CASES ON LIBEL
UNITED STATES v. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918 Malcolm, J.
FACTS:
 In 1915, the law office of Crossfield and O’Brien
submitted a complaint with a petition and several
affidavits to the Executive Secretary. The petition
and affidavits charged Roman Punsalan, a justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asked
for his removal.
 The specific charges against Punsalan were:
“1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint
against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the
peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for
P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid;
also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and
took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding
land which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went
to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the
trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he
wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount,
Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was
informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the
office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the
justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for
assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the
justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave
him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon
shelved.”
 The CFI found the second and third charges were
established. It was recommended to the Governor-
General that the respondent be removed from his
position as justice of the peace. A motion for new
trial was filed and granted. The CFI eventually
acquitted Punsalan and ordered the suppression
of the charges.
 Subsequently, a criminal action was instituted
against Felipe Bustos, Felix Fernandez, Juan S.
Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, Manuel Mallari, and
their companions for “voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice
and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano xxx
wrote, signed, and published a writing which was
false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous.” Notably, the information omits
paragraphs of the petition mentioning the
investigation before the judge of first instance.
 Except for Fernandez, Alfonso, Garcia, and
Mallari, the CFI found all defendants guilty. The
defendants appealed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the acts of Bustos et al are protected by the
rights of free speech and press, and of assembly and
petition. YES
2. WON the defendants are guilty of libel. NO
HELD:
Defendants are entitled to the protection of qualified
privilege, and are ACQUITTED.

RATIO:
 The Court briefly historicizes the history of freedom of
speech in the Philippines:
Freedom of speech was unknown in the Philippine
Islands before 1990 (except for a few Filipino
patriots calling for liberty of the press in Spain,
through La Solidaridad) FOS enshrined in the
Malolos Constitution, work of the Revolutionary
Congress, under the Bill of Rights retained while
the Philippines was under the US and the
American Constitution, where the right to free
speech is guaranteed also in the 1902 Philippine
Bill and the Jones Law of 1916
 The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public
men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. It is a duty which everyone owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct.
 The guaranties of free speech include the right to
criticize judicial conduct, since the administration of
the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the
law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for
proper comment.
 The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of free speech.
o Assembly — right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public
affairs
o Petition — means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without
fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances
o The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made
 Doctrine of privileged communications — arises
from the fact that for the betterment of public policy,
societal welfare, and the orderly administration of
government, it is necessary the public opinion and
free speech be protected.
o Privilege may be either absolute
(speech is absolutely protected) or
qualified (speech is protected under
certain conditions).
o Qualified privilege – a
communication made upon any
subject matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if said communication is
made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty (even
if it contains defamatory matter which
without this privilege would be
libelous and actionable)
o Example: a complaint made in good
faith and without malice with regard
 to the character or conduct of a
public official, addressed to an officer
or a board having some interest/duty
in the matter
o In the usual case, malice is
presumed from the very fact of
defamatory words. Privilege destroys
that presumption
o A privileged communication need not
be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection
which the law throws over privileged
communications.
 In no way did they abuse the privilege. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner of
commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace
was proper. And finally the charges and the petition
were submitted through reputable attorneys to the
proper functionary, the Executive Secretary.
 The Court noted that publicity is immaterial if the
charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged
communication. Also, malicious and untrue
communications are not privileged.

 All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient

administration of justice and public affairs. Privilege is
not defeated even if the communication is made in
intemperate terms.

 In the case at bar, although the charges are probably

not true as to the justice of the peace, they were
believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to
think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office
existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of
these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal — were justifiable.

