FIRST DIVISION The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.

bmit their respective nominees for the position.6 Both failed to

comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the parties
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L.
vs. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of
who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V.
stock and other personal properties. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said
document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an
inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit
moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was movant’s motion to dismiss.
gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from
real properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their SO ORDERED.10
deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. 2 He argued that No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of dispositive portion of which reads:
their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late
mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo
they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s affidavits,
statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and
SO ORDERED.11
passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution
3 dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
In his opposition, Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s
house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared
in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, I
Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their
mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document. RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents’ residence APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City II
General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in
the same way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Perico’s residence at RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS
Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593,
conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.5
 WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF
RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A
PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE
RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING
VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH
THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-
8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually
stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration
granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent
residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the
following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in
Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as
their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres
Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a
house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled
that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It
cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical
presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s
Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their
elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least,
petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner
failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly
considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s
observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and
respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at
the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of
death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the
documents presented by petitioner pertained not toresidence at the time of death, as required
by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and
"residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.17
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the place where
he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found
mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place
different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and
business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of
where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and
peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in
ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of
Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and
the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate
was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that,
contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents’ physical
presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was
more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual
findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be
held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2, 18 on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings.
He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for
the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only
refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the
properties are kept and where most of the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982
NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON,
respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.
Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Boloricon for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to annul an order of the respondent judge of the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan
del Sur directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos
seized under the questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding in
Civil Case No. 65.
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it "Claim
Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this
complaint, including an allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the
above-named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and considering
that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order
commanding the provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of
petitioner Nicanor Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3)
carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the late Isabelo
Nacar.
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to order the
return of the carabaos. Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while
intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of
the attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to the Supreme
Court.
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were
enjoined from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. The
judge was restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.
We find the petition meritorious.
The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the municipal court read as
follows:
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,
FOR:
— Versus —
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO
NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x ---------------------------
------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court,
respectfully avers:
xxx xxx xxx
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred
indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long
been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have (sic) not
been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other
things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the
possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar;
That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to
recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;
That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned
property with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;
 That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary
attachment in an amount to be fixed by the Court, not exceeding the sum of P
2,791.00 which is the plaintiff's claim herein;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case, a
writ of preliminary attachment be issued against the properties of the defendant
to serve as security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered herein; and that after due hearing on the principal against the
defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00 with legal interest from September 15, 1970
plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a
cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged
to have been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore,
no cause of action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no jurisdiction
to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts or
inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased persons. The
proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in the court of first
instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming without admitting that
the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent that he committed a very
grave abuse of discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules of
Court and decisions of this honorable Court when he issued an ex-parte writ of
preliminary attachment, when there is no showing that the plaintiff therein has a
sufficient cause of action, that there is no other security for the claim sought to be
enforced by the plaintiff; or that the amount claimed in the action is as much as
the sum for which the order is prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There
was no bond to answer for whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer;
(Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in the motion to
dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaint styled it a claim against the estate of the
late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed that the nature of the action was really for the recovery
of an indebtedness in the amount of P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the contents of the
complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations are not only vague
and ambiguous but downright misleading. The second paragraph of the body of the complaint
states that the defendant (herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968
incurred debts to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, one
clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, who died several
months before the filing of the complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one
for the collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally unnumbered,
expressly states as a material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the
aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of action against
petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (58 SCRA 559) gives the
elements of a valid cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right
in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury
or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios,
et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-
19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand, Section 3 of
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must state the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Hence, where the complaint
states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of a cause of
action, the complaint states a cause of action; (Community Investment and
Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must
succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him,
petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that
there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the
creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the
petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the
latter as would create a cause of action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar
to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana
wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the
late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter
does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an
outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which vs. Batac Producers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et
petitioner Nacar has nothing to do. al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526, 531)

In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court when it advised
respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with his evidence and from the court's
admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for the complaint in intervention of
respondent Doloricon. Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that
the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, the
respondent court in its Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of
preliminary attachment and in order the return of the carabaos said:
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because respondent
Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were
in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the
recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner
Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):

... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party
complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful owner of the carabaos in
questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both parties
will not for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10
days from receipt hereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The plaintiff
who in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic) for the custody
of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff to put up the additional bond
of P I,000.00 after which the latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the
carabaos subject of litigation pending final termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-
19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to applicable precedents on
the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, supra:
Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in
accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of
litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of
justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity
thereof.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint
and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper.
With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural
rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in issuing the
subject writ of attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued on
January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection
therewith is ordered returned to him.

Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that: SO ORDERED.

Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made

on any of the following grounds; ...

(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...

explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested exclusively on the basis of
the complaint itself and no other should be considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is
that the complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court has ruled that:

As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a

motion to dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis
of the facts alleged therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama
Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69,
72. See also De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95 Phil. 365,
371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29,
1964, 10 SCRA 400; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo,
et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 250, 254; Acuna
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
C. Oben for appellant.
L. Joaquin for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in
the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the
distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it appears:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina
Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children
Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November,
1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been
appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said
Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and
opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the
deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th
of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to
be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula
Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that it
be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of
notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in replying to the foregoing motion of
Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged
by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a
hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she
prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and
that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court
below entered the following judgment:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and
Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde
should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of
their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she
is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the
administrator, Roman Abaya.
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and presented
the following statement of errors:
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural
children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special probate
proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the
mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the
acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuos possession of the deceased children of
Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in
these proceedings; and
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to Paula
Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having declared that said
property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not
having previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the
property to those who might fall within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the
administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought to enforce the
acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to
say, whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the
deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsorily by
reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special
proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to
be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs
of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is
entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by
the judge, under oath, and signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive
share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within
the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding section.
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimentel
vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother of a
natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural father,
also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such
child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to
be his natural father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only
foundation:
In resolving a similar question Manresa says: "An acknowledgment can only be
demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should
they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally represents them; the
mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her authority." On this point
no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not considered
necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be followed.
Elsewhere the same author adds: "It may so happen that the child dies before four years
have expired after attaining majority, or that the document supporting his petition for
acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring after his
parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such
right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment
may interest." (See Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code, Vol. I.)
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks
legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to
his descendants can not be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive, limiting in
form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death of the
presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the
present time no argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could
be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children,
granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws, they were not,
however, placed upon the same place as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two
classes of children is still great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family
and the succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be laid down as legal maxim, that
whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must
still less be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their rights.
There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child, the
acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family
of the father or the mother who recognized him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the
family, relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with
other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, nothing is more logical than to establish a
comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its
lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to
institute the action.
The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not lapsed
before then.
ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which case the latter may
institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its maturity.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the discovery of
such instrument.
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in
that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can
always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of
action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general
rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be
exercised only during the life of the presumed parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents
of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation, there exists the
most radical difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be
legitimate, and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or
indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as
a general rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference,
derived as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the
presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for acknowledgment is not
brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception of the two cases prescribed by article
137 transcribed above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to
acknowledge the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim his legitimacy, or to
obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the first case,
but not in the second. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the
purpose claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the
transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of
action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted
to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the
acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the
reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of action to
secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted,
independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his
predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the
legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the right
of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted
to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension,
nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the
greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs
of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a matter of
fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, no even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life,
while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole
life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action
to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but
depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the
latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an
exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died
during his minority, or while insane, or after action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against
the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during
the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was
unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It can not
be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said action
should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child, whether he
had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides it as follows:
There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed
admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child is transmitted by the analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is
transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article
118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a
natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare
them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for
decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the
said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as we have said, there is no
provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that
prohibits it. (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the supreme
court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants
them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the
transmission of said right for the space of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child die
during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article 137 is based on the
consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the
eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the
action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in said
article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the heirs,
inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed on
general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason
that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is
not, nor it can be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a wide difference
between the advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one.
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Código Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a natural
child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation
to acknowledge"? And says:
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right
of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his patrimony is
transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it
 were correct the same thing would happen as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle
and as already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the and without exception, extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of the
heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under certain limitations and inheritance of the deceased child.
circumstances. Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result
would be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part of the child's inheritance, it would be
filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived that the legislator should necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the
have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child, which is only granted under presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited
great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist by certain circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a natural child with a legitimate one to place
that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural child are the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate child
entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by the article 118. The majority, however, are would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations, most absurd and
inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right, and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof.
consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are no legal grounds to warrant
the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts,
without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for the
purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which
article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one
case and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of law should be the same when
the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.

The theory of law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in the
Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his
lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea
that if the inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were,
however, certain things which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to
accept the inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to
the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to the article 659
of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person,
which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural child, and the
latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action of his
acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the latter, if after his death in some of the
excepting cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his
mother as being his heir, and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the
right in question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his
death, but a any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right of supposed
transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.

The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of
the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to
claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by
inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so,
there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the
terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of
the child's inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118
shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal
and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would
and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 56700 March 28, 1983
WARLITO MABALOT and ARACELI MABALOT, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE TOMAS P. MADELA, JR., in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and PEDRO V. MALIT, respondents.
Efren A. Santo for petitioners.
Pedro V. Malit in his own behalf.
VASQUEZ, J.:
This is an unlawful detainer case originally commenced in the City of Manila by private respondent
to eject the petitioners from an apartment located at No. 2262 Coral Street, San Andres, Manila.
The decision of said court, which was in favor of the petitioners, was appealed by the private
respondent to the Court of First Instance of Manila where it was assigned to the branch presided
over by respondent Judge Tomas P. Madela, Jr. A decision rendered on January 6, 1981 by
Judge Madela reversed the decision of the City Court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the
premises in question.
The petitioners took a direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila on
the legal question raised by them with respect to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of
Manila and the Court of First Instance of Manila to take cognizance of the basic action.
The facts of this case, as synthesized in the decision of Judge Madela and which are impliedly
admitted by the petitioners in taking this direct appeal to this Court on a pure question of law, are
as follows:
From the records and evidence of the case, plaintiff appellant as owner of an
apartment No. 2262 located at Coral Street, San Andres, Manila leased it to Atty.
Armando Galvez on a monthly basis of P200.00 a month since 1967. Staying
with him in said apartment is defendant Araceli Mabalot and a maid the former
claiming to be a ward of Atty. Galvez since she was 10 years old when her
mother died and her father could not support her (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Dec. 6, 1979). In
1970 Araceli Mabalot married defendant Warlito Mabalot and continued to stay
with Atty. Galvez until his death on August 23, 1977. After the death of Atty.
Armando Galvez, the arrearages for the monthly rentals of July and August were
paid by Atty. Fernando Galvez, a brother of the late Atty. Armando Galvez and
for the month of September 1977, Atty. Fernando Galvez issued a check (pay to
cash) which he gave to the defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiff-appellant.
However, the corresponding receipts were issued by plaintiff in the name of Atty.
Fernando Galvez.
As early as September 1, 1977, in his letter to Atty. Fernando Galvez, the
plaintiff-appellant intimated that with the death of his brother, Araceli Mabalot and
husband cannot take over the apartment as the contract of lease between him
and Atty. Armando Galvez is a personal one and could not be transmitted to
them (Exh. "A"). On September 5, 1977, plaintiff wrote the defendants that they
could not take over the apartment as it could not be the subject of inheritance
and gave them three (3) months to vacate the same (Exhibit "B"). However,
defendants refused to receive said letter, as plaintiff with the help of patrolman
Tomas Soriaga served it the following morning with the policeman as a witness
(Exh. "B-1").
Araceli Mabalot admitted that the late Armando Galvez has his own family, a wife
and children namely, Cynthia, Rosalinda, Danilo, Jocelyn and Olivia who were
mentioned in his application for insurance as his legitimate children with Araceli
mentioned as a niece (t.s.n. p. 16, Oct. 25, 1977). The succeeding payments of
the rentals were paid by defendants- appellees' counsel, Atty. Efren Santos.
The question to be resolved is, whether or not the defendants, Warlito and
Araceli Mabalot have the right to continue as tenants of the plaintiff from the
death of Atty. Armando Galvez. (Annex "A", Petitioners' Brief, p. 72, Rello.)
As may be noted from the definition of the issue by Judge Madela, the question which was raised
and argued by the parties in the lower courts was the right of the petitioners to succeed to the
lease over the subject apartment previously existing between Armando Galvez and the private
respondent. Apparently convinced of the correctness of the holding of Judge Madela that they
may not continue said lease inasmuch as the petitioners are not heirs of Armando Galvez (Art.
1311, Civil Code), nor was such lease assigned by Armando Galvez to the petitioners with the
consent of private respondent (Art. 1649, Ibid), the petitioners now rely on the alleged legal
infirmity of the proceedings had in the lower courts by attacking their jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.
It is the petitioners' main contention that the City Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action
filed by the private respondent inasmuch as it is not an action for unlawful detainer, but one the
subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation falling within the original jurisdiction of
the court of first instance pursuant to Section 44(a) of the former Judiciary Act. Petitioners argue
that an action for unlawful detainer must be filed within one year after the unlawful deprivation of
the possession of the subject property by the defendant. They contend that this requirement does
not exist in this case inasmuch as petitioner Araceli Mabalot was admittedly staying in the
apartment together with Armando Galvez since 1966, and the action to eject her was filed only on
January 8, 1978. They further point out that in paragraph 7 of the complaint, the private
respondent had expressly alleged that he denied the request of the petitioners to continue the
lease of Armando Galvez on the ground "that a lease contract is personal in nature and cannot be
the subject of inheritance." By this allegation, so the petitioners contend, the basic issue becomes SO ORDERED.
a determination of whether or not a lease contract may be the subject of inheritance, thereby
making the action as one of the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation.

