G.R. No.

L-27594 November 28, 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.

HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch III,
PARAÑAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C. TAMAYO, THE
COMMISIONER OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-28144 November 28, 1975

ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAÑAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, applicant-appellee,

vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors-appellants.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
The Director of Lands, etc.

Jaime B. Lumasag Jr. and Jose J. Roy and Associates Law Office for Roman C. Tamayo.

Nemesio P. Diaz and Celso B. Fernandez, Jr. for Alipio Alinsunurin, etc.

ANTONIO, J.:

These cases are interrelated, and so are decided jointly.

In his application originally filed on February 24, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the
late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of
land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less, situated at the municipality of Laur,
province of Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort
Magsaysay.1

On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and
was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay
established under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President.2

On May 10, 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties,
requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered as the
applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over
the property subject matter of the application.3 The motion was granted by the lower court in
its order dated June 10, 1966.4
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area reserved
for military purposes under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President.
The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber
of commercial quantities.5 Except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by homesteaders
issued patents by the Director of Lands, there were no occupants on the land.6

It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory
information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in
1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir, Maria
Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for
pasture, until her death sometime in 1944.

On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land
applied for, described in the technical description Plan II-6752, is adjudicated to and ordered to
be registered in favor of (a) Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, a Philippine
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds
(2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos per Joint Manifestation of Alipio Alinsunurin
and Encarnacion Caballero-Alinsunurin, Ariosto Santos and Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation dated July 19, 1966 and marked as Exhibit "AA-4 "7 and (b) Roman C.
Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the
said property.

On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to the Supreme Court,8
copy of which notice was furnished counsel for the applicant Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation; however, no copy was furnished to counsel for Roman C. Tamayo, to
whom one-third (1/3) portion of the land was adjudicated.

On January 18, 1967, within the extended period granted by the court, the oppositors-
appellants filed the corresponding Record on Appeal, copy of which was duly served upon
appellees Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo.

By an order dated March 8, 1967, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an
Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings, within ten
(10) days from receipt of the order. 9

On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies served upon the
appellees.

Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending
appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of
registration. Both motions were opposed by the Government.

On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had become
final as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the
entire land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and two-thirds (2/3) pro
indiviso in favor of Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final
outcome of the appeal.
On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration forthwith issued Decree No. 113485
pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15, 1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija.

On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on Appeal which, together
with the evidence and transcripts, was forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.

As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a decree of
registration, on May 29, 1967, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines instituted before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to nullify the order dated March 11, 1967, the
decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967) and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija,
and to command the respondent court to certify the entire proceedings and to allow appeal to
the Supreme Court from its decision in toto in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.

On June 5, 1967, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You (respondent Judge) are hereby
restrained from issuing a writ of possession in Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No.
25545 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled "Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation versus Director of Lands, et al."; You (respondent Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo), your agents or
representatives are hereby restrained from taking possession and/or excercising acts of
ownership, occupancy or possession over the property in question subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545; and You (respondent Register of Deeds) are
hereby restrained from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until
petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman Tamayo
and Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, under Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of
Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.

Accordingly, petitioners-appellants caused the entry of a notice of lis pendens to be duly

inscribed in the primary entry book of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151.

In due time, the respondents filed their answers to the petition for certiorari. The parties having
filed their respective memoranda, the case is deemed submitted for decision.

At the outset, We shall resolve the petition for certiorari and mandamus

(L-27594).

Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice
of Appeal to the counsel for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because,
admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on Appeal
in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. 10 Hence, such failure cannot impair the
right of appeal. 11

What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not
severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. 12
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration
proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into
purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.

A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of
the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued
only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis
of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.

Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision
a quo.

II

In the instant case, as a precaution, oppositors-appellants caused notice of lis pendens to be

duly inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of the appeal within the power of the court until
the litigation is terminated. 13

Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final termination of the
litigation. The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles subsequently issued, which
will yield to the ultimate result of the appeal. 14

During the pendency of the appeal, it appears that Honofre A. Andrada, et al., filed with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Branch I, not the land registration court), a complaint
against the appellee Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, Rodolfo A. Cenidoza
and Roman C. Tamayo, for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question (Civil Case No.
4696). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case despite the pendency of the appeal
involving the same land, and decided the case in favor of plaintiffs. In violation of Our injunction
adverted to above, Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation executed a subdivision
plan of the original single parcel of land subject of the land registration proceedings covered by
Original Certificate of Title No.

0-3151, and deeded over six (6) lots of the subdivision plan to plaintiffs Honofre A. Andrada and
Nemesio P. Diaz. By an order dated September 23, 1968, entered in Civil Case No. 4696, the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija was directed to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151
and to issue new titles to the above-named transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances."
Immediately, transfer certificates of title were issued to them and other transferees in which the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did not carry over the notice of lis pendens originally inscribed
in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151. Subsequently, other transactions were entered into
involving portions of the land reconveyed in Civil Case No. 4696, including a transfer of about
4,000 hectares to the Land Bank of the Philippines in consideration of P8,940,000.00.

