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2 [Open session]
11 could the interpreters please confirm? It's fine. Okay, fine. Thank
12 you.
15 Ms. Nikolic.
17 come to you, General, and say good morning, there are two small issues
18 that I would like to address. There is a motion from the Prosecution for
20 filed on the 25th of May. I don't know exactly when the fortnight
22 possible? I know that some of you will not be here in the course of next
23 week. I had in mind -- I had in mind the -- not later than the 12th of
24 June so that we give at least three weeks for the Prosecution to be able
25 to organise this, if the motion is granted. All right? 12th June is all
2 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, I can assure the Trial Chamber that we will
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. The other thing is that yesterday the
5 Prosecution filed a motion to amend the 65 ter exhibit list with nine
7 according to me, at least, to come after -- not after this witness but
8 after the next one. Is he still scheduled to come over after the next one
11 investigator, Mr. Blaszczyk and he was our sort of insurance witness for
13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. So we can allow the Defence teams
14 to file their response at their pleasure and leisure but within the
19 today. It also depends on you, particularly on how concise you can keep
20 your answers.
2 number 5D372?
3 Q. Sir, yesterday you said that fuel was sometimes smuggled in the
5 look at the document and tell us if you can confirm whether this document
6 was sent to the Sarajevo Corps and the Drina Corps on the 8th of November
7 1994.
8 A. Yes.
10 would like you to confirm for us that this document states that there are
12 Can you see the part where it says that it is well known that
13 there were cases of abuse when it came to the bottom part of the vehicle?
14 A. Yes. I have already said yes for this document. This is one in a
18 UNHCR to those facts and as for the Drina and Herzegovina corps and here
19 the Sarajevo Corps as well because from the area of responsibility of the
20 Sarajevo Corps the convoys usually departed from the sector of Sarajevo.
21 I was reading the document and I have forgotten what you want me to tell
25 A. Yes.
3 corps of the VRS on the 18th of December 1993, and it regards the
5 A. Yes. It was sent to all corps save for the 2nd Krajina Corps
9 the page.
11 below the title, the title is, "Attention to all corps." Is it true that
12 this passage calls for a very precise control of all humanitarian convoys?
15 Q. And can we now scroll down to the bottom of the document? I would
16 like the witness to be able to see item number 4. Item 4, a bit further
17 up. Yes.
21 which were connected with other territories. For example, Tuzla was
22 connected with the territory under the control of Muslims. The same
24 with Croatia.
25 Q. Can we now show the witness 6D7? And before this document appears
1 on the screen, I would like to tell you that this is a decision by the
3 of March 1995. Can we show page 2 to the witness, the second page,
4 please.
10 Can we go back to --
13 it?
14 A. Yes. I spoke about that yesterday, but I was not sure of the
15 month and now I can see that this was the month of March.
16 Q. Can we now show the witness Article number 6 in the same document?
21 committee decisions"?
22 A. Yes, which means that the army of Republika Srpska lost that
23 obligation. Up to then, we were the ones to issue such permits and the
24 obligation was passed on to the committee and we were just the executers
2 document? Can we blow up the top part of this page featuring the date?
7 8th of March, and this decision was passed on the 11th of March, as far as
8 I could see at the bottom, and it was published on the Official Gazette on
9 the 14th of March, which means that it was indeed published after the
12 army of Republika Srpska merely carried out orders by this committee and
15 upon anything with UNPROFOR. This was the duty of the committee. And the
16 committee simply issued orders to the army to let convoys through and to
19 not.
21 A. Yes.
24 the military post 7111 with regard to the passage of the convoy on the
2 document?
4 7111, in which this post is informed about the passage of a convoy and was
7 suppose that this was the command of either eastern Bosnia or the Drina
8 Corps, since the convoy was on its way from the Federal Republic of
9 Yugoslavia. I believe that this was the Drina Corps because the convoy
13 A. Correct. Only --
16 of the drafter at the end of it? The screen doesn't show it all.
23 answered it in part.
2 and then you said "only." You were seeking trying to explain something
5 link the document with any source. Usually, military documents are
12 can see that General Miletic in his own hand stated on behalf of the Chief
15 of this document is that it doesn't show the source based on which the
19 right in front of you, calling for better control, is it the case that
20 this control was in fact in keeping with the previously adopted rules and
23 reviewed, but regardless of the fact that actual people on the ground who
24 were effecting those controls have been warned already, in our language we
25 say it's never too much care or better safe than sorry.
2 state of war?
4 1992 when it was decided to bring humanitarian aid to the warring parties
6 Q. But General Miletic, then Colonel, in any case, did not have the
8 A. In this document, nobody from the army had any more power to
9 decide whether the convoy would pass or not. It was up to the committee.
10 And Miletic and other officers in the army were duty-bound to see that
12 Q. I would now like to show the witness 5D371 -- sorry, just before
13 that, are you sure that the handwriting on this document is the
17 Could you please look at first paragraph only? We don't see the
18 date on this document, but I believe that in the first paragraph we can
22 name, typed there, which I think is possible because in April I was at the
23 Main Staff. I see again this military PO box, 7111 and 7598, but I don't
24 remember those PO boxes. I don't know what exactly one would say.
25 Q. Could you please read this first paragraph that follows after the
1 numbers of PO boxes?
3 discrepancy between the original and the English translation. The English
6 All right. Then my next question is: We see 7111 and then an
7 "i," and then 7598. What's that "i"? What does it stand for?
11 yesterday. It's going to those two military post boxes only: 7111 and
12 7598. Those must be the Sarajevo and the Drina Corps, because the
16 Yes, that's written there. So the command of the corps, through whose
18 JUDGE AGIUS: When you see those two numbers with an "i" in
19 between, to you it means letter box 7111 and letter box 7598? That is
20 both of them?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And also other corps are left
22 out of this notification. This was addressed only to those two units.
24 for having interrupted your question, which you can now proceed with,
25 please.
