 3
· Dissents on issue 1
Congressional Oversight:
· Embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted; concerns post-
enactment measures
· Monitor compliance, determine if agencies properly administered, eliminate
dishonesty, assess executive conformity with public interest
· Intrinsic in grant of legislative power and integral to checks and balances
o Scrutiny – determine efficiency; may request information and reports; based primarily
on power of appropriation
§ Ex. budget hearings, question hour, confirmation
o Congressional investigation – intense digging of facts; compel information needed to
discharge legislative functions
§ Must be in aid of legislation, conducted following rules of procedure, persons
appearing afforded constitutional rights
o Legislative supervision – informed awareness of a committee regarding executive
operations; allows scrutiny the exercise of delegated law-making authority
§ Ex. veto power
· Sec 19/25 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations – Congress can veto under the oversight
committee
· Majority sustains that the petitioner as it holds that “by vesting itself with powers
to approve, review, amend and revise the IRR for the Overseas Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon
the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
· The focus is on the exact place of the power of congressional oversight in our
constitutional canvass. This will involve exposition of two principles basic to our
constitutional democracy: separation of powers and checks and balances.
· Separation of Powers – prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the
three branches of government.
o “The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.” (Laurel)
· Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separately and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government
· There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers.
· It is beyond debate that the Principle of Separation of Powers:
o Allows the “blending” of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers in one
body;
o Does not prevent one branch of government from inquiring into the affairs of the
other branches to maintain the balance of power;
o but ensures that there is no encroachment on matters within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the other branches.
· Supreme Court checks the exercise of power of the other branches of government
through judicial review. It is the final arbiter of disputes involving the proper allocation
and exercise of the different powers under the Constitution.
· Judicial Supremacy
o The Constitution is a definition of the powers of the government. The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundary, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantee to them.
· The power of judicial review is, however, limited to “actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of arguments by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional questions raised or the very lis mota presented” but this was redefined
in the 1987 Constitution which expanded the jurisdiction of this Court to include the
dermination of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
· COMELEC is a constitutional body exclusively charged with the enforcement and
administration of “all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, and is invested with the power to decide all
questions affecting elections save those involving the right to vote.
· COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive,
legislative, and judiciary branches of government given its important role in preserving
the sanctity of the right of suffrage.
· The 1973 Constitution broadened the power of the COMELEC by making it the sole
judge of all election contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the national legislature and elective provincial and city officials. Thus, the
COMELEC was given judicial power aside from its traditional administrative and executive
functions. The trend towards strengthening the COMELEC continued with the 1987
Constitution.
· The decisions of COMELEC are reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds
of grave abuse of discretion.
· The COMELEC is, however subject to congressional scrutiny especially during
budget hearing. But congress cannot abolish COMELEC as it’s a mere creature of the
legislature; it owes its origin from the Constitution.
· Congress has no power to call the commissioners of the COMELEC to a question
hour but COMELEC is mandated to “submit to the President and the Congress
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall.” This provision allows the Congress to review and assess the effectivity of
election laws and if necessary, enact new laws or amend existing statuses.
· Be that as it may… legislative veto power or congressional oversight power over
the authority of COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce election laws
is unconstitutional.
· The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the
constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed
with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its
responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer
laws belong to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively by the 1987
Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the exercise of
its oversight function.
“I join the majority in holding that the section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 is
unconstitutional for it allows Congress to negate exclusive power of the COMELEC to
administer and enforce election laws and regulations granted by the Constitution itself.
Granting the petition will not invalidate the entire Rep. Act No. 9819. Decision (sic)
IN VIEW OF THE FORGOING, I dissent from the majority’s ruling upholding the
constitutionality of section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a
permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators
and Party-List after executing the required affidavit. I concur, however, with the
majority’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section
18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 with respect to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim
the winning candidates for Senators and Party-List representatives but not as to the
power to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. I also concur with the
majority with respect to the unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review
and approval by Congress.
I so vote.
