Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) vs.

DND
FACTS:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, Pres. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for the Fort Bonifacio military reservation.

On 28 May 1967, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proc. No. 423, which excluded the Libingan ng mga Bayani
and reserved it for a national shrine under the administration of Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

On 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded brgys Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proc. No. 423 and declared it open for disposition. At the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan, (SGD.) Marcos". The
controversy started when Proc No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the addendum.

On 16 October 1987, President Aquino issued Proc. No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this
time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of NMSMI filed a Petition with the COSLAP, praying for: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied,
covering Lot 3 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proc. No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of
the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the LMB’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the lot to its bona fide occupants.

On 1 September 2006, COSLAP granted the petition and declared the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with
Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was
an integral part of Proc. No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence
or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proc. No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers,
it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proc. No. 172 could not have superseded much
less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when Pres. Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

Ass Com Aguilar-General dissented that pursuant to Art. 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she
held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent,
the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to
supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proc. No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on
the field of the legislature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proc. No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

RULING:

YES! Art. 2 of the NCC provides: “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.”

In the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, the Court ruled that publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did
not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if
the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication
(or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.

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 The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476
as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Sec.24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.

It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law.

Facts:

R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF),
which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of
collecting and administering the Fund was Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA).

P.D. No. 755, under its Section 1 states that: “It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the
implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA…;
and that the PCA is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers….

.....Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D. No. 755, under its Section 2, authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF
collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank interest free, the deposit withdrawable only
when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. The same section also decreed that all levies PCA is
authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government within
the contemplation of P.D. No. 711.”

P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of coconut/palm oil industries.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to finance various projects and/or was converted
into various assets or investments. Relevant to the present petition is the acquisition of the First United Bank controlled by Pedro
Cojuangco’s group, and was subsequently renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank.

Per Cojuangco’s own admission, PCA paid, out of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), the entire acquisition
price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It
would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10%
of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock. In all, from the "mother"
PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840
shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.

As to whether P.D. No. 755 and the text of the agreement described therein was published, the Court takes judicial notice that
P.D. No. 755 was published in volume 71 of the Official Gazette but the text of the agreement was not so published with P.D. No. 755.

Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded the status of a law without publication.

Ruling:

NO! It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not
reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law.

It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a
law. Tañada v. Tuvera said as much: Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x. Laws must come out in the open in the
clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.

The publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the
law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy
the publication requirement.
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 In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way
reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. The SC
cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the Court joined the Sandiganbayan in its holding that
the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under
the Civil Code.

SEC vs GMA

FACTS:

On August 19, 1995, GMA filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws with the SEC. The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name from "Republic
Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and
after June 16, 2000.

Upon such filing, GMA had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application
for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.

On September 26, 1995, the GMA informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment.
However, the GMA requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to
have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment
amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.

The following year, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1
thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner
was formed. But GMA requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application
for extension of its corporate term.

Consequently, the SEC, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment. Thus, GMA
appealed the ruling of the SEC to the CA on the ground that the assessment of filing fees for the petitioner’s application for extension of
corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.

The CA ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in
accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative
rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity.

In its Memorandum dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that it issued the questioned MC in the exercise of its delegated
legislative power to fix fees and charges. The filing fees required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the transacting public and are
essential to its supervisory and regulatory functions. The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore, require no publication.

GMA avers that the latter did not take effect and cannot be the basis for the imposition of fees for the reasons that it was neither
filed with the UP Law Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

RULING:

YES! Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
it is otherwise provided."

In Tañada v. Tuvera,10 the Court ruled that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

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 The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of
the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987.

Also, the questioned memorandum circular cannot be construed as simply interpretative of Corporation Code or RA 3531. This
administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of RA 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It
cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared
ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

CASTILLO vs. CASTILLO

FACTS:

On 25 May 1972, Lea Castillo married Benjamin Bautista. On 6 January 1979, Lea married Renato A. Castillo Renato.

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea
be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Lea opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was
null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between Lea and Renato null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under
Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6
January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio.

The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of
a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly,
RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage
to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC,
the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

RULING:

NO! The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision
of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato
is valid.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the
Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83
(second paragraph), 85 and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:

1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid
until annulled by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage
there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
decree.

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 Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v.
Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon
inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required
where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior
to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.

ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the Isidro Ablaza filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

Isidro alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to
such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a
marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half
of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is filed out of time and that Isidro is not a party
to marriage. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on
the ground that the action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

HELD:

NO! The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old
Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage
as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely
no application to the petitioner. The case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned,
it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is
as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio.

However, Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible.

Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
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clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license
to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. Only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest"
can file the action. Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner
was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code

Also, Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends only to marriages covered
by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only
to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who
was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was
Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate.

Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime
of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.

CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be
filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away
his right.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive application in accordance with the Civil Code in this case.

RULING:

YES! Art. 255 provides that the Family Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, as granted by Art, 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of
the Family Code. A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. Indeed, the overriding
consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative
parents.