 The Court remarked, “Instead of punishing citizens for

an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we
should rather commend them for their good
citizenship.”
NEWSWEEK, INC. v. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-
ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA,
LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO
GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE
MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH
MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO,
FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO
YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986 Feria, J.
FACTS:
• In March 1981, the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters, an association of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members
and several individual sugar planters, filed a class suit
in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against Newsweek and two of its
non-resident correspondents, Fred Bruning and Barry
Came.
• The complaint alleged that Newsweek committed libel
against them by the publication of the article "An Island
of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of Newsweek.
The article supposedly portrayed the island province of
Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not only
exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane
workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them
with impunity. The news report stated that the victim
had been arrested by members of a special police unit
and brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of
Kabankalan.
• The complaint alleged that the article, taken as a
whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of
falsehood, slanted presentation and misrepresentation
of facts intended to put sugarcane planters in bad light,
to expose them to public ridicule, to discredit and to
humiliate them. It was alleged that the article makes
the sugar planters of Negros the objects of hatred,
contempt and hostility of agricultural workers and the
the public in general.
• Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that (1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable;
and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
Newsweek pointed out the non-libelous nature of the
article and the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action.
• The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating
that the complaint on its face states a valid cause of
action.
• Newsweek filed a petition for certiorari with the IAC.
• IAC affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. Thus,
Newsweek filed this petition for certiorari.
• Newsweek argues that private respondents' complaint
failed to state a cause of action because the complaint
made no allegation that anything contained in the
article complained of regarding sugarcane planters
referred specifically to any one of the private
respondents; that libel can be committed only against
 individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is
claimed to have been directed at a group, there is
actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to
reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a
specific, individual group member's reputation.
ISSUE:
WON the complaint failed to state a cause of action. YES
HELD:
The complaint for libel is dismissed.
RATIO:
YES
 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable (Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr.)
although it is not necessary that victim be named
(People v. Monton). A "defamatory matter which does
not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the
imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it
be shown that the readers of the libel could have
Identified the personality of the individual defamed."
(Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons)
 Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of
persons in general language only, are not actionable
by individuals composing the class or group unless the
statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that
even then no action would lie where the body is
composed of so large a number of persons that
common sense would tell those to whom the
publication was made that there was room for persons
connected with the body to pursue an upright and law
abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and
absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a
part. (Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen)
• It is evident based on jurisprudence that where the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently
specific so that each individual in the class or group
can prove that the defamatory statement specifically
pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be.
• The Court noted that private respondents filed a
"class suit" in representation of all the 8,500
sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. The case
at bar however is not a class suit. It is not a case
where one or more may sue for the benefit of all or
where the representation of class interest affected
by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make
each member of the class an actual party.
• This is a case where each of the plaintiffs has a
separate and distinct reputation in the community.
They do not have a common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy.
• The allegedly libelous statement that “the victim had
been arrested by members of a special police unit
[and] brought into the area by Sola” never singled
out Sola as a sugar planter. Hence, the report
referred to an official act performed by an elective
public official. It is within the realm of privilege and
protected by the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and press.

 The complaint contains a recital of the favorable
working conditions of the agricultural workers in the
sugar industry and the various foundations and
programs supported by planters' associations for
the benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the
statements in the article in question are sweeping
and exaggerated. However, paraphrasing the ruling
in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be
unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority
of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the
welfare of their workers, because of the actions of
some. Articles such as the one in question may also
serve to prick the consciences of those who have
but are not doing anything or enough for those who
do not have.
 Obiter dictum: The Court advised Newsweek to
heed the admonition of the President to media that
they should check the sources of their information to
ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the
press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with
responsibility.
NICASIO ALCANTARA v. VICENTE PONCE and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 156183 28 February 2007 Corona, J.
FACTS
 Respondent Vicente Ponce filed a string of
