Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
704
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of
the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August
31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason
et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally
the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of
Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and
reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00,
P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot
773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered
in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No.
R0-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental
Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein
private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who
died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are
children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib.[1] It is not
clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares
of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a
total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the
children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that
Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the
outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to
peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation",
when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he
was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were
in possession of Lot 773.[2]
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818
square meters.[3] TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of
the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also
registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 under TCT
No. RT-2695 (28192).[4] Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification
to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr.
in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00.[5] Consequently, on February 20, 1956,
TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name.[6]
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix
thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No.
4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting
authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.[7] By virtue of a court order granting said
motion,[8] on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.[9] Hence, on April 1, 1958, TCT Nos. T-23165 and
T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo
Alvarez.[10]
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother
Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return"
of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an
accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be
made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or
money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.[11]
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold
Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.[12]
Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason,[13] who, thereafter,
declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes.[14]
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of
the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case
No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic)
any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella in connection with the above -entitled case".[15]
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to
reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and
T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of
said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."[16]
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not
mentioned in the aforesaid decision:
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773.
In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he
discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they
were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and
that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per
writ of execution."[17]
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein
private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title
and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo
Alvarez.[18] Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates
of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A,
773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable
consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said
propert(ies)"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding[19] could not be enforced
against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No.
5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a
party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory.[20]
Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of
September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the
certificates of title mentioned therein.[21]
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it.[22] In its order of September
28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had
instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that the
judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the
case.[23]
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real
property with damages.[24] Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason,
Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291
and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriff's,
return of service dated October 20, 1965"; Siason's delivery of possession of Lot
773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the
issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarezes and Siason jointly and
severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason
render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the
filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the
Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus
attorney's fees of P4,000.00.[25]
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots
773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September
4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning
said order.[26] On their part, the Alvarezes stated in their answer that the Yaneses’
cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and
estoppel."[27]
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who
purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico
pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable
consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice
of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect
their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded
that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed
between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval.[28] The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in
the following manner:A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the
Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismissed.B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and
Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of the deceased
Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
sum of P20,000 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages
suffered by the plaintiffs; the sum of P5,000 representing moral damages and the
sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the
filing of this complaint up to final payment.C. The cross-claim filed by the
defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo,
all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and
Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez, are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this
suit.SO ORDERED."[29]
The Alvarezes appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which, in its
decision of August 31, 1983,[30] affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it
ordered defendant-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees
the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B
of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages,
moral damages' and attorney's fees, respectively."[31]
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered
defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum
of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded
the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.SO ORDERED."[32]
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants' motion for reconsideration, said
appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition.
In their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whether or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and
properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.2. Whether or
not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are
any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been
docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by
statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.3. Whether or not
the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra, and father of
the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit "4"-defendant
Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra, where the private respondents had
unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged
rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia
Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962
(Exhibits "4:-Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or
indirectly denied by them.4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo
Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to
Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by
operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due
process."[33]
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is
the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez
to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had
long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who
was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the
case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to
appeal the decision against them.[34]
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed,
it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.[35] As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end.
Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it.
Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The
prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless
litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the
detriment of the administration of justice.[36]
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have
been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from
the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of
ownership and possession of the lots in question.[37]. In fact, Civil Case No. 8474
now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject
lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having
been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners’ father to Dr. Siason
who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on
the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a
purchaser-in-good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez
in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court
ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the
actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to
pay said amount.[38]
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages.[39] "It is one thing to protect an innocent
third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit
would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this
Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against"[40]
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated
in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in
the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have
not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed
in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if
any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat
the enforcement of a judgment which has long become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of said Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B made by Resendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the
sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code state:
"Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law."Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person which are not extinguished by his death."Art. 1311. Contracts take effect
only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property received from the decedent."
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of
Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.[41]
"The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered
by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said
heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state
is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive."Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a
consequence of the progressive ‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the
persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where
the obligation is strictly personal, i. e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. x x x"
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no
moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the
mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the
estate.[42]
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the
value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners’
admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient
to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
TSN, October 17, 1973, pp. 4-5.
