G.R. No.

L-62207 December 15, 1986

JUAN BONIFACIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM [Ministry of Education & Culture] and EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents-appellees.

Cenon, Roncesvalles, Reyes & Leus for petitioner-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated August 19,
1982, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of petitioner's claim for benefits under PD
No. 626, as amended, for the death of his spouse, Lourdes Bonifacio.

The facts are undisputed.

The late Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc, Division of
Catanduanes, Ministry of Education and Culture from August, 1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast
with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on October 5, 1978.

Dra. Corazon Yabes-Almirante of the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan certified that the late Lourdes Bonifacio
underwent radical mastectomy for cancer of the breast in 1973. In 1976, when her ailment was noted to have
metastasized to her abdomen, she submitted herself to an operation known as "exploratory laparotomy" in
March of the same year. On September 1, 1978, she complained of "abdominal pain, abdominal enlargement,
vomiting, and failure to pass stools inspite of laxatives." Upon operation it was found that her entire
gastrointestinal tract was enveloped by carcinoma. Despite chemotherapy, she died on October 5, 1978 from
carcinoma of the breast metastatic to gastrointestinal tract and lungs.

Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The
same was however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment, carcinoma of the breast with
metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is not an occupational disease for her particular work as a teacher,
nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working conditions.

The Employees Compensation Commission, on appeal affirmed the decision of the respondent System.

Petitioner now assails the decision of the respondent Commission on the following grounds:

a] The respondent Commission's affirmance of the denial by respondent System totally ignored
the Supreme Court's pronouncements on compensation cases; and

b] Under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the same shall be resolved in
favor of the laborer.

We hold that the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission did not err in denying petitioner's claim.

A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees
Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable
based on peculiar hazards of employment." [Art. 167(1) Labor Code as amended by P.D. No. 1368, effective May 1,
1978].

Thus, for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
accepted occupational disease fisted by the Employees Compensation Commission [Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation], or any other sickness caused by employment subject to proof by claimant that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. [Sec. 1, Rule 11, Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation].

Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not listed by the Commission as
an occupational disease. As to the "metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs" the Commission lists such
disease as occupational only in the following employment:

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

16. Cancer of stomach and other lymphatic and blood Woodworkers, wood products industry carpenters,
forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and
plywood mills

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain. Vinyl chloryde workers, plastic workers.
[Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, see p. 38, Rollo.]

The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her particular employment, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of her contracting
the fatal illness. This onus petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge. We note the following medical report on
breast cancer which the Employees Compensation Commission cited in its decision and which the petitioner failed
to controvert:

... Recent observations on the epidemeology of breast cancer suggest that it is intimately linked to
"estrogenic hormones" [W.A.P Anderson, Mosby, Pathology 5th edition, pp. 1217-1218]. Mammary
carcinoma is likely to metastasize relatively early to the regional lymph nodes-axillary and supra clavicular,
if the primary site is in the outer half of the breast. From thence it spreads primarily to the bones, lungs,
skin and subcutaneous tissues generally; less frequently to the brain. [Wintrobe et. al., Harrison's
Principles of Internal Medicine, 7th edition, pp. 584-585]. (pp. 3-4, ECC decision dated August 19, 1982).

Petitioner's contention that the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission totally ignored the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on compensation cases is unmeritorious. The petitioner evidently overlooked that his
claim is now within the ambit of the Labor Code and the rulings under the old law, Act No. 3428, as amended, no
longer control.

The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA No. 772 amending Act No. 3812, provided for "the
presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the employee," and "paved the
way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee
or worker." [Sulit v. ECC, 98 SCRA 483, 489] The presumption in essence states that in any proceeding for the
enforcement of the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act "it shall be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary that the claim comes within the provisions of the said Act, that
sufficient notice thereof was given, that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured
employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another, that the injury did not result solely from the
intoxicatiojn of the injured employee while on duty, and that the contents of verified medical and surgical reports
introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct."
Thus, under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to
establish his case to the point of demonstration [Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278]. It is "not necessary to
prove that employment was the sole cause of the death or injury suffered by the employee. It is sufficient to show
that the employment had contributed to the aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment." [Fontesa vs.
ECC, 22 SCRA 282] "Once the disease had been shown to have arisen in the course of employment, it is presumed
by law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that it arose out of it." [Hernandez vs. ECC, et. al. L-
20202, May 31, 1965].