ALEJANDRINO v. QUEZON
Topic: Illustrations of Application of the Principle of Blending of Powers
OSMENA v PENDATUN
Topic: The interference of the Supreme Court when dealing with the members of the
Senate
FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He
asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House;
second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7
of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member
had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action
and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required
respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of
such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent
adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its
talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its
reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour;
and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before closing its
session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De
Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao) 1 filed their answer, challenged
the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to
discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then
invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before
the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are
quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee
created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no
question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in
support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of
fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave
him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought
not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which
he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor,
the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before
approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the
House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can interfere with the senate for disorderly
behavior
HELD: “NO, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the decision of the senate of what
is disorderly behaviour
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one
thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been
said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
In Clifford vs. French, There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise,
or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are
functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this
committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the
legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to
exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to
discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that
sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is
our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state
that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we
found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least
two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action
against offenders, even after other business had been considered.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
NOTE:
However, under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court may inquire
whether or not the decision to expel a member of Doctrine of Necessary Implication.
The Doctrine of necessary implication provides that the exercise of the power may
be justified in the absence of an express conferment because the grant of express power
carried with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it.
Font: Helvetica Neue, Justified
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
Topic: Delegation of Powers
FACTS:
PETITIONER
· Jesus Garcia is the husband of Rosalie Jaype-Garcia and the father of their minor
children.
· A series of Temporary Protection Orders were issued against Jesus Garcia, ordering
him, among other things, to remove all his personal belongings in the conjugal dwelling
and leave the premises, to stay away from Rosalie and their children, to not harass them
in any way and to provide financial support.
· He filed oppositions to the renewal of the TPO. However, when it was renewed on
September 26, 2006, he no longer submitted the required comment to the motion for
renewal of the TPO arguing that it would be an exercise in futility.
· He then filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with a prayer for injunction
and TRO challenging the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the equal
protection clause and due process clause, and the validity of the modified TPO for being
an unwanted product of an invalid law.
· CA dismissed his petition for failure to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the RTC and that the challenge to the validity of RA 9262 via petition for
prohibition constituted a collateral attack on said law.
· Jesus Garcia then filed this petition before the SC, assailing the constitutionality of
RA 9262 for
a. making a gender-based classification, providing remedies only to women&children
and not to men thus violating the equal protection clause. He claims the even the title of
the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is already
discriminatory since it means violence by men against women. The law also does not
include violence committed by women against children and other women. He adds that
gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband of the remedies under it
because its purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence.
b. Violating the due process clause since he has practically no opportunity to
respond and that he was stripped of his property and family without an inkling of what
happened.
c. by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
FACTS: RESPONDENT
· Jesus Garcia had allegedly inflicted acts of violence against his wife Rosalie Jaype-
Garcia and his daughter, Jo-ann.
· He was controlling , forbade Rosalie to pray and deliberately isolated her from her
friends. When she took up law, he trivialized her ambitions and asked her to just stay at
home.
· Jesus Garcia admitted having an affair with a bank manager (godmother to one of
their kids) and boasted about their sexual relations to the household help.
· His infidelity was the subject of their numerous arguments, some resulting in
physical harm to Rosalie; one quarrel of theirs, Jesus grabbed Rosalie on both arms and
shook her, leaving bruises and hematoma.
· Jesus Garcia also beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, who saw his text messages to
said bank manager and who told Rosalie about it.
· All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia to despair causing her to attempt
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital,
Jesus Garcia left the house and never visited her in all the 7 days she was confined in the
hospital.
· He even told his mother-in-law that Rosalie Garcia should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child
with her.
· Rosalie Garcia was determined to separate from Jesus Garcia but she was afraid he
would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if
she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him.
· After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office in the family
businesses of which they are both stockholders, depriving her of access to full
information about their businesses.
a. Note that Rosalie gets only P20k/month as salary from one corporation only while
Jesus receives P60k/month from said corporation and also enjoys unlimited cash
advances and other benefits from the corporations.
· Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order against Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262. RTC found reasonable ground to believe
there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a
series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) against Jesus Garcia.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether VAWC is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause? No.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not RA. 9262 allows undue delegation of judicial
power, thus being unconstitutional
RATIO: R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:
 The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that
it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based
on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection.
Unequal power relationship between men and women
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
Art. II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of
women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. To this end, the Philippines has participated in the global movement to
address violence against women and children. Senate has ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. Congress also enacted RA 9262 (VAWC)
in line with this State policy.