complaints against petitioner Alcantara and his
family. Among these was estafa. In essence,
Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out
of 3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement Corporation.
 As an annex to a subsequent affidavit, Ponce
submitted to the investigating prosecutor a
newsletter that read:
"For every extraordinary fortune there is a great
crime"
An example is Marcos. We need not discuss
this.
Second example is the Alcantaras.
Over shipment of log; b) Land grabbing; c)
Corruption of public office; and d) Corporate
grabbing.
 Petitioner Nicasio Alcantara then filed a complaint
for libel against Ponce with the Makati
Prosecutor’s Office. This was in connection with
the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1) the
statements therein were defamatory; (2)
respondent had circulated it in the Makati
Prosecutor’s Office and (3) the newsletter could
not be considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder
because respondent had not attached it to the said
affidavit but had given it thereafter.
 The prosecutor found probable cause for libel.
 However, upon respondent Ponce’s petition for
review, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City
Prosecutor. This reversal was based on the finding
that the newsletter was a privileged
communication, having been submitted as an
intended annex to respondent’s sur-rejoinder.
 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
and so he elevated the matter via petition for
certiorari to the CA. The CA found that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion, set aside the latter’s resolution and
directed the reinstatement of the criminal case.
 After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in
the Department of Justice, respondent Ponce
attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105.
However, the SC denied respondent Ponce’s
motion for extension for time to file his petition as
well as his subsequent motions for
reconsideration.
 In the meantime, before the petition for certiorari
was decided by the CA, the Office of the Makati
City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of
the Justice Secretary, filed a motion to withdraw
information. The motion was granted. The trial
court ruled that the absence of the essential
element of publicity precluded the commission of
the crime of libel. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the withdrawal but the trial court
denied the motion.
 Petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the
CA. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed
decision.
ISSUE:
WON the controversial newsletter constituted privileged
communication, which would exempt it from libel. YES.
HELD:
Petition is denied. Liberally applying the privileged
communication doctrine, the statements were still
relevant to the complaint under investigation because,
like the averments therein, they also involved petitioners
alleged rapacity and deceitfulness.
RATIO:
1. The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code has the following elements:
a. imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance;
b. publicity or publication;
c. malice;
d. direction of such imputation at a natural or
juridical person, or even a dead person and
e. tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of the person defamed.
2. Statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute
privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and
the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent
or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry.
The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of
absolute privilege is the test of relevancy.
 The "newsletter" containing the defamatory
statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal
complaint for estafa then under preliminary
investigation. The crime of estafa involves deceit,
dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. The
inclusion in the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the
"newsletter" discussing the alleged "corporate
grabbing" by petitioner Alcantara will tend to
support private respondent Ponce’s case of estafa
against petitioner insofar as such alleged
"corporate grabbing" will highlight or manifest
petitioner’s propensity for dishonest dealing or
fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no
doubt that the subject "newsletter" is relevant and
pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa, and
hence the same comes within the protective cloak
of absolutely privileged communications as to
exempt private respondent from liability for libel or
damages.
 In determining the issue of relevancy of
statements made in judicial proceedings, courts
have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all
doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs.
Aquino, our Supreme Court has emphasized that it
is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should
be liberally construed to favor the writer, and the
words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic
intensity. The doctrine of privileged communication
has a practical purpose.
3. Publication in libel means making the defamatory
matter, after it has been written, known to someone other
than the person to whom it has been written. There is
publication if the material is communicated to a third
person. What is material is that a third person has read or
heard the libelous statement, for "a man’s reputation is
the estimate in which others hold him, not the good
opinion which he has of himself." Our Supreme Court has
established the rule that when a public officer, in the
discharge of his or her official duties, sends a
communication to another officer or to a body of officers,
who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject
matter of the communication, such communication does
not amount to publication. Applying this rule by analogy
to the present case, private respondent’s submission of
the "newsletter" intended as an annex to his Sur-
Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor
Bautista who was then conducting the preliminary
investigation in said case, does not amount to publication
for the reason that the sending of such material was
made specifically for the purpose of including the same
as evidence in the preliminary investigation.
4. Since the newsletter was presented during the
preliminary investigation, it was vested with a privileged
character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of
whether the doctrine of absolute privilege extends to
statements made in preliminary investigations or other
proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case
of Borg v. Boas makes a categorical declaration of the
existence of such protection: It is hornbook learning that
the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far
as the actual participants therein are concerned and
preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official
nature have been given absolute privilege.