We find the order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 03151 and to issue subsequent titles
free from all liens and encumbrances to be void ab initio.

Civil Case No. 4696 is an action in personam to which the appellants are not parties; its object
was to decree reconveyance to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to the Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo in Land Registration Case No.
N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, which is subject to the outcome of the appeal. Such action is
barred by the pendency of the appeal. In that case, the court is without jurisdiction to order the
Register of Deeds to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to
transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances ." 15 Nor can such order be construed to
authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens, which was not entered by
virtue of the reconveyance case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty bound to carry over the
said notice of lis pendens on all titles subsequently issued. But, in plain violation of lis pendens in
said titles; such act constitutes misfeasance in the performance of his duties for which he may
be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third parties, but
cannot affect the petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of injunction and the
notice of lis pendens inscribed in the original title. It must be remembered that Our injunction
restrained the Register of Deeds "from accepting for registration documents referring to the
subject land until the petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates
of Roman C. Tamayo and Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation under section
24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675,
LRC Rec. No. 25545." Its plain meaning is to enjoin registration of documents and transactions
unless the notice of lis pendens is annotated and so subject the same to the outcome of the
litigation. In such case, subsequent transferees cannot be considered innocent purchasers for
value.

On the other hand, the lower court's order dated September 23, 1968, in Civil Case No. 4696,
cannot overrule an injunction of this Court (in L-27594). As a result, We consider the notice of lis
pendens entered in virtue of this litigation to remain in full force and effect, and affects all
subsequent transferees of the title of the land subject of this appeal.

At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary
entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such
adverse claim. 16

III

We now consider the appeal on the merits.

1. To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved
by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character. 17 Unless a plan and its technical description are
duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 18

It is true that blueprints of two survey plans were presented before the trial court (both marked
Exhibit "D"). The first blueprint copy of a plan of land as surveyed for Maria Padilla (Exhibit "D",
p. 4, Exhibits of Applicant), was not formally offered in evidence. The second plan of the land, as
surveyed for Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation (also marked as Exhibit "D",
p. 3, Exhibits of Applicant) was submitted by the said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the
Director of Lands.

Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan
by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or
verified the survey plan and the technical descriptions thereof. It is not the function of the LRC
to check the original survey plan as it has no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for
any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve
the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done.

It is also asserted that a blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) was
superimposed in the military plan of the reservation under Proclamation No. 237, which military
plan was presented in evidence by the oppositors-appellants (Exhibit "6"), and it was agreed by
the parties that the plan, Exhibit "D", superimposed in the plan of the area covered by the
proclamation, is the plan of the land applied for (p. 15, Brief for Applicant-Appellee).

Obviously, the superimposition of the copy of the survey plan of land as surveyed for applicant
in the military map of the area under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole purpose of showing
that the land applied for is situated within the area covered by the military reservation of Fort
Magsaysay appropriately indicated in the perimeter map of said reservation (Exhibit "6"). But
the applicant is not relieved from the original tracing cloth plan approved by the Director of
Lands as required by law. One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute
certainty of the identity of a registered land. Consequently the primary purpose of the aforesaid
requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical
descriptions. Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the original tracing
cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands.

It will be noticed that the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) does not bear the
approval of any officer authorized by law.

In similar manner, the surveyor's certificate, also required in original land registration
proceedings, was not offered in evidence.

2. We next consider the question of whether the applicant has a registerable title to the land
applied for.

The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria issued in the name of
Melecio Padilla (Exhibit "T" pp. 64-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the original of the
said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in
evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in
the circumstances surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of
the said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the date when said informacion
posesoria was issued. One copy showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895
(Exhibit "T") while the other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5,
1883 (Exhibit "2").

Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on the basis
of the "List of Possessory Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the corresponding
supporting documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla
does not appear among those listed as holders of informacion posesoria titles as of the year
1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur) Nueva Ecija. According to said document, the
name Melecio Padilla appears only in the list of holders of possessory information titles over
lands situated in Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, but of a substantially smaller acreage. 19 Thus, the
seven (7) parcels recorded in the name of Melecio Padilla covered only a total area of 49
hectares, 18 acres and 325 centares. 20 In addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now
Laur), Nueva Ecija existing in the Division of Archives does not include the name of Melecio
Padilla. 21 It is true that an alleged copy of an informacion posesoria in the name of Melecio
Padilla, was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one
Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija could
not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document does not exist in their records. 22 There is
another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of the applicant. The alleged informacion
posesoria covers an area of "seis mil quiñiones, poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800
hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of the supposed acquisition, no one could
acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880
and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in excess of one thousand (1,000)
hectares. 23

Besides, the document described in Exhibit "H" is not the titulo de informacion posesoria,
because it was merely a certification of possession of Melecio Padilla over the property, and was
issued without prejudice to a third party or parties having a better

right. 24 Thus, it states: "En su virtud habiendo examinado el Registro nuevamente formado por
la perdida o destruccion del mismo y no hallando en ningun asiento contrario a lo relacionado
reinscribe la posesion de la finca de este numero a favor de Don Melecio Padilla sin perjuicio de
tercero que puede tener mejor derecho a la propiedad." Under Spanish law, in order that an
informacion posesoria may be considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the
holder thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally converted into a
registration of ownership because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of
Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has been in open possession
of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the
date of such registration; that such conversion be announced by means of a proclamation in a
proper official bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the registration of possession into
a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper record thereof in the Registry."
25 Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the
inscription of the informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of
ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law.