Petitioners' submissions are typical examples of the arguments advanced by defendants in

ejectment cases in their attempt to prolong their occupancy of premises over which they ceased to
have valid ground to possess, by keeping alive the litigation involving their ejectment therefrom.
The records of our courts will reveal that a considerable percentage of the cases pending in them
are actions for forcible entry and detainer. Ordained by law to be commenced in the courts at the
municipal or city level, they pass thru all the other grades of courts in the judicial system up to the
Highest Court of the land. It is ironic that a forcible entry or detainer case which is intended to be
disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to
terminate. It has become a truism that, if a landlord would like to eject a tenant in the shortest
possible time, the worst thing that he could do is to file an ejectment case. It is, indeed, about time
that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of
court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatment in all the
courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and
energy which could otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations.

The time limitation of one year within which to file an action for forcible entry and detainer is
reckoned not from the moment of occupancy by the defendant, but from the time that his
possession becomes unlawful. The occupancy of the apartment by Araceli Mabalot in 1966 was
not unlawful because she was then a member of the household of Armando Galvez who was the
lessee of the premises in question. The possession of the petitioners became unlawful only after
Armando Galvez died, which was on August 23, 1977. Such death of Armando Galvez terminated
the lease in his favor. Petitioners do not have any colorable right to occupy the apartment
thereafter. The filing of the case on January 8, 1978 was well within one year period from August
23, 1977.

