API RP 581 THIRD EDITION, JANUARY 2018

RISK-BASED INSPECTION METHODOLOGY –

DEMONSTRATING THE TECHNOLOGY THROUGH A WORKED EXAMPLE
PROBLEM

L. C. Kaley, P.E.
Trinity Bridge, LLC
Savannah, Georgia USA

1.0 ABSTRACT
The Joint Industry Project for Risk-Based Inspection (RBI JIP) was initiated and
managed by API within the refining and petrochemical industry in 1992. The
work from the JIP resulted in two publications, API 580 Risk-Based Inspection
released in 2002 and API 581 Base Resource Document – Risk-Based Inspection
originally released in 1996. The concept behind these publications was for API
580 to introduce the principles and present minimum general guidelines for RBI
while API 581 was to provide quantitative RBI methods. The API RBI JIP has
made major advances in the technology since the original publication of these
documents and released the 1st addendum to the third edition of API RP 581
Risk-Based Inspection Methodology in December 2017. API RP 581 is a is a
three-part document, Part 1 – Inspection Planning Methodology, Part 2 –
Probability of Failure Methodology, and Part 3 – Consequence of Failure
Methodology. This paper provides a step-by-step worked example that
demonstrates the technology documented in API 581, Third Edition, 1st
Addendum to be released by API in 2018.

This document is intended solely for the internal use of Trinity Bridge, LLC and may not be reproduced or
transmitted by any means without the express written consent of Trinity Bridge, LLC.
All rights reserved.

Copyright 2017, Trinity Bridge, LLC

2.0 INTRODUCTION
The API risk-based inspection methodology outlined in API RP 581 has been
used in the Refining and Petrochemical industries to manage the overall risk of a
plant since the mid-1990’s as a methodology for focusing inspection efforts on
the process equipment with the highest risk. API RP 581 Third Edition, 1st
Addendum published in November 2017 (API 581) is the latest edition of API
581 that provides the basis for making informed decisions on inspection
frequency, the extent of inspection, and the most suitable type of NDE. In most
processing plants, a large percent (80-90%) of the total unit risk will be
concentrated in a relatively small percentage (10-20%) of the equipment.
These potential high-risk components require greater attention, often through a
more extensive inspection or by more advanced inspection methods. The cost
of this increased inspection effort often is offset by reducing inspection efforts
on the larger percentage of lower risk equipment.
API 581 provides quantitative RBI methods to establish an inspection program.
The worked example presented in this paper follows the step-by-step procedure
outlined in the document to demonstrate use of the technology developed by
the API JIP. This will enable practitioners to better understand the methodology
and facilitate effective peer review.
The API 581 is a three-part document:
• Part 1 – Inspection Planning Methodology
• Part 2 – Probability of Failure Methodology
• Part 3 – Consequence of Failure Methodology
Calculation of risk involves the determination of a probability of failure (POF)
combined with the consequence of failure (COF). Failure in API RBI is defined
as a loss of containment from the pressure boundary resulting in leakage to the
atmosphere or rupture of a pressurized component. As damage accumulates in
a pressurized component during in-service operation the risk increases. At
some point, the risk tolerance or risk target is exceeded and an inspection of
sufficient effectiveness to determine the damage state of the component is
recommended. It is important to note that the inspection itself does not reduce
risk; however, it reduces the uncertainty in the component condition by allowing
better quantification of the damage present.
The following worked example follows the step-by-step procedures in API 581 to
calculate risk for a drum that is susceptible to internal corrosion and in-service
stress corrosion cracking. API 581 involves evaluating the risk associated with
releases from four representative hole sizes. This example demonstrates the
calculation of POF for each of these representative hole sizes. COF will be
calculated using the Level 1 consequence model for one of the representative
hole sizes; however, consequence results for all four hole sizes will be used in
the final consequence and risk calculations. Inspection planning will be
demonstrated using an iterative calculation required to plot risk over time and
to determine the impact of inspection on risk.
All figures, tables and equation numbers used in this paper correspond to the
actual numbers in API 581 for an easy cross reference with the document.
3.0 WORKED EXAMPLE INTRODUCTION
The pressure vessel for the risk determination is V-07, a Debutanizer Overhead
Accumulator in a Saturated Gas plant. The drum operates at a temperature of
49OC (121OF) and a pressure, Ps , of 0.696 MPa (101 psig) and contains a
mixture of propane and butane with 0.11% H2S. The drum operates with
approximately a 50% liquid level.
The mechanical design basis of the drum is as follows:

Fabrication date 01/01/1981

Design Pressure 1.138 MPa (165 psig)
Design Temperature 232 oC (450oF)
Weld Joint Efficiency 0.85
Material of Construction ASTM 285 Gr. C 1968
Yield Strength 206 MPa (30,000 psi)
Tensile Strength 413 MPa (60,000 psi)
Allowable Stress 94.8 MPa (13,750 psi)
Furnished thickness 20.637 mm (0.8125 inch)
Corrosion Allowance 3.175 mm (0.125 inch)
Post Weld Heat Treatment (PWHT) Yes
Diameter 2,479.675 mm (97.625 inch)
Length 9.144 m (30 ft)

Operating conditions allow aqueous conditions to occur with a localized

measured corrosion rate of 0.254 mmpy (10 mpy). In addition, stress corrosion
cracking caused by wet H2S is possible with a susceptibility of Low. Inspection
history from 4/4/2013 (B effectiveness level) revealed some localized corrosion
and a measured thickness of 19.05 mm (0.75 inch). A cracking inspection for
wet H2S cracking was conducted on this drum on 10/8/1991.
The process fluid in the drum has the following properties:
Vapor Density, ρV 10.0065 kg/m3 (0.6247 lb/ft3)
Liquid Density, ρl 538.3804 kg/m3 (33.61 lb/ft3)
NBP -21.28oC (-6.3oF)
Auto-Ignition Temperature; AIT 368.89oC (696oF)
Liquid Discharge Coefficient, Cdisch 0.61
Gravitational constant, gc 1 m/s2 (32.2 ft/s2)
Detection/Isolation factor factdi 0.0
Mitigation Factor, factmit 0.0
Inventory Group Mass, lbs 181,527.68 kg (400,200 lbs)
Management Factor 1.0

The plant information for inspection planning is as follows:

Inspection Planning
RBI Date 05/01/2017
Plan Date 05/01/2027
Financial Risk Target, €/yr 1,000
DF Target 3,000
4.0 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
The probability of failure used in API RBI is computed from Equation (2.1).
Pf t   gff  Df t   FMS
In this equation, the probability of failure, Pf (t ) , is determined as the product
of a generic failure frequency , gff , a damage factor, D f (t ) , and a
management systems factor, FMS .
The gff for different component types was set at a value representative of the
refining and petrochemical industry’s failure data (Table 3.1) and is the rate of
failure prior to damage occurring in-service due to the operating environment.
The gff is provided for four discrete hole sizes by equipment type (i.e. vessels,
drums, towers, piping tankage, etc.), covering the full range of consequence
model release scenarios (i.e. small leak to rupture).
Adjustments are applied to the gff in order to account for damage mechanisms,
operating environment and mechanical integrity management practices within a
plant. The DF is based on the active damage mechanisms (local and general
corrosion, cracking, creep, etc.), based on original design and the current
condition of the component assessed during inspection. The DF modifies the
industry gff to calculate the POF for the specific component being evaluated.

The management systems adjustment factor, FMS , is based on the influence of

the facility’s management system on the mechanical integrity of the plant
equipment. This factor accounts for the probability that accumulating damage
which results in loss of containment will be discovered in time and is directly
proportional to the quality of a facility’s mechanical integrity program. The
factor is the result of an audit of a facilities or operating unit’s management
systems that affect plant risk.

