Operation

Rim… EN
Introduction

Operation Rimon 20
Background
Soviet intervention
Israeli change of heart
Connected to: War of Attrition Israeli Air Force Soviet Union
Prelude
Battle
The Mirages engage From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Phantom kills
Shared kill Rimon 20
Part of the War of Attrition
Aftermath
Date July 30, 1970
Order of Battle
Location West of Suez Canal
Israeli
Soviet Result Israeli victory
Belligerents
See also
Israel Soviet Union
References
Commanders and leaders
Notes
Bibliography Mordechai Hod Nikolai Yurchenko †
Iftach Spector
Amos Amir
Strength
12 Mirage IIICs 24 MiG-21MFs
4 F-4E Phantom IIs
Casualties and losses
1 aircraft damaged 4 killed
5 aircraft destroyed

War of Attrition [hide]

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Boxer · Raviv · Rooster 53 · Priha · Rhodes · Rimon 20

Rimon 20 (Hebrew: 20 ‫ רימון‬, Pomegranate 20) was the code name of an aerial battle in 1970 which pitted the Israeli Air
Force directly against Soviet ghter pilots stationed in Egypt during the War of Attrition. Israel chose its most skilled
ghter pilots to participate in the planned dog ght in order to send a message to the Soviet Union. During the three-
minute engagement, which took place on July 30, 1970, the Soviets were dominated by their veteran Israeli counterparts,
resulting in the downing of ve Soviet- own MiG-21s by Israeli F-4 Phantoms and Mirage IIIs. Egyptian military leaders
were satis ed to hear the outcome of the battle because the Soviets had long been criticizing Egypt's aerial losses to
Israel and attributing them to the lack of skill of its ghter pilots. It was one of the nal engagements of the War of
Attrition and is believed to have contributed to its conclusion.

Background
Soviet intervention
Egypt had launched the War of Attrition in the hope of wearing down Israel's
hold on territories captured during the 1967 Six-Day War. By the start of
1970, however, the Israeli Air Force had established complete aerial
superiority over the front lines along the Suez Canal, and the launching of
Operation Priha in January laid bare Egypt's inability to counter Israeli
supremacy not only along the canal but in the Egyptian heartland as well.
President Nasser of Egypt therefore turned to the Soviet Union for
assistance. Nasser visited Moscow on January 24–25, 1970, and persuaded
his hosts to expand Soviet assistance.[1] An entire division of the Soviet Air
Romanian MiG-21MFs, the Soviet aircraft type
Defence Forces (Voyska PVO), the 18th Special Anti-Aircraft Rocket Division,
deployed to Egypt.
including the MiG-21MF-equipped 135th Fighter Aviation Regiment[2] and the
latest versions of the SA-2 and SA-3 SAM batteries, therefore deployed to
Egypt. These were initially tasked with the defence of Cairo, Alexandria and the Aswan Dam alone, freeing Egyptian air
defence assets to engage the IAF over the canal zone.[3] Their presence and active participation in the defence of Egypt
was not made public and denied long afterwards, yet picked up by Israeli intelligence not long after their arrival.[4][5]

The Israeli government, fearful of confronting a superpower and the possible consequences, directed the IAF to keep its
distance from the Soviet forces. Operation Priha was soon curtailed, and as the Soviets made their presence felt,
terminated outright. By the end of April 1970 Israeli aircraft were no longer ying into Egypt, in the hope that this would
satisfy the Soviets.[6][7] The Soviets and Egyptians, however, now began rolling their combined air defence array towards
the canal zone, threatening to deprive Israel of its aerial superiority. The Israeli air force targeted both the Egyptian SAM
batteries and ancillary infrastructure, but by the end of June two F-4 Phantoms had fallen to SAMs and two more in July.
Moreover, Soviet ghters were also expanding their sphere of operations and it was becoming apparent that the
Soviets, bolstered by their success, were actively seeking an engagement.[6] On July 25 Soviet MiG-21s intercepted Israeli
A-4 Skyhawks on a ground attack mission and chased them into Israeli-controlled Sinai. One Skyhawk was hit by an AA-2
Atoll missile and forced to land at Rephidim.[8]