TY vs. CA

FACTS:

In 1977, Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They also had a church wedding in the same year.
In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of
marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC of QC decision,
Reyes married Ofelia Ty.

Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage
license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna.
Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license including the specific license number designated.

The lower court however ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA applying
the provisions of the Article 40 of the Family Code.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code applies in this case.

RULING:

NO! Article 40 of the Family Code provides, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of the
previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void.
For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts.

In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the Family Code. Both marriages entered by Reyes
were solemnized prior to the Family Code. The old Civil Code did not have any provision that states that there must be such a declaration
before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the Family Code (which took effect in 1987)
cannot be applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the Civil Code which was
operational during her marriage with Reyes.
ATIENZA vs. BRILLANTES

FACTS:

Judge Brillantes became a lawyer in 1963. He married Zenaida Ongkiko in 1965, albeit without marriage license.

In December 4, 1991, he married Yolanda De Castro in civil ceremony in Los Angeles, California.
In the same month, complainant Lupo Atienza with whom Yolanda De Castro has two children, saw Judge Brillantes sleeping in his house
in No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. Said house was purchased by him in 1987. Upon inquiry, the houseboy
told him that De Castro has been cohabiting with Judge Brillantes.

Judge Brillantes asserts that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him since his first marriage was in 1965 and
therefore not covered by the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.

RULING:

NO! Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous void
marriage shall make the subsequent marriage void ab initio.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Judge Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case.

As a general rule, no vested right may arise from procedural laws. Article 40 is a rule of procedure, hence it has no vested right
and therefore cannot be violative of rights vested in other laws. Therefore, it has retroactive effect and is thus applicable to respondent's
marriage to Ongkiko in 1965.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

TING vs. VELEZ-TING

FACTS:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. They fell in love and get
married on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when Carmen was already pregnant with their first child. They resided first at Benjamin’s family at
Mandaue City.

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 When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City. In September 1975,
Benjamin passed the medical board examinations. On 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member
of its active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospitals treasurer. The couple were blessed with six (6) children.

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years. Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
for nullifying their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Carmen claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble
occasionally with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight
.Benjamin physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was
affected. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family. Aside from this, Benjamin
also engaged in compulsive gambling. Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her
friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim.

On January 9, 1998, the TRIAL COURT DECLARED the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC
found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner appealed to the CA.

On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that
no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since
Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina. Carmen filed a MR, it was denied then she filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC, SC directed CA to decide on Carmen’s case. On review, CA reversed its earlier ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases.

RULING:

YES! The Court ruled that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions.
It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In
our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." As the rule evolved,
early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

The 4-pronged test of stare decisis rule are: the court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply
in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or
come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

SARTO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

8
 On 3 October 2007, Redante Sarto was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly contracting two (2) marriages: the first,
with Maria Socorro G. Negrete, and the second, with Fe Aguila. The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint of bigamy filed by Fe
against Redante on 4 June 2007.

During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-trial ensued wherein Redante admitted
that he had contracted two marriages but interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce obtained in
a foreign country.

The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies tended to establish the following:

Redante and Maria Socorrowere married on 31 August 1984. Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a
nurse. While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian
citizenship on 1 April 1988. Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British Columbia, Canada. The divorce was eventually granted by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia on November 1, 1988.

Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation. Their attempts to rekindle their romance
resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March 1993 in Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante and Maria Socorro's efforts to save
their marriage were futile.

Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously married to Maria Socorro who,
however, divorced him. Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29 December 1998. Their
relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to persuade him to allow their
daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sarto may remarry upon the issuance of the Divorce Decree obtained in a foreign country.

RULING: (Connect with Art. 26 of the Family Code)

NO! A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage. As in any
other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine
courts may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be
presented and admitted in evidence.

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce as a fact or that it was
validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.

An examination of the judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered the said decision after finding that there was lack of
any competent evidence with regard to the divorce decree and the national law governing his first wife, not merely because of the lack of
evidence concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's naturalization. The fact that Redante failed to prove the existence of the
divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the celebration of the second marriage still subsists.

REPUBLIC vs. MANALO

FACTS:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married in the Philippines to Yoshino Minoro, a Japanese national. She divorced Minoro in Japan
and a Japanese court issued the divorce decree dated December 6, 2011.

On January 10, 2012, she filed in the RTC of Dagupan City a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Manila, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. She also prayed that she be allowed to use her maiden surname: Manalo.
She claims there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage cancelled so that it would not appear that she is still married to a
Japanese national who is no longer married to her, and so that she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry should she decide
to remarry.

The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Dagupan questioned the caption of the petition and alleges that the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of judgment; this was admitted by Manalo and accordingly amended the petition

9
 RTC Ruling: Petition denied. The divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code. Art. 15 provides that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

CA Ruling: RTC ruling was overturned. Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. vs. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling, the meaning of the law should be based on the intent
of the lawmakers. In view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married
to the Japanese national who is no longer married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.

