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Dan R. Millado


1. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association,

Inc., 328 SCRA 836 (2000)

The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a

"body politic and corporate." — one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial
and political subdivisions of the state.

“While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should
not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law”

2. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA, 181 SCRA 495 (1995)

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the

Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971,
37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there
was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted
the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A.
No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement
of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao

and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates
the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to
these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive
department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art.
X, sec. 18].

the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It

does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted
to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
3. Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)

Decentralization Defined.

Decentralization is the process by which local government units are given

more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources by the national
government. In this sense, it is substantially similar to devolution.”
Decentralization means devolution of national administration — but not
power — to the local levels.

4. Limbona vs Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 (1989)

Autonomy Defined.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of

political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous, in that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its

5. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene
a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation
could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning
to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of
the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the
power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the
direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

6. Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)

Nature of authority

The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in

nature. Delegation of this power to the President without sufficient
standards is unconstitutional.

7. Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969)

A corporation organized under a statute subsequently declared invalid cannot

acquire the status of a ‘de facto’ corporation unless there is some other statute
under which the supposed corporation may be validly organized.

In the case at bar, the mere fact that the municipality was organized before the
statute had been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a ‘de facto’ corporation
since there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.

8. Mariano vs. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)

Purpose of “metes and bounds” requirement

The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit
must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

9. Sarangani vs COMELEC, 334 SCRA 379 (2000)

The dissolution of a municipal corporation is regarded as in the nature of a

political or legislative act, which can be accomplished only by virtue of and in
the manner prescribed in the law.

The fact that no one resides within the locality of a local government unit does
not ipso facto cause the abolition of a local government unit.

A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in
the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government.

10. Padilla vs. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (1992)

“Political Unit Affected” defined.

The phrase “political unit affected" refers to the residents of the political
entity that would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion

11. Tobias vs Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

This definition (political unit affected) was applied by the Court in a case
involving a plebiscite for the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The Court held that the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the plebiscite as they had nothing to do with its change of status.

12. Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)

Nature of General welfare clause

Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations.

Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of power by the legislature which may be through express
delegation or inferred by the mere fact of creation of the municipal corporation.

13. US vs. Salvatierra, 39 Phil 103 (1918)

Nature of General welfare clause

The general welfare clause delegates police power to local government units in
statutory form. Independent of the provisions of this Code, this clause has been
liberally construed by the courts. The clause has two branches one branch
attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority and relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law,
the second branch is much more independent of the specific functions of the
council enumerated by law. It authorizes the enactment of ordinances necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property

14. OSG vs Ayala Land Corporation, G.R. No. 177056

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the
State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers,
namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon... payment of just compensation to
the owner.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties.

The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter's
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the
public access to said parking spaces for free.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of

parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police... power, since said prohibition
amounts to a taking of respondents' property without payment of just

15. Republic vs Gonzales, 199 SCRA 788 (1991)

Restriction on Police Power

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest
of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not.
under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. The determination as to what is a proper exercise of the police
power of a municipal corporation is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts. In this regard, the following have been found to be
valid exercises of police power: 1) an ordinance declaring a warehouse as a
public nuisance; 2) enactment of a zoning ordinance; and 3) the reservation of
land for street widening and parking lots.

16. LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805 (2000)

Effect of Code on registration of motor vehicles.

Municipal corporations indubitably now have the power to regulate the

operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof.
This power is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of
Transportation and Communication under Article 458(a)(3)(vi) of the Ixxal
Government Code. However, the newly delegated powers only pertain to the
franchising and regulatory powers previously exercised by the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board and not the functions of the
Land Transportation Office relative to the registration of motor vehicles and
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.

17. Tan Toco vs Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil 52 (1926)

The movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for

governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a
judgment against the municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the
character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The
necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the
municipality be exempt from execution.

18. City of Quezon vs. Lexber Incorporated, 354 SCRA 493 (1992)

Power to enter into contracts.

The chief executive of a local government unit may enter into contracts on
behalf of the latter. However, the chief must secure prior authorization from
the local sanggunian. Moreover, a legible copy of the contract must be posted
at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or
barangay hall.

19. Frivaldo vs COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 (1989)

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements which must be

possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office, but also during entire tenure.

Notably, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that
the citizenship requirement need not be complied with prior to election but
may be possessed on the day the candidate assumes office.

The Court reasoned that qualifications under Section 39(a) of the Code refer to
elective officials and not candidates.
20. Labo vs COMELEC, 176 SCRA (1989)

Effect of disqualification of winner of election.

