Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology: Group Therapy, Scapegoating, and the Displacement

of Disquiet
Author(s): Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell
Source: Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture , Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 2017),
pp. 37-56
Published by: Michigan State University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/contagion.24.1.0037

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 Mimetic Euphemism and
Mythology: Group Therapy,
Scapegoating, and the
Displacement of Disquiet
Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell
Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia

M
imetic theory draws support from diverse disciplines in the humani-
ties and social sciences. But arguably Girard would have even more
influence if his theory had stronger life data, and one field well posi-
tioned to provide such input is psychology. Girard distinguished his thinking
from Freud, while critiquing the psychoanalytic tradition more generally, in
Book III of Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World1—­a work taking the
form of an extended dialogue with two psychiatrists. One of these, Jean-­Michel
Oughourlian, has begun to develop the Girard-­inspired practice of “interdi-
vidual psychology.”2 In Girard’s own hands, albeit to a limited degree, mimetic
theory has been applied to mental health issues.3 The purpose of this study is to
interpret the data from 10 sessions of group therapy, which has proved sugges-
tive for mimetic theory.
The role of scapegoating in group formation and cohesion was observed,
in tandem with a misrecognition of this process by participants. Most sugges-
tive, however, was the constant deployment of metaphorical illustrations as the
group sought to process conflict, from which the authors draw possible theo-
retical conclusions. Namely, that what they observed and are calling “mimetic
Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, Vol. 24, 2017, pp. 37–56. issn 1075-7201.
© Michigan State University. All rights reserved.

37

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38 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

euphemism” is a process whereby group disquiet is explored unawares through

metaphorical examples of threat, danger, conflict, and dissolution, all of which
serve to displace the group’s disquiet and keep it from rising to consciousness.
It is proposed that this observed process might suggest the natural emergence
of mythology from the scapegoating process as a way of mapping the conflict
onto an alternative narrative serving to shift the threat, and the solution, outside
the group.
This theoretical possibility is the unexpected outcome of an investigation
into group formation, conceived in the hope that key Girardian themes would
reveal themselves. One of the authors, Bruce A. Stevens, is a clinical psycholo-
gist who regards group therapy as providing valuable “here and now” data for
human interaction.4 In 2013, he ran two therapy groups with college freshmen.
One provided the raw data for this study.5 While many characteristic Girardian
themes might have been investigated, his main interest was in the scapegoating
process. Scapegoating is relatively common in group therapy and this proved
to be the case with one of the two groups showing this phenomenon. The new
possibilities regarding metaphoric displacement that emerged might suggest a
development in our understanding of the mythologizing process in Girardian
terms.

The Data

A therapy group of Psychology 101 students ran (with ethics committee

approval) for one hour weekly over ten weeks at the University of Canberra,
from February 14 to April 18, 2013. Initially there were 12 members, but it soon
settled down to a varying cohort of between seven and nine. Participating
students were granted study credit toward their psychology degrees, but no
other inducements were offered for their involvement. Almost all came for six
sessions to receive maximum credit. A couple attended less frequently, while a
few were present at nearly every session. Sessions were recorded in both video
and audio formats with transcripts produced to aid analysis. Participants chose
their own pseudonyms, which are used in this paper. Citations are referenced in
shorthand form, referring to the session (S) number and the line numbers (L)
as they appear in the transcript.
This group therapy experiment might be a first for Girardian studies, the
authors being unaware of any similar undertaking. The leader of the group was
Bruce Stevens, the first author, and the analysis was assisted by Scott Cowdell,
a theologian who has written extensively on Girard and who pored over ten

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 39

hours of video footage along with the transcripts. Both were on the lookout for
Girard-­related themes, including mimetic processes involving triangular desire,
mimetic contagion, undifferentiation and doubling, the group leader’s role in
providing structure or containment, the emergence of any “pecking order”
to restrain the escalation of rivalry and undifferentiation, any selection and
persecution of a scapegoat, and any appearance of “all against all.” The leader
acknowledges that he was not entirely able to escape the mimetic cauldron of
the group.6 While data emerged touching on all the themes mentioned, our
focus will be on scapegoating.
Before launching into specific details, the methodology used in this investi-
gation should be clearly specified. It was an exploratory qualitative study. It used
an ethnographic approach in which Stevens participated as the group leader to
gain “deep understanding from within.”7 This researcher held both the position
of “insider” and “outsider” in the group. This methodology has been commonly
used in field studies in anthropology and more recently in sociology. In this
study the rigor of the research was supported by the following: a clear theo-
retical approach provided by Girard, identification of the two researchers with
their disciplines and perspectives, articulation of the research process including
recruitment and selection, significant number and duration of group sessions,
significant participation in the group, a clear identification of the relationship
between the group leader and participants, video and audio recording of all
group sessions that produced transcripts for analysis, and clear reporting of
relevant input in the study, with participants given an opportunity for feedback
in the final group session. The co-­author provided input from a second coder.8
Both authors did an observational and thematic analysis of the data in light of
mimetic theory.9

Beginnings of the Group Process

The video recorded a significant encounter among participants gathered in the

meeting room before the first group session had even begun. Matic was massag-
ing Anne’s sore neck and forcibly manipulating her head—­a performance that
represented some preemptive scene stealing, attention seeking, and dominating
behavior. It prefigured how Matic was to behave throughout the whole group
process.
Matic was a large middle-­aged woman of Eastern European origin recently
emigrated to Australia (this is mentioned to explain her broken English, which
is evident in citations from the transcripts—­although none of the group proved