4.1 Calculation of Thinning Damage Factor

The following example demonstrates the steps required for calculating the
thinning damage factor:
1.) Determine the time in-service, age, from the last inspection reading, trdi to
the RBI and Plan Dates.
1B level inspection was performed on 04/04/2013 with a measured thickness of
19.05 mm (0.75 inch)
age @ RBI Date= 4.0 years
age @ Plan Date= 14.0 years
2.) Determine the corrosion rate of the base material, Cr,bm : 0.0254 mmpy
(10 mpy)
3.) Determine the minimum required wall thickness, tmin, from API 579,
Appendix A
PRc
C
tmin 
SE  0.6 P

97.625
165 
tmin  2  0.6950 inch
13, 750  0.85  0.6 165
4.) Determine the Art parameter using Equation (2.13) based on age and trdi
from Step 1 and tmin from Step 6 using Equation (2.13).

 C   agetk  agerc  
Art  max  r ,bm ,0
 trdi 

5.) Art at RBI Date:

(0.010  0)  4
Art  1   0.053
0.75

Art at Plan Date:

(0.010  0) 14
Art  1   0.187
0.75

6.) Calculate the Flow Stress, FS Thin

FS Thin 
YS  TS   E 1.1
2

FS Thin 
 30  60   0.85 1.1
2
FS  42.075
Thin

7.) Calculate the Strength Ratio parameter, SRPThin

S  E Max(tmin , tc )
SRPThin  
FS Thin trdi
13.75  0.85 Max(0.6950, 0.100)
SRPThin  
42.075 0.75
SRPThin  0.2574

8.) Determine number of thinning inspections

Thinning Inspection History: 1B
9.) Calculate the inspection effectiveness factors, I1Thin , I 2Thin , I 3Thin , using
Equation (2.17) and values from Tables 4.5 and 4.6

1  Co p1   CoThinB   CoThinC   CoThinD 

N Thin N BThin NCThin Thin
ND
I1Thin  PrpThin ThinA A

p1 p1 p1

I1Thin  0.500  0.9   0.7   0.5   0.4 

0 1 0 0

I1Thin  0.35

2  Co p 2   Co  Co  Co 
Thin
N BThin NCThin Thin
ND
I 2Thin  PrpThin ThinA A ThinB ThinC ThinD
p2 p2 p2

I 2Thin  0.300  0.09   0.2   0.3  0.33

0 1 0 0

I 2Thin  0.06

3  Co p 3   Co   Co   Co 
N Thin N BThin NCThin Thin
ND
I 3Thin  PrpThin ThinA A ThinB ThinC ThinD
p3 p3 p3

I 3Thin  0.200  0.01  0.1  0.20   0.27 

0 1 0 0

I 3Thin  0.02

Thin Thin
10.) Calculate the Posterior Probabilities, Pop1 , Pop 2 and PoThin
p3

I1Thin
Po Thin
 Thin
I1  I 2Thin  I 3Thin
p1

0.35
p1 
PoThin
0.35  0.06  0.02
PoThin
p1  0.8140

I 2Thin
Po Thin
 Thin
I1  I 2Thin  I 3Thin
p2

0.06
p2 
PoThin
0.35  0.06  0.02
PoThin
p2  0.1395

I 3Thin
p3 
PoThin
I1Thin  I 2Thin  I 3Thin
0.02
p3 
PoThin
0.35  0.06  0.02
PoThin
p3  0.0465
11.) Calculate the parameters, 1Thin , 2Thin , 3Thin
Where :
COVt  0.20
COVS f  0.20
COVP  0.05

1  DS1  Art  SRThin

 
Thin p

 
1 2
DS1 2  Art 2  COVt 2  1  DS1  Art  COVS f 2  ( SRThin
p ) 2  COVP 2
1  1  0.053  0.2574
1Thin 
12  0.0532  0.202  1  1  0.053  0.202  (0.2574) 2  0.052
2

1Thin  3.6263

1  DS2  Art  SRThin

 
Thin p

 
2 2
DS2 2  Art 2  COVt 2  1  DS2  Art  COVS f 2  ( SRThin
p ) 2  COVP 2
1  2  0.053  0.2574
 2Thin 
22  0.0532  0.202  1  2  0.053  0.202  (0.2574) 2  0.052
2

 2Thin  3.5252

1  DS3  Art  SRThin

3Thin 
p

 
2
DS3 2  Art 2  COVt 2  1  DS3  Art  COVS f 2  ( SRThin
p ) 2  COVP 2
1  4  0.053  0.2574
3Thin 
4  0.053  0.20  1  4  0.053  0.202  (0.2574) 2  0.052
2 2 2 2

3Thin  3.2366
Calculate the thinning base DF at the RBI Date and Plan Date

D Thin


 PoThin 
p1    1
Thin
    PoThin
p2 
    2Thin     Po
Thin
p3 
   3Thin   
fb
 1.56 E  04 
 
  0.8140  NORMSDIST  3.6263   
 
  0.1395  NORMSDIST  3.5252    
 
DThin


 0.0465  NORMSDIST  3. 2366   

1.56 E  04
fb
 
 
 
 
 
fb @ RBI Date  1.1196
DThin

D Thin


 PoThin 
p1    1
Thin
    PoThin
p2 
    2Thin     Po
Thin
p3 
   3Thin   
fb
 1.56 E  04 
 
  0.8140  NORMSDIST  3.6263   
 
  0.1395  NORMSDIST  3.5252    
 
DThin


 0.0465  NORMSDIST  3. 2366   

1.56 E  04
fb
 
 
 
 
 
fb @ Plan Date  159.71
DThin

12.) Calculate the final thinning DF at the RBI Date and Plan Date

 DThin
fb  FIP  FDL
 
D Thin
 max   ,1
f 
 FCM  
 0.49  1  1  
DThin
f  max   ,1
 1  
fb @ RBI Date  1.1196
DThin

 DThin  
fb  FIP  FDL
D Thin
 max   ,1

f
FCM  
 126.65  1  1  
DThin
f  max   ,1
 1  
D fb @ Plan Date  159.71
Thin
4.2 Calculation of Stress Corrosion Cracking Damage Factor
The following example demonstrates the steps required for calculating the
HIC/SOHIC-H2S damage factor:
1.) Determine the number of historical inspections and historical inspection
effectiveness category: A 1C cracking inspection was been performed on
10/8/1999 this vessel
2.) Determine time in-service, age, from the last A, B, C or D inspection
performed to the RBI and Plan Dates.
age @ RBI Date = 25.5 years
age @ Plan Date = 35.5 years

3.) Determine the environmental severity for cracking based on the H2S content
of the water, PWHT and pH: Low
4.) Based on susceptibility in Step 3, determine the severity index, SVI, from
Table 10.5: SVI = 1
5.) Determine the base damage factor for HIC/SOHIC-H2S cracking,
/ SOHIC  H2 S
DHIC
fB using Table 6.4 based on the number of and highest inspection
effectiveness determined in Step 1, and the severity index, SVI, from Step
4:
/ SOHIC  H 2 S
DHIC
fB 1
6.) Calculate the escalation in the DF at the RBI Date and Plan Date

 D HIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
  Max[age,1.0] 
1.1
HIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
 Min  ,5000 
fB
D f
 FOM 
 
HIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
 1  Max[25.5,1.0]1.1 
D  Min  ,5000 
f
 1 
 
DfHIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
@ RBI Date  Min  35.25,5000   35.25

 D HIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
  Max[age,1.0] 
1.1
HIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
 Min  ,5000 
fB
D f
 FOM 
 
HIC / SOHIC  H 2 S
 1  Max[35.5,1.0]1.1 
D  Min  ,5000 
f
 1 
 
D HIC
f
/ SOHIC  H 2 S
@ Plan Date  Min  50.73,5000   50.73
4.3 Calculation of Damage Factor Combination for Multiple Damage
Mechanisms

If more than one damage mechanism is present, the total damage factor, D f total
is given by Equation (2.2).