2 Q. Sir, in this paragraph that you just read, that speaks of this
3 medical evacuation, do you see in line 3 the date, 6 April 1995 [realtime
6 addressed indicating the time when the evacuation would take place, and we
7 see below that it was actually sent on the 5th of April, 24 hours earlier,
9 follows an earlier agreement between the UNPROFOR and the VRS that
11 Q. Just one correction. Page 11, line 3 and the date is 6 April
12 1995.
17 reports that you discussed yesterday and the day before yesterday.
18 I would like to show you P2672. I would like to show the witness
20 You have already spoken about this document and you said it was
21 sent to the Drina Corps. Is it correct that this document was not sent to
23 A. What I said yesterday was that I don't know whether it was sent on
24 to the Main Staff by the command of the Drina Corps, but I checked. It
25 was not sent from the Main Staff to the Supreme Command. So the command
1 of the Drina Corps was the link. I don't know whether the command of the
3 Q. And when you speak of the reports sent by the Drina Corps, in fact
4 the Drina Corps would not physically send on this report. It would just
6 A. I never said that this document, in this form, the way we see it,
7 was sent by the Drina Corps to the Main Staff. I said I didn't know
8 whether the Drina Corps informed the Main Staff of the things it had
9 learned from this Engineering Battalion because I don't have any reports
12 correct that this information should have been reflected, taken up, in the
18 What you have before you now, is it the report of the Drina Corps
21 contents, but now I see it, and I see that there is a reference to a
1 enemy forces aiming to attack from the front and thus enable link-up with
2 the group that had broken out from Srebrenica enclave." Now, I suppose
3 that that is the group. I'm not sure. But we don't see here the number
5 1.500 people killed, which means that the Main Staff was not aware of that
8 It's a report of the Main Staff of the 15th of July 1995 that you
9 had occasion to see the day before yesterday, and I would like page 3,
12 You've already said that you didn't know how this reference to Turkish
13 forces found its way into the document, how this expression was used. Is
14 it probable that the person who drafted this report at the Main Staff
15 simply took up the phrase from the report sent them by the Drina Corps?
20 NT. I suppose he just copied this phrase, Turkish forces, I don't know
21 from where, but I already told you yesterday that we freely traded
23 called Croats Ustashas, and Croats called us Chetniks and they called
24 Muslims either Turks or something even worse that I don't want to mention.
25 .
1 Q. I would like to show you the interim report of 15 July 1995 from
2 the Drina Corps, and I would like it placed on the ELMO so that the
5 Could you please look at the document on your right and find the
6 sentence that reads, "[In English] During the transport towards Zvornik
7 the Turkish pulling out from Srebrenica toward Tuzla in the Planinci
8 village sector opened fire on the ambulance and killed the driver Milos
9 Tesic and paramedic Nenad Stevic. The brigade will forward details on
15 A. It is an interim report?
17 A. Are you referring to the sentence, "The attack ended around 5.30
18 but the enemy continued to open fire sporadically from artillery and
20 Velimor Peric, Dusan Stevanovic and Zoran Ristic. During the transport
21 towards Zvornik the Turk forces which were pulling out from Zvornik
22 towards Tuzla in the Planinci mountain sector opened fire on the ambulance
23 and killed the driver, Milos Tesic and the paramedic, Nenad Stevic. The
24 information on the enemy groups that are pulling out from Srebrenica will
1 Q. Yes, sir. This is the sentence. Does it fully reflect the report
2 of the Main Staff? Was it taken over completely from that report, in
3 other words?
5 Staff.
7 correct that the report of the Main Staff took over virtually completely a
8 sentence that can be found in the interim report of the Drina Corps?
9 A. I should be able to see the stamps, the four angled stamps on both
10 reports to see when the reports arrived, and then I will -- would be able
11 to answer your question. This is interim report and interim reports were
13 which stated that regular reports should be sent every day by 2000 hours
14 and interim reports as needed. Obviously this interim report was drafted
15 because of the people who were wounded and killed. This was the reason
17 Q. I don't think that the report of the Main Staff carries that kind
18 of stamp but the interim report of the Drina Corps does have a stamp
22 Q. Could you please first look -- I'm sorry. Both have stamps, but
23 can you please look at the stamp on the report by the Drina Corps first?
25 was received on the 15th of July at 1945 hours, and now I should see when
1 the Main Staff report was sent to the Supreme Command, and I'm talking
5 A. I can see the stamp. The report of the Main Staff to the Supreme
6 Command was sent on the 16th of July on the following day, that is at 0207
8 are good. Somewhere in this report of the Main Staff to the Supreme
10 Drina Corps was included in that report but the author of the report to
11 the Supreme Command did not mention the names of the casualties. He just
12 mentioned the numbers of the wounded and the killed. It was not customary
14 You can only imagine how far that would leave. For example, if the troops
16 really be too much to mention all of their names in the reports to the
17 Supreme Command. And let me conclude: I believe that this interim report
18 of the Drina Corps was included in the regular combat report of the Main
20 Q. The day before yesterday, you spoke about the nature of combat
21 reports.
22 Can we please show the witness the first page of the document?
23 Is it correct that this combat report was not sent only to the
24 Supreme Command but also to the commands of all corps of the Republika
25 Srpska army?
1 A. Yes. I can see that in the heading, the commands of the 1st and
2 2nd Krajina Corps, the Sarajevo Corps, the Drina Corps, the aircraft,
5 situations, even the subordinate units because the Main Staff doesn't send
7 them and when it writes to them it sends them decisions and orders. I
10 extraordinary was happening, all the units were informed about that.
11 Q. Can we now show the witness the last page of the same document?
12 This document has not been signed, but the name on this report is the name
13 of General Miletic, and his role was described as standing in for the
14 Chief of Staff. The day before yesterday, you told us that your name was
15 supposed to be on these reports because at that time you were the Chief of
16 Staff of the VRS, and the person who signed these reports should have put
19 that this was his document so he came up with something. He could not put
22 came up with standing in for the Chief of Staff. We've discussed this at
23 great length. The important thing is that the signatory of this document
24 is General Miletic, and there are the abbreviations standing for the
25 person who drafted the document, NT, and MM is the person who typed the
3 when sometimes you were present for short time in the Main Staff, other
4 times, most of the time you're not, did you ever come across any of these
5 documents that you have seen here and also during your proofing session
7 statement, "Standing in" for yourself? Did you come across those
8 documents at the time? And if you did, did you ever raise the matter with
12 yesterday, I said that my absence from the staff was from the 29th of May
13 to the beginning of November, and that only on the 28th of July I came
14 back in order to see General Zivanovic off. Upon my return to the Main
15 Staff, I --
22 transcript and that's not correct, because the witness said yesterday and
23 the day before 19th and 20th of July. So that's to correct the statement.