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40 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

especially articulate). Matic broke the silence of the first group session. She
began with a long introduction about how she was approaching the group: “I
promised myself I would not pretend to be as cool as usually I am pretending
to fake my control . . . I would be courageous today and conquer my image” (S1,
L36–­38). She was forever concerned about self presentation, and only rarely did
she express any interest in other group members. Even her questions to others
were self-­focused. She asked, “Do you see me [as] shy in the group?” (S4, L389)
and “What was your perception about me?” (S5, L10). A narcissistic preoccupa-
tion? Yes, as it turned out.
Matic did not seem to appreciate the impact of her forceful personality.
She directed long monologues at other group members and was involved in
almost every charged interaction.10 She was mostly unaware of the risk of adopt-
ing a high profile in the group. The leader recognized that her interpersonal
style marked her out as a possible scapegoat,11 following Girard’s insight that
“By accepting kingship every man runs the risk of becoming a scapegoat.”12 The
group eventually demonstrated the power of contagion, in accord with Girard’s
observation that “In societies without a judicial system, contagious indignation
explodes in the form of the lynch mob.”13

Early Stages of Scapegoating

Initially a norm of politeness was adhered to. Peter expressed concern about
being able to say the right thing, preferring otherwise to remain silent. Open
conflict was avoided. This suggests that a readily understood prohibition was in
operation: one of Girard’s planks of religion, designed to avoid the emergence
of conflict. But conflict was not long in coming.
The first offense was taken by Matic. Mary commented, after Matic had talked
for much of the first group session, “If everyone wants to jump in and dominate
the conversation then it’s going to be nobody can listen” (S1, L615). Matic asked,
“Who do you think dominated the discussion?” (S1, L641). Mary observed
that Matic had done “the most talking” (S1, L644–­645). Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly Matic felt hurt by this interaction. The leader amplified Matic’s feelings
about Mary’s response to her “because it has teeth for you” (S1, L652), to which
Matic replied, “It hurt me, it hurt me” (S1, L660). Mary tried to repair her
unintended insult, saying, “I didn’t mean to” (S1, L666). But, as with almost all
attempts at interpersonal repair in the group, this went unacknowledged by Matic.
At the beginning of the second session, Matic reflected, “Probably I
assumed that everybody [would] think that we are here for a purpose, we are

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 41

a bunch of people to get connected.” This was gently challenged by the leader:
“Do you want to assume that or do you want to ask people?” (S2, L33–­36).
Matic was unwilling. Amanda responded with a rhetorical question that
became pivotal for how the group process unfolded: “You know what happens
when you assume?” (S2, L46). She continued, “You make an ass out of u and
me” (S2, L50). Unfamiliar with this play on words, the leader initially missed
how Amanda was saying that “to assume” is to make a donkey out of you
and me. Matic also missed the point, and took this observation to be aggressive
(S2, L52), thinking that it was a crude insult, labeling her “an ass(hole).”
Matic continued to talk about the “assumption” (S2, L81, L122, L128).
Amanda tried to repair things by affirming Matic (S2, L99–­100), but with no
response. Later, Matic kept referring to “arse something?”—­“arse” being the
British/Australian version of the American colloquialism “ass.” Amanda tried
to explain, “It means make us both look dumb” (S2, L210–­221). Though Matic
thanked her for the explanation, she maintained that “It can be structured dip-
lomatically without hurt so I felt aggressiveness” (S2, L232). What appeared
to be an initial misunderstanding proved to be a sustained point of conflict,
beyond even sincere attempts to provide clarity and redress. In response to
Amanda’s attempted apology, the leader asked her, “Why would you apologize?
Can’t you simply express what you want to express?” (S2, L254–­255). This led
to a discussion in which the leader asked the group to vote on whether an apol-
ogy should have been made. Most in the group endorsed the need to apologize,
acknowledging Matic’s sense of injury, though she refused a further apology
from Amanda without explanation (S2, L405, L409). A member concluded
that this was “a clashing of heads” (S2, L429). Amanda acknowledged that “I
didn’t mean for it to escalate” (S2, L516). By the end of session two, there was
growing tension and conflict.
Matic was becoming isolated in the group, in what was plainly a two-­way
development. The scapegoating impulse was becoming evident, though it was
initially restrained by other members walking on eggshells. Matic was prov-
ing difficult. She both took offense at and tried to assert her superiority over
Amanda, her “uncouth” rival. Amanda retaliated with further aggression. Matic
declared that she would normally have left the group because of the provoca-
tion she had received from Amanda (S5, L683-684), but remained, saying, “I
couldn’t move on until I had to balance that power” (S5, L688-695). A power
struggle had begun in earnest.
The trend toward scapegoating was becoming overt, but there were also
moments of reprieve. As early as the second session, the leader tried to affirm
Matic as “the first person to take a risk” and “one of the most courageous

