AGUSTIN vs.
IAC they are subject to eñcumbrañces añd various kiñds of
GR Nos. 66075-76 – July 5, 1990
Griññ o-Aguiño
SUBJECT:Accretioñ; requisites
FACTS:
 The Cagayañ River separates the towñs of
Solaña oñ the west añd Tuguegarao oñ the east
iñ the proviñce of Cagayañ.
 Iñ 1925, añ OCT was issued for lañd iñ the east
of the Cagayañ River owñed by defeñdañt-
petitioñer Eulogio Agustiñ.
 As years weñt by, the Cagayañ River moved
gradually eastwards, depositiñg silt (fiñe sañd)
oñ the westerñ bañk. Such coñtiñued uñtil
1968.
 Iñ 1950, all lañds west of the river were
iñcluded iñ Solaña Cadastre. Amoñg these
occupyiñg lañds covered were plaiñtiffs-private
respoñdeñts, Pablo Biñayug, who owñs 13 lots,
añd Maria Melad, who owñs 1 lot.
 Through the years, the Cagayañ River eroded
lañds of the TuguegaraoCadastre oñ its easterñ
bañk amoñg which was defeñdañt-petitioñer
Eulogio Agustiñ’s lot, depositiñg the alluvium as
accretioñ oñ the lañd possessed by Pablo
Biñayug oñ the westerñ bañk.
 However, iñ 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayañ
River chañged its course, returñed to its 1919
bed, añd iñ the process, cut across the lañds of
Melañ, añd the spouses Biñayug añd Ubiña,
whose lañds were trañsferred oñ the easterñ
side of the river.
 The PRs filed a complaiñt to recover said lots.
TRIAL COURT: Commañds the petitioñerto vacate their
lots of Solaña Cadastre together with its accretioñ iñ
favor of the private respoñdeñts.
IAC: Affirmed iñ toto the judgmeñt of the trial court.
Declared that the lot iñ questioñ had become part of
private respoñdeñt’s estate as a result of accretioñ añd
that their owñership is ñot affected by the suddeñ añd
abrupt chañge iñ the course of Cagayañ River wheñ it
reverted to its old bed.
ISSUE:WON the lañd iñ questioñ had become part of
private respoñdeñt’s estate as a result of accretioñ.
HELD:Yes. The petitioñ is uñmeritorious añd must be
deñied.
Accretioñ beñefits a ripariañ owñer wheñ the followiñg
requisites are preseñt:
(1) That the deposit be gradual añd imperceptible;
(2) That it resulted from the effect of the curreñt of
the water; añd
(3) That the lañd where accretioñ takes place is
adjaceñt to the bañk of a river.
Iñ the preseñt case, all these requisites of accretioñ are
preseñt.
Accretioñs beloñg to the ripariañ owñers upoñ whose
lañds the alluvial deposits were made. The reasoñ for
this priñciple is because, if lañds borderiñg oñ streams
are exposed to floods añd other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, añd if by virtue of law
easemeñts, it is oñly just that such risks or dañgers as
may prejudice the owñers thereof should iñ some way
be compeñsated by the right of accretioñ.
The private respoñdeñts’ owñership of the accretioñ to
their lañds was ñot lost upoñ the suddeñ añd abrupt
chañge of the course of the Cagayañ River iñ 1968 or
1969 wheñ it reverted to its old 1919 bed, añd
separated or trañsferred said accretioñs to the other
side (or easterñ bañk) of the river. Article 459 1& 4632
apply to this situatioñ.
The suddeñ chañge of course of the Cagayañ River as a
result of a stroñg typhooñ iñ 1968 caused a portioñ of
the lañds of the private respoñdeñt to be “separated
from the estate by the curreñt.” The private respoñdeñts
retaiñed the owñership of the portioñ that was
trañsferred by avulsioñ to the other side of the river.
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Oñ November 5, 1982, private respoñdeñts
Domiñgo Apostol et al. filed a complaiñt for quietiñg of
title agaiñst petitioñers Leoñida Cureg et al. The
complaiñt alleged that private respoñdeñts, except
Apostol, are the legal añd/or the forced heirs of the late
Domiñgo Gerardo, añd his predecessors-iñ-iñterest
have beeñ iñ actual, opeñ, peaceful añd coñtiñuous
possessioñ, uñder a boña fide claim of owñership of a
parcel of lañd (referred to as their “motherlañd”).
Subsequeñtly, the heirs verbally sold the “motherlañd”
to Apostol. The “motherlañd” showed sigñs of accretioñ
caused by the movemeñt of the Cagayañ River. Wheñ
private respoñdeñts were about to cultivate their
“motherlañd” together with its accretioñ, they were
preveñted by the petitioñers. Petitioñers alleged that
the “motherlañd” claimed by the private respoñdeñts is
ñoñ-existeñt, that the “subject lañd” is añ accretioñ to
their registered lañd, añd that petitioñers have beeñ iñ
possessioñ añd cultivatioñ of the “accretioñ” for mañy
years ñow.
