KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET AL v ERMITA
It is now up to the
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-
born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court.
Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list
of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter
for the determination of the issue regarding Ong’s citizenship. Respondent Ong
contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in
nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the
petitioner has no standing to file the said petition.
HELD: First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue
involved is of utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court.
Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s
petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among
others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became
a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino
citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the
naturalization papers of his father.
It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less
than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore,
that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and
the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner
correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be
made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial
change. The long string of events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-
born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
judicial proceedings.
NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may be
approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will complete the
appointment.
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission.
appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office,
etc. It doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment.
When the appointee doesn’t pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is
whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesn’t provide really that there is a
period to accept or reject an appointment.
Moy Ya vs Commissioner of Immigration
FACTS: This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing
the arrest and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng.
Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking and that she desired to
take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a period
of one month.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount
of PHP1, 000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart
from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration
or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962.
But on January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either
English or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not speak either English or Tagalog.
She could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa.
ISSUE: Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen of
the Philippines.
HELD: Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads.
Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised
governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity

Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines.
Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might
herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws
was not required.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified
under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative
employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or
Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain
schools, etc.
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does
not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove

only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her
citizenship status as a fact.

Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman

marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same
law. likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised
here follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath
as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.
Burca vs Republic

So vs Republic

Facts: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has
lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he
derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging
and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog;
he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30
a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined
to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and
its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition
and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is deemed as a citizen of the Philippines
Building.9

During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came
to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s
business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by
petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed
of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner
for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were
classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003. must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and
upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.
(OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from
questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A
Issue:W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
citizen. rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may
be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
Ruling:The petition is denied for lack of merit.
subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC
of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the
and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by lower court.
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization
in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who
lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all
along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to
the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the
intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging
which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature
believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines,
there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be
amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely
to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of
by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice
to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his
own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses,
who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a Limkaichong vs Comelec
"credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a
crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured
in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is
not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person
Facts: In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court reversed
the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos.
07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional
candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship
requirement. Biraogo filed the instant motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral
argument.
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong
to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative
for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her
disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the
citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the
election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and
garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a
natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong
Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
Issues: 1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an
election case
2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to
disqualification based on citizenship
Held: 1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should
be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion
made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative,
or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or
illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of
said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country
and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person
naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his
former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as
prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the
same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to
graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private
Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through
the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the
naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department
of Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the
Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a
dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring
Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,
franchise or privilege.
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for
naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is
beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule
upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure
laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon
motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative
must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each
particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate
of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a
matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office
requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any
tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by
the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on
account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be
observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a
Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be
deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The
obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has
not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for
her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken
her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23,
2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no
longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his
case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated
tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged
to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.
3. No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period
under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship,
because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at
the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being acontinuing
requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question
the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.
Vilando vs HRET
Facts: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.
Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed
disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a
natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still
a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage
to Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before
the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and
Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared
Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared
Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-
guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and
she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing
that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the
jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with
Limkaichong.
Issues:
WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the
Philippines
 Held: which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
COMELEC En Bancher motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24,
incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the COMELEC’s Joint 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member
Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.
impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation
of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification
should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of
the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9,

1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The
HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957
and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental,
which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any
evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those
persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935
Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under
the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the
requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976,

accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as
Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of
Philippine citizenship. The case of In re:Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election
of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note
that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during