D f total  Dthin
f  gov  D f  gov  D f  gov  D f
extd scc htha
 Dbrit
f  gov  D f
mfat

D f total  1.1196  0  35.25  0  0  0

D f total @ RBI Date  36.37

D f total  Dthin
f  gov  D f  gov  D f  gov  D f
extd scc htha
 Dbrit
f  gov  D f
mfat

D f total  159.71  0  50.73  0  0  0

D f total @ Plan Date  210.44

4.4 Calculation of Probability of Failure

The final probability of failure calculation is performed using above Equation
(1.1).
Pf (t ) at RBI Date = 3.06e05  36.37 1  1.09 E 03
Pf (t ) atPlan Date  3.06e05  210.44 1  5.43E 03
Damage factors do not provide a definitive Fitness-for-Service assessment of
the component. The basic function of the damage factor is to statistically
evaluate the amount of damage that may be present as a function of time in
service and the effectiveness of an inspection activity to quantify that damage.

5.0 CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE

Loss of containment of hazardous fluids from pressurized processing equipment
can result in damage to surrounding equipment, serious injury to personnel,
production losses, and undesirable environmental impacts. In API RBI, the
consequences of loss of containment are expressed as an affected impact area
or in financial terms. Impact areas from such event outcomes as pool fires,
flash fires, fireballs, jet fires and vapor cloud explosion (VCEs) are quantified
based on the effects of thermal radiation and overpressure on surrounding
equipment and personnel. Additionally, cloud dispersion analysis methods are
used to quantify the magnitude of flammable releases and to determine the
extent and duration of personnel exposure to toxic releases. Event trees are
utilized to assess the probability of each of the various event outcomes and to
provide a mechanism for probability-weighting the loss of containment
consequences.
Methodologies for two levels of consequence analysis are provided in API RP 581
and outlined in Table 3.1. Level 1 consequence analysis provides a simplistic
method to estimate the consequence area based on lookup tables for a limited
number of generic or reference hazardous fluids. A Level 2 consequence
analysis methodology is more rigorous in that it incorporates a detailed
calculation procedure that can be applied to a wider range of hazardous fluids.
The simpler Level 1 analysis will be used in this worked example to demonstrate
the approach.
5.1 Calculation of Release Phase
Select a representative fluid group from Table 4.2: C3-C4
Determine the stored fluid phase: Liquid (50%)
Determine stored fluid properties from Table 4.2:
Liquid Density, ρl = 538.4125 kg/m3 (33.612 lb/ft3)
Vapor Density, ρV = 13.8529 kg/m3 (0.8652 lb/ft3)
Auto-Ignition Temperature, AIT = 368.9oC (696oF)
Normal Boiling Point, -21.3oC (-6.3oF)
Determine steady state phase of fluid after release to atmosphere: Gas

5.2 Determination of Release Hole Size Selection

A discrete set of release events or release hole sizes are used since it would be
impractical to perform the consequence calculations for a continuous spectrum
of release hole sizes. The four hole sizes calculated in Level 1 analysis are ¼-
inch, 1-inch, 4-inch and rupture (to a maximum of 16-inch). For the purposes
of this worked example, we will calculate the consequences of only one hole size
to demonstrate the calculation procedure.
Determine the hole size for calculation: 101.6 mm (4-inch)
Determine the generic failure frequency, gff n , for the 4-inch hole size: 2.00E-06
5.3 Calculation of Release Rate

1.) Calculate the release hole size area, An , using Equation (3.8)
 
A3,hole  d2   42  12.57 inch 2
4 4

2.) Select the appropriate release rate calculation using the stored fluid phase
determined.
3.) Determine the viscosity correction factor, K v , n : for non-viscous fluids, the
viscosity correction factor is set equal to 1.
4.) Calculate the release rate, Wn , for the release area An determined in Step 2
using Equation (3.3).

An 2  g c   Ps  Patm 
Wn  Cd  K v ,n  l 
C1 l
12.57 2  32.2  101  0 
Wn  0.61 1  33.61 
12 33.61
Wn  298.6733 lb / sec

5.4 Estimate the Fluid Inventory Available for Release

The available mass for release is estimated as the lesser of two quantities:
• Inventory Group Mass – The component being evaluated is part of a larger
group of components that can be expected to provide fluid inventory for the
release. The inventory group mass is the sum of the inventory available for
all components in the inventory group and is used as the upper limit mass of
the fluid available for a release.
 • Component Mass – An assumption is made that for large leaks, operator
intervention will occur within 3 minutes, thereby limiting the amount of
released fluid. Therefore, the amount of additional mass, massadd , n , is based
on 3 minutes of leakage from the components inventory group for the hole
size, limited to 203 mm (8-inch).

1.) Calculate the inventory mass available: 181,528 kg (400,200 lbs)

2.) Calculate the fluid mass, masscomp , for the component.

Total Volume, and the Liquid and Vapor Volume
Vcyl   R 2  L
2
 97.625 / 2 
Vcyl       30
 12 
Vcyl  1,559.45 ft 3

Liquid Volume, Vl  50% 1.559.45 ft 3

Liquid Volume, Vl  779.72 ft 3
Vapor Volume, Vv  (100%-50%) 1,559 ft 3
Vapor Volume, Vv  779.72 ft 3

Component Mass, lbs

Masseqp  Vl  l   Vv  v 
Masseqp  (779.72  33.61)  (779.72  0.625)
Masseqp  26, 693.60 lbs
3.) Calculate the added fluid mass, massadd ,n , as a result of 3 minutes of flow
from the inventory group

massadd ,n  298.67 lb / sec 180 sec  53, 761 lbs

5.5 Determine Release Type
1.) Determine if the release type is instantaneous or continuous using the
following criteria:
If the release hole size is 6.35 (1/4-inch) or less, release type is continuous
If the sum of the component mass and the release mass for 3 minutes is greater
than 4,536 kg (10,000 lb), the release type is instantaneous; otherwise the
release type is continuous
Total mass  53, 761.19 lbs  26, 693.60 lbs
Total mass  80, 454.78 lbs

Inventory Group Mass  400, 200 lbs

 massavail , n  min masscomp  massadd ,n  , massinv 
massavail ,3  min  80454.78 , 400200   80, 454.78 lbs

Since the total massavail , n 36,607.99 kg (80,454.78 lbs) is greater than 4,536 kg
(10,000 lb), the release is instantaneous.

5.6 Estimate Impact of Detection and Isolation Systems on Release

Magnitude
Detection and isolation systems can have a significant impact on magnitude and
duration of a hazardous fluid release. Guidance for assigning the effectiveness
of detection and isolation systems is provided in Table 4.5.

Determine the detection and isolation system

Detection: C
Isolation: C
Mitigation: None
Determine release reduction factor, factdi : 0
Determine mitigation factor, factmit : 0
Discharge coefficient Liquid, Cdisch= 0.61
Gravitational constant, gc=1 m/s2 (gc=32.2 ft/s2)

5.7 Determine Flammable and Explosive Consequence

Level 1 consequence analysis uses equations to calculate flammable and
explosive consequence areas presented in Table 3.1. The equations are
estimated from a set of equation using release rate (for continuous releases)
and mass (for instantaneous releases).
1.) Calculate the energy efficiency correction factor, eneff n
(Note that this is ONLY applied to Instantaneous releases.)
eneff n  4  log10  massn   15
eneff 4  4  log10 80, 454.78  15  4.6222
Since the auto-ignition, AIT temperature is AIT of 368.9oC (696oF) is more than
80 above ambient conditions, auto-ignition upon release is unlikely.
Since the operating temperature of 49.44 oC (121OF) is greater than the normal
boiling point, NBP, of -21.3056oC (-6.3oF), model the released fluid as a gas.
Calculate the equipment damage consequence and personal injury areas for
AINL  INST
auto-ignition Not Likely, Instantaneous Release (AINL-INST), CAinj ,n
.

2.) Determine the Flammable Equipment Damage Area constants a and b from
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 for the release phase determined in Step 3 and using
Equation (3.17).

