Case Digest - Statcon - 1ST Set of Cases

(US VS KEPNER) GR No.
L-571, October 11, 1902
FACTS:
 KEPNER was brought to trial in the Court of First Instance of Manila on the charge of estafa, and after a
full hearing of the case he was acquitted.
 The prosecuting attorney took an appeal to this court by virtue of the provisions of General Orders, No.
58, sections 43, 44, et seq
 KEPNER asks that the appeal so taken be dismissed on the ground that the Government is "not entitled
to an appeal from a finding of not guilty and a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case and that that portion
of the "Philippine Bill" recently passed by Congress which secures a defendant against more than one
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
ISSUE/S:
1.) WHETHER OR NOT KEPNER HAS BEEN PLACED ONCE IN JEOPARDY BY HIS TRIAL AND ACQUITTAL
IN THE LOWER COURT?
2.) WHETHER OR NOT AN APPEAL IS CONSIDERED A VIOLATION ON PROHIBITION OF DOUBLE

JEOPARDY IN PHILIPPINE BILL?
RULING:
NO. KEPNER has not been placed in jeopardy by his trial and acquittal in the lower court, hence, the
appeal cannot be considered as violation on the prohibition of double jeopardy.
HENCE, court is of the opinion that respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal taken by the Government
must be DENIED.
REASONING:
The prohibition stated on the Philippine Bill against double Jeopardy is not present in this case because to
be in jeopardy in the legal sense it is not sufficient that the danger should have begun. It must also have ended
before the plea can be made effectual. Jeopardy is not the peril of more than one trial, but the peril of more than
one punishment, and in the same proceeding there can be no danger of a second punishment until the first has
been finally adjudged.
Considering the decisions of any court as completion of double jeopardy will contradict the protection and
right against an illegal and improper judgment, hence, in the form of an appeal, the decision which is prejudicial to
the accused can be modified, corrected, and set aside. Noteworthy, Judgments of Courts of First Instance in felony
cases (except those for capital offenses) final unless an appeal has been taken either by the Attorney-General or
the accused. So then, so now: Once a criminal cause is before the court, whether on appeal or on review, the
judgment may be changed, altered, or reversed as to the appellate tribunal may seem proper.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 1 of 53

(RAMON DIOKNO VS REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION) G.R. No. L-4712, July 11, 1952
FACTS:
 DIOKNO is a holder of a backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 of a face value of P75,857.14 dated August 30, 1948.
 DIOKNO has an outstanding loan P 50,000 with RFC which was contracted on 27 Jan. 1950 covered by a
mortgage on his property w/ interest at 4% per annum, of which P47, 355.28 was still unpaid.
 RFC did not accept the backpay certificate as payment of DIOKNO, hence this case.
RFC RESISTS THIS CASE:

1.) That DIOKNO’s demand is not authorized by the abovementioned law because the law permits only
"acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans.
2.) Assuming that the demands was authorized, RFC has no availability of loanable funds – DIOKNO
insists otherwise.
THE COURT A QUO:

1.) Held that section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely, and that even if where mandatory,
plaintiff's case cannot fall thereunder because he is not acquiring property for a home or construing
a residential house, but compelling the acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a debt he
contracted after the enactment of Republic Act No. 304. It, therefore, dismissed the complaint with
costs.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER NOT RFC IS COMPELLED TO ACCEPT THE BACKPAY CERTIFICATE OF DIOKNO AS

PAYMENT TO HIS OUTSTANDING LOAN IN CONNECTION TO SECTION 2 OF R.A. 304?
The appeal involves the interpretation of section 2 of Republic Act No. 304, which provides:
. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or
controlled by the Government shall, (1) subject to the availability of loanable funds, and
any provision of the their charters, articles of incorporation's, by-laws, or rules and regulations
to the contrary notwithstanding, accept or discount at (2) not more than two per centum per
annum for ten years such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the acquisition of real
property for use as the applicant's home, or (2) the building or construction of the residential
house of the payee of said certificate: . . .
RULING:
NO. RFC is not compelled to accept the backpay certificate of DIOKNO because the law specifically
provides that the acceptance is subject to availability of funds wherein the determination of it is not within the control
of the congress, hence the refusal of RFC to accept the certificate due to non-availability of funds was lawful.
HENCE, the Court dismiss this appeal.
REASONING:
The abovementioned law is not absolutely mandatory because it has two modifiers which are (1) accept or
discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years, this modifier could be construed as mandatory
since the congress intention is to protect the interest of the people. While the second modifier (1) subject to the
availability of loanable funds, is not mandatory and compelling, because the acceptance of a backpay certificate is
on the condition which is under the prerogative of RFC.

DIOKNO avers that RFC has the availability of loanable funds at the time he de paid his load using his
backpay certificate. RFC refuted it and stands that the summation of funds of RFC cannot be intended all for the
implementation of the R.A. 304 because RFC is created to carry out various function that needed funds so in order
to carry out those, RFC needed to allocate and appropriate their funds. Thus, the determination of availability of
loanable funds rests on RFC and not in Congress. With this the DIOKNO’s point is not meritorious.
SEC. 2. Corporate powers. — The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation shall have the power:
(a) To grant loans for home building and for the rehabilitation, establishment or development of any
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprise, including public utilities;
(b) To grant loans to provincial, city and municipal governments for the rehabilitation, construction or
reconstruction of public markets, waterworks, toll bridges, slaughterhouses, and other self-liquidating
or income-producing services;
(c) To grant loans to agencies and corporations owned or controlled by the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines for the production and distribution of electrical power, for the purchase and subdivision
of rural and urban estates, for housing projects, for irrigation and waterworks systems, and for other
essential industrial and agricultural enterprises;
(d) To grant loans to cooperative associations to facilitate production, the marketing of crops, and the
acquisition of essential commodities;
(e) To underwrite, purchase, own, sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of stocks, bonds, debentures,
securities and other evidences of indebtedness issued for or in connection with any project or enterprise
referred to in the proceeding paragraphs;
(f) To issue bonds, debentures, securities, collaterals, and other obligations with the approval of the
President, but in no case to exceed at any one time an aggregate amount equivalent to one hundred
per centum of its subscribed capital and surplus. . . .

ARNEL P. MISOLAS VS HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990
FACTS:



ISSUE/S:
RULING:
REASONING:
CORTES, J.:
This petition for certiorari ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the
respondent judge who denied petitioner's motion to quash the information filed against him as well as his motion for
reconsideration.
The case brings into focus our laws on subversion and subversion-related offenses.
The controversy arose from the following facts:
After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's Army (NPA) were
resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided said house in the early morning of August 8, 1987. Three persons were inside
the house, petitioner and two women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women were able
to escape in the confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a
pillow allegedly used by petitioner a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and four live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner
was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters. On September 4, 1987, an information charging petitioner with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal.
The information alleged that the firearm and ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the
offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which provides:
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
However, a few days later, the same counsel (also his counsel in this petition) filed a motion to withdraw the plea
on the ground that there was basis for the filing of a motion to quash. Respondent judge gave petitioner time to file
a motion to quash.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
(1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the information does not charge the
proper offense since from the allegations the offense that may be charged is either subversion or rebellion;
and
(2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because of violations of his
constitutional rights, i.e, his arrest and the seizure of the firearm and ammunition were illegal.
Respondent judge denied the motion to quash for lack of merit in an order dated January 7, 1988. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, but such was denied on February 15, 1988.
Hence, this petition.
1. The petition, reiterating the grounds alleged in the motion to quash, centers on the argument that the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms and ammunition committed