One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on April 17, 1895, the right to perfect
possessory information title under the law expired. After that date, full property right of the
land reverted to the government and the right of the cultivator and possessor to obtain
gratuitous title was extinguished. 26

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession,
for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a
matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares
of said land consist of public forest. During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion
thereof was cleared and cultivated under the "kaingin" system, while some portions were used
as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables
and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. 27 During the Japanese occupation, Maria
Padilla died. Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land
approximately in 1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled peace and order
conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them was prevented by the Army.

It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither applicant Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessors-
in-interest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation"
of the property in question, "under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title." 28

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of
cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. 29 While
grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial
inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. 30 The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. 31

Apart from the aforesaid inconclusive evidence of possession to support the applicant's claim of
title, it does not appear that the said property has ever been declared for taxation purposes by
either applicant or applicant's predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the only tax declarations
submitted were those of Mamerto Garcia and Honofre Andrada, et al. (Exhibit "G", Tax
Declaration No. 5576, covering an area of 7,340 hectares) and Mamerto Garcia, et al. (Exhibit
"H-1", Tax Declaration No. 5577, over an area of 9,547 hectares) but both were filed only in
1958. The latter declaration contains an annotation that the property described therein is an
unidentified property, as the declarant failed to identify the same, and it "was only through his
insistence" that it was assessed. Neither applicant Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation nor its predecessor, Alipio Alinsunurin had submitted any tax declaration
supporting its/his claim over the property. It is true that tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they
constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.

It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing proof of actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of the entire area in question during the period
required by law. This is especially true in view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh
incontrovertible." 32

Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forest are excluded. 33 It is well-settled that
forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one
issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. 34

Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes the existence of private
property within the military reservation. It is true that the proclamation states that the same is
subject "to private rights, if any there be", but applicant must prove its private rights over the
property, which said party failed to do. 35 For it is well-settled that, unless the applicant has
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicant or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. 36

WHEREFORE, decision in the above case is hereby rendered:

(1) in G. R. No. L-27594, the petition for certiorari is granted; the order dated March 11, 1967 in
LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto
(Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967), and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija are all declared void; the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija is
ordered to recall and cancel all transfer certificates of title, including owners' duplicates and
mortgagees' copies, if any, arising out of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151; the preliminary
injunction issued on June 5, 1967 and the temporary restraining order issued on June 1, 1973
are made final and permanent, with costs against respondents (except respondent Judge); and

(2) in G. R. No. L-28144, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside, and judgment is
rendered dismissing the application for registration. Costs against appellee.

Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and
Martin, JJ., concur.

Castro J, concurs in the result.

Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Director of Lands), petitioner, vs. IGLESIA NI
CRISTO, with its Executive Minister ERAÑO G. MANALO as CORPORATION SOLE and HON.
GABRIEL O. VALLE, JR. as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Nor

Parent Category: 1984

Category: March

DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:

The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether or not the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a
corporation sole, is qualified to apply for registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land in its
name in the light of the prohibition in Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 1 Constitution the same
issues raised in the identical case of Republic vs. Judge Candido P. Villanueva and Iglesia ni
Cristo, 114 SCRA 875 (June 29, 1982), 2 to which this Court has recently given a negative answer.

We can nave no different answer in this instant case.

On August 7, 1979, respondent Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) filed with the defunct Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte an application for registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land situated
in San Pedro, Vintar, Ilocos Norte allegedly acquired by respondent by virtue of a deed of sale
dated April 10, 1978 from a certain Carmen Racimo whose predecessors-in-interest, it was
claimed, possessed the same for more than thirty (30) years. 3 The application was filed, as
stated therein, under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529, July 11,
1978).

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application,
alleging, among others, that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Section 48 (b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
P.D. 1073); that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of by the applicant who had failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required under
Presidential Decree No. 892; 4 that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the
Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain (Section 11 Article XIV); and that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

On July 23, 1980, the respondent court rendered its decision adjudicating the land applied for
registration in favor of the Iglesia ni Cristo, but with a reservation for road right of way purposes.
Respondent stated, among others, that the Iglesia ni Cristo with its Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo as a corporation sole is not within the contemplation of Section 11, Article XIV of the
new Constitution but said corporation sole can qualify as applicant pursuant to the provision of
Section 14 of Presidential Decree 1520.

From the decision, the Republic of the Philippines elevated the case to this Court in this petition
for review which We gave due course.

Reiterating its stand in the lower court, petitioner stresses private respondent's disqualification
to hold lands of the public domain except by lease pursuant to Section 11 Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution.