5. While the doctrine of privileged communication
can be abused, and its abuse can lead to great
hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this
account will give rise to even greater hardships. The
doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks to the
free and unfettered administration of justice. It is as a rule
applied liberally.
6. The one obstacle that those pleading the defense
of privileged communication must hurdle is the test of
relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course
of the proceedings need not be in every case material to
the issues presented but should be legitimately related to
the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it
may become the subject of inquiry in the course of trial.
RAFAEL MERCADO v. CFI OF RIZAL and VIRGINIA
MERCADO
G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982 Fernando, C.J.
FACTS:
 Rafael Mercado was charged by Virginia Mercado
for sending an allegedly libelous telegram to her
superior, Secretary David Consunji Department of
Public Works and Communications. The telegram
reads, "we have reason to believe that [Virginia
Mercado] has enriched herself thru corrupt
practices considering that she has properties and
spending above what her salary can afford with
the husband jobless.”
 A motion to dismiss was filed by Rafael Mercado
on the ground that the telegram is a privileged
communication. It was denied by the lower court.
 Rafael now filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari praying that his motion to
quash the information for libel against him be
granted.
Antecedent Facts:
 On October 14, 1972, Rafael filed an
administrative case with the Chairman of the
Board of Transportation through a letter-complaint
against Virginia for a grave violation of RA 2260
and civil service rules.
 Fourteen days later, the allegedly libelous
telegram was sent to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
  In November 1972, the complaint with the Board of
Transportation was amended to include such
charges as dishonesty, pursuit of private business
or corrupt practices and misconduct.
 The Board of Transportation found Virginia
innocent. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Rafael was denied.
 During the pendency of the administrative case,
Rafael filed the following:
1. A complaint with the Constabulary Highway
Patrol Group a complaint against Virginia and
her husband, accusing them of selling a
carnapped Ford Willys engine. The case was
closed for lack of evidence.
2. A complaint before the Criminal Investigation
Service for corrupt practices against Virginia.
The case was dismissed as it is not supported
by the evidence submitted.
ISSUE:
WON a communication addressed to a superior
complaining against the conduct of a subordinate is a
privileged communication. NO.
HELD:
The petition for certiorari to annul the order denying the
motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration
does not lie.
RATIO:
 A libel prosecution must survive the test of
whether or not the offending publication is within
the guarantees of free speech and free press.
 In US v. Bustos, Justice Malcolm pointed out that
qualified privilege is lost upon proof of malice. A
communication made bona fide upon any subject
matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained incriminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
 A pertinent illustration of the application of
qualified privilege is a complaint made in good
faith and without malice with regard to the
character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and
the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual.
 The statements must be made under an honest
sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive.
Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have
an interest in the pure and efficient administration
of justice and of public affairs.
 The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
the communication is made in intemperate terms.
 A further element of the law of privilege concerns
the person to whom the complaint should be
made. The rule is that, if a party submits the
complaint to the wrong person through some
natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials, such unintentional
error will not take the case out of the privilege.
 What casts doubt on the good faith of the accused
Rafael Mercado is his conduct. The tenacity with
which Rafael filed cases even while an
administrative case he initiated was already
pending with Board of Transportation would create
a doubt as to the bona fides.
 Given the above considerations, the prosecution in
the libel case should be given the opportunity to
prove malice.
 In People v. Monton, the motion to quash in a libel
case based on qualified privilege was denied.
Malice can be shown and this burden lies with the
prosecution.
NANERICO D. SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45031 October 21, 1991 Fernan, C.J.
FACTS
 On February 23, 1970, Columnist Nanerico Santos
wrote in his column with the Manila Bulletin an
article entitled “Charges Against CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc.”
 The article was quoted verbatim from an unverified
complaint filed on February 13, 1970 with the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) by
Rosario Sandejas and her daughters charging
CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its Board
Chairman Carlos Moran Sison (Carlos) and its
president-general manager Luis Sison (Luis), of
engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock
market.
 On the same day the news article appeared,
Carlos sought a meeting with Santos so that he
could submit to the columnist his reply which he
wanted to be published the next day in the same
column.
 During their meeting at around 6:15pm, Santos
promised to publish the reply not on the next day
but on February 25, 1970 instead saying it was
past the deadline for the next day’s issue.
 The reply was not published on the February 25
issue as promised. Thus Carlos called Santos
through phone and told him not to publish the
article anymore as it would only rekindle the
controversy.