in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, should be
stricken down as unconstitutional. In the words of petitioner:
Unconstitutional because it is violative of the due process clause, particularly substantive due process against
arbitrary laws. Arbitrary because it disregards the overwhelming weight of national as well as international laws and
jurisprudence behind the Hernandez (99 Phil. 515) and Geronimo (100 Phil. 90) rulings on the doctrine of absorption
of common crimes in rebellion.
If murder is absorbed in rebellion, with more reason should illegal possession of firearms be absorbed in rebellion
and for that matter subversion.
While it is true that subversion is an entirely different and distinct crime from rebellion, both are recognized as
political offenses. So much so that in the Guidelines for the Grant of Pardon to Political Detainees/Prisoners, the
latter are defined as those charged detained or imprisoned for rebellion or subversion, among others.
The idea of absorption of illegal possession of firearms in subversion is also bolstered by the fact that in Republic
Act 1700, as amended, subversion or its penalty is qualified when the subversive "takes up arms against the
Government."
It cannot be said that P.D. No. 1866 is an exception to the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings. On the contrary, it is
the other way around by virtue of the overwhelming weight of national as well as international laws and jurisprudence
which form part of the law and legal system of the land.
xxx xxx xxx
... an armed subversive or rebel is to be distinguished from a common criminal illegally possessing a firearm. The
former should be charged with subversion or rebellion, absorbing his illegal possession of firearm. His illegal
possession of firearm is not the main thing. It is only incidental to his involvement in subversion or rebellion. (Petition,
pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Republic Act No. 1700, as amended, provides in Section 4 that "if such member [of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive association] takes up arms against the Government, he shall
be punished by prision mayor to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the Revised
Penal Code." Thus, given the particular facts of the case, petitioner could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or
R.A. No. 1700. But as bluntly pointed out by petitioner:
. . . It is a matter of public knowledge that the military has even admitted its policy or practice of charging armed
subversives or rebels with "qualified" illegal possession of firearms instead of subversion or rebellion for two
reasons: (1) the former is easier to prosecute than the latter, and (2) the former has a higher penalty than the latter.
[Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 6].
Undeniably, it is easier to prove that a person has unlawfully possessed a firearm and/or ammunition under P.D.
No. 1866 than to establish that he had knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliated himself with, became or
remained a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive organization

under R.A. No. 1700, as conviction under the latter "requires that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party' [People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27,
1972, 48 SCRA 382].
However, that the same act may be penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered
highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused, will not necessarily call for the invalidation of
the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 which provides for the higher penalty.
Neither would the doctrines enunciated by the Court in Hernandez and Geronimo, and People v. Rodriguez [107
Phil. 659] save the day for petitioner.
In Hernandez, the accused were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery while
in Geronimo, the information was for the complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery and kidnapping. In those
two cases the Court held that aforestated common crimes cannot be complexed with rebellion as these crimes
constituted the means of committing the crime of rebellion. These common crimes constituted the acts of "engaging
in war" and "committing serious violence" which are essential elements of the crime of rebellion [See Arts. 134-135,
Revised Penal Code] and, hence, are deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Consequently, the accused can
be held liable only for the single crime of rebellion.
On the other hand, in Rodriguez, the Court ruled that since the accused had already been charged with rebellion,
he can no longer be charged for illegal possession of firearms for the same act of unauthorized possession of firearm
on which the charge of rebellion was based, as said act constituted the very means for the commission of rebellion.
Thus, the illegal possession of the firearm was deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
However, in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition under P.D. 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in
Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriquez find no application in this case.
Even the dictum in Hernandez that,
... national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot
be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the crime, to justify the imposition of the
greater penalty. [At 541.]
which petitioner relies on, cannot find application in this case considering that the Legislature had deemed it fit to
provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. No. 1866) and (2)
subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. No. 1700), which the Legislature has
the power to do. The practical result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances
similar to those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power
to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into as it would be in derogation of the principle of separation
of powers. In the words of Chief Justice Fernando:

xxx xxx xxx
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity
and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is
well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuazon: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." There can be no objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do
not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not
they are wise or salutary." For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and ..., never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute
invalid. That is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective
authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be the
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy
of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provisions likewise insofar as there
may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained. [Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-2038
id. January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451].
Then, that P.D. No. 1866 was enacted by deposed former President Marcos (pursuant to his law-making powers
under the 1973 Constitution) is not by itself a legal argument for its invalidation. The 1987 Constitution expressly
provides that "[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." [Art.
XVIII, Sec. 3].
The remedy lies with the present Legislature to correct the situation through remedial legislation if it finds a failure
of logic and reason in the existing statutes on political offenses.
. . . If remedial measures are deemed necessary, let Congress provide the same. Courts have no authority to grant
relief against the evils that may result from the operation of unwise or imperfect legislation, unless its flaw partakes
of the nature of a constitutional infirmity ... Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, Palawan, G.R. No. L-20125,
July 20,1965,14 SCRA 660, 666].
That the facts charged comply with the elements of the offense penalized in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 is not disputed. But petitioner asserts that the nature of his alleged acts requires that he be charged with
subversion or with rebellion instead of qualified illegal possesion of firearms and ammunition, perhaps in view of the
lower penalty for subversion and rebellion. Quashal of the information cannot be had on this ground, the matter of
what offense to charge in the information being within the prosecutor's sound discretion. As the Court stated in the
case of People v. Pineda [G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748]:
. . . The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal.
The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by the facts brought about by an inquiry made by
him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal

who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail.
In this regard, he ordinarily cannot be subject to dictation. . . . [At 756].
In sum, petitioner's case for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 is wanting in legal basis.
In this separate opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento espouses the view that P.D. No. 1866 should be struck down as
unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.
Initially, it must be pointed out that the petition never challenged P.D. No. 1866 on that ground. As discussed earlier,
petitioner objected to P.D. 1866 on the ground of substantive due process. Established rules of constitutional
litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the theory that P.D. No. 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. It
must also be noted that while petitioner challenges only the third paragraph of section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, Mr. Justice
Sarmiento would have the other portions of the law invalidated. Again, this is impermissible.
But even if a challenge on the ground that P.D. 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately considered, it will
still be met with little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, supra, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act
which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of
attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and
the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential [Id. at pp. 395-397; 400-401]. P.D. No.
1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the
decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying
circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine
after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal
possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established
also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require.
The presumption of constitutionality attaches to legislative acts [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Morfe
v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 425]. Before a statute or a portion thereof may be declared
unconstitutional, "it must be shown that the statute violates the constitution clearly, palpably plainly, and in such a
manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court." [SINCO PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 525
(11th ed., 1960, citing Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 147; also quoted in Alba v. Evangelists, 100 Phil. 683 (1957)].
"Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication." [Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30,
55]., Absent a clear showing that the challenged measure ousts the courts from the function of passing upon the
question of guilt or innocence of the accused and an unequivocal demonstration that P.D. No. 1866, by legislative
fiat, declares the petitioner guilty of a crime and imposes directly the penalty prescribed thereunder, the challenge
will have to be rejected.
Neither can the Court strike down P.D. No. 1866 for snowing the possibility of a second jeopardy, as Mr. Justice
Sarmiento suggests. It must be pointed out that at the time this petition was filed, there had been no previous
conviction, acquittal or dismissal. Hence, the question of a second or double jeopardy does not arise. This is
manifest from the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
[Art. III.]
More particularly, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without Ms express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
The right against double jeopardy is a matter which the accused may raise in a motion to quash [Sec. 3(h) Rule
117]. But, precisely, petitioner's motion to quash flied in the trial court did not raise the issue of double jeopardy
because it had not arisen. The Court cannot anticipate that the opportunity for a second jeopardy will still arise if he
is acquitted or convicted as charged under P.D. 1866.
Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No. 1866 will not be rendered
unconstitutional. That an accused will be exposed to double jeopardy if he is prosecuted under another law is not a
ground to nullify that law. Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat a subsequent
prosecution or conviction for the same offense.
2. The thrust of petitioner's contention that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person is that
his constitutional rights against unlawful arrest and unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. He
asserts that he was arrested in contravention of the clear provisions on arrests in the Revised Rules of Court. He
concludes that since his arrest was unlawful, the search pursuant thereto which yielded the shotgun and the live
rounds of ammunition was also illegal.
When the case was assigned to the ponente, she had intended to consider and to resolve this issue, it having been
squarely raised in the petition. However, in an unexpected turn of events, petitioner filed a Manifestation dated
September 18, 1989, wherein he averred:
1. He has filed a bond in the trial court and the same was approved on September 14, 1989.
2. He is well aware that the filing of a bail bond has the effect of waiving the right to question the irregularity of
an arrest (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).
3. Be that as it may, the irregularity of the arrest was only a secondary issue in the instant Petition. The principal
issue is still the unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 insofar as it penalizes