[2]
TSN, December 11, 1973, pp 11 & 55.
[3]
Exhibits 26 and 28.
[4]
Exhibit 27.
[5]
Exhibit B-Alvarez.
[6]
Exhibits 23 and 24-Siason.
[7]
Exh. 1-Alvarez; Exh. 17-Siason.
[8]
Exh. 2-Alvarez.
[9]
Exh. 3-Alvarez.
[10]
Exh. 2-Siason.
[11]
Civil Case No. 5022; Exhibit B.
[12]
Exhibit F.
[13]
Exhibits 12 and 13.
[14]
Exhibits 10, 11, 14 and 15.
[15]
Exhibit 4-Alvarez.
[16]
Record on Appeal, p. 25.
[17]
Exhibit E.
[18]
Cad. Case No. 6; Exhibit 3.
[19]
Cad. Case No. 6.
[20]
Exhibit 5.
[21]
Exhibit 6.
[22]
Exhibit 78.
[23]
Exhibit 9.
[24]
Civil Case No. 8474
[25]
Record on Appeal, pp. 8-9.
[26]
Record on Appeal, p. 36.
[27]
Ibid. , p. 63.
[28]
Ibid, pp. 95-99.
[29]
Record on Appeal, pp. 100-101.
[30]
Porfirio V. Sison, J., ponente. Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Marcelino R. Veloso and
Desiderio P. Jurado, JJ. concurring.
[31]
Rollo, p. 32.
[32]
Rollo, p. 32.
[33]
Rollo, p. 119.
[34]
Rollo, p. 27.
[35]
Miranda v. C.A., 141 SCRA 302 [1986].
[36]
Ngo Bun Tiong v. Judge Sayo, G.R. No. 45825, June 30, 1988.
[37]
Record on Appeal, pp. 24-25.
[38]
Rollo, p. 27.
[39]
Quiniano et al. v. C.A., 39 SCRA 221 [1971].
[40]
Ibid.
[41]
100 Phil. 388.
[42]
Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336 (1910).
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3] dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of
land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and
the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged
by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot
shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to
give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar
and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492),
shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth
paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that
the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation
to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die,
lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall
turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the
obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall
die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of
this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell,
lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and
my sister."[4]Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto
issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided
that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop
year to herein private respondent.The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March
28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S.
Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]However, there was no
compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action
is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in
favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as
mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge
Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of
the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the
category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the
intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order
to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over
Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution
- i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's
"near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without
issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be
given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as
to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of
the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the
Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action,
there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private
respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on
modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally
demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue
the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted
to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever
rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to
the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they
also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to
herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution
of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against
petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions
is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private
respondent.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first
heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article
882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of
the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered
as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the
testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it
shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his
wishes.The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In
a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the
purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
imposed by the testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the
heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19]
On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not
suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that
the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar
to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of
the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and
the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with,
the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner
of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in
nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself
from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as
to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances
under which it was made.[23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in
all its parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation
is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer,
lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the
property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation
to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance
of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and
reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his
successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of
non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which
a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed,
the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot
be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, J., s
ee separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., j oin the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., n
o part.
[1]
Was spelled interchangeably in Rollo as Ravadilla.
[2]
Was spelled interchangeably in Rollo as Marlina.
[3]
Penned by Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (Chairman) and concurred in by Justices
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Eduardo G. Montenegro, (Members)
[4]
Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[6]
RTC Decision, pp. 8-9.
[7]
CA Decision, p. 14.
[8]
Art. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and
when there are two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some
circumstance by which the instituted heir may be known.
Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he
designate him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been
instituted, the institution shall be valid.
[9]
Art. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by
some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in
favor of a definite class or group of persons shall be valid.
[10]
Article 777, New Civil Code.
[11]
Ibid. , Article 887.
[12]
Ibid. , Article 859.
[13]
Ibid. , Article 863.
[14]
Ibid. , Article 859.