With this legal presumption in the old law, the burden of proof shifts to the employer and the employee no longer
suffers the burden of showing causation. Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or expansive
application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer prevails as the
burden of showing proof of causation has shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or injuries
which are not accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation Commission. As stated in Sulit
vs. Employees Compensation Commission [supra] "the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability
and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment. "

While we do not dispute petitioner's contention that under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the doubt
shall be resolved in favor of the laborer, we find that the same has no application in this case since the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their interpretation or application.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission
denying the claim are affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of
title to a subdivision lot. The position of the petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial
court is null and void ab initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted
to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by
September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments
and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot
or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in
the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection
in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to
the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount
was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's
fees, and the costs of the suit.1

Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also berated the appellant
for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner
was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for
realty taxes and registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.

In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself
providing that:

SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws.

and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension that the court a
quo was bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of Justice as
impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court
and the respondent court on the dubious conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the
jurisdictional issue.

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing
Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of

subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial
Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3
The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).

It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981,
after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law,
the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that-

The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land
and the other as the law of the particular case. 4

xxx xxx xxx

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change
the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication. 5

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.

The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier
quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial
Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be
lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved
party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under
the Revised Penal Code. 6

On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred
upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore
erroneous for the respondent to brush aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice that-
 Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have against the owner,
developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for
non-performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in
the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph
C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to
include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases
specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the
subject provisions.

The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by
agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages
are awarded and (2) where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

xxx xxx xxx

Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC
the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages and for attorney's fees would
result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the
HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced
to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the
contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.)7

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty
Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court sustained the competence of the respondent
administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to
determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.

It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v. National
Housing Authority 10 is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal
provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National Housing Authority and not the Regional
Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are
doing now.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
even on appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel,
12 which does not appear in the case before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to
dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to
the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify
the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731,
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309,
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
 e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively
to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies,
3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
 circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact
of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette
as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
 questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette
is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations
of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1
Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must
be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting
these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular
persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight
members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it
was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws
as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of
the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the
body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication
without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court
to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication
as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of
suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as
Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service
Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and
implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and
deploying such workers.

PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased
workers, including domestic helpers.

On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in
Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p.
30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.

In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is
hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and
deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for
said purpose.

In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's
regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower
pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.

For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)

Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10,
1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong
Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.

Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic

Helpers to Hong Kong.

Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the
temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong
resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said
skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation
of said policy.

I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)

An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the
POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry
segment:

The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other
entities concerned:

1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies

2. Manpower Pooling

3. Worker Training and Briefing

4. Processing and Deployment

5. Welfare Programs

II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment
Agencies or Principals

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may
negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in
Hong Kong.

xxx xxx xxx

X. Interim Arrangement

All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31
July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be
processed with the HWPU.

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong
kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of
acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for
 processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the
POEA manpower pool.

For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)

On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the
processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for
Hong Kong

Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing
and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts
which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be
processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.

Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall
recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor
Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991.
Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the
POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their
recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.

Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the
cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will
be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.

For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)

On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE
and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:

1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars;

2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and

3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.

Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities.

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate
the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title
 [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this
title. (Emphasis ours.)

On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No.
797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National
Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-
ranging for:

1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services
was the power and duty:

"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate

private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally
and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)

2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:

3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract

workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other
sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)

3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:

2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of

shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and
secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers
and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional,
unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the
regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with
the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice" (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged
administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by
necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict
and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests,
first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:

. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the
scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms"
 that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other
than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may
still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other
classes of Filipino workers for other countries.

Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule
against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges
committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to
Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the
Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected
with public interest.

xxx xxx xxx

The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in
Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained.
This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily
suspended effective July 1, 1991."

The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going
to Hongkong only.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for
Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to
the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment
as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp.
62-65, Rollo.)

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch
of Government.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)

Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
 against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not

inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed
in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make
emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (p. 448.)

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of
1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby
SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the
aforementioned laws of the land.