24 Otherwise, General, you may proceed. And thank you for the
3 read these reports. During my short stays in the Main Staff I did not
7 same for General Mladic when he returned from somewhere. I did not read
8 documents which were no longer topical. That's why I did not notice that
9 until the moment Mr. McCloskey showed them to me in Banja Luka. And then
10 I saw that all the documents bore that indication. I did not read the
11 reports, especially not the reports that were sent to the Supreme Command,
12 because they were the thing of the past. When you're in war you usually
13 look at the present and the future rather than the past. You don't look
14 back.
16 Madam Fauveau?
18 Q. In any case, you were the Chief of Staff of the VRS in July 1995?
19 A. Yes. I was the Chief of Staff, and I said that I was the Chief of
20 Staff from the 12th of May 1992 to 23rd December 1996, 1.687 days in
21 total.
22 Q. Starting with June 1993, up to the end of the war, you were
24 A. Yes. From the moment when he was appointed the chief of education
1 Q. During the two days before your testimony before this Trial
4 among these documents you did not see a single document that you might
6 omissions?
9 speaks about the appointment of Colonel Krstic as the person acting for
10 the commander of the Drina Corps. I don't remember the name of that
12 law.
18 Miletic, in June 1995, could not issue orders to the commanders or other
21 the Main Staff, was able to issue executive orders to subordinate units,
22 unless the commander has authorised one of us to deal with one segment of
24 Lukavac 93, the counterattack in Bihac and the defence against Croatian
1 receive a command role but not for the VRS as a whole but only as relating
3 Q. You said the day before yesterday that while you were at the Main
4 Staff, and when General Mladic was absent, in fact when you were in the
6 it correct that when you were in Western Bosnia and General Mladic was not
7 at the headquarters of the Main Staff, assistant commanders did not report
8 to General Miletic?
12 coordinated the work of the Main Staff, was always present. However, in
13 view of the military chain of command and hierarchy, reports were received
15 Q. You said the day before yesterday that in your absence, General
16 Miletic was not able to take over all your functions and, for instance, he
17 was not sent on field trips to inspect units. Is it correct that in your
21 Q. And General Miletic did not have the powers to coordinate the work
22 of assistant commanders?
25 advisory role. I don't know which word to use. Perhaps the best word is
3 problem that your sector should deal with, for instance, crime, theft of
5 Gvero has a problem with supplies in his sector, he has no paper, no pens,
7 security purposes.
8 So he was the one who coordinated but not in the sense of issuing
10 absence but he could tell Gvero, "Go to that logistical unit and check why
19 establish contact with me across 600 or 700 kilometres, and there was no
22 infractions.
4 Staff, then my role would be the same as the role I have described for
5 Miletic a moment ago. I was also an assistant commander except that I was
6 the first among equals in a way. However, if Mladic was not around, then
7 I did have a command role. I could order Miletic or Djukic to give Gvero
13 Mladic was not at the Main Staff headquarters, his position was never one
16 commanders.
18 So as I understand it, if General Mladic was not there but you were there,
19 you would have been issuing orders? But if General Mladic was not there
20 and you also were not there, who would be in a position to issue orders,
21 for instance, in this case, to General Djukic and General Gvero? No one?
23 General Miletic would have had to call me regardless of the distance, but
25 have called me or if Mladic was closer, he would have had to call Mladic
2 in the practice of the Main Staff, such situations never arose because,
3 after all, the Main Staff was a harmonious whole. We had a good mutual
5 would refuse the advice of General Miletic, and I can't imagine any of the
11 were the Chief of Staff of the VRS, and at that time, General Miletic was
13 A. No, he wasn't.
21 Q. But he never had all the powers that you disposed of when you were
23 A. He never had such powers, and I just said a moment ago that he was
25 Q. You said the day before yesterday that the work of General Miletic
1 was important. Could we say that in times of war, in an army, all the
3 A. The most important mission in a war is to keep the trench you are
6 the uniform task of all VRS units, and that is to defend Republika
7 Srpska. Miletic did this as the officer -- an officer of the staff. The
10 the soul of the Main Staff of the VRS. He knows everyone, he is able to
12 Q. I'm not asking you to describe the tasks of General Miletic but to
15 A. No.
16 Q. You said the day before yesterday that when you were at the Main
17 Staff headquarters, it was a rare occurrence for Mladic not to accept your
19 you?
23 which he had the right to do. On the contrary, he supported the execution
2 General Miletic were not of the same nature as your relations with General
3 Mladic?
7 Main Staff were professional, although I have an idea of what you might be
12 administration, which was not very busy because rocket systems of air
13 defence were under the command of air defence and air force, and the
15 deploying Miletic on the front line, mainly around the Main Staff, units
16 defending the Main Staff and some other units but mainly there in eastern
17 Bosnia.
18 And on one occasion, General Mladic was inspecting the front line
19 close to the Main Staff. I believe it was on the side of Zepa. And I
21 Colonel, and when he returned to the Main Staff, he told me, "This bloke
24 Miletic -- there was nothing Miletic could have done, and I told
1 officer. Let's not send him to the front any more. Let him rather help
2 out here in the Main Staff." Because at that time, I had been alone in
3 the staff sector for three or four months. Mladic did not say anything to
4 that, but that was the last time that he gave Miletic any tasks on the
5 front line himself. And since Miletic was a native of that area around
6 Foca, I always took him with me when I visited that area because he knew
8 At the beginning of the war, Mladic did not have much use for
9 Miletic, and later on I did not have much insight into how their relation
10 developed. I don't know about Miletic, but I know that Mladic did not
14 A. He was certainly not his main man, but whether he ever provided
17 Mladic how to use units, and advising the commander amounts to giving the
18 commander your opinion how that should be done and Miletic could do that
22 proposals?