Private respondent argues that Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution is inapplicable to
the land involved herein because the land sought to be registered is a private property or has
ceased to be part of the alienable public domain by reason of acquisitive prescription for more
than thirty (30) years, and its adverse, continuous possession in the concept of an owner; that
private respondent is but a mere administrator of the land titled in its name for the benefit of its
members, creating thus, a trust relationship in its favor; that as trustee or authorized
representative of its members, private respondent can exercise their right to have the
questioned land titled in its name under the Property Registration Decree (1529) by express
mandate of the law.

We agree with petitioner's stand, following our decision in Republic vs. Judge Candido
Villanueva, et. al., 114 SCRA 875 (June 29, 1982) to which We have made reference at the
threshold of this decision as well as the subsequent cases of Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong,
et. al. G.R. No. L-56025 (Nov. 25, 1982); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 59447,
and its companion case of Republic vs. Judge Dominador Cendaña, et. al., G.R. No. 60188 (Dec.
27, 1982).

All that has been stated by this Court in the aforementioned cases in interpreting Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942) applies with equal force in the
instant case where the application for registration of the herein parcel of land was, in essence,
sought on the basis of the alleged open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the said land by respondent's predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for registration on August 7, 1979.

Records reveal that no application for confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title had been
filed by respondent's predecessors-in-interest under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.
Under the law, the questioned land retains its public character. The application for registration
under Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) which, among others,
recognizes possession of alienable lands of the public domain in the manner and for the length
of time therein required as basis for registration of title to the land, did not remove the land
from the operational effect of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. It nevertheless strengthens
the conclusion that the land never ceased to be part of the public domain. Apparently, the
pertinent provisions of law relied upon by respondent in invoking Section 14 of P.D. 1529
provide:

"Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:.

"1). Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

xxx xxx xxx

"2). Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws.

xxx xxx xxx

"3). Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx

"A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust
by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust."

As indicated earlier, the issue raised is already a settled matter. In Republic vs. Judge Candido
Villanueva, et. al., supra, this Court made the following categorical pronouncement:

"As correctly contended by the Solicitor-General the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a
juridical person is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the
two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because
the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of Section 48 (b) which applies only
to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has
no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission,
102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and Section 49 of the
Public Land Law).

"The contention in the comments of the Iglesia ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that
the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land possessed by a Filipino
citizen since time immemorial as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 531 L. ed. 594,
41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that
category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under Section 48 (b)
`presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20
SCRA 641, 644).

"As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.

"In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural
land to obtain a confirmation of his title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law is a
"derecho dominical incoative" and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State." (114 SCRA 881-882).

Moreover, it may be observed that respondent relies strongly on the doctrine laid down in the
1925 case of Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424, reiterated in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, Mesina
vs. Vda de Sonza, 108 Phil. 361, Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 21 SCRA 743, Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals, 29 SCRA 760, Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 437, to the effect that lands of the public domain
which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to
the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is
segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose under the public land laws or statutes. As pointed out in the separate opinion by the
herein ponente in the cases, of Meralco vs. Hon. Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. 49623
and Republic vs. Hon. Candido P. Villanueva, G.R. No. 55289 (June 29, 1982), to wit:

"I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described had become private land, even
before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title,"
has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. This is the only legal method by which full and
absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority
over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of
disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales
patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land
would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by
the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant
under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free
patents. .

"It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land
subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are
found in many cases, such as those cited to the effect that such land has ceased to be public
land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms
part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority
granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by
Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is
provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. Only when
the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence."

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge's decision dated July 23, 1980, is hereby SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of the Iglesia ni Cristo is hereby dismissed. No costs.

G.R. No. 70825 March 11, 1991

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, respondents.

Antonio A. Azana for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV
No. 66710 affirming in all respects the decision ** of the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
Branch IV, dated January 30, 1978, ordering the registration, in the name of Isidro Espartinez of
Lot 6783, Cad 239, Ligao Cadastre, located in Agul, formerly of Ligao, Albay, now Pioduran,
Albay.

The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172
square meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot
by purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable.

The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing (Exhibits "A" and "C")
and posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the
municipal building (Exhibit "B") having been complied with, and considering that only the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared, the lower
court issued an order of general default with the exception of said government agencies.
Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena appeared and, together with the fiscal, she was required to file
an opposition to the application.

Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the
period set by the court, on December 12, 1972, it commissioned the clerk of court to receive
evidence. On the same day, however, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the
government and at the same time, filed an opposition to the application for registration. He
alleged therein that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the land the same not having been acquired by means of any
of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of
acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws; that neither Espartinez nor his
predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application; that Espartinez may not
avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for failure to fulfill the requisites
prescribed therein; and that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and
therefore, not subject to private appropriation.

Thereafter, seventeen (17) oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers on the land, flied a motion
to lift the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration. Espartinez
filed a motion to dismiss the opposition contending that the private oppositors were, with one
exception, mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No.
2976, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in CAR Case No. 523 wherein the Court
of Agrarian Relations declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of Lot 6783 and the oppositors as her
tenants.