 On March 4, 1970, Carlos sued Santos and other
individuals working for the Manila Daily Bulletin for
libel.
ISSUES
1. WON the publication of a complaint filed with SEC
before any judicial action is taken is privileged. YES.
2. WON malice was established by the prosecution. NO.
2. Malice was not established by the prosecution.
HELD: Santos is acquitted of the crime of libel.
RATIO:
1. The publication of the complaint filed with the SEC
before any judicial action is take is privileged
communication.
 Malice is generally presumed (malice in law) in
every defamatory imputation but this does not
arise from an imputation made in a privileged
communication under Article 354.
 It must be noted that Pars. 1 and 2 of Article 354
refer to qualified privileged communication in
which the character of the privilege is a matter of
defense which may be lost by positive proof of
express malice.
Re: Santos’ invoked Barreto v. Philippine Publishing Co.
and argued that the published article is privileged, being
a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding, without
comments or remarks, and therefore not punishable.
 The Baretto case was already overturned by the
Court’s ruling in Cuenco v. Cuenco in which the
Court pronounced the correct rule on the matter
should be that a fair and true report of a complaint
filed in court without remarks nor comments even
before an answer is filed or a decision
promulgated should be covered by the privilege.
This doctrine was reiterated by the Court in
Manuel v. Pano.
 The article was a faithful reproduction of the
pleading. It had no embellishments or imputations
calculated to damage the reputation of the
offended parties and expose them to public
contempt.
 Santos furnished the readers with the information
that a complaint has been filed against a
brokerage firm by reproducing the pleading
verbatim. Since the publication was a fair and true
report and made without malice, Santos is entitled
to the protection and immunity of the rule on
privileged matters under Article 354 (2).
FERNANDO SAZON y RAMOS v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120715 March 29, 1996 Hermosisima, Jr., J.
FACTS
 Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private
complainant Abdon Reyes were both residents of
the PML Homes in East Drive, Parang Marikina,
Metro Manila. They are both members of the PML-
Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association,
Inc. (PML-BLCA) which had a monthly newsletter,
the PML-Homemaker. Reyes was the editor the
newsletter.
 PML-BLCA held an election for the members of its
board of directors
 Reyes and Sazon ran. Sazon was elected as a
director and as President of the homeowners’
association. Reyes lost in the election.
 Reyes wrote a letter to the Estate Management
Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMO-
HFC) protesting the election of the Sazon as a
director and president. He alleged that the election
was a nullity.
 Reyes wrote to his co-homeowners explaining to
them his election protest and urging them not to
recognize Sazon and the other members who won
in the election.
 In response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC
ordered the PML-BLCA to conduct a referendum
to be supervised by the EMO-HFC.
 Reyes then notified his co-homeowners about this
development and requested them to attend a
general meeting with the representatives of the
EMO-HFC which was to be held before the
referendum.
 Soon after the general meeting, several copies of
a leaflet called the “PML Scoop” were received by
the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled
“Supalpal si Sazon,” obviously referring to the
affirmative action taken by the EMO-HFC in
connection with the private respondent’s election
protest.
 At about the same time, the phrase “Sazon,
nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?” was seen
boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate
of the subdivision. There was no proof as to who
was responsible for these writings.
 Thinking that only private complainant was
capable of these acts, Sazon started writing,
publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-
homeowners, culminating in the appearance in the
February 10, 1984 issue of the PML-Homemakers
containing an article against Reyes.
 Reyes initiated the necessary complaint against
the petitioner. This led to the filing of an
Information before the trial court charging Sazon
with libel.
 The trial court found Sazon guilty of libel.
  Sazon appealed the decision to the CA. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 Hence, this present action for certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON the questioned article written Sazon is libelous.
YES
HELD: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
 Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel
in this wise:
“ART. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, on to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.”
 The following requisites must concur in a case for
libel:
(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.
 Sazon concedes the existence of the third and
fourth requisites.
Regarding the first requisite, Sazon insists that the
allegedly offensive words found in the subject article are
not actually defamatory
 Sazon argues that the word “mandurugas” and
other words and phrases used in the questioned
article do not impute to private complainant any
crime, vice or defect which would be injurious or
damaging to his name and reputation. The
descriptive words and phrases used should be
considered as mere epithets which are a form of
non-actionable opinion, because while they may
express petitioner’s strong emotional feelings of
dislike, they do not mean to reflect adversely on
private complainant’s reputation.
SC does not agree. In libel cases, the question is not
what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the
words used by him mean.
 The defamatory character of the words used by
the Sazon are shown by the very recitals thereof
in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde
need be adduced to prove it.
 Sazon used the following words and phrases in
describing the private complainant: “mandurugas,”
“mag-ingat sa panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong
niloloko,” “may kasamang pagyayabang,” “ang
ating pobreng super kulit,” “patuloy na
kabulastugan,” “mastermind sa paninirang puri,”
etc.
 Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine
the defamatory character of words used in the
following manner:
“Words calculated to induce suspicion are
sometimes more effective to destroy reputation
than false charges directly made. Ironical and
 metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for
slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach
their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold
the person or persons up to public ridicule. x x
x.”
 Branding Reyes as “mandurugas” most certainly
exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No
amount of sophistical explanation on the part of
petitioner can hide the negative impression
already created in the minds of the readers of the
libelous material.
 CA is thus correct in holding that “these words and
phrases (‘mandurugas,’ et al.) are indisputably
defamatory for they impute upon the private
complainant a condition that is dishonorable and
shameful, since they tend to describe him as a
swindler and/or a deceiver.”
Regarding the second requisite, Sazon also maintains
that there was no malice in this case.
 Sazon argues that the prosecution failed to
present evidence demonstrating that the accused
was prompted by personal ill-will or spite or that he
did not act in response to duty but acted merely to
cause harm to private complainant.
SC is not persuaded.
 The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that:
“Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. x x x” -
 When the imputation is defamatory, as in this
case, the prosecution need not prove malice on
the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that the defendant’s
imputation is malicious (malice in law).
 The burden is on the defendant to show good
intention and justifiable motive in order to
overcome the legal inference of malice.
Sazonfailed to discharge this burden.
 Sazon submits that malice should not be
presumed in the instant case, but must be proved
as a fact (malice in fact), since the questioned
article is a privileged communication covered
under the two exceptions enumerated under
Article 354, viz:
“1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and,
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.”
Sazon avers that he wrote the article in response to some which are related to the discharge of their official
moral, social or civic duty as he was at that time the duties will not constitute libel if the defendant
President of their homeowners’ association and editor of proves the truth of the imputation. Nonetheless,
its newsletter any attack upon the private character of the public
officer on matters which are not related to the
SC found that this argument has no basis. discharge of their official functions may constitute
libel.
 In Daez v. Court of Appeals, SC held:  Sazon’s article reveals that it has no reference
“As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a whatsoever to the performance of private
complaint of any misconduct on the pant of public complainant’s position as a public relations
officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged
with supervision over them. Such a communication is
consultant in the DTI.
qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel.
The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional
requirement. Such complaints should be addressed
solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into
the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has
some duty to perform or interest in connection
therewith.”