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42 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

people” (S2, L1083, L1094). Also, there was some modeling of mature behavior
from group members. So, for instance, in session three, Peter admitted his own
past responsibility for bad relationship outcomes (S3, L4, L67). Such acknowl-
edgement of one’s own complicity in bad outcomes while refusing to load all
blame onto another can mitigate against scapegoating. Later, when Peter gently
but firmly stood up to Matic, he was modeling healthy leadership by being
neither aggressive nor passive aggressive but open, and object-­rather-­than-­rival
focused. The calm patience of Ashalind, who also refused rivalry with Matic,
restrained some conflictual escalation. But there was no appeasing Matic, who
did not believe that Amanda was genuine: “she apologized but she didn’t” and
“she stand up for arse expression, so she didn’t take back the word” (S5, L72,
L76, L138–­142). It is sobering to consider that even healthy models for group
behavior were not sufficient to halt the scapegoating process.
Matic escalated the conflict. The offense would not be forgotten: “When I
try to say something I’m trying to say in a way to not hurt that person. So this is
the big role [difference] between [us] saying straight forward. . . . Or this is the
diplomacy, brilliant or you can take in the way you don’t have to reach that point
where people, as person, can suffer” (S4, L891–­896). Sarah responded, “I think
you took it too much to heart” (S4, L883). She sought to have the last word in
session four: “Well, I don’t want to fart around. People are going to get offended
no matter what you say. Why try to sugarcoat it? Just say what you think” (S4,
L960–­961). Such feedback revealed an increasingly sharp edge.
In the uneasy ambiguity of the group context, a common search for norms
or rules was observed. This was possibly driven by a need to have some point
of objective appeal in the face of increasing conflict. Franky noted, “It [the
group] started, I guess, all messy and some aspects are starting to become more
rule-­like” (S2, L600). This expresses a need for “safe” rituals. Perhaps the group
resembled primitive societies in that it lacked institutions though it did have
rituals.14 Perhaps this group process tended to confirm that “the true guide of
human beings is not abstract reason but ritual.”15
The issue of leadership also arose. In session four, the leader offered the
following: “Imagine a scenario in which we have to elect a leader at the end of
today’s session. Who would you vote for?” (S4, L4). Matic indicated her desire
for leadership: “I want to be leader too” (S4, L38). She asked another member if
“You never, never, ever, ever in your life have the feeling you want to be first, you
want to be more?” (S4, L59–­60). She was willing to stake her claim for leader-
ship, as a “fighter” or “on the fight side” (S4, L169). But this declaration was sure
to raise the specter of prestige and hence to generate rivalry in the group over

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 43

access to the group’s site of maximal “being.” Ashalind talked of leadership in

empowering terms, as against Matic’s concern for being Number 1, saying, “I
always wanted to be more than me.” This recalled Ashalind’s aspirations to be
a ballet dancer (S4, L62). Jono considered the leader in the role of a “media-
tor” (S4, L401), and better described as “someone fooling around and having
fun” (S4, L406). Anne acknowledged the Girardian point that a leader holds an
exposed position—­literally, as a scapegoat-­in-­waiting.
Rivalry developed between Matic and Jono over their different under-
standings of group leadership. Both, however, were unable to clearly articulate
their fundamental disagreement. This surfaced in session four. Jono expressed
his view that the group did not need a leader because “We are not trying to
achieve anything” (S4, L343). This reflected a very concrete view of his own
participation, since he simply wanted research credit: “By turning up I have
achieved something . . . therefore . . . there is nothing I need to achieve now
by being in group” (S4, L506–­507). Matic found this contradictory, so Jono
attempted a clarification: “By being part of the group I’ve achieved what I
wanted to achieve . . . I don’t need a leader to get me to arrive. So I arrive, I’m
done.” (S4, L511–­512). That led to the following exchange that was typical of
their interaction:

matic:  I want more, not just that’s it. I want more reason, more.
jono:  But that is it; that is my reason, there is no more.
matic:  But how come?
jono:  What do you mean “How come”? That is it; that is my reason. One plus
one is two, I told you two.
matic:  When you talk about the relationship in the leader and the task you
don’t have one of one, one plus one, you have more. Because one thing, if I
had a relationship one plus one, there is not such things in reality. It is a big
lie, it is a big abstract.
jono:  Some things are black and white.
matic:  That is right. So we are having here two big opposite[s], big abstract,
big lie, a big true and a big lie. You can’t say because nothing in nature [is]
one plus one makes two.
jono:  I disagree.
matic:  Nothing in nature. Show me. Give me an example.
jono:  Okay, do you want me to write one plus one. That would be nature; that
would be maths.
matic:  Nature, nature, give me an example in nature. The abstract one plus
one is made up.

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44 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

jono:  Okay. You’ve got a mouse. You drop a giant boulder on a mouse. What
happens?
matic:  I don’t know.
jono:  It dies. Every time. One plus one equals two.
matic:  What is one, why is one represent . . .
jono:  One is the boulder, one is the mouse, two he is dead.
matic:  One, the ball, you can’t have the ball with the mouse and have a death,
come on.
jono:  I believe that you are confused and don’t understand my point and I’d
like to stop. (S4, L552–­589)

But something was building behind such disagreement. It was more than differ-
ence in “styles,” with Jono being concrete and Matic abstract. Studying the video
footage and group transcripts, Cowdell declared in frustration that her name
should be “mi-­Matic,” observing, “She is a mimetic provocateur, drawing others
into her own conflict and rivalry. Matic had sucked all the oxygen out of the
group, so that no room for anything other than rivalry with her remains, hence
the silence” (i.e., the frustrated silence that often followed her long diatribes).

