G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989 ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD RUDY M.

, AMOS,
FRANCIS F., ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES,
CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner, RICARDO S., ANOLIN, MILAGROS H., AQUINO,
vs. PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M., ARCANGEL,
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE AGUSTIN S., JR., ARPON, ULPLIANO U., JR.,
JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P.,
their respective capacities as Commissioner of ARVISU, ALEXANDER S., ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T.,
Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive ASLAHON, JULAHON P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R.,
Secretary, respondents. ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R.,
BACAL, URSULINO C., BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE, Z.,
G.R. No. 81967 August 8, 1989
BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B., BARROS,
VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner, VICTOR C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE A., BAYSAC,
vs. REYNALDO S., BELENO, ANTONIO B., BERNARDO,
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE ROMEO D., BERNAS, MARCIANO S., BOHOL,
JAYME, and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in AUXILIADOR G., BRAVO, VICTOR M., BULEG,
their respective capacities as Commissioner of BALILIS R., CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO,
Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive HONESTO G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V., CAMPOS,
Secretary, respondents. RODOLFO C., CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.,
CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS, LORENZO B.,
G.R. No. 82023 August 8, 1989 CARRANTO, FIDEL U., CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO
M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO, ROGELIO B.,
ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN
CATURLA, MANUEL B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F.,
C. ESPIRITU, DENNIS A. AZARRAGA, RENATO DE
CINCO, LUISITO, CONDE0, JOSE C., JR.,
JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS
CORCUERA, FIDEL S., CORNETA, VICENTE S.,
NIEVES, FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO
CORONADO, RICARDO S., CRUZ, EDUARDO S.,
H. FLORESCA, SUBAER PACASUM, ZENAIDA
CRUZ, EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.,
LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ, GLICERIO R. DOLAR,
CRUZADO, MARCIAL C., CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.,
CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, FERMIN
DABON, NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.,
RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO
DANDAL, EDEN F., DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO,
JOSE, ALBERTO LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO,
GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA, DE
JOSE BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO, ESTER TAN,
GUZMAN, ANTONIO A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.,
PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIO DAVID, RODOLFO
DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ,
AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA CATRE,
FRANCISCO C., DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO, DEL
ROBERTO ABADA, petitioners,
CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.,
vs.
DEMESA, WILHELMINA T., DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.,
COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON,
DIZON, FELICITAS A., DOCTOR, HEIDY M.,
COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF
DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J.,
CUSTOMS, respondent.
DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR., DUAY, JUANA G.,
G.R. No. 83737 August 8, 1989 DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.,
ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL M.,
BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA.
DIONISIO, petitioners, LOURDES H., ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO,
vs. RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO, FERMIN I., FELIX,
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.,
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and FERRAREN, ANTONIO C., FERRERA, WENCESLAO
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as A., FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR., FUENTES, RUDY
Commissioner of the Bureau of L., GAGALANG, RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO
Customs, respondents. R., GAMBOA, ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R.,
GARCIA, GILBERT M., GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA,
G.R. No. 85310 August 8, 1989 JUAN L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V., GEMPARO,
SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.,
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as
GRATE, FREDERICK R., GREGORIO, LAURO P.,
Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,
GUARTICO, AMMON H., GUIANG, MYRNA N.,
vs.
GUINTO, DELFIN C., HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA, SISINIO
HONRALES, LORETO N., HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.,
T., ABAD, ROGELIO C., ABADIANO, JOSE P.,
HULAR , LANNYROSS E., IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C.,
ABCEDE, NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA,
ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE, REYNALDO C.,
AURORA M., AGBAYANI, NELSON I., AGRES
ISAIS, RAY C., ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.,
ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR, AGUILUCHO MA.
JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER, AMADOR L.,
TERESA R., AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T., ALANO,
JAVIER, ROBERTO S., JAVIER, WILLIAM R.,
ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT
JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO V.,
B., ALCANTARA, JOSE G., ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.,
JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO
F., KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR., KOH, NANIE G., A., VILLAR, LUZ L., VILLALUZ, EMELITO V., ZATA,
LABILLES, ERNESTO S., LABRADOR, WILFREDO ANGEL A., JR., ACHARON, CRISTETO, ALBA,
M., LAGA, BIENVENIDO M., LAGLEVA, PACIFICO RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA, ERNESTO
Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG, C., CALO, RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMIN
WILFREDO G., LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., R., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C ., DONATO, ESTELITA
LAPITAN, CAMILO M., LAURENTE, REYNALDO A., P., DONATO, FELIPE S., FLORES, PEDRITO S.,
LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O., GALAROSA, RENATO, MALAWI, MAUYAG,
LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z., LOPEZ, MELENCIO L., MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M., OMEGA,
LUMBA, OLIVIA., MACAISA, BENITO T., MACAISA, PETRONILO T., SANTOS, GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO,
ERLINDA C., MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA, CELSO, VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and VALDEZ,
FERNANDO P., MALABANAN, ALFREDO C., NORA M., respondents.
MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN, LAZARO V.,
MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN, RAMON S., G.R. No. 85335 August 8, 1989
MANUEL, ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B.,
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE,
MARCELO, GIL C., MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V.,
FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, MA. J. ANGELINA G.
MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.,
MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA,
MARTINEZ, ROMEO M., MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.,
LEONARDO A. DELA PEÑ;A, ABELARDO T.
MATIBAG, ANGELINA G., MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.,
SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A.
MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA, PORTIA E.,
MARTIN, RUDY M. AMISTAD, ERNESTO T.
MEDINA, NESTOR M., MEDINA, ROLANDO S.,
MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, LILLIAN V.
MENDAVIA, AVELINO I., MENDOZA, POTENCIANO
GAVIOLA, MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE B. ORTIZ,
G., MIL, RAY M., MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.,
ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA,
MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G., MONTANO,
ANTONIO A. RARAS, FLORDELINA B.
ERNESTO F., MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE,
GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES, EDGAR Y.
ESMERALDO B., JR., MORALES, CONCHITA D.L.,
QUINONES, MANUEL B. CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG,
MORALES, NESTOR P., MORALES, SHIRLEY S.,
RODRIGO C. RANADA, LAURO GREGORIO,
MUNAR, JUANITA L., MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R.,
ALBERTO I. GAN, EDGARDO GALANG, RAY C.
MURILLO, MANUEL M., NACION, PEDRO R.,
ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS,
NAGAL, HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B.,
JR., ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R. MANUEL,
NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E.,
AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL, LEONARDO ELEVAZO,
NICOLAS, REYNALDO S., NIEVES, RUFINO A.,
VICENTE S. CORNETA, petitioners,
OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q.,
vs.
ORTEGA, ARLENE R., ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO,
COM. SALVADOR M. MISON/BUREAU OF
ABNER S., PAPIO, FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA,
CUSTOMS and the CIVIL SERVICE
ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO, PELAYO,
COMMISSION, respondents.
ROSARIO L., PEÑ;A, AIDA C., PEREZ, ESPERIDION
B., PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A., G.R. No. 86241 August 8, 1989
PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S., PUNZALAN,
LAMBERTO N., PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as
EDGARDO I., QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,
NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P., RAÑ;ADA, vs.
RODRIGO C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S.
VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA, PONCE F., DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE BERNARDO S.
REYES, LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E., REYES, QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO C.
NORMA Z., REYES, TELESFORO F., RIVERA, BADILLO respondents
ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V., ROQUE,
SARMIENTO, J.:
TERESITA S., ROSANES, MARILOU M., ROSETE,
ADAN I., RUANTO, REY, CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA, The Court writes finis to this contreversy that has raged
PASCASIO G., SALAZAR, SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, bitterly for the several months. It does so out of
VICTORIA A., SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C., ligitimate presentement of more suits reaching it as a
SALMINGO, LOURDES M., SANTIAGO, EMELITA B., consequence of the government reorganization and the
SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO, COSME B., JR., instability it has wrought on the performance and
SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C., efficiency of the bureaucracy. The Court is apprehensive
SORIANO, ANGELO L., SORIANO, MAGDALENA R., that unless the final word is given and the ground rules
SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO are settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment on the
T., TABIJE, EMMA B., TAN, RUDY, GOROSPE, TAN, constitutional crisis for the nation, itself biset with grave
ESTER S., TAN, JULITA S., TECSON, BEATRIZ B., and serious problems.
TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO T.,
JR., UMPA, ALI A., VALIC, LUCIO E., VASQUEZ, The facts are not in dispute.
NICANOR B., VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA,
AVELINO A., VERAME, OSCAR E., VIADO, LILIAN On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
T., VIERNES, NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A
NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS
MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC
RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION,
AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A
GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among
other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve
the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate
unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime; 1
...
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government,
priority shall be given to measures to promote economy,
efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated
from the service as a result of the organization effected
under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws
then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits
accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities
and other properties of all government offices shall be
carefully preserved. In case any office or body is
abolished or reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation,
its FUNDS and properties shall be transferred to the
office or body to which its powers, functions and
responsibilities substantially pertain. 2
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as
February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first act in
office, called upon "all appointive public officials to
submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the
members of the Supreme Court."3 Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa4 and the positions of
Prime Minister and Cabinet 5 under the 1973
Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of
executive orders and directives reorganizing various
other government offices, a number of which, with
respect to elected local officials, has been challenged in
this Court, 6and two of which, with respect to appointed
functionaries, have likewise been questioned herein. 7
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order
No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF
THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17
recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization
among the deserving officials and employees" the
ongoing government reorganization had generated, and
prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement
of personnel," the following:
SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for
separation replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant
to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by
the Mnistry Head concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of
functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the
incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.8
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated
Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE." 9 Among other offices,
Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs 10 and prescribed a new
staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11
the Filipino
people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of
Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the
nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by
Executive Order 127 and the grace period extended to
the Bureau of Customs by the President of the
Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or
agency or
c) informed of their termination. 13
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a
Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating
appeals from removals under the above
Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner
14
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs
officials, in the tenor as follows:
Sir:
Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the
process of implementing the Reorganization Program
under Executive Order No. 127.
Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all 22. PORFIRIO TABINO
officers and employees of the Department of Finance, or
the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to 23. JOSE BARREDO
perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a
24. ROBERTO ARNALDO
hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents whose
positions are not carried in the new reorganization 25. ESTER TAN
pattern, or who are not re- appointed, shall be deemed
separated from the service. 26. PEDRO BAKAL

In this connection, we regret to inform you that your 27. ROSARIO DAVID
services are hereby terminated as of February 28, 1988.
Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the 28. RODOLFO AFUANG
retirement benefits to which you may be entitled under
29. LORENZO CATRE
existing laws, rules and regulations.
30. LEONCIA CATRE
In the meantime, your name will be included in the
consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service 31. ROBERTO ABADA
Commission so that you may be given priority for future
employment with the Government as the need arises. 32. ABACA, SISINIO T.

Sincerely yours, 33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.

(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON
34. ABADIANO, JOSE P
Commissioner15
35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.
As far as the records will yield, the following were
recipients of these notices: 36. ABIOG, ELY F.

1. CESAR DARIO 37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.

2. VICENTE FERIA, JR. 38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.

3. ADOLFO CASARENO 39. AGRES, ANICETO

4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA 40. AGUILAR, FLOR

5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU 41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.

6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA 42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.

7. RENATO DE JESUS 43. ALANO, ALEX P.

8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA 44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.

9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES 45. ALBANO, ROBERT B.

10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ 46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G.

11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA 47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.

12. SUBAER PACASUM 48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R.

13. ZENAIDA LANARIA 49. AMISTAD, RUDY M.

14. JOSE B. ORTIZ 50. AMOS, FRANCIS F.

15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR 51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V.

16. CORNELIO NAPA 52. ANGELES, RICARDO S.

17. PABLO B. SANTOS 53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H.

18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ 54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L.

19. DALISAY BAUTISTA 55. ARABE, MELINDA M.

20. LEONARDO JOSE 56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR.

21. ALBERTO LONTOK 57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR.

58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR. 94. CORNETA, VICENTE S.

59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P. 95. CORONADO, RICARDO S.

60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S. 96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S.

61. ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T. 97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A,

62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P. 98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.

63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R. 99. CRUZADO,NORMA M.

64. ATANGAN, LORNA S. 100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.

65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R. 101. DABON, NORMA M.

66. BACAL URSULINO C. 102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.

67. BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE Z. 103. DANDAL, EDEN F.

68. BANTA, ALBERTO T. 104. DATUHARON, SATA A.

69. BARROS, VICTOR C. 105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.

70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A. 106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA

71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S. 107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.

72. BELENO, ANTONIO B. 108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.

73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D. 109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.

74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S. 110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.

75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G. 111. DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO

76. BRAVO, VICTOR M. 112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO

77. BULEG, BALILIS R. 113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.

78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M. 114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.

79. CALVO, HONESTO G. 115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.

80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V. 116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.

81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C. 117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.

82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G. 118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.

83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z. 119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.

84. CARLOS, LORENZO B. 120. DUAY, JUANA G.

85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U. 121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.

86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M. 122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.

87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J. 123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A

88. CATELO, ROGELIO B. 124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR.

89. CATURLA, MANUEL B. 125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.

90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F. 126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.

91. CINCO, LUISITO 127. ESPINA, FRANCO A.

92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR. 128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C.

93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S. 129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.

130. FELIX, ERNESTO G. 166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.

131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M. 167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.

132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C. 168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.

133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A. 169. KOH, NANIE G.

134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR. 170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S.

135. FUENTES, RUDY L. 171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M.

136. GAGALANG, RENATO V. 172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.

137. GALANG, EDGARDO R. 173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G.

138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C. 174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.

139. GAN, ALBERTO P 175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.

140. GARCIA, GILBERT M. 176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M.

141. GARCIA, EDNA V. 177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.

142. GARCIA, JUAN L. 178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.

143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V. 179. LIPIO, VICTOR O.

144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G. 180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.

145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B. 181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L.

146. GRATE, FREDERICK R. 182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R.

147. GREGORIO, LAURO P. 183. MACAISA, BENITO T.

148. GUARTICO, AMMON H. 184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C.

149. GUIANG, MYRNA N. 185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO

150. GUINTO, DELFIN C. 186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.

151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A. 187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.

152. HONRALES, LORETO N. 188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.

153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H. 189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V.

154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E. 190. MALLI, JAVIER M.

155. IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C. 191. MANAHAN, RAMON S.

156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C. 192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R.

157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C. 193. MARAVILLA, GIL B.

158. ISAIS, RAY C. 194. MARCELO, GIL C.

159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B. 195. MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V.

160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M. 196. MAROKET ,JESUS C.

161. JAVIER, AMADOR L. 197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.

162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S. 198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.

163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R. 199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.

164. JOVEN, MEMIA A. 200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.

165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V. 201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.

202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T. 238. PRE, ISIDRO A.

203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E. 239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.