illegal possession of firearms 'in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion'.
The Court takes this to mean that petitioner is submitting the case for decision on the sole issue that P.D. No. 1866
is unconstitutional and is abandoning the issue of the legality of the search and his arrest.
In view thereof, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the second issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of petitioner's failure to clearly and unequivocally establish that the third paragraph of Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866 violates the Constitution, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan. C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino
and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento's dissent, with these additional brief observations. As I submitted in Guazon v. De Villa,
G.R. No. 80508, we should not unreasonably inhibit ourselves on technical grounds when a constitutional question
is presented to us for resolution. An unconstitutional act is illegal per se and must be slain on sight. It should not be
reprieved simply because it has not been properly challenged, to be struck down only if and when all the formal
requirements are satisfied. If and when. In the meantime, the lawless act continues to corrode the Constitution, and
all because we have refused to act.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
It perplexes me why this dissent should first of all merit what appears to be repartees from the majority. I am but
casting a contrary vote, which, after all, is in performance of a constitutional duty.1
I am also concerned at how this case has journeyed from ponente to ponente and opinion to opinion, which, rather
than expedited its resolution, has delayed it-at the expense of the accused-petitioner.
I was originally assigned to write the decision in this case, and as early as June, 1989, I was ready. On June 14,
1989, I started circulating a decision granting the petition and declaring Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1878-A, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Meanwhile, Madame Justice Irene
Cortes disseminated a dissent. By July 18, 1989, my ponencia had been pending in the office of the Chief Justice
for promulgation. It carried signatures of concurrence of eight 2 Justices (including mine), a slim majority, but a

majority nonetheless. Five Justices, on the other hand, joined Justice Cortes in her dissent. The Chief Justice did
not sign the decision on his word that he was filing a dissent of his own.
Subsequently, and as events would soon unfold quickly and dramatically, the Chief Justice returned my decision to
the Court en banc, and declared that unless somebody changed his mind, he was promulgating my decision. Justice
Edgardo Paras, who was one of the eight who had stamped their imprimatur on my decision, indicated that he did
not want to "clip the wings of the military" and that he was changing his mind. This sudden reversement under the
circumstances surrounding its manifestation, took me aback for which I strongly voiced my protest for a case
(although the majority is very slim) that I had thought was a settled matter.
I am aware that similar events in the Supreme Court are nothing uncommon. The following are the ringing words of
my distinguished colleague, Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, but they could just as well have been mine, as far
as the instant controversy is concerned, and I could not have put it any better:
It has taken all of a year and four months to what, I hope, will see the final disposition of this case, notwithstanding
periodic reminders for an earlier resolution. It is this delay that has caused me a great deal of concern. It is, to me,
a crying example of justice delayed and is by no means "much ado about nothing," ... Nor is the question involved
"none too important." ... The bone of contention is whether or not a criminal complaint, which is an offense against
the State, may be dismissed on the basis of an amicable settlement between the complainant and the accused,
who is a public officer.
As assigned initially, I was to prepare the opinion of the Court. My original "ponencia" annulling the Order of
respondent Municipal Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu dismissing the criminal case against respondent Mayor Emiliano
Caruncho, granting the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, and ordering respondent Municipal Judge to reinstate
and proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal case against respondent Mayor without further delay, was
circulated beginning July 30, 1982. 3
The following is my dissenting opinion based mainly on my original ponencia.
I hold to be unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1866, "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE. DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION
OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR
RELEVANT PURPOSES," specifically, sections 1 and 3 thereof, thus:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition or
Instruments used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms and Ammunition. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor. 4
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess handgrenade(s) rifle grenade(s) and other
explosives, including but not limited to "pillbox bombs", molotov cocktail bombs", "firebombs", or other incendiary
devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.
Any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of the
aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or
persons shall be punished with the penalty of death.
If the violation of this Section is ill furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, or director or other responsible officer of ally public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violation the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. 5
I find, first and foremost, the law to be a bill of attainder the aforequoted provisions specifically, as it has been
defined, that is, "a legislative enactment which inflicts punishment without trial. 6 It is a bill of attainder so I submit,
because it presumes the accused, upon conviction, to be guilty as well-of the crimes (murder and homicide under
the second paragraph of Section One, and the rebellion, insurrection, and subversion under the third paragraph of
Section Three) that supposedly merely qualify the offense of "illegal possession" (or "illegal manufacture" as the
case may be) when the accused has not been tried and found guilty of either crimes in any judicial proceeding. In
the case at bar, the fact that the petitioner has been charged with illegal possession of firearms "in furtherance of
subversion" means that the petitioner has committed subversion, notwithstanding the fact that he is not standing
trial for subversion.
I am aware that this suit has been brought on the theory that the charge of "illegal possession" against the accused
supposedly offends the rulings in People v. Hernandez 7 People v. Geronimo 8 and People v. Rodriguez 9 and not,
rather, on the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended. It is my view, however, that the case
is nonetheless ripe for constitutional adjudication albeit the constitutional question has not been asserted. It has
indeed been held:
But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may
determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In Re Woolsey

[1984], 95 N.Y., 135,144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that
the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal.
(12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that is it the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional
question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to
a decision of the case. (McCabes Adm'x vs. Maysville & B.S.R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S.W., 892; Lohmeyer
vs. St. Louis Cordage Co., [1908]. 214 Mo., 685; 113 S.W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit co [1905],188 Mo.,
572; 87 S.W., 913.) 10
The fact that the accused has not been charged with the complex crime of subversion and illegal possession of
firearms (which can not be done) does not, to me, acquit the Decree. The fact that "in the present case, petitioner
is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. . " 11 to me,
makes a good scrabble game, but it is nothing else. There is no gainsaying the fact that the conviction of the
petitioner (assuming that the petitioner is convicted) under the statute, will carry with it the stain of subversion
although he had not been charged with subversion. This, so I submit, does violence to due process and the
constitutional guaranty against hazy accusations.12
I likewise find the law to be vague and in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Charter. It is vague because
it is unsure which offense to punish: Illegal Possession or Subversion. It states that subversion merely qualifies the
primary offense of "illegal possession" yet, if this is so, the accused may still be held guilty of subversion later.
However, if the accused has been found liable for illegal possession in furtherance of subversion, it means that he
is also guilty of subversion, which would clearly not require a subsequent prosecution.
The very efforts of this Court to make anything out of this strange animal have not been, so I submit, encouraging.
In one case, 13 a prosecution for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm used in parricide under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 9 (which sired Presidential Decree No. 1866), it was held that "[t]he offense of 'Illegal
Possession of Unlicensed Firearm used in Parricide" includes the lesser offense of Parricide." 14 If this were so,
then, subversion would have been an ingredient of "illegal possession". So also, conviction thereof should be an
abatement of any proceeding for the other, yet, in a subsequent ruling, 15 it was said that "illegal possession" used
in the commission of homicide "does not operate to extinguish [any] criminal liability for" homicide. Apparently, as
the state of the law stands now, "illegal possession" (or "manufacture") does not stop a later prosecution for
subversion (or murder or homicide), (as Tangan tells us) but just as apparently, we would have made possible a
prosecution for a crime which constitutes but an element of the "primary offense" (as Lazaro tells us), possible.
Clearly, the statute allows the possibility of a double jeopardy. I submit that while double jeopardy is a matter of
defense, the fact alone that the law permits such a possibility is sufficient to assail it for breach of due process.
The fact that the accused has posted bail is of no moment. It would not have, for me, rescued the statute from
constitutional infirmity, notwithstanding the petitioner's "acceptance" (by posting bail) of the legality of the
proceedings against him.
Presidential Decree No. 1866, it has to be noted, was not passed by the regular legislature. It is one of the many
presidential issuances which had served the Marcos dictatorship, and served it well, as an instrument of repression
during the years of dissent and resistance. Because of it, many courageous freedom fighters perished or languished
in various places of detention throughout our country. It is unfortunate that this oppressive Presidential Decree has
been allowed to remain in our statute books after the apparatus of dictatorship had been dismantled and supposed
freedom attained, and sadly, it is still being used as incessantly as in the previous regime. It is an anachronism in
the broad democratic space or what little we have of it today. I am, accordingly, for striking the Decree down.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses
FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status
quo. Ligle do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their
framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from
applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners'
favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli
y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by
merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank.
The antecedent facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion,
then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or
up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February
5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.)
Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-
108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.)
Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No.
801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On
the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for
Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were
archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application
of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4)
1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by
the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In
a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No.
1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando
de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of
bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a
court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989
on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or
amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to

be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
May 26, 1989
Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:
This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular
No. 960 (1983).
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same
been repealed nor amended.
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system which
would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights
of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but
it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO

Director1
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to serve summons by publication
in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the
complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file
his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering
the latter:
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the
amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;
3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein
awarded;
5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
6. Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.