Nothing Resolved

The conflict between Jono and Matic was “sticky.” In the next session, Jono said
directly to Matic, with some projection and doubling, “I think you like con-
flict, I think you like debate. I think that’s the way you go about things” (S5,
L207). Matic asked, “What makes you think that I like conflict?” Jono replied,
“Because every time I have seen you speak there has been one. That’s why” (S5,
L303–­305). A number of brief exchanges followed, until Jono again tried to end
it by saying, “We are talking around in circles like we did last week and I’m
done. Thank you” (S5, L396). Jono added in exasperation, “Yes, but you keep
asking the same questions. I keep giving you the same answers, but you still
don’t understand, which is why we are going around in circles and we aren’t
getting anywhere” (S5, L409–­410).
The group increasingly found unity through scapegoating Matic. Jono
joined Anne in judging that Matic was “looking for something to be upset
about” (S5, L422, L426). Ashalind, too, joined in, pointing to “a majority of a
room of people saying that they felt your opinion was over-­reacted” (S5, L596–­
597). Matic became defensive, which Ashalind challenged, saying, “I think you
put yourself in that position.” She explained that when Amanda apologized,

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 45

Matic did not say anything about wanting her to take back the word “ass” (S5,
L622, L626–­627). Jono engaged once more, venturing that “I don’t under-
stand what you need.” He observed that in the first session it was as if Matic
had “different personalities” (S5, L710–­713), adding the accusation, “You feel
good asserting power over other people’s views” (S5, L725). Even Matic tried
to let the argument go, saying, “I let it go” (S5, L713), though Jono continued
with the following: “But we haven’t really let it go. It is five weeks in, and this
is what I am arguing as well” (S5, L733). The group rejected Matic’s claim for
victim status, but ironically it still propelled the process toward scapegoating.
It seems unlikely that anyone intended consciously to scapegoat Matic, but an
unconscious process was gathering momentum. It was not something under
the control of participants, as Girard would have predicted.
There were moments of awareness when it appeared that scapegoating
was being resisted. Ashalind gave an account of how she stood up for a victim
in the workplace and refused to join in their scapegoating, despite the chief
persecutor in that situation being a former role model for her. A good model
is needed to resist a bad one. Ashalind tended to be that model in the group.
Yet tension increased. The group discussed Amanda’s absence from session five,
speculating that she might have been upset and did not intend to return. Matic
asked, “Anne, you made the assumption that she’s not coming back because of
me now?” (S5, L152). Matic was present in session six but maintained a stony
silence throughout—­her looming, affectless presence was ominous even on the
video, leading Cowdell to conclude that this was a new tactic, at once defensive
and bullying. Amanda returned in session six and the leader, referring to her
absence, reported that “One of the theories I heard was that Matic was chasing
you away” (S6, L176). Later in the session, the leader challenged the group for
being boring and asked what they were avoiding. Amanda expressed exhaus-
tion with the conflict: “I think we are avoiding what we talked about a hundred
billion times and we are bored with talking about it” (S6, L704–­705). But not
talking about it does not mean that it goes away.

The Scapegoat’s Injury

The scapegoating process developed a momentum of its own. Matic expressed

her defensiveness: “It is not the moment to go to that deeper level of opening
up because already I open up and I didn’t want to make a mistake and you [loud
slap noise] punch me” (S4, L542–­543). Matic must have sensed that she was

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46 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

becoming vulnerable to the scapegoating process. She related an experience in

which she had been treated badly:

My first month in my accommodation in the new world here in Australia I had, with
not being able to talk too much, people were not aware much about my background,
about my abilities, capacity, whatever makes you light in other’s eyes to be able to
give you more or less respect and they treat me bad, bad, bad. So with no reason
than doing what I had to be done because I had to do it, it was a job and I, I lived on
my skin, discrimination, and I had to go with a little bit of help to get out of the stab-
bing of me just because I wasn’t able to be myself but not putting an impediment to
my abilities of executing the task. (S4, L765–­770)

Matic told the group about “very serious domestic violence” without any social
support in a new country that led to her low self-­esteem (S8, L23, L33)—­though
she did mention the “possibility of prayer” (S8, L40). This was one of the few
times a spiritual theme was raised.
Increasingly, Matic was experiencing the hurt of rejection. In session eight,
she talked about her reaction to an earlier session, after which she had privately
sought out Anne for support: “I end up crying and she had to listen to me and
crying and shaking” (S8, L62–­63). But after saying this, she responded nega-
tively to the first person who attempted to give her support. Matic’s accusation
was, “Do you agree that not knowing the other’s background, you should actu-
ally be careful how you talk before you talk?” (S8, L85–­86). Of the group, Matic
observed that “the majority was on that rejection position, it was negative”
and “it was not a pleasant feedback from general overall from the group” (S8,
L95–­97). The leader affirmed her pain “You were hurt in that encounter. . . . It
was hurtful to you” (S8, L131). Then Matic took the fight to Amanda “because
her reaction, from my point of view, was arrogant . . . it was rude” (S8, L318–­319).
Neither the leader, Matic, nor the other group members were able to reverse the
destructive process in which all sides were involved.
Matic introduced a new topic, basically to confront others in the group.
She named a breach in confidentiality, complaining that “I was offended” (S8,
L328). She explained that Ashalind had informed Sarah of what took place in the
group in Sarah’s absence. Was this a breach of confidentiality? Jono expressed a
different view: “If they’re talking outside group, if they are a part of group, that’s
still group isn’t it as well?” (S8, L384–­385). Kel and Mary agreed. Peter thought
that Matic’s concern might be that Ashalind and Sarah had been talking about
her (S8, L399).