204. MEDINA, NESTOR M. 240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.

205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S. 241. PURA, ARNOLD T.

206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO 242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.

207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G. 243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.

208. MIL, RAY M. 244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.

209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L. 245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.

210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G. 246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.

211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F. 247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.

212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III 248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V.

213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR. 249. RAZAL, BETTY R.

214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L 250. REGALA, PONCE F.

215. MORALES, NESTOR P. 251. REYES, LIBERATO R.

216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S. 252. REYES, MANUEL E.

217. MUNAR, JUANITA L. 253. REYES, NORMA Z.

218. MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R. 254. REYES, TELESPORO F.

219. MURILLO, MANUEL M. 255. RIVERA, ROSITA L.

220. NACION, PEDRO R. 256. ROCES, ROBERTO V.

221. NAGAL, HENRY N. 257. ROQUE, TERESITA S.

222. NAVARRO, HENRY L. 258. ROSANES, MARILOU M.

223. NEJAL FREDRICK E. 259. ROSETE, ADAN I.

224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S. 260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR.

225. NIEVES, RUFINO A. 261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G.

226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T. 262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S.

227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q. 263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.

228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R. 264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.

229. ORTEGA, JESUS R. 265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.

230. OSORIO, ABNER S. 266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.

231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II 267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.

232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A. 268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.

233. PASTOR, ROSARIO 269. SIMON, RAMON P.

234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L. 270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.

235. PEÑ;A, AIDA C. 271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.

236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B. 272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.

237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M. 273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .

274. TABIJE, EMMA B.
275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE
276. TAN, ESTER S.
277. TAN, JULITA S.
278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.
279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.
280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.
281. UMPA, ALI A.
282. VALIC, LUCIO E.
283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.
284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C.
285. VERA, AVELINO A.
286. VERAME, OSCAR E.
287. VIADO, LILIAN T.
288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K
289. VILLALON, DENNIS A.
290. VILLAR, LUZ L.
291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.
292. VILLAR, LUZ L.
293. ZATA, ANGELA JR.
294. ACHARON, CRISTETO
295. ALBA, RENATO B.
296. AMON, JULITA C.
297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.
298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.
299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.
300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.
301. DONATO, FELIPE S
302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.
303. GALAROSA, RENATO
304. MALAWI, MAUYAG
305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.
306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.
307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.
308. TEMPLO, CELSO
309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.
310. VALDEZ, NORA M.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente
Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967; Messrs.
Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu,
Dennis A. Azarraga Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa,
Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R.
Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum
Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R.
Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin
Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose,
Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto
Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario
David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,, Ms. Leoncia
Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R.
No. 82023; the last 279 16 individuals mentioned are the
private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394
officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were
given individual notices of separation. A number
supposedly sought reinstatement with the
Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the
Civil Service Commission. The first thirty-one mentioned
above came directly to this Court.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the
279 employees, the 279 private respondents in G.R. No.
85310, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of
comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs
without loss of seniority rights;
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from
the dates of their illegal termination based on the rates
under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be
interpreted as an exoneration of the appellants from any
accusation of wrongdoing and, therefore, their
reappointments are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with
pending administrative cases, and where investigations
have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate
decisions;
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints
against appellants with derogatory reports or
information if evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by
the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration
Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on
September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison
instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court,
docketed, as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this
Court.
On November 16,1988, the Civil Service Commission
further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of the
Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of
comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs
without loss of seniority rights; and
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned
from the date of their illegal termination based on the
rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not
lower than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be
interpreted as an exoneration of the herein appellants
from any accusation of any wrongdoing and therefore,
their reappointments are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with
pending administrative cases, if any, and where
investigations have been finished, to promptly, render
the appropriate decisions; and
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints
against appellant with derogatory reports or information,
if any, and if evidence so warrants.
20
SO ORDERED.
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the
Civil Service Commission's Resolution in this Court; his
petitioner has been docketed herein as G.R. No. 86241.
The employees ordered to be reinstated are Senen
Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo Quintong,Gregorio
Reyes, and Romulo Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO
PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22was signed into
law. Under Section 7, thereof:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the
Civil Service Commission to have been separated in
violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered
reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without
loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all
officers and employees, including casuals and temporary
employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the
appropriate separation pay and retirement and other
benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from
the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the
date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as
the case may be: Provided, That application for
clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
made by the corresponding department or agency.
Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid
a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service. Such
separation pay and retirement benefits shall have
priority of payment out of the savings of the department
or agency concerned. 23
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William
Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by Commissioner
Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject
of this controversy, petitioned the Court to contest the
validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R.
No. 83737.
On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials
whom the Civil Service Commission had ordered
reinstated by its June 30,1988 Resolution filed their own
petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
comply with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed
as G.R. No. 85335.
On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all
seven petitions.
On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for
hearing on January 12, 1989. At the said hearing, the
parties, represented by their counsels (a) retired Justice
Ruperto Martin; (b) retired Justice Lino Patajo. (c)
former Dean Froilan Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester Escobar
(e) Atty. Faustino Tugade and (f) Atty. Alexander Padilla,
presented their arguments. Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez argued on behalf of the Commissioner of
Customs (except in G.R. 85335, in which he represented
the Bureau of Customs and the Civil Service
Commission).lâwphî1.ñèt Former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla also appeared and argued as amicus
curiae Thereafter, we resolved to require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda which they did in
due time.
There is no question that the administration may validly
carry out a government reorganization — insofar as
these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs — by mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various
Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her
capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-
1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted
that under the present Constitution, there is a
recognition, albeit implied, that a government
reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject
to certain conditions. 24
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on
the validity of a reorganization per se the only question
being, as shall be later seen: What is the nature and
extent of this government reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions raised as to
procedure, failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
the standing of certain parties to sue, 25 and other
technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the
demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service,"26 and because of the
serious implications of these cases on the administration
of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public
servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil
Service Commission's Resolution dated June 30, 1988
had attained a character of finality for failure of
Commissioner Mison to apply for judicial review or ask
for reconsideration seasonalbly under Presidential
Decree No. 807, 27 or under Republic Act No. 6656, 28 or
under the Constitution, 29 are likewise rejected. The
records show that the Bureau of Customs had until July
15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration or come to this Court
pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 807.
The records likewise show that the Solicitor General filed
a motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The
Civil Service Commission issued its Resolution denying
reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a copy of this
Resolution was received by the Bureau on September
23, 1988.31 Hence the Bureau had until October 23,
1988 to elevate the matter on certiorari to this
Court.32 Since the Bureau's petition was filed on October
20, 1988, it was filed on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition
(in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional questions, and is
therefore bereft of any basis as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 33 We
find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's
petition (in G.R. 85310) are, indeed, proper
for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean
questions having to do with "an indifferent disregard of
the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh
pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without
rational deliberation, 34 as distinguished from questions
that require "digging into the merits and unearthing
errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the other
hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. What
cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil
Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs
employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has
implications not only on the entire reorganization
process decreed no less than by the Provisional
Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in
general; these implications are of such a magnitude that
it cannot be said that — assuming that the Civil Service
Commission erred — the Commission committed a plain
"error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be
corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching
of Aratuc — as regards recourse to this Court with
respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission —
which is that judgments of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Aratuc we declared:
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory
modifications that there is a definite tendency to
enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on
Elections as the independent constitutional body charged
with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest
elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be
presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means
to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'.
And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it
ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead
'brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot
insist that there was no intent to change the nature of
the remedy, considering that the limited scope
of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in
remedial law.36
We observe no fundamental difference between the
Commission on Elections and the Civil Service
Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that
matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave the
constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws
relative to elections, with respect to the former, and the
civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of
government accounts, with respect to the Commission
on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole judge" 37 of all
election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the
single arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil
service.
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution,
as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari," 38 which, as Aratuc tells
us, "technically connotes something less than saying
that the same 'shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an appeal by
petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our
jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service
Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that
justify certiorari under Rule 65.
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of
the Commission are "final and executory"40 and hence,
unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in
the absence of an appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition
(G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil Service
Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper
subject of certiorari, although it may not have so stated
in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of
time, we reiterate that it has been filed seasonably. It is
to be stressed that the Solicitor General had thirty days
from September 23, 1988 (the date the Resolution,
dated September 20,1988, of the Civil Service
Commission, denying reconsideration, was received) to
commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we
stated, under the Constitution, an aggrieved party has
thirty days within which to challenge "any decision,
order, or ruling" 42 of the Commission. To say that the
period should be counted from the Solicitor's receipt of
the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that
he should not have asked for reconsideration But to say
that is to deny him the right to contest (by a motion for
reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main
decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives him
such a right. That is also to place him at a "no-win"
situation because if he did not move for a
reconsideration, he would have been faulted for
demanding certioraritoo early, under the general rule
that a motion for reconsideration should preface a resort
to a special civil action. 43Hence, we must reckon the
thirty-day period from receipt of the order of denial.
We come to the merits of these cases.
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one
of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs
until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on
January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality
of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority
of Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, supra,
hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of
this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the
Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities and
receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in
the meantime they are separated from government
service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or
Article III of the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the
Ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the
Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
approval of this Executive Order and the authorized
positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case
may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not reappointed shall be
deemed separated from the service. Those separated
from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under existing laws, rules
and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the
equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of
service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof
favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received
but in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent
of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the
separation/replacement of any officer or employee
effected under this Executive Order.44
a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have
legally invoked. He avers that he could not have been
legally deemed to be an "[incumbent] whose [position]
[is] not included therein or who [is] not
reappointed"45 to justify his separation from the service.
He contends that neither the Executive Order (under the
second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing
pattern proposed by the Secretary of
Finance 46 abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner
of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. 47 Nor can
it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not been
"reappointed" 48 (under the second paragraph of the
section) because "[[r]eappointment therein presupposes
that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of
that which has been abolished or although an existing
one, has absorbed that which has been abolished." 49 He
claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution,
the power to dismiss public officials without cause ended
on February 25, 1987,50 and that thereafter, public
officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution.51
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until
his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. And like
Dario he claims that under the 1987 Constitution, he has
acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to
be covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127,
having been appointed on April 22, 1986 — during the
effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He adds that
under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner of Customs has the
power "[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel, except those
appointed by the President," 53 and that his position,
which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the
control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of
reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and
examiners in venous ports of the Philippines, say, on the
other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end
corruption at the Bureau of Customs and that since
there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption,
they cannot be validly dismissed from the service.
The Case for Commissioner Mison
In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's
resolution in Jose v. Arroyo54 in which the following
statement appears in the last paragraph thereof:
The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No.
127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution
guaranteeing career civil service employees security of
tenure overlooks the provisions of Section 16, Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize
the removal of career civil service employees "not for
cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under
Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the
ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without
cause as a result of such reorganization.55
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of
security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He further
states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional
Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been superseded
by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory
provisions thereof, 56 which allows a reorganization
thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court
has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that
contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to
Dario and Feria in the sense that retention in the
Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either
retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or
reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they
had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison
proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are
considered on holdover status, "which means that all
those positions were considered vacant." 57 The Solicitor
General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v.
De la Paz 58 because that case supposedly involved a
mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally,
the force and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39
for the reason that Executive Order No. 17, which was
meant to implement the Provisional Constitution, 59 had
ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order
No. 39, the dismissals contemplated were "for cause"
while the separations now under question were "not for
cause" and were a result of government reorganize
organization decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent
Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the
constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as
regards the reinforcement of security of tenure) since
the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after
its effectivity.
G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241
The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to
three rulings of the Civil Service Commission: (1) the
Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265
customs employees above-stated; (2) the Resolution,
dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration;
and (3) the Resolution, dated November 16, 1988,
reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's
arguments are as follows:
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the
nature of a "progressive" 60 reorganization "impelled by
the need to overhaul the entire government
bureaucracy" 61 following the people power revolution of
1986;
2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the
various guidelines issued by the President, in particular,
as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for
appointment under the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127, on mere holdover
standing, "which means that all positions are declared
vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive
Order No. 127 under the transitory provisions of the
1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
The position of the Civil Service Commission is as
follows:
1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a
reduction in personnel or redundancy of functions; there
is no showing that the reorganization in question has
been carried out for either purpose — on the contrary,
the dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere
service of notices;
2. The current Customs reorganization has not been
made according to Malacañ;ang guidelines; information
on file with the Commission shows that Commissioner
Mison has been appointing unqualified personnel;
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127,
did not countenance illegal removals;
4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in
the course of reorganizations.
The Court's ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of. —
I.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article
XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from
the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other
benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieul thereof, at the option of the employees, they may
be considered for employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to
career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, had been accepted. 63
The Court considers the above provision critical for two
reasons: (1) It is the only provision — in so far as it
mentions removals not for cause — that would arguably
support the challenged dismissals by mere notice, and
(2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after
the ratification of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act
No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10, 1988.
[Nota been Executive Orders No. 116 (covering the
Ministry of Agriculture & Food), 117 (Ministry of
Education, Culture & Sports), 119 (Health), 120
(Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare & Development), 124
(Public Works & Highways), 125 transportation &
Communications), 126 (Labor & Employment), 127
(Finance), 128 (Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian
Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs),
and 133 (Trade & Industry) were all promulgated on
January 30,1987, prior to the adoption of the
Constitution on February 2, 1987].64
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power
to effect reorganizations under the past Constitutions,
the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the
right of the Government to reorganize its offices,
bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article
XVI, of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing
Government of the Philippine Islands shall continue in
office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all
officers whose appointments are by this Constitution
vested in the President shall vacate their respective
office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period
of one year from the date of the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing
Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by law or
decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines,
but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate
their respective offices upon the appointment and
qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in
similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986. 67
Other than references to "reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution," there is no provision for
"automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by
provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated
by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the
new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process
and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from
separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue
of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried
out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged
to prove good faith.68 In case of removals undertaken to
comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates,
the Government is not hard put to prove anything,
plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a
license upon the Government to remove career public
officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"
vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or
reason.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have
been characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution
on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to
dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present
Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should
have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and
1986 counterparts had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two
things: (1) The Constitution meant to continue the
reorganization under the prior Charter (of the
Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the latter
provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to
put a stop to those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself,
however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization — the first, to its conferment or
authorization under Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom
Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its
effectivity date (February 2, 1987).lâwphî1.ñèt But as
we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution were to extend the effects of
reorganize tion under the Freedom Constitution, it
should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it
should talk of two phases of reorganization when it
could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of
the first reorganization.
Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure
compensation for victims" of constitutional revamps —
whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution —
and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow
reorganization. We turn to the records of the
Constitutional Commission:
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA
On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a
specific reference to Proclamation No. 3 and not merely
state "result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution', Mr. Suarez, on behalf of
the Committee, replied that it is necessary, inasmuch as
there are two stages of reorganization covered by the
Section.
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposal of the
Commission on Government Reorganization have not
been implemented yet, it would be better to use the
phrase "reorganization before or after the ratification of
the Constitution' to simplify the Section. Mr. Suarez
instead suggested the phrase "as a result of the
reorganization effected before or after the ratification of
the Constitution' on the understanding that the provision
would apply to employees terminated because of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 and even
those affected by the reorganization during the Marcos
regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed out that it is
also for this reason that the Committee specified the two
Constitutions the Freedom Constitution — and the 1986
[1987] Constitution. 69
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service
employees separated from the service. And the
separation contemplated must be due to or the result of
(1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from
February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career
officers tendered in line with the existing policy and
which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not
for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to
exclude those career civil service employees separated
"for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the
benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and
the other positive, must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three
situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials
under the Provisional Constitution ended on February
25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2,
1987. 70 It Can only mean, then, that whatever
reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of
the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of
its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be
legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what
the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are through with
reorganization under the Freedom Constitution — the
first stage. We are on the second stage — that inferred
from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, supra, but is apparent from
the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding
in Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez, in which we
categorically declared that after February 2, 1987,
incumbent officials and employees have acquired
security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam
fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that
this reorganization is no "purge" like the execrated
reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we
also have the democratic character of the Charter itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as
he contends that the reorganization is open-ended
("progressive"), had it been a reorganization under the
revolutionary authority, specifically of the Provisional
Constitution. For then, the power to remove government
employees would have been truly wide ranging and
limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3 permitted
it, but because of the nature of revolutionary authority
itself, its totalitarian tendencies, and the monopoly of
power in the men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is that
notwithstanding her immense revolutionary powers, the
President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule.
This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17, which
established safeguards against the strong arm and
ruthless propensity that accompanies reorganizations —
notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom
were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such
removals would have been valid and unquestionable.
Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the
"unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the
government rank and file that reorganization was
causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action.
Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is
necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for
implementing the said constitutional provision to protect
career civil servants whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of service demanded
by the New Government, and to ensure that only those
found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive
Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of
findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render
public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987
should furthermore be considered. We quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on
the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no
further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals
"not for cause" in a manner that would have been
permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner
Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner
would have been powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence,
even if we accepted his "progressive" reorganization
theory, he would still have to come to terms with the
Chief Executive's subsequent directives moderating the
revolutionary authority's plenary power to separate
government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature,
Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v. Arroyo, clarified. —
The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves,
supposedly extended the effects of government
reorganization under the Provisional Constitution to the
regime of the 1987 Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo73 is said
to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if
Arroyo indeed so ruled, Arroyo would be inconsistent
with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the
later holding of Palma-Fernandez. The question,
however, is: Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects of
reorganization under the revolutionary Charter to the era
of the new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be
explained. First, the opinion expressed therein that "[b]y
virtue of said provision the reorganization of the Bureau
of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue
even after the ratification of this constitution and career
civil service employees may be separated from the
service without cause as a result of such
reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an obiter dictum.
We dismissed Jose's petition 75 primarily because it was
"clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory,
based merely on newspaper reports which do not show
any direct or threatened injury," 76 it appearing that the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs had not been,
then, set in motion. Jose therefore had no cause for
complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the
petition. The remark anent separation "without cause"
was therefore not necessary for the disposition of the
case. In Morales v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter
dictum "lacks the force of an adjudication and should
not ordinarily be regarded as such."78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma
Fernandez is a full-blown decision, although both are en
banc cases. While a resolution of the Court is no less
forceful than a decision, the latter has a special weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later
doctrine. (Jose v. Arroyo was promulgated on August
11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was decided on August
31, 1987.) It is well-established that a later judgment
supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the
1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the
reorganization, the first stage being the reorganization
under Proclamation No. 3 — which had already been
consummated — the second stage being that adverted
to in the transitory provisions themselves — which is
underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of
reorganization after the effectivity of the new
Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the
reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be said to have
carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible
with Palma-Fernandez (or Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the
aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern as
reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the
latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed
constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be
said of the reorganization inferred under the new
Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution
seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we
concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16 is an
exception to due process and no-removal-"except for
cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the very
same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify
removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in
terms here because, while the former Constitution left
the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act
requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a
result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies.
It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not
obviously required under the revolutionary government
formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in
democratic societies and in this government under a
democratic Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization
under Executive Order No. 127 after the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization
provided that it is done in good faith. Otherwise, security
of tenure would be an insuperable implement. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. 81 As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
(in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons
or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever
"abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 83
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization
to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring.
Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good
faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we
refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary
action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each
case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are
told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall
be removed except for a valid cause and after due
notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists
when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position
has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order
to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful
causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence
of any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim
for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party: (a) Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced
by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; (d) Where there is a
reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation
provided in Section 3 hereof. 84
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about
Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack of it.
Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
Lack of Good Faith in. —
The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no
perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy —
except for the change of personnel — has occurred,
which would have justified (an things being equal) the
contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing
pattern at the Bureau (which would have furnished a
justification for a personnel movement) is the same s
pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No.
127 already prevailing when Commissioner Mison took
over the Customs helm, has not been successfully
contradicted 85 There is no showing that legitimate
structural changes have been made — or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at
the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office,
which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire
employees. There can therefore be no actual
reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison
separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced
them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86 This betrays a
clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so,
furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to
halt further layoffs as a consequence of
reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs
87
should observe the procedure laid down by Executive
Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order
No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution. While the
act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was
implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of. —
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner
Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof, "[t]hose
incumbents whose positions are not included therein or
who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated
from the service." He submits that because the 394
removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they
are considered terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the
provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under Executive
Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may
"appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed
by the President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners
Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison
could not have validly terminated them, they being
Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been
rendered inoperative according to our holding in Palma-
Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive
Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover status
cannot mean that the positions held by them had
become vacant. In Palma-Fernandez, we said in no
uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision,
petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and
that she continued in the performance of her duties
merely in a hold over capacity and could be transferred
to another position without violating any of her legal
rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a
hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate
reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced
to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became
effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B.
Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After
the said date the provisions of the latter on security of
tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring
Commissioner Mison from carrying out a reorganization
under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
But such a reorganization should be subject to the
criterion of good faith.
Resume. —
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government
employees, elected or appointed, without cause but only
before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on
February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-
Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of
Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis for
termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid
separation and retirement benefits or upon their option
be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987],
art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the
right to reorganize the Government resulting in the
separation of career civil service employees [CONST.
(1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is
made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we
have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a challenge to the
validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued
that the Act, insofar as it strengthens security of
tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive
effect, 92 runs counter to the transitory provisions of the
new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for
reinstatament of employees separated without "a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing" 93 is not
contrary to the transitory provisions of the new
Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the
Charter's transitory provisions mention separations "not
for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be
on account of a valid reorganization and which do not
come about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure
may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the
statute itself recognizes removals without cause.
However, it also acknowledges the possibility of the
leadership using the artifice of reorganization to
frustrate security of tenure. For this reason, it has
installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional
about the Act.
We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's
replacements would sustain. We also commisserate with
them. But our concern is the greater wrong inflicted on
the dismissed employees on account of their regal
separation from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988,
SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED
IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8,
1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023,
AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R.
NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO
REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT
OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY
HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED
TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT
OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW.
NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griñ;o-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr.
Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional
comments may seem superfluous in view of the
exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I nevertheless offer the
following brief observations for whatever they may be
worth.
Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution,
the dissenting opinion considers the ongoing
government reorganization valid because it is merely a
continuation of the reorganization begun during the
transition period. The reason for this conclusion is the
phrase "and the reorganization following the ratification
of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2,
1987, appearing in the said provision. The consequence
(and I hope I have not misread it) is that the present
reorganization may still be undertaken with the same
"absoluteness" that was allowed the revolutionary
reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no
longer in force.
Reorganization of the government may be required by
the legislature even independently of specific
constitutional authorization, as in the case, for example,
of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in
nature, the reorganization decreed by Article III of the
Freedom Constitution was unlimited as to
its method except only as it was later restricted by
President Aquino herself through various issuances,
particularly E.O. No. 17. But this reorganization, for all
its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under
Section 3 of the said Article III, it was allowed only up to
February 29,1987 (which we advanced to February 2,
1987, when the new Constitution became effective).
The clear implication is that any government
reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter must
be authorized by the legislature only and may not be
allowed the special liberties and protection enjoyed by
the revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would