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we'll have the break now. How much more
2 Mr. President.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. For the record, Mr. Meek has joined us.
8 Madam Fauveau?
10 Q. The day before yesterday you told us that in July 1995 the Supreme
11 Commander, Radovan Karadzic, had started sending you orders directly, that
12 they no longer went via General Mladic. Do you know whether Radovan
14 A. The 1st and the 2nd Corps of Krajina did not receive direct
16 was the only one who received them. I don't know anything about the other
17 corps.
18 Q. The day before yesterday you spoke about the Lukavac operations--
19 operation, and you told us that that operation had been planned. The
21 A. Yes.
24 it?
5 Corps.
8 question. "At the beginning, this operation was an operation of the Drina
9 Corps," you said, General. And after the beginning, what was it?
11 happened after the beginning. I don't know how General Mladic found
13 And I don't know how this operation expanded, how it went on.
15 western front and that on the -- from the Main Staff, I asked for
17 an answer that I could not count on such reinforcement because the troops
18 were engaged in eastern Bosnia, i.e., on the eastern front. I was also
19 told that I would receive the requested brigades once the burden was off
20 that part of the front, and I indeed received them between the 1st and the
21 3rd August 1995, when it was already too late for me because by then I had
22 already lost Grahovo and Glamoc and VRS started withdrawing from that part
4 already spoken about that. And he simply conveyed two or three items from
5 their reports. One of them was the situation on the front line, the
6 situation on the territory, and the planned actions for the following
7 day. He only united all these reports and conveyed them further.
8 Q. But in order to draft his report, he had to read all the other
9 reports, the reports of Drina Corps, the Sarajevo Corps, the 1st Corps,
10 the 2nd Corps, the Eastern Bosnian Corps and the Herzegovina Corps?
15 important, am I right?
16 A. Yes.
18 General Miletic did not have any authority with regards to the prisoners
19 of war?
2 question, Madam?
5 functions in July 1995, he did not have any authority with regards to
9 also the number of our troops who were captured. There were other sectors
12 Q. When you were in Western Bosnia, the information about the western
13 Bosnian front line were included into the report to -- of the VRS Main
14 Staff?
15 A. Yes. But I did not send the written combat reports to the Main
16 Staff. This was done by the commanders of the 1st and the 2nd Corps.
17 Q. But this was the area in which you performed your operations, am I
18 right?
20 operations, but it had been agreed that I would not write combat reports.
21 I only communicated orally with General Mladic. He would call me and then
24 Western Bosnia. Can we then say that General Miletic did not have any
25 authority with regard to the operations that were carried out in Western
1 Bosnia?
2 A. Yes. I can say that because General Miletic could not act as my
5 General Miletic did not have any authority or influence on the activities
7 A. No, he didn't.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Yes, Mr. McCloskey? He's answered the
9 question but --
12 he have any command authority, I think it's a fair question, but authority
13 and his responsibilities I think have been clearly defined by the witness
15 command authority.
19 so --
21 Miletic's and everyone else's advisory powers within the Main Staff, and
22 that could fall under the question, under the aspect of influence, so you
1 the witness, because I have no further questions. But I would also like
4 answer a question of that kind. And I don't have any further questions.
5 Thank you.
8 midway through my answer. I said no, he did not have any influence, and I
10 JUDGE AGIUS: So do you wish to add anything to what you have just
11 stated? Do you think your answer is now complete or do you wish to add on
12 to it?
16 witness's answer, with your leave I would like to clarify this answer. I
17 would kindly ask you to allow me to put another question to the witness in
21 Q. Sir, when were you in Western Bosnia, what kind of influence did
25 A. For example, when I asked for the three brigades, he answered that
1 the Main Staff could not send me those three brigades and he explained
7 communication with the other members of the Main Staff, and very often
10 brigades, ammunition, fuel, and other things that you mentioned to you,
15 what you had requested to somebody else and to make sure that the request
17 A. Yes.
22 discussing, for instance, the operation in Western Bosnia that you have
23 been referred to, apart from any messages that he would pass on on your
5 proposals to the commander, just like me, because he was familiar with the
12 please?
16 tried, in such a way that most of them can be answered with a yes or no.
17 Let me begin. The army of Republika Srpska was formed on the 12th
18 of May 1992. Could you tell me if before that time, before the VRS was
24 A. Yes. There was the Patriotic League, Green Berets, and some
1 jihad warriors, swallows, larks. Those are the ones I can remember.
3 MR. SARAPA:
5 the army of Republika Srpska, only legal basis were given, only a legal
6 basis was given for establishing the VRS, whereas the task of establishing
9 proceed to answer it. If you have not, you have every right to ask for a
10 clarification.
12 decision of the 12th of May 1992 to establish the army, or, rather, that
13 decision legalised what already existed, in terms of Serbs under arms, and
14 the Main Staff was given the assignment to organise a real army and that
15 was the 7th armed force on the territory of the former SFRY, because the
16 prior six had already been established, some as long back as one year,
23 all but many, brigades were formed. At the time they were called TO,
25 themselves, those were paramilitary units because they fell outside the
1 official army that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, that is
5 establishment of the Main Staff, it was decided and it was one of our
6 first decisions, that all those municipal units should be placed under the
10 now, some Chetnik groups, of this or that political party, that all of
11 them should be summoned and placed under the command of the army of
12 Republika Srpska.
14 expelled from our territory. With the exception of Arkan's Tigers and
15 that group called Repici, all of them placed themselves under the command
16 of the VRS. The tigers were expelled from the area around Bijeljina and
17 Zvornik, while Repici were crushed a month or two later and their leader,
20 organisation existed even before the official decision to set up the army
21 of Republika Srpska.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: General, when did the formal presence of the JNA end
2 made to establish the army of Republika Srpska, the JNA ceased to exist in
4 May. However, there was a delay and the last soldier of the JNA left
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 20th of June. We consider that 23rd June is
6 the date of establishment of the VRS, when the Presidency of the Serbian
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's take them one by one, please, General. Start
17 was due to the lack of capacity in the Ministry of Defence of the Serbian
19 Main Staff. For that reason we had to set up a special sector called the
22 among the people that we had to go to war, that the war had been imposed
23 on us, and we didn't have any problem with call-ups, save for some
7 everything that the army needs. As far as food and clothing -- sorry,
8 clothing and footwear were concerned, we kept what we had, what we were
9 wearing, and taking the example of other armies that were formed after the
10 break-up of the JNA, we also kept most of the materiel and equipment of
11 the JNA that happened to be on the territory of Republika Srpska when the
12 JNA left, starting with depots of weapons and ammunition, reserves of fuel
13 and even reserves of clothing and footwear, anything that was already on
14 our territory.