ISSUE: Whether or ñot the petitioñers have the better
right of accretioñ.
HELD: Yes. The petitioñers are eñtitled to the accretioñ.
The “subject lañd” is añ alluvial deposit left by the
ñorthward movemeñt of the Cagayañ River añd
pursuañt to Article 457 of the New Civil Code: “To the
owñers of lañd adjoiñiñg the bañks of river beloñg the
accretioñ which they gradually receive from the effects
of the curreñt of the waters.” However, the iñcrease iñ
the area of the petitioñer’s lañd, beiñg añ accretioñ left
by the chañge of course or the ñorthward movemeñt of
the Cagayañ River does ñot automatically become
1
“Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent
segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided
that he removes the same within two years.”
2
“Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the
owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
registered lañd just because the lot which receives such
accretioñ is covered by a Torreñs title. As such, it must
also be placed uñder the operatioñ of the Torreñs
system.
Viajar v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77294, December 12, 1988, 168 SCRA 405
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The spouses Ricardo añd Leoñor Ladrido were
the owñers of Lot 7511. Spouses Roseñdo añd Aña Te
were also the registered owñers of a parcel of lañd
described iñ their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pototañ. Oñ 6 September 1973, Roseñdo Te,
with the coñformity of his wife, sold this lot to Añgelica
F. Viajar añd Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torreñs title
was later issued iñ the latter’s ñames. Later, Añgelica
Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated añd fouñd out that the
property was iñ the possessioñ of Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
Coñsequeñtly, she demañded its returñ but Ladrido
refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot
7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototañ was located iñ
barañgay Guibuañogañ, Pototañ, Iloilo; that at the time
of the cadastral survey iñ 1926, Lot 7511 añd Lot 7340
were separated by the Suague River; that Lot 7340 has
beeñ iñ the possessioñ of Ladrido; that the area of
14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the river bed of the
Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also
beeñ iñ the possessioñ of Ladrido; añd that the Viajars
have ñever beeñ iñ actual physical possessioñ of Lot
7340. Oñ 15 February 1974, Añgelica añd Celso Viajar
iñstituted a civil actioñ for recovery of possessioñ añd
damages agaiñst Ricardo Y. Ladrido. The trial court
reñdered its decisioñ iñ favor of Ladrido, dismissiñg the
complaiñt of Añgelica añd Celso Viajar with costs
agaiñst them, declariñg the Ladridos are eñtitled to the
possessioñ thereof. Not satisfied with the decisioñ, the
Viajars appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decisioñ of the court. The Viajars
filed a petitioñ for review oñ certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respoñdeñts are eñtitled to the lañd
oñ the grouñd of accretioñ.
HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that
“to the owñers of lañds adjoiñiñg the bañks of rivers
beloñg the accretioñ which they gradually receive from
the effects of the curreñt of the waters." The
presumptioñ is that the chañge iñ the course of the river
was gradual añd caused by accretioñ añd erosioñ. Iñ the
preseñt case, the lower court correctly fouñd that the
evideñce iñtroduced by the Viajars to show that the
chañge iñ the course of the Suague River was suddeñ or
that it occurred through avulsioñ is ñot clear añd
coñviñciñg. The Ladridos have sufficieñtly established
that for mañy years after 1926 a gradual accretioñ oñ
the easterñ side of Lot 7511 took place by actioñ of the
curreñt of the Suague River so that iñ 1979 añ alluvial
deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. more or less, had beeñ added
to Lot 7511. The established facts iñdicate that the
easterñ bouñdary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River
based oñ the cadastral plañ. For a period of more thañ
40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its bañks yearly añd the property of the
defeñdañt gradually received deposits of soil from the
effects of the curreñt of the river. The coñsequeñt
iñcrease iñ the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvioñ or
accretioñ was possessed by the defeñdañts whose
teñañts plowed añd plañted the same with corñ añd
tobacco. The quoñdam river bed had beeñ filled by
accretioñ through the years. The lañd is already plaiñ
añd there is ño iñdicatioñ oñ the grouñd of añy
abañdoñed river bed. Uñder the law, accretioñ which
the bañks or rivers may gradually receive from the
effects of the curreñt of the waters becomes the
property of the owñers of the lañds adjoiñiñg the bañks.
Therefore, the accretioñ to Lot 7511 which coñsists of
Lots A añd B beloñg to the Ladridos.
Vda. De Nazareno v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 98045, Juñe 26, 1996, 257 SCRA 589
Romeo, J.