have been no necessity at all for the time limitation
expressly prescribed by the Freedom Constitution.
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an
authorization for the open-ended reorganization of the
government "following the ratification of the
Constitution." I read the provision as merely conferring
benefits — deservedly or not — on persons separated
from the government as a result of the reorganization of
the government, whether undertaken during the
transition period or as a result of a law passed
thereafter. What the grants is privileges to the retirees,
not power to the provision government. It is axiomatic
that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if
these impinge on individual rights, and I do not see why
we should depart from this rule.
To hold that the present reorganization is
a continuation of the one begun during the transition
period is to recognize the theory of the public
respondent that all officers and employees not separated
earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only and so may
be replaced at any time even without cause. That is a
dangerous proposition that threatens the security and
stability of every civil servant in the executive
department. What is worse is that this situation may
continue indefinitely as the claimed "progressive"
reorganization has no limitation as to time.
Removal imports the forcible separation of the
incumbent before the expiration of his term and can be
done only for cause as provided by law. Contrary to
common belief, a reorganization does not result in
removal but in a different mode of terminating official
relations known as abolition of the office (and the
security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile
holder of the abolished office cannot claim he has been
removed without cause in violation of his constitutional
security of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has
disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory
following the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51
O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Manalang
v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not
unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a valid
purpose, such as the promotion of efficiency and
economy in the government through a pruning of offices
or the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v.
Auditor-General, 91 Phil. 359.) Normally, a encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the
reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means
of purging the undesirables for this would be a removal
in disguise undertaken en masse to circumvent the
constitutional requirement of legal cause. (Eradication of
graft and corruption was one of the expressed purposes
of the revolutionary organization, but this was
authorized by the Freedom Constitution itself.) In short,
a reorganization, to be valid, must be done in good
faith. (Urgelio v. Osmena, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court
of Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Carino v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA
183.)
A mere recitation — no matter how lengthy — of the
directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the
government and the action purportedly taken
thereunder does not by itself prove good faith. We know
only too well that these instructions, for all their noble
and sterile purposes, are rarely followed in their actual
implementation. The reality in this case, as the majority
opinion has pointed out and as clearly established in the
hearing we held, is that the supposed reorganization
was undertaken with an eye not to achieving the
avowed objectives but to accommodating new
appointees at the expense of the dislodged petitioners.
That was also the finding of the Civil Service
Commission, to which we must accord a becoming
respect as the constitutional office charged with the
protection of the civil service from the evils of the spoils
system.
The present administration deserves full support in its
desire to improve the civil service, but this objective
must be pursued in a manner consistent with the
Constitution. This praiseworthy purpose cannot be
accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that
will sweep in its wake the innocent along with the
redundant and inept, for the benefit of the current
favorites.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at
reorganization hark back to the people power
phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and Proclamation
No. 1 of President Corazon C. Aquino, issued on 25
February 1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the
people expect a reorganization of government." In its
wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12
March 1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization," with the following relevant
provisions:
WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and
proper changes in the organizational and functional
structures of the national and local governments, its
agencies and instrumentalities, including government-
owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, in order to promote economy, efficiency
and effectiveness in the delivery of public services
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall
national and local governments, its agencies and
instrumentalities including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March
1986, also known as the Freedom Constitution,
declaring, in part, in its Preamble as follows:
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as
manifested by their extraordinary action demands the
complete reorganization of the government, ...
(Emphasis supplied)
and pertinently providing:
ARTICLE II
Section I
xxx xxx xxx
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve
the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate
unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE III — GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
Section 2. All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such is made
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
Section 3. Any public office or employee separated from
the service as a result of the reorganization effected
under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws
then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits
accruing thereunder. (Emphasis ours)
On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued
"Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the Freedom
Constitution' providing, inter alia, as follows:
Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III,
Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each
Ministry shall see to it that the separation or
replacement of officers and employees is made only for
justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissal,
of personnel in the career civil service whose
qualifications and performance meet the standards of
public service of the New Government.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and
procedures for the review and assessment of its own
personnel, including the identification of sensitive
positions which require more rigid assessment of the
incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment
as expeditiously as possible but not later than February
24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public
service.
Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of
such review and assessment shall determine who shall
be separated from the service. Thereafter, he shall issue
to the official or employee concerned a notice of
separation which shall indicate therein the reason/s or
ground /s for such separation and the fact that the
separated official or employee has the right to file a
petition for reconsideration pursuant to this Order.
Separation from the service shall be effective upon
receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or
employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of
sufficient discretion.
Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for
separation/ replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of
functions;
4. Misuse of Public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the
incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to
elective officials or those designated to replace them,
presidential appointees, casual and contractual
employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant
to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law
and rules, and to those laid off as a result of the
reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order
No. 5. (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued
by the President "Enlarging the Powers and Functions of
the Commissioner of Customs", as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of
the Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized,
subject to the Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules and regulations:
a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those
appointed by the President;
b) To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize
erring Bureau officers and employees;
c) To act on all matters pertaining to promotion,
transfer, detail, reassignment, reinstatement,
reemployment and other personnel action, involving
officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs.
xxx xxx xxx
On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was
issued "Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance." Similar
Orders, approximately thirteen (13) in all, 1 were issued
in respect of the other executive departments. The
relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs
read:
RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is
mandated expressly in Article II, Section l(a) and Article
III of the Freedom Constitution;
HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No.
5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper
changes in the organizational and functional structures
of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be
effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the delivery of public services;
BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry
of Finance to make it more capable and responsive,
organizationally and functionally, in its primary mandate
of judiciously generating and efficiently managing the
financial resources of the Government, its subdivisions
and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-
economic objectives of the national development
programs.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 2. Reorganization. — The Ministry of Finance,
hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby
reorganized, structurally and functionally, in accordance
with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs.
... Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which
grants autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in
matters of appointment and discipline of Customs
personnel shall remain in effect.
SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. — All
units not included in the structural organization as
herein provided and all positions thereof are hereby
deemed abolished. ... Their personnel shall be entitled to
the benefits provided in the second paragraph of Section
59 hereof.
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval
of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of
the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities and
receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in
the meantime they are separated from government
service pursuant to executive Order No. 17 (1986) or
article III of the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the
ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the
Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
approval of this Executive Order and the authorized
positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case
may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not reappointed shall be
deemed separated from the service. Those separated
from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under the existing laws,
rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the
equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of
service or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof
favorable to them on the basis of highest salary
received, but in no case shall such payment exceed the
equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or
preliminary junction or restraining order to enjoin the
separation/replacement of any officer or employee
affected under this Executive Order.
Section 67 — All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and
other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect
(De Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August
31, 1987153 SCRA 602). Reorganization in the
Government service pursuant to Proclamation No.
3, supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII
entitled Transitory Provisions, reading:
Section 16. Career civil service employees separated
from the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other
benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may
be considered for employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. Ms provision also applies to career
officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the
existing policy, has been accepted.
On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs,
Alexander A. Padilla, transmitted to the Department of
Finance for approval the proposed "position structure
and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. Said
Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing
pattern was transmitted to and approved by the
Department of Budget and Management on 7 September
1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern,
there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing
pattern, there are 6,530 positions CSC Resolution in CSC
Case No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, pp. 3-4).
On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed
office as Commissioner of Customs.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re:
Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders" was issued reading, insofar as
revelant to these cases, as follows:
It is my concern that ongoing process of government
reorganization be conducted in a manner that is
expeditious, as well as sensitive to the dislocating
consequences arising from specific personnel decisions.
The entire process of reorganization, and in particular
the process of separation from service, must be carried
out in the most humane manner possible.
For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly
followed:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the
Executive Orders for each agency on reorganization shall
be:
a. informed of their reappointment or
b. offered another position in the same department/
agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will
be no reduction in the salary.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Each department/agency shall constitute a
Reorganization Appeals Board at the central office, on or
before October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider
appeals or complaints relative to reorganization. All
cases submitted to the Boards shall be resolved subject
to the following guidelines:
a. publication or posting of the appeal procedure
promulgated by the Department Secretary;
b. adherence to due process;
c. disposition within 30 days from submission of the
case;
d written notification of the action taken and the
grounds thereof.
Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude
appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
5. Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent
personnel shall be completed prior to the hiring of new
personnel, if any.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the
President requesting a grace period until the end of
February 1988 within which to completely undertake the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to
Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said
request was granted in a letter-reply by Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22 December
1987.
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period
requested, Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re:
Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders" was issued in the same tenor as the
Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987,
providing inter alia:
To effectively implement the reorganization at the
Bureau of Customs, particularly in the selection and
placement of personnel, and insure that the best
qualified and most competent personnel in the career
service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby
prescribed for the guidance of all concerned
1. By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by
Executive Order No. 127 and the grace period extended
to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the
Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or
agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of termination, the employee shall:
a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil
Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February
28, 1988, and
c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits
within 45 days from termination and in no case later
than June 15, 1988.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-
sections reproduced verbatim the Malacanang Guidelines
of 2 October 1987 in that the employees concerned
were merely to be informed of their termination.
On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed
identical letters of termination to Bureau of Customs
officers and employees effective on 28 February 1988.
As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed
five hundred twenty-two (522) officials and employees
of the Bureau of Customs (CSC Resolution in CSC Case
No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a
letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison
recommended Jose M. Balde for appointment to
President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy
Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127.
In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions,
Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act to Protect the
Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June
1988. The President signed it into law on 10 June 1988
and the statute took effect on 29 June 1988.
On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases
pending before this Court, invoking the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant provisions thereof
read:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers
and employees in the reorganization of the various
agencies of the National government ....
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service
shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due
notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists
when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position
has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order
to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful
causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence
of any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim
for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the
original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation
provided in Section 3 hereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by
the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in
violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered
reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without
loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all
officers and employees, including casuals and temporary
employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the
appropriate separation pay and retirement and other
benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from
the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the
date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as
the case may be: Provided, That application for
clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
made by the corresponding department or agency.
Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid
a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service. Such
separation pay and retirement benefits shall have
priority of payment out of the savings of the department
or agency concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government
shall implement reorganization schemes within a
specified period of time authorized by law.
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive
branch, all departments and agencies which are
authorized by executive orders promulgated by the
President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from
the approval of this Act within which to implement their
respective reorganization plans in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The rights and
benefits under this Act shall be retroactive as of June 30,
1987.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can
now be addressed.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to
be given to the abovementioned Constitutional provision
(SECTION 16, for brevity), which speaks of.
Career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
and the reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution ... (paragraphing supplied).
To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the
reorganization authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2)
that such separation is NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result
of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation; and
(3) that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.
3 may be continued even after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution during the transition period.
Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil
service officer or employee is that it must be FOR
CAUSE. That means a guarantee of both procedural and
substantive due process. Basically, procedural due
process would require that suspension or dismissal come
only after notice and hearing. Substantive due process
would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for
cause'." Bernas The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition, 1988,
p. 334)
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in
Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that 'No officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except FOR CAUSE
provided by law."
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the
phrase FOR CAUSE. It simply means the observance of
both procedural and substantive due process in cases of
removal of officers or employees of the civil service.
When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from
the service NOT FOR CAUSE, it can only mean the
diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent to exempt
the separation of civil service employees pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 from the operation of Article IX-B,
Section 2(3), becomes readily apparent. A distinction is
explicitly made between removal FOR CAUSE, which as
aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT
FOR CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not bound
by the "fetters' of due process.
It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants
separation pay and retirement benefits to those
separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the
reorganization precisely to soften the impact of the non-
observance of due process. "What is envisioned in
Section 16 is not a remedy for arbitrary removal of civil
servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of
relief for members of the career civil service who may
have been or may be legally but involuntarily
'reorganized out' of the service or may have voluntarily
resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy" (ibid., p.
615).
Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to
Continue Transitorily Even After Ratification
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the
continuance of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the
Constitution and during the transition period. The two
[2] stages contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before
and (2) after ratification, refer to the same nature of
separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of
Proclamation No. 3." No valid reason has been advanced
for a different treatment after ratification as the majority
opines i.e., that separation NOT FOR CAUSE is allowed
before ratification but that, thereafter, separation can
only be FOR CAUSE.
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is
to assure the realization of the purpose of the framers of
the organic law and of the people who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 was envisioned to continue even
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, at least
transitorily, is evident from the intent of its authors
discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October
1986 and evincing their awareness that such
reorganization had not as yet been fully implemented.
Thus:
Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the
clause 'pursuant to the provisions of Article III of
Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1986, and the
reorganization.' Are those words necessary? Can we not
just say 'result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution'? In other words, must we
make specific reference to Proclamation No. 3?
Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is
necessary, because in truth there has been a
reorganization by virtue of Proclamation No. 3. In other
words, there are two stages of reorganization covered
by this section.
Mr. PADILIA. I understand there is a reorganization
committee headed by a minister?
Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government
Reorganization.
Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been
implemented or not, I do not believe in it. There has
been a plan, but I do not think it has been
implemented. If we want to include any previous
reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we
not just say reorganization before or after the
ratification' to simplify the provision and eliminate two-
and-a-half sentences that may not be necessary? And as
a result of the reorganization, if the committee feels
there has been reorganization before ratification and
there be reorganization after, we just say 'before or
after the ratification of this Constitution.
Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this as a result of the
reorganization effected before or after the ratification of
the Constitution on the understanding, with the
statement into the records, that this would be applicable
to those reorganized out pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution also.
Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a
reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization
after the ratification." (RECORDS of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 5, p. 416) (Emphasis provided)
It should also be recalled that the deadline for the
reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was "one year
from February 25, 1986" (Article III, Section 2), or up to
February 24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself
provided that the review/assessment of personnel be
completed "not later than February 24, 1987." But,
confronted with the reality of the ratification of the
Constitution before that deadline without reorganization
having been completed, there was need for a provision
allowing for its continuance even after ratification and
until completed. It was also to beat that deadline that
EO 127 and similar issuances, providing for the
reorganization of departments of government, were all
dated 30 January 1987 or prior to the plebiscite held on
2 February 1987. The intent to continue and complete
the reorganizations started is self- evident in SECTION
16.
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11,
1987), which was a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition
to enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No.
127, we recognized that the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to
continue even after ratification when we stated:
The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative
of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing
career civil service employees security of tenure
overlooks the provision of Section 16, Art. XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the
removal of career civil service employees not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of the
Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under
Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the
ratification of this Constitution and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without
cause as a result of such reorganization. (Emphasis
ours)
With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its
conclusion that the foregoing pronouncement is mere
"obiter dictum."
An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a
remark or opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement
of the court concerning a question which was not
directly before it (In re Hess 23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J.
Misc. 12).lâwphî1.ñèt It is language unnecessary to a
decision, (a) ruling on an issue not raised, or (an)
opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution
or determination of the court, and is made without
argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v.
US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an
expression of opinion by the court or judge on a
collateral question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring
Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 132 A. 106, 107, 102 N.J.
Law 85) or not necessary for the decision Du Bell v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La.
167).
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and
squarely before the Court was the issue of whether EO
127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution against removal of civil service employees
except for cause." Petitioner batted for the affirmative of
the proposition, while respondents contended that
"removal of civil service employees without cause is
allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but
also under the 1987 Constitution if the same is made
pursuant to a reorganization after the ratification of the
Constitution."
It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for
being premature, speculative and purely anticipatory"
inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not received any
communication terminating or threatening to terminate
his services." But that was only one consideration. The
Court still proceeded to decide all the issues
adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that
the expiration date of February 25, 1 987 fixed by
Section 2 of Proclamation No. 3 on which said Executive
order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the Executive
Order has not been published in the Official Gazette as
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 1 of
the Revised Administrative Code; and 3) that its
enforcement violates Section 2(3) of Article IX B of the
1987 Constitution against removal of civil service
employees except for cause."
The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional
issues presented, particularly, the lapse of the period
mandated by Proclamation No. 3, and the validity of EO
127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They were
ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly
decided in the course of the consideration of the case,
so that any resolution thereon must be considered as
authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See
Valli v. US, 94 F2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760,
303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v. Tayokichi
Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such resolution would not lose
its value as a precedent just because the disposition of
the case was also made on some other ground.
.....And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions
although only incidentally involved, which are presented
and decided in the regular course of the consideration of
the case, and lead up to the final conclusion (Northern
Pac. Ry Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1; See also
Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit 254 NW
119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City
of Detroit, et al. v. Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368).
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the disposition of the case
is made on some other ground. (Wagner v. Com
Products Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617) Where a
case presents two or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case is an
authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and
none of such points can be regarded as having merely
the status of a dictum (See U.S. Title Insurance and
Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed.
1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and one point
should not be denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
considered. (Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. U.S. 48 S.
Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)"
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No.
78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision
(Section 26 of Executive Order No. 119, or the
'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health'),
petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and
that she continued in the performance of her duties
merely in a hold-over capacity and could be transferred
to another position without violating any of her legal
rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a
hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate
reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced
to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became
effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Esguerra, et al., G.R.
No. 78059, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the d
date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure
govern.
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically
differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the
petitioner, had already been extended a permanent
appointment as Assistant Director for Professional
Services of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still
being transferred by the Medical Center Chief to the
Research Office against her consent. Separation from
the service as a result of reorganization was not
involved. The question then arose as to whether the
latter official had the authority to transfer or whether the
power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health.
Related to that issue was the vital one of whether or not
her transfer, effected on 29 May 1987, was tantamount
to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact
that the transfer was basically made "in the interest of
the service" pursuant to Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or
the Civil Service Decree, and not because she was being
reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the
"Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health," although
the said Act was invoked after the fact. And so it was
that SECTION 16 was never mentioned, much less
invoked in the Palma-Fernandez case.
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to
state that there were no reorganization orders after
ratification. There were, namely, EO 181 (Reorganization
Act of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO
193 (Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs),
June 10, 1987; EO 230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA),
July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of the
Department of Local Government), July 25, 1987; EO
297 (Reorganization Act of the Office of the Press
Secretary), July 25, 1987.
The Element of Good Faith
The majority concedes that reorganization can be
undertaken provided it be in good faith but concludes
that Commissioner Mison was not in good faith.
The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.
Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987,
specifically authorized the reorganization of the Bureau
of Customs "structurally and functionally" and provided
for the abolition of all units and positions thereof not
included in the structural organization S election 55).
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of
Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987,
transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval
the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern" of
the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the
Department of Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to
and approved by the Department of Budget and
Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation.
Under the old staffing pattern, there were 7,302
positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are
6,530 positions.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re:
Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders" provided:
By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the
Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall
be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or
agency, or
c. informed of their termination. (emphasis supplied)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for
and was granted by the President an extension up to
February 1988 within which to completely undertake the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs.
On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs
Memorandum "Re Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" reiterating the above-
quoted portion of the Malacanang Memorandum of 2
October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988,
Commissioner Mison addressed uniform letters of
termination to the employees listed on pages 15, 16 and
17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February
1988, within the extended period granted.
The records further show that upon Commissioner
Mison's official inquiry, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñ;ez, rendered the following Opinion:
. . . It is believed that customs employees who are
reorganized out in the course of the implementation of
E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing the Department of Finance)
need not be informed of the nature and cause of their
separation from the service. It is enough that they be
'informed of their termination' pursuant to section 1(c)
of the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President
Aquino, which reads:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the
Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall
be:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Informed of their terminations.
The constitutional mandate that 'no officer or employee
of the civil service shall be renewed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law' (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution) does not apply to employees
who are separated from office as a result of the
reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive
Order No. 127.
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is set at
rest, after the Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the
petition for certiorari questioning its enforceability, for
lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra).
(Opinion No. 41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Emphasis
supplied)
The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
Celerina G. Gotladera likewise periodically consulted by
Commissioner Mison, also expressed the opinion that "it
is not a prerequisite prior to the separation of an
employee pursuant to reorganization that he be
administratively charged." (Annex 16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R.
No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and
placement of personnel was done by a Placement
Committee, one of whose members is the Head of the
Civil Service Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs.
Purificacion Cuerdo The appointment of employees
made by Commissioner Mison was based on the list
approved by said Placement Committee.
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the
President's directive to halt further layoffs as a
consequence of reorganization, citing OP Memo of 14
October 1987, reading:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on
the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no
further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. (p. 45, Decision)
The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded
by later developments, namely, the grant to
Commissioner Mison by the President on 22 December
1987 of a grace period until the end of February 1988
within which to completely undertake the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs, which was, in fact,
accomplished by 28 February 1988.
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states
that Commissioner Mison failed to observe the
procedure laid down by EO 17, supra, directing inter
alia that a notice of separation be issued to an employee
to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or
ground/s for such separation. That requirement,
however, does not appear in Section 59 of EO 127,
which provides on the contrary "that those incumbents
whose positions are not included in the new position
structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry or who are
not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the
service." The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to
be informed of the ground for his separation must be
deemed to have been revoked by the repealing clause of
EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this
Executive Order, are hereby repealed and modified
accordingly."
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its
coverage a reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus
The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials
or those designated to replace them, presidential
appointees, casual and contractual employees, or
officials and employees removed pursuant to
desciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and
rules, and to those laid off as a result of reorganization
undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No.
5. (Emphasis ours)
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in
implementation of EO 5, is shown by its introductory
portion reading:
Recalling that the reorganization of the government is
mandated expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and
Article III of the Freedom Constitution;
Having in mind that pursuant to Executive order No. 5
(1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper
changes in the organizational and functional structures
of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be
effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the delivery of public service; (Italics supplied)
Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656
The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656
entitled an "Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil
Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization," particularly Section 2
thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
We are of the view, however, that in providing for
retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally
with SECTION 16.
1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service
employees separated from the service by reason of the
"complete reorganization of the government" pursuant
to Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR
CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite —
separation FOR CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote
the provision again:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall
be removed except for a valid cause and after due
notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exist
when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position
has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order
to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful
causes allowed by the Civil Service law. The existence of
any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim
for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party: (a) Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced
by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; (d) Where there is a
reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation
provided in Section 3 hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for
removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid
cause, due notice and hearing, abolition of, or
redundancy of offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other
hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of
reorganization dictated by the exigencies of the
historical and political upheaval at the time. The
"traditional" type is limited in scope. It is concerned with
the individual approach where the particular employee
involved is charged administratively and where the
requisites of notice and hearing have to be observed.
The "progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other
hand, is the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is
the reorganization contemplated under SECTION 16.
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA
6656 adds a benefit not included in SECTION 16. The
benefits granted by the latter provision to employees
separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of
reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and
other benefits accruing to them under the laws of
general application in force at the time of their
separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not
included. RA 6656, however, allows reinstatement. That
it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not one of
the laws "in force at the time of their separation."
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws
must conform. It is from the Constitution that all
statutes must derive their bearings. The legislative
authority of the State must yield to the expression of the
sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the
Charter from which it draws its own existence (Phil.
Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, that is exactly what
RA 6656 does in providing for retroactivity — it
disregards and contravenes a Constitutional imperative.
To save it, it should be applied and construed
prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its
explicit provision. Then, and only then, would it make
good law.
Effects of Reorganization
To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of
members of the career service as defined in Section 5,
Article IV of Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even
result in the separation from the office of some
meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good
of the greatest number and the right of the citizenry to a
good government, and as they themselves have
mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3,
provide the justification for the said injury to the
individual. In terms of values, the interest of an
employee to security of tenure must yield to the interest
of the entire populace and to an efficient and honest
government.
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His
right lies in his past services, the entitlement to which
must be provided for by law. EO 127 provides for the
same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when
the latter specified that career civil service employees
separated from the service not for cause:
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has
been separated from the service, there would be no
harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good, if the
Commissioner of Customs reviews the evaluation and
placements he has so far made and sees to it that those
terminated are included in a consolidated list to be given
preference by departments who are recruiting (Section
2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6,1988).lâwphî1.ñèt
Conclusion
Premises considered, and subject to the observation
hereinabove made, it is our considered view that the
separation from the service "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.
3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and
employees of the Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD,
and the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission,
dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16
November 1988 should be SET ASIDE for having been
issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for
retroactivity, should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for being repugnant to the letter and spirit of Section 16,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to