[15]
Arturo Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Volume
III, p. 212.
[16]
Ibid. , p. 212.
[17]
Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramos, 111 SCRA 704.
[18]
Tolentino, supra, pp. 241-242.
[19]
Ibid. , p. 242.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Jottings and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Ruben Balane, p. 249.
[22]
Tolentino, supra, p. 242.
[23]
Article 789, NCC.
[24]
Tolentino, supra, p. 34.
[25]
Art. 783, NCC and Tolentino, p. 28-29.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
"FIRST
"I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
"(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-4002(10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
"(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and
the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged
by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"FOURTH
"(a) It is also my command, in this my addition (codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002(10942), and
also at the time that the lease of Balbinito Guanzon of the said lot shall expire,
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty
Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
dies.
"FIFTH
"(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002(10942),
shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth
paragraph of this testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
"SIXTH
"I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that
the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation
to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die,
lastly should the buyer, lessee, or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall
turn it over to my near descendants,[2] and the latter shall then have the obligation
to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I
further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot
No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
sister."[3]
Pursuant to the above provisions of the codicil, ownership of Lot No. 1392 was
transferred to Jorge Rabadilla and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-44498 was
issued in his name.
Sometime in 1983, Jorge Rabadilla died, survived by his wife, Rufina, and their
children Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.
On 21 August 1989, on account of the failure of the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla to
comply with the obligation under the codicil, private respondent filed an action,
docketed Civil Case No. 5588, against the Rabadilla heirs before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, of Bacolod City for the reconveyance of Lot 1392 to the heirs of
Aleja Belleza and the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 covering
the property in the name of Jorge Rabadilla.
The trial court dismissed the complaint "without prejudice."[4] On appeal taken by
private respondent to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court set aside the
appealed decision and held:
"Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over
Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[5]
Petitioner, in the instant petition for review, submits that the appellate court has
erred in: (1) ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of Aleja Belleza on the
basis of paragraph six of the codicil, and (2) in ruling that the testamentary
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article
882 of the Civil Code. Additionally, he avers that respondent court has
improvidently deviated from the sole issue raised which is the prematurity of the
action before the court a quo. Upon the other hand, respondent would have this
Court sustain the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the
appellate court is completely justified in delving into the nature of the institution in
the codicil, the same having a direct significance on the issue of whether or not the
complaint before the trial court has been prematurely filed. Private respondent adds
that the institution in question is modal within the context of Article 882 of the Civil
Code which gives her the right to seize the subject property.
The institution of Jorge Rabadilla in the Belleza codicil partook the nature of an
institution sub modo, rather than one of substitution, governed by the provisions of
Article 882 of the Civil Code. This law provides:
"Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered
as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
"That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that
the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes
of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive,
together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation." (Emphasis supplied)
A mode is distinguished from a condition contemplated in the rules on succession in
that the latter dictates the efficacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory manner, of
a testamentary disposition while the former obligates the instituted heir to comply
with the mandate made by the testator but does not prevent the heir from at once
claiming the inheritance provided he gives a security to ensure compliance with the
will of the testator and the return of the thing received together with its fruits and
interests, "should (the heir) disregard this obligation." The obligation imposed upon
the heir or legatee is deemed not to be a condition for his entry forthwith into the
inheritance unless a contrary intention of the testator is evident. In case of doubt,
the institution is considered modal, rather than conditional. Much of the variance in
the legal effects of the two classes,[14] however, is now practically theoretical and
merely conceptual. Under the old Civil Code [15]
an institucion sub modo c
ould be
said to be more akin to an institution sub demonstratione, o
r an expression of a
wish or suggestion of the testator that did not have any real obligatory force, that
matter being left instead to the discretion of the heir, i.e. , whether to abide by it or
not. The amendatory provisions of the new Civil Code now hardly differentiates
between the principal effect of the non-compliance with the mode and that of the
occurrence of a resolutory condition expressed in the will. In both instances, the
property must be returned to the estate of the decedent to then pass on under the
rules on intestacy.