There is less merit in the contention that the action filed by the private respondent is one in which
the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation just because it involves the legal question
as to the right of the petitioners to continue the lease by reason of inheritance. Such legal issue is
purely incidental to the question of whether they are entitled to possess the apartment in question.
The action is for the recovery of the possession of real property brought within one year from the
time the possession of the defendant became unlawful, technically known as an action for
unlawful detainer. Although it is a real action which should ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of
the court of first instance (now the regional trial court), the law vests the exclusive original
jurisdiction over it in the courts at the municipal or city level as an exception to the general rule on
jurisdiction over real actions, presumably in view of the summary nature of the proceedings
contemplated to be taken therein. This kind of action is different and distinct from the class of
actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action does not
become one where the subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation by the mere fact that an issue
of law is raised therein. Such a view would result in converting virtually all civil actions into that
category, and in depriving the municipal and city trial courts of jurisdiction over all civil cases
where a party raises a question of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14127 August 21, 1962
ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-14128 August 21, 1962
LEON C. VIARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PILAR BELMONTE, PATRICIA DRIZ, JOAQUINA DRIZ, ISIDORO MERCADO,
TRINIDAD ISIDRO, ZACARIAS BELMONTE, TERESITA FLORES,
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK,defendants-appellees.
No. L-14127:
Agustin C. Bagasao for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel A. Concordia for defendants-appellants.
No. L-14128:
Manuel A. Concordia for plaintiff-appellant.
E. A. Bello, M. Y. Macias and A. A. Reyes for defendant-appellee Philippine American General
Insurance Company, Inc.
Cecilio F. Wycoco for defendants-appellees Pilar Belmonte and Teresita Flores.
Carlos M. Ferrer for defendants-appellees Patricia Driz, et al.
PADILLA, J.:
In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled Leon C. Viardo vs.
Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, a writ of execution was issued and levy was made "upon all
the rights, interest and participation which the spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or
might have" in a parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 of the Registrar of
Deeds in and for the province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A, p.3). This certificate of title covers a
parcel of land (Lot No. 1, Psu-14371) in the barrios of Nieves and Santo Rosario, municipality of
Zaragoza, province of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 1,192,775 square meters, more or less.
The land is registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte, Felisa Belmonte, Pilar Belmonte and
Ines de Guzman, subject . . . to the condition that ¼ share [that] belongs to Ines de Guzman is
usufructuary "correspondiendo la nuda propiedad a sus tres hijas arriba citadas en participaciones
iguales quienes se consolidara el dominio despues del fallecimiento de su madre' " (Exhibit A, p.
2).
On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above mentioned, the provincial sheriff of
Nueva Ecija sold at public auction one-half (½) of the following property:
TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZARAGOZA, PROVINCE OF
NUEVA ECIJA AND COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 OF THE
LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA ECIJA.
A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto. Rosario, municipality of
Zaragoza, Province of Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the North by property of Felisa
Belmonte; on the East by Sapang Dalagot; on the Southeast by Ines de Guzman; on the
South by the property of Felisa Belmonte; and on then West by the property of Cirilo
Acosta; containing an area of THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more or less. Declared under tax
No. 11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an assessed value of P8,400.00.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor, Leon C. Viardo, who paid
P2,125.64 for the interest sold and P83.15 for the land tax corresponding to such interest (Exhibit
B). When the judgment debtors failed to redeem the property within the statutory period of one
year from the date of sale (21 February 1941), the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on 12
May 1943 a Final Bill of Sale of the property described in Exhibit B in favor of Leon C. Viardo
(Exhibit C). On 3 May 1943 a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was issued to Leon C.
Viardo (Exhibit A, p. 3).
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case No.
918, G.L.R.O. Record No. 17910, acting upon a verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the
Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija —
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue another in lieu thereof in the
name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE ¼ share; FELISA
BELMONTE, ¼ share; PILAR BELMONTE, ¹/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, ¹/8 share; and
INES DE GUZMAN, ¼ share, upon the payment of the corresponding fees (Exhibit D).
However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 (Exhibit A) that the above-
mentioned order was not carried out and that said original certificate of title was not cancelled.
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija a complaint against Leon C. Viardo (civil case No. 161) praying that judgment be rendered
against the defendant:
(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question in favor of plaintiffs herein
upon payment by the latter of the lawful redemption price in accordance with law, or the
sum of P2,125.64 with interest at the rate of one per centum (1%) per month for twelve
(12) months from February 27, 1941 to February 27, 1942. (Exhibit E.)
On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for the plaintiffs Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte,
requested the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for —
the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija,
affecting the undivided one-half (½) portion of the property of the plaintiffs in the above-
entitled cause, situated in the Sitio of Valdez, Barrio of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of
Zaragoza, which is involved in the said controversy against the defendant LEON C.
VIARDO, and which is more particularly described under paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs'
complaint a copy of which is hereby presented, hereunto attached. (Exhibit F.)
On 6 June 1946 the Registrar of Deeds made the following annotation on the back of original
certificate of title No. 3484:
Entry No. 3347/0-3484: Kind — Lis Pendens — Executed in favor of Bartolome Driz and
Pilar Belmonte; Conditions — Al the rights, interests, and participation of Leon C. Viardo
in this title is the subject of a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16 of the C.F.I. of N.E. now
pending for action. Date of the instrument — June 4, 1946; Date of the inscription — June
6, 1946 at 3:18 (?) p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Cuizon, Acting Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 3.)
While the above-mentioned case was pending in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Pilar
Belmonte, one of the plaintiffs, entered into the following contracts involving her interest or rights
over the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484:
(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Isidro M. Mercado & Trinidad
Isidro; Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of Seven and One-Half (7-½) hectares of
the property described in this title for the sum of P5,500.00 (D-126: P-90: B-11: S-1948,
Herminio E. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. — June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind — Sale with right of repurchase: Executed in favor of —
Federico Aquino; Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold with a right of repurchase seven and
one-half (7-½) hectares of her share, interest and participation in this title for the sum of
P3,600.00 (D-127: P-90: B-11: S-48. H. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. — June 28, 1948;
Date of the Inscription — June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 15110/0-3484: Kind — Resale: Executed in favor of — Pilar Belmonte;
Conditions — Federico Aquino resold his share in this title consisting of 7-½ Has. for the
sum of P3,600.00 (D-63: P-15: B-6: S-1949, Jose E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst.
— March 8, 1958: Date of the Inscription — April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 15111/0-3484: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Dominador Asuncion
and Tomasita Dansil: Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of seven (7) Has. of her share and
participation in this title for the sum of P7,000.00. (D-64: P-15: B-6: S-1949, J. E.
Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 9, 1949; Date of the Inscription — April 8,
1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 4)
On 11 April 1950 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment in civil case No.
161, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court absolves the defendant from the complaint of the
plaintiffs, in the same manner that plaintiffs are absolved from the counter complaint of the
defendant. Defendant is the legal owner of the land in question and the right of redemption of the
plaintiff of said land had already elapsed. With costs to the plaintiff. (Exhibit G.)
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo
appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the following transactions
involving the interest or rights of Pilar Belmonte over the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 took place:
(1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind — Partition: Executed in favor of — Felisa Belmonte,
et al.; Conditions — By virtue of a deed of partition, the share of the deceased Ines de
Guzman and Isidro Belmonte has been adjudicated in favor of the heirs of said deceased.
(D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 31,
1948: Date of the Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind — Agreement: Executed in favor of — Felisa
Belmonte, et al; Conditions — By virtue of an agreement of the parties concerned in the
partition, Lots Nos. 1-D and 1-J, with an area of 300,000 sq. m. and 80,000 sq.m., more
or less, respectively in the subdivision plan Psd-36340, a portion of lot 1 described on
plan Psu-14371, of this title, have been adjudicated in favor of Felisa Belmonte and Lot 1-
G with an area of 75,000 sq.m., more or less, of the same subdivision, has been
adjudicated in favor of Isidoro Mercado, See TCT No. 15162 and 15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-
211: P-44: B-IV: S-1952, P. Bautista, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Jan. 22, 1952: Date of
the Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Sp. Zacarias
Belmonte and Teresita Flores; Conditions — Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil
sold all their rights and interest in this title consisting of seven hectares for the sum of
P6,000.00. (D-177: P-37: B-IV: S-1952; R. S. Pengson, N.E.) Date of the Inst. — Feb. 4,
1952; Date of Inscription — May 13, 1954 at 10:08 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind — Project of Partition — Executed in favor of Pilar
Belmonte; Conditions — By virtue of a project of partition re-estate of the late Ines de
Guzman, a portion of 13.2775 hectares of the land described in this title has been
adjudicated in favor of Pilar Belmonte. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castañeda,
Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription — Aug. 23, 1954 at
2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.1äwphï1.ñët
 (5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Joaquin Driz:
Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of the subdivision plan of this title Psd-36340 a
portion taken from her undivided 13.2775 hectares with an area of 52,775 sq.m., more or
less, for the sum of P800.00. See TCT NT-16440, Vol. No. 83. (D-160: P-33: B-I: S-1954,
Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Aug. 23, 1954; Date of the Inscription —
Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Patricia Driz:
Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36340 being a
portion of Lot 1 described in plan Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 17910, of this
title for the sum of P1,000.00 with an area of 80,000 sq.m., with respect to her share of
13.2775 hectares. See TCT No. NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-440: P-90: B-V: S-1954, H. V.
Garcia, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Aug. 31, 1954: Date of the Inscription — Sept. 2,
1954 at 8:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Patricia Driz:
Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos. 1-H and 1-I of the subdivision plan Psd-
30340 of the property described in this title for the sum of P850.00. See TCT No. NT-
16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst.
— Sept. 9, 1954; Date of the Inscription — Sept. 9, 1954 at 11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind — Sale; Executed favor of — Patricia Driz;
Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the
property described in this title, with an area of 79,848 sq.m., more or less the subdivision
plan of this title, was sold for the sum of P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-16546, Vol. 83. (D-
172: P-36: BS-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Sept. 11, 1954; Date
of the Inscription — Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20 am. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)
On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last transactions mentioned above, the Court of
Appeals passed a resolution granting the prayer of defendant-appellant Leon C. Viardo that the
children and only heirs, namely, Artemio, Patricia, Mario, Domingo, Joaquina and Catalina,
surnamed Driz, who were all of age, be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz (the
husband of Pilar Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).
On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding damages prayed for in
the counterclaim of Leon V. Viardo. The judgment made the following findings and conclusions:
. . . The area of the contested property is 15 hectares. By computation, this is capable of
producing 750 cavans of palay a year. On the basis of 70-30, defendant is entitled to 225
cavans of palay a year. Therefore, plaintiffs are under obligation to deliver to defendant
this quantity of palay every agricultural year from the filing of defendant's answer on
August 5, 1946, up to the time he vacates said land, or pay the equivalent value thereof at
P12.00 a cavan.
Having been declared owner of the land in dispute, defendant is entitled to its possession.
Inasmuch as the court below did not order plaintiffs to restore the possession of the land
in question, we hereby order them to vacate the same and restore possession thereof to
defendant. (Exhibit H.)
This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and the records were
remanded to the lower court. On 16 December 1954 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). The return made by Chief of Police of the Municipality of
Zaragoza on 14 February 1955 states that Leon C. Viardo had been placed in possession of the
parcel of land referred to in the writ and that levy was made on a total of 86 cavans and 74 kilos of
palay, and that the same were deposited in a warehouse (Exhibit X).
On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a third party claim with the Provincial Sheriff
of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit Y). The affidavit attached to the claim states that Isidoro M. Mercado and
his wife purchased from Pilar Belmonte on 28 June 1948 seven and one-half hectares of her
undivided share in the land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, that on the same day
the deed of sale was registered, that a transfer certificate of title was issued in their names, and
that since 1948 up to the time of the levy on execution he had been in actual possession of the
parcel of land, paying the corresponding taxes thereon and had exclusively benefited from the
harvests therein, (Exhibit Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the levy on the
harvest in the parcel of land they were claiming.
On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a
complaint docketed as civil case No. 1718, against Leon C. Viardo and the Provincial Sheriff. The
complaint alleged that improper levy had been made on the harvest in plaintiff's parcel of land and
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to return the palay levied upon,
together with damages. On 26 February 1955 the defendants answered that plaintiffs' purchase of
the parcel of land in question from Pilar Belmonte was subject to whatever judgment the courts
might render in civil case No. 161 between Pilar Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October
1955 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order suspending the trial of the case,
in view of the information by counsel for the defendant that his client Leon C. Viardo would file a
complaint against all persons claiming ownership of or interest in the parcel of land covered by
original certificate of title No. 3484 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by Leon V. Viardo against Pilar Belmonte,
Patricia Driz, Joaquina Driz, Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro, Zacarias Belmonte, Teresita Flores,
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. and the Philippine National Bank, as parties
claiming some right, participation, share or interest in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates of title derived therefrom. The defendants filed
their answers. After trial,1 on 24 August 1956 the trial court rendered judgment in civil cases Nos.
1718 and 2004, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil Case 2004, Leon C. Viardo,
Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Patricia Driz are hereby declared CO-
OWNERS PRO-INDIVISO of lots 1-A PSD-16864, which is the ¼ share of Pilar Belmonte
in Lot 1, PSU 14371, OCT No. 3484 in the following proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON C.
VIARDO; 7½ hectares for Isidoro M. Mercado; 7 hectares for Zacarias Belmonte, and the
remainder for Patricia Driz, it being understood that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia
 Driz in the partition shall be subject to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine National
Bank; the deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of Patricia Driz, Exhibits R
and S are declared NULL AND VOID; the deeds of partition Exhibits L and N, are set
aside, and the certificates of title issued in favor of Zacarias Belmonte, Isidoro M.
Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P, Q, R-1 and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And in civil
case 1718 Isidoro M. Mercado is hereby declared to be entitled to the products which had
been levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff. No damages are awarded. The parties in civil
case 2004 shall come to an amicable settlement with respect to the partition. Upon their
failure to arrive at an amicable settlement, commissioner shall be appointed by this Court
in accordance with a law to make the partition.
With costs against the defendants in both cases.
Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and defendant in civil case No. 1718, appealed
to the Court of Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter certified and forwarded the appeals to this
Court because the facts are not in dispute and "the questions raised by appellant in his brief are
purely legal in nature."
In his first assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in not annulling the
sale executed by Pilar Belmonte to Isidoro M. Mercado, marked as Exhibit I, and to Dominador
Asuncion and Teresita Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale by Dominador Asuncion to Zacarias
Belmonte and Teresita Flores in a Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M." In support thereof he argues
that the three sales took place and were registered after he had become the absolute owner of an
undivided one-half interest in the parcel of land owned by Pilar Belmonte and after notice of lis
pendens had been recorded on the title of Pilar Belmonte.
The argument is without merit. It is true that the appellant became the absolute owner of an
undivided one-half interest in the undivided one-fourth interest owned by Pilar Belmonte in the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484; that before Pilar Belmonte sold
parts of her undivided share in the parcel of land to Isidoro M. Mercado and Dominador Asuncion
and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias Belmonte, there was notice of lis pendens recorded on