Israeli change of heart

Both Israeli government and air force had by now realised that the policy of restraint versus the Soviets had failed. For
the rst time, Israel's hard-won aerial supremacy was under serious threat, not only on the west bank of the Suez Canal,
but over Israeli-controlled territory as well. The Israeli Air Force therefore proposed to take the Soviets head-on, hoping
to demonstrate that although it possessed no operational answer to the extensive air defence array forming on the west
bank of the Suez Canal,[9] it was nevertheless superior in the air. The opportunity to punish the Soviets would also serve
to boost agging morale following the loss of several aircraft and airmen in the previous few months,[4] and would also
prove valuable in upcoming cease re negotiations.[10][11] IAF Chief of Sta Mordechai (Motti) Hod, backed by IDF Chief of
the General Sta Haim Bar-Lev, took his case to the Israeli cabinet on July 25.[12] Once the approval of Golda Meir's
government had been received, the IAF then set about organizing a planned team ambush.[6] Such ambushes had been
carried out before, under the code name "Rimon" (Pomegranate), and an existing plan was now brought up to date and
designated "Rimon 20".[13] Initially planned for July 29, it was later pushed back to July 30.[10][14]

Prelude
"Rimon 20" was to begin with an attack by IAF 69 Squadron F-4E Phantom IIs
on an Egyptian radar station southeast of the city of Suez. These were to be
carried out in an attack pro le usually adopted by IAF Skyhawks, giving the
impression of yet another day of battle on the Suez Canal front. Four 119
Squadron Dassault Mirages, meanwhile, were to penetrate Egyptian airspace
in the far south near Hurghada, imitating a routine reconnaissance ight.
Once Soviet MiGs were scrambled to intercept the Mirages, these were to
draw the MiGs westward, at which point the Phantoms and four 117
Squadron Mirages on station over the Sinai were to close in on the MiGs
from the east, springing the trap. A further four 101 Squadron Mirages were
to be on immediate alert at Rephidim.[8][10][15] Israeli Air Force Mirage IIIC.

Leaving nothing to chance, Motti Hod decided to assemble the best possible
squad for the mission. Airmen selection rested with the Squadron commanders and each subsequently selected
himself. Amos Amir, commanding 119 Squadron and a 5-kills ace at the time, selected Asher Snir (11 kills), Avraham
Salmon (6) and Avi Gilad (2) to accompany him. Uri Even-Nir, commanding 117 Squadron and already credited with 3
kills, was to be accompanied by Itamar Neuner (4), Yehuda Koren (7) and Kobi Richter (7). Iftach Spector, an 8-kills ace
leading 101 Squadron, was accompanied by Michael Tzuk (2), Israel Baharav (5) and Giora Ram-Furman. The 69
Squadron Phantoms was led by Avihu Bin-Nun, who had shot down 2 aircraft as a Mirage pilot, with navigator Shaul
Levi. Also present were Aviem Sella (1) with Reuven Reshef, Ehud Hankin (3, navigator unknown) and Uri Gil (1) with
Israel Parnas. To face the Soviets, who had little combat experience and no kills to their name, the IAF was preparing to
send up some of its most experienced pilots, with a combined score of 67 aerial kills.[16]

Battle
Thursday, July 30, 1970, began as yet another day in the ongoing War of Attrition with the IAF striking Egyptian positions
along the Suez Canal. 69 and 201 Squadron Phantoms, 110 Squadron Vautours, 113 Squadron Ouragans and 115, 102,
and 116 Squadron Skyhawks took part in the strikes, encountering no aerial opposition. Once all aircraft had returned to
base, Rimon 20 could commence.[17]