Instantaneous
b  1  factmit 
AINL  INST
CAcmd ,n  a  massn    
 eneff n 
 1 0 
AINL  INST
 27.96  80, 454.78 lb  
0.72
CAcmd ,3 
 4.6222 
AINL  INST
CAcmd ,3 = 95,177.55 ft 2

Continuous
b  1  factmit 
AINL  INST
CAcmd ,n  a  massn    
 eneff n 
1  1 0 
AINL  INST
CAcmd ,3  49.48  298.6733 lb/sec    
 4.6222 
AINL  INST
CAcmd ,3 = 1, 644.35 ft 2

Final Results
Instananeous Continuous
,1  11,357.52 ,1  6.42
AIL AIL
CAcmd CAcmd

,2  46,840.70 ,2  102.77
AIL AIL
CAcmd CAcmd

,3  95,177.55 ,3  1, 644.35
AIL AIL
CAcmd CAcmd

,4  210,158.01 ,4  26,309.54
AIL AIL
CAcmd CAcmd

Instananeous Continuous
CA AINL
cmd ,1  100, 247.08 ,1  40.71
AINL
CAcmd

,2  346,333.16 ,2  651.36
AINL AINL
CAcmd CAcmd

,3  644, 045.15 ,3  10, 421.73

AINL AINL
CAcmd CAcmd

,4  1, 288, 031.03 ,4  166, 747.63

AINL AINL
CAcmd CAcmd
3.) Determine the Flammable Personnel Damage Area constants a and b from
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 for the release phase determined in Step 3.
Instantaneous
 1  factmit 
  a   massn    
 INST b
CAinjAINL
,n
   eneff n 
0.75  1  0 
CAinjAINL
,3
 INST
 57.72   80, 7033.93 lb    
 4.6222 
 INST
CAinjAINL
,3 = 275, 733.93 ft 2

Continuous
 1  factmit 
  a   massn    
 INST b
CAinjAINL
,n
   eneff n 
1  1 0 
CAinjAINL
,3
 INST
 125.2   298.6733 lb    
 4.6222 
 INST
CAinjAINL
,3 = 4,160.72 ft 2

Instananeous Continuous
CA AINL
inj ,1  11,357.52 ,1  6.42
CAinjAINL

,2  46,840.70
CAinjAINL ,2  102.77
CAinjAINL

,3  95,177.55
CAinjAINL ,3  1, 644.35
CAinjAINL

,4  210,158.01
CAinjAINL ,4  26,309.54
CAinjAINL

Instananeous Continuous
CAinjAIL,1  30,114.14 CAinjAIL,1  16.25
CAinjAIL,2  131, 749.65 CAinjAIL,2  260.04
CAinjAIL,3  275, 733.93 CAinjAIL,3  4,160.72
CAinjAIL,4  629, 267.74 CAinjAIL,4  66,571.44
4.) Calculate Instantaneous/Continuous Blending factor

  rate4  
factnIC  min    , 1.0 
  C5  
where : C5  55.6

  33.23  
fact3IC  min    , 1.0 
  55.6  
fact3  min  0.5977, 1.0 
IC

fact3IC  0.5977

5.) Calculate the Instantaneous/Continuous areas

AINL
CAcmd AINL  INST
,n  CAcmd ,n
AINL CONT
 factnIC  CAcmd ,n  1  factnIC 

,3  95,177.55  0.5977 1, 644.35  1  0.5977 

AINL
CAcmd

,3  57,549.86 ft
AINL 2
CAcmd

,1  32.93
AINL
CAcmd

,2  1,848.75
AINL
CAcmd

,3  57,549.86
AINL
CAcmd

,4  210,158.01
AINL
CAcmd

AIL
CAcmd AIL  INST
,n  CAcmd ,n
AIL CONT
 factnIC  CAcmd ,n  1  factnIC 

,3  644, 045.15  0.5977 10, 421.73  1  0.5977 

AIL
CAcmd

,3  389,143.33 ft
AIL 2
CAcmd

,1  274.67
AIL
CAcmd

,2  13,564.90
AIL
CAcmd

,3  389,143.33
AIL
CAcmd

,4  1, 288, 031.03
AIL
CAcmd
6.) Calculate the AIT Blending factor

fact AIT  0 for Ts  C6  AIT

fact AIT 
Ts  AIT  C6  for Ts  C6  AIT  Ts  C6
2  C6
fact AIT  1 for Ts  C6  AIT

AIT  696.0
Ts  101F
C6  100
Ts  C6  101  100  201F  696.0
fact AIT  0

7.) Calculate the AIT Blending areas

, n = CAcmd ,4  fact ,4   1- fact 

flam AIL AIT AINL AIT
CAcmd +CAcmd

, n =  389,902.56  0    57, 678.11  1  0  

flam
CAcmd
flam 2
CAcmd , n = 57, 678.11 ft

,1  32.93
AINL
CAcmd

,2  1,848.75
AINL
CAcmd

,3  57,549.86
AINL
CAcmd

,4  210,158.01
AINL
CAcmd

, n = CAinj , n  fact
CAinjflam , n   1- fact 
AIL AIT
+CAinjAINL AIT

, n = 1,316, 064.49  0   166,869.16  1  0  

CAinjflam
CAinjflam
, n = 166,869.16 ft
2

,1  86.53
AINL
CAcmd

,2  5,172.07
AINL
CAcmd

,3  166, 482.12
AINL
CAcmd

,4  629, 267.74
AINL
CAcmd
8.) Final Weighted Flammable Consequence Area for Equipment Damage:
 4 flam 
  gff n  CAcmd ,n 
flam
CAcmd   n 1 
 gff total 
 
 
8.00E -06
 32.93   2.00E -05 1,848.75  

CA flam

 2.00E -06
 57,549.86    6.00E -07  210,158.01
cmd
3.060E -05
flam
CAcmd  9, 099.11 ft 2

Final Weighted Flammable Consequence Area for Personnel Injury:

 4 flam 
  gff n  CAinj ,n 
CAinjflam   n 1 
 gff total 
 
 
8.00E -06
 86.53   2.00E -05  5,172.07  

CA flam

 2.00E -06
166, 482.12    6.00E -07  629, 267.74 
inj
3.060E -05
CAinjflam  26, 622.82 ft 2

The final consequence area for the equipment damage and personnel injury is
the maximum of the areas calculated. For this worked example, the maximum
damage area is the flammable consequence for personnel injury or 2,473.34 m2
(26,622.82 ft2).
A similar procedure is used for determining the consequences associated with
releases of toxic chemicals such as H 2S, ammonia or chlorine. Toxic impact
areas are based on probit equations and can be assessed whether the stream is
pure or a percentage of a hydrocarbon stream. For simplicity, the toxic
calculation is not included in this worked example.
A limitation of Level 1 consequence analysis is that it can only be performed for
the cases where the component fluid is best represented by one of the reference
fluids. The Level 1 consequence analysis has been used by the refining industry
for over 10 years with success. However, as international interest has grown in
API RBI in the refining and petrochemical industries, as well as in the chemical
industries, the limited fluids available were insufficient and the cost to develop
additional fluids was high. The Level 2 analysis was developed to address the
limitations of Level 1 and to provide a wider industry audience with
consequences a more rigorous approach.
5.8 Determining Financial Consequence
Failure (loss of containment) not only has safety consequences, represented by
flammable and toxic consequence areas but there are costs associated the
release of hazardous materials that does not result in damage to equipment or
serious injury to personnel. Since the costs include more than business
interruption, analysis for financial consequence is determined by the sum of the
following individual costs, shown in Equation (3.97):

FC  FCcmd  FCaffa  FC prod  FCinj  FCenviron (3.97)

Where:
FC is the final financial consequence, € ($)
FCaffa is the financial consequence of damage to surrounding equipment on the
unit, € ($)
FCenviron is the financial consequence of environmental clean-up, € ($)

FCcmd is the financial consequence of component damage, € ($)

FCinj is the financial consequence as a result of serious injury to personnel, € ($)

FC prod is the financial consequence of lost production on the unit, € ($)