SO ORDERED.

AMELIA J. DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 154185

Petitioner,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- versus - CORONA,
 CARPIO MORALES, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

JEBSEN MARITIME, INC.,

Respondent. November 22, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioner Amelia J. Delos Santos seeks in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to nullify and set aside the decision and resolution dated 21 March 2002 [1] and 03 July 2002 [2], respectively, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62229.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondent's comment thereto, and the parties' respective memoranda, the
Court gathers the following factual antecedents:

On 10 August 1995, or thereabout, herein respondent Jebsen Maritime, Inc., for and in behalf of Aboitiz Shipping
Co. (Aboitiz Shipping, for short), hired petitioner's husband, Gil R. Delos Santos (hereinafter, Delos Santos) as third
engineer of MV Wild Iris. The corresponding contract of employment, as approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), was for a fixed period of one (1) month and for a specific undertaking of
conducting said vessel to and from Japan. It quoted Delos Santos' basic monthly salary and other monetary
benefits in US currency. Under POEA rules, all employers and principals are required to adopt the POEA - standard
employment contract (POEA-SEC) without prejudice to their adoption of terms and conditions over and above the
minimum prescribed by that agency. [3]
On the vessel's return to the Philippines a month after, Delos Santos remained on board, respondent having opted
to retain his services while the vessel underwent repairs in Cebu. After its repair, MV Wild Iris, this time
renamed/registered as MV Super RoRo 100, sailed within domestic waters, having been meanwhile issued by the
Maritime Industry Authority a Certificate of Vessel Registry and a permit to engage in coastwise trade on the
Manila-Cebu-Manila-Zamboanga-General Santos-Manila route. [4] During this period of employment, Delos Santos
was paid by and received from respondent his salary in Philippine peso thru a payroll-deposit arrangement with
the Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank. [5]

Some five months into the vessel's inter-island voyages, Delos Santos experienced episodes of chest pain,
numbness and body weakness which eventually left him temporarily paralyzed. On 17 February 1996, he was
brought to the Manila Doctor's Hospital ' a duly accredited hospital of respondent - where he underwent a spinal
column operation. Respondent shouldered all operation-related expenses, inclusive of his post operation
confinement.

As narrated in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, the following events next transpired:

1. After his discharge from the Manila Doctor's , Delos Santos was made to undergo physical
therapy sessions at the same hospital, which compelled the Batangas-based Delos Santoses to
rent a room near the hospital at P3,000.00 a month;
2. Delos Santos underwent a second spinal operation at the non-accredited Lourdes Hospital at
the cost of P119, 536.00; and

3. After Lourdes, Delos Santos was confined in a clinic in San Juan, Batangas where P20,000.00 in
hospitalization expenses was incurred.

It would appear that the spouses Delos Santos paid all the expenses attendant the second spinal operation as well
as for the subsequent medical treatment. Petitioner's demand for reimbursement of these expenses was rejected
by respondent for the reason that all the sickness benefits of Delos Santos under the Social Security System (SSS)
Law had already been paid.

Thus, on 25 January 1997, petitioner filed a complaint [6] with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against respondent and Aboitiz Shipping for recovery of disability benefits, and sick
wage allowance and reimbursement of hospital and medical expenses. She also sought payment of moral damages
and attorney's fees.
After due proceedings, the labor arbiter rendered, on 08 January 1999, [7] judgment finding for petitioner and
ordering respondent and Aboitiz Shipping to jointly and severally pay the former the following:

(1) P119,536.01, representing reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital expenses;

(2) P9,000, representing reasonable cost of board and lodging;

(3) P500,000, representing moral damages;

(4) US$60,000, representing disability benefits corresponding to Total Permanent

Disability;

(5) US$2,452, representing Sick Wage allowance;

(6) P62,853.60, representing attorney's fees; and,

(7) US$6,245.20, also representing attorney's fees.

On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision [8] dated 29 August 2000, modified that of the labor arbiter, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED to the extent that respondents Jebsen
Maritime, Inc., and Aboitiz Shipping Company are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to
pay Gil delos Santos through Amelia delos Santos the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment of US DOLLARS SIXTY THOUSAND (US$60,000.00) and US DOLLARS TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRD (sic) FIFTY TWO (US$2,452.00) representing total disability
compensation benefits and sickness wages, and the amount of ONE HUNDRED THREE
THOUSAND EGHT (sic) HUNDRED FOUR AND 87/100 PHILIPPINE PESOS (P103,804.87)
representing reimbursement of surgical, medical and hospital expenses, plus the equivalent of
five percent (5%) of the aggregate award as and for attorney's fees.