the certificate of title; and that this notice is binding upon all who should acquire an interest in the
property subsequent to the record of the lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens (Exhibit A),
however, was limited to one-half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar Belmonte. The
other one-half undivided interest of the latter was not in litigation and therefore the trial court
correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this undivided one-half interest, had a right to
sell it and could convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. Of course, the deeds of sale
executed by Pilar Belmonte appears to convey definite or segregated parts of her remaining
interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which she could not
do, because this one-fourth in interest had not yet been subdivided to show the interest acquired
by Leon C. Viardo, amounting to one-half of the said one-fourth interest. This defect, however,
does not result in the nullity of the deeds of sale she had executed relating to her remaining
interest of one-eighth. The sales were valid, subject only to the condition that the interests
acquired by the vendees were limited to the parts which might be assigned to them in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership (Article 493, Civil Code).
In the second assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in not annulling
the sales executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her daughters Joaquina and Patricia Driz of lots
1-B and 1-A, Exhibits U and V of Plan PSD 36340."
Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from the original one-fourth interest of Pilar
Belmonte in the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484, which interest was
levied upon and thereafter acquired by Leon C. Viardo to the extent of one-half, but from another
one-fourth interest in the same parcel of land, which belonged originally to Ines de Guzman, the
mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest subsequently devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and
her two sisters. The three sisters partitioned this one-fourth interest among themselves and lots 1-
A and 1-B were assigned to Pilar Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her daughters. These sales,
the appellant contends, are fictitious and in fraud of his rights as creditor.
The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support of this contention is that the sales were
made by the mother to her daughters. This is not enough evidence to hold the sale fictitious and
fraudulent. There is no evidence whatsoever that Pilar Belmonte, at the time she sold the lots, had
outstanding debts or was in an otherwise embarrasing financial position. Even the credit of Leon
C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only after the sales were executed, when the Court of
Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court in civil case No. 161 by awarding damages to him.
There is no merit, therefore, in the second assignment of error.
In the third assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in declaring that
the "product raised in the portion under the occupancy of Isidoro Mercado, therefore, pertains to
him and was not subject to the levy or execution in favor of Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 161."
In support of this assignment the appellant again harps on the fact that the time Isidoro Mercado
acquired an interest in the property, there was notice of lis pendens, and therefore Isidoro
Mercado "is not a purchaser in good faith."
This contention has been overruled in the first assignment of error when the notice of lis
pendens (Exhibits A and F) was held to refer not to the remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar
Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, but to the one-
eighth interest which Leon C. Viardo had acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and which the latter was
trying to recover from him in civil case No. 161. It was Pilar Belmonte who caused the notice of lis
pendens to be recorded to subject "all the rights, interests and participation of Leon C. Viardo in
this Title" to the result of the litigation in the aforesaid civil case No. 161. Pilar Belmonte did not
thereby subject her remaining one-eighth interest to the result of civil case No. 161 which she had
filed against Leon C. Viardo. If the latter wanted to subject the remaining one-eighth interest of
Pilar Belmonte to the outcome of his counterclaim in civil case No. 161, he should have asked for
it.
The view held by this Court in passing upon the third assignment of error renders it unnecessary
for the Court to discuss the respective rights and liabilities of co-owners when one co-owner,
without the knowledge and/or consent of the other co-owners, plants or builds on the property
owned in common.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred "in concluding that the heirs of Bartolome
Driz could not be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 161 and therefore Lots 1-A and 1-B cannot be subject to the payment of the judgment in
favor of Leon C. Viardo."
The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots are the
children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and
that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161,
these children were substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit. The
substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal
heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest he had in the case on
appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted
parties personally liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their
deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code provides:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor, was to
proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case
No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was
Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484,
which appears to be paraphernal property.
The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that "the trial court erred in not awarding
damages to the plaintiff Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 2004." Obviously the appellant refers to
the prayer in his complaint that P5,000 be awarded to him against Pilar Belmonte for attorney's
fees. He maintains that appellee Pilar Belmonte had disposed of all her property with the intent of
avoiding payment of her liability or debt to him.
A review of the record lends credence to the appellant's claim. Appellee Pilar Belmonte had one-
fourth interest in a parcel of land containing an area of 119.2775 hectares. On 12 May 1943 Leon
C. Viardo acquired one-half interest of Pilar Belmonte's one-fourth interest. In a partition, where
the appellant did not participate but which he does not impugn, Pilar Belmonte's original one-fourth
interest was segregated and delimited. She was assigned in that partition and subdivision, Lot 1-A
of Plan PSD-16864, containing an area of 30 hectares (Exhibit K). Upon the death of her mother,
she acquired another 13.2775 hectares. These 13.2775 hectares she sold to her two daughters
and the validity of the sales has been upheld by this Court. With the original 30 hectares, however,
Pilar Belmonte did not act in good faith when she sold more than 15 hectares to her daughter
Patricia Driz. Knowing that one-half of said 30 hectares or a total of 15 hectares belonged to the
appellant Leon C. Viardo, she nevertheless proceeded to enter into the following transactions: (1)
sale of seven and one-half hectares to Isidoro Mercado, dated 28 June 1948, Exhibit A; (2) sale of
seven hectares to Dominador Asuncion, who later sold the same parcel or interest to Zacarias
Belmonte, dated 9 March 1949, Exhibit A; (3) subdivision and partition of her lot 1-A, PSD-16864,
into lots 1-E, 1-F, 1-G, 1-H and 1-I, without the knowledge of her co-owner Leon C. Viardo, Plan
PSD-36340, Exhibit O; (4) sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lots 1-H and 1-I, Plan PSD-
36340, containing an area of 20,000 and 55,152 sq. meters, respectively, dated 9 September
1954, Exhibits R and A; and (5) sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lot 1-E; Plan PSD-
36340, containing an area of 79,848 sq. meters, dated 11 September 1954, Exhibits S and A.
It will thus be seen that on 9 March 1949, after Pilar Belmonte had sold seven hectares to
Dominador Asuncion, she had only one-half hectare left to dispose of, since out of her original
thirty hectares (Lot 1-A, PSD-16864) the appellant Leon C. Viardo had acquired one-half or fifteen
hectares, Isidoro Mercado, seven and one-half hectares, and Dominador Asuncion, seven
hectares.
Fully aware that one-half hectare remained her only property, Pilar Belmonte nevertheless
proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz three lots containing a combined area of more than
fifteen hectares. It is obvious, therefore, that the sales to Patricia Driz cannot be sustained,
regardless of whether Pilar Belmonte was aware or suspected that she would be held liable for
damages to Leon C. Viardo in civil case No. 161, as in fact she was held liable by the Court of
Appeals about two weeks after she had executed the sales in favor of her daughter. The sales
above referred to stand on a different footing from the sales made in favor of Isidoro Mercado and
Dominador Asuncion, because in the latter sales Pilar Belmonte still had something to sell,
namely, her remaining fifteen hectares. But after she had disposed of fourteen and one-half
hectares to Mercado and Asuncion she had only one-half hectare left and therefore could not sell
another fifteen hectares.
The trial court, however, did not completely annul the sales made by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her
daughter. It merely reduced the sale of fifteen hectares to a sale of one-half hectare, obviously in
the belief that the sales should be sustained to the extent of Pilar Belmonte's remaining interest.
The record shows that both Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz knew that one-half
hectare only remained as the former's property, but they nevertheless proceeded to sell and
purchase more than fifteen hectares. When it is considered further that the final judgment in civil
case No. 161 awarded damages to Leon C. Viardo amounting to 225 cavans of palay from 1946
(Exhibit H) and that when this judgment was executed in 1954 no property of Pilar Belmonte could
be found to satisfy the damages (p. 11, t.s.n.), it is evident that Pilar Belmonte and her daughter
Patricia Driz had conspired to dispose of all the property of Pilar Belmonte in order to frustrate any
award of damages the Court of Appeals might make in favor of Leon C. Viardo and that this
conspiracy must have taken place at the latest on 9 September 1954 when Pilar Belmonte
proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz parcels of land which no longer belonged to her.
The judgment appealed from is modified by holding and declaring that (1) Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro
M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Pilar Belmonte (not Patricia Driz) are the co-owners pro-
indiviso of lot 1-A, Plan PSD-16864, which is the one-fourth share of Pilar Belmonte in lot 1, PSD-
14371, original certificate of title No. 3484, in the following proportion: one-half or fifteen hectares
owned by Leon C. Viardo, seven and one-half hectares by Isidoro M. Mercado, seven hectares by
Zacarias Belmonte, and one-half hectares by Pilar Belmonte, subject to the rights of Leon C.
Viardo to the balance of his judgment credit against Pilar Belmonte; and (2) Leon C. Viardo is
awarded damages of P1,000 against Pilar Belmonte. In all other respects, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against appellees Pilar Belmonte and Patricia Driz.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA
MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO
MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO
MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-
G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et
al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
I at Biñan.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they
acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in
Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by
certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children,
namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio,
Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs
Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff
Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano
Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor
of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1")
covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No.
1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570
issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired
during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new
transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to
Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano
Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona.
Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia
Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot.
The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the
portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495
and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the
fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No.
1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house
and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-half
meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the
defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that
Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same
belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already
dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied
by them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half
of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the
other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the
defendants. "After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the defendants to
vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay actual and moral damages
and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from
August 1958 until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of
the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is
registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that the
vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out
that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the
deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention
of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed
of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496
covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to
its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781
square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants
are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of
390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a certificate
of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office
of the Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles
issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona,
married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The
defendants are ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty
(30) days after this decision shall have become final for cancellation in
accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of
Laguna for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and circumstances
duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952 from
Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already been dead six
years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil
Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not been
inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The
necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the
heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176
amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition
brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between the
surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the
concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the
death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and
becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the
widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived
therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
(Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no reason in law
why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the surviving husband for the
management and control of the community property of the marriage and conceivably such a
partnership, or rather community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband might
be formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court
held that "(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the
community property, has authority to sell the property with• ut the concurrence of the children of
the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of
bringing about a conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such
property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the property will
acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family who join in the act of
conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the vendees
constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor pointed out to them as
the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of the vendees, also built his house
within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the
back of their house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both
vendor and vendees believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was
Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so
that the deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But
actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the proceedings of
the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte
as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto,
stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25,
1961, or a period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents who are
the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12,
1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation,
possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded
and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the
property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant
from presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long
time to elapse without presenting the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil.
92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved
six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the
surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New
Civil Code is applicable and it provides a follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when at the time
of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to
the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son
of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned three
parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area
of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area
of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is
bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on
the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on
the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not
separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by
private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these
three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso
of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to
dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a
remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the
other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more
than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the
vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as
vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to
be erectd without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as
against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said
vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses,
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano
Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his
children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano
Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and
1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering
the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein
private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other part
to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well
as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their
deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations
which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil
Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private
respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq.
meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto)
and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more
than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land
surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a
new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano Moreto in
favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its entirely.

Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the eastern
portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their houses and piggery coral
stand.

The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq. meters from
Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners
covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN
SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA
BANTA, Respondents.
Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.
Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE
CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. — The legitime of the
surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the
levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting
the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five
(5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased
father. Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said
properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private respondents to satisfy the personal
judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein
petitioners.chanrobles law library
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate
consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or
partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the
consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and
severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and
executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were
levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest
bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale
which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory
action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as
Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of
the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the
case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels
of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale
3 over the properties.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion
for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of land are
co-owned by them and further informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul
the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion however, was
denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private respondents
from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned
lands are co-owned by petitioners.
On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 a Motion
to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later
denied by Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.
On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss
complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155 through an Order dated May
29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner’s pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be
served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was
later denied.
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing
Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial
sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to private
respondents the owner’s duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the
Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos.
21736-21739.
On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of the Order 5
dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous
order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons.chanrobles law library : red
Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated February
25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further said portion.chanrobles law library
ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its
decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph SO ORDERED.

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated
February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are
hereby annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203." 11

Hence, this appeal.

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private
respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot but notice
the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner
of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5
parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of
the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and
of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled
to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and
adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are
not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own
interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution
of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated
only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, LEONCIO GERVACIO BLAS and
LODA GERVACIO BLAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased
MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
defendants-appellants. MARTA GERVACIO BLAS and DR. JOSE CHIVI, defendants-
appellants.
Teofilo Sison and Nicanor Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.
De los Santos, Caluag, Pascal and Felizardo for defendants-appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos, to
secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the project of partition presented in the
proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas, had been promised
by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs,
and requesting that the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The complaint
also prays for actual damages in the amount of P50,000. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-65.) The
alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document executed by Maxima
Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to the complaint as Annex "H" and introduced at the trial
as Exhibit "A". (Ibid., pp. 258-259.) The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to
inherit certain properties enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and
Obando, Bulacan, but which properties have already been in included in the inventory of the
estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and evidently partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the
proceedings for the administration of his (Simeon Blas) estate.
Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
filed an answer with a counterclaim, and later, an amended answer and a counterclaim. The said
amended answer admits the allegations of the complaint as to her capacity as administratrix the
death of Simeon Blas on January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz begot three
children only one of whom, namely, Eulalio Blas, left legitimate descendants; that Simeon Blas
contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos on June 28, 1898. She denies for lack of
sufficient information and belief, knowledge edge of the first marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta
Cruz, the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired properties situated in Obando,
Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as capital, etc. As special defenses, she alleges that
the properties of the spouses Blas and Santos had been settled and liquidated in the project of
partition of the estate of said Simeon Blas; that pursuant to the project of partition, plaintiffs and
some defendants had already received the respective properties adjudicated to them; that the
plaintiffs and the defendants Marta Geracio and Jose Chivi are estopped from impugning the
validity of the project of partition of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning
the ownership in the properties conveyed in the project of partition to Maxima Santos as her own
exclusive property; that the testament executed by Maxima Santos is valid, the plain plaintiffs
having no right to recover any portion of Maxima Santos' estate now under administration by the
court. A counterclaim for the amount of P50,000 as damages is also included in the complaint, as
also a cross-claim against Marta Gervacio Blas and Jose Chivi.
Trial of the case was Conducted and, thereafter, the court, Hon. Gustave Victoriano, presiding,
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiff, and dismissing also the
counterclaim and cross-claim decision ,the plaintiffs filed by the defendants. From this district have
appealed to this Court.
The facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in the case may be briefly
summarized as follows: Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before
1898. They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio
Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro Gervacio Blas.
Lazaro died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely,
Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898,
and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the
time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta
Cruz was made. Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima
Santos does not appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week before his death on January 9,
1937, Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas makes
the following declarations:
I
2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, ay
nagkaroon ako at nakatipon ng mga kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari (propriedades) na
ang lahat ng lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay umaabot sa halagang ANIM NA
RAAN PITONG PU'T WALONG DAAN LIBO WALONG DAAN WALONG PUNG PISO
(678,880-00) sang-ayon sa mga halaga sa amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)
II
1. Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos mabayaran ang lahat ng aking o
aming pag-kakautang na mag-asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang ang lahat ng ito ay
kita sa loob ng matrimonio (bienes ganaciales) ay bahagi ng para sa aking asawa,
MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, sang-ayon sa batas. (Record on Appeal, pp. 250-251.)
The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:
 I A — The claim was not pushed through because they reached into an agreement
2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and acquired
wealth and properties, consisting of lands, fishponds and other kinds of properties, the
total assessed value of which reached the amount P678,880.00.
II
1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness, all these
properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal properties), constitutes the
share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas, according to the law.
At the time of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual a son-in-law of the testator, and Avelina
Pascual and others, were present. Andres Pascual had married a descendant by the first
marriage. The will was prepared by Andres Pascual, with the help of his nephew Avelino Pascual.
The testator asked Andres Pascual to prepare a document which was presented in court as
Exhibit "A", thus:
Q — Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this document?
A — Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this document (referring to Exhibit "A"),
(t.s.n., Sarmiento to, P. 24).
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was because the properties
that the testator had acquired during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated
and were not separated from those acquired during the second marriage. Pascual's testimony is
as follows:
Q — To whom do you refer with the word "they"?
A — Simeon Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When Marta Cruz died they had not
made a liquidation of their conjugal properties and so all those properties were included
all in the assets of the second marriage, and that is the reason why this document was
prepared. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, p. 36.)
The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio Gervacio, son-in-law of Simeon Blas.
Q — Please state to the Court?
A — My children were claiming from their grandfather Simeon Blas the properties left by
their grandmother Marta Cruz in the year 1936.
Q — And what happened with that claim of your children against Simeon Blas regarding
the assets or properties of the first marriage that were left after the death of Marta Cruz in
1936?
whereby the parties Simeon Blas Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio Bias, Marta Gervacio
Blas and Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that Simeon Blas and Maxima Blas will give one-
half of the estate of Simeon Blas. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).
The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit "A" reads in Tagalog,
thus:
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang, kasal kay SIMEON
BLAS, taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay
malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking
asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap ng
aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at bawa't isang bahagi ng
nabanggit na testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na
ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at
bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko naman ng aking testamento ay ipagkakaloob ko
ang kalahati (½) sa mga herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit
na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento, na ako'y makapipili o makahihirang
na kahit kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa
paggalang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama ng gagawin sa akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26
ng Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal,
Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 29-30 — Appellant's brief).
(Fdo.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
and which, translated into English, reads as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, of legal age, married to SIMEON BLAS, resident of
Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, voluntarily state:
That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed by my husband, SIMEON
BLAS, (2) and I promise on my word of honor in the presence of my husband that I will
respect and obey all and every disposition of said will (3) and furthermore, I promise in
this document that all the properties my husband and I will leave, the portion and share
corresponding to me when I make my will, I will give one-half (½) to the heirs and
legatees or the beneficiaries named in the will of my husband, (4) and that I can select or
 choose any of them, to whom I will give depending upon the respect, service and
treatment accorded to me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this 26th day of December, 1936 at San
Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 30-31, Appellant's brief).
(Sgd.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which can
serve as basis for the complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable
contract for lack of consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The court also
declared that Exhibit "A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for the
execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue vehemently
that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the
unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage, because the same were
already included in the mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas
and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same has
prescribed. This contention is correct. The descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim the
conjugal properties that she and her husband may have required during their marriage although
no liquidation of such properties and delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been made,
no action to recover said propertied having been presented in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit "A". It is
not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that
the conjugal properties of me on Blas for the reason his first marriage had not been liquidated; that
it was prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at the
instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by Maxima
Santos and one copy thereof, which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was kept by plaintiffs'
witness Andres Pascual.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust agreement and a contract in the
nature of a compromise to avoid litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is neither
a trust agreement nor a compromise a agreement. Considering that the properties of the first
marriage of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated when Simeon Blas executed his will on
December 26, 1936', and the further fact such properties where actually , and the further fact that
included as conjugal properties acquired during the second marriage, we find, as contended by
plaintiffs-appellants that the preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was ordered by Simeon Blas
evidently to prevent his heirs by his first marriage from contesting his will and demanding
liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage, and an accounting of the
fruits and proceeds thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or
retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already
the provocation been instituted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and knew the contents of the will of
her husband read and knew the contents of the will Simeon Blas — she was evidently referring to
the declaration in the will(of Simeon Blas) that his properties are conjugal properties and one-half
thereof belongs to her (Maxima Santos) as her share of the conjugal assets under the law. The
agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is to hold one-half of her said
share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the
obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last
will and testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal properties referred to are those that were
actually existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon Blas died on January 9, 1937. On June
2, 1937, an inventory of the properties left by him, all considered conjugal, was submitted by
Maxima Santos herself as administratrix of his estate. A list of said properties is found in Annex
"E", the complete inventory submitted by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, is administratrix of the
estate of her husband, dated March 10, 1939. The properties which were given to Maxima Santos
as her share in the conjugal properties are also specified in the project of partition submitted by
said Maxima Santos herself on March 14, 1939. (Record on Appeal, pp. 195-241.) Under Exhibit
"A", therefore, Maxima Santos contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of the
above indicated properties to the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas.
Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper because it is
not a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have in indicated above, it is a
compromise and at the same time a contract with a sufficient cause or consideration. It is also
contended that it deals with future inheritance. We do not think that Exhibit "A" is a contract on
future inheritance. it is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her
share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or
declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in
existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact,
Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband's estate of June 2, 1937.
The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her
husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise
contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has been decided by
the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October 8, 19154, thus:
Que si bien el art. 1271 del Codigo civil dispone que sobre la herenciafutura no se podra
celebrar otros contratos que aquellos cuyo objecto seapracticar entre vivos la division de
un caudal, conforme al articulo 1056, esta prohibicion noes aplicable al caso, porque la
obligacion que contrajoel recurr en contrato privado de otorgar testamento e instituir
heredera a su subrina de los bienes que adquirio en virtud de herencia, procedentes
desu finada consorte que le quedasen sobrantes despues de pagar las deudas, y del
ganacial que se expresa, asi como de reconocer, ademas, con alguna cosaa otros
sobrinos, se refiere a bienes conocidos y determinados existentes cuando tal compromisi
se otorgo, y no a la universalidad de una herencia que, sequn el art. 659 del citado
Codigo civil, as determina a muerte, constituyendola todos los bienes, derechos y
obligaciones que por ella no sehayan extinguido: ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of 32. Pangjolo, Obando 3.5857 "
the Civil Code is "future inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in
existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future 34. Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga 11.9515 "
acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined 35. Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga 30.2059 "
properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as
38. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 215.4325 "
belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in
the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in 39. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 8.3763 "
existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed. 40. Bangkal, Sinubli 23.0730 "
41. Tagulod, 6.8692 "
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar are concluded by the judgement
rendered in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason that the 44. Bangkal Pugad (a) 34.2779 "
properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife Maxima Santos; that the project of partition (b) 51.7919 "
in the said case, adjudicating to Maxima Santos one-half as her share in the conjugal properties,
is a bar to another action on the same subject matter, Maxima Santos having become absolute (c) 2.5202 "
owner of the said properties adjudicated in her favor. As already adverted to above, these 45. Magtapat Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga (a) 18.0024 "
contentions would be correct if applied to the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants that said properties
(b) 7.3265 "
were acquired with the first wife of Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz. But the main ground upon which
plaintiffs base their present action is the document Exhibit "A", already fully considered above. As (c) 53.5180 "
this private document contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey in her 46. Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga 159.0078 "
testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties she would receive as her share in
the conjugal properties, the action to enforce the said promise did not arise until and after her 47. Emigdio Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga 34.5229 "
death when it was found that she did not comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, 48. Propios, Lubao, Pampanga 80.5382 "
old Civil Code.) The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to oppose the
49. Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga 43.3350 "
project of partition in the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of the
project which assigned to Maxima Santos one-half of all the conjugal properties bars their present 50. Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan,
action, is, therefore, devoid of merit. It may be added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the Pampanga 3.5069 "
validity of the project of partition precisely because of the promise made by Maxima Santos in the 51. Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga 56,8242 "
compromise Exhibit "A"; they acquised in the approval of said project of partition because they
were relying on the promise made by Maxima Santos in Exhibit "A", that she would transmit one- 52. Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga 5.0130 "
half of the conjugal properties that she was going to receive as her share in the conjugal 53. Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.8935 "
partnership upon her death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
54. Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan, Pampanga (a) 5.2972 "
Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in favor of the defendants. The right of action (b) 5.9230 "
arose at the time of the death of Maxima Santos on October 5,1956, when she failed to comply (c) 1.4638 "
with the promise made by her in Exhibit "A". The plaintiffs-appellants immediately presented this
(d) 1.4638 "
action on December 27, 1956, upon learning of such failure on the part of Maxima Santos to
comply with said promise. This defense is, therefore, also without merit. (e) 2.8316 "
(f) 10.4412 "
It is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima Santos complied with her above-
(g) 3.9033 "
mentioned promise, — that Andres Pascual, Tomasa Avelino, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin and
Marta Gervacio Blas were given substancial legacies in the will and testament of Maxima Santos. (h) 11.9263 "
To determine whether she had actually complied with the promise made in Exhibit "A", there is (i) 6.0574 "
herein set forth a list only of the fishponds and their respective areas as contained in the list of
properties she acquired as her share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes, besides 55. Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.3989 "
many ricelands as well as residential lots, thus: 62. Alaminos, Pangasinan 147.1242 "
80. Mangasu Sexmoan, Pampanga 10.000 "
31. Paco, Obando, Bulacan 5.8396 has.
81. Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga 21.6435 "
 82. Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga 16.0000 "
Total area ............................... 1045.7863 "
(See Record on Record, pp. 195-
241.)

In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the 80-hectare fishpond situated in
Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond devised is evidently that designated as "Propios" in Lubao,
Pampanga, item No. 8 in the list of properties adjudicated to her in the project of partition. (Record
on Appeal, p. 215.) Considering that the total area of the fishponds amount to 1045.7863
hectares, the 80 hectares devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not even one-tenth of the total area of
the fishponds. Add to this the fact that in the will she imposed upon Marta Gervacio Blas de Chivi
an existing obligation on said fishponds, namely, its lease in 1957 and the duty to pay out of the
rentals thereof an obligation to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation RFC (Ibid., pp. 262-263.)
Angelina Blas was given only a lot of 150 square meters in Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and
Leony Blas, the sum of P300.00 (Ibid., p. 264.)

It is evident from a consideration of the above figures and facts that Maxima Santos did not
comply with her obligation to devise one-half of her conjugal properties to the heirs and legatees
of her husband. She does not state that she had complied with such obligation in her will. If she
intended to comply therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the properties mentioned
above, the most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct the value of said properties from
the total amount of properties which she had undertaken to convey upon her death.

All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their respective briefs, have now been fully
discussed and considered. Reiterating what we have stated above, we declare that by Exhibit "A",
a compromise to avoid litigation, Maxima Santos promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of
her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the conjugal
partnership of herself and her husband, which share is specified in the project of partition
submitted by herself on March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her husband, and which
is found on pages 195 to 240 of the record on appeal and on pages 27 to 46 of the project of
partition, submitted by Maxima Santos herself before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil
Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de
Bias, Administradora"; and that she failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation. (Exhibit
"A")

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee,
administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the
properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case
No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all
said heirs and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit
Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not appeared in these proceedings, the record is hereby
remanded to the court below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the properties
hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file
adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every one of them in said
properties. Costs against the defendant- appellee Rosalina Santos.
 Republic of the Philippines (a) Regular support and educational expenses;
SUPREME COURT
Manila (b) Allowance to use his surname;

FIRST DIVISION (c) Payment of maternal bills;

(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996 (e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family
rejoicing;
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON,
ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN (f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.