retirement and other benefits accruing to them under
the laws of general application in force at the time of
their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the
employees, they may be considered for employment in
the Government or in any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
This provision also applies to career officers whose
resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has
been accepted.

This is a reward for the employee's past service to the

Government. But this is all There is no vested property
right to be reemployed in a reorganized office.

The right to an office or to employment with

government or any of its agencies is not a vested
property right, and removal therefrom will not support
the question of due process" Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54
Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee
does not have a constitutionally protected right to his
position, which position is in the nature of a public
office, political in character and held by way of grant or
privilege extended by government; generally he has
been held to have no property right or vested interest to
which due process guaranties extend (See Taylor v.
Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US CA2
NY 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel. Baker v. Wilson, 39 III
App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil
Service Com 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103121 September 10, 1993
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, HERMINIO GUTIERREZ,
AUGUSTO R. ORAA, VIRGINIA MALLILLIN, NENA
T. AQUINO, RIZALYN DELA CRUZ, SATURNINO Y.
CANMANGONAN, ALICIA S. UMEREZ,
PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, VICTORIO M.
VILLAGRACIA, FELISA C. GALARAGA, NELIA D.
CANUELA, EDITHA P. FRIGILLANA, GLORIA T.
DACANAY, BERNARD M. DE LARA, NORMA G.
SORIANO, ADELAIDA CALOOY, VIRGINIA B.
MILLANO, ADONIS S. JAVIER, SYLVIA C.
ABUNGAN, BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN, NOEL V.
FERRER, JOSUE PEREZ, RAMON QUEBRAL,
ALFONSO DELA CRUZ, JOEL ALMOSARA, IMELDA
CLARION, ANTONIO P. GUANSING, JR.,
WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, WENCESLAO MAGO,
ANTONIO DEQUINA, ANGELO A. JAVIER, JOSE DE
GUZMAN, REYNALDO VECINO, JOSEFA CAABAY,
EXPEDITO SORIA, LAMBERTO MELAD, REBE
LOZANO, DANILO C. ADINA, JOSE P. ARZADON,
EDWIN L. DE VERA, BERNARDO M. MENDOZA,
TITA H. MACARAEG, FELIFE B. SANTOS, LUCIO R.
SUYAT, SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE, FRANCISCA D.
CANUEL, EVELYN B. LORQUE, LUIS MENDOZA,
JAIME GATAN, PROTACIO ARAGON, JR., ARTURO
T. SANTOS, R0GELIO S. GALANG, JOSEFA B.
PELIAS, EDWARD P. FRANCO, DOMINADOR
ABAD, MAXIMIANO ISADA, JR., MAMAO C.
MACAPODI, JUAN CANLAS, SALVADOR PATA,
ROLANDO LACANDASO, ALFONSO DE LEON,
RODOLFO VELASCO, JR., DALMACIO H. NADAL,
RENE CILINDRO, ELENA CASIS, ISABEL
AMISCARAY, ELIZABETH VIDAL, MANUEL D. DE
GUZMAN, ESTRELLA S. PABAIRA, VIOLETA S.
TUVERA, LILIA T. TABENA, EDNA L. DOLLAGA,
RODOLFO E. SIBAYAN, ALEXANDER R. PAYUMO,
VIRGILIO R. ABAYA, TEMPOLOK G. AMIR, VICTOR
B. BALDE, LULLA V. BERNANDO, ANGEL CADIZ,
LUZ F. CADIZ, GUADALUPE P. CORLONCITO,
FLORDELIZA P. FEDERIS, BERNANDO P. IBE,
SALAMBAI A. KADATUAN, ZENAIDA A. LEANDER,
TEDDY B. MARASIGAN, PASTOLERO A. NOEMI,
ROBERTO C. DELA PAZ, AUGUSTO J. SANTOS,
SAGUNDINA A. SARONA, IRISH S. TINO,
CRISENTE C. MANIO, PUREZA T. SAYON,
PETRONIO TADIOSA, HERMINIGILDO S.
ALLASCO, ELVIRA C. SABANDO, SERGIO ABUAN,
MITCHELL A. LACHICA, CELEDONIO C. BERNABE,
MA. THERESA G. AQUINO, ALEJANDRO R.
SIBUCAO, JR., EVELYN V. MENDEZ, DIGNICITA G.
SERRANO, LILIA, J. RADA, NICASIO F. ROMERO,
ANGELINA B. FERNANDEZ, INOCENCIA M.
SANTOS, WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA, SATURNINA V.
VITE, GUADENCIA V. FLORES, PEDRO VICTORIA,
CATALINO ALCONIZ, MARIA REBECCA B.
BURGOS, MA. MAGDALENA ESPEJO-MORENO,
ROLANDO I. ETEROSA, ROMEO L. MANOSO,
SATOR H. ALTAREJOS, NENITA N. AQUINO,
FAUSTO S. BERNARDO, ROSARION MERLINDA B.
BELLEDO, MANUEL V. DELA CRUZ, EMMIE L.
IGNACIO, ANABELL C. LABORTE, ALBERT A.
MAGALANG, JAIME P. MALLARE, CONCEPCION C.
OCAMPO, FLORENTINO C. PALO, REGULO S.
QUEJADA, LUIS FIDEL B. RONQUILLO, NELIA M.
SANTOS, MALANE DELOS SANTOS, REBECCA E.
SARACHO, LIZ Y. VELARDE, ANITA R. ABIERA,
ARMANDO V. ACOSTA, ADVINCULA B.
ADVINCULA, FELIMON J. ALANO, ASUNCION T.
AMIN, LORELIE N. ANDRES, RAUEL A.
BALAJADIA, ROSARIO B. BATOON, DOLORES B.
BETRAN, PRIMA M. CABRAL, ROSARIO H. CAPILI,
BRIGIDA N. DE CASTRO, TEODORO A. DE
CASTRO, DUNN HERMANN C. DALIRE, JOCOBO G.
FESALBON, FE G. GAMBA, MARIA JAY A.
GENCIANA, ROSARIO G. GUIRON, CONSTANTINO
C. GODOY, FRANCISCO F. GODOY, JOVITA C.
GOMEZ, TEODORA R. KUIZON, JOSEPHINE G. L.
LAUCHENGCO, PUBLIO P. MALLINLLIN, JULIE C.
MANALO, ROSALINDA P. MEMPIN, HERNANI G.
DEL MUNDO, EDERLINA C. MUSNGI, FE V. NOCHE,
PERCIDA G. NORTON, EVA A. NUGUIM, EMELITA
S. DEL PRADO, EMERICO B. PUMARADA,
BENJAMINA QUINACUAN, ISABEL C. RIVERA,
RAQUEL P. DEL ROSARIO, OLYMPIA M. DE
SAGUN, JAIME F. SANTOS, MARIO L. SANTOS,
VIRGILIO M. SARMIENTO, LILIBETH M. SOAN,
LOIDA S. VALENCIA, ANGELINA A. VELASQUEZ,
ADELINA B. VICTORIA, MA. ROSARIO MANZANO,
ROSALINDA C. BALANCIO, GLORIA KABIGTING,
MARIO N. TOLENTINO, VICTORIA C. TIONGSON,
EMILIO S. MEDINA, SYLVIA H. CASTRO
ABUNGAN, DEMCIA T. BRAGANZA, MARINO K.
SANTOS, TERESITA B. TOMAS, PEDRILLO B.
ALFAREJOS, JANETTE L. GARCIA, DON E.
ABARRIENTOS, REYNALDO M. CENTENO,
CRISTETA A. CASTRO, WILFREDO B. BONILLA,
DELIA C. SERRANO, CONCESA IMPOS-ALDAY,
RESTITUTO P. PARDIÑAS, EVANGELINE T.
CORCUERA, ANICETO D. ORDEN, ESTELITA S.I.
FLORES, PATRIA ABUNALES, SELFA C.
FERNANDEZ, VIOLETA A. BUAGAS, LYDIA
VILLARIN, LULU CORRALES, ZENAIDA MALLATE,
RAQUEL FUENTES, EMELINA GAMBA, JEAN MIN
LADIA, CHONA ZAMORA, ALICIA CIMATU,
REYNALDO P. ALCANCES, MARINELA CECILIA T.
PASCUA and DOLORES T. TOLENTINO,
petitioners, CONRADO SALVADOR and MIGUEL
CAISIP, Intervenors,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Office for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioners and intervenors who are permanent
employees in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) filed this petition for
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, to stop the respondents from
removing them from their positions in the DENR
pursuant to the 1987 reorganization of that department
under Executive Order No. 192 dated June 10, 1987.
To carry out said reorganization, and pursuant to
Executive Order
No. 165 of May 5, 1987 which abolished the Commission
of Government Reorganization and transferred its
remaining functions1 to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM for brevity), DENR Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. submitted to the DBM a
staffing pattern consisting of 28,106 positions. The DBM
approved only 22,956 positions and the petitioners'
positions were among those trimmed off the new
plantilla. As the lean plantilla did not meet the
manpower requirements of the DENR, Secretary
Factoran submitted a staffing pattern consisting of
24,614 positions.
On July 4, 1988, the DBM released a revised staffing
pattern containing 23,612 positions only which was
1,002 positions less than what the DENR Secretary
requested and which still did not include the positions of
the petitioners.
On July 29, 1988, the DENR requested the DBM to
restore 839 positions which DBM had disapproved
earlier. The request was approved on September 14,
1988 after long negotiations between the DENR and
DBM, subject to the condition that these positions shall
be coterminous with the appointees but not to exceed
three (3) years. The implications of this are:
1. If the appointee desires to retire, resign, transfer to
other office or leave his employment for any reason
whatsoever, the position is automatically abolished, even
if the three-year period has not lapsed.
2. By the end of the 3rd year, the employee holding a
coterminous position is automatically separated. (p.
7, Rollo.)
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656 "An
Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees In the Implementation of
Government Reorganization," was passed. Section 11
thereof orders all departments and agencies to complete
the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch within
ninety (90) days from the approval of the law, or on or
before September 8, 1988.
The directors of the affected bureaus (the Environmental
Management Bureau, Forestry Management Bureau,
Parks and Wildlife Bureau, Mines and Geosciences
Bureau) requested the DENR and DBM Secretaries to
convert the coterminous positions to permanent. The
DENR Secretary favorably endorsed their request citing
changes in the functions of the DENR as justification for
the request (Annex B). The request was reiterated by
the DENR Assistant Secretary for Services Management
but it was denied on December 19, 1990 by DBM
Secretary Guillermo Carague.
The DENR Secretary's motion for reconsideration was
not acted upon by Secretary Carague.
Meanwhile, the General Appropriations Act of FY 1991
(R.A. No. 7078) provided for the salaries of the
coterminous employees in the DENR until December 31
,1991.
On August 6, 1991, DENR Secretary Factoran submitted
a memorandum to President Aquino, through Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon, requesting that the 597
coterminous positions of the DENR (which would expire
on September 15, 1991) be extended up to December
31, 1991, without prejudice to DBM's action on his
(Secretary Factoran's) motion for reconsideration. The
Office of the President granted the request.
But as Secretary Factoran's request for reconsideration
of Secretary Carague's order remained unacted upon,
the petitioners filed in this Court on December 19, 1991,
the present petition for
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the
2 3
issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are:
1. That the impending mass dismissal of petitioners from
employment on December 31, 1991 would violate their
right to security of tenure and the provisions of Republic
Act. No. 6656;
2. That the appointment of the petitioners to the so-
called coterminous positions deprived them of the right
to due process;
3. The creation of positions "coterminous with the
incumbent but not exceeding three years" is not in
accordance with civil service laws, rules and regulations;
and
4. Respondent DBM Secretary has no discretion but to
grant respondent DENR Secretary's request for
regularization of the coterminous positions.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order directing the DENR
Secretary to "cease and desist from terminating the
services of the petitioners effective December 31, 1991
and from preventing them from performing their duties
and functions as officials and employees of the DENR
corresponding to their respective positions" (p.
51, Rollo).
On January 23, 1992, petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion
to Cite Respondents for Contempt" for failure to pay
their salaries, allowances and such other benefits due
them while they continue to perform their respective
duties and responsibilities in the DENR. On March 2,
1992, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion for
Contempt on the ground that besides not paying their
salaries respondents made them sign new appointments
making them "coterminous with the incumbent." These
acts of the respondents allegedly violate the Restraining
Order issued by this Court on December 27, 1991.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
denied that public respondents have violated the
temporary restraining order. Respondent DENR
Secretary complied with the TRO by not terminating the
services of the petitioners. Non-payment of the
petitioners' salaries was due to the lack of an
appropriation of funds for their salaries. Besides, the
TRO did not require the DBM to appropriate funds for
their salaries. The DBM did not violate the TRO when it
required petitioners to sign new appointments making
their positions coterminous with the incumbent for it
(DBM) was not directed by the TRO to desist from
committing any act.
On January 23, 1992, Reynaldo Alcances, Marinela
Cecilia T. Pascua and Dolores T. Tolentino, through the
petitioners counsel, asked to be included as petitioners
because their names had been inadvertently omitted
from the list of petitioners. Their motion may be granted
for they are similarly situated as the original petitioners
who have continued to work in the DENR beyond
December 31, 1991.
On February 24, 1992, a Motion for Leave to Intervene
was filed by Conrado Salvador and Miguel Caisip which
was not opposed by the petitioners. Before the Court
could grant them leave to intervene, they filed a
complaint in Intervention on July 20, 1993.
On March 6, 1992, Alfredo S. Marchadesch, Jr. and
Carolina S. Cavan withdrew as petitioners because they
had accepted new appointments in the DENR.
On April 13, 1992, the public respondents, through the
Solicitor General, filed their Comment on the petition.
The petitioners argue that their dismissal on December
31, 1991, would violate their right to security of tenure
safeguarded by paragraph (3), Section 2 of Article IX-B
of the Constitution, and the 2nd paragraph, Section 3 of
Article XIII thereof. They also invoke Sections 1 and 11
of Republic Act No. 6656, which provide that
"departments and agencies of the government have only
ninety (90) days from the approval of the Act to
undertake the complete implementation of their
respective reorganization plan, hence, the DENR had
only up to September 8, 1988, to reorganize. Their
dismissal on December 31, 1991, goes beyond the
period allowed by law for the reorganization of the
DENR.
We find merit in the petition.
It may be recalled that upon her assumption of office as
President of the Philippines after the EDSA Revolution,
President Corazon Aquino invested herself under
Sections 1 and 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution
(Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986) with power and
authority to reorganize the Government "by
proclamation or executive order or by designation or
appointment and qualification of the successor of any
elective and appointive officials under the 1973
Constitution." The reorganization was to be completed
within one year from February 25, 1986, or by February
25, 1987.
Sec. 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority
shall be given to measures to promote economy,
efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.
Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such is
made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986. (Emphasis ours.)
However, "in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees, particularly in the Career Civil Service"
arising from the reorganization of the government, the
President issued E. O. No. 17 on May 28, 1986 providing
guidelines for the implementation of the reorganization
"to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of service demanded
by the new Government, and to ensure that only those
found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service." The head of each
Ministry (now Department) was tasked to "see to it that
the separation and replacement of officers and
employees is made only for justifiable reasons" which
are:
Sec. 3. The following shall be the grounds for
separation/ replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of
functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the
incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
(E.O. No. 17.)
Excluded from the protection of E.O. No. 17 are:
Sec. 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective
officials or those designated to replace them,
presidential appointees, casual and contractual
employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant
to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law
and Rules, and to those laid off as a result of the
reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order
No. 5. (Emphasis supplied.)
As a result of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution by
the nation, the reorganization deadline in Proclamation
No. 3 (February 25, 1987) was advanced to February 2,
1987.
Although the security of tenure of government
employees is protected by Section 2, subpar. (3), Title B,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
Section 16 of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
Constitution still allows the separation of employees " not
for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant
to Proclamation No. 3 . . . and the reorganization
following the ratification of this Constitution." Section 16
is quoted hereunder:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from
the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other
benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may
be considered for employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivision, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to
career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, had been accepted. (Emphasis ours.)
E. O. No. 192 dated June 10, 1987 "PROVIDING FOR
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
RENAMING IT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" is a "reorganization following the ratification
of this Constitution." Although impliedly sanctioned
under Section 16 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, it must nevertheless pass the test of
good faith to be valid. Good faith, we ruled in Dario
vs.Mison4 is a basic ingredient for the validity of any
government reorganization. It is the golden thread that
holds together the fabric of the reorganization. Without
it, the cloth would disintegrate.
Reorganization is a recognized valid ground for
separation of civil service employees, subject only to the
condition that it be done in good faith. No less than the
Constitution itself in Section 16 of the Transitory
Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of
Executive Order No. 6656, support this conclusion with
the declaration that all those not so appointed in the
implementation of said reorganization shall be deemed
separated from the service with the concomitant
recognition of their entitlement to appropriate separation
benefits and/or retirement plans of the reorganized
government agency. (Domingo vs. Development Bank of
the Phils., 207 SCRA 766.)
A reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim
the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy and
greater efficiency in its operation. It is not a mere tool of
the spoils system to change the face of the bureaucracy
and destroy the livelihood of hordes of career employees
in the civil service so that the new-powers-that-be may
put their own people in control of the machinery of
government.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
(in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons
or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and
whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is
an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change
of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds .
(Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84, 92-93.)
There is no dispute over the power to reorganize —
whether traditional, progressive, or whatever adjective is
appended to it. However, the essence of constitutional
government is adherence to basic rules. The rule of law
requires that no government official should feel free to
do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere
intentions and conscience to guide him. The
fundamental standards of fairness embodied in the bona
fide rule cannot be disregarded. More particularly, the
auto-limitations imposed by the President when she
proclaimed the Provisional Constitution and issued
executive orders as sole law maker and the standards
and restrictions prescribed by the present Constitution
and the Congress established under it, must be obeyed .
Absent this compliance, we cannot say that a
reorganization is bona fide. (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing,
186 SCRA 108.)
In fact, the right of the state to reorganize the
Government resulting in the separation of career civil
service employees under the 1987 Constitution is
beyond dispute, but as emphasized in the Mison
case (G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967 and 82023, August 8,
1989) and in the cases of Bondoc vs. Sec. of Science
and Technology (G.R. No. 83025), Quisumbing
vs. Tupas (G.R. No. 87401) and Hamed vs.Civil service
Commission (G.R. No. 89069), all of which having been
promulgated on July 19, 1990, said reorganization,
ouster, and appointments of successors must be made
in GOOD FAITH. (Emphasis supplied; Siete vs. Santos,
190 SCRA 50, 51-52.)
There appears to be no sufficient justification for the
reorganization of the DENR, as revised by the DBM. The
fact that Section 25 of E.O. No. 192 changed the status
of all the officers and employees of the DENR from
permanent or regular to mere "hold-overs," flagrantly
violating the employees' right to due process, taints the
reorganization process. Section 25 provides:
Sec. 25. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval of
this executive Order, the officers and employees of the
Department shall in a hold-over capacity, continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities and
receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in
the meantime they are separated from government
service.
. . . Those incumbents whose positions are not included
therein, or, who are not reappointed, shall be deemed
separated from the
service. . . .
In Domingo vs. DBP, 207 SCRA 766, the Court
emphasized that a reorganization "does not justify a
detraction from the mandatory requirement of notice
and hearing" (emphasis ours) to the affected officials
and employees.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no
officer or employee in the career service shall be
removed except for a valid cause and after due notice
and hearing." Thus, there is no question that while
dismissal due to a bona fide reorganization is recognized
as a valid cause, this does not justify a detraction from
the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing . . . .
(Emphasis supplied; Domingo vs. Development Bank of
the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766.)
In Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108, the Court
noted the pernicious effect of the "hold-over" provision
(Sec. 24) in Executive Order
No. 117 reorganizing the Department of Education and
Culture which uprooted thousands of school teachers
and employees, thus:
number of permanent positions in the DENR before the
reorganization." In fact, DENR Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran (who is presumed to know better than anyone
else the needs of his department) had urged the DBM to
restore the positions of the petitioners because they are
"vital to the functions, mandates and objectives of the
DENR" (p. 30, Comment). Since the abolition of their
positions will not conduce to either "efficiency" or
"economy" in the Service, which are the principal
justifications for any government overhaul, then,
obviously, the reorganization of the DENR is not
justified.
The conversion of the petitioners from permanent to
"coterminous" employees is a wholesale demotion of
personnel which is tantamount to removal without cause
and without due process. (Floreza vs. Ongpin, 182 SCRA
692, 693.) It is therefore null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in GRANTED.
The removal of the petitioners and intervenors from
office is declared null and void. The respondent
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), or his successor in office, is ordered
to reinstate the petitioners to their former or equivalent
positions in the DENR without loss of seniority and other
benefits, and to issue regular and permanent
appointments to them for the positions in the new
organization and staffing pattern corresponding to their
positions in the 1986 plantilla. The respondent Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management, or his
successor in office, is ordered to reinstate the
appropriation for the salaries of the petitioners and
intervenors. The temporary restraining order which the
Court issued in this case is made permanent.
The petitioners' motion to cite the public respondents for
contempt of court is DENIED for having become moot
after the latter's resignation from office upon the change
of administration on June 30, 1992. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