And:
Population Density, personnel/ft2 = 0.00005
Production, $/day = 50,000
Injury Cost, $/fatality = $5,000,000
Environmental Cost, $/event = 0
Equipment Cost, $/ft2 = 1,200
5.9 Component Damage Cost, FCcmd
The Damage cost uses a cost required for repair of the damaged component,
independent of other damage caused by the event. The cost of repair,
holecost , for different release hole sizes can be found in Table 5.15 and are
provided below.
Damage Costs, holecost
¼” hole cost - $5,000
1” hole cost - $12,000
4” hole cost - $20,000
Rupture cost - $40,000
The values in Table 5.15 are based on carbon steel prices. For other materials a
material cost factor, matcost , is used to adjust the cost of alloy materials. The
drum in this worked example is constructed of carbon steel so a matcost of 1 will
be used.
 Finally, the cost to repair or replace the component is a probability weighted
average of the individual repair costs determined for each release hole size and
calculated using Equation (3.98).
 4 
  gff n  holecostn 
FCcmd   n 1   matcost
 gfftotal 
 
 
holecost1  5, 000  8.00 E  0.0400
-06

holecost2  12, 000  2.00 E -05  0.2400 (3.98)

holecost3  20, 000  2.00 E -06
 0.0400
holecost4  40, 000  6.00 E -07  0.0240
 0.3440

FCcmd  0.3440 1/ 3.06 E -05  $11, 241.83

5.10 Damage Cost to Surrounding Equipment and Affected Area, FCaffa

The consequence cost to repair or replace surrounding components, equipcost ,
that are damaged in the affected area is probability weighted average of the
affected areas costs determined for each release hole size and is calculated
using Equation 3.99. The equipcost is € 12,000 for the worked example.

FCaffa  CAcmd  equipcost

(3.99)
 9, 099.11 ft 2 1, 200 $ / ft 2  $10,918,936.97

5.11 Business Interruption Costs, FC prod

Outage Days, Outagecmd - The costs associated with business interruption is

determined based on downtime (lost production) while repairs to the affected
component and surrounding equipment are completed. For each release hole
size, an estimated downtime, Outagen , can be found in Table 5.17 but are
presented below. An outage multiplier, Outagemult , is used to adjust downtimes
expected for extreme delivery situations. For this worked example, Outagemult is
1.
Outage Days, Outagen
Outage1  2.00
Outage2  3.00
Outage3  3.00
Outage4  10.00
 Equation (3.100) is used to calculate Outagecmd

 4 
  gff n  Outagen 
Outagecmd   n 1   Outagemult
 gff total 
 
 

Outage1  2.00  8.00 E -06  1.60 E -05

Outage2  3.00  2.00 E -05  6.00 E -05
Outage3  3.00  2.00 E -06  6.00 E -06 (3.100)
Outage4  10.00  6.00 E -07  6.00 E -06
 8.80 E -05

 8.80 E -05 1/ 3.06 E -05  2.88 days

Other Outage Days, Outageaffa – If a component fails and that failure results in
an affected area, the cost of downtime for replacement or repair of surrounding
equipment in the area is considered using Equation (3.101).
6
1.242  0.585log10  FCaffa 10  
Outageaffa  10  

(3.101)
6
1.242  0.585log10 10,918,936.9710  
 10  
 70.69 days

Business Interruption Cost, FC prod – The cost of business interruption associated

with repairing damaged equipment is equal to the cost associated with lost
production due to shutdown of the unit/plant, shown in Equation (3.102). If the
production outage per day costs is 50,000, FC prod is calculated.

FC prod   Outagecmd  Outageaffa   prodcost 

(3.102)
  2.88  70.69 days   50, 000 $/day
 $3, 678,107.97
5.12 Potential Injury Cost, FCinj
When injuries as a result of an event are possible and costs of potential injuries
are determined, appropriate resources can be managed and allocated to prevent
injuries from occurring. A population density, popdens , is determined and
reflects the proximity of personnel to the equipment location such as control
rooms, walkways, roads, etc. In addition to the population density, the cost per
individual, injcost , potentially affected by the failure is considered to reflect
typical costs to businesses of an injury up to and including fatal injuries. When
assigning this value, consideration should be given to the following:
Any existing company standards for such calculations,
Local medical/compensation costs associated with long-term disability,
Legal/settlement costs,
Indirect costs such as increased regulatory scrutiny, loss of reputation, etc.

The costs associated with personnel injury are computed using Equation
(3.103). The popdens is 0.0005/m2 and injcost €5,000,000/serious injury.
FCinj  CAinj  popdens  injcost
(3.103)
 26, 622.82  5.00 E -04  5, 000, 000  $6, 655, 706.05

5.13 Environmental Cleanup Cost, FCenviron

Environmental consequences as a result of loss of containment can be a
significant cost and considered along with other costs including fines and other
financial penalties. The methods presented in API 581 are based on the amount
of material spilled to the ground, the number of days to clean up the spill and
the environmental hazards associated with the properties of the fluid released.
The environmental cost for this worked example is €0.
 4 
  gff n  voln
env

FCenviron   n 1   envcost
 gff total  (3.106)
 
 
 $0

5.14 Total Financial Consequence, FC

The financial consequence of a loss of containment and subsequent release of
hazardous materials can be determined by adding up the individual costs
determined above (Equation 3.97).

FC  FCcmd  FCaffa  FC prod  FCinj  FCenviron

 $11, 242  $10,918,936.97  $3, 678,107.97  $6, 655, 706.05  $0

=$21, 263,992.82
6.0 RISK ANALYSIS
6.1 Determination of Risk
The calculation of risk can be determined as a function of time by combining
probability of failure and the consequence of failure, as shown in Equation (1.5).

R(t )  Pf (t )  C (t ) (1.5)

Note that probability of failure, Pf (t ) , is a function of time since damage factor

increases as the damage in component due to thinning, cracking or other
damage mechanisms accumulate with time. Consequence of failure, C (t ) , is
assumed to be invariant with time. Therefore, Equations (1.6) and (1.7) show
the determination of risk, expressed in area or in financial terms.

R(t )  Pf (t )  CA for Area  Based Risk (1.6)

`
R(t )  Pf (t )  FC for Financial  Based Risk (1.7)

So for the area risk calculation for our worked example, the Risk at the RBI Date
using the maximum area calculated in the consequence of failure section is:
R(t )  Pf (t )  CA

Risk cmd @ RBI Date  1.11E -03  26, 622.82  29.12

 29.6 ft 2 / yr

Risk cmd @ Plan Date  6.44 E -03  26, 622.82  144.51

=177 ft 2 / yr

Similarly, for Financial Risk,

R(t )  Pf (t )  FC

Risk finan @ RBI Date  1.11E -03 $21, 263,992.82

 $23, 666.73 / year

Risk finan @ Plan Date  6.44 E -03  $21, 263,992.82

 $136,926.23 / year

In these equations, CA is the consequence impact area expressed in units of

area and FC is the financial consequence expressed in economic terms. Note
that Risk varies with time due to the influence of the changes probability.
7.0 INSPECTION PLANNING
The inspection planning module calculates risk over time until some point in
time when the risk defined in Equations 10 and 11 will reach a specified risk
target, as defined by the Owner-User. An inspection of the equipment is
recommended on or before date that the risk target is reached. Inspection of
equipment does not reduce the inherent risk associated with that piece of
equipment but inspection provides knowledge of the damage state of the vessel
and reduces uncertainty. As a result, the probability that loss of containment
will occur is directly related to the amount and quality of the information
available from past inspection and the ability of the inspection method to
quantify the damage.