All other dispositions are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Like the labor arbiter, the NLRC predicated its ruling mainly on the theory that the POEA-approved contract of
employment continued to govern Delos Santos' employment when he contracted his illness. In specific terms, the
NLRC states that the same contract was still effective when Delos Santos fell ill, thus entitling him to the payment
of disability and like benefits provided in and required under the POEA-SEC.
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per NLRC Resolution [9] of 31 October 2000, respondent
went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62229, imputing on the
NLRC grave abuse of discretion. 'In its petition, respondent scored the NLRC for, among other things, extending the
application of the expired POEA-approved employment contract beyond the one-month limit stipulated therein.

On 21 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment [10], modifying the NLRC's decision by deleting
altogether the award of disability compensation benefits, sickness wages and attorney's fees, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated August 29, 2000 and the Resolution of October 31, 2000 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that the
disability compensation benefits of US$60,000.00 and the sickness wages of US$2,452.00 are
hereby deleted, without prejudice to claiming the same from the proper government agency.
The award of attorney's fees is likewise deleted.

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the motion per its resolution of 03
July 2002. [11]

Hence, petitioner's present recourse on the grounds that the Court of Appeals seriously erred: [12]

IN DELETING THE AWARD OF US$60,000.00 REPRESENTING THE MAXIMUM DISABILITY BENEFITS

APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(A) PRIOR TO HIS ACCIDENT, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS
HAS NOT YET BEEN TERMINATED, IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) AND
SECTION 18 (A), POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(B) THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS'

ACCIDENT HAS NOT YET EXPIRED BECAUSE IT WAS MUTUALLY EXTENDED BY THE PARTIES WHEN
DELOS SANTOS WAS NOT SIGNED OFF AND REPATRIATED PRIOR TO SAID ACCIDENT.

II

IN CONCLUDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUATION OF DELOS SANTOS'

EMPLOYMENT ON BOARD THE SAME VESSEL AND UNDER THE SAME CONTRACT, IT IS THE
PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, THAT SHALL GOVERN HIS EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS.
III
 IN DELETING THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALLOWANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF US$2,452.00.

(A) THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALOWANCE (sic)
SINCE PAYMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM SICK LEAVE BENEFIT IS INDEPENDENT, SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT FROM THE SICKNESS ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE POEA STANDARD
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

The petition is devoid of merit.

As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals
have the force of law between the contracting parties. [13] An employment with a period is generally valid, unless
the term was purposely intended to circumvent the employee's right to his security of tenure. [14] Absent a
covering specific agreement and unless otherwise provided by law, the terms and conditions of employment of all
employees in the private sector shall be governed by the Labor Code [15] and such rules and regulations as may be
issued by the Department of Labor and Employment and such agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of the Code.

The differing conclusions' arrived at by the NLRC, finding for the herein petitioner, and the Court of Appeals, siding
in part with the herein respondent, on Delos Santos' entitlement to disability benefits and sickness allowance are
veritably attributable to the question of applicability, under the premises, of the POEA-SEC. The principal issue to
be resolved here, therefore, boils down to: which, between the POEA-SEC and the Labor Code, governs the
employer-employee relationship between Delos Santos and respondent after MV Wild Iris, as later renamed Super
RoRo 100, returned to the country from its one-month conduction voyage to and from Japan.