ISSUE:

W/N a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining
a favorable judgment against his/her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

RULING:

YES! pursuant to Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. However, this case was remanded to the RTC to allow Manalo to prove
the Japanese law on divorce.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Art. 26 only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino souse
is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of par. 2 of Art.26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino souse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino souse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country.

Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife.
A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means
to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien souse are severed by the
operation of the latter’s national law.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of 2 types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vincula matrimonii, which terminated the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

In our jurisdiction, the following rules on divorce exist:

1. The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Art. 15 and 17 of the NCC, the marital bond between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC. vs. BASSO

FACTS:

Continental Micronesia is a US corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. Joseph Basso, a US citizen residing in
the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a General Manager position by Mr. Braden, Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines.

On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso retaining his position as General
Manager. Thereafter, Basso received a letter from Mr. Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing him

10
that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.” The letter also informed Basso that: (1) he will not receive
any monetary compensation but will continue being covered by the insurance provided by CMI; (2) he will enjoy travel privileges; and (3)
CMI will advance Php1,140,000.00 for the payment of housing lease for 12 months . Basso wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected
by CMI.

Ms. Marty Woodward of the HR Department informed Basso that CMI rejected his counter-proposal and, thus, terminated his
employment. Basso then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the corporation. Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since the letter-offer was under the
Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.” Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws
apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws.

The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his office’s
jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the
case. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties.

ISSUE:
Whether labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

YES! The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case.

Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-laws issue. Under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here.

Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had physical presence in the Philippines during the duration
of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch, while Basso, before his death, was residing here. Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no
extraordinary measures were needed for the parties to make arrangements in advocating their respective cases.

The labor tribunals can make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident subject of this case (i.e. dismissal of
Basso) happened in the Philippines, the surrounding circumstances of which can be ascertained without having to leave the Philippines.
As to the law, we hold that Philippine law is the proper law of the forum, as we shall discuss shortly. Also, the labor tribunals have the
power to enforce their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties.

Also, Philippine law is the applicable choice of law in this case. In Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA the Court emphasized that an
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact, as follows:

(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;

(2) The seat of CMI;
(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;
(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties;
(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and
(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done.

Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable law. Basso, though a US citizen, was a
resident here from the time he was hired by CMI until his death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a
license to do business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso was hired to work. The contract of employment was
negotiated in the Philippines. A purely consensual contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso accepted the terms and
conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The place of performance relative to Basso’s contractual duties was in the Philippines.
The alleged prohibited acts of Basso that warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines. Clearly, the Philippines is the state
with the most significant relationship to the problem.

DEL SOCORRO vs VAN WILSEM

FACTS:

Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January
19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. On July 19, 1995, by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
the appropriate Court of Holland, their marriage bond ended. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines.
11
 According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since their arrival in the Philippines,
Ernst never gave support. Thereafter, Ernst came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu and since then, have been residing thereat.
On August 28, 2009, Norma, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from Ernst, who refused to receive it.

Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of Section 5, par. E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child. RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against Ernst. Consequently, Ernst was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail. On February 19, 2010, the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Ernst. Norma filed a petition for review on certiorari before SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national is governed by the Philippine laws on matters pertaining to family rights and duties.

RULING:
NO! Insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since Ernst is a citizen of Holland,
he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.

This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the case, Ernst hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even
if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
ANDO vs. DFA

FACTS:

On 16 September 2001, Edelita Ando married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro validly
granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with Edelita. On 13 September 2005, Edelita married Masatomi Ando.
Yuichiro married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005.

Edelita applied for the renewal of her passport to indicate her surname with Ando but she was told at the DFA that it cannot be
issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with Ando is valid. On 29 October 2010, Edelita filed with
the RTC a petition for Declaratory Relief. On 15 November 2010, RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that there is no showing of
the compliance with Art. 13 of the Family Code – judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES! A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
and like any other fact.

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for
declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. Also, Edelita should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband. There appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both
the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration
as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national
law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

NOVERAS vs. NOVERAS

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FACTS:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. Upon learning that David had an extra-
marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court
granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the custody
of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She
relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation.

David answered that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.

RULING:

NO! The Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of
the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

In Bayot v. CA, the Court relaxed the requirement on certification where it held that the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no
seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if the Court apply the doctrine of processual presumption with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition
of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent
a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.

Doctrine of Processual Presumption- Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the
parties did not submit any proof of their national law.

REPUBLIC vs. OLAYBAR

FACTS:

Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before
the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation
of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion.

During trial, Merlinda testified and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor
in Hansao Pharma. She revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working
as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. Her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave
her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.

She also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son
Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. A document
examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. Thus, RTC granted petition.

13
 The Republic, through the OSG, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, in effect, declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.

RULING:

NO! In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not,
in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. Merlinda sought, not the nullification of marriage as there
was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

FACTS:

Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage
did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).”