According to the Philippine Commission on Women, violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and
men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of
men's expression of controlling women to retain power.
MAIN ISSUE: No undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts
as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay
officials to issue protection orders.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.
The Barangay Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
“enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay”
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of
a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence
and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and
that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials
and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and
to maintain peace and order.
PHCAP v. Sec. Duque III,
Topic: Delegation of power
Facts:
E.O. No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution.
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured
that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers
of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner’s Argue: The RIRR goes beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby
amending and expanding the coverage of said law.
1. That the RIRR impose unreasonable requirements for advertising and promotion;
2. It impose an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants from 0-24 months old or beyond,
3. It forbids the use of health and nutritional claims.
4. It impose additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code
The DOH Administrative order is violative of the WHA obligation in implementing the
ICMBS under which the state has an obligation to aid in marketing breast milk substitutes
in line with protecting and promoting the rights of children.
Respondent’s Defense:
1. International instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the
DOH may implement them through the RIRR. The RIRR does not violate the state
obligation under the WHA because the ICMBS was not ratified by senate, hence there is
no state obligation arising from it.
2. The DOH is authorized to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-
à-visbreastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products as stated under Sections
5,8, and 10 of the Milk Code.
Issue: WON the advertising and labeling requirements under the RIRR are valid
Held: NO
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however,
the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as
DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information
on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products;
and the power to control such information.
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on
breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes.
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such
information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code54 to
ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and
health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and
factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottle-feeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control
information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not
absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely
prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR
regarding labeling and advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling
requirements, specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no substitute to
breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant formula may contain
pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately. Section 1657
of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the
Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant
and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the
Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that there is
any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as
such information would be inconsistent with the superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to
health workers regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof.
However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b) will result in the absurd situation in
which milk companies and distributors are forbidden to claim to health workers that their
products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and yet be allowed to display on
the containers and labels of their products the exact opposite message. That askewed
interpretation of the Milk Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by
mandating that all information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be
consistent, at the same time giving the government control over planning, provision,
design, and dissemination of information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the
product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing
Section 8 of the Milk Code.
Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement.
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers
thereof. The buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 of
the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms
being present in infant formula and other related products when these are prepared and
used inappropriately.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis
breastmilk substitutes and supplements and related products cannot be
questioned. It is its intervention into the area of advertising, promotion, and
marketing that is being assailed by petitioner.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the
regulatory authority given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in
Section 6 thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional
materials prior to dissemination.
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the
standards set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall
screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising,
promotion, and marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control over
the information content of advertising, promotional and marketing materials on
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other related products. It
also sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen such materials before they
are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs, the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity,
economy and welfare."
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public
interest and welfare.
ABAKADA v. SEC. PURISIMA
Topic: Delegation of Powers
People v. Maceren
Topic: Delegation of power
FACTS
● Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito
del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
● The accused were found to have performed “electro fishing” in the water of Sta.
Cruz, by using electricity from the machine of their bangka to fish and kill aquatic
animals which come into contact with its scope
● Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of
dismissal
● CFI ruled that that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric currentd is
not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries
Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted
by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful
○ Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous
substance" in fishing
○ Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or
poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more
than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five
years.
○ The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing
● Later, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84 prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters
● The Secretary later upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No.
84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries
○ The Supreme Court treated the appeal as one that is an appeal to the SC and not
the CFI, as The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that
electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76
thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than
two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion
of the court."
○ That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order
No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which
amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty
for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and
which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
○ Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83,
then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
inferior court
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded its
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1
HELD: Yes. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
● Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to
that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law
○ That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive
in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine
molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind
and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations
● Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order
No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails
within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for
electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the
penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the
Fisheries Law
● At present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable
under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive
revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of
all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May
16, 1975 , expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas The
inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear
recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an
admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro
fishing.
● An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative
agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources under
the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he exceeded his authority in penalizing electro
fishing by means of an administrative order
● Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking
body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of
the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes
● The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned
● In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
– Prospero PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al.