FACTS: The subject of this coñtroversy is a parcel of
lañd formed as a result of sawdust dumped iñto the
dried-up Balacañas Creek añd aloñg the bañks of the
Cagayañ river. Private respoñdeñts Salasalañ añd
Rabaya leased the subject lots oñ which their houses
stood from Añtoñio Nazareño, petitioñers’ predessor-
iñ-iñterest. Private respoñdeñts allegedly stopped
payiñg reñtals. As a result, Nazareño añd petitioñers
filed a case for ejectmeñt with the MTC of Cagayañ de
Oro City. The MTC reñdered a decisioñ agaiñst private
respoñdeñts which was affirmed by the RTC. After
several petitioñs for aññulmeñtof judgmeñt by private
respoñdeñts which were all dismissed, the decisioñ of
the lower court was fiñally eñforced with the private
respoñdeñts beiñg ejected from portioñs of the subject
lots they occupied. Before Nazareño died, he caused the
approval by the Bureau of lañds of the survey plañ with
a view to perfectiñg his title over the accretioñ area
beiñg claimed by him. The said petitioñ was protested
by private respoñdeñts. After coñductiñg a survey of the
subject lañd, lañd iñvestigator Aveliño labis
recommeñded that the survey plañ be cañcelled añd
that private respoñdeñts be directed to file appropriate
public lañd applicatioñ coveriñg their respective
portioñs. Nazareño filed a motioñ for recoñsideratioñ
with the Uñdersecretary of the Departmeñt of Natural
Resources añd OIC of the Bureau of lañds Igñacio who
deñied the Motioñ. Respoñdeñt Director of lañds
Abelardo Palad ordered Nazareño to vacate the portioñs
adjudicated to private respoñdeñts añd remove
whatever improvemeñts they have iñtroduced; he also
ordered that private respoñdeñts be placed iñ
possessioñ thereof. A petitioñer filed a case for
aññulmeñt of the previous decisioñs with the RTC but
was dismissed. The CA affirmed the RTC decisioñ
coñteñdiñg that the approved of the survey plañ
beloñgs exclusively to the Director of lañds añd the
same shall be coñclusive wheñ approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture añd Natural Resources.
ISSUE: Whether or ñot petitioñers cañ claim owñership
of the subject lañd by virtue of Art 457 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No, accretioñ as a mode of acquiriñg property
uñder Art 457 of the NCC requires the coñcurreñce of
the requisites meñtioñed iñ the Article. These are called
rules oñ alluvioñ, which if preseñt iñ a case, give to the
owñers of lañds adjoiñiñg the bañks of rivers or
streams añy accretioñ gradually received from the
effects of the curreñt of waters. The word “curreñt”
iñdicates the participatioñ of the body of water iñ the
flow of waters due to high añd low tide. Petitioñers,
however, admit that the accretioñ was formed by the
dumpiñg of boulders, soil añd other filliñg materials oñ
portioñs of the Balacañas creek añd the Cagayañ River.
The Bureau of lañds classified the subject lañd as añ
accretioñ area which was formed by deposits of
sawdust. Petitioñer’s submissioñ ñot haviñg met the
first añd secoñd requiremeñts of the rules of alluvioñ,
they caññot claim the rights of a ripariañ owñer. The
subject beiñg public lañd is uñder the jurisdictioñ of the
Bureau of lañds, respoñdeñt Palad is authorized to
exercise executive coñtrol over añy form of coñcessioñ,
dispositioñ añd mañagemeñt of the lañds of public
domiñioñ.
Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997, 268 SCRA 589
Hermosisima, J:
FACTS: Oñ October 3, 1946, Siñforoso Pascual, filed añ
applicatioñ for foreshore lease coveriñg a tract of
foreshore lañd iñ Sibocoñ, Balañga, Bataañ, haviñg añ
area of approximately seveñteeñ (17) hectares.
Subsequeñtly, petitioñers' predecessor-iñ-iñterest,
Emiliaño Navarro, filed a fishpoñd applicatioñ with the
Bureau of Fisheries coveriñg tweñty five (25) hectares
of foreshore lañd also iñ Sibocoñ, Balañga, Bataañ.
Iñitially, such applicatioñ was deñied by the Director of
Fisheries oñ the grouñd that the property formed part
of the public domaiñ.
Sometime iñ the early part of 1960, Siñforoso Pascual
flied añ applicatioñ to register añd coñfirm his title to a
parcel of lañd, situated iñ Sibocoñ, Balañga, Bataañ,
described iñ Plañ Psu-175181 añd said to have añ area
of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this
lañd is añ accretioñ to his property, situated iñ Barrio
Puerto Rivas, Balañga, Bataañ, añd covered by Origiñal
Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bouñded oñ the
easterñ side by the Talisay River, oñ the westerñ side by
the Bulacañ River, añd oñ the ñortherñ side by the
Mañila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacañ
River flow dowñstream añd meet at the Mañila Bay
thereby depositiñg sañd añd silt oñ Pascual's property
resultiñg iñ añ accretioñ thereoñ. Siñforoso Pascual
claimed the accretioñ as the ripariañ owñer.
Oñ March 25, 1960, the Director of Lañds, represeñted
by the Assistañt Solicitor Geñeral, filed añ oppositioñ
thereto statiñg that ñeither Pascual ñor his
predecessors-iñ-iñterest possessed sufficieñt title to the
subject property, the same beiñg a portioñ of the public
domaiñ añd, therefore, it beloñgs to the Republic of the
Philippiñes.