The decision of the RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

1. NO! Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country.

Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has

14
no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and
the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the
public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew.
It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.”

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However,
the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of
the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact."

Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.

2. YES! The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section
1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. YES! There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen
who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy
nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations.

15
 CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS

FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship married respondent Daisilyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines and discovered that his wife
was having an affair with another man, he filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada which
granted the petition for divorce.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree.
Gerbert also filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn
did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition.

The RTC denied the petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy. Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of
the alien spouse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2nd par. of Art. 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

NO! The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.”

The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

BAYOT vs. CA

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix,
born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic ordering the dissolution of the marriage.
The same court also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support for her
and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P
220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by
the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According the CA, RTC
ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree
was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

16
ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

YES! The Divorce decree is valid. Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen(thus, not a Filipino citizen), and remains to
be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship
to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and
represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate, when she secured divorce in
Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996.

In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:

Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a
motion to dismiss, but it was denied. Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the effects of the divorce decree, such as the finality of the custody of children, may be recognized in our jurisdiction.

RULING:

NO! As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must be determined by our courts. The Court held that before
our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court.

The Court held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Also, a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

17
 It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given opportunity to challenge
said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the finality of the custody of children.

DE ROCA vs. DABUYAN

FACTS:

In 2012, Eduardo C. Dabuyan, et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RAF Mansion Hotel Old Management and New
Management and Victoriano Ewayan. The respondents amended the complaint and included Rolando De Roca co-respondent.

On 18 April 2012, Dabuyan submitted their position paper. On the same day, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. De Roca claims that Ewayan was their employer, who owned Oceanic Travel and Tours Agency which operated
the RAF Mansion Hotel where they were employed as cook, waitress, and housekeeper. Consequently, he asserted that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and Dabuyan et al. and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction.

There is no connection between De Roca and Oceanic other than through the lease agreement executed by them; they are not
partners in the operation of RAF Mansion Hotel. It just so happens that Oceanic decided to continue operating the hotel using the original
name – "RAF Mansion Hotel". The only claim respondents have in resorting to implead De Roca as a co-respondent in the labor case is
the fact that he is the owner of the entire building called "RAF Mansion Hotel" which happens to be the very same name of the hotel which
Ewayan and Oceanic continued to adopt, for reasons not evident in the pleadings.

On 29 June 2012, the labor arbiter rendered a decision directing De Roca, among others, to pay backwages and other monetary
award to private respondents. On 4 September 2012, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction before the NLRC which was dismissed because it was filed beyond the period allowed by the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was also denied. CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA, in affirming the findings of both LA and the NLRC, abuse their discretion and acted beyond their jurisdiction
when they asserted their authorities and found DE ROCA solidarily liable with EWAYAN/ OCEANIC TRAVEL AND TOUR AGENCY to
Dabuyan, et al, despite the patent lack of employer-employee relationship between them.

RULING:

YES! To allow respondents to recover their monetary claims from petitioner would necessarily result in their unjust enrichment.
There is unjust enrichment ‘when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.’ The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid ba5is or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without
just cause or consideration.

In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around." In short, substantive law outweighs procedural
technicalities as in this case.

CARBONELL vs. MBTC

FACTS:

Sps. Cristino & Edna Carbonell alleged that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation,
insults and embarrassment during their trip to Bangkok, Thailand because of the MBTC's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that turned
out to be counterfeit.

They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch. While in Bangkok,
they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer
because the fifth one was "no good." Because of currency’s rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon
Bank in Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was confiscated by the bank teller. On the next day, they had been
confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit after they had bought
jewelry.

18
 Upon the Carbonells’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the MBTC's Pateros branch on the fake
dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them were genuine, for the bills were certified by Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) after examination. They had demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.

Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the Spouses Carbonell had two meetings with the MBTC's representatives. In the course
of the two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners
had encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip
to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out.

The RTC ruled in favor of the MBTC. The Spouses appealed, but the CA ultimately promulgated its assailed decision affirming
the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the award of attorney's fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC.

RULING:

NO! It is true that the petitioners suffered embarrassment and humiliation in Bangkok. Yet, we should distinguish between
damage and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the consequences because the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BPI Express Card
Corporation v. CA, the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled after several
defaults in payment, holding therein that there could be damage without injury where the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the injured person alone should bear the consequences because the law afforded no
remedy for damages resulting from an act that did not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct
complained of precluded the recovery of damages.

Here, although the Spouses suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar bills, the
respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate
any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the
nature of its obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque
injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.

FELIX PLAZO URBAN vs. LIPAT SR

FACTS:

On December 13, 1991, Alfredo Lipat Sr., as represented by Lipat Jr., executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the Felix Plazo
Urban Poor Settlers Community Association, whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter two parcels of land in Naga City for a
consideration of P200/sq. m.

As stipulated in the CTS, the Association had 90 days to pay in full the purchase price of the properties; otherwise, the CTS
shall automatically expire. The period, however, elapsed without payment of the full consideration. According to the Association, the 90-
day period provided in the CTS was subject to the condition that the subject properties be cleared of all claims from third persons
considering that there were pending litigations involving the same.