7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional
Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private
respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their
mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr.
and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and
natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them,
with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as
above outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this
relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and 1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz
September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private Fabian;
respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.;
that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs 2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased
father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, xxx xxx xxx
to wit:
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family
friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to 5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate
the following: daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
 6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the
estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of
P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.3
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive
Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in
the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground
that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by
herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit
in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was
denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:
A August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY
TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY
PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION.
C (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS
NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION
AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE
CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE
STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT
THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST
MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT
OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under
Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the
manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of
his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on
the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to
Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory
recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent
without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173
[during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent
and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death
of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the
new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the
action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to
the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the
application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private
respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. "The
Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts
to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide
the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future."5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim
for Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child
brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also
on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to
rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to
final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right
can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been
vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct
in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that
private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent
Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed
prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not
by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect
insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private
respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to
her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this,
the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it
was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then
still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the
Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the
complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known
as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil
cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,
1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T.
SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD,
EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct orders of a probate court
nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively passing upon title to the properties subject of
such deeds? Is a compromise agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the
approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?
The Case
These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for review
on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled the decision3 of the trial court4 and which declared the
compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court's
approval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the instant
petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the subsequent
orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on October 14, 1992 is made
PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated October 30, 1969 as modified
by the memorandum of agreement of April 13, 1970 is DECLARED valid and
binding upon herein parties. And Special Proceedings No. 44-M and 1022 are
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. 5 petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S.
Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of
[herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed
Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967,
[herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a
petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate
of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility (Annex
"B", Petition).
On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as administratrix of
the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of the
real and personal estate of her late mother (Annex "C", Petition).
Before the administration proceedings Special in Proceedings No. 44-M could
formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private respondent]
Rosalia's father, died on October 21, 1968.
On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a
petition for letters of administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the
intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by (herein
private respondent) Rosalia.6
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein
petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise
agreement (Annex "D", Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties
enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court], and
took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate.
On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require administratrix,
[herein private respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to
set aside compromise agreement (Annex "E", Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein
modified the compromise agreement (Annex "F". Petition)
On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru counsel, a
motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory
and to render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise
agreement (Annex "G", Petition). They likewise filed a motion to defer the
approval of the compromise agreement (Annex "H", Ibid), in which they prayed
for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.
On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to
withdraw his appearance and the two motions he flied, Annex "G" and "H"
(Annex "I", Petition).
On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein private
respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her
administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof, which prompted [herein
private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex "K",
Petition).
On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to change
administratrix (Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia
filed an opposition (Annex "M", Ibid).
The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position
papers, which they did (Annexes "N" and "O", Petition). On September 14, 1989,
former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his re-appearance as counsel for
(herein petitioners).
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this time
presided by Judge Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June 26,
1991, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows by declaring and ordering:
1. That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez
under Special Proceedings No. 44-M consists of all her
paraphernal properties and one-half (1/2) of the conjugal
properties which must be divided equally between Rosalia
Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;
2. That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under
Special Proceedings No. 1022 consists of all his capital
properties, one-half (1/2) from the conjugal partnership of gains
and one-half (1/2) of the intestate estate of Maria Villafranca
under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;
3. That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C.
Sanchez shall be inherited by his only legitimate daughter,
Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod while the other one-half (1/2)
shall be inherited and be divided equally by, between and
among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely: Patricia Alburo,
Maria Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida
Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez;
4. That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez
Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod
on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967 are all declared simulated
and fictitious and must be subject to collation and partition
among all heirs;
5. That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision,
Rosalia Sanchez Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a project
of partition of the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under
Special Proceedings No. 1022 and distribute and deliver to all
heirs their corresponding shares. If she fails to do so within the
said thirty (30) days, then a Board of Commissioners is hereby
constituted, who are all entitled to honorarium and per diems
and other necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to be
paid by Administratrix Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) of Gingoog City as members thereof, with the task to
prepare the project of partition and deliver to all heirs their
respective shares within ninety (90) days from the finality of said
decision;
6. That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision,
Administratrix Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby
ordered to submit two (2) separate certified true and correct
accounting, one for the income of all the properties of the entire
intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings
No. 44-M, and another for the properties of the entire intestate
estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022
duly both signed by her and both verified by a Certified Public
Accountant and distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate
brothers and sisters in equal shares, one-half (1/2) of the net
income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968
up to the finality of this decision;
7. For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give
cash advances to the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez
during their minority and hour of need from the net income of
the estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which adversely prejudiced their
social standing and pursuit of college education, (the trial court)
 hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod to pay her six
(6) illegitimate brothers and sisters the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages, and
also the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00)
Pesos for attorney's fees;
8. Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should
appeal be made, the Register of Deeds and Assessors of the
Provinces and Cities where the properties of Juan C. Sanchez
and Maria Villafranca are located, are all ordered to register and
annotate in the title and/or tax declarations, the dispositive
portion of this decision for the protection of all heirs and all
those who may be concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated July
17, 1991 (Annex "P", Petition) on August 6, 1991.
For clarity's sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise agreement9 of the
On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and
parties:
opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalia's motion for reconsideration
(Annex "Q", Petition).
On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex "S",
Petition) declaring, among other things, that the decision at issue had become
final and executory.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of said
Omnibus Order (Annex "T", Petition). Said [herein private respondent] was
allowed to file a memorandum in support of her motion (Annex "V", Petition).
On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalia's
motion for reconsideration (Annex "W", Petition).7
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari and contended:
I
The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.
II
The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible.
III
The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional rights
of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto
S. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale between the
said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without affording them
their day in court.
IV
[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and
entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.
V
[The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod's right to appeal.8
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their mutual
desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations between and among
themselves, for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of good will and
fair play, and, for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement, agree to the
following:
1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21, 1968
was legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who predeceased her on
September 29, 1967, out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor
herein, was born, thus making her the sole and only surviving legitimate heir of
her deceased parents;
2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children, Intervenors-
Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;
(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on
March 17, 1926 at Cebu City, Philippines, to
Emilia Alburo;
(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of
wedlock on May 9, 1937 at Gingoog, Misamis
Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to Alberta
Ramoso;
 (3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May
19, 1947,
(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February
16, 1949,
(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950,
and
(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all
born out of wedlock to Laureta Tampus in
Gingoog City, Philippines.
3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:
I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ
NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No. 1041 C-2,
located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 1033,
1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 & 1043; South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087
& 1084; East by Lot Nos. 1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954, 1038, 1057
& 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms. more or less.
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA
VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No. 2745, C-7
located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 2744,
2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741,
containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700) sq.
ms. more or less.
P1,900.00
(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-7
located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot
No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by Panyangan River & F.
Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more
or less.
P11,580.00
(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No. 2319, Case
2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 1061;
South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No. 1044; and West by Lot No. 1041,
containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
(3,225) sq. ms. more or less.
(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No. 3272, C-7
Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan River; South by Panyangan River;
and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by
Damian Querubin.
P2,370.00
(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case
7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay
Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 &
3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P61,680.00
(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No. 3273, C-7
Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East by Panyangan River; and West by Lot
No. 3270, containing an area of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
(34,300) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.
P3,880.00
(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No. 2806, Case
7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Agayayan
River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo Ramoso; and West by
Restituto Baol, containing an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or less.
P380.00
(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-1
located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the NW., by Lot No. 1209;
SW., by Lot No. 1207; Eastby National Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207;
containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4,513)
sq. ms. more or less.
 P740.00 Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
(96,200) sq. ms. more or less.
(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No. 5554,
located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by P3,370.00
Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot No. 5555; and West
by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.
NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL
P320.00
1. Fifty (50) shares of stock
(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No. 5555 C-7 Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.
located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by at P100.00 per share P5,000.00
Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488,
3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496; and West by Lot No. 5554, containing
an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX 2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock
(77,776) sq. ms. more or less. with San Miguel Corporation 400.00

P1,350.00 4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated
properties in the following manner, to wit:
(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No. 61-C-1
(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso
located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot
Sanchez, Roland Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida
64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; West by
Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and
Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO
(1,042) sq. ms. more or less. Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso
shares, considering not only their respective
areas but also the improvements existing
P9,320.00 thereon, to wit:

(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5, Block 2, Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No.
located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 4, block 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at
2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on
Road, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or less. the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South
by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272; East by Lot Nos.
P12,240.00 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek,
containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED
(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-A-16-0 EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 7-A-16- (483,600) sq. ms. and assessed in the sum of
0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8, P61,680.00.
PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol, containing an area of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less. (b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of
the properties, both real and personal,
P1,050.00 enumerated above with the exception of the
following:
(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7,
located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. (1) Two Preferred Shares of
5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158, Stock in the San Miguel
Corporation, indicated in San
 Miguel Corporation Stock
Certificate No. 30217, which
two shares she is ceding in
favor of Patricio Alburo;
(2) The house and lot
designated as Lot No. 5,
Block 2 together with the
improvements thereon and
identified as parcel No. II-12,
lot covered by Tax Decl. No.
15798 identified as Parcel
No. II-13 in the above
enumerated, and Cad. Lot
No. 5157-C-7 together with
the improvements thereon,
which is identified as parcel
No. II-14 of the above-
enumeration of properties,
which said Rosalia S. Lugod
is likewise ceding and
renouncing in favor of
Rolando Pedro, Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez, in equal
pro-indiviso shares;
5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez
hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally in form of advances
after October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR
CENTAVOS;
6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the
indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria
Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum of P43,064.99;
7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their respective shares as may be
determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be responsible
for the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective shares;
8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez, Florida
Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive, relinquish
and renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner that is absolute and
irrevocable, all their rights and interests, share and participation which they have
or might have in all the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown
and/or which may not be listed herein, or in excess of the areas listed or
mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one time or another, owned
by, registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or
Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which either one or both might have
sold, ceded, transferred, or donated to any person or persons or entity and which
parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify together with all the improvements
thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof, and particularly of the
properties, real and personal listed herein, as well as demandable obligations
due to the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of the
aforementioned spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in
favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;
9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney's fees shall be borne
respectively by the parties hereto;
10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children,
namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, hereby
declare that she has no right, interest, share and participation whatsoever in the
estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or both, and
that she likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share,
participation or interest therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S.
Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other
any whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected with, and as a result of
Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod, warranting that the parcel of land ceded to
the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 ares.
12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to
Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93 representing the indebtedness
of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the
advances made to Rolando Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myna all surnamed
Sanchez, mentioned in paragraphs 5 hereto agree to have letters of
administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any bond.
That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of
the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately after
the signing of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree among
themselves to have the said lot subdivided and partitioned immediately in
accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and
intervenor and that in the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet
effected, the administrations of said parcel of land shall be vested jointly with
Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and Maria Ramoso, one of the
intervenors who shall see to it that each petitioner and intervenor is given one
sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural harvest made thereon.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the
agreement be approved. Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.

Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969. (Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)

PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties entered into with the
Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor assistance of their counsel, amended the above compromise. (It will be reproduced later in our
discussion of the second issue raised by the petitioners.)
(Sgd.)
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY: The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution 10 dated September 4, 1992, initially dismissed private
Intervenor-Oppositor respondents' petition. Acting, however, on a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion
for reconsideration dated September 14, 1992 and September 25, 1992,
(Sgd.) respectively, 11 Respondent Court thereafter reinstated private respondents' petition in a
ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES resolution 12 dated October 14, 1992.
R-101-Navarro Bldg.
(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St. In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed Decision granting the
REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement
Gingoong City valid and binding.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ
Petitioner Petitioner The Issues