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 47

The leader asked Matic how she felt with the group united against her. She
clung to her position, that “to have a point of view different from others doesn’t
mean necessarily to be wrong.” (S8, L466). The leader was concerned about
the cost of rejection for Matic (S8, L488). By this time the group was interpret-
ing Matic’s reactivity in very personal ways, providing further evidence of the
slide into scapegoating. Anne thought that Matic paid a price for taking things
so personally (S8, L506–­511). Franky told Matic, “You are the one who keeps
bringing up the argument as well. It’s not anyone else” (S8, L579), adding that
“It would help if sometimes you tried to step back a little and listened a little to
other perceptions as well . . . could we learn from each other’s experiences and
learn how we can talk to people better and socialize better?” (S8, L689–­690).
Matic was determined to generate conflict with everyone in the group. The
leader could see her pain, but he judged her capable of “giving as good as she
got.” Equally, he was worried about being overly protective and “infantilizing”
her. He hoped that her self-­sabotage might eventually become obvious to her.
Looking back, however, it is more likely that he was caught up in the same pro-
cesses that led to Matic’s rejection. Cowdell reported to Stevens that by the end
of his detailed examination of the video footage and transcripts of all sessions,
he too had developed a hatred for Matic, though he had not met her.
In session nine, the most active scapegoating of Matic occurred. She was
again entirely silent, as in session six, maintaining a fixed gaze and a threatening
presence. No one invited her to participate, and the hostility she was radiat-
ing was largely ignored by those who were talking. Amanda and Ashalind in
particular used obscene language of the sort that Matic would have judged to
be uncouth and offensive. With Sarah these three dominated the session, dem-
onstrating a palpable insouciance in speech and body language (especially from
Amanda). Maybe the pending end of the group was bringing things to a head.
Cowdell predicted that after such flagrant provocation, the silent Matic could
only save face by avoiding the next (and final) session. This is just what she did,
robbing her rivals of any chance of a final “victory.” After the leader reminded
the group that it was nearing its end with session ten, Amanda started to really
throw her weight around and became offensive (S9, L16). She asked Ashalind
about her tattoo: “I can just see it behind your ear” (S9, L715). Ashalind
explained that it spelled out “FIWN” (S9, L729), which is the acronym of “Fuck
It Why Not?” She had gotten the tattoo along with 11 young traveling compan-
ions in Europe, one of whom went further and had the words spelled out in full
on his chest (S9, L742). The discussion of Amanda’s obscenely worded tattoo
would surely provoke Matic to break her silence. She was being taunted.

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48 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

When Matic did not attend the final session, the leader drew attention
to her absence. This was the first and only session that Matic had missed. He
asked, “So we are missing her?” Sarah replied dismissively, “Yeah, not so much”
(S10, L170–­172). Anne then mentioned that Matic had told her that “she got
more damage from this group than positive things” (S10, L228). Some group
members found this hard to believe, which seems to represent a minimizing of
the cost to the scapegoat. There was considerable discussion about why Matic
might feel injured, taking into account her life experiences, cultural changes,
trauma from domestic violence (S10, L359), along with psychological explana-
tions such as the presence of defense mechanisms (S10, L413–­414).
In the final session, nostalgia was expressed for the days when unlikeable
people could be more easily removed from the workplace, which seemed sug-
gestive of frustrations with Matic in the group while also indirectly implying
sacrifice. There were attempts at self-­justification, too. Ashalind thought that
the group did not pick on Matic, though Mary rightly observed that they did
distance themselves from her. Ashalind replied that Matic also distanced herself
from the group, which was true as well.
In that final session, Mary reflected on the doubling relationship that
emerged for her with Matic, confiding, “I had no idea she was going to take that
so personally” (S10, L722). She added that “I’m not normally an aggressor . . .
[but] Yeah, it felt that way” (S10, L734, L739). The group’s momentum was
certainly experienced as greater than the sum of individual contributions. Sarah
noted, “It seemed to me, when I was talking to her, the more she got her back up
and the more she tried to put that wall there, the worse it got” (S10, L742–­743).
She added that “There was no reasoning. We were trying to explain what you
actually meant and no, no, no, no and you were getting such resistance . . . it
made it very tense” (S10, L47–­748).
Ashalind noted that Matic behaved differently in the group, compared with
elsewhere: “I’ve tried to talk to her outside of class and she’s very friendly, but
as soon as you get in here it’s [snap of fingers] cold, dead, silent, and I feel truly
intimidated” (S10, L309–­310). This was a highly significant statement. It sug-
gests that there is something different about being in the group—­that there is
a potential to change personality. Could it be that a person is swept up into the
group’s mimetic dynamics that are bigger than any one individual’s contribu-
tion? The language used suggested that the scapegoating process had achieved
its purpose. Matic was killed off—­she was “cold, dead, silent.” We conclude that
the sacrificial ritual had resulted in group cohesion. Perhaps there was also an
element of awe, which for Girard typifies the false sacred that emerged from the
primal murder.

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 49

In retrospect, it seems likely that Matic was even more unstable than she
appeared in the group. Some grandiosity was evident. She thought she had
the answer to difficulties in the discipline, stating, “We need a theory in psychol-
ogy, who unifies the whole field” (S7, L591–­592, L595). This was discussed in the
final session—­how “she wants to write a theory that unifies all these theories
about the human psyche” (S10, L883). But group members observed that this
seemed unlikely given that she was struggling to pass Psychology 101. She also
thought that she was able to interpret dreams (S7, L608) and therefore she had
surpassed Freud. In the last session, Mary said that she had met Matic before
the group experiment: “She told me that she actually was a psychologist or a
counselor back in [her country of origin] . . . she was doing her retraining” (i.e.,
in order to gain professional accreditation in Australia for a foreign qualifica-
tion; S10, L797). Initially, she believed Matic to have known what group therapy
was about and so she gave her the benefit of the doubt. Anne, who tried to sup-
port Matic outside the group, was worried about her labile moods, swinging
between deep depression and “so high” (S10, L894). Anne thought that Matic
might be bipolar (S10, L894) because of the mood swings, adding, “I met her,
like, out of this group and . . . she’s so weird” (S10, L905). This possible presence
of mental illness was a concern especially in light of Matic’s sense of abiding
injury. On the basis of his extensive pastoral experience as a priest, Cowdell
wondered whether she was a confabulist and compulsive liar.
The leader saw Matic privately after the group process had concluded
(May 8, 2013) and was given her written permission to report on their conver-
sation. She had seen a counselor and a doctor at the university health clinic,
and was prescribed psychiatric medication. She had a referral to see a private
psychologist without cost to her. She said that it had been her goal in the group
to “be more open to [being] socialized,” but the injuries “hurt you and it was
intended,” so after a few sessions she “wanted to pay her back.” Matic declared
an extensive history of trauma and felt that she was more sensitive “than others.”
In the wrap-­up after the final session, the leader outlined the mimetic
theory and then discussed some of the themes that had emerged in the experi-
ment from a Girardian perspective. Franky explained his understanding of
the scapegoat in the group as one who is “the odd one out of the group where the
attention and the energy goes of negativity, so everyone will start picking on
the one person” (S10, L1015–­1016). The scapegoat focus persisted. Sarah added,
“Matic is not even here and it’s still about her ten weeks later” (S10, L1061).
Girard’s observation that “The sacrificial principle is the fundamental principle
of the human order”16 seems to be borne out in this experiment. The process
was two-­way, however, with clear provocation from the scapegoat. But what