. . . Pursuant to the above provision [Sec. 24, E. O. No.

117], around 400,000 school teachers, janitors, clerks,
principals, supervisors, administrators, and higher
officials were placed on "hold-over status." When a
public officer is placed on hold-over status, it means that
his term has expired or his services terminated but he
should continue holding his office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified. (See Topacio
Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12 [1946]). (Mendoza vs.
Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108, 110-111.)

That the reorganization of the DENR was not intended to

achieve economy and efficiency, is revealed by the
admission in page 16 of the public respondents'
Comment that the new staffing pattern of the
department contains "991 positions more than the total
Republic of the Philippines 4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
SUPREME COURT
Manila 5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%

EN BANC 6. Gervacio, Agnes 69.86%

7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%

G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992 8. Tolentino, Julian R. 67.64%

ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner, 9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%

vs.
10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE-REORGANIZATION APPEALS 11. Aquino, Martina 66.94%
BOARD AND JUANA BANAN, respondents.
12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%

13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%

CAMPOS, JR., J.:
14. Zareno, Bernardo 65.57%
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the following
Resolutions of the public respondents Civil Service 15. Madrid, Angel S. 65.57%
Commission (the "CSC") * and Department of
16. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
Agriculture Reorganization Appeals Board (the
"DARAB"), ** to wit: 17. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
1. Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by 18. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
respondent DARAB which revoked petitioner's
permanent appointment as Municipal Agriculture Officer 19. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
(MAO) and appointed, in his stead, private respondent
Juana Banan (Rollo 17); 20. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%

2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the 21. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%
respondent CSC affirming the aforementioned Resolution
22. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
of respondent DARAB (Rollo 22);
23. Miguel, Jose 61.86%
3. Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the
respondent CSC which denied petitioner's motion for the 24. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
reconsideration of the respondent Commission's
Resolution dated February 8, 1991. 1 25. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%

The antecedent facts are as follows: 26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%

Prior to the reorganization of the then Minister of 27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
Agriculture and Food (the "MAF"), the private
respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal 28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the aforesaid Minister in
29. Sinon, Eliseo A. 60.66% 2
Region II, Cagayan, while the petitioner Eliseo Sinon
occupied the position of Fisheries Extension Specialist (Emphasis supplied)
(FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) in the same region. Thus, respondents Banan filed an appeal with the
DARAB for re-evaluation of the qualification of all those
However, the reorganization of the MAF into the included in the aforementioned list made by the
Department of Agriculture (the "DA"), with the issuance Placement Committee.
of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January 1987,
called for the evaluation of the following employees for On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution No.
twenty nine position of MAO in Region II, Cagayan. The 97 in which the ranking for 29 MAO prepared by the
list as prepared by the Placement Committee included Placement Committee was re-evaluated as follows:
the herein petitioner Sinon but excluded the respondent
1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%
Banan:
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%
3. Sebastian, Alice 72.18%
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
3. Sebastian, Alice 74.18%
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50% the appointing authority or the Placement Committee
assisting him is in a better position to determine. Hence,
6. Gervacio, Agnes 70.04% the Resolution dated 28 February 1989 of the DARAB
was set aside. 4
7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%
On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for
8. Tolentino, Julian Jr. 67.22%
Reconsideration in which she pitted her qualifications
9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22% against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available MAO
positions. At the same time, she pointed out that to
10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00% allow the findings of the Placement Committee to
supersede the DARAB resolution which the Secretary of
11. Aquino, Martina D. 66.94%
Agriculture had approved would be tantamount to giving
12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84% precedence to the Placement Committee over the head
of the agency.
13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the
14. Madrid, Angel 65.57% Comment filed by the DARAB which had not been
considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No. 573, the
15. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45% CSC granted respondent Banan's Motion for
Reconsideration and gave due course to her
16. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
appointment by the DARAB.
17. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed a Motion for
18. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42% Reconsideration of the February 8, 1991 Resolution
which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed
19. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01% Resolution dated July 11, 1991.

20. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07% According to the respondent CSC:

21. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
22. Miguel, Jose L. 61.86%
23. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
24. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
25. Zareno, Bernardo 61.50%
26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
29. Banan, Juana 59.32% 2
(Emphasis supplied)
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by
the respondent Banan and this same resolution was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture, Carlos G. Dominguez, who also affixed his
signature on the same date.
However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an
appointment as MAO for Region II in Cagayan as
approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D. Lasam on
the basis of the first evaluation made by the Placement
Committee.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service
Case No. 573 on November 22, 1989 to the CSC. This
appeal was granted mainly for two reasons: first, the
respondent DARAB failed to file its Comment within the
period required; and second, the evaluation of the
qualification of the employees is a question of fact which
Mr. Sinon strongly argued that the findings of the
Placement Committee on the qualifications of the parties
should be accorded deference and greater weight over
that of the RAB. Under the Placement Committee's
evaluation, Mr. Sinon garnered 60.66 while Ms. Juana
Banan earned 57.32 after assessing the contending
parties qualification in education, relevant experience,
eligibility and other factors. Following the request of
several parties for reevaluation, the RAB in their decision
gave Mr. Sinon 57.66 while Ms. Banan obtained 59.32.
Seemingly the findings of the two bodies are in conflict.
Mr. Sinon argues that the findings of the Placement
Committee should prevail since it is specially mandated
by RA 6656.
We disagree. The Placement Committee's function is
recommendatory in nature. The agency's Reorganization
Appeals Board was specially created by the Circular of
the Office of the President dated October 2, 1987 and
conferred with authority to review appeals and
complaints of officials and employees affected by the
reorganization. the decision of the agency RAB has the
imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is
therefore controlling in matters of and is therefore
controlling in matters of appointment. Under this
principle, the decision of the DARAB in this case enjoys
precedence over the Placement Committee. 5
Hence, this petition was filed with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin
the execution of the assailed resolutions.
Without giving due course to the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction, the court required the parties to
file their respective Comments. 6
On 12 November 1991, the Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda. 7
The main issue for Our consideration is this: whether or
not the CSC committed grave abuse discretion in
reviewing and re-evaluating the ring or qualification of
the petitioner Sinon.
The arguments of the petitioner can be summed up as
follows:
1). In issuing the Resolution of 8 February 1991, the
CSC in effect revoked the appointment that the
petitioner received as early as 30 August 1989 and
which was deemed permanent by virtue of the approval
of the Regional Director of the Department of
Agriculture:
2). In giving petitioner a rating of only 57.66%, 8 from
his previous rating of 60.66% and at the same time
according a rating of 59.32% to private respondent from
a rating of only 57.32%, the CSC departed from its
power which is limited only to that of "review", and
hence encroached upon the power of appointment
exclusively lodged in the appointment authority;
3) In giving due course to the appointment of
respondent Banan in its Resolution of 8 February 1991,
CSC was directing the appointment of a substitute of
their own choice when the power to appoint was
exclusively lodged in the appointing authority.
We rule as follows.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.9
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, We do not
find any evidence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8
February 1991 which in effect approved the appointment
of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon.
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with
Executive order No. 116, it became imperative to
"protect the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers
and employees in the implementation of government
reorganization". Thus, Congress passed Republic Act No.
6656. 10
It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the
Placement Committee was created:
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and mot
deserving persons shall be appointed in any
reorganization, there shall be created a Placement
Committee in each department or agency to assist the
appointing authority in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel. The Committee shall consist of
two (2) members appointed by the head of the
department or agency, a representative of the
appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected
by the employees holding positions in the first and
second levels of the career service: Provided, that if
there is a registered employee association with a
majority of the employees as members, that employee
association shall also have a representative in the
Committee: Provided, Further, that immediately upon
the approval of the staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall be made
known to all officers and employees of the agency who
shall be invited to apply for any of the positions
authorized therein. Such application shall be considered
by the committee in the placement and selection of
personnel. (Emphasis supplied).
To "assist" mean to lend an aid to, 11 or to contribute
effort in the complete accomplishment of an ultimate
purpose intended to be effected by those engaged. 12
In contrast, to "recommend" 13 is to present one's
advice or choice as having one's approval or to
represent or urge as advisable or expedient. It involves
the Idea that another has the final decision.
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the
duty of exercising the same discretionary functions as
the appointing authority in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel when the law empowered it to
"assist" the appointment authority.
The same law also allows any officer or employee
aggrieved by the appointments to file an appeal with the
appointing authority who shall made a decision within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. If the same
employee is still not satisfied with the decision of the
appointing authority, he may further appeal within ten
(10) days from the receipt thereof the CSC. 14
In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987 of
the Office of the President created the agency
Reorganization Appeals Board to address the problem of
the employees affected by the reorganizations.
The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of
aggrieved parties which make it impossible to give the
status of finality to any appointment until all protests or
oppositions are duly heard.
Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper
received by petitioner Sinon on 30 August 1989 for the
position of MAO had not conferred any permanent status
and was still subject to the following conditions attached
to any appointment in the civil service:
Provided that there is no pending administrative case
against the appointee, no pending protest against the
appointment, nor any decision by competent authority
that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment . 15
Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against
qualification filed by Banan was pending, the petitioner the petitioner.
cannot claim that he had been issued with a "complete"
appointment. Neither is there any point in asserting that SO ORDERED.
his appointment had "cured" whatever changes was
subsequently recommended by the DARAB. 16

The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the

findings of the Placement Committed only to find that
Sinon is not qualified should no be taken as a grave
abuse of discretion.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that

the public respondent CSC had disregarded the findings
of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings
of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings
were re-evaluated and the report after such re-
evaluation was submitted to and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed the findings
of the DARAB.

Because of all the foregoing circumstances, the

jurisprudence cited by the petitioner Sinon appears to be
incorrect. 17

Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February 1991,

any statement by the CSC directing the appointment of
the respondent Banan. Hence, there was no directive
from the CSC that may be misinterpreted as a
usurpation of any appointing power. 18

Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as

recommended by the DARAB and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent
with the law. Section 4 or R.A. 6656 mandates that
officers and employees holding permanent appointments
shall be given preference for appointment to the new
positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to
their former positions. Also, the term incumbent officer
and the privileges generally accorded to them would
more aptly refer to Banan and not to petitioner Sinon
whose appointment was never confirmed
completely. 19 There is no dispute that the position of
MAO in the old staffing pattern is most comparable to
the MAO in the new staffing pattern.

Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC

correctly noted that the petitioner Sinon had
conveniently omitted the then Secretary of Agriculture
who had affixed his approval on the findings of the
DARAB. Petitioner Sinon knew fully well that as head of
the agency, the Secretary of Agriculture was the
appointing authority.

It must be recalled that the whole purpose of

reorganization is that is it is a "process of restructuring
the bureaucracy's organizational and functional set-up,
to make it more viable in terms of the economy,
efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to
the needs of its public clientele as authorized by
law." 20 For as long as the CSC confines itself within the
limits set out by law and does not encroach upon the
prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this Court
must sustain the Commission.
G.R. No. 93355 April 7, 1992
LUIS B. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This special civil action impugns the resolution 1 of
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated
on April 10, 1990 in CSC Case No. 473 setting aside its
earlier resolution of November 27, 1989 and affirming
the separation of petitioner Luis B. Domingo as Senior
Training and Career Development Officer of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and
Career Development Officer on permanent status from
February, 1979 to December 1986.
On December 3, 1986, Executive Order No 81 (The
Revised Charter of DBP) was passed authorizing the
reorganization of DBP in this wise:
Sec. 32. Authority to Reorganize. — In view of the new
scope of operations of the Bank, a reorganization of the
Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to
achieve simplicity and economy in operations, including
adopting a new staffing pattern to suit the reduced
operations envisioned. The formulation of the program
of reorganization shall be completed within six months
after the approval of this Charter, and the full
implementation of the reorganization program within
thirty months thereafter.
Further, Sections 33 and 34 thereof provide:
Sec. 33. Implementing Details; Organization and Staffing
of the Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
In the implementation of the reorganization of the Bank,
as authorized under the preceding section, qualified
personnel of the Bank may be appointed to appropriate
positions in the new staffing pattern thereof and those
not so appointed are deemed separated from the
service. No preferential or priority rights shall be given
to or enjoyed by any officer or personnel of the Bank for
appointment to any position in the new staffing pattern
nor shall any officer or personnel be considered as
having prior or vested rights with respect to retention in
the Bank or in any position as may have been created in
its new staffing pattern, even if he should be the
incumbent of a similar position therein.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 34. Separation Benefits. — All those who shall retire
from the service or are separated therefrom on account
of the reorganization of the Bank under the provisions of
this Charter shall be entitled to all gratuities and
benefits provided for under existing laws and/or
supplementary retirement plans adopted by and
effective in the Bank: . . .
Pursuant thereto, DBP issued Board Resolution No. 304-
87 allowing the issuance of temporary appointments to
all DBP personnel in order to fully implement the
reorganization. The resolution states in part:
It is understood that pursuant to Section 32 of the new
DBP Charter full implementation of the reorganization
program shall be completed within a period of thirty-six
(36) months from the approval of this Charter. In this
connection, the plantilla approved and appointments
issued are purely interim and the Bank is reserving its
right to put in place the permanent structure of the Bank
as well as the permanent appointments thereto until the
end of the 36-month period. 2
In effect, said resolution authorized the issuance of
temporary appointments to all DBP personnel to allow
maximum flexibility in the implementation of the
reorganization. Such temporary appointments issued
had a maximum period of twelve (12) months during
which period the performance of the incumbents were
assessed on the basis of the results of their evaluation.
With the passage of Executive Order No. 81 and Board
Resolution No. 304 87, DBP undertook the evaluation
and comparative assessment of all its personnel under
the CSC approved New Performance Appraisal System, a
peer and control rating process which served as an
assessment tool of DBP's screening process.
Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment
on January 2, 1987 for a period of one (1) year, which
was renewed for another period up to November 30,
1988. Thereafter, in a memorandum 3 dated November
23, 1988 issued by the Final Review Committee,
petitioner got a performance rating of "below average,"
by reason of which his appointment was "made to
lapse."
Consequently, petitioner, together with a certain
Evangeline Javier, filed with the CSC a joint verified
complaint 4against DBP for illegal dismissal. The
complainants therein alleged that their dismissal
constituted a violation of the Civil Service Law against
the issuance of temporary appointments to permanent
employees, as well as of their right to security of tenure
and due process.
On November 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution 5 in CSC
Case No. 473 directing "the reappointment of Mr.
Domingo and Ms. Javier as Senior Training and Career
Development Officer and Research Analyst or any such
equivalent rank under the staffing pattern of DBP." The
order for reappointment was premised on the findings of
the CSC that "(t)he action of the DBP to issue temporary
appointments to all DBP personnel in order to allow for
the maximum flexibility in evaluating the performance of
incumbents is not in accord with civil service law rules,"
in that "(t)o issue a temporary appointment to one who
has been on permanent status before will deprive the
employee of benefits accorded permanent employees
and will adversely affect his security of tenure," aside
from the fact that such an act is contrary to Section 25
(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807.
DBP filed a motion for reconsideration 6 on December
27, 1989 alleging, inter alia, that the issuance of
temporary appointments to all the DBP employees was
purely an interim arrangement; that in spite of the
temporary appointment, they continued to enjoy the
salary, allowances and other benefits corresponding to
permanent employees; that there can be no impairment
of herein petitioner's security of tenure since the new
DBP charter expressly provides that "qualified personnel
of the bank may be appointed to appropriate positions in
the new staffing pattern and those not so appointed are
deemed separated from the service;" that petitioner was
evaluated and comparatively assessed under a rating
system approved by the respondent commission; and
that petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due
process of law considering that, although several
appeals were received by the Final Review Committee
from other employees similarly situated, herein
petitioner never appealed his rating or the extension of
his temporary appointment although he was advised to
do so by his direct supervisor.
On April 10, 1990, CSC rendered the questioned
resolution setting aside its previous decision and
affirming the separation of herein petitioner. In so
ruling, CSC explained that:
While it is true that this Commission ruled that the
issuance of temporary appointment to all DBP personnel
in order to allow "for maximum flexibility" in evaluating
the performance of incumbents is not in accord with civil
service laws and rules, however it cannot lose sight of
the fact that appellants are among those who indeed got
a below average rating (unsatisfactory) when their
performance were reevaluated and comparatively
reassessed by the Final Review Committee of the Bank
approved by the Vice Chairman.
xxx xxx xxx
In effect, the determinative factor for retention and the
separation from the service is the individual performance
rating.
While the Commission supports the principle of merit
and fitness and strongly protects the security of tenure
of civil service officials and employees which are the
essence of careerism in the civil service, it does not
however, sanction the reappointment of said officials
and employees who have fallen short of the
performance necessary in order to maintain at all times
efficiency and effectiveness in the Office.
It bears stressing that the DBP submitted the records
and documents in support of its allegations that Mr.
Domingo and Ms. Javier have indeed got(ten) a below
average rating (unsatisfactory) during the filing of the
instant motion for reconsideration. Had DBP promptly
submitted the records/documents supporting its
allegations, this Commission at the outset should have
sustained the separation of the appellants from the
service on ground of poor performance (below average
rating, unsatisfactory) after the reassessment and re-
evaluation by the Bank through the Final Review
Committee. The CSC could not have guessed that such
was the basis of the DBP's termination of Domingo and
Javier until the papers were submitted to it. . . .
It must be pointed out that appellants' separation from
the service was the lapse of their temporary
appointment. The non-extension or non-issuance of
permanent appointments were principally based on their
below average rating (unsatisfactory) performance after
they were reevaluated and comparatively reassessed by
the Final Review Committee of the Bank. After all, the
1986 DBP Revised Charter (E.O. No. 81) gives the Bank
a wide latitude of discretion in the reappointment of its
personnel, subject to existing civil service laws, rules
and regulations.
There is no doubt that the DBP conducted a reevaluation
and comparative reassessment of its employees for
placement/retention (for permanent) and for separation
from the service and found out that appellants are
wanting of performance, having been rated as "Below
Average." 7
Hence this petition, whereby petitioner raises the
following issues:
1. Petitioner's tenure of office was violated by
respondents;
2. Petitioner was not afforded a day in court and was
denied procedural due process in the unilateral
evaluation by his peers of his efficiency ratings for the
years 1987 and 1988;
3. Average and below average efficiency ratings are not
valid grounds for termination of the service of petitioner;
4. Section 5 of the rules implementing Republic Act No.
6656 is repugnant to the constitutional mandate that "no
officer or employee of the Civil Service be removed or
suspended except for causeprovided by law;" and
5. Section 16, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
New Constitution was also violated by respondents. 8
I. Petitioner puts in issue the validity of the
reorganization implemented by DBP in that the same
violates his right to security of tenure. He contends that
government reorganization cannot be a valid ground to
terminate the services of government employees,
pursuant to the ruling in the case of Dario vs. Mison, et
al.9
This statement of petitioner is incomplete and
inaccurate, if not outright erroneous. Either petitioner
misunderstood or he totally overlooked what was stated
in the aforecited decision which held that
"reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith." As we
said in Dario:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
(in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
Clearly, from our pronouncements
in Dario, reorganization is a recognized valid ground for
separation of civil service employees, subject only to the
condition that it be done in good faith. No less than the
Constitution itself in Section 16 of the Transitory
Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of
Executive Order No. 81 and Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6656, support this conclusion with the declaration
that all those not so appointed in the implementation of
said reorganization shall be deemed separated from the
service with the concomitant recognition of their
entitlement to appropriate separation benefits and/or
retirement plans of the reorganized government agency.
The facts of this case, particularly the evaluation process
adopted by DBP, bear out the existence of good faith in
the course of reorganization.
As a tool in the assessment process, a bank-wide peer
and control rating process was implemented. Under this
process, the peers and supervisors rated the DBP
employees. 10
To make the reorganization as open, representative and
fair as possible, two principal groups were formed: (1)
the Group Placement Screening Committee (GPSC) and
(2) the Central Placement Screening Committee (CPSC),
to review all recommendations (for retention or
separation) prior to submissions to the Chairman an the
Board of Directors. The members of the two screening
committees were the Department and Group Heads and
representatives from the Career Officials Association and
the DBP Employees Union. The CPSC was further
represented by the DBP Civil Service Officer, who sat as
consultant to help resolve questions on Civil Service
rules and regulations.
As an assessment tool to the Bank's screening process, a
peer and control rating process was implemented bank-
wide, the results of which were used as a gauge to
determine the suitability of an employee to stay in the
Bank. Through this rating, the Bank determines the
value of the individual employee to the Bank with the
help of his peers (peer rating) and his supervisors
(control
rating). 11
Also, as part of the evaluation process, a Final Review
Committee, composed of the group, department or unit
head, the heads of the Human Resource Center and of
the Personnel Services, and representatives from the
Career Officials Association and the Employees Union,
was created to screen further and to recommend the
change in status of the employee's appointment from
temporary to permanent beginning 1988. For the rank
and file level, the committee was chaired by the Vice-
Chairman while the officer level was presided over by
the Chairman of the Bank. 12
The performance rating system used and adopted by
DBP was duly approved by the Civil Service Commission.
Herein petitioner was evaluated and comparatively
assessed under this approved rating system. This is
shown by the memorandum to the Vice-Chairman from
the DBP Final Review Committee wherein petitioner,
among other DBP employees, was evaluated and rated
on his performance, and was shown to have gotten a
rating of "below average." 13
In the comment 14 filed by DBP with the CSC,
respondent bank explained the procedure it adopted in
the evaluation of herein petitioner, together with one
Evangeline Javier, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. During the second phase of the screening process,
the Bank used several instruments for determining
proficiency or skills on the job. More than skills,
however, the evaluation also covered trait factors to
determine a positive work attitude. The Bank placed a
premium on work attitude because it believes that
technical and professional skills can easily be acquired
by an ordinary normal individual as long as he has the
right attitude towards learning.
5. These attitudes are part of the new corporate culture
outlined in the corporate philosophy instituted for the
Bank and disseminated thru the various corporate
culture seminars, monthly tertulias, speeches of the
Chairman and numerous various internal
communications and bulletins. One of the most
important values emphasized was TEAMWORK due to
the very lean personnel force that the Bank was left with
and the competition it has to contend with in the
industry.
6. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were subjected to this
rating process as all other employees of the Bank were.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were recommended for
a renewal of temporary status after assessment of their
performance because of several indications of lack of
skill and their inability to work with others in the
department where they were stationed. In a
compassionate stance, it was considered in the Central
Personnel Committee to transfer them to another
department or unit of the Bank where they may be more
effective and productive, but they expressed preference
to stay in the training unit of the Bank, the Human
Resource Center.
9. Along with others whose performance for 1987 was
found wanting, Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were
recommended for reappointment as temporary for
another period from January to November 1988 to give
the Bank sufficient time to consider their cases.
However, in an evaluation of performance for all
extendees in November 1988, Mr. Domingo and Miss
Javier were again found wanting having both acquired a
rating of "Below Average."
In addition, it is not disputed that DBP now has less than
2,000 employees from a former high level of around
4,000 employees in 1986. And, under Section 27 of
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Government is
authorized to lay off employees in case of a reduction
due to reorganization, thus:
Sec. 27. Reduction in Force. — Whenever it becomes
necessary because of lack of work or funds or due to a
change in the scope or nature of an agency's program,
or as a result of reorganization, to reduce the staff of
any department or agency, those in the same group or
class of positions in one or more agencies within the
particular department or agency wherein the reduction is
to be effected shall be reasonably compared in terms of
relative fitness, efficiency and length of service, and
those found to be least qualified for the remaining
positions shall be laid off.
Lastly, petitioner failed to invoke the presence of any
the circumstances enumerated under Section 2
Republic Act No. 6656 which would show or tend
show the existence of bad faith in the implementation
the reorganization.
Quintessentially, the reorganization having been
conducted in accordance with the mandate of Dario, it
can safely be concluded that indeed the reorganization
was attended by good faith, ergo, valid. The dismissal of
herein petitioner is a removal for cause which, therefore,
does not violate his security of tenure.
As a final note on this issue, we quote with approval the
statement of Mme. Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera in her dissenting opinion in the above-cited
case:
To be sure, the reorganization could affect the tenure of
members of the career service as defined in Section 5,
Article IV of Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even
result in the separation from office of some meritorious
employees. But even then, the greater good of the
greatest number and the right of the citizenry to a good
government, and as they themselves have mandated
through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3, provide the
justification for the said injury to the individual. In terms
of values, the interest of an employee to security of
tenure must yield to the interest of the entire populace
and to an efficient and honest government.
II. Petitioner also maintains that "average" and "below
average" efficiency ratings are not valid grounds for his
termination from the service.
It has become a basic and primordial concern of the
State to insure and promote the constitutional mandate
that appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness pursuant to its adopted
policy of requiring public officers and employees to serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency. 15 As a matter of fact, the
development and retention of a competent and efficient
work force in the public service is considered as a
primary concern of the Government. 16 Hence,
employees are selected on the basis of merit and fitness
to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of
the position to which they are
appointed. Concomitantly,
17
the government has
committed itself to engender a continuing program of
career and personnel development for all government
employees, 18 by establishing a performance evaluation
system to be administered in such manner as to
continually foster the improvement of individual
employee efficiency and organizational effectiveness. 19
All these abundantly show that the State puts a
premium on an individual's efficiency, merit and fitness
before one is accepted into the career service. A civil
service employee's efficiency rating, therefore, is a
decisive factor for his continued service with the
Government. The inescapable conclusion is that a
"below average" efficiency rating is sufficient justification
for the termination of a government employee such as
of
herein petitioner. This is the reason why, painful as it
of
may be, petitioner's separation must be affirmed if
to
public good is to be subserved. In the words of
of
respondent commission in its questioned resolution, it
cannot "sanction the reappointment of said officials and
employees who have fallen short of the performance
necessary in order to maintain at all times efficiency and
effectiveness in the Office." 20
III. Petitioner finally contends that where the purpose of
the evaluation proceeding is to ascertain whether he
should be retained or separated from the service, it is a
proceeding to determine the existence of a ground for
his termination and, therefore, he should be afforded a
day in court, pursuant to the requirements of procedural
due process, to defend himself against any adverse
findings in the process of evaluation of his performance.
Petitioner's contention cannot be sustained.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no
officer or employee in the career service shall be
removed except for a valid cause and after due notice
and hearing." Thus, there is no question that while
dismissal due to a bona fide reorganization is recognized
as a valid cause, this does not justify a detraction from
the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing.
However, it is equally true and it is a basic rule of due
process that "what the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and
the lack of opportunity to be heard." 21 There is no
violation of procedural due process even where no
hearing was conducted for as long as the party was
given a chance to present his evidence and defend
himself.
The records show that petitioner had the opportunity to
present his side and/or to contest the results of the
evaluation proceedings. In DBP's motion for the
reconsideration of the original decision of respondent
commission, respondent bank averred:

It may be stated that although several appeals were

received by the Final Review Committee from other
employees similarly situated (i.e., also given temporary
appointments for 1988), Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier
never appealed their ratings or the extension of their
temporary appointments in 1988. Even at this writing,
the Bank has not received any formal appeal from them
although they were advised to do so by their direct
supervisor. 22

The fact that petitioner made no appeal to the Final

Review Committee was duly considered by respondent
commission in resolving said motion for reconsideration
and in affirming the separation of petitioner from the
service, noting that "appellants Mr. Domingo, and Miss
Javier did not file or submit their opposition to the
motion for reconsideration." Consequently, petitioner
cannot, by his own inaction, legally claim that he was
denied due process of law.

Considering petitioner's years of service, despite the

unfortunate result of the reorganization insofar as he is
concerned, he should be allowed separation and other
retirement benefits accruing to him by reason of his
termination, as provided for in Section 16, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution, as well as in Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6656 and Section 34 of Executive Order
No. 81.

WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been

committed by respondent Civil Service Commission, its
challenged resolution of April 10, 1990 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012 On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner, abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. text of the assailed executive order reads:
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-
officio member of the Monetary ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
Board, Respondents. COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS
INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND
DECISION RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The Case WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission and Transferring Its Investigative,
Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the
Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal
Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently
prohibit respondents from administratively proceeding
against petitioner on the strength of the assailed
executive order.
and advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the
different departments, bureaus, offices and other
government agencies and instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of
streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote
economy and efficiency in government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices;

The Facts WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal- provides for the continuing authority of the President to
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and the President;
vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting
corruption, among others, against presidential Continuing Authority to the President of the Philippines
appointees and to submit its report and to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by
recommendations to the President. Pertinent portions of PD 1722, provides that the President of the Philippines
E.O. 12 provide: shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the National Government and
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. – may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group,
consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies,
(a) x x x xxx xxx
instrumentalities and units of the National Government,
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall as well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify
have the authority to investigate or hear administrative their powers, functions and authorities;
cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of
the government and any of its agencies or
Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations Act of
instrumentalities xxx
2010) authorizes the President of the Philippines to
xxx xxx xxx direct changes in the organizational units or key
positions in any department or agency;
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III,
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
– After completing its investigation or hearing, the vested in me by law, do hereby order the following:
Commission en banc shall submit its report and
recommendations to the President. The report and SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the
recommendations shall state, among others, the factual government to fight and eradicate graft and corruption
findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other
recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action government agencies and instrumentalities.
that may be taken."
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the
government bureaucracy to promote economy and
efficiency in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the
President (OP) to directly investigate graft and corrupt
cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive
Department including heads of government-owned and
controlled corporations, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby
abolished and their vital functions and other powers and
functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to
the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions
of this Executive Order.
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In addition to
the Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division shall perform powers, functions and duties
mentioned in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(DESLA) will be the recommending authority to the
President, thru the Executive Secretary, for approval,
adoption or modification of the report and
recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division of ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the
Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be affected
by the abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of
the benefits provided under existing laws if applicable.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is
hereby ordered to release the necessary funds for the
benefits of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and
Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel, Assets
and Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations
of PAGC including the final disposition or transfer of their
functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as
may be necessary, shall be in accordance with the
applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under
or Attached to the Office of the President) dated March
15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later
than 31 December 2010.
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the
assistance of the Department of Budget and
Management, shall ensure the smooth and efficient
implementation of the dispositive actions and winding-up
of the activities of PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders,
rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order, are hereby revoked or modified
accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take
effect immediately after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V.
Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco,
Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and
Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the
LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three
Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order 3 signed
by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring
him and his co-respondents to submit their respective
written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case
involving the same transaction and charge of grave
misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is
already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law,
petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC
OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-
JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING
UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING
THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner
asseverates that the President is not authorized under
any existing law to create the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by
creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with
quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only
usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,
appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions
to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon
the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when
weighed against the due process requirement and equal
protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
The contentions are unavailing.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize
the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions
the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments and Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President
to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the
Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out
a reorganization in any branch or agency of the
executive department is an express grant by the
legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the
President to reorganize any department or agency in the
executive branch does not have to end here. We must
not lose sight of the very source of the power – that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
"the President, subject to the policy of the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office
of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale
behind the President's continuing authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of
the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational
changes is limited to transferring either an office or a
function from the Office of the President to another
Department or Agency, and the other way around. 7
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand
in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the
President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units,
apart from the less drastic move of transferring
functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in
Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office
of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the
Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of
EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside
the Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational
actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and
Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as
it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as
it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is,
whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the
limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC
was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a
Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the
ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and
was placed directly "under the Office of the
President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which
the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is
an office within the Office of the President
Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office
of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President
went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him
to reorganize the executive department since his
issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition
of an office but the creation of one as well. He argues
that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the
Court in several cases does a reorganization include the
act of creating an office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New,
Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of
a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body
were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an
existing office within the Office of the President Proper.
The reorganization required no more than a mere
alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA
through the establishment of a third division – the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which
ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has
been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado
v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that –
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised
through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in
good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in
good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and
efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining
of functions within the Office of the President Proper
was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the
reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating
corruption in the government and promoting economy
and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the
economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the
fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22
Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual
budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a
considerable amount was ever required after the
transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-
ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and maintain
its personnel would be sourced from the following year's
appropriation for the President's Offices under the
General Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner
asseverates, however, that since Congress did not
indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the
Office of the President was to be distributed, taking
therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA
would amount to an illegal appropriation by the
President. The contention is without legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to
appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run
government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of
the Government,16 which implies that he has the
necessary authority to evaluate and determine the
structure that each government agency in the executive
department would need to operate in the most
economical and efficient manner.17 Hence, the express
recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to
"direct changes in the organizational units or key
positions in any department or agency." The aforecited
provision, often and consistently included in the general
appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the
President’s power to reorganize the executive offices
and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that
purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of
the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the
General Appropriations Law using the savings in other
items of the appropriation for his office. 19 In fact, he is
explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department which
is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked
for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may
be properly sourced from the President's own office
budget without committing any illegal appropriation.
After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power
to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates
the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress
for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally
vested with judicial power which is reserved to the
Judicial Department and, by way of exception through
an express grant by the legislature, to administrative
agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA
wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in
its Comment,21 while the term "adjudicatory" appears
part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and
resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct
of investigations, preparation of reports and submission
of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the
IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties
xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to
"investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
against all presidential appointees in the
government" and to "submit its report and
23
recommendations to the President." 24The IAD-ODESLA is
a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settle controversies
and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute
the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator cannot
be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted
full control over the Executive Department to ensure the
enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully
executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of
officials and employees in the executive department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers
and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did
not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint
affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier
filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the
same charges and allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not
to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any
time, take over the investigation being conducted by
another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the
Ombudsman to –
(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an
administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it
may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with
other similarly authorized government agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the
determination of the existence of probable cause and
the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation,
the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited
to that of a fact-finding investigator whose
determinations and recommendations remain so until
acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no
usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's
Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the
Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the
equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of
limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions
in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government.29 It is embraced under
the due process concept and simply requires that, in the
application of the law, "all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed."30 The equal
protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject
to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from
each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive
Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that –
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis
supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct
disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds
from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a
contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is
lodged in the same authority on which the power to
appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or
discipline presidential appointees, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate such public officials and
look into their conduct in office.33 Petitioner is a
presidential appointee occupying the high-level position
of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well
within his right to order an investigation into matters
that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions
in government from non-presidential appointees and
those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, 34 we had ruled
extensively on the substantial distinctions that exist
between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
xxxx
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that
petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit
his written explanation under oath with respect to the
charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own
failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats
his subsequent claim of denial of due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can
lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent
Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The
mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate
the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present
substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had
unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the
investigation. No such evidence has been presented as
to defeat the presumption of regularity m the
performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The
assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of
proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a
valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will,

perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of
the people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering
that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, x x x complete
deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that
they be served by such officials until the end of the term
for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no
such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due

process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him
since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the
formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, 35 which simply
means having the opportunity to explain one’s
side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner was given the