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) In this appeal, petitioners invite the Court's attention to the following issues:
FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ
Petitioner Petitioner
I
(Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPUS The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under
For herself and as Guardian Rule 65 considering that the special civil action of certiorari may not be availed of
Ad-Litem of the minors as a substitute for an appeal and that, in any event, the grounds invoked in the
petition are merely alleged errors of judgment which can no longer be done in
Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and
Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had long become final and
executory.
ASSISTED BY:
II
TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the
Counsel for Petitioners
Cagayan de Oro City decision of the lower court for the reason that a compromise agreement or
partition as the court construed the same to be, executed by the parties on
October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been
The Clerk of Court approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably
Court of First Instance repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.
Branch III, Medina, Mis. Or.
III
Greetings:
 The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of facts
of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of real properties made by the
spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca just before their death in favor of
their daughter and grandchildren, private respondents herein, are tainted with
fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.
IV
In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower court's
declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of
annulment.
V
The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate
proceedings even as the lower court had not made a final and enforceable
distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C. Sanchez.
VI
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at least
directing respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight (8)
hectares due petitioners under the compromise agreement and memorandum of
agreement, and in not further directing her to include in the inventory properties
conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to be part of the
estate of Juan C. Sanchez. 13
The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are hereby consolidated
into three main issues specifically dealing with the following subjects: (1) the propriety
of certiorari as a remedy before the Court of Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise
agreement, and (3) the presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of
the properties sold.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
Before the Court of Appeals
Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the
reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private
respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They contend that private respondents'
invocation of certiorari was "procedurally defective." 14 They further argue that private
respondents, in their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial court which,
being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were not correctable
by certiorari. 15 This Court disagrees.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the
appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78
Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will
inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896,
Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction
(Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept.
231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs.
Zulueta, et al. 16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the
court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no
remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity
(Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in
the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-
38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." 16 Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has
issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its
jurisdiction, 17 as in the present case.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the
following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 18 After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are convinced that all these requirements
were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed
resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this case
with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only
provisionally. 19 It is hornbook doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.
This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at
bar." 20 In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious
all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and
Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren,
namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that
the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the
Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership
of the properties subject thereof . In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate
court. Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
 the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so. 21
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in
disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. 22 Such disregard, on the ground that the
compromise agreement "was nor approved by the court," 23 is tantamount to "an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and
within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court's decision but also
the latter's jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion,
not merely errors of judgment. 25 Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition
for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled that "(a)n act done by a probate
court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari." 26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here
under Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from
making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient (Echauz vs. Court
of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the respondent court has
disregarded the compromise agreement which has long been executed as early
as October, 1969 and declared null and void the deeds of sale with finality,
which, as a probate court, it has no jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal
is inadequate. Considering further the [trial court's] granting of [herein
petitioners') motion for execution of the assailed decision, 27 [herein private
respondent] Rosalia's resort to the instant petition [for review on certiorari] is all
the more warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be challenged
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At the very least,
this case is a clear exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal
because the trial court's decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction,
which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. "A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is
no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said to be a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head.' " 29
Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency
of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress
that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add
that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all miners represented only by their
mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. 30
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as
"a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end
to one already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. 31 Petitioners' argument
that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised
in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, 32 where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting
of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599
[1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that
moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De
Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res
judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la
Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23
SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977],
76 SCRA 361). (Emphasis found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated
its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth
draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in
July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by
the parties on October 30, 1969, 33 followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a
long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to
come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and
voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. 34 To be valid, it is merely required under
the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. 35
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged
in civil cases. 36Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade
the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise."
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the
minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend
that the court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in
behalf of their wards or children. 37
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this
case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides
that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction."
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of
the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there
were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors,
the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition
was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. 38 We
find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the
parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case.
In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court. This new question
or matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the issues or questions submitted and threshed out
before the lower court which are reproduced below, viz.:
I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the
deceased spouses to their grandchildren collationable?
II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the
deceased spouses to their legitimate daughter also
collationable?
III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is
the rightful share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate
children? 39
Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court 40 readily reveals that they never questioned the validity of the compromise. In
their comment before the Court of Appeals, 41 petitioners based their objection to sad compromise
agreement on the solitary "reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception," zeroing specifically
on the alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod. 42 The issue of minority
was first raised only in petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
Decision; 43 thus, it "is as if it was never duly raised in that court at all." 44 Hence, this Court cannot
now, for the first time on appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic
rule of fair play, justice and due process. 45 We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize
the well-settled rule that "(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the
proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within
the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal." 46
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in No. 8 of the
aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a relinquishment by petitioners of "a
right to properties which were not known." 47They argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public
policy, morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver pertained to their
hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent's estate which were not included in the
inventory of the estate's properties. It also covered their right to other properties originally
belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been
transferred to other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm and
ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners' protestation, the parties
waived a known and existing interest — their hereditary right which was already vested in them by
reason of the death of their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent." Hence, there is no legal
obstacle to an heir's waiver of his/her hereditary share "even if the actual extent of such share is
not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate." 48 At any rate, such waiver is
consistent with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the
settlement of civil disputes. 49
Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod's alleged fraudulent acts,
specifically her concealment of some of the decedent's properties, attended the actual execution
of the compromise agreement. 50This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial
and convincing evidence on record showing fraud on her part. As aptly observed by the appellate
court:
[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or
deception by alleging, inter alia, that the parcel of land given to them never
conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight (48) hectares, as stated in the
compromise agreement. We find this argument unconvincing and unmeritorious.
[Herein petitioners'] averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent]
Rosalia becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of agreement
they later executed with [herein private respondent] Rosalia wherein said
compromise agreement was modified by correcting the actual area given to
[herein petitioners] from forty-eight (48) hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If
the actual area allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in
the compromise agreement, then why did they agree to the memorandum of
agreement whereby their share in the estate of their father was even reduced to
just 36 hectares? Where is fraud or deception there? Considering that [herein
petitioners] were ably represented by their lawyers in executing these documents
and who presumably had explained to them the import and consequences
thereof, it is hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded and deceived
by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually surveyed,
happened to be different in area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the
compromise agreement, this circumstance is not enough proof of fraud or
deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalia's part. Note that Tax
Declaration No. 06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein
petitioners] pursuant to the compromise agreement contained an area of 48
hectares (Annex "A", Supplemental Reply). And when [herein petitioners]
discovered that the land allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares, a
conference between the parties took place which led to the execution and signing
of the memorandum of agreement wherein [herein petitioners'] distributive share
was even reduced to 36 hectares. In the absence of convincing and clear
evidence to the contrary, the allegation of fraud and deception cannot be
successfully imputed to [herein private respondent] Rosalia who must be
presumed to have acted in good faith. 51
The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties on April 13, 1970 Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.
and referred to above reads:
(Sgd.)
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT LAURETA TAMPOS
For herself and as Guardian
The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby ad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,
agree: Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez
1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30, 1969
so as to include the following: Assisted by:

a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners (Sgd.)

and intervenors, all illegitimate children of the late Juan C. TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.
Sanchez, forty-eight (48) hectares, thirty-six (36) ares as Counsel for Petitioners
embodied in the aforementioned compromise agreement to
thirty-six (36) hectares only, thus enabling each of them to get (Sgd.)
six (6) hectares each. ROSALIA S. LUGOD
Administratrix
b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel
of land which is now covered by O.C.T. No. 146 (Patent No. Assisted by:
30012) and the adjoining areas thereof designated as Lot A and
Lot C as reflected on the sketch plan attached to the record of (Sgd.)
this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E. Zalles PABLO S. REYES
pursuant to the Court's commission of March 10, 1970 provided, Counsel for Administratrix
however, that if the said 36-hectare area could not be found (Sgd.)
after adding thereto the areas of said lots A and C, then the MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ
additional area shall be taken from what is designated as Lot B, Intervenor 52
likewise also reflected in the said sketch plan attached to the
records;
Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement; they even amended it
when they realized some errors in the original. Such correction emphasizes the voluntariness of
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the said deed.
late Juan C. Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be
effective among themselves in such a manner to be agreed
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and
upon by them, each undertaking to assume redemption of
availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. 53 This Court has consistently ruled that "a
whatever plants found in their respective shares which need
party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits." 54 By their acts,
redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of
the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement.
the tenancy agreements now existing and covering the said
shares or areas. Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine
years after its execution, when they filed with the trial court their Motion to Defer Approval of
Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979. 55 In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that
d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners filed said motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their
petitioners and intervenors prorata. compromise agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was unwise and
unfair. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only stress that
e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary this alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard the legal effects of said compromise which, by its
administration of the area designated as Lot 5 of the Valles very nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the parties. Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction
Sketch Plan pending final survey of the said 36-hectare area. to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision different therefrom. 56 It is a well-
entrenched doctrine that "the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or
disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he
was doing" 57 and "a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded
even if there was a mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488)
because courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply
because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments." 58 Volenti non fit
injuria.
Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 "CLOSED and TERMINATED," arguing that
there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
They add that they had not received their full share thereto. 59 We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the "debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax,
if any," had been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate's residue must contain the
names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the
trial court's conclusion, 60 reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this
case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in
the amount of P51,598.93 was shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed or
charged against her share the advances of Rolando T. Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in
compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code on collation. 61 Furthermore, the compromise of the
parties, which is the law between them, already contains the names and shares of the heirs to the
residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. On this point, we agree with the following
discussion of the Court of Appeals:
But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the facts of
this case are the uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners) have been in
possession and ownership of their respective distributive shares as early as
October 30, 1969 and they have received other properties in addition to their
distributive shares in consideration of the compromise agreement which they
now assail. Proofs thereof are Tax Declarations No. 20984, 20985, 20986,
20987, 20988, 20989 and 20990 (Annexes "B" to "H", Supplemental Reply) in the
respective names of (herein petitioners), all for the year 1972. (Herein
petitioners) also retained a house and lot, a residential lot and a parcel of
agricultural land (Annexes "I", "J" and "K", Ibid.) all of which were not considered
in the compromise agreement between the parties. Moreover, in the compromise
agreement per se, it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash advances in the
aggregate sum of P8,533.94 were received by (herein petitioners) after October
21, 1968 (Compromise Agreement, par. 5) 62
All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate
proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In view of the above
discussion, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Third Issue: Fraud and Collation
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod to
deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement. They
further contend that said court erred in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged
deficiency in the inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned deeds
of sale. 63 We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one hearing conducted, and it
was held only for the reception of the evidence of Rosalia S. Lugod to install her as administratrix
of the estate of Maria Villafranca. There was no other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise,
"received, formally offered to, and subsequently admitted by the probate court below"; nor was
there "a trial on the merits of the parries' conflicting claims." 64 In fact, the petitioners "moved for
the deferment of the compromise agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of
properties — NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed to them under the
agreements." 65 Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to back up petitioners' claims.
In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to reimburse any
deficiency actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer who prepared
the certification and the sketch of the lot in question, and who could have provided evidence for
the petitioners, "to bring records of his relocation survey." 66 However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa
did not comply with the court's subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum. Neither did he furnish
the required relocation survey. 67 No wonder, even after a thorough scrutiny of the records, this
Court cannot find any evidence to support petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private
Respondent Rosalia.
Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are
bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal
presumption of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public
documents, has not been overcome. 68 On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations. We stress
that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these were
contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. 69 Hence, the properties
conveyed thereby are not collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under Article
1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by
way of donation or other gratuitous title.
In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares provided in the
compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale are factual in nature which,
as a rule, are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 70 Petitioners have failed to
convince us that this case constitutes an exception to such rule. All in all, we find that the Court of
Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them. Indeed, they have not persuaded us
that said Court committed any reversible error to warrant a grant of their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH
PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA
ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
D. Tañedo, Jr. for appellants.
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the
late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the
said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,
Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9,
1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-
Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to
facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros situados
en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de
CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; — Titulo Num. 6530,
mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m.
cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie;
y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier
pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta
ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado
son;
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados objectos de
este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de empezar a
gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y
ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que pierde el legatario este
derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar de continuar sus estudios
para ordenarse de Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada año
VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos, y si
el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este
legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual Parroco y sus
sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo arriba
queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo del actual
Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos los
productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de los productos
anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los derechos
correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco
celebrar cada año, depositando todo lo restante de los productos de estate
legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project containing the
following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest
male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered
by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac,
Philippines, or his successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value
 grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers
T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P 340.00
in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Victoria as trustee.
T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 7,290.00
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor
had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but
T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00 that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would
violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within
twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888
T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.

The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions
Total amount and value — 44.1163 P13,090.00 so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.

Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition, directed
that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the
church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective
shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and
implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix
and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
pending.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative because no
one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because
the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding
on this Court. They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced in
this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the
intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue
is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex.
Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 546).

About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention
parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor), meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from
who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A
new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a
the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See
Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the
bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's intention is to
since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has
be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into consideration the circumstances under which
ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by
it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code
the parish priest of Victoria.
of the Philippines).

Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino,
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-statement of the
declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his
provisions of his will.
order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.