Upon the expiry of the 90-day period, and despite the failure to clear the subject properties from the claims of third persons, the
Association contributed financial assistance for the expenses of litigation involving the subject properties with the assurance that the CTS
will still be enforced once the cases are settled. In the meantime, the Association agreed to pay rental fees for their occupation of the
subject properties from 1992 to 1996.

After the termination of the cases involving the subject properties, however, the Lipat Sr. refused to enforce the CTS on the
ground that the same had expired and averred that there was no agreement to extend its term. Consequently, the Association filed a
case for Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction on June 10, 1997 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. For their defense, Lipat alleged that the CTS was not enforced due to the petitioner's failure to pay the
selling price before the expiration of its term. As a result, the members of the petitioner were required to pay rental fees corresponding to
the area they occupy. Moreover, Lipat claimed that the so called "financial assistance" they received from the petitioner's members was
in the nature of a loan and that it has nothing to do with the alleged extension of their CTS.

On August 9, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision6in favor of the Association. Lipat filed an appeal to the CA. In a Decision19
dated April 30, 2007, the CA granted the appeal of Lipat.

19
ISSUE:

Whether or not the payments made by the Association must be refunded.

RULING:

YES! Payments made by the Association must be refunded. In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Radiomarine Network
(Smartnet) Philippines, Inc., the Court ordered the refund to the buyer of all sums previously made, after terminating the CTS for failure
to pay the purchase price, based on the principle against unjust enrichment. The Court held that:

Likewise, a cause of action for specific performance does not arise where the [CTS] has been cancelled due to nonpayment of
the purchase price. Smartnet obviously cannot demand title to the Valgoson Property because it did not pay the purchase price in full.
For its part, Piltel also cannot insist on full payment since Smartnet's failure to pay resulted in the cancellation of the [CTS]. Indeed, in the
case of Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Devt. Corp., the Court rejected the seller's demand for full payment and instead ordered
it to refund to the buyer all sums previously paid. The order to refund is correct based on the principle that no one should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.

In the present case, however, since the records are insufficient to use as bases to properly compute all payments previously
made by the petitioner to the respondents in connection with the CTS they executed dated December 13, 1991, the case should be
remanded to the RTC for a detailed computation of the refund and to include the imposition of an interest at the rate 6% per annum.

COCA-COLA PHIL vs. BERNARDO

FACTS:

Sps. Bernardo, doing business as “Jolly Beverage Enterprises”, were distributors of petitioner’s products from 1987-1999. In
their agreement, Coca Cola will extend cash assistance and trade discount incentives to the respondent while the latter undertook to sell
petitioner's products exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in its marketing efforts in exchange.
Before the expiration of their contract, Coca Cola required the respondents to submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it would
formulate a policy defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City and as a condition for the renewal of their contract. Despite their
compliance, the contract was not renewed.

Respondents later on found out that, Coca Cola started to reach out to the persons whose names were on the list and that the
respondent’s delivery trucks were being trailed by petitioner's agents; and that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach the
former's customers. Further, respondents found out that petitioner had employed a different pricing scheme, such that the price given to
distributors was significantly higher than that given to supermarkets. It also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area
with its "Coke Alok" promo, in which it gave away one free bottle for every case purchased. It further engaged a store adjacent to
respondents' warehouse to sell the former's products at a substantially lower price.

The respondents filed a case against Coca-Cola PH, for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil Code and alleging that the acts
of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial enterprise.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts of the petitioner constitutes a violation of the petitioner’s right under Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

Yes. The SC held that the acts of the petitioner constitutes abuse of rights and unfair competition under the Civil Code. According to the
SC, the petitioner shall liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found
that petitioner had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment
returns of respondents. The CA summarized its findings as follows:

This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take over the market: directly sell its products to or deal them off
to competing stores at a price substantially lower than those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers suffered losses,
and in [respondents'] case, laid of a number of employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers including small-scale
stores.

It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the price. In
addition, it took advantage of the information provided by respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area.
Distributors like respondents, who had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with fewer customers. Other
distributors were left with no choice but to fold.

20
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever
another person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive
law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, this Court held that under any of the above provisions of law, an act that causes injury to
another may be made the basis for an award of damages. As explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:

The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The
mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a
person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over and above the specific
precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and which are expressed in three principles: honeste
vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible
to abuse our rights to prejudice others.

Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of
action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises
or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise
to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

ALANO V. MAGUD-LOGMAO
FACTS:

At around 9:50 pm of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao then 18 y/o, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center by two
sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmer’s Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The patient’s
data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong.