15 So that when the JNA left Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless from
17 controlled the particular territory, the JNA could only pull out its
18 soldiers and the weapons that they were carrying. It was not that easy to
19 keep those JNA resources but we managed because we were the last armed
20 force to be formed in the Balkans, and we always invoked that when the
2 explain now how each of the corps command came into being. At any rate,
6 readiness. These are the other two aspects that Mr. Sarapa asked you
7 about.
8 When the VRS was -- came into being, did it have any particular
9 mobilisation problems that you are aware of? If not, could you try and be
10 brief in your answer so that we do our best to finish with your testimony
11 today?
15 other problems.
18 with combat readiness either because our officers were well trained. Five
19 generals happened to be in the VRS there and four generals in the Main
20 Staff, and two of us had completed all military schools, including the
25 called them.
2 officers had been the opposition or deserters in the former JNA. Unlike
3 them, our senior staff was well trained. Those soldiers who happened to
4 be serving their military service in the JNA at the time when the VRS was
7 disagrees. If you don't disagree could you proceed with your next
8 question, please?
12 officer and you're familiar with the structure of the army and the
13 relationship between the army and the state organs in the former
14 Yugoslavia. Also as the Chief of Staff of the VRS, of the Main Staff, you
15 were also familiar with the situation in Republika Srpska and for that
16 reason I believe that my next few questions will be easy for you to
17 answer.
21 A. Yes.
23 VRS was a state institution which was not part of the Ministry of
25 Republika Srpska?
4 Q. Yesterday, you told us that within the Main Staff of the army of
5 Republika Srpska, there was a sector for intelligence and security and
6 that there were two administrations within that sector, the intelligence
13 A. I believe that that was the case. On the eve of the war, or
14 immediately before I was sent out of Macedonia, I know that a decree had
22 administration --
24 administration.
2 Main Staff?
4 the JNA, this was much too high for me. I just carried orders of the army
6 Q. Thank you for your answer. Can we then say that the Main Staff of
7 the VRS army was directly linked to the corps and independent units?
8 A. Yes, and I was bragging about that and saying that I could -- had
9 to push a button.
10 Q. And the corps, did they have brigades and independent battalions
11 linked to them?
12 A. That's correct, but the links were not as automatic as they were
13 at the higher level, between the General Staff and the corps.
17 normally have. We had ad hoc teams or groups which we would send to the
18 units in order to establish the level of their combat readiness and the
20 Q. Did the corps commands do the same with regard to the lower units,
22 A. They adopted the same principle and they used the same system as
23 the system that the Main Staff applied with regard to them.
24 Q. The officers who inspected the commands and units, did they have
25 their team leaders? In other words, was anybody of them in charge? Did
2 A. Yes. The team leaders were well known. If the team was sent to
3 the corps, then it would be General Mladic who would head the team, or
5 inspection was.
6 Q. In such cases, the commander of the Main Staff, i.e., the corps
7 commander, if the team was sent from the corps, could they authorise the
8 team leader or one of the officers to influence the situation in the lower
11 Q. Can we say that the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS army
15 Q. Is it also correct that the officers from the Main Staff were also
17 A. I am sure that in my case that was the case. I don't know about
19 Q. You personally inspected corps commands and lower units during the
20 war and you spent a lot of time on the ground observing combat operations,
23 Q. Do you know whether there were any cases of an officer from the
24 Main Staff issuing orders to brigade commanders and that the corps
25 commander were not informed about such an order that had been issued?
3 Q. Are you aware of any such cases? Are you familiar with any of
4 them?
5 A. I believe that there were one or two such cases. They were done
7 Podrinje, and the commander would often send him to inspect the area from
8 Zvornik to Foca. On one occasion the commander of the 1st Bircani Brigade
11 battalion, and I believe that there was another such case in the Visegrad
12 Brigade.
14 issued certain orders to that brigade, but around that time, Zivanovic was
16 measures, were taken against him. I don't know about any other cases. We
19 Q. Thank you very much. Your answer was quite detailed. Is it true
20 that --
23 Zivanovic this is and what his particular position was. People may be
7 Main Staff, during the formation of the Drina Corps, as the 6th Corps of
8 the VRS army, and this took place on the 1st November, when he was
10 that corps. In other words, this was Milenko Zivanovic, the future
15 A. Yes.
18 lieutenant colonels, one would be a brigade commander and the other would
20 Colonel who acts as a brigade commander would have a higher pay than the
21 Lieutenant Colonel who works in a staff and who doesn't have any
23 position group but popularly it was also known as a pay group amongst us
25 Q. Could we also say that a position group also denoted the duties,
5 required ranks? In other words, their ranks were lower than were required
8 commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, General Momir Talic, was a higher
9 ranking officer than me and he was also older than me. For example, in
11 PG, i.e., my function, was higher than his. Still, I never arrived in the
15 In the eyes of the people who attended this act, this looked
16 strange. They wondered how it was possible for a higher ranking officer
17 to report to the General Major. Still, this was in keeping with the rules
18 and General Talic never violated that obligation that he had towards me,
23 can punish me for that whereas Milovanovic does not have that
24 possibility."