On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the
following findings of facts:
On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino
Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila:

INTENDENCIA GENERAL DE HACIENDAS DE FILIPINAS

Indice de las resoluciones definitivas adoptadas por esa Intendencia general desde el 16 al 28
del Febrero proximo pasado, que se publica en la Gaceta, con arreglo a lo mandado en Decreto
de 28 de Octubre de 1869 . . .

Feb. 24. — Adjudicando a D. Faustino Llacer la extension de 80 hectares y 16 centiareas de

terreno situado en el pueblo de Ligao, Provincia de Albay, en la cantidad de pfs. 10053.

Manila de 28 de Marzo de 1885 . . . Luna. (Exhibit "L")

The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then
minor Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11,
1913 in Civil Case No. 422 entitled "Abintestato de los Finados Faustino Llacer y Maria
Prollamante" (Exhibit "K"). Hence, the land which was earlier declared for taxation purposes in
the name of "Los Herederos de los finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibits "P",
"Q" and "R"), was so declared by Sotera Llacer in her own name (Exhibits "I", "S" and "T"). In CAR
Case No. 523, Sotera Llacer and her husband, Bonifacio Viscaya were also declared by the Court
of Agrarian Relations in Legazpi City as landholders of Lot 6783 (Exhibit "J").

On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the
deed of absolute sale as containing an area of 1,036,172 square meters in consideration of the
amount of P 8,500.00 (Exhibit "E"). So as to reflect the agreement that Espartinez would assume
the responsibility and expenses in ejecting the occupants of the land pursuant to the decision in
CAR Case No. 523, Espartinez and Sotera Llacer executed an amended deed of sale on June 11,
1970 (Exhibit "F"). Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit
"G") and paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit "H").

Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit "M") and a technical description thereof
(Exhibit "N") indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares.
He planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and
carabaos.

Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs
heavily in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects.

The appellate court considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held
that Espartinez' possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his
predecessors-in-interest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885
when it was adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the
application for registration was filed.

The Director of Land and Forestry Development, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari contending that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed
errors of law in: (a) granting the application of confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding
the fact that he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a
registerable title to the property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower
court's decision which directed the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of
proof that the same is alienable and disposable and despite private respondent's failure to
adduce in evidence certain required documents.

A crucial point to resolve is whether the appellate court correctly considered Exhibit "L" as a
possessory information title. Worth noting is the fact that said document is, as the said court
itself describes it, "a copy of a certification issued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the
Bureau of Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de
Manila of the year 1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain
decree dated October 28, 1869." (Rollo, p. 29). The "excerpt of an entry" is the Spanish text
quoted above.

From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit "L" is neither a document, deed or title
evidencing ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of
the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover,
while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it
does not state by what reason such adjudication was made.

Granting that there was indeed an "adjudication" or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same
cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a
registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the
requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands vs. Reyes,
L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit "L" not being either a titulo de
informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of
ownership of Espartinez' predecessors-in-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No.
62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545).

The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any
help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership (Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The
survey plan, Exhibit "M", which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an
area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit "L", is not even
admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of
Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396).

In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and
1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey
plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence
(Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 568, 571;
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705), in
this case, the tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between
the area of the land under Exhibit "L" and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there
seems to be no tracing plan at all, notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the
same was attached thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached
and kept by the Land Registration Commission (See: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
61462, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners' repeated contention of
the absence of the tracing cloth plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention.

Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer and Maria
Prollamante be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no
transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No.
523, were not land registration cases and therefore, ownership of the property was not
definitively passed upon.

Espartinez' reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is also misplaced. That law
is premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural land, The
law states:

Sec. 48 The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of title therefor, under the land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling
in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the
end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws
(Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the
foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23
hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit "L" from which Espartinez' claim of ownership
sprung, the ruling in the Heirs Amunategui case must be given strict application.

Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and
forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citing Adorable vs. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401
[1960]; Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands
vs. Abanzadao, L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473,
April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim
over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain
(Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and
confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., Pro hac vice.

G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,

vs.

MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR, HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE and INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Cases Division), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the adjudication
by the land registration court of a parcel of land in Mulanay, Quezon in favor of the private
respondents.

In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and the Heirs of Felipe Rocete applied for the
registration of a parcel of land described in PSU-215779, with an area of 226,773 square meters.

Unrebutted testimonial evidence established that the land was part of the property originally
belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during
her lifetime and extended until 1936 when she died. (Tsn., August 6, 1976, Testimony of
Florencio Marquez, Exhibit "U"). The present applicants are the grandchildren of Candida
Fernandez. In 1936, after the death of Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in the
name of the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty
(30) hectares.

Subsequently, sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the
government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942 by
Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the
administrator of the property. A final deed of sale (Exhibit "N") was executed by the Provincial
Treasurer of Tayabas in 1944 in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs
that the property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others until such time that
partition among them was effected. The evidence shows Vitaliano's public and continuous
possession.

The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among themselves. The particular
lot now disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. Shortly
after the partition, in 1948, the new owners declared their share for taxation purposes. Tax
Declaration 91 for that year indicated the land as 12 hectares. This declaration was followed by
another one, Tax Declaration No. 2021, in 1958.