It began at 14:00 (Israel time, 15:00 in Egypt) with Bin-Nun, Sela, Hankin and Gil striking the Egyptian radar post at
Sohana.[5] Meanwhile, Amos Amir's four 119 Squadron Mirages were crossing the Gulf of Suez at low altitude, entering
Egyptian airspace before turning north and ascending to 35,000 feet. Flying in tight formation to appear as a single or
double target on a routine reconnaissance ight, the four Mirages were each armed with a pair of AIM-9D Sidewinders.[8]
[10]
It took 11 minutes[4] but the Soviets eventually fell for the ruse and scrambled their ghters to intercept the Israeli
aircraft. First o the ground was a MiG-21 quartet from Kawm Ushim led by Captain Kamenev, followed shortly later by
two four-ship formations from Beni-Suef led by captains Yurchenko and Saranin. A MiG from the latter formation soon
aborted the mission after encountering engine problems. 12 more MiGs were later launched from Kawm Ushim and al-
Qatamiyah (also known as Wadi Al Jandali, near Kafr Mas'ud). Two Soviet quartets were vectored to intercept the
intruding "reconnaissance" ight, while another two were directed at what were thought to be Skyhawks on a ground
attack mission.[18][19]

As the rst MiGs were 20 km out and approaching from the west, Amos Amir
led his four aircraft in a 270° climbing turn that brought them on a westerly
heading. They had, however, turned too tightly. Instead of drawing the MiGs
westward, they were now facing them head-on. As the Mirages were closing
in on the MiGs, the four Phantoms were approaching the area at low altitude
and at a line abreast.[18] The original plan had called for the Phantoms to zip An Egyptian MiG-21RF. Soviet aircraft in Egypt
carried Egyptian Air Force markings.
in from below, behind and beneath the MiG-21s pursuing the Mirages, and
pick them o with their radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrows. This was now no
longer possible and as the Phantoms entered the fray, a close-quarters dog ght commenced.[20]

The Mirages engage

While the Phantoms maintained mutually protective pairs, the less disciplined Mirage pilots broke apart to individually
engage their opponents. Avraham Salmon and Avi Gilad separated as the battle began and Salmon was soon the rst to
score a kill. Spotting two MiGs on the tail of a pair of Phantoms, he warned his comrades of the approaching danger
before leveling o behind the rear MiG and launching an AIM-9D. The MiG exploded, killing pilot Nikolai Yurchenko.[21]

Asher Snir had also separated from his wingman to chase MiGs. Finding himself in the midst of a number of MiGs and
Phantoms, he opted to chase one of the Soviet ghters. As the MiG was pulling away from the Mirage, Snir let o an
AIM-9D which struck the MiG-21's underbelly.[22] Captain Yevgeny Yakovlev managed to bail out of the stricken aircraft,
yet died in the descent. Aviem Sella witnessed the downing:[5]

One of the Mirages ( own by Asher Snir) red an air-to-air missile seconds after the battle began. The missile hit a MiG
and set it on re. The pilot bailed out; the aircraft went into a spin and dropped like a stone from 30,000 ft. The Russian
pilot's parachute opened right away – it's not supposed to: chutes are designed to open automatically at 10,000 ft., so
their wearers don't freeze or su ocate at high altitudes.
Snir, however, in the heat of pursuit and without the protection of a wingman, had failed to spot a MiG-21 closing in on
his tail. Captain Vladimir Ivlev red an AA-2 Atoll at the Mirage, which exploded in the exhaust of the Atar engine,
shredding the nozzle and tail of Snir's aircraft. Snir disengaged and managed to nurse his damaged aircraft to a safe
landing in Rephidim.[8][23] Ivlev, short on fuel, let o an unsuccessful cannon burst at one of the Phantoms before heading
back to al-Qatamiyah.[22]

With the battle underway, Israeli reinforcements were ordered into the ght. The four 117 Squadron Mirages which had
been lurking at low altitude over the Sinai, beyond the reach of Egyptian and Soviet radar, were pulling up and
proceeding westward when Itamar Neuner's jet su ered an engine malfunction and had to abort the mission. Wary of
leaving Neuner alone in hostile territory, Even-Nir escorted his wingman back to Rephidim. A 101 Squadron pair, Iftach
Spector and Michael Tzuk, were scrambled to replace them.[8] Spector, however, soon lost sight of Tzuk and ordered him
to return to base, proceeding into the battle by himself.[24] The remaining 117 pair, Koren and Richter, were also about to
engage the Soviet ghters.