2 the war. It was very difficult to find commanders for the three corps,
3 the Sarajevo, the Herzegovina and the Eastern Bosnian Corps, and we were
5 brigades for the commander of the east corps. At that time he was a
6 colonel, Novica Simic. He remained bearing that rank for only two or
7 three months. He took over that duty in the corps where there were some
8 older colonels who were close to retirement. The problem was solved very
9 quickly. The older colonels were sent to retirement or they were sent to
10 some other units, and very soon, the Eastern Bosnia Corps was regenerated
12 Q. Were there cases that you were familiar with that brigade
17 withdrew together with the JNA and we were left with the lower-ranking
19 Suput left with the JNA and the oldest officer in the Protection Regiment
20 was Captain First Class Milomir Savcic, and he was appointed the commander
22 regiment commander. And at the end of the war he was promoted and became
23 a colonel and after the war, he was even promoted to the rank of a
24 general.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Sarapa, I hate to interrupt you. You know that
3 explain the relevance, of course we can live up with all these questions
6 as for this one, it was asked because General Pandurevic at the time when
7 he was appointed commander of the Zvornik Brigade, had the rank of Captain
8 First Class, and the idea of my question was to establish what the
14 your book covering the issues of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that you
15 had taken the rules of the former JNA and adapted them. Does that
18 the rules of the JNA. On the contrary, we adapted the rules of the JNA to
22 A. Yes.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Does that apply to checks made by the Main Staff but also corps
1 commands?
3 orders. If any other people came to inspect units, such as team leaders,
5 commands.
8 A. Yes, but they had to ask for permission to do that, from the
11 a corps?
13 leave the command of the corps, has to require permission from his
14 commander.
16 they have to report to the brigade commander, let him know they have
17 arrived?
19 Zivanovic.
2 the corps commander knows whether the visit had been announced or not.
5 A. Yes.
7 required to act in that way regardless of whether the inspector was coming
9 A. Yes.
12 A. Yes.
19 brigades. Do you know that at the beginning of the war in Zvornik, the
23 and went?
25 brigade commander.
2 were engaged to deal with certain problems that had resulted from the
4 A. I know that one unit from the regiment was engaged, whether the
7 Q. Are you aware that after brigade commander Major Petkovic, Dragan,
8 was wounded in October 1992, there was a problem appointing the new
10 A. Yes. When I mentioned that Vinko Pandurevic was the third or the
11 fourth, I had forgotten about Petkovic, although I know all about the
12 incident in which he was wounded and indeed there was a problem appointing
14 be their own property and they tried to impose a commander of their own.
17 A. I know that he did, but I take your word for it being in October
18 [as translated].
19 Q. Do you know that he was very young at the time, only 32 years old,
21 A. I knew all that, and I knew that Vinko Pandurevic had before that
1 ones.
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Sarapa, just for clarification, line 13, should
9 time.
12 commander in 1992.
14 Captain First Class at age 32. If he had completed the military academy,
15 he had to be -- he had only nine years to change four ranks. You have to
16 hold one rank for at least three years. In fact, never mind, I'm not
17 really interested.
24 little lower, please, so we can see the top of the document. It's all
3 that correct?
6 Q. Can we see page 3 of this document? Could you please look at the
7 signature?
9 Q. Can we see page 2 now? Mr. Milovanovic, could you please read
13 advance, as well as the attempt to bring back the old brigade commander
14 through the back door without any formal legal basis, and as a result of
21 rifts among troops, denigration of the Chief of Staff, (the lawful deputy
22 commander, which the said person has in no way deserved; on the contrary),
1 Q. Could you please continue reading? Can you please read the second
2 passage?
4 please?
9 Hereby request that the corps commander clearly informs the organs in the
10 municipality as well as the planned new commander who the commander is and
11 what -- and on what basis and who holds the responsibility in the brigade
14 interpretation?
21 this with all means and very energetically because I believe that this
22 phenomenon has been caused for the most part by the premature public
25 By that act, the command and control over the army has been brought into a
2 protect the process of command and control and his subordinates and to do
3 so by helping the work of the brigade commander whose work has maintained
6 sending 150 troops to the 2nd Motorised Romanija Brigade are being carried
10 vain individuals. The climate that has been created in the territory and
11 the way the official organs and institutions in the municipality work are
12 aimed at recruiting commanders and officers for their own interests, and
14 tries at all costs to protect the unit and maintain a high level of combat
15 readiness, they are trying to deal with such a commander using even the
4 that between the brigade commander, Pandurevic, and the corps commander,
5 Milenko Zivanovic, there were always harsh words said, and there were
7 see in his signature, the title, master of arts or sciences, which could
8 not be said of General Zivanovic. He did finish some military schools but
9 he did not have much of a general education. The only thing he knew was
13 mistaken about the name. What Mladic told him, I don't know. They -- the
14 two of them spoke. But I know that after that, Vinko no longer had any
16 in prison in Belgrade, where he's being held responsible for some crimes
18 Q. Do you remember that Pandurevic was denied the fact that he was
20 A. Not only Pandurevic, but all the officers who developed to the
21 level of being entitled to such education, because of the war, this was
22 also denied to Novica Simic, the commander of the East Bosnia Corps. We
24 cutoff age for war school was 42 but this did not apply to the members of
1 Yugoslavia that we would send them for education once the war was over
2 irrespective of their age at the time. And Vinko was enabled to get his
5 national defence, he was denied education in 1997, when the war was
7 A. Sir, I don't want to insult you but you were supposed to listen to
9 the whole of the Main Staff and up to 1998 I did not hold any functions, I
10 did not hold any positions, and in 1998 I was appointed a Minister of
11 Defence so I really don't have a clue why his education was denied, who
13 Q. Can the witness be shown Exhibit P02509? The document has been
18 is -- has come for the break so maybe it would be best if we had our break
22 I will finish.
24 What's the position with regard to the Beara team and the Nikolic team?
5 heard, we will require 15 minutes with this witness but not more than 15
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Can I suggest you consult a little bit with each
8 other to see whether you can then finish with Simic tomorrow, because if
9 it's unlikely, then I would prefer not to have him here, I mean, because
13 I think have the most interest and I think in fact he will be able to to
15 talk after the break. But that does bring up the issue Your Honour raised
16 earlier about the next witness and the motion to add some exhibits to the
17 65 ter list. We didn't think we were going to reach him but now it looks
20 from the Defence, but we acted before on the statement of Mr. McCloskey
21 that that was not likely to be the case tomorrow. So we'll -- please, do
22 have some mutual consultations during the next 25 minutes when we will
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: We've added up some of the time and I may have 30
4 minutes, but if we are lucky we'll finish tomorrow morning with the
6 Defence but I'm told Mr. Sarapa has no more questions so we may.
10 basically.