1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10,
ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer
the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the
same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the
ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty
masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his
successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated above, the
administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of
Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products
thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration
and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would
celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the
name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to
sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or
having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say
annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in
two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was
studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado",
or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would
pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the
controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male
relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives
at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them
as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the
provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not
have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified
his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would
be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the
exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be
living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his
nephew or grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest
male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao,
the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that
contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the
maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own
son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood
at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that
devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one
contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by
the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was
based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at
the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in
1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order
adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84,
Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's
intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to
the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened
and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased
reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la
camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his
death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision
would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"?
The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time
of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was
not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands
before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the
seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits
thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer
valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died
in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to
follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein
that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp.
25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise
inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor
assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of
the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish
priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not
survived by a nephew who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet
entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code,
now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall
be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion
exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia,
fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to
the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition
as to the said ricelands.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995
TEODORO ACAP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOS REYES, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, 2nd Division, in
CA-G.R. No. 36177, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental holding that private respondent Edy de los Reyes had acquired ownership of
Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental based on a document
entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights", and ordering the dispossession of
petitioner as leasehold tenant of the land for failure to pay rentals.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced
by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. meters. The title was issued and is
registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses
died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized
document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established that since 1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap had
been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred
(9,500) meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap
continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and
thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana.
The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs
executed a notarized document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of
Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre," wherein they declared; to quote its pertinent portions, that:
. . . Cosme Pido died in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, he died
intestate and without any known debts and obligations which the said parcel of
land is (sic) held liable.
That Cosme Pido was survived by his/her legitimate heirs, namely:
LAURENCIANA PIDO, wife, ELY, ERVIN, ELMER, and ELECHOR all surnamed
PIDO; children;
That invoking the provision of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
above-mentioned heirs do hereby declare unto [sic] ourselves the only heirs of
the late Cosme Pido and that we hereby adjudicate unto ourselves the above-
mentioned parcel of land in equal shares.
Now, therefore, We LAURENCIANA3 , ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and ELECHOR all
surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and
participation over the said parcel of land in favor of EDY DE LOS REYES, of
legal age, (f)ilipino, married to VIRGINIA DE LOS REYES, and resident of
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, Philippines. . . .4 (Emphasis supplied)
The document was signed by all of Pido's heirs. Private respondent Edy de los Reyes did not sign
said document.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property continued to be
registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with
Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry
of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claimagainst the original certificate of title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally inform him that he (Edy)
had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him.
Private respondent further alleged that he and petitioner entered into an oral lease agreement
wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982,
petitioner allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however, petitioner refused to pay any
further lease rentals on the land, prompting private respondent to seek the assistance of the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited petitioner to
a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. Petitioner did not attend the conference but sent his
wife instead to the conference. During the meeting, an officer of the Ministry informed Acap's wife
about private respondent's ownership of the said land but she stated that she and her husband
(Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's claim of ownership over the land.
On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, alleging in the main that as his leasehold
tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay
despite repeated demands.
During the trial before the court a quo, petitioner reiterated his refusal to recognize private
respondent's ownership over the subject land. He averred that he continues to recognize Cosme
Pido as the owner of the said land, and having been a registered tenant therein since 1960, he
never reneged on his rental obligations. When Pido died, he continued to pay rentals to Pido's
widow. When the latter left for abroad, she instructed him to stay in the landholding and to pay
the accumulated rentals upon her demand or return from abroad.
Petitioner further claimed before the trial court that he had no knowledge about any transfer or
sale of the lot to private respondent in 1981 and even the following year after Laurenciana's
departure for abroad. He denied having entered into a verbal lease tenancy contract with private
respondent and that assuming that the said lot was indeed sold to private respondent without his
knowledge, R.A. 3844, as amended, grants him the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price. Petitioner also bewailed private respondent's ejectment action as a violation of his right to
security of tenure under P.D. 27.
On 20 August 1991, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, Edy de los Reyes, and against the defendant, Teodoro Acap, ordering
the following, to wit:
1. Declaring forfeiture of defendant's preferred right to issuance of a Certificate of
Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholdings;
2. Ordering the defendant Teodoro Acap to deliver possession of said farm to
plaintiff, and;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, the sum of
P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of P10,000.00 as actual
damages.5
In arriving at the above-mentioned judgment, the trial court stated that the evidence had
established that the subject land was "sold" by the heirs of Cosme Pido to private respondent. This
is clear from the following disquisitions contained in the trial court's six (6) page decision:
There is no doubt that defendant is a registered tenant of Cosme Pido. However,
when the latter died their tenancy relations changed since ownership of said land
was passed on to his heirs who, by executing a Deed of Sale, which defendant
admitted in his affidavit, likewise passed on their ownership of Lot 1130 to herein
plaintiff (private respondent). As owner hereof, plaintiff has the right to demand
payment of rental and the tenant is obligated to pay rentals due from the time
demand is made. . . .6
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the sale of the Pido family of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff does not of
itself extinguish the relationship. There was only a change of the personality of
the lessor in the person of herein plaintiff Edy de los Reyes who being the
purchaser or transferee, assumes the rights and obligations of the former
landowner to the tenant Teodoro Acap, herein defendant.7
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, imputing error to the lower court when it
ruled that private respondent acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 and that he, as tenant, should
pay rentals to private respondent and that failing to pay the same from 1983 to 1987, his right to a
certificate of land transfer under P.D. 27 was deemed forfeited.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioner's argument that the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights (Exhibit "D"), the document relied upon by private respondent to prove his
ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its order dated 27 August 1990. The order
indeed noted that the document was not identified by Cosme Pido's heirs and was not registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental. According to respondent court, however, since
the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized, no further
proof of its due execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was also convinced
that the said document stands as prima facie proof of appellee's (private
respondent's) ownership of the land in dispute.
With respect to its non-registration, respondent court noted that petitioner had actual knowledge of
the subject saleof the land in dispute to private respondent because as early as 1983, he
(petitioner) already knew of private respondent's claim over the said land but which he thereafter
denied, and that in 1982, he (petitioner) actually paid rent to private respondent. Otherwise stated,
respondent court considered this fact of rental payment in 1982 as estoppel on petitioner's part to
thereafter refute private respondent's claim of ownership over the said land. Under these
circumstances, respondent court ruled that indeed there was deliberate refusal by petitioner to pay
rent for a continued period of five years that merited forfeiture of his otherwise preferred right to
the issuance of a certificate of land transfer.
In the present petition, petitioner impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals as not in accord
with the law and evidence when it rules that private respondent acquired ownership of Lot No.
1130 through the aforementioned Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights.
Hence, the issues to be resolved presently are the following:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND
WAIVER OF RIGHTS IS A RECOGNIZED MODE OF ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID DOCUMENT CAN BE CONSIDERED A
DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court, in its order dated 7 August 1990, explicitly
excluded the document marked as Exhibit "D" (Declaration of Heirship, etc.) as private
respondent's evidence because it was not registered with the Registry of Deeds and was not
identified by anyone of the heirs of Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held the same to
be admissible, it being a notarized document, hence, a prima facie proof of private respondents'
ownership of the lot to which it refers.
Petitioner points out that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is not one of the
recognized modes of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of the Civil Code. Neither can the
same be considered a deed of sale so as to transfer ownership of the land to private respondent
because no consideration is stated in the contract (assuming it is a contract or deed of sale).
Private respondent defends the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as in accord with the
evidence and the law. He posits that while it may indeed be true that the trial court excluded his
Exhibit "D" which is the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as part of his evidence, the
trial court declared him nonetheless owner of the subject lot based on other evidence adduced
during the trial, namely, the notice of adverse claim (Exhibit "E") duly registered by him with the
Registry of Deeds, which contains the questioned Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as
an integral part thereof.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That
right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership
and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical
justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in
question.8
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into
two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or
intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as
a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale.
They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of
and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its
equivalent.9
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument
when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate
left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement
between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.10
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary
rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. 11 The
second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or
intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to
relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession.12 Private respondent,
being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over
the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale,13 or a donation,14 or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
Quite surprisingly, both the trial court and public respondent Court of Appeals concluded that a
"sale" transpired between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent and that petitioner acquired
actual knowledge of said sale when he was summoned by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to
discuss private respondent's claim over the lot in question. This conclusion has no basis both in
fact and in law.
On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights"
was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990 because the document was
neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no
showing that private respondent had the same document attached to or made part of the record.
What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse claim filed with the Registry of
Deeds which contained the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of rights and was annotated at the
back of the Original Certificate of Title to the land in question.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent's ownership
over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the
registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is
no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court."15
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no
evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private
respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private
respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot
by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's
name.
Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be
binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be
perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.
Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the subject land since 1960 and religiously paid lease
rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to be the registered tenant of Cosme Pido and his family
(after Pido's death), even if in 1982, private respondent allegedly informed petitioner that he had
become the new owner of the land.
Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in good faith, assumed such statement of private
respondent to be true and may have in fact delivered 10 cavans of palay as annual rental for 1982
to private respondent. But in 1983, it is clear that petitioner had misgivings over private
respondent's claim of ownership over the said land because in the October 1983 MAR conference,
his wife Laurenciana categorically denied all of private respondent's allegations. In fact, petitioner
even secured a certificate from the MAR dated 9 May 1988 to the effect that he continued to be
the registered tenant of Cosme Pido and not of private respondent. The reason is that private
respondent never registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights with the Registry of
Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private respondent) sought to do indirectly what could not be
done directly, i.e., file a notice of adverse claim on the said lot to establish ownership thereover.

It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or deliberate refusal by
petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations to the landowner/agricultural lessor which, in
this case, private respondent failed to establish in his favor by clear and convincing evidence.16

Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his preferred right to be issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer under P.D. 27 and to the possession of his farmholdings should not be applied against
petitioners, since private respondent has not established a cause of action for recovery of
possession against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed the decision of the RTC of Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental dated 20 August 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent's
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner Acap is hereby DISMISSED
for failure to properly state a cause of action, without prejudice to private respondent taking the
proper legal steps to establish the legal mode by which he claims to have acquired ownership of
the land in question.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 116018 November 13, 1996
NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S.
AUSTRIA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her
heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in
1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee,
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty (250)
square meters. The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners'
mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses
Severino and Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to
prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
After having the document drafted — with several spaces left blank including the specification as
to the metes and bounds of the land — petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the
document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S.
Roque, one of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau
of Lands and have the land surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently
surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not
furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of
Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was
much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied
by the spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.
On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender to them
of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to
no avail. On 25 June 1986 respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 1
Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October 1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and
adjudicate among themselves the inherited property with an area of one thousand five hundred
and three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the
property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-009105 identified as Lot 4-A with an area
of one thousand ninety-six (1,096) square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and
seven (407) square meters, and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a
consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-292265 in the name of
the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the name of petitioner.
In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before the land was
surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold that could be
indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about
the survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area
supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they could not have agreed to the
extent of the area actually reflected in the deed because it included the portion being occupied by
the Lim spouses, which was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them
and their predecessor.
The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale taking into account that (a) while petitioner
claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary public and in her presence, she was not able to
enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed that the document was
signed only after the survey of the land was completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was
negated by her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984;
and, (c) while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no
explanation was offered why the same could not have been signed and notarized in Bulacan
where notaries public abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned.
Additionally, the trial court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their
demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September 1990 ordered the
annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos.
T-292265 and T-292266 and Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner to
pay private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for attorney's fees, and to
pay the costs of suit. 2
On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court, 3 and on
20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its decision. 4
Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding documentary evidence already
presented, marked and identified on a purely technical ground, and (b) for concluding that
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.
Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to admit formal offer of
evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as late filing, citing Siguenza v. Court of
Appeals. 5 We are not persuaded. Indeed, we held in Siguenza that rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very rigid and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case as the trial court had a
reasonable basis for denying petitioner's motion —
On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendant's counsel, manifested
in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked that he be given
15 days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the
scheduled hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado . . . . was not in
Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs' counsel, called the attention of the Court that
Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with the Court Order dated
February 06, 1990, which is to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty.
Veneracion, defendant's right to file a formal offer of evidence was deemed
waived. Atty. Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence
considering that the defendant can (sic) no longer make a formal offer of
evidence.
On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of
exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, on May 02,
1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having
filed their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal offer of exhibits was
denied (emphasis supplied).
The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence.
A considerable lapse of time, about three (3) months, had already passed before petitioner's
counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioner's motion to
admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court
order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of
justice.
Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject
matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-examination respondent Aurora S. Roque
admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for
the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo Lim). Moreover,
according to petitioner, the assertions of private respondents to petitioner contained in the demand
letter should not necessarily be true and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Sale was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the
subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v. Court of Appeals. 6
These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of respondent Roque
cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting of the minds on
the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted
on the premises. Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the demand letter
after having weighed the respective evidence of the parties. But even without the letter, the
evidence of respondents had already amply substantiated their claims.
We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by the fact
that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was located. What is
more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable to the
present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary public had the authority to acknowledge
the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared
before him and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.
The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could
have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in
the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the
ten (10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized
considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan,
where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they
did not sign the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble claim to
the contrary.
Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or
before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner
that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such
contention was contradicted by petitioner's own witness who positively asserted in court that the
survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the signing. Quite obviously,
when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who
caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of
the property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance
of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the
property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced,
the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the
deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto. 7 Apparently, petitioner
deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and
subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge,
much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a
contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other
party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the
party seeking annulment. 8
Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and
conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests that the number of the subdivision
plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the
statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures
thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.
WHEREFORE, their being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and resolution in question
of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.