However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the emergency room of EAMC,
stated the patient is Angelito Logmao. Dr. Cabrera reported that Logmao was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent;
that the skull x-ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:30am of March 2, 1988, Logmao developed generalized seizures and was
managed by the neuro-surgeon resident on-duty; that the condition of Logmao progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and
ambu-bagging support was provided; that admission to the ICU and mechanical ventilation support became necessary, but there was no
vacancy at the ICU and all the ventilation units were being used by other patients; that a resident physician of NKTI, who was rotating at
EAMC, suggested that Logmao be transferred to NKTI; and that after arrangements were made, Logamo was transferred to NKTI.

At the NKTI, the name Angelito Logmao was recorded as Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately attended to and given the
necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, transplant coordinator was asked to locate his family
by enlisting police and media assistance. Dr. Enrique Ona, chairman of the Department of Surgery, observed that severity of the brain
injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested to conduct tissue typing and tissue cross-matching examination,
so that should Lugmoso expire, the organs thus donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible beneficiary.

Misa contacted several radio and television stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of Lugmoso.
Lugmoso was pronounced brain dead on March 3, 1988. He was found to be a suitable donor of the heart, kidneys, pancreas, and liver,
and after the extensive search, no relatives were found.

Dr. Ona then requested the removal of the specific organs of Lugmoso from Dr. Alano, the director of NKTI who thereafter issued
a memorandum stating that only after the requirements of RA 349 as amended by PD 856 was complied, they can remove the specified
organs of Lugmoso. Lugmoso’s remains was brought at La Funeraria Oro. A press release made by NKTI announcing a double organ
transplant led to the findings of the relatives of Lugmoso.

On April 29, 1988, Zenaida Magud-Logmao, the mother of Angelito, filed a complaint for damages in connection with the death
of her son.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Lugmoso’s organs were valid.

RULING:

21
 YES! The internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus the emotional pain
suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot be in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the court find evidence
nor second to show that respondent’s emotional suffering at the sight of the pitful state in which she found her son’s lifeless body be
categorically attributed to petitioner’s conduct.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioners employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the
relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allotted for notices to reach the relatives of
the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son’s death because the notices did not properly state the name or
identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner’s door. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who recorded
the wrong information regarding the deceased’s identity to NKTI. The NKTI could not have obtained the information about his name from
the patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time.

HING vs. CHOACHUY SR.

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, Sps. Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the RTC-Mandaue a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer
for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/TRO against Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

The spouses alleged that they are the registered owners of a lot situated in Brgy. Basak, Mandaue, Cebu; that Choachuys are
the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc., adjacent to their property; that Choachuys constructed an auto-repair shop building;
that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against the Spouses for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO where Aldo
claimed that the spouses were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which was denied. In order to get evidence, Choachuys on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo
two video surveillance cameras facing the Spouses’ property without their consent. They also took pictures of the spouses’ on-going
construction, thus, violative of right to privacy.

Choachuys claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures
of petitioners’ construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. On October 18, 2005, RTC
granted the application for TRO which was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code.

RULING:

YES! The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In this
regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding
social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and
only certain individuals are allowed to enter. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence xxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by
others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the
latter." The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy.

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it
may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

BEUMER vs. AMORES

FACTS:

22
 Willem Beumer, a Dutch national, married Avelina Amores, Filipina, on March 29, 1980. Their marriage was declared null by the
RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of Willem’s psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage. The lots acquired by purchase by way of
inheritance. In defense, Amores averred that she purchased lots and its improvements using her own money.

On February 28, 2007, the RTC ruled against Willem. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unjust enrichment.

RULING:

NO! Willem was well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines. Hence, he cannot invoke
equity to support his claim for reimbursement. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:

Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated
as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application
of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties,
or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself
which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners
applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition
is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.

CHENG vs. SY

FACTS:

Anita Cheng filed 2 estafa cases before the RTC-Manila against spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBC) Checks for ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for
having been drawn against a closed account. Also, she filed the same case in METC for violation of BP 22. Both cases were dismissed.

On April 26, 2005, Cheng filed a case against the spouses before RTC-Manila a complaint for collection of a sum of money with
damages based on the ₱600,000 covered by the 2 PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases. On January 2,
2006, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the civil action to collect the loaned amount was already impliedly
instituted in the BP 22 cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the nonpayment of the loaned amount due to technicality would be tantamount to unjust enrichment.

RULING:

YES! the inability of Cheng to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of the spouses, as they
may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against her.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s
expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will
give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication

23
of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities. For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of the
legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so, we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.

CHENG vs. DONINI

FACTS:

In an oral lease agreement, Cheng agreed to lease his property to Donini, who intended to put up a restaurant thereon. Donini
then proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises. However, before respondents’ business could take off and before any final
lease agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding its terms and conditions.

Cheng wrote to Donini, demanding payment of the deposit and rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to continue with
the agreement should Donini fail to pay. Donini ignored the demand, and continued to occupy the premises, until in April 17, 1991, when
their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to the petitioner.

Donini then filed an action or specific performance and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in the RTC-Pasig. The Court ruled in favor of Cheng.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unjust enrichment when the expenses on improvements made to the leased property were not
reimbursed to the Spouses.

