MICHAEL C.

GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors,
KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented
by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents. G.R. No.
163707 September 15,2006

Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of
the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-
respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
intestate. The minors were represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with
his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition
alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be
settled without the issuance of letters administration. The
other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed
by Remedios and not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid
and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating
that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from
the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged
the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as
well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not
the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could
not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the
petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the
inheritance the wards.

Held:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and
parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial
approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not
having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is
therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not
have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove
their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would
be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which,
according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to
determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original
petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the
settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action
may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for
recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
VS
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE
RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-
appellees. G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979

Facts:
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died
on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29,
1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. In addition to the
devices contained therein, the will had a provision to the
effect that the testator intended to devise the rice lands to his
nearest male relative who would become a priest.
It was stated therein that the parish priest of Victoria
would administer the rice lands only in two situations: one,
during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the
testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the
testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.

Issue:
Whether or not a device in favour of a person whose
identity at the time of the testator’s death cannot be
ascertained, may be efficacious.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the said bequest refers
to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to
be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be
living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). The
said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably
construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's
nearest male relative at any time after his death would render
the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to
the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his
intention. The reasonable view is that he was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death,
who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or
in high school or was not yet in the seminary.
 In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the rice lands before the nephew entered the
seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the
seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer
the rice lands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would
be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a
nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That
query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957.
He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the
late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood." Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by
any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion
is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise
inoperative. It should be understood that the parish priest of
Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's
nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become
a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this
case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by
article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which
provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases
of substitution and those in which the right of accretion
exists."
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil
Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal
succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said rice lands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if
the testator had made no disposition as to the said rice lands.
 LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-
appellant,
VS
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of
the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-15737 Feb. 28, 1962

Facts:
In the will of the testator, he gave certain properties to
his wife for her “use and possession while still living and she
does not remarry, otherwise the properties will pass to my
grandniece.” The widow lived for 34 more years but never
remarried. On the widow’s death, the grandniece wanted to
get said properties. It was contended that since the widow
never remarried, the grandniece cannot get the properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the grandniece has a right over the
subject property.

Held:
The grandniece can get the property, despite the fact
that the widow never remarried. It would have been different
had ownership over the properties been given to the widow.
In such a case, since there was no remarriage, the grandniece
cannot inherit. However, as will be observed, what had been
granted to the widow were only the “use and possession” of
the properties “while living”, the clear intent or usufructruary
interest- an interest which could have ceased even during her
lifetime had she remarried. Art. 791 of the Civil Code requires
that each word of the will be given effect.
 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
VS
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
GR No.22595, November 1, 1927

Facts:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in
question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s
participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.

Issue:
Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis
on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

Held:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will
expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those
contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by
the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre
Brimo, as one of the legatees.
 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.
MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch Vl, petitioners,
VS
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

Facts:
Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of
Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging “that
on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratix over the estate. Judge
Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased, contending that
1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months
before his death as shown by his death certificate and
therefore have an improper venue.
2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the
petition.
CFI denied the motion. CA reversed and affirmed making
Preciosa the administratix. Thus, Fule elevated the matter to
the SC on appeal by certiorari.

Issues:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be
determined in the present case?
b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of
Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Held:
No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear
and decide a case base on the merits or the substance of the
facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is
granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived
or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue
as the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated.
Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more
on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of
the case. In some cases it may be waived or stipulated by the
parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate.
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of
residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court.
Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time
of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the
venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia
was granted as a special administratix.