The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the trial
court in its decision as follows:
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to
escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding
Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he
was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by
publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising
Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however,
failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the
last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in
default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her
father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who
gave the following testimony:
Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has recently
transferred to Arellano University for her second year.
In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her
friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack
on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone
because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp.
2 to 5)
The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he
talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in
New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and who was with him in
his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)
The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's Pilipino. He then
invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave
her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant's house
along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged niece was not
outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the
alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen
to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because
his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with it, and
then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape
and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her
feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her
sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because there

were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt
more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ.
After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it,
Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely
presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could
not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)
After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and
he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she
presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood came
out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After
the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying.
The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time because
defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep.
Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30
to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit
and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had
rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it
looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three
times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was
inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet
nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed;
besides, all the windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would
hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police,
it was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the
defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept
with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes
after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not
know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened
the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was
covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he
put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the
door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also
spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She cried:
"Maawa no po kayo so akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!" Somebody heard
her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was "istorbo". Karen
pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep
but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time
sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always
kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7,
1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about

8:30 — 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second
time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did
not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After
shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and
she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they
will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom
to the room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call for the
police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing
a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help
because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes,
and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police
that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear
people conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked
repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the
door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why she
was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform
and the defendant was talking to them. "Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen added. "The
policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode
the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of
her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-
Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived,
followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second
floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement
she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal
officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day
when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer
has been marked as Exhibit B.
She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the incident but she
subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue,
because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for
transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit
Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The
reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore,
and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out
of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father
prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she
would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this
experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin
once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of
the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's
dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief
rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as
amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign
transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of
substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor
or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for
criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their
wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit
account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have
the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted
by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by
way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section
113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim
from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants
exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself;
that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a
law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it
applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to
encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more
in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and
the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from
economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so
doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare
or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court

provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No.
6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall
be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central
Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor
Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of
Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so
in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of
these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can
only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions to
this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that
should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by
teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to
his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was
detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On
the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more
than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had
suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has
the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law,
therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As
stated by the trial court in its decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking
and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the
mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated
once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where
she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High
School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in
the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner
defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless
victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to
believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor
capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident
happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a
snake, . . . .4
If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for
foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the

victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he
is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a
shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was
enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not,
the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The
intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
It has thus been said that —
But I also know,5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man to
wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen
of their barbarous ancestors.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a
wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a
purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien. More
specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment
or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No.
960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or
tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the
forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor
the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of
Central Bank Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be

exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and
regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the
rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.

The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as amended by
P.D. 1246, thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits

authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well
as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other court
process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are
authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the
establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking
units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;
WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality
of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income
of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in
the Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such

foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the
vested rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency
deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the
Offshore Banking in the Philippines" (3rd Whereas).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No.
1034 are as follows:
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking

system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;

WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as
possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be

advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other
positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD. No. 1035. Its purposes
are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has

been authorized under a separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the

Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and
participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said
depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as
would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide
second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are
induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because
such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in
the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with
respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes. 6
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg
Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is

one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74
Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by
accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and
executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding
or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime?
This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214,
"Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners
the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 141855 February 6, 2001
ZACARIAS COMETA and HERCO REALTY & AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE FRANCO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 25, 19991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48277, entitled "Zacarias Cometa, et al. v. Non. Perfecto Laggui, et
al.," and the Resolution dated January 27, 20002 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent factual antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.
On July 2, 1976, the quondam Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 15 3 at Makati rendered a Decision in
Civil Case No. 17585 for Damages, entitled "Jose Franco v. Zacarias Cometa," awarding to herein private
respondent Jose Franco, the sum of P 57,396.85. 4
The judgment became final on March 9, 1978. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued. Pursuant thereto, the
sheriff levied on execution three (3) commercial lots of petitioner Zacarias Cometa 5 located at Guadalupe, Makati.
On October 17, 1978, two (2) of the lots were sold to respondent Franco at public auction for the amount of
P57,396.85. The sheriffs return was made on March 12, 1981.6
On November 17, 1981, petitioner Herco Realty & Agricultural Development Corporation (Herco) filed Civil Case
No. 43846 with the same CFI Rizal, Branch 15, to annul the levy on execution and sale at public auction of the real
properties.7 The complaint alleged that the ownership of the lots had been transferred by Cometa to Herco before
the execution sale. It assailed the validity of the levy and sale on the ground that the sheriff, in disregard of the
proper procedural practice, immediately proceeded against Cometa's real properties without first exhausting his
personal properties; that the lots were sold en masse and not by parcel; and that the said properties which are
commercial lots situated in Guadalupe, Makati, and are conservatively valued at P500,000.00, were sold only for
P57,396.85, the amount of the judgment.8
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1982, the same court, now designated as Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, issued an
order in Civil Case No. 17585 directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel petitioner Cometa's certificates of
title to the lots and to issue new ones in favor of respondent Franco. Cometa, who died during the pendency of the
proceedings, was substituted by his heirs, who filed before this Court a petition for certiorari questioning the said
order. The petition was, however, dismissed on February 28, 1983. 9
On May 13, 1983, Franco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 140, a motion for issuance of writ of
possession. Cometa opposed the motion on the ground that there was pending before another Regional Trial Court
an action for annulment of levy and sale of the properties in question. 10
On August 12, 1983, the trial court issued an order granting the motion; but the same was reconsidered and set
aside on November 18, 1983 on the ground that the issuance of the writ of possession was premature,11considering
that the RTC of Makati, Branch 60, had not yet decided the case filed by Herco and Cometa for the annulment of
the levy and sale of the properties.
Franco then instituted a special civil action for certiorari with this Court on June 27, 1984, but the case was referred
to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which subsequently reversed the ruling of the RTC, Branch 140, on October 4,
1984, and granted the issuance of the writ of possession' in Franco's favor.12
Cometa and Herco elevated their cause to this Court, where the same was docketed as G.R. No. L-69294 and
entitled, "Zacarias Cometa and Herco Realty and Agricultural Development Corporation v. IAC and Jose Franco."
In a Decision dated June 30, 1987,13 this Court reversed the appellate court and withheld the granting of the writ of
possession pending the promulgation of the resolution of the RTC, Branch 60, on the issue of whether or not the
levy and sale of Cometa's properties are valid. In the said judgment, this Court said:
In the case at bar, the validity of the levy and sale of the properties is directly put in issue in another case
by the petitioners. This Court finds it an issue which requires pre-emptive resolution. For if the respondent
acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled to its possession.