ACCORDINGLY, I also vote for the dismissal of the instant petition.
[1]
The will, along with the codocil, was probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
[2]
Relative to the intimation that the term "near descendants" of the testatrix is too
indefinite and opposed to the requirement of Article 843 of the Code, attention
might be invited to the provisions of Article 845, in relation to Article 959, of the
Code that can permit proper identification by some means other than the given
name and surname of the intended testate heirs enough to render the institution
valid and effective. The ponencia, in any case, states that the testatrix "died single
and without issue."
[3]
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[4]
The trial court opined that the action was premature since no cause of action had
as yet arisen in favor of private respondent and noted that the banking institutions,
mortgagees of the property, were not privies to the obligation of Jorge Rabadilla
under the Belleza codicil.
[5]
Rollo, p. 73.
[6]
Article 857, New Civil Code.
[7]
Article 859, New Civil Code.
[8]
The codicil indicates that the testatrix clearly intended Jorge Rabadilla to have
the ownership of the lot in question pass on to him upon her death.
[9]
Article 863, New Civil Code.
[10]
Article 864, New Civil Code.
[11]
See Crisologo vs. Singson, 4 SCRA 491.
[12]
111 SCRA 704.
[13]
29 May 1987.
[14]
Morente vs .De la Santa, 9 Phil. 387; Chiong vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. 119.
[15]
See Art. 797.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National
Housing Authority (NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro,
Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.[1] By virtue of
Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 757.[2] NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner
in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
(the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
predeceased her mother and left heirs.
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita
Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only
remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the
Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment
was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.[6]
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed
of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void.[7]
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots
submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother.
Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the
application.
In a Resolution[8] dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by
Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we
gathered the following facts: the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded
and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure
Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who
was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late
Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46,
47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an
area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the
lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the
Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee
left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan
Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in
question; he has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera;
on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots
in question in favor of the protestee; a
nd protestee had paid the lots in
question in full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in
question.[9]Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.[10]
The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated
January 23, 1987.[11]
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of
the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of
the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February
8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction.[17] The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989
reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction."[18]
The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the
resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the
subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by
NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna,
Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title issued.
Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon
death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate
before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for
reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They
both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera
was denied admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002
for being a "carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed
seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to
Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over
the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe
otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it
can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense
that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her
death. Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita
Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her
right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for
submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the
lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not an assignment of rights as
what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of
Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's
demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she
is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in court by
the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that
Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.[19]The
Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the
heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will
must first be determined by probate.
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980[26] where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now,
Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts
and Quasi- Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except
those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution..."[27] and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to
rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003,
already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the
instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per
entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989).[28] We find no reason to disturb this
ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of judicial
review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and
executory judgment.[29] The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case
which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.[30]
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious
grounds when it considered the application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner
argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the
subject lot; that it considered the respective application and inquired whether she
had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a possible awardee. It
is the position of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award
was not done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a
will, it could not bind the NHA.[31] That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an
evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the
original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same
before it."[32]
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it
should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time
of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng
Dios ng aking buhay..." Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should
cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are
transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides
that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or
by operation of law.[33]By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have
noted that the original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera
passed away on October 27, 1971.[34] The NHA issued its resolution[35] on February
5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera
without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property,
rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have
had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original
owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera
had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs–in accordance
with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell[36] with NHA as the seller. Upon
Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked.
This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties–Margarita Herrera and NHA.
Obligations are transmissible.[37] Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the
interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by
virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the
decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on
sales and obligations.[38]
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the
decedent as the next "person"[39] likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the
rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by
Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots.
Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of
Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void[40] should have
alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the
decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is
concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to
determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted
that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and
transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the
instrument maker.[41]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case
No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, at 8.
[2]
A Decree Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the Existing
Housing Agencies, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes, Presidential Decree No. 757, promulgated July 31, 1975.
[3]
Rollo, at 70.
[4]
Id.