The reduction of uncertainty is a function of the effectiveness of the inspection

method and coverage in identifying and quantifying the type and extent of the
damage. The calculated risk is not only a function of time but it is also a
function of the knowledge obtained on the condition or damage state of the
component determined in an effective inspection program. When inspection
effectiveness is introduced into risk, Equations (1.8) and (1.9) are the result:

R(t , I E )  Pf (t , I E )  CA for Area  Based Risk (1.8)

R(t , I E )  Pf (t , I E )  FC for Financial  Based Risk (1.9)

7.1 Inspection Planning Information

RBI Date: 05/01/2017
Plan Date: 05/01/2027
Financial Risk Target, $/year: 1,000
DF Target: 3,000
Estimate Target Date
For our worked example, if the Target Area Risk is 3.716 m 2/year (40 ft2/year),
what inspection is required and what date should the inspection date occur
(Target Date) in order to avoid exceeding the Area Risk Target by the Plan date?
At the RBI date of 05/01/2017, the calculated risk is 29.63 ft2/year which is less
than the target risk of 40 ft2/yr. At the plan date of 05/01/2027, the calculated
risk is 171.43 ft2/yr. The target date will be reached on the Target Date of
8/22/2021.

Propose an Inspection Plan

Calculate the DF required at the Plan Date to achieve Target Risk
Risk @ Plan Date/Target Risk = 171.43/40 = 4.29
Based on the Risk ratio above, a Damage Factor reduction of 4.29 is required.
Therefore, the target damage factor after inspection is 171.43/4.29 = 49.10.
Thinning Damage factor at the plan date is 159.71 and the cracking damage
factor at the plan date is 35.50 so it is likely that both a thinning and cracking
inspection will be required by the target date. Let’s assume a 1B thinning and a
1C cracking inspection.
Calculate New Thinning Damage Factor
The previous 1B thinning inspection (04/04/2013) plus an additional 1B thinning
inspection at the target date (8/22/2021).

1.) Calculate the Art at the Plan Date with the planned inspection
(0.010  0) 14
Art  1   0.1867
0.75
2.) Calculate the inspection effectiveness factors, I1Thin , I 2Thin , I 3Thin , using
Equation (2.17) and values from Tables 4.5 and 4.6

1  Co p1   Co   Co   Co 
N Thin N BThin NCThin Thin
ND
I1Thin  PrpThin ThinA A ThinB ThinC ThinD
p1 p1 p1

I1Thin  0.500  0.9   0.7   0.5   0.4 

0 2 0 0

I1Thin  0.245

2  Co p 2   CoThinB  CoThinC  CoThinD 

Thin
N BThin NCThin Thin
ND
I 2Thin  PrpThin ThinA A

p2 p2 p2

I 2Thin  0.300  0.09   0.2   0.3  0.33

0 2 0 0

I 2Thin  0.012

3  Co p 3   CoThinB   CoThinC   CoThinD 

N Thin N BThin NCThin Thin
ND
I 3Thin  PrpThin ThinA A

p3 p3 p3

I 3Thin  0.200  0.01  0.1  0.20   0.27 

0 2 0 0

I 3Thin  0.002
 Thin Thin
3.) Calculate the Posterior Probabilities, Pop1 , Pop 2 and PoThin
p3

I1Thin
p1 
PoThin
I1Thin  I 2Thin  I 3Thin
0.245
p1 
PoThin
0.245  0.012  0.002
PoThin
p1  0.9459

I 2Thin
p2 
PoThin
I1Thin  I 2Thin  I 3Thin
0.012
p2 
PoThin
0.245  0.012  0.002
PoThin
p2  0.0463

I 3Thin
p3 
PoThin
I1Thin  I 2Thin  I 3Thin
0.002
p3 
PoThin
0.245  0.012  0.002
PoThin
p3  0.0077

4.) Calculate the parameters, 1Thin , 2Thin , 3Thin

Where :
COVt  0.20
COVS f  0.20
COVP  0.05
 1  DS1  Art  SRThin
 
Thin p

 
1 2
DS1 2  Art 2  COVt 2  1  DS1  Art  COVS f 2  ( SRThin
p ) 2  COVP 2
1  1  0.187  0.2574
1Thin 
1  0.187  0.20  1  1  0.187   0.202  (0.2574) 2  0.052
2 2 2 2

1Thin  3.3211

1  DS2  Art  SRThin

 2Thin 
p

 
2
DS2 2  Art 2  COVt 2  1  DS2  Art  COVS f 2  ( SRThin
p ) 2  COVP 2
1  2  0.187  0.2574
 2Thin 
2  0.187  0.20  1  2  0.187   0.202  (0.2574) 2  0.052
2 2 2 2

 2Thin  2.5213

1  DS3  Art  SRThin

 3Thin 
p

 
2
DS3 2  Art 2  COVt 2  1  DS3  Art  COVS f 2  ( SRThin
p ) 2  COVP 2
1  4  0.187  0.2574
 3Thin 
4  0.187  0.20  1  4  0.187   0.202  (0.2574) 2  0.052
2 2 2 2

 3Thin  0.0258
5.) Calculate the thinning base DF at the RBI Date and Plan Date

D Thin


 PoThin 
p1    1
Thin
    Po
Thin
p2 
    2Thin     Po
Thin
p3 
   3Thin   
fb
 1.56 E  04 
 
  0.8140  NORMSDIST  3.3211   
 
  0.1395  NORMSDIST  2.5213   
 
DThin


 0.0465  NORMSDIST   ( 0.0258)  

1.56 E  04
fb
 
 
 
 
 
D fb @ Plan Date with inspection  29.71
Thin

6.) Calculate the final thinning DF at the RBI Date and Plan Date
 DThin
fb  FIP  FDL
 
D Thin
@ Plan Date with inspection  max   ,1
f 
 FCM  
 29.71  1  1  
DThin
f @ Plan Date with inspection  max   ,1
 1  
DThin
f @ Plan Date with inspection  29.71

Calculate New Cracking Damage Factor:

The previous 1C cracking inspection (10/8/1991) plus an additional 1C cracking
inspection at the target date (5/1/2022). The years since last inspection by the
Plan Date is 5.0 years and the cracking Damage Factor becomes:

Cracking Damage Factor  1  5.0 

1.1
 5.87
Determine Total Damage Factor at Plan Date
The new Total Damage Factor is 29.71 + 5.87 or 35.59

Calculate Future POF, COF and Risk at the Plan Date with recommended
inspection, the POF at the Plan Date with the recommended inspection is:
POFPlan = 3.06E -05  35.59 1  1.09E -03 failures / year
The COF at the Plan Date with the recommended inspection is still 1,590 m 2,
because COF is invariant with time. And the future Risk at the Plan Date with
the recommended inspection is:
Riskplan = 1.09E -03 failures / yr ×26,622.83 ft 2 = 28.99 ft 2 / year
Since the risk at the Plan Date after inspection is 28.99 ft2/year, the Risk at the
Plan Date with the recommended inspection is below our established Risk Target
of 40 ft2/year.
 The following Table summarizes the results of the worked example
demonstrated in this paper.

Plan Date w/o Plan Date With

RBI Date Inspection Inspection
2
COF Equipment, ft 9,099.11 9,099.11 9,099.11
2
COF Personnel, ft 26,622.82 26,622.82 26,622.82
Thinning Factor 1.1196 159.7078 29.7134
Cracking Factor 25.50 35.50 5.87
Total Damage Factor 36.37 210.44 35.59
POF with inspection, failures/year 1.11E-03 6.44E-03 1.09E-03
2
Risk, ft /year 2.96E+01 1.71E+02 2.90E+01

Equipment Damage Hole Cost, $ $11,241.83 $11,241.83 $11,241.83

Affected Area Cost, $ $10,918,936.97 $10,918,936.97 $10,918,936.97
Outage Area Cost, $ $3,678,107.97 $3,678,107.97 $3,678,107.97
Injury Area Cost, $ $6,655,706.05 $6,655,706.05 $6,655,706.05
Flammable Financial
Consequence, $ $21,263,992.82 $21,263,992.82 $21,263,992.82
Financial Risk, $/year $23,666.73 $136,926.23 $7,397.20

Cost of Inspection, $ $45,000.00

2
Area Risk Reduction, ft /year 142.44
Financial Risk Reduction, $/year $129,529.03
8.0 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT WORK
8.1 Overview
The technology embedded within API RP 581 is a continuous process of
improvement. As the technology is improved, the methodology will be modified
and revisions to API 581 will be issued.
9.0 NOMENCLATURE

age is the time since the last thickness reading

th
An is the cross sectional hole area associated with the n
release hole size
Art is the metal loss parameter