Phantom kills
The Phantoms crews, meanwhile, were nding out that ying in pairs was
indeed safer, yet not as conducive towards scoring aerial kills since it limited
individual pilot freedom of action. Their Soviet adversaries did not seem
skilled enough to pose a serious threat and Bin-Nun and Sella decided to
part ways and go after their own quarries.[25] Sella set his sights on one of the
MiGs yet failed to get into position to re his missiles. When the MiG
performed a tight turn and came face to face with the Phantom, Sella himself
performed a tight Immelman turn which placed him above and behind the
MiG:[5]

By this time I'd realized the Russian pilot was inexperienced; he didn't know
Israeli Air Force 69 Squadron F-4E Phantom II.
how to handle his aircraft in a combat situation. At 15,000 ft he proved this
fact by trying to escape in a steep dive to 700 ft. All we had to do was follow
him and lock our radar onto him – and re a missile. There was a tremendous explosion – but the MiG came out of the
cloud of smoke apparently unharmed. That made me mad and I red a second missile – which turned out to be
unnecessary. The Russian aircraft had, in fact, been severely damaged by the rst missile; suddenly, it burst into ames
and fell apart. By the time the second missile reached it, it wasn't there any more.
Sella's AIM-9 had downed Captain Georgy Syrkin, who successfully bailed out of his aircraft.[25]

Two minutes had passed by now and both Mirages and MiG-21s were low on fuel and starting to depart the combat
zone. Avihu Bin-Nun spotted one such MiG ying at 1,000–2,000 feet with 117 Squadron's Koren and Richter on his tail.
Richter had launched a Shafrir 2 missile at the MiG, yet the distance was too great and the missile fell harmlessly to the
ground. Koren also attempted a missile launch, only to discover that he had jettisoned his missiles along with his fuel
tanks when he entered the battle. Koren was closing into cannon range when an AIM-7 Sparrow passed him by. It struck
its target, disintegrating it to bits and killing pilot Kamenev.[26] The missile had been launched by Avihu Bin-Nun and
Shaul Levi:[4]

Suddenly we found ourselves, me and my number 2, along with a lone 117 Squadron jet, pursuing a MiG ying at low
level and almost at the speed of sound. As we saw it, the biggest threat was that the 117 pilot would claim our MiG. We
launched a "Sparrow", though one shouldn't at that altitude and in those conditions. Just so that 117 wouldn't get him.

Shared kill
Another MiG-21 trying to make its way away from the battle zone was being chased by Avraham Salmon. Having spotted
Salmon on his tail, Vladimir Zhuravlev was maneuvering hard to deny Salmon the opportunity to shoot him down.
Salmon had already red a missile that failed to cause any damage, when Spector's 101 Squadron Mirage joined the
ght and red another pair at the MiG. Although at least one struck home, these too failed to bring the aircraft down,
and it continued to y away to the northwest. Salmon continued to give chase to the vicinity of Helwan, where he
managed to close the distance to the MiG and emptied his cannon into the aircraft. With both his ammunition and fuel
exhausted, he departed the scene. Only years later (see below) was it revealed that Zhuravlev's aircraft had in fact
crashed and its pilot killed. Spector and Salmon were both credited with a shared kill, the fth and last of the battle.[27]

The engagement had lasted a little less than three minutes. As the Soviets could yet scramble more aircraft to the scene,
Motti Hod gave the order for all remaining aircraft to disengage and withdraw. While the Mirages headed to Rephidim to
refuel prior to their return to their home bases in Israel proper, the 69 Squadron Phantoms made their way directly to
Ramat David.[28]

Aftermath
First details of the encounter appeared in the international press within hours of the event. Israel had claimed the
downing of 4 Egyptian aircraft, not disclosing the true identity of the participants, while Egypt denied losing any aircraft.
[29]
More details, however, soon became available. The true identity of the MiG pilots was reported within days,[30][31] and
con rmed by Prime Minister Meir in late October 1970 when discussing the Soviet presence in Egypt:[32]

How do I know there are Russian pilots in Egypt? Very simply because we had shot down four Soviet planes that were
own by Soviet pilots.
In 1972 the Egyptian press disclosed that 5 Soviet aircraft had in fact been lost on July 30, 1970.[33] This was later also
con rmed by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt during his visit to Israel prior to the signing of the Camp David Accords.[34]