In 1965, the private respondents caused a survey of their property to be made. The property
was found to actually contain an area of 22.6773 hectares. This corrected area was reflected in
subsequent tax declarations. The last one submitted in evidence is dated 1974.

An ocular inspection conducted by the trial court found more than one hundred (100) coconut
trees with ages over thirty (30) years old, out of a total of more or less one thousand four
hundred (1,400) coconut trees on the land.

The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an opposition alleging that
neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land, not
having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an opposition alleging that they have
registrable title on account of their possession since time immemorial.

Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was no actual survey of the
land applied for; and that he is entitled to registration on account of his occupation and that of
his predecessor.

The spouses Dominador Lacson and Esperanza Lacson likewise filed their opposition with
respect to "the portion of land embraced by points 22 to 24 to 25 to 26 to 27 and by a straight
line drawn between point 27 to point 23 of Plan Psu-215779" in answer to which the applicants-
respondents agreed to relinquish or quitclaim whatever right, title, and interest they might have
over the above specified portion in favor of oppositors Lacson. In view thereof, the oppositor
spouses withdrew their opposition in the land registration case.

On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its decision adjudicating the land to applicants
as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the applicants, namely MARIANO FUNTILAR,
MAGDALENA FUNTILAR and the HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE are hereby declared owners
proindiviso of the parcel of land described according to Plan Psu-215779, with an area of
22.6773 square meters, subject to the claim of oppositors Dominador Lacson and Esperanza
Lacson as per agreement with the applicants and when the decision becomes final and
executory, let a final decree be issued for the issuance of title as provided by Act 496.

The Government alone, represented by the Director of Lands and Director of Forest
Development, filed its appeal with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision
now under review dated August 24, 1984 states:

xxx xxx xxx

According to the government oppositors, the land in question was certified as alienable and
disposable only on September 3, 1953, They, therefore, conclude that herein applicants could
not have been in possession of said land for more than 30 years. There is no evidence presented
by the government, however, that said land in question was part of the forest zone. For that
matter, during the hearing, the Director of Forestry and the Director of Lands manifested in
writing that they have no evidence in support of their opposition. They have not presented plans
or sketches to show that the land in question is part of the communal forest.

Under the foregoing circumstances, We do not find any merit in the appeal of the Government.
It has been ruled on this issue that the Director of Forestry has the burden of proving that a
piece of land belongs to the forest zone (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; de Villa vs.
Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 5847-R, June 13, 1952).

... It has been ruled that the inclusion of portions of said lands within the reservations declared
by the Director of Forestry in 1928 cannot affect the vested rights of applicants and her
predecessors who have been continuously occupying and profiting from the land since time
immemorial (Ankron vs. Government of the Phil., 40 Phil. 15; Llana vs. Director of Forestry, CA-
G.R. No. 4887-R, Sept. 23, 1950). Applicants have established by preponderance of evidence that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of the land in question for over 30 years introducing improvements thereon.

As we have stated in previous decisions, the registration of public lands for private titles after
satisfying the requirements of open, adverse and public possession will be more beneficial to
the country as it will promote development of Idle lands.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

Hence, this petition

The petitioners contend that in affirming the decision of the lower court, the Intermediate
Appellate Court committed the following errors:

1. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE IdENTITY OF THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.

2. IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30) YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF THEIR
APPLICATION IN 1972 AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTRATION.

3. IN NOT DECLARING APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION.

4. IN NOT FINDING THAT APPLICANTS RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE

PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND

The petitioners have come to us for a review on questions of fact property within the province
of the trial courts to resolve. (Santos vs.Aranzanso 116 SCRA 1). This case furnishes occasion for
us to reiterate the general principle that only legal questions, not factual issues, Should be
raised in the Supreme Court (Magpantay vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 236) and that findings
of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court should not be disturbed absent any showing of grave
error or abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the respondent court are fully
substantiated by evidence on record ( Regalano vs. Northwest Finance Corporation, 117 SCRA
45), we decide not to disturb them.

The first issue raised refers to identity.

Petitioners allege that the identity of the land sought to be registered has not been established.
We sustain the contrary finding. Survey Plan Psu-215779 of the property, showing its boundaries
and total area, clearly Identifies and delineates the extent of the land. The petitioners cite the
insufficiency of such a survey to identify the land. The petitioners overlook the fact that no
survey would at all be possible where the Identity of the land is not first properly established.
More importantly, without such Identification, no opposition, even its own, to the application
for registration could be interposed. Encroachment on or adverse possession of property could
not be justly claimed.

The petitioners cite differences in the description of the land boundaries, as well as in the land
area stated in the tax declarations submitted in evidence by applicants-respondents. They allege
that these do not refer to one and the same property.