The Court of Appeals ruled against the governing applicability of the POEA-SEC and, on that basis, deleted the
NLRC's award of US$60,000.00 and US$2,452.00 by way of disability benefits and sickness allowance, respectively.
An excerpt of the appellate court's explanation:

xxx Both parties do not dispute the existence of the POEA approved contract signed by the
parties. The said contract is the law between the contracting parties and absent any showing that
its provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law, morals, good policy, it shall be enforced to the
letter by the contracting parties (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Wong, G.R. No. 120859,
June 26, 2001). The contract in question is for a duration of one (1) month. Being a valid contract
between Delos Santos and the [respondent], the provisions thereof, specifically with respect to
the one (1) month period of employment has the force of law between them (D.M. Consunji vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 116572, December 18, 2000). 'Perforce, the said contract has already expired and
is no longer in effect.
 The fact that Delos Santos continued to work in the same vessel which sailed within Philippine
waters does not mean that the POEA standard employment contract continues to be enforced
between the parties. The employment of Delos Santos is within the Philippines, and not on a
foreign shore. As correctly pointed out by [respondent], the provisions of the Labor Code shall
govern their employer-employee relationship. xxx. (Words in bracket added.)

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for two (2) main reasons. First, we the start with
something elementary, i.e., POEA was created primarily to undertake a systematic program for overseas
employment of Filipino workers and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. [16] And to
ensure that overseas workers, including seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, are amply protected, the POEA is
authorized to formulate employment standards in accordance with welfare objectives of the overseas employment
program. [17] Given this consideration, the Court is at a loss to understand why the POEA-SEC should be made to
continue to apply to domestic employment, as here, involving a Filipino seaman on board an inter-island vessel.

Just as basic as the first reason is the fact that Delos Santos' POEA-approved employment contract was for a
definite term of one (1) month only, doubtless fixed to coincide with the pre-determined one-month long
Philippines-Japan-Philippines conduction-voyage run. After the lapse of the said period, his employment under the
POEA-approved contract may be deemed as functus oficio and Delos Santos' employment pursuant thereto
considered automatically terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the expired
contract. [18] This is as it should be. For, as we have held in the landmark case of Millares v. National Labor
Relations Commission: [19]

From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. ' Their
employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their
employment is terminated when the contract expires. ' Their employment is contractually fixed
for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 [of the Labor Code]
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking . . . We need not depart
from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare
decisis with respect to the employment status of seafarers. (Underscoring and words in bracket
added)

Petitioner's posture, citing Section 2 (A) [20] in relation to Section 18 [21] of the POEA-SEC about the POEA
approved contract still subsisting since Delos Santos was never signed off from the vessel and repatriated to
Manila, the point of hire, is untenable. With the view we have of things, Delos Santos is deemed to have been
signed off when he acceded to a new employment arrangement offered by the respondent. A seaman need not
physically disembarked from a vessel at the expiration of his employment contract to have such contract
considered terminated. And the repatriation aspect of the contract assumes significance only where the vessel
remains in a foreign port. For, repatriation presupposes a return to one's country of origin or citizenship. [22] In
the case at bar, however, there can be quibbling that MV Wild Iris returned to the port of Cebu with Delos Santos
on board. Parenthetically, while the parties are agreed that their underlying contract was executed in the country,
the records do not indicate what city or province of the Philippines is the specific point of hire. While petitioner
says it is Manila, she did not bother to attach to her petition a copy of the contract of employment in question.

Petitioner next submits, echoing the NLRC's holding, that the POEA-approved contract remained in full force and
effect even after the expiry thereof owing to the interplay of the following circumstances: 1) Delos Santos, after
such contract expiration, did not conclude another contract of employment with respondent, but was asked to
remain and work on board the same vessel just the same; and 2) If the parties intended their employer-employee
relationship to be under the aegis of a new contract, such intention should have been embodied in a new
agreement.

Contract extension or continuation by mutual consent appears to be petitioner's thesis.

We are not persuaded.

The fact that respondent retained Delos Santos and allowed him to remain on board the vessel cannot plausibly be
interpreted, in context, as evidencing an intention on its part to continue with the POEA-SEC. In the practical
viewpoint, there could have been no sense in consenting to renewal since the rationale for the execution of the
POEA-approved contract had already been served and achieved.