RULING:

NO! There is no unjust enrichment because Cheng has a valid claim. The relationship between petitioner and respondents was
explicitly governed by the Civil Code provisions on lease, which clearly provide for the rule on reimbursement of useful improvements
and ornamental expenses after termination of a lease agreement. Article 1678 states:

If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half
of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Article 1678 modified the (old) Civil Code provision on reimbursement where the lessee had no right at all to be reimbursed for
the improvements introduced on the leased property, he being entitled merely to the rights of a usufructuary – the right of removal and
set-off but not to reimbursement.

The fact that Cheng will benefit from the improvements introduced by the spouses is beside the point. In the first place, the
spouses introduced these improvements at their own risk as lessees. The spouses were not forced or obliged to splurge on the leased
premises as it was a matter of necessity as well as a business strategy. In fact, had respondents only complied with their obligation to
pay the deposit/rent, there would have been no dispute to begin with.

Also, Cheng is entitled to moral damages but not in the amount of ₱500,000 which the Court finds to be excessive. While trial
courts are given discretion to determine` the amount of moral damages, it "should not be palpably and scandalously excessive." Moral
damages are not meant to enrich a person at the expense of the other but are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the other person’s culpable action. It must always
reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed.

ASJ CORP. vs. EVANGELISTA

FACTS:

Sps. Efren and Maura Evangelista are owners of R.M. Sy Chicks, a business engaged in selling chicks and egg by-products.
For hatching and incubation of eggs, they availed the services of ASJ Corp., owned by San Juan and his family.

After years of doing business with the ASJ Corp., the spouses delayed payments for the services of ASJ Corp, prompting owner
San Juan to refuse the release of the hatched egg. She explained that she was unable to pay their balance because she was hospitalized
for an undisclosed ailment. The spouses tendered Php 15,000 to San Juan for partial payment which San Juan accepted but he still
insisted on the full settlement of spouses’ accounts before releasing the chicks and by-products. He also threated the spouses that he

24
would impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their accounts
with him.

The parties tried to settle amicably before police authorities but failed. The spouses then filed with the RTC an action for damages
based on the retention of the chicks and by-products by ASJ Corp. The RTC held ASJ Corp. and San Juan solidarily liable for the actual
and moral damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and added exemplary damages. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s retention of the chicks and by-products on account of respondents’ failure to pay the
corresponding fees justified and did not constitute abuse of rights.

RULING:

YES! The retention has legal basis, however, the threats constitute abuse of rights. ASJ Corp’s act of withholding the chicks
and by-products is entirely different from petitioners’ unjustifiable acts of threatening respondents. The retention had legal basis; the
threats had none.

ASJ’s obligation to deliver the chicks and by-products corresponds to three dates: the date of hatching, the delivery/pick-up date
and the date of the spouses’ payment. On several setting reports, spouses made delays on their payments, but ASJ tolerated such delay.
When the spouses’ accounts accumulated because of their successive failure to pay on several setting reports, ASJ opted to demand
the full settlement of accounts as a condition precedent to the delivery. However, the spouses were unable to fully settle their accounts.

Spouses’ offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248 27 of the Civil
Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect.
More so, respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and by-products they expect to derive because
it is necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character. Needless to say, there was no valid application
of payment in this case.

Furthermore, it was the spouses who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to ASJ’s right
of retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation.

Nonetheless, San Juan’s subsequent acts of threatening the spouses should not remain among those treated with
impunity. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly
found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence all over
again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive
and will not be disturbed on appeal. Since it was established that respondents suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on
ASJ’s abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are
recoverable.

UP vs. PHILAB

FACTS:

In 1979, UP decided to construct an integrated system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the
project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the BIOTECH at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E.
Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.

Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish
the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for PHILAB, to fabricate the laboratory
furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and downpayment for the office
and laboratory furniture for the project, thus: 1) Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and 2)
Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project, and paying the downpayment of 50% or P286,687.50.

Ten days after, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory
furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.

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 On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project,
for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of P800,000 to
PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and
delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.

On October 16, 1982, UP executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and
donate sums of money. The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA with Philab on November 25, 1982. Later, President Marcos
was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking
her help to secure the payment of the amount due from the FEMF.

PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB
had no cause of action against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the
FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging
itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the legal principle of unjust enrichment when it held that UP and not FEMF, is liable to Philab.

RULING:

YES! There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not
bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the parties and their assigns. A contract cannot be binding upon and
cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it
must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. Moreover, to
substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of
value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.

Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received
under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads: Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched,
(2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff
has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted
to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. PHILAB had a remedy
against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. UP legally acquired the
laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER, July 19, 2001

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He
was married with Erlinda Ilusorio for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner, Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and
Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
26
 In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging
that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued and visitation rights should be granted.

RULING:

NO! Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person
is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify
issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are
choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.