It is a fundamental idea of republican forms of government that no one can be

declared elected unless he receives a majority of legal votes in the election The
exception is where the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the other candidate. In such case,
the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes
by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes
may be deemed elected.

21. Borja vs COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998)

“Three consecutive terms” defined.

It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an

elective local office for the disqualification in Section 43(b) to apply. He must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times.
Involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity
of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

22. Latasa vs COMELEC, 417 SCRA 601 (2003)

Effect of conversion of municipality to city.

the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that
of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor
for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he
held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of
Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over
the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

23. Recabo vs COMELEC, 308 SCRA 794 (1999)

Substitution of candidate.

Only an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party can be

substituted. A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed
any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
a candidate at all. There can be no valid substitution for the latter, much in the
same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied
due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. Likewise, where the
position sought to be substituted for was filled by another candidate who
filed his certificates of candidacy for the same party and for the same
position, the other certificate can be cancelled as there was no void to fill.

24. Fariñas vs Barba, 256 SCRA 396 (1996).

The “local chief executive" under Section 45(c) of the Code refers to those
persons enumerated under Section 45(a)(1) to (3). Implicit in these provisions is
a policy to vest in the President, the governor and the mayor in descending
order the exercise of an executive power whether to appoint in order to fill
vacancies in local councils or to suspend local officials. These provisions are in
pari materia with Section 45.

the phrase "sanggunian concerned" in §45(c) should more properly be

understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This
is in keeping with the policy implicit in section 45(a) (3).

Nature of appointing power under Section 45(c).

The appointing authority is limited to the appointment of those recommended

to him The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended
to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of appointment is a
discretionary power. On the other hand, neither is the appointing power vested
with so large a discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the
Sanggunian concerned. Since the recommendation takes the place of
nomination by political party, the recommendation must likewise be
considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by
analogy to the provision of Section 45(b).

There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay.

Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be
made by the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason
is that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party

25. Tatel vs. Virac, 207 SCRA 157 (1991)

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and
basic principles of a substantive nature.

These principles require that a municipal ordinance

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

26. Villacorta vs Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 (1986)



It is a general rule, that ordinances regulating subjects, matters, and things on

which there is a general law of the state must be in harmony with that state law,
and in any conflict between an ordinance and a statute the latter must prevail,
unless under the statutes or law of the state the ordinance plainly and
specifically is given predominance in a particular instance or as to a particular
subject matter. The central question is not whether the legislature intended to
grant authority to municipalities to act concerning a particular matter, but
whether the legislature intended to deny municipalities the right to legislate on
the subject.

27. Gordon vs Veridiano, 167 SCRA 51 (1988)

A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by
the FDA is a condition precedent to the grant of a mayor's permit to the drug
store seeking to operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is
imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the drug store is
conformable to the national policy and the laws on the regulation of drug sales
belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not
previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity.
This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayor's permit is mandatory
once it is shown that the FDA has licensed the operation of the applicant drug
store. This is not a necessary consequence. For while it may appear that the
applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and policies, this fact
alone will not signify compliance with the particular conditions laid down by
the local authorities like zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety
regulations, and other municipal ordinances enacted under the general welfare
clause. This compliance still has to be ascertained by the mayor if the permit is
to be issued by his office. Should he find that the local requirements have not
been observed, the mayor must then, in the exercise of his own authority under
the charter, refuse to grant the permit sought.

The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly

granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by
the authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place.
Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store
has complied with the requirements of the general laws and the implementing
administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA
may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon
his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to
Olongapo City have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such
conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.

Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on the ground that the
compliance with the conditions laid down and found satisfactory by the FDA
when it issued its license is in his own view not acceptable. This very same
principle also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not revoke its license on the
ground that the conditions laid down in the mayor's permit have been violated
notwithstanding that no such finding has been made by the mayor.

In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by
the FDA for violation of its own conditions, which it certainly had the primary
power to enforce. By revoking the mayor's permit on the same ground for
which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already been penalized by the FDA,
the mayor was in effect reversing the derision of the latter on a matter that came
under its jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws
which the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had no
authority to interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them for
the decision already made by the FDA

28. Acebedo Optical Company vs. CA, 329 SCRA 315 (2000)

Regulation of Profession

Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do

business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular
profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second
is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular
profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to
engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license,
on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the
practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is
a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not
purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate
body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly
licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

29. Zamora vs Caballero, 419 SCRA 384 (2004)

Effect of lack of quorum.

A sanggunian is a collegial body Legislation, which is the principal function

and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of members so that they
may not only represent the interests of their respective constituents but also
help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put upon the
body. The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of
the legal provisions are null and void. These acts cannot be given binding force
and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized

Power of court to determine compliance.