[5]
It should be noted that a thumbmark is considered a valid signature. As held in
Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil. 848 (1936): "The testator's thumbprint is always valid
and sufficient signature for the purpose of complying with the requirement of the
article. While in most of these cases, the testator was suffering from some infirmity
which made the writing of the testator's name difficult or impossible, there seems
to be no basis for limiting the validity of thumbprints only to cases of illness or
infirmity."
[6]
Rollo, at 49.
[7]
Vol. 1, Original Record, at 11-14.
[8]
Rollo, at 39-43.
[9]
Id., at 41-42 (emphasis supplied).
[10]
Id., at 9.
[11]
Id., at 9, 44-47.
[12]
Id., at 9.
[13]
Id., at 25-26. Francisca Herrera left behind her husband, Macario Berroya, and
children: Ramon, Antonio, Alberto, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and
Rustica. In the extra judicial settlement made by the said heirs, Rosita, Pacita,
Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and Rustica waived all their rights, interest and
participation therein in favor of their siblings Macario, Alberto, Ramon and Antonio.
Deeds of sale involving the subject lots were executed by the NHA in favor of
Alberto, Antonio and Macario. Hence, TCT Nos. T-173557, T-173579, T-173578 and
T-183166 were issued to Macario, Alberto and Antonio, respectively.
[14]
Id., at 27.
[15]
Id., at 27-28.
[16]
Id., at 28.
[17]
Id., at 5.
[18]
Id., at 6; see Annex "F."
[19]
Id., at 71-72.
[20]
Brillantes v. Castro, 9
9 Phil. 497, 503 (1956).
[21]
G.R. No. L-14791, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 75.
[22]
Administrative Code of 1987, Executive Order No. 292, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, § 2(9).
[23]
Midland Insurance Corp. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-71905, August 13, 1986, 143 SCRA
458, 462.
[24]
1987 Phil. Const., art. VIII, § 1 as explained in United Residents of Dominical
Hills, Inc. v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March
7, 2001, 353 SCRA 783, 797-798.
[25]
1987 Phil. Const., art. VIII, § 1 ¶ 2.
[26]
An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, promulgated August 14, 1981.
[27]
Id. §9 (3).
[28]
Records, vol.1, at 80.
[29]
Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance, Corp., 396 Phil. 739 (2000).
[30]
Ayala Corp. v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Dev't. Corp., 400 Phil. 511 (2000).
[31]
Rollo, at 17.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Civil Code, art. 774 (emphasis supplied).
[34]
Rollo, at 70.
[35]
Id., at 39-43.
[36]
Id., at 24; C.A. G.R. No. 68370 citing Agreement No. 3787, dated July 28, 1959.
[37]
Araneta v. Montelibano, 14 Phil. 117 (1909).
[38]
Civil Code, arts. 1544 (which prohibit double sales) and 1165 (which established
the obligation of the seller to the buyer respecting a thing which is determinate in
nature).
[39]
Because the estate acquires juridical personality to continue the transmissible
obligations and rights of the decedent.
[40]
Vol. 1, Original Record, at 11-14.
[41]
Rollo, at 34.
Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: June 03, 2014
DECISION
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing its claim against the
Estate of K. H. Hemady (Special roceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause of
action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal
and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in
consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.'s of having guaranteed, the various principals
in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity agreements,
all contained the following stipulations:
"Premiums.—As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and
severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of
_________________(P_____________) pesos, Philippines ' Currency, in advance
as premium there of for every _______________ months or fractions thereof, this
___________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.
Indemnity.—The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify
the company and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and
against any and all damages, losses, coats, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and
expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the company shall or may, at any
time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or
any extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of
the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned
or any of them; and to pay, reimburse and make good to the company, its
successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its
representatives shall pay or cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account
of the undersigned or any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15%
of the amount involved in the litigation or other matters growing out of or
connected therewith for counsel or attorney's fees, but in no case less than
P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this
___________we equally bind ourselves for the payment thereof under the
same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity of executing
another indemnity agreement for the purpose and that we hereby equally waive our
right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this____________ which may be
granted under this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company.—Any and all sums of money so paid by
the company shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not
paid, will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn, the
same interests as the capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest,
shall be paid to the Company as soon as the Company shall have become liable
therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or
not.