12 even before we heard from Mr. McCloskey. I would have more questions but
13 I don't have the time. I have a question about document P02509 but it
16 the brigades that at the beginning of August 1995 arrived in Krajina was a
17 brigade from the Drina Corps under the command of Vinko Pandurevic?
19 Q. Thank you very much for this answer and for all the others, and I
24 witness.
4 A. Good afternoon.
6 Nikolic in this case and I have just a few questions for you so I believe
9 you already referred to in your testimony, that the VRS inherited from the
10 JNA the doctrine that guided its actions during the war. I'm not talking
11 about the rules. I'm talking about the doctrine. Is that correct?
15 Q. But would I be right in saying that what guided the actions of the
16 VRS during the war, you inherited for the most part from the JNA even
19 i.e., provisions of the combat rules, from the JNA. Everything else,
20 i.e., the higher forms of defence, were adapted to the army of Republika
21 Srpska.
22 Q. Thank you, General. Now, within those combat rules that you say
24 activities was divided between the strategic, the operational and the
25 tactical level?
1 A. Yes.
3 are talking about a body that operates at the strategic level; is that
4 correct?
5 A. Yes. The Supreme Command and the Main Staff are strategic
6 commands.
8 in your capacity as Chief of Staff of the Main Staff, you also worked at
9 the strategic level but of course, the Main Staff has some responsibility
12 their zones, and as for the tactical level -- and I'm anticipating your
15 brigades operate indeed at the tactical level. Now, the fact that a
16 brigade works at this level, I'm talking about the tactical level, would I
17 be right in saying that this implies that a brigade is given and expected
21 operative level. If two or more corps prefer one task, this is strategic
22 level.
24 about the brigade, at the tactical level, would I be right in saying that
3 and level.
4 Q. Thank you, General. I'd like you to simply have a quick look at
5 Exhibit P2755, if we can call this up on the e-court, please. You are
6 familiar with this document, General, and I'd simply like you to confirm
10 document?
12 policy, and every item from 1 through 6 are strategic tasks for the army
13 of Republika Srpska.
15 what you call strategic tasks being given to the army of Republika Srpska,
18 A. Not only brigades, but also the corps and the Main Staff do not
19 have any impact on this document. Not even the Supreme Command has any
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 which is Exhibit P5, and I believe you are also familiar with this
24 exhibit, if we can call this on the e-court, please, and, General, I'd
25 like you to confirm that this exhibit that will appear before you is an
5 level. This concerns the defence policy, but some operative tasks are
6 being defined so we can say that we are talking about the operative level
7 as well.
9 the Supreme Commander or Mr. Karadzic, and this document is dated on the
14 goals and since the tasks are divided by the corps, they perform operative
15 tasks each in their respective area. Let me not go into what each corps
17 Q. Fully agree with you. I don't want you to go into what each of
18 the corps was asked to do, simply to -- I'm talking about the nature and
19 the character of the document, and my next question is: Can you confirm
20 that this type of document, that once again brigades have no input or say
24 more questions and that will be it. You testified during the last two
2 commanders within the Main Staff. I'd simply ask you to confirm that you
3 would agree this also applies, albeit at a much lower level, to assistant
7 smaller scale but the principles remain the same. The main decisions at
8 the brigade level are made by the brigade commander. His deputy, i.e.,
9 Chief of Staff, has almost the same functions as I had in the Main Staff.
10 He doesn't have different sectors but he has assistants for morale and for
11 logistics and that would be that. In other words, the principle of work
16 dealt with the inspections which may be conducted at lower levels than the
17 corps.
18 Now, I'll just read you the exact words which were mentioned and
19 it goes as follows: "If the team was sent from the corps, could they
21 situation in the lower units on the spot?" And your answer to this
24 talk about influencing the situation on the spot, that does not mean the
3 because the team is sent and when the team is sent no matter from which
4 level to a lower level it goes there not only to establish the situation
7 Q. And when that team issues orders, if you -- what kind of orders
10 two?
12 that the brigade or one of its battalions is not properly deployed, that
13 its tactical position is not good, the team leader has the powers to order
18 and visiting the brigade, you would agree with me that such an assistant
22 front line. His assignment could be only to size up the situation and
3 A. At any rate, he would pass his orders through the unit commander.
4 For instance, General Milovanovic would not just show up and move the
5 battalion. He would take Vinko Pandurevic, the commander, aside, tell him
6 what needs -- what he needs to tell him and then Vinko Pandurevic would be
8 Q. Thank you, General. I have one last question and this one is
9 based on your experience as Chief of Staff, and I would ask you to -- I'd
10 like to give you a situation and ask you for your -- based on your
13 told by one of his -- one of the assistant commanders within the brigade
14 that he has been given an order directly by Mladic, would it be normal for
15 this Chief of Staff to act upon this order without verifying whether
1 facts of this case is a matter for argument at a later time. I'm asking a
5 MR. BOURGON: And he can just tell us if it's normal for a Chief
6 of Staff to be told.
8 simple. The Chief of Staff at the brigade level who is standing in for
9 his commander at the time, and he is told by one of his -- well, one of
15 So that Chief of Staff has the obligation to carry out the order and
19 circumstances but indeed you would agree that the Chief of Staff in such a
22 A. Correct. But informing the immediate superior must not delay the
23 execution.
24 Q. And what if, General, this order that we are talking about
2 superiors?
6 answer it because we have not stopped the question or asked you not to
7 answer.
9 enough training and education to decide what is wrong and what is right.
12 7/1 that a commander of the Main Staff did not transmit to the units that
15 his order, refused or denied the order of the superior commander to enter
18 want to make sure that we are answering the same question, the Chief of
19 Staff was told this not by assistant commander from the corps but he was
22 such an order? Would that be what military both customs and the rules
23 call for?