Courts have jurisdiction to determine compliance of Sanggunians with the

quorum requirement. In doing so, the court is called upon to determine
whether the Sanggunian complied with the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules.

30. Delos Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan, 280 SCRA 631 (1997)

Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the
approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes
his signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous.

Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the
Local Chief Executive. Contrary to petitioner’s belief, the grant of the veto
power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an
ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords
the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in
the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian,
which may proceed to reconsider the same.

The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds

(2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or resolution
effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the
concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or
resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of
judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
31. Moday vs CA, 268 SCRA 586 (1997)

Review power of sangguniang panlalawigan.

Section 153 of Batas Pambansa Big 337 grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
the power to declare a municipal resolution or ordinance invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the lower sanggunian or Mayor to issue.
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. If a provincial board
passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council
or president. This case is still good law as the provision was left substantially

32. Aguinaldo vs Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992)

The quantum of proof required in suspension or removal from office through

an administrative case is only substantial evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

33. Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601 (2002)

Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
xxx xxx

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds

enumerated above by order of the proper court.

It is clear from the last paragraph of the afore-cited provision that the penalty
of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed
only by a court of law.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to

remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may
alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government
Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they
implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with
the statute is a nullity

34. Salalima vs Guingona, 257 SCRA 55 (1996)

“Final and executory” defined.

The Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal as it specifically allows a
party to appeal to the Office of the President. The phrases “final and executory,"
and “final or executory" in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the Local
Government Code, are not indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the
decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the
administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions.
The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless
appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be.

“[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials,
since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly
provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.”

35. Morfe vs Mutuc, 22 SCRA 439 (1968)

Applicability of due process clause.

While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as
such not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can
be no disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution, the mantle of protection offered by due process
could rightfully be invoked.

36. Morales vs CA, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post.

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is

simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.

In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be

condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to
administrative offenses: xxx …"

37. Ombudsman vs Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017

Considering that the present case was instituted prior to the above-cited ruling of this
Court, the doctrine of condonation may still be applied.

Doctrine of Condonation

The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-
elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. In Giron v.
Ochoa,38 the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public
officer who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the
body politic electing the person to another office is the same. Thus, the Court

On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court
agrees with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the
condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in
Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of
removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective official's re-
election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the
right to remove him therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate,
who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their
right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who
elected him to another office, was the same.

From the above ruling of this Court, it is apparent that the most important
consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact that the misconduct was
done on a prior term and that the subject public official was eventually re-
elected by the same body politic. It is inconsequential whether the said re-
election be on another public office or on an election year that is not
immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the
public official be the same. In this case, the respondent was re-elected as mayor
by the same electorate that voted for him when the violation was committed.
As such, the doctrine of condonation is applied and the CA did not err in so

38. Province of Batangas vs Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004

In the case of Province of Batangas v. Romulo. These resolutions imposed

guidelines such that the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
could not be released to the local government units without the Oversight
Committee's prior approval The guidelines required: a) the local government
units to identify the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down
by the Oversight Committee, b) the local government units to submit their
project proposals to the Department of Interior and Local Government for
appraisal; c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the Department
of Interior and Local Government to be submitted to the Oversight Committee
for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval thereof that the
Oversight Committee would direct the Department of Budget and
Management to release the funds for the projects.

The Court ruled that the entire process involving the distribution and release
of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. It noted that the LGSEF is part
of the internal revenue allotment or "just share" of the LGUs in the national
taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing
rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001
and the resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the
constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the local
government units “shall be automatically released to them.

39. Mandanas vs Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018

One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards
decentralization of government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two
facets, the administrative and the fiscal. Fiscal autonomy means that local
governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in
addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities. Such autonomy is as indispensable to
the viability of the policy of decentralization as the other.

Municipal corporations, being the mere creatures of the State, are subject to the
will of Congress, their creator. Their continued existence and the grant of their
powers are dependent on the discretion of Congress. On this matter, Judge John
F. Dillon of the State of Iowa in the United States of America enunciated in Merriam
v. Moody's Executors11 the rule of statutory construction that came to be oft-
mentioned as Dillon's Rule, to wit:

[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers
and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily
implied or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those
absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-
not simply convenient but indispensible; fourth, any fair doubt as to the
existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation-against
the existence of the powers

40. Javier vs Cadiao

The Vice Governor, as the Presiding Officer, shall be considered a part of the SP
for purposes of ascertaining if a quorum exists. In determining the number
which constitutes as the majority vote, the Vice Governor is excluded. The Vice
Governor's right to vote is merely contingent and arises only when there is a tie
to break.