The respondent appellate court's emphasis on the failure of the petitioner to redeem the properties within
the period required by law is misplaced because redemption, in this case, is inconsistent with petitioner's
claim of invalidity of levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of the sale and
would estop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on that ground.14
Moreover, equitable considerations constrain us to reverse the decision of respondent court. The fact is
undisputed that the properties in question were sold at an unusually lower price than their true value.
Properties worth at least P500,000.00 were sold for only P57,396.85. We do not comment on the
consequences of the inadequacy because that is the very issue which confronts the court below in the
pending case. It appearing, however, that the issuance of the writ of possession would and might work
injustice because the petitioner might not be entitled thereto, we rule that it be withheld.
Thereafter, in Civil Case No. 43846, Branch 60 of the Makati RTC issued an order dated July 21, 1993 dismissing
the case on the ground of "lack of interest in the prosecution of the complaint" for failure of the representatives of
Corneta and Herco to appear.1âwphi1.nêt
The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July 16, 1996 and by this Court on January 20, 1997
in G.R. No. 126760. On February 26, 1997, this Court's Resolution which, in effect, upheld the validity of the assailed
levy and sale, became final and executory.
On May 2, 1997, Franco again filed, this time with Branch 60 of the RTC of Makati City, a motion for issuance of
writ of possession and cancellation of lis pendens. The heirs of Cometa opposed the motion claiming that they
intended to redeem the properties.
On December 4, 1997, Cometa's heirs consigned with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Makati City, the sum
of P38,761.05 as purchase price for the lots, plus interest of P78,762.69 and P1,175.25 as realty tax.
On June 8, 1998, Branch 60 of the Makati City RTC issued an order 15 which reads in part as follows:
6.2. With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 43846, did HERCO and the HEIRS still have the right to redeem?
xxx xxx xxx
11. What may be inferred from the aforesaid decisions (except Sumerariz v. DBP) is that the running of the
period of redemption is suspended if the validity of the sale is questioned at any time within the said period
of redemption.
12. When the validity of the sale is questioned after the period of redemption has expired, the rule that the
filing of the action questioning such validity suspends the running of the period for redemption no longer
applies. This is only logical - for there would no longer be any period to be suspended - it has already
expired. Where the sale is declared void in such action, there would be no right of redemption to speak of
thereafter; for legally speaking, there was no sale at all. Avoid sale would be inconsistent with a right of
redemption. For in such case, the buyer has not acquired any right over the property sold to him. Hence,
there is nothing that could be redeemed by the owner of the property.
13. The certificate of sale of the two (2) lots was registered and annotated in the corresponding certificates
of title on January 25, 1980. The period of redemption expired twelve (12) months thereafter (Section 30,
Rule 39, Rules of Court) - or on January 20, 1981. Civil Case No. 43846 was filed on November 27, 1981 -
or more than ten (10) months after the period of redemption expired. Hence, when Civil Case No.43846
was filed, there was no longer any period of redemption that could be suspended.
xxx xxx xxx

23.3 Accordingly:
23.3.1. The Officer-in-Charge [is ordered] to issue the corresponding writ of possession over the lots
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 113114 and 113115 in favor of JOSE FRANCO.
Dissatisfied, Cometa's heirs and Herco filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 48227, asserting that –
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING NO LESS THAN THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECLARATION IN COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT THAT
COMETA STILL HAS A RIGHT TO REDEEM.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING COMETA'S REDEMPTION

IN THAT EVEN ABSENT THE SUPREME COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT IN COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, COMETA WOULD STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM UNDER SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING COMETA'S REDEMPTION

IN THAT AT THE VERY LEAST THE LAW RESOLVES ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE RIGHT TO
REDEEM.
The appellate court's 10th Division thereafter promulgated a Decision dated January 25, 1999, 16 affirming the order
of respondent presiding Judge of Branch 60, Makati City RTC, and denying due course to the petition.
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was likewise denied by a Special Division of Five Justices.
Hence, this petition for review on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE

DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT OR HAS DECIDED IT NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THAT: -
A. COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT

COMETA STILL HAS A RIGHT TO REDEEM.
B. EVEN ABSENT THE PRONOUNCEMENT IN COMETA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, COMET A WOULD STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM UNDER SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE.
C. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE LAW RESOLVES ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE RIGHT TO
REDEEM.
Considering the pleadings filed by the parties, this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of memoranda, give
due course to the petition and decide the same.
The questions raised by petitioners can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not petitioners can still
redeem the properties subject of this litigation.

In ruling in the negative, the appellate court opined, among others, that -
Section 30, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is very explicit: "(t)he judgment debtor or redemptioner
may redeem the property from the purchaser at any time within twelve (12) months after the sale, xxx."
(italics ours) In the case at bar, the sale took place on October 17, 1978. The Certificate of Sale was
registered and annotated on the TCT Nos. S-79894 and 79895 on January 25, 1980. The Officer's Final
Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Franco on March 2, 1981. Petitioners questioned the validity of the
sale only on November 27, 1981 or more than three (3) years after the said sale. We agree with respondent
judge that "(w)hen the validity of the sale is questioned after the period of redemption has expired, the rule
that the finding of the action questioning such validity suspends the running of the redemption period, no
longer applies. This is only logical – for there would no longer be any period to be suspended - it has already
expired." We likewise agree that to still allow redemption "counted from February 26, 1997, when the
Resolution in G.R. L-126760 became final and executory xxx would give rise to mischievous legal
consequences. For this would be a device to revive a lost right of redemption. Under this theory, a party
who lost the right of redemption could just file an action to set aside the sale on the ground that it was a
nullity confident that if the action does not prosper, he would still be entitled to redeem thereafter. This could
not be validly done." xxx The failure of petitioners to redeem the properties after the expiration of the
redemption period vests title over the property to private respondent. 17 The Supreme Court has uniformly
ruled that redemption from execution sales under ordinary judgments pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court should be made within twelve (12) months 18 from the registration of the same
xxx."19 In Juan Mateo vs. The Court of Appeals and Severino Alberto, 99 Phil. 1042 (unreported), the High
Court categorically said that "(t)he right of redemption in execution sales being statutory, it must, to make it
effective, be exercised in the mode prescribed by the statute." We therefore find petitioners' invocation of
the liberal ruling of the Supreme Court on the exercise of the right to redemption to have neither factual nor
legal basis. The Court has no alternative but to apply Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the
letter.20
We disagree.
Paraphrasing what we trenchantly pointed out in Hermoso v. CA,21 we test a law by its result. A law should not be
interpreted so as to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular sense because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply them in servile
subservience to their language. More explicitly -
. . . we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation,
we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of the law," so we were warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."22 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While
we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the
reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to the "the spirit that vivifieth,"
to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
The spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within

the statute.Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.23
Stated differently, the legal perspective within which the right to redeem can still be availed of or not must be viewed
in the light of the dictum that the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat the right of redemption.24 In short, the
statute, being remedial, is to be construed liberally to effectuate the remedy and carry out its evident spirit and
purpose.25 Thus, the Court allowed parties in several cases to perfect their right of redemption even beyond the
period prescribed therefor.26 We can do no less vis-à-vis the prevailing facts of this case for the following reasons:
First, we are confronted with the grossly and patently iniquitous spectacle of petitioners being made to pay a money
judgment amounting to P57,396.85 with their two (2) parcels of prime land conservatively valued at that time at
P500,000.00, on account of the lapse of the period given for exercising their right – despite their apparent willingness
and ability to pay the money judgment. Although this was the very fact in issue in the second case, the gross
disparity of the money judgment to the value of the levied real properties was not lost on the Court when, .in Cometa
v. IAC,27 it said that –
Moreover, equitable considerations constrain us to reverse the decision of the respondent court
(Intemediate Appellate Court). The fact is undisputed that the properties in question were sold at an
unusually lower price than their true value. Properties worth at least P500,000.00 were sold for only
P57,396.85. We do not comment on the consequences of the inadequacy because that is the very issue
which confronts the court below in the pending case. It appearing, however, that the issuance of the writ of
possession would and might work injustice because the petitioner might not be entitled thereto, we rule that
it be withheld.
There is no question that petitioners were remiss in attending with dispatch to the protection of their interests as
regards the subject lots, and for that reason the case in the lower court was dismissed on a technicality and no
definitive pronouncement on the inadequacy of the price paid for the levied properties was ever made. In this regard,
it bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights as in this case. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.28
Such compelling justifications for taking exception to the general rule are strewn all over the factual landscape of
this case. Pertinently, in Dayag v. Canizares,29 we said that -
...where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. 30 xxx Given the foregoing, it seems
improper to nullify Young's motion on a mere technicality. Petitioner's averments should be given scant
consideration to give way to the more substantial matter of equitably determining the rights and obligations
of the parties. It need not be emphasized that rules of procedure must be interpreted in a manner that
will help secure and not defeat justice.31 (emphasis and italics supplied)
In short, since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided.32 Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving
the rights and obligations of the parties.33 It was thus towards this sacrosanct goal that this Court in the recent case
of Paz Reyes Aguam v. CA, et al.34 held:
. . . The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or
dispense justice35 "A litigation is not a game of technicalities."36 "Law suits unlike duels are not to be won
by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great

hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."37 Litigations must be decided on
their merits and not on technicality.38 Every' part)' litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.39. . . the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. 40 It is a far better and more
prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of
the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. (emphasis and italics ours)
Second, while there is no dispute that mere inadequacy of the price per se will not set aside a judicial sale of real
property, nevertheless, where the inadequacy of the price is purely shocking to the conscience, 41 such that the mind
revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it, 42 the same
will be set aside.43 Thus, in one case,44 the judicial sale of land worth P60,000.00 for P867.00 was considered
shocking to the conscience. So also, the sale of properties at around 10% of their values, as when a radio worth
P1,000.00 was sold for P100.00 and a matrimonial bed costing P500.00 was sold for P50.00, the price was held to
be grossly inadequate.45 How much more the judicial sale of two (2) prime commercial lots located in Guadalupe,
Makati, conservatively valued at P500,000.00 in 1987, to satisfy a money judgment of P57,396.85?
Third, the questionable manner in which the said lots were levied upon and sold at public auction has, likewise,
caught the attention of the Court. The manner of execution of money judgments is governed by Section 15, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, which was then in force, thus:
SEC. 15. Execution of money judgments. – The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by
levying on all the property, real and personal property of every name and nature whatsoever, and which
may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount
of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor or his
attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the
judgment and the accruing costs must be delivered to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and accruing costs, within the view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of
the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. xxx (emphasis and italics
supplied)
In relation to the foregoing, Section 21, also of Rule 39, provides that -
SEC. 21. How property sold on execution; Who may direct manner and order of sale. – All sales of property
under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder, between the hours of nine in the
morning and five in the afternoon. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution; no more
shall be sold. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots, they must be sold
separately; or, when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third person, he may require it to be
sold separately. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual delivery, it must be sold within
view of those attending the sale and in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price. The judgment
debtor, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which property, real or personal, shall be sold, when
such property shall consist of several known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage separately.
Neither the officer holding the execution nor his deputy can become a purchaser, nor be interested directly
or indirectly in any purchase at such sale. (emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the subject lots were sold en masse, not separately as above provided. The unusually low price
for which they were sold to the vendee, not to mention his vehement unwillingness to allow redemption therein, only
serves to heighten the dubiousness of the transfer.

Fourth, with regard to the applicability of prescription and laches, there can be no question that they operate as a
bar in equity. However, it must be pointed out that the question of prescription or laches can not work to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.46 As explicitly stated by this Court in Santiago v. Court of Appeals:47
As for laches, its essence is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 48 But there is, to be sure, no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches
is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to
defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.49 In the case under consideration, it would not only
be impractical but well-nigh unjust and patently iniquitous to apply laches against private respondent and
vest ownership over a valuable piece of real property in favor of petitioners . . . It is the better rule that
courts under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. 50 (Emphasis
provided)
Lastly, petitioners have demonstrated, albeit tardily, an earnest and sincere desire to redeem the subject properties
when Cometa's heirs, on December 4, 1997, consigned with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Makati, the sum
of P38,761.05 as purchase price for the lots, plus interest of P78,762.69 and P1,175.25 as realty tax. The rule on
redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property and the policy of the law is to aid
rather than defeat him in the exercise of his right of redemption. 51 Thus, we allowed parties in several cases to
perfect their right of redemption even beyond the period prescribed therefor.52
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 25, 1999,
which affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioners' right of redemption, as well as the subsequent Resolution dated
January 27, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 48227 entitled "Zacarias Cometa, et al. v. Ron. Pedro Laggui, et al.,"
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and another one hereby rendered ordering respondent Jose Franco to accept
the tender of redemption made by petitioners and to deliver the proper certificate of redemption to the
latter.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese
court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel
for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit
of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein,
the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer
living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between
the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage
was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she
be allowed to return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo
in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
"does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and
that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues
related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to
enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent
of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn
v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed
abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No.
227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),
but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As modified,
Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to
a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes
our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce
case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. 24 The
aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered
married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and enforcement of
the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,
respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter.
Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only,
the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the
ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction.
The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is
void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or
that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support
the Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce
decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound
by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino
spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband,
who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal
property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court
denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could
not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration
of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the
effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are
to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without
a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and
given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a
judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a
Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of

marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration
of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree
must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation
to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law,
which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be
given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling
will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the
Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. 37 "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or
her country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is
in the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code,
is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that
the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are
equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The
deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. 48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry,
the right to exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right
to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for
which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general
welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and
allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of
the President, which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly,
the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is
based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is

married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes
of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to
insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the
RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
"mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If
the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating
divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent
of crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, 58 that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law and fact,60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal,
irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages.
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one
case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children,
to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such
as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because
Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their exchange reveal as
follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage
the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned the issue of
divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant
an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by
virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon
him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the
latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"),
which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one
spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have
force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No.
386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116,711062,72 238073 and
602774 were filed in the House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was
submitted by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It was approved on
March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for
a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage
in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the marriage,
except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or
when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2) years, either or both spouses can
petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of
age or over but below twenty-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to
be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after
the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether
or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transitions from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to
enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon
marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State
will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as

policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion. 76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry
nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and
interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional
provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the
women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955
(prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by
R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate
to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her
to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of
such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few
of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation
of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication
and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect
people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that
not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought
to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. 87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the
divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree
of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove
the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written
act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither
was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as
her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations
are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join the dissent of J. Caguioa.
Caguioa, J., see dissenting opinion.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 192285, July 11, 2018
MATEO ENCARNACION (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: ELSA DEPLIAN-

ENCARNACION, KRIZZA MARIE D. ENCARNACION, LORETA ENCARNACION, CARMELITA E. STADERMAN,
CORAZON S. ENCARNACION, RIZALINA ENCARNACION-PARONG, VICTORIA ENCARNACION-DULA, MARIA
HELEN ENCARNACION-DAY, TERESITA ENCARNACION-MANALANG, GEORGE ENCARNACION, MARY
MITCHIE E. EDWARDSON, ERNESTO ENCARNACION, MATEO ENCARNACION, JR., AND GRACE
WAGNER, Petitioners, v. THOMAS JOHNSON, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals'
(CA) August 12, 2009 Decision2 and May 13, 2010 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100483. The CA denied the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by Mateo Encarnacion (Mateo) against the February 17, 2005 Order 4 of
Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003. The RTC granted
Thomas Johnson's (respondent) prayer to further amend the amended writ of execution in his action for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment.
On October 6, 2000, respondent filed an action for breach of contract with prayer for damages and costs against
spouses Narvin Edwarson (Narvin) and Mary Mitchie Edwarson (also known as Mary Encarnacion; hereinafter shall
be referred to as Mary), Mateo's daughter, before the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court of British Columbia,
Canada. Respondent alleged that Narvin and Mary convinced him to invest his money and personal property in a
vehicle leasing company owned by the couple, which turned out to be a fraudulent business scheme. The couple
neither deposited the promised profits into his account nor gave an accounting or explanation as to where his funds
went.5
The Supreme Court of British Columbia gave due course to respondent's action and ordered summons to be served
upon Narvin and Mary. While service of summons was being attempted, respondent moved that the Supreme Court