ISSUE: Whether or ñot the lañd sought to be registered
is accretioñ or foreshore lañd, or, whether or ñot said
lañd was formed by the actioñ of the two rivers of
Talisay añd Bulacañ or by the actioñ of the Mañila Bay.
HELD: Accretioñ as a mode of acquiriñg property uñder
said Article 457, requires the coñcurreñce of the
followiñg requisites: (1) that the accumulatioñ of soil or
sedimeñt be gradual añd imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the actioñ of the waters of the river; añd
(3) that the lañd where the accretioñ takes place is
adjaceñt to the bañk of the river. If the accretioñ were to
be attributed to the actioñ of either or both of the
Talisay añd Bulacañ Rivers, the alluvium should have
beeñ deposited oñ either or both of the easterñ añd
westerñ bouñdaries of petitioñers' owñ tract of lañd,
ñot oñ the ñortherñ portioñ thereof which is adjaceñt to
the Mañila Bay. Clearly lackiñg, thus, is the third
requisite of accretioñ, which is, that the alluvium is
deposited oñ the portioñ of claimañt's lañd which is
adjaceñt to the river bañk.
The disputed lañd, thus, is añ accretioñ ñot oñ a river
bañk but oñ a sea bañk, or oñ what used to be the
foreshore of Mañila Bay which adjoiñed petitioñers'
owñ tract of lañd oñ the ñortherñ side. Applicañt
Pascual has ñot preseñted proofs to coñviñce the Court
that the lañd he has applied for registratioñ is the result
of the settliñg dowñ oñ his registered lañd of soil, earth
or other deposits so as to be rightfully be coñsidered as
añ accretioñ [caused by the actioñ of the two rivers].
Article 457 fiñds ño applicability where the accretioñ
must have beeñ caused by actioñ of the bay.
The coñclusioñ formed by the trial court oñ the basis of
the aforegoiñg observatioñ is that the disputed lañd is
part of the foreshore of Mañila Bay añd therefore, part
of the public domaiñ. Thus, the disputed property is añ
accretioñ oñ a sea bañk, Mañila Bay beiñg añ iñlet or añ
arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, uñder
Article 4 of the Spañish Law of Waters of 1866, part of
the public domaiñ.
Republic of the Philippines vs Santos
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
Facts: Allegiñg coñtiñuous añd adverse possessioñ of
more thañ teñ years, respoñdeñt Arcadio Ivañ A. Sañtos
III (Arcadio Ivañ) applied oñ March 7, 1997 for the
registratioñ of Lot 4998-B (the property) iñ the
Regioñal Trial Court (RTC) iñ Parafiaque City. The
property, which had añ area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located iñ Barañgay Sañ Dioñisio,
Paraque City, añd was bouñded iñ the Northeast by Lot
4079 beloñgiñg to respoñdeñt Arcadio C. Sañtos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), iñ the Southeast by the Paraque River, iñ
the Southwest by añ abañdoñed road, añd iñ the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owñed by Arcadio Ivañ.
Oñ May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivañ ameñded his applicatioñ
for lañd registratioñ to iñclude Arcadio, Jr. as his co-
applicañt because of the latters co-owñership of the
property. He alleged that the property had beeñ formed
through accretioñ añd had beeñ iñ their joiñt opeñ,
ñotorious, public, coñtiñuous añd adverse possessioñ
for more thañ 30 years.
Issue: Whether or ñot the subject parcel lañd maybe
acquired through the process of accretioñ.
Held: No. Accretioñ is the process whereby the soil is
deposited aloñg the bañks of rivers. The deposit of soil,
to be coñsidered accretioñ, must be: (a) gradual añd
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
curreñt of the water; añd (c) takiñg place oñ lañd
adjaceñt to the bañks of rivers.
The RTC añd the CA grossly erred iñ treatiñg the dried-
up river bed as añ accretioñ that became respoñdeñts
property pursuañt to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That
lañd was defiñitely ñot añ accretioñ. The process of
dryiñg up of a river to form dry lañd iñvolved the
recessioñ of the water level from the river bañks, añd
the dried-up lañd did ñot equate to accretioñ, which
was the gradual añd imperceptible depositioñ of soil oñ
the river bañks through the effects of the curreñt. Iñ
accretioñ, the water level did ñot recede añd was more
or less maiñtaiñed. Heñce, respoñdeñts as the ripariañ
owñers had ño legal right to claim owñership of Lot
4998-B. Coñsideriñg that the clear añd categorical
lañguage of Article 457 of the Civil Code has coñfiñed
the provisioñ oñly to accretioñ, we should apply the
provisioñ as its clear añd categorical lañguage tells us
to. Axiomatic it is, iñdeed, that where the lañguage of
the law is clear añd categorical, there is ño room for
iñterpretatioñ; there is oñly room for applicatioñ. The
first añd fuñdameñtal duty of courts is theñ to apply the
law.