At any rate, factors obtain arguing against the notion that respondent consented to contract extension under the
same terms and conditions prevailing when the original contract expired. Stated a bit differently, there are
compelling reasons to believe that respondent retained the services of the acceding Delos Santos, as the Court of
Appeals aptly observed, but under domestic terms and conditions. We refer first to the reduced salary of Delos
Santos payable in Philippine peso [23] which, significantly enough, he received without so much of a protest. As
respondent stated in its Comment, without any controverting response from petitioner, Delos Santos, for the
period ending October 31, 1995, was drawing a salary at the rate of P8,475.00 a month, whereas the
compensation package stipulated under the POEA-approved contract provided for a US$613 basic monthly salary
and a US$184 fixed monthly overtime pay. And secondly, MV Super RoRo 100 was no longer engaged in foreign
trading as it was no longer intended as an ocean-going ship. Accordingly, it does not make sense why a seafarer of
goodwill or a manning agency of the same disposition would insist on being regulated by an overseas employment
agency under its standard employment contract, which governs employment of Filipino seamen on board ocean-
going vessels. [24]

Petitioner's submission about the parties not having entered into another employment contract after the
expiration of the POEA-approved employment contract, ergo, the extension of the expired agreement, is flawed by
the logic holding it together. For, it presupposes that an agreement to do or to give does not bind, unless it is
embodied in a written instrument. It is elementary, however, that, save in very rare instances where certain formal
requisites go into its validity, a contract, to be valid and binding between the parties, need not be in writing. A
contract is perfected when the contracting minds agree on the object and cause thereof. [25] And, as earlier
discussed, several circumstantial indicia tended to prove that a new arrangement under domestic terms was
agreed upon by the principal players to govern the employment of Delos Santos after the return of MV Wild Iris to
the country to engage in coastwise trading.

Given the foregoing perspective, the disallowance under the decision subject of review of the petitioner's claim for
maximum disability benefits and sickness allowance is legally correct. As it were, Delos Santos' right to such
benefits is predicated on the continued enforceability of POEA-SEC when he contracted his illness, which, needless
to stress, was not the case.

Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorney's fees, the NLRC having failed to explain
petitioner's entitlement thereto. As a matter of sound policy, an award of attorney's fee remains the exception
rather than the rule. It must be stressed, as aptly observed by the appellate court, that it is necessary for the trial
court, the NLRC in this case, to make express findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception. In fine, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the text of the
decision. [26] The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the decision, else, the
award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. [27] In the absence of a stipulation, attorney's
fees are ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate. [28] They are not
awarded every time a party wins a suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 166365. September 30, 2005]

DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. ROSSANO J. MOJICA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the August
31, 2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76995, and its December 13, 2004 Resolution3 denying
the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts show that on November 28, 1997, the Discipline Committee of Duty Free Philippines (DFP)
rendered a decision4 in DISCOM Case No. 97-027 finding Stock Clerk Rossano A. Mojica guilty of Neglect of Duty
by causing considerable damage to or loss of materials, assets and property of DFP. Thus, Mojica was considered
forcibly resigned from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except his salary and the monetary value of the
accrued leave credits.5

Mojica was formally informed of his forced resignation on January 14, 1998. Thereupon, he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of full back wages, damages, and attorney's fees, against
DFP before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

On February 2, 2000, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision finding that Mojica was illegally
dismissed. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant Rossano J. Mojica to be illegal
such that respondent Duty Free Philippines is directed to reinstate him to his former or substantially equivalent
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay him the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
NINE THOUSAND SEVENTEEN PESOS & 08/100 (P259,017.08) representing his backwages and attorney's fees, both
awards being subject to further computation until actual reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.6

The NLRC reversed the ruling of the arbiter. It found that the dismissal was valid and with just cause.

Mojica's motion for reconsideration was denied,7 hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76995.

The appellate court agreed with the arbiter that Mojica was not guilty of gross or habitual negligence that would
warrant his dismissal. It found that there was no convincing evidence to prove that Mojica connived with other
personnel in pilfering the stocks of DFP.

Hence, this petition.

Respondent Mojica is a civil service employee; therefore, jurisdiction is lodged not with the NLRC, but with the
Civil Service Commission.

DFP was created under Executive Order (EO) No. 468 on September 4, 1986 primarily to augment the service
facilities for tourists and to generate foreign exchange and revenue for the government. In order for the
government to exercise direct and effective control and regulation over the tax and duty free shops, their
establishment and operation was vested in the Ministry, now Department of Tourism (DOT), through its
implementing arm, the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).9 All the net profits from the merchandising operations
of the shops accrued to the DOT.