of British Columbia grant him a Mareva injunction, with ex juris affect, to restrain Narvin and Mary from dealing with
any of their assets except as is necessary for payment of ordinary living expenses or to carry on their ordinary
business.6 On October 6, 2000, the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a Mareva injunction7 and authorized
respondent, among others, to obtain orders in foreign jurisdictions which would permit its enforcement in those
jurisdictions.
On February 26, 2001, the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a Default Judgment 8 finding Narvin and Mary
liable to respondent in the amount of C$380,431.00 with interest in the amount of C$18,385.56, C$1,198.04 as cost,
and for damages to be determined. On June 29, 2001, it ordered Narvin and Mary to each pay respondent the sum
of C$25,000.00 as aggravated damages.9
On February 24, 2003, respondent filed an action for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment with prayer
for the recognition of the Mareva injunction10 with Branch 72 of the RTC of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 110-0-2003. Respondent also simultaneously petitioned to be allowed to litigate as a pauper litigant. 11 On
February 27, 2003, the RTC granted his petition on the condition that a lien of P123,161.00, representing the amount
of the filing fees, would be imposed upon him in the event of a favorable judgment. 12
On March 5, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 13 restraining Narvin and Mary from disposing or encumbering their
assets, as well as those belonging to, or controlled by, the Zambales-Canada Foundation, the 5-E Foundation, and
those belonging to Mateo (for being properties transferred in fraud of creditors). On May 12, 2003, the RTC ordered
the Register of Deeds of Zambales and the Provincial Assessor to annotate its March 5, 2003 Order on the titles
and tax declarations of all properties owned by Narvin and Mary, as well as those belonging to Mateo. 14 Thereafter,
the RTC ordered the service of summonses by publication upon Narvin and Mary.15 Despite publication, Narvin and
Mary still failed to file their answer. Accordingly, on December 1, 2003, the RTC declared them in default, and
subsequently rendered a judgment in default in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia.16
On March 30, 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution17 authorizing the sheriff to attach sufficient properties
belonging to Narvin and Mary to satisfy the judgment award. On August 3, 2004, the RTC, acting on respondent's
motion to modify the Writ of Execution (to include in the writ the properties under the name of Mateo whose title and
tax declarations were previously annotated), modified the Writ of Execution. 18 It issued an Amended Writ of
Execution19 on September 9, 2004 authorizing the sheriff to include the properties registered in the name of Mateo
as subject of the execution.
Subsequently, 13 levied properties not covered by certificates of title were sold in public auction on June 23, 2004,
wherein respondent placed the highest bid of P10,000,000.00. 20 The properties listed in the Certificate of
Sale21 were: (1) a coco/agricultural land covered by Tax Declaration No. 016-0322A in the name of "Mary Mitchie
Encarnacion;" and (2) a commercial/agricultural land covered by Tax Declaration No. 007-0410AR in the name of
"Mary Mitchie E. Edwardson."
On January 11, 2005, respondent filed a motion for clarificatory order 22 seeking further amendment of the writ of
execution to expressly authorize the levy of the properties in the name of Mateo whose title and tax declarations
were previously annotated with the March 30, 2004 Order.
Subsequently, Mateo filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim 23 dated January 17, 2005 before the RTC, which was
noted on January 20, 2005,24 claiming that he is the owner of 14 parcels of land which were being levied. The
records, however, are not clear as to what action was taken by the RTC on Mateo's third party claim. 25
In its February 17, 2005 Order,26 the RTC, acting on respondent's motion for clarificatory order, further amended
the Writ of Execution as follows:
"x x x

"AND FURTHER ORDERS to levy the properties registered under the name of Mateo Encarnacion which was
previously annotated in the Assessors Office and the Register of Deeds of Iba, Zambales, shall be the subject of
the same under execution."
On September 10, 2007, or more than two years after the February 17, 2005 Order was issued, Mateo filed a petition
for annulment of judgment27 before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 100483). He alleged that he is the owner of 18
properties levied in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003; that he was not made a party to the case; and that the inclusion of
his properties in the levy and execution sale were made without notice to him.28 Mateo, nonetheless, admitted before
the CA that he has no standing to question the proceedings on the action for recognition and enforcement of
judgment. He asserts that he is only questioning the February 17, 2005 Order which deprived him of his properties.29
In his answer,30 respondent countered that the tax declarations under Mateo's name cannot be invoked as a legal
basis to claim ownership over the properties. According to respondent, Mateo fraudulently caused the issuance of
these tax declarations under his name—they were effected after the issuance of the March 5, 2003 Order and the
execution sale on July 23, 2004. 31 Respondent also averred that the RTC conducted an investigation and had
already excluded from the levy certain properties which undisputedly belonged to Mateo.32
Meanwhile, another sale in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003 resulted in a Certificate of Sale33 dated November 29, 2006
in favor of respondent, covering the properties covered by the following: (1) Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-9496; (2) Tax Declaration No. 016-0324AR; (3) OCT No. P-9498; (4) OCT No. P-9336; (5) OCT No. P-9421; (6)
OCT No. P-9508; and (7) Tax Declaration No. 016-0845. Respondent was the highest bidder for these properties
in the total amount of P4,000,000.00. On November 3, 2008, the RTC issued an Order 34 granting the motion for
consolidation of title filed by respondent over the properties subject of the Certificates of Sale.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the CA, Mateo died and was substituted by his heirs (petitioners),
including his daughter Mary.35 In their Memorandum36 dated January 12, 2009, petitioners amended their argument
to aver that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003 should be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and extrinsic fraud.37
On August 12, 2009, the CA denied the petition.38 It upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action of recognition
of foreign judgment. By filing an Affidavit of Third Party Claim, Mateo was deemed to have voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC.39 It also ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment is not proper because
the February 17, 2005 Order is not a final order as it merely seeks to clarify the RTC's further amended writ of
execution; the proper remedy is to move to quash the writ of execution and if unsuccessful, to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.40 The CA also said that even if procedural rules were relaxed, the
petition would still fail because it has already been barred by estoppel and laches due to Mateo's delay in filing the
petition despite numerous opportunities to do so. 41 Lastly, the CA pointed out that Mateo is not the proper party to
file the petition, as he had already transferred the properties to Mary by virtue of a deed of quitclaim on February
27, 1995.42
On May 13, 2010, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 43 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners reiterate their arguments before the CA that the whole proceedings in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003 be
annulled on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud because the RTC: (1) allowed respondent to sue as
an indigent party when he is willing and able to put up a bond that may be required by the court; (2) allowed a
complaint with a grossly defective certification against forum shopping; (3) allowed service of summons by
publication in an action in personam and exercised jurisdiction on that basis; (4) recognized a global injunction
issued by a foreign court as a writ of attachment; (5) promulgated a final order without requiring the presentation of
evidence, even ex parte, and without distinctly stating the facts and the law on which it is based; (6) allowed the
levy on execution of properties belonging to a party who was not named as defendant in the civil action; and (7)
allowed the sale and delivery of the properties to a foreigner who is disqualified from owning private lands under the
Constitution.44

The issues presented are:
I. Whether an action for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy of a third-party claimant of properties
levied and sold under execution sale; and
II. Whether respondent, an alien, may own private lands by virtue of an execution sale.
We deny the petition. Nevertheless, we nullify the sale of the private lands to respondent for being a flagrant violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled is rendered.45 The ultimate objective of the remedy is "to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and
thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense." 46 The remedy is
provided by Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals,47 we explained the nature of the remedy, to wit:
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only
when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character,
is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions.
The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot
prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.48 x x x (Citations omitted.)
In Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. v. Far East Bank & Trust Company,49 we said that owing to
the extraordinary nature and objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order, there are requirements
that must be complied with before the remedy is granted. First, the remedy is only available when the petitioner can
no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of the petitioner. Second, the ground for the remedy is limited to either extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction (although lack of due process has been cited as a ground by jurisprudence). Third, the time for availing
the remedy is set by the rules: if based on extrinsic fraud, it must be filed within four years from the discovery of
extrinsic fraud; if based on lack of jurisdiction, it must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Fourth,
the petition should be verified and should allege with particularity the facts and law relied upon, and those supporting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense.50
Petitioners failed to show their standing to file the petition. They have also failed to comply with the first requirement.
a. The proper party to file a petition for annulment of judgment or final order need not be a party to the judgment
sought to be annulled. Nevertheless, it is essential that he is able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he is
adversely affected by the judgment.51 A person not adversely affected by a decision in the civil action or proceeding