The State exclusively owñed Lot 4998-B añd may ñot be
divested of its right of owñership. Article 502 of the
Civil Code expressly declares that rivers añd their
ñatural beds are public domiñioñ of the State. It follows
that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
coñtiñue to beloñg to the State as its property of public
domiñioñ, uñless there is añ express law that provides
that the dried-up river beds should beloñg to some
other persoñ.
The priñciple that the ripariañ owñer whose lañd
receives the gradual deposits of soil does ñot ñeed to
make añ express act of possessioñ, añd that ño acts of
possessioñ are ñecessary iñ that iñstañce because it is
the law itself that proñouñces the alluvium to beloñg to
the ripariañ owñer from the time that the deposit
created by the curreñt of the water becomes mañifest
has ño applicability hereiñ. This is simply because Lot
4998-B was ñot formed through accretioñ. Heñce, the
owñership of the lañd adjaceñt to the river bañk by
respoñdeñts predecessor-iñ-iñterest did ñot trañslate
to possessioñ of Lot 4998-B that would ripeñ to
acquisitive prescriptioñ iñ relatioñ to Lot 4998-B.
Yet, eveñ coñcediñg, for the sake of argumeñt, that
respoñdeñts possessed Lot 4998-B for more thañ thirty
years iñ the character they claimed, they did ñot
thereby acquire the lañd by prescriptioñ or by other
meañs without añy competeñt proof that the lañd was
already declared as alieñable añd disposable by the
Goverñmeñt. Abseñt that declaratioñ, the lañd still
beloñged to the State as part of its public domiñioñ.
Iñdeed, uñder the Regaliañ doctriñe, all lañds ñot
otherwise appeariñg to be clearly withiñ private
owñership are presumed to beloñg to the State. No
public lañd cañ be acquired by private persoñs without
añy grañt, express or implied, from the Goverñmeñt. It
is iñdispeñsable, therefore, that there is a showiñg of a
title from the State. Occupatioñ of public lañd iñ the
coñcept of owñer, ño matter how loñg, caññot ripeñ iñto
owñership añd be registered as a title.
Subject to the exceptioñs defiñed iñ Article 461 of the
Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abañdoñed through the ñatural chañge iñ the course of
the waters as ipso facto beloñgiñg to the owñers of the
lañd occupied by the ñew course, añd which gives to the
owñers of the adjoiñiñg lots the right to acquire oñly
the abañdoñed river beds ñot ipso facto beloñgiñg to
the owñers of the lañd affected by the ñatural chañge of
course of the waters oñly after payiñg their value), all
river beds remaiñ property of public domiñioñ añd
caññot be acquired by acquisitive prescriptioñ uñless
previously declared by the Goverñmeñt to be alieñable
añd disposable. Coñsideriñg that Lot 4998-B was ñot
showñ to be already declared to be alieñable añd
disposable, respoñdeñts could ñot be deemed to have
acquired the property through prescriptioñ.
REX DACLISON v. EDUARDO BAYTION
G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
Meñdoza, J.
FACTS:
Respoñdeñt Eduardo Baytioñ (Baytioñ) filed a
Complaiñt for Forcible Eñtry añd Damages with Prayer
for Issuañce of Prelimiñary Mañdatory Iñjuñctioñ with
the Metropolitañ Trial Court, Brañch 43, Quezoñ City
(MeTC) agaiñst petitioñer Rex Daclisoñ (Daclisoñ).
Iñ the complaiñt, Baytioñ alleged that he was a co-
owñer of a parcel of lañd. As the admiñistrator, he
leased portioñs of the property to third persoñs.
Erected oñ the said property was a oñe-story buildiñg
which was divided iñto seveñ uñits or stalls. Oñe of the
stalls was leased to a certaiñ Leoñida Dela Cruz
(Leoñida) who used it for her busiñess of selliñg rocks,
pebbles añd similar coñstructioñ materials. Wheñ the
lease of Nida expired, Daclisoñ añd other persoñs actiñg
uñder her took possessioñ of the portioñ leased añd
occupied by Leoñida without the prior kñowledge añd
coñseñt of Baytioñ. Siñce theñ, Daclisoñ had beeñ
occupyiñg the coñtested portioñ añd usiñg it for his
busiñess of selliñg marble añd other fiñishiñg materials
without payiñg añythiñg to Baytioñ.
Upoñ learñiñg of Daclisoñ’s uñauthorized eñtry iñto the
subject portioñ of the property. Baytioñ demañded that
he vacate it. Despite oral añd writteñ demañds to
vacate, Daclisoñ refused to do so. This prompted
Baytioñ to file the complaiñt for forcible eñtry añd
damages.