Ca is the corrosion allowance

Cr is the corrosion rate

Cd is the coefficient of discharge

C t  is the consequence of failure as a function of time

CA is the consequence impact area

CA flam is the final component damage consequence area

cmd

CAinjflam is the final personnel injury consequence area

D f total is the total damage factor

D thin is the damage factor for thinning

f

D elin is the damage factor for component linings

f

Dextd is the damage factor for external damage, i.e. corrosion

f
under insulation
D scc is the damage factor for stress corrosion cracking
f

Dhtha is the damage factor for high temperature hydrogen attack

f

Dmfat is the damage factor for mechanical fatigue

f

D brit is the damage factor for brittle fracture

f

Df t  is the damage factor as a function of time, equal to D f total

evaluated at a specific time
FMS is the management systems factor

FC is the financial consequence

gc is the gravitational constant

gff is the generic failure frequency

k is the release fluid ideal gas specific heat capacity ratio

Kv is the viscosity correction factor

MW is the release fluid molecular weight

Pa is the atmospheric pressure

Ps is the storage or normal operating pressure

Pf  t  is the probability of failure as a function of time

Pf  t , I E  is the probability of failure as a function of time and

inspection effectiveness
l is the liquid density

v is the vapor density

R is the universal gas constant

R t  is the risk as a function of time

R t, I E  is the risk as a function of time and inspection effectiveness

tmin is the minimum required thickness for the component

established using the applicable construction code
trdi is the thickness reading

Ts is the storage or normal operating temperature

th
Wn is the release rate associated with the n release hole size
10.0 REFERENCES

API, API RP 581 API RBI Technology, Third Edition 1st Addendum, January 2018,
American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.
11.0 TABLES
Part 1, Table 3.1 – Steps in Consequence Analysis
Section in this Part
Level 1
Level 2
Conseq
Step Description Consequ
uence
ence
Analysi
Analysis
s
Determine the released fluid and its properties, including the
1 4.1 5.1
release phase.
Select a set of release hole sizes to determine the possible
2 4.2
range of consequence in the risk calculation.
3 Calculate the theoretical release rate. 4.3 5.3
4 Estimate the total amount of fluid available for release. 4.4
Determine the type of release, continuous or instantaneous, to
5 determine the method used for modeling the 4.5
dispersion and consequence.
Estimate the impact of detection and isolation systems on
6 4.6
release magnitude.
Determine the release rate and mass for the consequence
7 4.7 5.7
analysis.
8 Calculate flammable/explosive consequence. 4.8 5.8
9 Calculate toxic consequences. 4.9 5.9
10 Calculate non-flammable, non-toxic consequence. 4.10 5.10
Determine the final probability weighted component damage
11 4.11 5.11
and personnel injury consequence areas.
12 Calculate financial consequence. 4.12
 Part 2, Table 3.1 – Suggested Component Generic Failure Frequencies

Equipment Type Component Type

gff as a Function of Hole Size (failures/yr) gfftotal
Small Medium Large Rupture (failures/yr)
Compressor COMPC 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 0 3.00E-05
Compressor COMPR 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05
HEXSS.
Heat Exchanger 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05
HEXTS,

Pipe PIPE-1, 2.80E-05 0 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05

PIPE-2
Pipe PIPE-4, 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05
PIPE-6

PIPE-8,
PIPE-10,
Pipe 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05
PIPE-12,
PIPE-16,
PIPEGT16
PUMP2S,
Pump 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05
PUMPR,
PUMP1S
Tank650 TANKBOTTOM 7.20E-04 0 0 2.00E-06 7.22E-04
Tank650 COURSE-1-10 7.00E-05 2.50E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-04
KODRUM,
COLBTM,
FINFAN,
Vessel/FinFan FILTER, 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05
DRUM,
REACTOR,
COLTOP,
COLMID

Note:
See references [1] through [8] for discussion of failure frequencies for equipment
 Table 4.2 – Properties of the Representative Fluids Used in Level 1 Consequence Analysis

Cp Auto-
Liquid Ideal Gas
NBP Ambient Ignition
Fluid MW Density Specific
(F) State Temp.
(lb/ft3) Heat Eq. Ideal Gas Ideal Gas Ideal Gas Ideal Gas Ideal Gas
Constant Constant Constant Constant Constant (F)
A B C D E
C1-C2 23 15.639 -193 Gas Note 1 12.3 1.150E-01 -2.87E-05 -1.30E-09 N/A 1,036
C3-C4 51 33.61 -6.3 Gas Note 1 2.632 0.3188 -1.347E-04 1.466E-08 N/A 696
C5 72 39.03 97 Liquid Note 1 -3.626 0.4873 -2.6E-04 5.3E-08 N/A 544
C6-C8 100 42.702 210 Liquid Note 1 -5.146 6.762E-01 -3.65E-04 7.658E-08 N/A 433
C9-C12 149 45.823 364 Liquid Note 1 -8.5 1.01E+00 -5.56E-04 1.180E-07 N/A 406
C13-C16 205 47.728 502 Liquid Note 1 -11.7 1.39E+00 -7.72E-04 1.670E-07 N/A 396
C17-C25 280 48.383 651 Liquid Note 1 -22.4 1.94E+00 -1.12E-03 -2.53E-07 N/A 396
C25+ 422 56.187 981 Liquid Note 1 -22.4 1.94E+00 -1.12E-03 -2.53E-07 N/A 396
Pyrophoric 149 45.823 364 Liquid Note 1 -8.5 1.01E+00 -5.56E-04 1.180E-07 N/A Note 4
Aromatic 104 42.7 293 Liquid Note 2 8.93E+04 2.15E+05 7.72E+02 9.99E+04 2.44E+03 914
Styrene 104 42.7 293 Liquid Note 2 8.93E+04 2.15E+05 7.72E+02 9.99E+04 2.44E+03 914
Water 18 62.3 212 Liquid Note 3 2.76E+05 -2.09E+03 8.125 -1.41E-02 9.37E-06 N/A
Steam 18 62.3 212 Gas Note 3 3.34E+04 2.68E+04 2.61e+03 8.90E+03 1.17E+03 N/A
Acid/Caustic 18 62.3 212 Liquid Note 3 2.76E+05 -2.09E+03 8.125 -1.41E-02 9.37E-06 N/A
Methanol 32 50 149 Liquid Note 2 3.93E+04 8.79E+04 1.92E+03 5.37E+04 8.97E+02 867
Ammonia 17.03 38.55 -28.2 Gas --- --- --- --- --- --- N/A
H2 2 4.433 -423 Gas Note 1 27.1 9.270E-03 -1.38E-05 7.650E-09 N/A 752
H2S 34 61.993 -75 Gas Note 1 31.9 1.440E-03 2.430E-05 -1.18E-08 N/A 500
HF 20 60.37 68 Gas Note 1 29.1 6.610E-04 -2.03E-06 2.500E-09 N/A 32000
HCl 36 74 -121 Gas --- --- --- --- --- --- N/A
CO 28 50 -312 Gas Note 2 2.91E+04 8.77E+03 3.09E+03 8.46E+03 1.54E+03 1128
DEE 74 45 95 Liquid Note 2 8.62E+04 2.55E+05 1.54E+03 1.44E+05 -6.89E+02 320
Nitric Acid 63 95 250 Liquid --- --- --- --- --- --- N/A
AlCl3 133.5 152 382 Powder Note 1 4.34E+04 3.97E+04 4.17E+02 2.40E+04 N/A 1036
NO2 90 58 275 Liquid --- --- --- --- --- --- N/A
Phosgene 99 86 181 Liquid --- --- --- --- --- --- N/A
TDI 174 76 484 Liquid --- --- --- --- --- --- 1148
PO 58 52 93 Liquid Note 2 4.95E+04 1.74E+05 1.56E+03 1.15E+05 7.02E+02 840
EEA 132 61 313 Liquid Note 2 1.06E+05 2.40E+05 6.59E+02 1.50E+05 1.97E+03 715
EE 90 58 275 Liquid Note 2 3.25E+04 3.00E+05 1.17E+03 2.08E+05 4.73E+02 455
EG 62 69 387 Liquid Note 2 6.30E+04 1.46E+05 1.67E+03 9.73E+04 7.74E+02 745
EO 44 55 51 Gas Note 2 3.35E+04 1.21E+05 1.61E+03 8.24E+04 7.37E+02 804
 Table 4.8 – Component Damage Flammable Consequence Equation Constants
Fluid Fluid Type Continuous Releases Constants Instantaneous Releases Constants
Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely
(AINL-CONT) (AIL-CONT) (AINL-INST) (AIL-INST)
Gas Liquid Gas Liquid Gas Liquid Gas Liquid
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
C1-C2 TYPE 0 43.0 0.98 280.0 0.95 41.0 0.67 1079 0.62