cannot bring an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The exception is if he is a
successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, or if the action or proceeding is in rem,
in which case the judgment is binding against him.52
In Bulawan v. Aquende,53 we held that assuming that the petitioner is not an indispensable party to the case that is
being annulled, he may still file for a petition for annulment of judgment. Our basic ruling is that "[w]hat is essential
is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he
would be adversely affected thereby."54
Here, the action sought to be annulled is a recognition of foreign judgment in a collection case rendered by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia filed by respondent against Narvin and Mary. Under Section 48(b), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." We have previously held that Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments and are not allowed to delve into its merits. Thus, the action for
recognition of foreign judgment does not require the relitigation of the case under a Philippine court. 55 Once admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, a foreign judgment can only be repelled by the parties and their successors in
interest by subsequent title on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."56Consequently, the right being enforced in the action is the subject
of the collection case, which is a personal one against the couple and their successors in interest.
Considering the foregoing, Mateo is not a party who could be adversely affected by the outcome of Civil Case No.
110-0-2003. To begin with, he was not an indispensable party to the action for recognition whose interest in the
controversy is such that a final decree will necessarily affect his rights, as he was not the judgment debtor in the
action.57 Neither is Mateo a real party in Interest58 in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003, as aptly noted by the CA, having
already transferred his interest in the properties to Mary. Lastly, he is not a successor in interest of Narvin and Mary.
Further, since the ultimate objective of the remedy is to grant the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause
or ventilate his defense,59 granting the petition for annulment of judgment would not give Mateo or petitioners
available defenses that he originally did not possess. Mateo and petitioners were affected only ins far as the alleged
properties of Mateo were levied and sold at the public auction—which came after the judgment in Civil Case No.
110-0-2003. Mateo himself admitted this when he initially filed the petition.60 Therefore, Mateo and his heirs cannot
raise the alleged irregularities in the action for recognition of foreign judgment; he may only question the propriety
of the levy and sale of their alleged properties.
Petitioners' arguments show that the very relief they are claiming is one against the alleged wrongful execution of
the decision (which resulted in the levy and sale of the properties allegedly belonging to Mateo), and not the decision
itself. It is apparent that had the judgment not been executed against the properties they are claiming, they would
not be seeking to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003. However, any alleged irregular implementation
of a writ of execution (or resulting levy) cannot be corrected through the equitable relief of annulment of judgment;
the remedy lies elsewhere.61
b.In this regard, there is another reason that militates against petitioners. The remedy of annulment of judgment is
a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may only be availed of when the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies provided by law are wanting without fault or neglect on the petitioner's part.62 It is a condition sine qua
non that one must have availed of the proper remedies before resorting to the action for annulment of judgment.63
We note that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief were not available to Mateo for the
reason that he was not a party to Civil Case No. 110-0-2003. Mateo was neither able to participate in the original
proceedings nor resort to the other remedies because he was not a real party in interest or an indispensable party
thereto. There are, however, other appropriate remedies available to him that he could have resorted to.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the remedies of a third-party claimant of an alleged wrongfully
levied property:

Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person
other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy
and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant
in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall
be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if
such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his
claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a
separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
xxxx
Based on this section, a third-party claimant has the following cumulative remedies: (a) he may avail of "terceria"
by serving on the levying officer making the levy an affidavit of his title, and serving also a copy to the judgment
creditor; (b) he may file a case for damages against the bond issued by the judgment debtor within 120 days from
the date of the filing of the bond; and (c) he may file "any proper action" to vindicate his claim to the property. 64
In Sy v. Discaya,65 and later in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Maunlad
Homes, Inc.,66 we recognized the right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to vindicate his claim
of ownership over the properties seized under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As we pointed out in Sy,
a "proper action" is entirely "distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced, with the court
of competent jurisdiction." Such a "proper action" may have for its object the recovery of ownership or possession
of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention of the
property. This determination of ownership is not the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment. 67
In this case, the proper recourse for petitioners is to vindicate and prove their ownership over the properties in a
separate action as allowed under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This is the more prudent action since
respondent also asserts that the properties claimed were owned by Mary, and the CA upheld such assertion. At this
juncture, we note that if we grant the petition, we would be nullifying the whole proceeding in Civil Case No. 110-0-
2003 which is more than what is necessary to address the remedy being sought by petitioners.
II
While mindful of our ruling that petitioners cannot file the petition for annulment of judgment, we nevertheless cannot
turn a blind eye to the blatant violation of the Constitution's prohibition on foreign ownership of lands. This violation
was committed when respondent was allowed to participate in the public auction sales where, as highest bidder, he
acquired land.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution states:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The fundamental law is clear that aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain.68 The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. 69 Consequently, they are also disqualified
from acquiring private lands.

In Matthews v. Taylor,70 we took cognizance of the violation of the Constitutional prohibition on alien land ownership
despite the failure of the trial and appellate courts to consider and apply these constitutional principles. There we
said, "[t]he trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent in light of
the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional principles,
which, in fact, are the more decisive."71 We said further:
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through
another.In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above
constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their
father's estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another; that
an implied trust be declared in their (aliens') favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the
improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of the estate
of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. We, however, excluded the
land and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never became the owner
thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller, petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany.
During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo City and constructed a
house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually separated,
prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically, respondent prayed for
reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case in favor of the petitioner,
the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated
in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in
the name of the petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a
right to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that an implied trust
was created by operation of law in view of petitioner's marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would
permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
In Frenzel v. Catito, petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a Filipina,
was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law relationship,
during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines,
respondent's name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner
filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of respondent, claiming that he was the
real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused to declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the
constitutional prohibition. The Court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and
ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in an
illegal contract may not maintain an action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman
acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latter's name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third
person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not
give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioner's) intention that the lot in question
be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and
in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null and void.72 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Also in Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,73 we said that "[b]efore resolving the question [of] whether the CA erred in affirming
the Order of the [Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)] setting aside the levy made by the sheriff, it
behooves this Court to address a matter of public and national importance which completely escaped the

attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualified under
the Constitution from owning real property in their names." 74 There, Hulst, a Dutch national, won an action for
rescission of a contract to sell over a 210-square meter townhouse against the developer in the HLURB. The HLURB
ordered reimbursement of the contract price to Hulst. Subsequently, the sheriff levied real properties owned by the
developer. The developer filed a motion to quash the writ of levy on the ground of over-levy of properties, which the
HLURB Arbiter granted. While the issue before the CA, and successively before us, was whether the HLURB
Arbiters erred in setting aside the levy, we took cognizance of the violation of the Constitution that escaped both the
HLURB and the CA. We declared that the contract to sell was void.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent is a Canadian citizen. 75 Respondent neither denied this, nor alleged
that he became a Filipino citizen. Being an alien, he is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands
in the Philippines. Concomitantly, respondent is also prohibited from participating in the execution sale, which has
for its object, the transfer of ownership and title of property to the highest bidder. What cannot be legally done
directly cannot be done indirectly.
In light of this, we nullify the auction sales conducted on June 23, 2004 and November 29, 2006 where respondent
was declared the highest bidder, as well as the proceedings which led to the acquisition of ownership by respondent
over the lands involved. Article 1409(1) and (7) of the Civil Code states that all contracts whose cause, object, or
purpose is contrary to law or public policy, and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and
void from the beginning. We thus remand the case back to Branch 72 of the RTC of Olongapo City, to conduct anew
the auction sale of the levied properties, and to exclude respondent from participating as bidder.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Nevertheless, the public auction sales conducted on June 23, 2004 and
November 29, 2006 in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003, and the proceedings which resulted therefrom,
are NULLIFIED for being contrary to Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003, is directed: (1) to proceed with the execution of the Decision dated
December 1, 2003; (2) to exclude respondent Thomas Johnson from participating in any public auction sale of lands
in said case; and (3) to order the delivery of the proceeds of any public auction sale relevant to the execution of the
Decision dated December 1, 2003 to respondent Thomas Johnson. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,* (Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo, Tijam, and Gesmundo,**JJ., concur.

Case Digest - Statcon - 1ST Set of Cases

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Case Digest - Statcon - 1ST Set of Cases

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

(US VS KEPNER) GR No.

L-571, October 11, 1902

2.) WHETHER OR NOT AN APPEAL IS CONSIDERED A VIOLATION ON PROHIBITION OF DOUBLE

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 1 of 53

RFC RESISTS THIS CASE:

THE COURT A QUO:

WHETHER NOT RFC IS COMPELLED TO ACCEPT THE BACKPAY CERTIFICATE OF DIOKNO AS

HENCE, the Court dismiss this appeal.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 2 of 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 3 of 53

The controversy arose from the following facts:

Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:

Hence, this petition.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 4 of 53

xxx xxx xxx

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 5 of 53

Even the dictum in Hernandez that,

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 6 of 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 7 of 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 8 of 53

More particularly, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 9 of 53

Regalado, J., In the result.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 10 of 53

The following is my dissenting opinion based mainly on my original ponencia.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 11 of 53

xxx xxx xxx

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 12 of 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 13 of 53

G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

TORRES, JR., J.:

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 14 of 53

The antecedent facts:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 15 of 53

May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

Dear Ms. Carolino:

Very truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO

1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

6. Costs of the suit.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 16 of 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 17 of 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 18 of 53

xxx xxx xxx

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 19 of 53

Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 20 of 53

This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

xxx xxx xxx

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 21 of 53

It has thus been said that —

In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (FIRST SET OF CASES) CASE DIGEST Page 22 of 53