As provided under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564,10 PTA is a corporate body attached to the DOT. As an
attached agency, the recruitment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of all its personnel was governed by a merit
system established in accordance with the civil service rules.11 In fact, all PTA officials and employees are subject
to the Civil Service rules and regulations.12

Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive authority of the PTA, it follows that its officials and employees are
likewise subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations. Clearly then, Mojica's recourse to the Labor Arbiter
was not proper. He should have followed the procedure laid down in DFP's merit system and the Civil Service rules
and regulations.
PD No. 807 or The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines13 declared that the Civil Service Commission shall be the
central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws governing the discipline of civil servants. 14 It
categorically described the scope of Civil Service as embracing every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation whether
performing governmental or proprietary function.15 It construed an agency to mean any bureau, office,
commission, administration, board, committee, institute, corporation, whether performing governmental or
proprietary function, or any other unit of the National Government, as well as provincial, city or municipal
government, except as otherwise provided.16

Subsequently, EO No. 18017 defined "government employees" as all employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.18 It provided that the Civil Service and labor laws shall be followed in the resolution of
complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. 19

EO No. 292 or The Administrative Code of 1987 empowered the Civil Service Commission to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. 20

Thus, we held in Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat21 that:

There is no dispute that petitioner, a water district with an original charter, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation. The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations are governed by provisions of the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Jurisdiction over the strike and the dismissal of private respondents is therefore lodged not with the NLRC but with
the Civil Service Commission. (Citations omitted) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. Court of Appeals22 we also held that:

It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution] government-owned or
controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original charters, as
distinguished from those created under general law.

PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently,
controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR should come under the
jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 16(2) of the said Code vest in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to:

a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision
shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the
Commission.

Applying this rule, we have upheld the jurisdiction of Civil Service Authorities, as against that of the labor
authorities, in controversies involving the terms of employment, and other related issues, of the Civil Service
official and employees...

EO No. 292 provided that civil service employees have the right to present their complaints or grievances to
management and have them adjudicated as expeditiously as possible in the best interest of the agency, the
government as a whole, and the employee concerned. Such complaint or grievances shall be resolved at the lowest
possible level in the department or agency, as the case may be, and the employee shall have the right to appeal
such decision to higher authorities. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available
remedies under existing laws and procedure, the parties may jointly refer the dispute in the Public Sector Labor
Management Council for appropriate action.23

In sum, the labor arbiter and the NLRC erred in taking cognizance of the complaint as jurisdiction over the
complaint for illegal dismissal is lodged with the Civil Service Commission. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in
sustaining the labor arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the August 31, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76995; and its December 13,
2004 Resolution, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
payment of backwages and attorney's fees, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO,
JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON
CITY, respondents.

Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

CORTES, J:

Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security
System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work.
Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

The antecedents are as follows:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return
to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared
illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].

The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial
court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition,
reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon
posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No.
79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of
Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to
recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the
Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-
143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners,
considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the
SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the
Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor
dispute.

On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered
by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.
Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of
Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and
may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from
continuing with their strike.

Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the
case and enjoined the strike are as follows:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers
from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?

These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim

I

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the
public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article
on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the
people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition
also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization
shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to
strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form
associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if
the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government
functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will
go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic
Act 875, workers, including those from the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to
organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice- President is
unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries with it the right
to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We know
that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in the government to strike, then
what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen to
those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social
Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.
[Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in
1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising
governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:

.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof,
 are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall
not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functions
of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of employees of
government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in
the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P.
Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not
government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree
[P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the
President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning
strike by government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present,
in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 is not at issue].

But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where
the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged
by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No.
60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in
the private sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are
governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277,
the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion
 by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government
which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. [At
p. 13; Emphasis supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public employer
and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike
given to unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects
the interest of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as
are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and
those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco,
G.R. No. 64313, January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].

E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, while
clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:

.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that
are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the
public sector to wit:

.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees.
In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing
laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-
Management] Council for appropriate action.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with
the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary
work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As
now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and
conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction
may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance
of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving
government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive
writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by
law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and
not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with
caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any further
disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the
unresolved controversies emanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].

III

In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and
supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual
petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to
restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their
supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which ruled
that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the
resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe
benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.

The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to
petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already
become final.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is
hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.