 None of the homeowners for whom the newsletter

was published was vested with the power of
supervision over the private complainant or the
authority to investigate the charges.

 A written letter containing libelous matter cannot

be classified as privileged when it is published
and circulated among the public.

Petitioner alleges that the subject article likewise

constitutes a fair and true report on the actuations of a
public official falling under the second exception of Article
354, since private complainant was a public relations
consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry.

 The rule is that defamatory remarks and

comments on the conduct or acts of public officers
CIRIACO BOY GUINGGUING v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 128959 September 30, 2005 Tinga, J.
FACTS:
 This case originated from a criminal complaint
against Choy Torralba.
 Choy Torralba is a broadcast journalist who
handled two programs for two radio stations based
in Cebu City.
 The programs were aired over a large portion of
the Visayas and Mindanao.
 Torralba filed a criminal complaint for libel against
Segundo Lim and Boy Guingging.
 The 2 caused the publication thru a paid
advertisement of records of criminal cases filed
against Torralba as well as photographs of
Torralba being arrested in the Sunday Post.
 The weekly publication edited and published by
Guingging. It was published in the same area as
the radio programs.
 Lim and Guingging were convicted by the TC and
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
WON Guingguing be liable for libel. NO
HELD:
Guingguing is acquitted of libel.
RATIO:
 Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
 Elements:
(a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another;
(b) publication of the imputation;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and,
(d) existence of malice
 Initially, the truth of a defamatory imputation was
not considered a defense in the prosecution for
libel. However, in this case, the Court quoted and
used NYT v. Sullivan in defining malice:
o a public official may not successfully sue for
libel unless the official can prove actual malice,
which was defined as “with knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard
as to whether or not it was true.”
 The Court also cited Curtis vs Butts which
expanded the actual malice test to cover not only
public officials but also public figures. “Public
figures’, like ‘public officials’, often play an
influential role in ordering society. Surely, as a
class, these ‘public figures’ have ready access as
 ‘public officials’ to mass media to influence policy
and to counter criticism of their views and
activities.”
 The Court cited Ayes vs Capulong to define the
term “public figure.”
o “A public figure has been defined as a person
who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode
of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in
his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.' He is, in other
words, a celebrity.”
 In the case at bar, Torralba is a public figure. He is
a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs
aired over a large portion of the Visayas and
Mindanao.
 Complainant’s volition to practice the radio
broadcasting profession necessarily thrusts him in
the public sphere.
 Since Torralba is a public figure comments about
him are privileged hence the prosecution must
prove actual malice.
 Lim and Guingging published them with
knowledge that the statements were false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
 There was nothing untruthful about what was
published in the Sunday Post. The criminal cases
listed in the advertisement as pending against the
complainant had indeed been filed
NEW YORK TIMES v. LB SULLIVAN, COMMISSIONER
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Montgomery, Alabama)
376 U.S. 254 (1964) Brennan, J.
FACTS
- Respondent Sullivan is one of the three
Commissioners of the City of Montgomery. He brought
this civil action against the New York Times for having
issued allegedly libelous statements in an advertisement
published in their newspaper.
- Entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," the
advertisement began by stating that "As the whole world
knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students
are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in
positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of
Rights." It went on to charge that "in their efforts to
uphold these guarantees, they are being met by an
unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny
and negate that document which the whole world looks
upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom . . . ."
paragraphs purported to illustrate the "wave of terror" by
describing certain alleged events. The text concluded
with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of
the student movement, "the struggle for the right-to-vote,"
and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment then
pending in Montgomery.
- There were certain events, which were stated in
the advertisement that turned out to be false. Firstly, the
advertisement stated that students were expelled from
their school after singing “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee” on
the State Capitol steps. They actually sang the National
Anthem not My Country, ‘Tis of Thee. Although the State
Board of Education expelled nine students, this was not
for leading the demonstration at the Capitol, but for
demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery
County Courthouse on another day. Secondly, the
advertisement stated that Martin Luther King was
arrested seven times when in reality, he was arrested
only four times.
- Trial Court Decision: Statements were “libelous
per se” and were not privileged by the first and fourteenth
amendment. "the law . . . implies legal injury from the
bare fact of publication itself," "falsity and malice are
presumed,"
- Supreme Court of Alabama Decision: Affirmed the
trial court, It held that "where the words published tend to
injure a person libeled by them in his reputation,
profession, trade or business, or charge him with an
indictable offense, or tend to bring the individual into
public contempt," they are "libelous per se"; that "the
matter complained of is, under the above doctrine,
libelous per se, if it was published of and concerning the
plaintiff"; and that it was actionable without "proof of
pecuniary injury . . ., such injury being implied." Damages
of $500,000 should be awarded to the respondent.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the advertisement is protected by the first
and fourteenth amendment. YES
2. WON the Alabama law as applied in this case, a
publication is "libelous per se" goes against the first and
fourteenth amendment. YES
3. WON the advertisement forfeits the protection
guaranteed to free speech and the press by the falsity of
some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of respondent. NO
RATIO:
The Federal Supreme Court reversed the Alabama
Supreme Court’s decision.
1. The respondent contended that the Times article is not
covered by the first and fourteenth amendment because
it is a paid advertisement. The Court ruled that the
publication at hand is not an advertisement per se. “It
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public
interest and concern. That the Times was paid for
publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this
connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are
sold.” To avoid placing a handicap upon the freedoms of
expression, the Court ruled that if the allegedly libelous
statements would otherwise be constitutionally protected
from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that
protection just because they were published in the from
of a paid advertisement.
2. Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a
publication is "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure
a person . . . in his reputation" or to "bring [him] into
public contempt"; the trial court stated that the standard
was met if the words are such as to "injure him in his
public office, or impute misconduct to him in his office, or
want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public
trust..." Once "libel per se" has been established, the
defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he
can persuade the jury that they were true in all their conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less
particulars. inadequate.

 The Court considered this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, and that it may well include
vehement and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. The
general proposition that freedom of expression
upon public questions is secured by the First
Amendment has long been settled by the Court’s
decisions. The constitutional safeguard, "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."
 “A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions -
and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amount - leads to a comparable "self-
censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth,
with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
does not mean that only false speech will be
deterred.”

 Actual Malice Test: “Where an article is published

and circulated among voters for the sole purpose
of giving what the defendant believes to be truthful
information concerning a candidate for public
office and for the purpose of enabling such voters
to cast their ballot more intelligently, and the whole
thing is done in good faith and without malice, the
article is privileged, although the principal matters
contained in the article may be untrue in fact and
derogatory to the character of the plaintiff; and in
such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to show
actual malice in the publication of the article."

3. Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its

constitutional protection merely because it is effective
criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. If
neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to
remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official
DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO v. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. L-32836-37 May 3, 1989 Bidin, J.
FACTS:
- Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practicing lawyer since
1926, one time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and
for sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar
Association, has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel
Victorio in certain civil cases since 1953. Petitioner Daniel
Victorio is the son of Exequiel Victorio.
- In 1963, petitioner Exequiel decided to hire the
services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of
Atty. Ruiz.
- Petitioner Exequiel and his wife filed a disbarment
case against Atty. Ruiz and an administrative charge
against Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and a collaborator of Atty. Ruiz.
The administrative case was assigned to Judge Ramon
Avancena, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
- During the hearing of the administrative case on
that particular afternoon of January 9, 1964 in the sala of
Judge Avanceña, Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios,
presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avanceña
to hear the administrative case, who apparently taken
aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture.
- Meanwhile Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent
Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that
Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court.
- After the said hearing and while the two accused
were later walking down the corridor leading to the stairs
from the sala of Judge Avanceña, the incident that gave
rise to the criminal prosecution for oral defamation took
place.
- Petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon,
a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the
following defamatory words:
- Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong
Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at
estapador."
- Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz,
suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado
Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog
as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan,
babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at
estapador.")
- On February 8, 1964, Daniel Victorio and Exequiel
Victorio were separately charged with the crime of
Serious Oral Defamation.
- After trial, both accused were convicted.
- During the pendency of the appeal, the elder
Victorio died and so the case against him was dismissed.
The son Daniel Victorio now petitions the SC to modify
the charges against him from grave oral defamation to
slight oral defamation.
ISSUE
WON the crime committed by the accused is that of a
lesser degree of slight oral defamation only, instead of
grave oral defamation. NO
HELD
The accused is guilty of grave oral defamation.
RATIO
- The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base
and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in
his reputation, office, trade, business or means of
livelihood.
- To determine whether the offense committed is
serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the
following guidelines:
- “We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or
the other, depending upon their sense and grammatical
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time.”
- The Court cited a case in which the offended party
was also imputed to be an “estapador”, just as in the
present case. In that case, the Court said:
- “The scurrilous words imputed to the offended
party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment
strikes deep into the character of the victim. No amount
of sophistry will take these statements out of the
compass of grave oral defamation. They are serious and
insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade
the slander.”
- In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted
having uttered the defamatory words against Atty.
Vivencio Ruiz. Among others he called Atty. Ruiz,
"estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of
estafa, a serious and insulting imputation.
- Defamatory words uttered specifically against a
lawyer when touching on his profession are also libelous
per se as held in Kleeberg v. Sipser. In that case, the US
SC said "where statements concerning plaintiff in his
professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their
ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to
injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and
(the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of
special damage, states cause of action."
- Therefore, oral statements that a certain lawyer is
'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade,
occupation, business or profession of a person charged,
are slanderous per se.
- In the case at bar, appellant-petitioner imputed the
crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time
Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a
president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association.
- As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the
character of the victim, no special circumstance need be
shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered
grave oral defamation.
- In addition, the fact that the offended party is a
lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw
ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him
has the import of charging him with dishonesty or
improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence,
actionable per se.
- The petitioner also argues that since the remarks
were uttered in the heat of anger, he should only be
charged with the lesser degree of oral defamation, citing
several cases which support the argument.
- The SC disagrees. The rulings relied upon by
petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by
the SC but by the CA, hence not binding.
- Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner
would not in any manner help his cause. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, there was no reason for the
petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was
merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his
client. Petitioner's anger was not lawfully caused.
- The fact that the defamatory words were uttered
by the petitioner without provocation by private
respondent and taken seriously by the latter, renders
inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.
- As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were
found by the respondent court to have been uttered in a
loud voice, in the presence of at least ten (10) persons,
taken seriously by the offended party and without
provocation on his part.
NOEL VILLANUEVA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND YOLANDA CASTRO
G.R. No. 16035 April 10, 2006 Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
 The accused Villanueva (a municipal councilor)
went to the Vice-Mayor’s office (herein private
complainant) for the application for monetized
leave. The petitioner’s application was not
immediately acted upon by the petitioner for no
reason.
 This inaction on the part of the petitioner resulted
to a barrage of insults from Villanueva. The
petitioner uttered the following:
o "Ibuatdaka ken, inabudakakengawang, e
baling masukulnaku." (I will lift you from
there and I will throw you out of the window
and I don’t care if I will go to jail)
o "Magmaliniska, enaka man malinis,
garapalka." "Balamumansanaskangmalutu,
pero king kilubularanka, tiktakkarinat" (You
are pretending to be clean and honest yet
you are not clean and honest, you are
corrupt. You are like red apple, you are
worm infested inside and extremely dirty).
 Villanueva also made a “dirty finger” to the private
respondent.
 These circumstances prompted Castro to file a
criminal case of grave oral defamation and slander
by deed against Villanueva.