C3-C4 TYPE 0 49.48 1.00 313.6 1.00 27.96 0.72 522.9 0.63

C5 TYPE 0 25.17 0.99 536.0 0.89 304.7 1.00 13.38 0.73 1.49 0.85 275.0 0.61

C6-C8 TYPE 0 29.0 0.98 182.0 0.89 312.4 1.00 525.0 0.95 13.98 0.66 4.35 0.78 275.7 0.61 57.0 0.55

C9-C12 TYPE 0 12.0 0.98 130.0 0.90 391.0 0.95 560.0 0.95 7.1 0.66 3.3 0.76 281.0 0.61 6.0 0.53

C13-C16 TYPE 0 64.0 0.90 1023 0.92 0.46 0.88 9.2 0.88

C17-C25 TYPE 0 20.0 0.90 861.0 0.92 0.11 0.91 5.6 0.91

C25 + TYPE 0 11.0 0.91 544.0 0.90 0.03 0.99 1.4 0.99

Pyrophoric TYPE 1 12.0 0.98 130.0 0.90 391.0 0.95 560.0 0.95 7.1 0.66 3.3 0.76 281.0 0.61 6.0 0.53

Aromatics TYPE 1 17.87 1.097 103.0 0 374.5 1.055 11.46 0.667 70.12 0 512.6 0.713 701.2 0

Styrene TYPE 1 17.87 1.097 103.0 0 374.5 1.055 11.46 0.667 70.12 0 512.6 0.713 701.2 0

Water TYPE 0

Steam TYPE 0

Acid/Caustic TYPE 0

Methanol TYPE 1 0.026 0.909 1751 0.934 28.11 0.667 1.919 0.900

H2 TYPE 0 64.5 0.992 420.0 1.00 61.5 0.657 1430 0.618

H2S TYPE 0 32.0 1.00 203.0 0.89 148.0 0.63 357.0 0.61

HF TYPE 0

CO TYPE 1 0.107 1.752 69.68 0.667

DEE TYPE 1 39.84 1.134 737.4 1.106 320.7 1.033 6289 0.649 155.7 0.667 5.105 0.919 5.672 0.919

PO TYPE 1 14.61 1.114 1,295 0.9560 65.58 0.667 3.404 0.869

EEA TYPE 1 0.002 1.035 117.0 0 8.014 0.667 69.0 0

EE TYPE 1 12.62 1.005 173.1 0 38.87 0.667 72.21 0

EG TYPE 1 7.721 0.973 108.0 0 6.525 0.667 69.0 0

EO TYPE 1 31.03 1.069 136.3 0.667

 Table 4.9 – Personnel Injury Flammable Consequence Equation Constants
Fluid Fluid Type Continuous Releases Constants Instantaneous Releases Constants
Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely
(AINL-CONT) (AIL-CONT) (AINL-INST) (AIL-INST)
Gas Liquid Gas Liquid Gas Liquid Gas Liquid
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
C1-C2 TYPE 0 110.0 0.96 745.0 0.92 79.0 0.67 3100 0.63

C3-C4 TYPE 0 125.2 1.00 836.7 1.00 57.72 0.75 1769 0.63

C5 TYPE 0 62.05 1.00 1545 0.89 811.0 1.00 28.45 0.76 4.34 0.85 959.6 0.63

C6-C8 TYPE 0 68.0 0.96 516.0 0.89 828.7 1.00 1315 0.92 26.72 0.67 12.7 0.78 962.8 0.63 224.0 0.54

C9-C12 TYPE 0 29.0 0.96 373.0 0.89 981.0 0.92 1401 0.92 13.0 0.66 9.5 0.76 988.0 0.63 20.0 0.54

C13-C16 TYPE 0 183.0 0.89 2850 0.90 1.3 0.88 26.0 0.88

C17-C25 TYPE 0 57.0 0.89 2420 0.90 0.32 0.91 16.0 0.91

C25 + TYPE 0 33.0 0.89 1604 0.90 0.081 0.99 4.1 0.99

Pyrophoric TYPE 1 29.0 0.96 373.0 0.89 981.0 0.92 1401 0.92 13.0 0.66 9.5 0.76 988.0 0.63 20.0 0.54

Aromatics TYPE 1 64.14 0.963 353.5 0.883 1344 0.937 487.7 0.268 18.08 0.686 0.14 0.935 512.6 0.713 1.404 0.935

Styrene TYPE 1 64.14 0.963 353.5 0.883 1344 0.937 487.7 0.268 18.08 0.686 0.14 0.935 512.6 0.713 1.404 0.935

Water TYPE 0

Steam TYPE 0

Acid/Caustic TYPE 0

Methanol TYPE 1 0.016 1.008 4484 0.902 37.71 0.688 6.255 0.871

H2 TYPE 0 165.0 0.933 1117 1.00 118.5 0.652 4193 0.621

H 2S TYPE 0 52.0 1.00 375.0 0.94 271.0 0.63 1253 0.63

HF TYPE 0

CO TYPE 1 27.0 0.991 105.3 0.692

DEE TYPE 1 128.1 1.025 971.9 1.219 1182 0.997 2658 0.864 199.1 0.682 47.13 0.814 821.7 0.657 52.36 0.814

PO TYPE 1 38.76 1.047 1955 0.840 83.68 0.682 15.21 0.834

EEA TYPE 1 0.017 0.946 443.1 0.835 11.41 0.687 0.153 0.924

EE TYPE 1 35.56 0.969 46.56 0.800 162.0 0.660 0.152 0.927

EG TYPE 1 25.67 0.947 324.7 0.869 8.971 0.687 0.138 0.922

EO TYPE 1 49.43 1.105 220.8 0.665

 Table 9.4 – Determination of Severity Index – HIC/SOHIC-H2S Cracking
Susceptibility Severity Index – SVI
High 100
Medium 10
Low 1
None 1
 Table 6.3 – SCC Damage Factors – All SCC Mechanisms
Inspection Effectiveness
SVI 1 Inspection 2 Inspections 3 Inspections
E
D C B A D C B A D C B A

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 8 3 1 1 6 2 1 1 4 1 1 1
50 50 40 17 5 3 30 10 2 1 20 5 1 1
100 100 80 33 10 5 60 20 4 1 40 10 2 1
500 500 400 170 50 25 300 100 20 5 200 50 8 1
1000 1000 800 330 100 50 600 200 40 10 400 100 16 2
5000 5000 4000 1670 500 250 3000 1000 250 50 2000 500 80 10

Inspection Effectiveness
SVI 4 Inspections 5 Inspections 6 Inspections
E
D C B A D C B A D C B A

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
50 50 10 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
100 100 20 5 1 1 10 2 1 1 5 1 1 1
500 500 100 25 2 1 50 10 1 1 25 5 1 1
1000 1000 200 50 5 1 100 25 2 1 50 10 1 1
5000 5000 1000 250 25 2 500 125 5 1 250 50 2 1

Notes: SI is the Maximum Severity Index determined for each specific SCC Cracking
Mechanism