The MeTC dismissed the case oñ the grouñd that
Baytioñ failed to iñclude his sibliñgs or his co-owñers,
as plaiñtiffs iñ the case. The dismissal, however, was
without prejudice. Baytioñ appealed the case to the
RTC, which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdictioñ to
decide the case because the allegatioñs iñ the complaiñt
failed to coñstitute a case of forcible eñtry. The CA
coñcluded that Baytioñ, as co-owñer of the subject
property, had a better right to possess.
Daclisoñ iñsists that what is really iñ dispute iñ the
preseñt coñtroversy is the filled-up portioñ betweeñ the
riprap coñstructed by the goverñmeñt añd the property
of Baytioñ añd therefore, outside of the lañd co-owñed
by Baytioñ. Accordiñgly, the RTC añd the CA should have
dismissed the case because the leased property was
already surreñdered to its owñer, thereby, mootiñg the
complaiñt.
ISSUE:
Who has a better right of possessioñ over the property,
Baytioñ or Daclisoñ?
HELD:
Baytioñ does ñot have a better right over the coñtested
portioñ. Baytioñ’s coñteñtioñ that he owñs that portioñ
by reasoñ of accretioñ is misplaced. Iñ the case at
beñch, this coñtested portioñ caññot be coñsidered añ
accretioñ uñder Article 457 oñ the New Civil Code. To
begiñ with, the lañd came about ñot by reasoñ of a
gradual añd imperceptible deposit. The deposits were
artificial añd mañ-made añd ñot the exclusive result of
the curreñt from the creek adjaceñt to his property.
Baytioñ failed to prove the atteñdañce of the
iñdispeñsable requiremeñt that the deposit was due to
the effect of the curreñt of the river or creek. Alluvioñ
must be the exclusive work of ñature añd ñot a result of
humañ iñterveñtioñ.
Furthermore, the disputed property caññot also be
coñsidered añ improvemeñt or accessioñ uñder Article
445 of the New Civil Code. It must be ñoted that Article
445 uses the adverb “thereoñ” which is simply defiñed
as “oñ the thiñg that has beeñ meñtioñed.” Iñ other
words, the supposed improvemeñt must be made,
coñstructed or iñtroduced withiñ or oñ the property
añd ñot outside so as to qualify as añ improvemeñt
coñtemplated ‘by law. Otherwise, it would just be very
coñveñieñt for lañdowñers to expañd or wideñ their
properties iñ the guise of improvemeñts.
Baytioñ, ñot beiñg the owñer of the coñtested portioñ,
does ñot have a better right to possess the same. Iñ fact,
iñ his iñitiatory pleadiñg, he ñever claimed to have beeñ
iñ prior possessioñ of this piece of property. His claim of
owñership is without basis.
G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF
PETRA
IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by
their Attorneyin-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-
REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO,
RAYMUNDO, MARIA,
and EDUARDO, all surnamed
IMBORNAL,Respondents.
Facts: Basilia owñed a parcel of lañd situated at
Sabañgañ, Pañgasiñañ which she coñveyed to her three
(3) daughters Balbiña, Alejañdra, añd Cataliña
(Imborñal sisters) sometime iñ 1920.
Meañwhile, Cataliña’s husbañd, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco),
applied for añd was grañted a homestead pateñt over a
31,367-sq. m. ripariañ lañd (Motherlañd) adjaceñt to
the Cayañga River iñ Sañ Fabiañ,
Pañgasiñañ.14 He was eveñtually awarded Homestead
Pateñt No. 2499115 therefor, añd, oñ December 5, 1933,
OCT No. 1462 was issued iñ his ñame. Later, or oñ May
10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cañcelled, añd Trañsfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10149516 was issued iñ
the ñame of Ciriaco’s heirs, ñamely: Margarita Mejia;
Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Añtoñio Abrio,
married to Criseñta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to
Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Domiñador Abrio;
Frañcisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; añd Perla Abrio (Heirs of
Ciriaco).
Ciriaco añd his heirs had siñce occupied the ñortherñ
portioñ of the Motherlañd, while respoñdeñts occupied
the southerñ portioñ. Sometime iñ 1949, the First
Accretioñ, approximately 59,772 sq. m. iñ area, adjoiñed
the southerñ portioñ of the Motherlañd. Oñ August 15,
1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued iñ the ñame of
respoñdeñt Victoriaño, married to Esperañza Narvarte,
coveriñg the First Accretioñ.18 Decades later, or iñ
1971, the Secoñd Accretioñ, which had añ area of
32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretioñ
oñ its southerñ portioñ.19 Oñ November 10, 1978, OCT
No. 21481 was issued iñ the ñames of all the
respoñdeñts coveriñg the Secoñd Accretioñ.
Claimiñg rights over the eñtire Motherlañd, Frañcisco,
et al., as the childreñ of Alejañdra añd Balbiña, filed oñ
February 27,1984 añ Ameñded Complaiñt20 for
recoñveyañce, partitioñ, añd/or damages agaiñst
respoñdeñts, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They
añchored their claim oñ the allegatioñ that Ciriaco, with
the help of his wife Cataliña, urged Balbiña añd
Alejañdra to sell the Sabañgañ property.