The Soviet Union deployed another regiment of MiG-21s and a squadron of Su-15 all-weather interceptors were sent to
Egypt to bolster defences.[35] The Egyptians themselves reacted with ill-concealed delight at the outcome of the
engagement. They had previously su ered intense criticism of their own performance and boasts of superior Soviet
skills, when in fact the Soviets had fallen for tactics the Egyptians were already familiar with.[4][9][35]

While a morale boosting achievement, Rimon 20 did not change the course of the war. Another IAF F-4 Phantom was lost
to an SA-3 on August 3 and another damaged.[9]

The new level of escalation, however, proved too ominous for all involved. Neither Israel nor Egypt could secure a clear
advantage, yet both could claim military achievements. American pressure to end a con ict with the potential to draw in
both the United States and the USSR soon bore fruit. On August 7, 1970, a cease re agreement came into e ect, ending
the War of Attrition.[6][10]

Order of Battle
Israeli
Serial
Name Squadron Aircraft
Number
Mirage
Amos Amir 119 Squadron CO.
IIIC
Mirage
Asher Snir 119 6x Squadron junior deputy CO. 1 kill, damaged by Ivlev.
IIIC
Mirage
Avraham Salmon 119 78 Squadron senior deputy CO. 1.5 kills.
IIIC
Mirage
Avi Gilad 119
IIIC
Mirage
Uri Even-Nir 117 Squadron CO. Aborted before battle, Neuner escort.
IIIC
Mirage
Itamar Neuner 117 Engine problem, aborted before battle.
IIIC
Mirage
Yehuda Koren 117
IIIC
Mirage
Kobi Richter 117
IIIC
Mirage Squadron CO. Rephidim standby, scrambled to replace Even-Nir and
Iftach Spector 101 52
IIIC Neuner. 0.5 kill.
Mirage Squadron junior deputy CO. Rephidim standby, scrambled to replace
Michael Tzuk 101
IIIC Aven-Nir and Neuner, aborted before battle.
Mirage
Israel Baharav 101 Rephidim standby, did not participate.
IIIC
Giora Ram- Mirage
101 Rephidim standby, did not participate.
Furman IIIC
F-4E
Avihu Bin-
69 Phantom 105 Squadron CO. 1 kill.
Nun/Shaul Levi
II
Aviem F-4E
Sella/Reuven 69 Phantom 183 Squadron deputy CO. 1 kill.
Reshef II
F-4E
Ehud Hankin/ 69 Phantom
II
F-4E
Uri Gil/Israel
69 Phantom
Parnas
II
sources[6][8][36]

Soviet
Name Base Aircraft Status
Nikolai P. Yurchenko Beni Suef MiG-21MF Squadron CO, KIA. born 1937
Pavel F. Makara Beni Suef MiG-21MF damaged
Yevgenniy G. Yakovlev Beni Suef MiG-21MF Ejected, KIA. born 1935
Georgiy A. Syrkin Beni Suef MiG-21MF Ejected.
Vitaliy F. Saranin Beni Suef MiG-21MF
Vladimir F. Vasiliev Beni Suef MiG-21MF
Sergiey W. Mazur Beni Suef MiG-21MF
V. Suprun Beni Suef MiG-21MF
Yevgenniy A. Kamnev Kom Ashwin MiG-21MF
? Kom Ashwin MiG-21MF A MiG-21 stands at the end of a row of
? Kom Ashwin MiG-21MF Phantoms in the Israeli Air Force Museum.
Vladimir A. Zhuravlev Kom Ashwin MiG-21MF Ejected (?), KIA. born 1932
al-Qutamiya MiG-21MF
Vladimir Ivlev al-Qutamiya MiG-21MF Damaged Snir Mirage.
al-Qutamiya MiG-21MF
al-Qutamiya MiG-21MF
Two more quartets, one from Kom Ashwin and another from Kom Ashwin or al-
Qutamiya, were also scrambled.[36][37][38]

See also

References

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