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50 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

was most striking in hindsight was the scapegoating momentum that built up.
Attempts to moderate or restrict it, including moves by the leader, all proved
futile. Yet the process seemed largely unconscious and perhaps this is why it first
emerged in metaphor. This brings us to the major new insight that the authors
have drawn from this process.

The Metaphoric Displacement of Disquiet

Violence entered the group discussion via metaphor. We suggest that the
threatening nature of the group environment was referenced unawares when
one participant spoke of “jumping in” to water (S2, L650) and being “dropped
into icy cold water and hav[ing] no idea what to do” (S2, L671–­672). Dance
provided another metaphor. Ashalind taught dance and talked about her stress
over workplace bullying at the dance school and other group conflict issues.
Matic seemed to understand that dance is a corrective to tension, providing
relief (S4, L725). Girard discussed dance as a ritual creating group cohesion,
and like sport it has origins in sacrificial ritual. In the third session, kangaroos
were noticed out the window (this is not typical of all Australian universities!),
prompting a discussion about how risky it can be encountering these animals
up close, which again suggested an underlying sense of vulnerability in the
group. Did it refer to the soft part of the self under threat, or to the danger that
a cornered animal represents, or indeed was it about animal sacrifice—­which
is a ritual proxy for human sacrifice in cultural maintenance? Here is another
instance of the group dynamic being addressed unawares.
We already noted the theme of death raised in session four, when Jono
explained, “One is the boulder, one is the mouse, two he is dead” (S4, L585).
The theme of sacrifice later became overt. Sarah:

I used to work with a gentleman who came from Africa—­he was extremely reli-
gious. His family used to practice goat sacrifices for their deities and things like that,
so there was a lot of things that people had to be aware about with him, but it’s also
a two-­way street, so if someone said, “Thank goodness,” he would get offended by
that, but it was dealing with both sides of it, so helping our workplace to under-
stand where he was coming from, his beliefs, his perspectives, and the right he had
to work in an environment where he felt comfortable and not threatened or like
he was silly or anything like that. But then also helping him to understand that
people also had a right to be themselves and not to give them permission to do

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 51

things that would make him uncomfortable or put down his belief but to help them
find a cohesiveness to be able to work on an even plane together. (S4, L748–­759)

Seemingly, modernity has moved on from that sacrificial context—­yet here is

the sacrificial process being enacted in the entirely modern context of group
therapy. This recognition is supported by Matic’s immediate response, recount-
ing her experience in her new country of being scapegoated—­“the stabbing of
me” (S4, L769). This raises the possibility of an original insight in the devel-
opment of mimetic theory about the use of metaphor as a displacement for
conflictual dynamics in the group, serving a prophylactic purpose. Apparently
random and disconnected topics and conversational gambits served as proxies,
allowing the conflictual dynamic to be safely negotiated. There was almost the
sense of a “phantom ego” present in the group.17
Other examples emerged, one of which was fireworks (S6, L115–­158).
Sarah, referring to her part-­time job, mentioned, “I was serving drink and stuff
like that and then the fireworks started and I left off and just looked” (S6, L115).
The leader suggested some significance to this in light of conflict from the last
group session (S6, L149, L157–­158). Fireworks are a ritual activity for evoking
the mimetic crisis and then allowing it to resolve peacefully—­like Mardi Gras,
which includes fireworks. Fireworks can also involve ritual sacrifice of the Guy
Fawkes figure. Here, an image of the mimetic crisis had been introduced and
played its role below the level of awareness. The leader actually named this
development (S6, L149).
The theme of funerals was also introduced. Funerals function, according
to Girard, as key rituals for heading off escalation toward sacrificial crisis. The
dead are escorted firmly from the premises, removing their potentially malign
presence as signs of unresolved conflict that might spark payback and blood-­
feud in an honor-­based society. When a funeral was mentioned in the group
(S6, L484–­495), the leader suggested (S6, L497) that it was the pending con-
clusion of the group that was being referred to. Hence this funeral reference
may indicate another ritual mechanism for containing mimetic crisis (like the
kangaroos, dancing, and fireworks). Other themes suggesting termination also
emerged, such as graduations (i.e., commencements)—­these are rituals, too,
though explicitly also terminations (S6, L527).
Another example of coded group dynamics came in a session when heavy
rain was drumming loudly on the roof. This prompted an exchange about
whether rain and hail on a tin roof encourages sleep or not (S6, L730–­735):
Sarah said it did, while Kel disagreed. Kel was perhaps voicing a level of disquiet