* * * * * * *
Waiver.—It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any
question which may arise between them by reason of this document and which has
to be submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court
of competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other
venue. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity
agreement is hereby likewise waived.
* * * * * * *
Our Liability Hereunder.—It shall not be necessary for the Company to bring suit
.against the principal upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal,
but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and
severally, a primary one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible
immediately upon the occurrence of such default." (Rec. App. pp. 98-102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of
the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further
asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to
the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady's estate,
the lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon
Surety Co., on two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary
stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the
undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after
the execution of the counter-bonds; and (2) that "whatever losses may occur after
Hemady's death, .are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he
ceased to be guarantor."
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the
reasoning of the court below ran as follows:
"The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as
a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or
damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court
believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of
the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a
person to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out by the
Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon
the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors.
Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemady's death, are not chargeable to his
estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied
on the personality, character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H.
Hemady, was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is
a paragraph entitled 'Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived
and renounced by the security company. The security company has not demanded
from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of
firat mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety
Company, no real property was mentioned in the list of properties mortgaged which
appears at the back of the indemnity agreement." (Rec. App., pp. 407—408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as
well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that:-
"Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except
in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law."
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code
(and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressely so provide, thereby
confirming Article 1311 already qouted.
"Art. 774.—Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law."
"Art. 776,—The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death."
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:
"Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated
to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be
regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a
party, touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
* * * * * * *
"The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the
new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a
deceased person cannot be held to be "third persons" in relation to any contracts
touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of
inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in
the hands of him from whom they derive their rights."
(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs.
Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered
by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said
heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate
is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed
by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions? From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into
a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position;, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly
personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by
a specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of
the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the
surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual
qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the
creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as
surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the
Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the
principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting
from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the
reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his
behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the
parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility
should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very
least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the
agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
"(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. —Lo general es la transmisibilidad de
darechos y obligaciones; le excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se
diga en contrario impera el principio de la transmision, como elemento natural a
toda relacion juridical salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es
menester el pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido ehtre partes trasciende a
sus herederos.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen
los efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarld, si
asi se quiere, es indispensable convention terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir mas alia de las
personas que les dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de
esa persona; cuando no se quiera esto, se impone una eetipulacion limitativa
expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la
concresion a del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon." (Scaevola,
Oodigo Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-542) (Italics supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is
deemed to have contracted for himself and hid heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary
for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; hence, his failure to do so, is no sign
that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon
Surety Co,. did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates
nothing more than the company's faith and confidence in the financial stability of
the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists
when they are "not transmissible by operation of law". The provision makes
reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental
authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article
1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles
of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084)
contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the
guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that
"one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses
integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the
obligation, which he guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires
these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of
guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and
binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to
exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; and if that be true of his
capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality
mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:
"ART. 2057.—If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime
involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another
who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted
where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be
guarantor."
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty
of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has
become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to
demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the
creditor: it is his right, not his duty; he may waive it if he chooses, and hold the
guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article. 2057 of the present Civil Code is
incompatible with the trial court's stand that the requirement of integrity in the
guarantor or surety makes the latter's undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his
individual ity that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety
Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The conT tracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5,
Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).
"The most common example of the continent claim is that which arises when a
person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead.
Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against
his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the
obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the
surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety
has contributed something to the payment of the debt, . or has performed the
secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against
anybody—no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15 Pla., 553;
Gibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; Maxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.J, 531 Reeves vs.
Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; Ernst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)"
For defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a
case where the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor; and it
is urged that .the rule does not apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady
was a surety, not principal debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the
relations between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as
guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if
the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim
against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his
principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal
debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the
existing solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the
assets of the principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the
administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the
New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his
death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against
the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to
discuss the estate's liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of
the solution to this question, the Luzon Surety's claim did state a cause of action,
and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with
law. Costs against the Administratrix-Appellee. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.