Also, The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board
since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He
was married with Erlinda Ilusorio for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner, Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and
Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging
that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued and visitation rights should be granted.

RULING:

NO! Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person
is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

27
 Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify
issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are
choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.

Also, the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board
since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

UE vs. JADER

FACTS:

Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first
semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his
application to take a removal examination.

In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws
and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the
investiture ceremonies and graduated. On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-
bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and
was not able to take the bar examinations.

He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial court
ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The
CA awarded moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not UE violated Art. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code.

RULING:

YES! Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In civilized society, men must be able to assume that
others will do them no intended injury — that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with
whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under
conditions of civilized society. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the
latter, the former are useless.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from
the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. UE ought to have known that time was
of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not

28
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. UE cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the
Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. UE's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of
the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.

UE cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to
respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency
is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit.

FIGUEROA vs. BARRANCO

FACTS:

In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession after passing the bar
after his 4th attempt. Before he could take his oath, however, PAtricia filed the petition alleging that they had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that he did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

Simeon and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies.
Simeon even acted as escort to Patricia when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael
Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. Simeon also promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman, hence, this petition. The
IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simeon committed gross immorality.

RULING:

No. It does not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

Simeon and Patricia were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. She continued to see and be
respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Unfortunately, Simeon chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

It is also intended to make Simeon suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to
be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that Simeon has been prevented from being
a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.

GAFFNEY vs. BUTLER

FACTS:

On September 21, 2011, Donald Francis Gaffney filed a Complaint against Gina V. Butler, President of ActiveFun, for sum of
money. Gaffney alleged that sometime between the years 2006 to 2007 he advanced the approximate amount of P12. 5 million
representing his initial investment in ActiveFun, a developer of children's play and party facilities. However, Butler's husband passed
away sometime in December 2009. Consequently, the proposed investment agreement did not materialize.

Gaffney then demanded the return of his investments from Butler, who personally undertook to repay the total amount plus
interest. However, Butler was only able to pay on October 15, 2010 Pl million. Several demands were made to Butler but to no avail.

On July 13, 2011, a letter was sent to petitioner through registered mail demanding her to pay Gaffney and Richard McDonnell
(another party who infused funds into ActiveFun) within ten (10) days from receipt of the said letter the aggregate amount of P25 million
plus interests. Butler denied having knowledge of the investments and having offered to buy Gaffney’s share in ActiveFun. Thus, Gaffney
instituted a legal action against Butler.

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 Butler averred, among others, that she had no knowledge of Gaffney's investment in ActiveFun. She, however, admitted that
she paid Gaffney 1 million, with the qualification that the same was an undue payment, having been misled and intimidated by the latter
into believing that she has an obligation to return said investment, when no such obligation exists under the law or under a contract.

Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler under the original Complaint, Gaffney
amended the Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs of the late Anthony Richard Butler, represented by Butler as
his surviving spouse. He alleged that petitioner required him, as a pre-condition for the payment of the balance, to execute a separate
handwritten acknowledgment of the said payment. Butler opposed the motion primarily on the ground that "only natural or juridical persons
may be parties in an ordinary civil action."

Butler filed a Motion to Dismiss, allegedly not as the defendant originally named in the complaint but as the purported
representative of her late husband, arguing that the death of her husband did not ipso facto make her the representative of his estate.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss, which was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deceased or his estate may not be named a defendant in the present case.

RULING:

NO! A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. 25 Section 1, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties
in a civil action."

In Ventura v. Militante, the court ruled that neither a deceased person nor his estate has capacity to be sued. In order to maintain
an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed
of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.

Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal
entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun
by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an ac tion is a
nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may
not be named a party defendant in a court action.

Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they
lack legal personality. Thus, when Butler’s husband died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as respondent
in the present ordinary civil suit for collection.

CONTINENTAL STEEL vs. MONTAÑO

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn child who died.

Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor.
The company granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano
claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality. Continental Steel argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus
without legal personality.

They also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent.
None which existed in Hortillano’s case. They further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil
Code, hence, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from
the very moment he/she was conceived. Continental Steel appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die.

RULING:
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 NO! The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous
to civil personality. We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as
a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to
his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
REPUBLIC vs. MIC

FACTS:

On December 22, 1998, or almost 46 years after the issuance of OCT, Republic, filed a petition before the CA for annulment of
judgment, cancellation of title, and reversion against Marjens Investment Corporation and Patrocinio Villanueva, the Register of Deeds
of Batangas, and the RTC- Lipa.

The Republic, through the OSG, alleges that the land is within the unclassified public forest. The OSG argues that the land in
question cannot be the subject of disposition or registration, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said property, much less
to decree the same as private property. Therefore, the registration proceedings, the judgment and all subsequent titles are null and void.
The other lands not having been legally registered, remains and forms part of the public domain of the State.

In their comment, respondents deny the OSG's allegations. They claim that their titles, their predecessors' titles, and their mother
title are issued in accordance with law, and that the property was registered and brought under the Torrens system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not

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