A careful examination of the record shows a misinterpretation of the evidence as to the

Identification of the land. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 in 1948 describe a twelve-hectare
property bounded as follows: "N-Mocboc Brook; E-Campacat Mt. ; S-Emilio Aguirre; W-Mocboc
Brook and Briccio Morales. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 in 1964 and 1974 speak of a
22.6773-hectare land bounded" N-Mariano Funtilar, et al.; "E-Heirs of Donaciano Pumarada; S-
Emilio Aguirre; W-Emilio Aguirre and Bagopaye Creek." However, the applicants-respondents
have satisfactorily explained the discrepancy. Tax Declaration Nos. 91 and 2021 followed in tax
payments from 1948 to 1958 and beyond were made prior to the survey of the property in
1965. Tax Declaration Nos. 3757 and 2662 were made subsequent thereto and, hence, account
for the difference in area stated. Such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations
are, more often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation.
More so, if the land as in this case was merely inherited from a predecessor and was still held in
common. Differences in boundaries described in required municipal forms may also occur with
changes in boundary owners, changes of names of certain places, a certain natural boundary
being known by more than one name or by plain error. Neither was it uncommon then to
designate the nearest, most visible natural landmarks such as mountains, creeks, rivers, etc. to
describe the location or situation of the boundaries of properties in the absence of knowledge of
technical methods of measuring or determining boundaries with accuracy, especially where as in
this case, the same were made merely by humble farm people. Certain discrepancies, if logically
explained later, do not make doubtful, the Identification of the property as made, understood
and accepted by the parties to the case.

It is respondents' contention that the land in question was originally owned by Candida
Fernandez; forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; subsequently
repurchased by Vitaliano Aguirre in a tax delinquency sale and finally adjudicated in favor of
applicants in 1948. Petitioners, however, allege that the relationship of the land sold at auction
with the land subject of registration has not been established, since the final deed of sale in
favor of Aguirre and the survey plan Psu-215779 refer to two different parcels of land.

The difference in boundary descriptions has already been explained. Anent the disparity in land
area, it must be noted that the property mentioned in the final deed of sale issued by the
provincial treasurer at the delinquency auction sale was the property originally owned by
Candida Fernandez. The parcel of land sought to be registered and Identified by Survey Plan Psu-
215779 is a part of that property. The surveyed land resulted from the partition of Candida's
property among her heirs. Adjudicated in favor of herein respondents was 22.6773 hectares
thereof, the rest having gone to Emilio Aguirre, a son of Candida whose property bounds the
parcel of land in dispute on the south. Such fact is revealed by the testimony of Mariano Funtilar
on direct examination, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Your counsel has presented a certain Exhibit 1, which is a certification from the Municipal
Treasurer of Mulanay. It clearly states that a certain parcel of land is declared in the name of the
heirs of Candida Fernandez, the administrator of which is Petronila Aguirre which clearly shows
that the tax declaration was only made in the name of the heirs Candida Fernandez, but in her
name, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Do we understand also that you are trying to register only the portion that you personally,
your brother and sister are occupying?

A. Yes, sir and we are applying for that.

Q. In other words, it is clear that this land supposedly originally owned by Candida Fernandez is
a bigger portion, is that correct, a bigger parcel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And only a portion of the land is allotted to your brothers and sisters?

A. Yes, sir.

(Tsn-March 13, 1975, Land Reg. Case No. 192-G, p. 7)

xxx xxx xxx

And on cross-examination

ATTY. LAUREL:

Q. Would you like to enlighten this Court that you and your brother and sister who are children
of Antonia Resales received this property, this entire property were the only ones who received
this entire property?

A. That was the property pointed to uses our own, sir.

Q. I am asking you whether this entire property was given- was inherited by the children of
Antonia Rosales only?

A. That is a big parcel but it is only a portion which was given to us which we are causing for
registration, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

(Tsn-March 4, 1976, Land Reg. No. 192-G, p. 7)

ATTY. LAUREL:

Q. When you said portions were adjudicated to the heirs in order to avoid conflict in the
repurchase do I get from you Mr. Funtilar, that the property repurchased that this property you
are claiming in your application is only a portion of the property repurchased from the
Government?

A. Yes, sir.

(Tsn-April 27, 1976, Land Reg. Case No. 1921-G, p. 18)

The petitioners contend that the private respondents have failed to establish possession for at
least thirty years to entitle them to confirmation of imperfect title and registration under the
law. The petitioners also fault the respondents reliance on the 1944 tax delinquency sale,
forgetting that possession must still be proved.

We are satisfied from the evidence that long before her death in 1936, Candida Fernandez
already possessed the disputed property. This possession must be tacked to the possession of
her heirs, through administrator Vitaliano Aguirre, and later to the possession of the private
respondents themselves, who are Candida's grandchildren.

The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land in favor of the
government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case to rule that the
government would order the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the
property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida Fernandez
redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the possession
of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than
the required period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses testified to their personal
knowledge of more than 50 years possession.

More important is the petitioners' allegation that the property sought to be registered was
unclassified public forest until September 15, 1953 when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634
declared it alienable and disposable.

It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application
for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of
the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA
69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden
of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.