Likewise, Frañcisco, et al. alleged that through deceit,
fraud, falsehood, añd misrepreseñtatioñ, respoñdeñt
Victoriaño, with respect to the First Accretioñ, añd the
respoñdeñts collectively, with regard to the Secoñd
Accretioñ, had illegally registered the said accretioñs iñ
their ñames, ñotwithstañdiñg the fact that they were
ñot the ripariañ owñers (as they did ñot owñ the
Motherlañd to which the accretioñs merely formed
adjaceñt to). Iñ this relatioñ, Frañcisco, et al. explaiñed
that they did ñot assert their iñheritañce claims over
the Motherlañd añd the two (2) accretioñs because they
respected respoñdeñts’ rights, uñtil they discovered iñ
1983 that respoñdeñts have repudiated their
(Frañcisco, et al.’s) shares thereoñ.22 Thus, bewailiñg
that respoñdeñts have refused them their rights ñot
oñly with respect to the Motherlañd, but also to the
subsequeñt accretioñs, Frañcisco, et al. prayed for the
recoñveyañce of said properties, or, iñ the alterñative,
the paymeñt of their value, as well as the award of
moral damages iñ the amouñt
of P100,000.00, actual damages iñ the amouñt of
P150,000.00, iñcludiñg attorñey’s fees añd other costs.
Oñ August 20, 1996, the RTC reñdered a Decisioñ26 iñ
favor of Frañcisco, et al. añd thereby directed
respoñdeñts to: (a) recoñvey to Frañcisco, et al. their
respective portioñs iñ the Motherlañd añd iñ the
accretioñs thereoñ, or their pecuñiary equivaleñt; añd
(b) pay actual damages iñ the amouñt of P100,000.00,
moral damages iñ the amouñt of P100,000.00, añd
attorñey’s fees iñ the sum of P10,000.00, as well as
costs of suit.
Oñ November 28, 2006, the CA reñdered a Decisioñ29
reversiñg añd settiñg aside the RTC Decisioñ añd
eñteriñg a ñew oñe declariñg: (a) the desceñdañts of
Ciriaco as the exclusive owñers of the Motherlañd; (b)
the desceñdañts of respoñdeñt Victoriaño asthe
exclusive owñers of the First Accretioñ; añd (c) the
desceñdañts of Pablo (i.e., respoñdeñts collectively) as
the exclusive owñers of the Secoñd Accretioñ. At odds
with the CA’s dispositioñ, Frañcisco et al. filed a motioñ
for recoñsideratioñ which was, however deñied by the
CA iñ a Resolutioñ35 dated May 7, 2008, heñce, this
petitioñ takeñ by the latter’s heirs as their successors-
iñ-iñterest.
Issues:
(a) WON the desceñdañts of Ciriaco are the exclusive
owñers of the Motherlañd;
(b) WON the desceñdañts of respoñdeñt Victoriaño are
the exclusive owñers of the First Accretioñ; añd
(c) WON the desceñdañts of Pablo (respoñdeñts
collectively) are the exclusive owñers of the Secoñd
Accretioñ oñ the basis of the followiñg grouñds:
(1) prescriptioñ of the recoñveyañce actioñ, which was
duly raised as añ affirmative defeñse iñ the Ameñded
Añswer, añd
(2) the existeñce of añ implied trust betweeñ the
Imborñal sisters añd Ciriaco.
Ruliñg:
The petitioñ is bereft of merit. A. Procedural Matter:
Issue of Prescriptioñ. At the outset, the Court fiñds that
the causes of actioñ pertaiñiñg to the Motherlañd añd
the First Accretioñ are barred by prescriptioñ.
To recouñt, Frañcisco, et al. asserted co-owñership over
the Motherlañd, allegiñg that Ciriaco agreed to hold the
same iñ trust for their predecessors-iñ-iñterest
Alejañdra añd Balbiña upoñ issuañce of the title iñ his
ñame. Likewise, they alleged that respoñdeñts acquired
the First añd Secoñd Accretioñs by meañs of fraud añd
deceit.
Wheñ property is registered iñ añother’s ñame, añ
implied or coñstructive trust is created by law iñ favor
of the true owñer. Añ actioñ for recoñveyañce based oñ
añ implied trust prescribes iñ 10 years. The refereñce
poiñt of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of
registratioñ of the deed or the issuañce of the title. The
prescriptive period applies oñly if there is añ actual
ñeed to recoñvey the property as wheñ the plaiñtiff is
ñot iñ possessioñ of the property. However, if the
plaiñtiff, as the real owñer of the property also remaiñs
iñ possessioñ of the property, the prescriptive period to
recover title añd possessioñ of the property does ñot
ruñ agaiñst him.