 The MCTC ruled in favor of Castro. The RTC and
CA also ruled in favor of Castro.
ISSUE:
1. WON Villanueva is guilty of grave oral defamation. NO.
2. WON Villanueva is guilty of slander by deed. NO.
HELD
Petitioner is guilty only of slight oral defamation and
simple slander by deed.
RULING:
1. As to the grave oral defamation, the Court ruled that
the slander committed by Villanueva can be
characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with
some provocation on the part of the offended party,
constitutes only a light felony.
 In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of
leave without valid justification, but as an offshoot
of a political dissension may have been vexing for
petitioner and may have been perceived by him as
provocation that triggered him to blow his top and
utter those disparaging words. I
 n hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave
credits must have stirred upon the petitioner a
feeling akin to begging for money that he was
legally entitled to.
 This oppressive conduct on the part of
complainant must have scarred petitioner’s self-
esteem, too, to appear as begging for money.
 This is not an excuse to resort to intemperate
language no matter how such embarrassment
must have wreaked havoc on his ego.
2. As to the slander by deed, pointing a dirty finger
ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is
similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in
local parlance.
 Such expression was not held to be libelous in
Reyes v. People, where the Court said that:
o "This is a common enough expression in
the dialect that is often employed, not really
to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its
literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother."
 Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there
was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioner’s act of pointing a dirty
finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by
deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the
case that the act complained of was employed by
petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at
complainant for procrastinating the approval of his
leave monetization. While it may have cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant,
said act is not of a serious nature.
MARCELO SORIANO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE
COURT, HON. AUXENCIO DACUYCUY, and HON.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR.
G.R. No. 72383 November 9, 1988 Guttierrez, J.
FACTS
 An information for libel was filed for libel against
petitioner Marcelo Soriano amd six others (Bobby
dela Cruz, Cesar Villegas, Cirilo Montojo,
Emmanuel Veloso, and Valenta Quintero) at the
Leyte RTC, Branch 7.
 It was in connection with the press releases and
articles imputing to respondent Francisco
Tantuico, then Chairman of the Commission on
Audit (COA), the tampering by COA personnel of
election returns in the May 14, 1984 Batasan
elections at his residence in Tacloban City and in
the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. This was
done according to Tantuico’s command to assure
the victory of certain candidates.
 The information alleges that:
o The accused Marcelo B. Soriano and
Bobby de la Cruz are the Editor
Publisher and Associate Editor,
respectively, of “The Guardian,” a
weekly newspaper or magazine.
 The accused published in the said newspaper
(dated May 26 – June 1, 1984) the press release
of accused Cesar G. Villegas written/printed and
first circulated/published in Tacloban City dated
May 19, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached as
part of this Information, publicly imputing the crime
of falsification of public documents and/or violation
of election laws to said Chairman Francisco S.
Tantuico, Jr.
 The publication in the said newspaper is captioned
"IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE LOOMS". The
article was quoted verbatim in the original case.
Here are some excerpts:
o “Unido lawyers are studying the filing of
impeachment proceedings against
Commission on Audit regional head Francisco
Tantuico, Jr. because election returns were
reportedly talled at his COA Regional Office
and at his residence.”
o “Tente U. Quintero former Leyte vice-mayor
reported that... their supporters went to the
Tantuico residence... Having no warrant of
arrest (sic) barred their entry.
o At the regional COA office at Candahug Palo,
Leyte... they were able to enter and were told
to wait for the regional director.
o People coming in and out of the conference
room attracted their attention. The open door
revealed election returns being opened by
persons inside, Identified later as COA
personnel who were "shocked" to see the
candidates query that they were "merely
tallying the votes for the five KBL candidates",
the personnel later added that they "did not
know" who instructed them to do so.”
 Soriano filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground of improper venue. He contended that
the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
 charged because under Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, the libel case should have been filed
at Quezon City where Tantuico holds office and
where the publication house of the "Guardian" is
located.
 The trial court denied the motion.
 Soriano then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction with the then Intermediate
Appellate Court raising the same question of
jurisdiction of the RTC of Leyte.
 The appellate court dismissed the petition. The
appellate court also denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Leyte may try
the libel case. NO
HELD:
The court directed the Leyte RTC to dismiss the criminal
case insofar as Soriano is concerned.
RATIO:
 The applicable law is Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
1289 and Republic Act No. 4363. This Court in
Agbayani v. Sayo (89 SCRA 699, [1979])
recapitulated the law as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public
official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual,
the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where
he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer
whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer
holding office outside of Manila, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense.
 The court declared that we follow the "multiple
publication" rule in the Philippines.
 Each and every publication of the same libel
constitutes a distinct offense.
 For purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art.
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
every time the same written matter is
communicated such communication is considered
a distinct and separate publication of the libel.
 Petitioner Marcelo B. Soriano was included as one
of the accused in the libel case in his capacity as
editor-publisher of the "Guardian." As far as
Soriano is concerned, his criminal liability, if any,
allegedly stemmed from the publication in the May
26-June 1, 1984 issue of the GUARDIAN of an
 article captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE
LOOMS" wherein the full text of the press release
prepared by accused Cesar G. Villegas in
Tacloban was reproduced.

 For purposes of complying with the jurisdictional

requirements of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, the liability of a Manila or Quezon City editor
must be deemed as commencing with the
publication of the allegedly libelous material in his
newspaper and not with the typing or
mimeographing of press releases by interested
persons in different municipalities or cities, copies
of which are sent to metropolitan newspapers for
national publication.

 The amendments to Art. 360 made by RA 1289

and 4363 is intended to avoid the harassment of
media persons through libel suits instituted in
distant or out-of the-way towns by public officers
who could more conveniently file cases in their
places of work.