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52 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

about Sarah’s capacity to handle group conflict. The storm is of course a classic
mythical image of the sacrificial crisis.
There was also some discussion of a then-­current news item: a girl had
gone missing at Sydney’s Central Railway Station (central to the group?). Was
she a figure for Matic, who had been sitting, glowering and silent the whole
time—­“missing,” yet still “the elephant in the room”? Reference was made to
reports that the missing girl had acted “just completely out of normal character”
(S6, L978), again suggesting that Matic was the deflected referent. The lost child
is a major theme in Australian literature and sensibility, reflecting the harsh
and unforgiving nature of pioneer experience. And of course child sacrifice is
a theme in pre-­modern scapegoating. Here again we see metaphors pointing to
the group dynamic. This theme was taken up by Amanda (S6, L885–­897) with
a story of her own teenage son being stalked by someone creepy and his not
knowing what to do about it.
In session nine, a likely further exploration of the group process took place
under the surface of a discussion about the discomforts and dangers of diving
under water. As mentioned, this was the session dominated aggressively by three
females in the face of Matic’s silence, with their unimpeded control of the group
allowing a sense to emerge of such fears being allayed. The reported sickness of
a swimming instructor due to consuming chlorine—­a ubiquitous though hid-
den element in swimming pool water (S9, L1199–­1215)—­was weighed against
the worthwhileness of the swimming experience. This suggested a further
metaphor for negotiating the risks of group conflict.
Also in session nine, an important conversation about self-­harm took place,
which the leader had raised with this student cohort in their Psychology 101
lectures. Amanda introduced this theme, mentioning that “I was sitting next
to a girl who had scars on her arms” (S9, L390–­391). Ashalind recalled another
girl: “She had it all up her arm. I noticed it” (S9, L399). She added, “I have had to
physically stop some of my friends from doing stuff like that . . . it’s horrible” (S9,
L423–­424). Sarah recalled a family in which the boy “was always self-­harming”
(S9, L459). The leader detected a sense of awe in the group about people who
self-­harm and leave the scars as evidence. He wondered whether this might be
a contemporary echo of Girard’s archaic sacred. It also pointed, metaphorically,
to what Matic was doing in the group.

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 53

“Mimetic Euphemism”

This phenomenon of metaphoric substitution, or dissimulation, bears closer

examination. We will name it mimetic euphemism. It suggests a collective
mimetic equivalent of the Freudian unconscious. Girard observed, against
Freud, that “the mimetic is the true unconscious,” while Nidesh Lawtoo has
pointed to the awareness in late-­nineteenth century psychology and modern-
ist fiction of a mimetically established group mind.18 We are not sure how it
operates, but this group therapy investigation suggested such a phenomenon
again and again. Virtually every conversational gambit intended to break the ice
quickly became a veiled discussion of the group dynamic. Only in the final ses-
sion, with the chief antagonist missing, could the group speak more plainly. It is
not at all clear that the covert discussions to which we refer were conscious—­
indeed, when the leader attempted to draw attention to this metaphoric
displacement of disquiet, the group expressed surprise.
Such méconnaissance is characteristic of the whole scapegoat process accord-
ing to Girard. We are unaware of our own involvement. Perhaps when the kat-
echon or else the prohibitions and rituals of group politeness are in force, so that
sacrificial crisis and its resolution via outright scapegoating are kept in check,
the scapegoating dynamic—­its advance, along with attempts at its restraint—­
goes “underground” into the “mimetic unconscious” of the group, emerging in
these veiled and tangential references: missing or harmed girls, people hurt by
animals, death of animals, swimmers poisoned by chlorine, injured feet, etc. So
perhaps the mimetic euphemism, as we are calling it, is an in-­group, real-­time
version of the role that myth plays in the foundational Girardian religious trio
of prohibition/ritual/myth. Myth is a narrative that encodes the scapegoating
process in a way that preserves its unifying effect in the group while keeping the
group’s scapegoating violence out of sight, out of mind. Perhaps in the uncon-
scious processing of conflict that we witnessed again and again in the “mind
of this group,” we see the mythic process originating. If so, it accompanies the
rituals and prohibitions we have also identified.

Conclusion

The investigation confirmed our Girardian expectations of what might emerge

as this group evolved. It suggests a refinement of mimetic theory in terms of
what we are calling mimetic euphemism, viewed as a natural process that we
observed and that might suggest an empirical basis for the formation of myth

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54 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

in the occlusion of scapegoating violence. We hope that the possibility might

be pursued by researchers interested in developing an empirically based inter-
dividual psychology.
One important question remains for a Girardian account of this process,
and that is what to make of Matic. All Girardian scapegoats are innocent in
terms of the group dynamic inflicted on them, though they may not be factually
innocent of any wrongdoing. Many will somehow draw attention to themselves,
standing out in one way or another from the group. In a searching exploration
of such dynamics, Girard explores the “underground psychology” and “onto-
logical sickness” of the underground man, who we meet in Dostoyevsky’s Notes
from the Underground—­a hyper-­mimetic character who engineered his own
isolation and drew down upon himself the contempt of those model-­rivals
whose “being” he craved.19 Girard’s discussion of hunger for being, which leads
some to abase themselves before abusers in order to confirm the superiority of
these mimetic models, might account for Matic’s behavior.20 So might a vari-
ant on that pathology discussed by James Alison in terms of “marginaholism,”
which is a mimetic predilection for self-­definition in opposition to others,
ensuring that your specialness is regularly confirmed by your not fitting in.21
Stephen Gardner points to an earlier form of sacrifice in Girard (that is, prior to
his elucidation of the primal murder in Violence and the Sacred) in such roman-
tic self-­immolation, which so many characters in modern fiction demonstrate.22
Matic’s singular behavior is no less mimetic for being oppositional;23 likewise,
she is no less the victim of scapegoating for having largely brought it on herself.