2 you.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Bourgon. I take it that there are no
5 other Defence teams that wish to cross-examine the witness. Do you have
12 in this situation that he gave you, that had a trusted, for example, chief
13 of security, if he'd asked his chief of security when he hears about this
14 order from his chief, when he asked the chief, we've got to check with our
15 commander about that and the chief says our commander knows about it, it
16 comes from the highest, would that Chief of Staff normally trust his --
5 full question so he would have been the deputy commander actually of the
6 situation.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I agree that that wouldn't be very smart just
11 many contacts, especially in war, don't the commanders have to trust their
15 you trust your subordinate who tell to you accomplish a crime? That's
21 about. So -- and the General too. He's heard the exchange and he can now
25 clarified the issue for me a little bit. We are talking about the Chief
1 of Staff who is standing in for the brigade commander. In that case, his
2 immediate superior is the corps commander and he would address the corps
3 commander and inform him of the order he had received. He doesn't even
4 need to ask the question, "Shall I execute or not," because it's obvious
6 the corps commander, that's why he was trained and appointed to that
8 the same sort of person as the one who ordered the commission of a war
11 this person was a Chief of Staff acting in his own position rather than
13 brigade commander and his first immediate superior in that case is the
18 somebody orders that the truck be loaded with 20 tonnes. The truck can be
19 destroyed. In that case, you don't execute the verbal order. You ask for
20 an order in writing.
22 action or possible war crime, you don't execute the order immediately, if
23 it's verbal. You ask for that order in writing. In this way, the
25 person who issued the order. And that latter person is also protected in
2 MR. McCLOSKEY:
3 Q. You talked a bit about the obligation that an officer has when he
7 7.
10 had any duty to draft those illegal orders in the directive? Under the
11 JNA rules and the rules the VRS we are working under.
13 the Supreme Commander, he had to inform General Mladic and ask for his
15 from the Main Staff and it would have been normal to inform General Mladic
16 of the guidelines. But neither Mladic nor Miletic can influence the
17 guidelines as such. The commander of the Main Staff can influence it,
18 which he did with his own order. He deleted or omitted some clauses from
19 that directive, risking court martial and God knows what other
20 consequences, because he could have been tried for not strictly executing
6 Prosecutor is misstating the evidence and the facts, that General Miletic
9 later and we saw what happened in view of what General Mladic did, but the
14 with her argument. That's a legal argument, and given that's the
19 MR. McCLOSKEY:
21 one that I've -- I don't think I've shown you before. You may have seen
22 it or not. It's, as we are waiting for it, hopefully the B/C/S will come
23 up on your screen. It's entitled, "Main Staff of the armed forces of the
1 Prosecution." And it's dated 1992. I have a hard copy that -- it's
2 coming but it will be easier for the general, I think, if he has something
3 in his hands.
4 Thank you, General, if you could just flip through that a bit see
9 would quite like to know where Mr. McCloskey is going. I don't know
16 MR. HAYNES: Well, if he's going to go ahead, can we all see the
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: The part I wanted to ask the general about was
25 English.
3 to finish today with this witness. This is beyond the scope of what was
4 asked. I don't know where -- this document was not on the list that was
5 given to us. It's a new document. And I don't know what kind of
7 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's wait for the question first and then see
11 time, General?
17 Q. Now, you've also spoken at some length about the various positions
18 at the Main Staff and, in particular, you were asked questions about Gvero
19 and Miletic. And I have a couple of documents from our time period that
20 actually have their names in it and I think, if we could get your comments
22 that you told us about their jobs. The first document I would go to is 65
25 MR. McCLOSKEY:
1 Q. All right. And this document -- there is the B/C/S. It's from
3 won't get into that. It's dated 9 July, as you can see. If that -- maybe
4 bring that up a bit for our eyesight. And it's very urgent to the
6 command post, Generals Gvero and Krstic personally. And I won't go into
7 the document or read it too much but it's a document that we have become
10 Srebrenica.
11 And can you tell us, General, well, first of all, have you ever
13 A. No.
15 command post, Generals Gvero and Krstic personally, what can we tell, if
16 anything, about the location of Generals Gvero and Krstic at the time that
22 General Gvero and Krstic indicate their location, and I think -- I think
23 you can rephrase it. I personally -- but I speak for myself, I don't see
24 any problem with the question as is but I'll confer with my colleagues.
5 me, I don't know the actual state of affairs on the ground, as it was at
6 the time the report was written, but it reads, "To the President of
7 Republika Srpska, for information," you don't know -- you didn't say who--
8 it was signed, General Tolimir, yes, I can see that. Could you now show
10 Karadzic and he's letting Karadzic know that his order is being executed
11 or has been conveyed and is in the process of being carried out. Now, the
13 personally to General Gvero and Krstic. That means that Tolimir knows
14 that they are at the forward command post of the Drina Corps, because if
15 Tolimir had been thinking they were at the Main Staff, it would have been
16 addressed to the Main Staff, not the forward command post out there in the
17 field.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY:
19 Q. Okay. And so, given that, and given what you've described about
20 the positions of Generals Gvero and others, can you tell us, if you can,
21 what would -- would Gvero have been there on his own or would he have
1 speculative. The witness wasn't there at the time and he's being asked to
2 assume something which is beyond the scope of his own personal knowledge.
5 General.
12 finish, but there are only a few minutes left, I would presume. And then
14 Have you also made up your mind as to what's going to happen? The
15 general can be escorted. Madam Usher, you can escort the general. Thank
19 documents to the 65 ter list for witness number 4. Others are not sure
20 yet. What the consensus seems to be is that they would prefer witness 4
21 not testify tomorrow. And I think this has now taken longer than we
22 expected. So the plan is, if it pleases Your Honours, to start off with
23 Witness 165 tomorrow after the general finishes and that will be the only
25 JUDGE AGIUS: And how long do you anticipate the Simic testimony
3 and a half, an hour to an hour and a half. I will have, unless things go
4 a little bit funny, my direct will be I think about half an hour and my
6 little more.
8 Thank you. Have a nice afternoon and evening. We'll reconvene tomorrow
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