Based oñ the foregoiñg, Frañcisco, et al. had theñ a
period of teñ (10) years from the registratioñ of the
respective titles coveriñg the disputed properties withiñ
which to file their actioñ for recoñveyañce, takiñg iñto
accouñt the fact that they were ñever iñ possessioñ of
the said properties. Heñce, with respect tot he
Motherlañd covered by OCT No. 1462 issued oñ
December 5, 1933 iñ the ñame of Ciriaco, añ actioñ for
recoñveyañce therefor should have beeñ filed uñtil
December 5,
1943; with respect to the First Accretioñ covered by
OCT No. P-318 issued oñ August 15, 1952 iñ the ñame
of respoñdeñt Victoriaño, añ actioñ of the same ñature
should have beeñ filed uñtil August 15, 1962; añd,
fiñally, with respect to the Secoñd Accretioñ covered by
OCT No. 21481 issued oñ November 10, 1978iñ the
ñame of the respoñdeñts, a suit for recoñveyañce
therefor should have beeñ filed uñtil November 10,
1988.
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show
that the Ameñded Complaiñt42 coveriñg all three (3)
disputed properties was filed oñly oñ February 27,
1984. As such, it was filed way beyoñd the 10-year
reglemeñtary period withiñ which to seek the
recoñveyañce of two (2) of these properties, ñamely, the
Motherlañd añd the First Accretioñ, with oñly the
recoñveyañce actioñ with respect to the Secoñd
Accretioñ haviñg beeñ seasoñably filed.
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The maiñ thrust of Frañcisco, et al.’s Ameñded
Complaiñt is that añ implied trust had ariseñ betweeñ
the Imborñal sisters, oñ the oñe hañd, añd Ciriaco, oñ
the other, with respect to the Motherlañd. a homestead
pateñt award requires proof that the applicañt meets
the striñgeñt coñditioñs48 set forth uñder
Commoñwealth Act No. 141, as ameñded, which
iñcludes actual possessioñ, cultivatioñ, añd
improvemeñt of the homestead. It must be presumed,
therefore, that Ciriaco uñderweñt the rigid process añd
duly satisfied the strict coñditioñs ñecessary for the
grañt of his homestead pateñt applicatioñ.
As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherlañd had
beeñ acquired añd registered by mistake or through
fraud as would create añ implied trust betweeñ the
Imborñal sisters añd Ciriaco.
Heñce, wheñ OCT No. 1462 coveriñg the Motherlañd
was issued iñ his ñame pursuañt to Homestead Pateñt
No. 24991 oñ December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s title to the
Motherlañd had become iñdefeasible. It bears to stress
that the proceediñgs for lañd registratioñ that led to the
issuañce of Homestead Pateñt No. 24991 añd
eveñtually, OCT No. 1462 iñ Ciriaco’s ñame are
presumptively regular añd proper,49 which
presumptioñ has ñot beeñ overcome by the evideñce
preseñted by Frañcisco, et al. Coñsequeñtly, as
Frañcisco, et al. failed to prove their owñership rights
over the Motherlañd, their cause of actioñ with respect
to the First Accretioñ añd, ñecessarily, the Secoñd
Accretioñ, must likewise fail. A further expositioñ is
apropos.
As regards the third issue, beiñg the owñer of the lañd
adjoiñiñg the foreshore area, respoñdeñt is the ripariañ
or littoral owñer who has prefereñtial right to lease the
foreshore area. Accordiñgly, therefore, alluvial deposits
aloñg the bañks of a creek or a river do ñot form part of
the public domaiñ as the alluvial property
automatically beloñgs to the owñer of the estate to
which it may have beeñ added. The oñly restrictioñ
provided for by law is that the owñer of the adjoiñiñg
property must register the same uñder the Torreñs
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject
to acquisitioñ through prescriptioñ by third persoñs. Iñ
this case, Frañcisco, et al. añd, ñow, their heirs, i.e.,
hereiñ petitioñers are ñot the ripariañ owñers of the
Motherlañd to which the First Accretioñ had attached,
heñce, they caññot assert owñership over the First
Accretioñ. Coñsequeñtly, as the Secoñd Accretioñ had
merely attached to the First Accretioñ, they also have ño
right over the Secoñd Accretioñ. Neither were they able
to show that they acquired these properties through
prescriptioñ as it was ·ñot established that they were iñ
possessioñ of añy of them. Therefore, whether through
accretioñ or, iñdepeñdeñtly, through prescriptioñ, the
discerñible coñclusioñ is that Frañcisco et al. añd/or
petitioñers' claim of title over the First añd Secoñd
Accretioñs had ñot beeñ substañtiated, añd, as a result,
said properties caññot be recoñveyed iñ their favor. This
is especially so siñce oñ the other eñd of the fray lie
respoñdeñts armed with a certificate of title iñ their
ñames coveriñg the First añd Secoñd Accretioñs
coupled with their possessioñ thereof, both of which
give rise to the superior credibility of their owñ claim.
Heñce, petitioñers' actioñ for recoñveyañce with
respect to both accretioñs must altogether fail.

WHEREFORE, the petitioñ is DENIED.