Notes

1. René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, with Jean-­Michel
Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, trans. Steven Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1987). See especially Book III, Chs. 2–­4.
2. See Jean-­Michel Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession,
and Hypnosis, trans. Eugene Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); The
Genesis of Desire, trans. Eugene Webb (Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture.
East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010); The Mimetic Brain, trans. Trevor
Cribben Merrill (Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture. East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 2016). See also, e.g., Henri Grivois, “Adolescence, Indifferentiation,
and the Onset of Psychosis,” Contagion 6 (1999): 104–­20. For a picture of Girard’s
location in the wider psychological discussion, see, e.g., Eugene Webb, The Self Between:
From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1993).

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Mimetic Euphemism and Mythology 55

3. Girard offers a mimetic account of the psychological disorder anorexia nervosa, in

“Eating Disorders and Mimetic Desire,” Contagion 3 (1996): 1–­20.
4. This was the assumption of the early T (or training) groups. Since then, it is more
or less accepted in group therapy; see Irvin Yalom, The Theory and Practice of Group
Psychotherapy, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1985). This classic text is now in its fifth
edition. A more recent review of research techniques applied to group therapy is found in
W. Lutz and S. Knox, eds., Qualitative and Qualitative Methods in Psychotherapy Research
(East Sussex: Routledge, 2014). See Ch. 10 by David Kenny and William T. Hoyt.
5. The second group ran in second semester for six sessions. It did not have any
scapegoating or indeed any obvious data of relevance to Girardian theory. This data was
not included in this study.
6. Girard discussed the possibility of empirical confirmation of the mimetic theory with
James Williams, expressing some doubts about how feasible it would be: “most of it
cannot be subjected to empirical verification or falsification through empirical testing
or the canons of contemporary science . . . the complexity of what we are talking
about is too great for that.” See The Girard Reader, ed. James G. Williams (New York:
Crossroad,1996), 277. Notwithstanding the risk of an experimenter that is caught up
mimetically in the group, such a group does provide a controlled environment in which
to observe Girardian dynamics.
7. John Swinton and Harriet Mowat, Practical Theology and Qualitative Research (London:
SCM Press, 2006), 166.
8. Criteria for assessing quality in qualitative research is found in Alison Tong, Peter
Sainsbury, and Jonathan Craig, “Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative
Research (COREQ): A 32-­item Checklist for Interviews and Focus Groups,”
International Journal for Quality in Health Care 19, no. 6 (2007): 349–­57.
9. This study did not use grounded theory from which theory emerges from the data; see,
for example, Anthony Bryant and Kathy Charmaz, The Sage Handbook of Grounded
Theory (London: Sage, 2007). While there are some similarities to more quantitative
sequential analysis, this study is best understood in qualitative terms; see Roger Bakeman
and John M. Gottman, Observing Interaction: An Introduction to Sequential Analysis, 2nd
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). The use of qualitative methods
including ethnography is accepted in psychological research; see, for example, Chris
Barker, Nancy Pistrang, and Robert Elliot, Research Methods in Clinical Psychology: An
Introduction for Students and Practitioners, 2nd ed. (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons,
2002).
10. “The scapegoaters truly cannot distinguish the true from the false . . . [it is] authenticated
by the unanimous scapegoating of the community.” See Girard, The Girard Reader, 125.
11. “The further one is from normal social status of whatever kind, the greater the risk of
persecution.” See Girard, The Girard Reader, 113.
12. René Girard, Oedipus Unbound: Selected Writings on Rivalry and Desire, ed. Mark Anspach
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), xxiv.
13. René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis, 2001), 65.

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56 Bruce A. Stevens and Scott Cowdell

14. Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 89.

15. Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 92.
16. René Girard, When These Things Begin: Conversations with Michel Tregeur, trans. Trevor
Cribben Merrill (Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture; East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 2014), 37.
17. Nidesh Lawtoo, The Phantom of the Ego: Modernism and the Mimetic Unconsciousness
(Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture; East Lansing: Michigan State University
Press, 2013).
18. Lawtoo, The Phantom of the Ego.
19. René Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoyevsky (1963, 1976), ed.
and trans. with a foreword by James G. Williams (New York: Crossroad, 1997). For a
discussion of the mimetically self-­loathing and self-­destructive as characteristic modern
types for Girard, see Scott Cowdell, René Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture,
and Crisis (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 45–­51.
20. See, e.g., Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, 326–­35.
21. James Alison, “Confessions of a Former Marginaholic,” in On Being Liked (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2003), 65–­77.
22. Stephen Gardner, “Democracy and Desire in The Great Gatsby,” in Passions in Economy,
Politics, and the Media: In Discussion with Christian Theology, ed. Wolfgang Palaver and
Petra Steinmair-­Pösel (Beiträge zur mimetischen Theorie 17. Wien: Lit Verlag, 2005),
273–­94, 273.
23. For instance, Girard says of Shakespeare’s character, Bottom, that “the need to contradict
is just as mimetic in him as the need to copy.” See “More than Fancy’s Images: The
Craftsmen in A Midsummer Night’s Dream,” in A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare,
René Girard (South Bend, IN: St Augustine’s Press, 2004), 57–­65, 61.

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