Topic: Delegation of Powers
FACTS:
In 2001, PGMA issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
Cut to 2010, PNoy issued E.O. 13 abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to
the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) more particularly
to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
In 2011, Purisima filed before the IAD a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay,
Jr., then the Chairman of the Board of Trustees (BoT) of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA BoT, in the
purchase of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Pichay et al then received an
Order, signed by the then ExecSec Ochoa, requiring them to submit their written
explanations.
Instead of complying with the Order, Pichay filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the SC, seeking, among others to declare E.O. 13 as unconstitutional for usurping
the powers of the Legislature – of Congress – to create a public office and to delegate
quasi-judicial powers to administrative agencies.
ISSUE:
Did the abolishing of the PAGC, an executive office, and the subsequent transfer of its
functions to another executive office (IAD) under E.O. 13 usurp upon the Congress’ power
to create public office? No, E.O. 13 is constitutional. The power of the President
to reorganize executive offices is a prerogative under his “continuing
authority” to do so under the Administrative Code.
HELD:
The Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Section 31 thereof enumerates instances of when the President may reorganize offices,
to wit:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other departments or agencies.
Under (1) the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In
contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31 (1) on the
one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the
limitations prescribed under the Admin Code.
When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2)
Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and
was placed directly “under the Office of the President.”
On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been
transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under
Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct
office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were
simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the
President Proper.
The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative
structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division the Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it
has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
BANDA v. ERMITA
Topic: How law-making power is delegated: suppletory rule-making (filling in details to
ensure enforcement of the law) and contingent rule-making (ascertaining the facts to
bring the law into operation)
FACTS:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are
allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive
bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of
superior... quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the National
Printing Office (NPO). Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act to its income.
Petitioners maintain that former President Aquino's Executive Order No. 285 is a
legislative enactment, as the same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution; thus, only Congress through legislation can
validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
Petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the
eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is
tainted with bad faith
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers.

HELD:
NO. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the
President's constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue
of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
The NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government
forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency
and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain government
printing jobs. Republic Act No. 7645, Executive Order No. 191 2003 General
Appropriations Act, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law recognize the
power of the President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said
appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and
operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign
appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
The power of the President to reorganize agencies under the executive department by
executive or administrative order is constitutionally and statutorily recognized.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in
government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services
by redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to
transform it into a... self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well
within the prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative
power to reorganize her own office... the presidential power to reorganize agencies and
offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such
reorganization is carried out in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. SEC. REYES
Topic: Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
FACTS:
· Petitioners are toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
· On December 21, 2004, DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration, Co., Ltd.
(JAPEX) formally converted GSEC-102 into SERVICE CONTRACT-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
· JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of
the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988
o JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An
Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management
Related Measures And For Other Purposes."
· Protected Area Management Board of Tanon Strait favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEX’s application of ECC.
o DENR granted an ECC to JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tañon Strait.
o Months later, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of
3,150 meters
· Petitioner applied to SC to enjoin the implementation of SC-46, which allowed the
exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a
narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu, for violation
of the 1987 constitution.
· Petitioner’s argument:
o a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically by 50 to 70 percent
o They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao," also known
as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."
o the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public
consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite
to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
o Insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution
ISSUE: WON the Service Contract 46 violates the 1987 Constituion? YES
HELD:
SC 46 is in violation of the 1987 Consitution - YES
· In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.
· In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an
exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens – and corporations at least 60
percent of which is owned by such citizens -- the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources
· In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that
paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of
Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
o Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, · Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
safeguards, among which are these requirements: protected areas.
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set · The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain protected area under the category of Protected Seascape.
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the · requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to
country. undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted shall be implemented
several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand · Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area,
public scrutiny. having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
and interpose timely objections, if any · The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an
· Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the ECC prior to the second subphase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil
requirements of the 1987 Constitution. exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were done in the
o Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic
the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in
SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void. violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586
· While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a
much bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put
in place by the framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the
abuses prevalent during the martial law regime."
o not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not
void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute,
but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the
contract.
· our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development,
and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
o the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in
SC-46.
o Even under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum
Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract
under said statute

SC 46 vis-à-vis other laws VIOLATIVE

· former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape
in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234
· During former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon
Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use
of the resources in that area without threatening its marine life.