The private respondents tried their best to present the necessary evidence. A certification issued
by then District Forester Fernando Roy on September 27, 1972 reads:

xxxxxxxxx

... said parcel of land falls within the Alienable and Disposable LC Project No. 16-D, LCMap No.
1634 certified" (not classified) "on September 15, 1953, by the Director of Forestry. In view
thereof, this office interposes no objection in behalf of the Director of Forestry for the
registration and/or confirmation of title on the property mentioned therein without prejudice to
such action, the Director of Lands and other government entities may deem proper to take on
the premises.

to which, the then District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, Land District No. IV-2 in Lucena
City, in a communication dated March 16, 1973 responded:

1. the parcel of land subject of this registration was originally claimed by Emilio Aguirre and A.
Fernandez and the herein applicants have acquired the rights and interest therein thru
predecessors-in-interest; and

2. that said parcel of land has not been disposed of, reserved, leased, applied for or granted as
homestead or otherwise be alienated by the government.

In view of the above findings, and basing from the report of the investigation submitted thereon
by a representative of this office, and considering that this Agency has no evidence to support
the opposition of the Government, it is further informed that this office interposes no
opposition in the confirmation of the rights to and interest on the parcel of land particularly
described under Plan Psu-215779 in favor of the herein applicants.

The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing
natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together
with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a
way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.

Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar
circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui us. Director of Forestry (supra)
ruling is warranted whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation,
fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance
the very reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act,
and Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should
not be made to stand in the way of their own implementation.

The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33 years ago. It is not
forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at
least three generations. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have
been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an
understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. We see no strong
reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent
appellate court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

This is an appeal[1] from the decision of the Court of Appeals[2] setting aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City which denied respondent Segundina Rosarios
(hereafter, Segundina) motion to dismiss[3] and cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042.

The Facts

There being no controversy as to the facts and the petition raising pure questions of law, we
adopt the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as follows:[4]

On September 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City,
an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, with an
area of 100,000 square meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended.[5]

On August 31, 1972, petitioner University of the Philippines (hereafter, U. P.) filed with the trial
court a motion for intervention in the case, claiming that the land covered by the application (by
Datu Ditingke Ramos) is within its property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462.

On March 15, 1973, U.P. filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss Datu
Ditingke Ramos application for registration.

On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads as follows:

Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the University of the Philippines and considering the
certification, sketch plan (Exhibits O and P). the testimony of the Acting Chief, Geodetic Engineer
as well as the written manifestation of the Land Registration Commission to the effect that the
land subject matter of this application and covered by plan SWO-15055 does not encroach on
the property of the University of the Philippines and that it is not inside any decreed property,
the motion to dismiss the application is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[6]
On June 8, 1973, the trial court First Instance decided the application as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application is hereby granted, declaring the applicant Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos (surviving spouse of the original applicant who was substituted as
party applicant in the order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for
and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon in the
order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by Plan
(LRC) SWO 15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon this decision becoming final,
let the required decree of registration be issued and after payment of corresponding fees, let
the certificate of title be issued in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, widow, Filipino
and a resident of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On March 19, 1974, the trial court[8] issued an order stating:

The decision rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case under the date of June 8, 1973
having become final, the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission is hereby directed
to comply with Section 21 of Act 2347.[9]

On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. N-150604 in favor of
Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, pursuant to which the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
issued OCT No. 17 in her name.

On November 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled OCT No. 17 and issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 also in the name of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos
due to errors in the technical description.[10]

On February 23, 1988, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Segundina Rosario (hereafter Segundina) covering the parcel of land embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619.

On June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall Building which housed the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was one of the titles
destroyed by the fire.

Subsequently, Segundina Rosario requested the Register of Deeds to reconstitute Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 223619 resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
78195 (223619).

On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Quezon City[11] a
petition for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N-126671) 367316 naming
Segundina, Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, among others, as respondents.

On November 10, 1994, Segundina caused the registration with the Register of Deeds of the
deed of absolute sale. Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 121042 in Segundinas name, resulting in the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-78195(223619).

On November 19, 1996, after the parties had presented their respective evidence, U.P. filed an
amended petition alleging that it is the true, absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
that the unlawful acts of ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and (Bugnay Construction
and Development Corporation) as well as the existence of their spurious certificates of title,
create a cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.).

In its third cause of action, U.P. prayed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 or the
reconstituted titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and void ab initio for being spurious
and fraudulently issued.

On May 15, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court an omnibus motion for the dismissal of U.
P.s third cause of action in the amended petition as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042.

On November 10, 1997, the trial court denied Segundinas omnibus motion.

On December 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
questioning the denial of her motion to dismiss and praying for the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens.[12]

On April 16, 1998, the trial court[13] denied Segundinas motion for reconsideration and motion
to cancel the notice of lis pendens.[14]

On November 10, 1997, the trial court[15] again denied Segundinas omnibus motion to dismiss
and cancel notice of lis pendens.[16]

On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the Court of Appeals[17] a petition for certiorari[18]
assailing the orders of the trial court denying her motion to dismiss.

On September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in favor of Segundina.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the third cause of action is barred by res judicata and that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Segundinas motion to
dismiss.[19] We quote its dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Orders
dated November 10, 1997, and April 16, 1998, are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE
insofar as they deny petitioners Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens.
The Third Cause of Action in respondent University of the Philippines Amended Petition is
ordered DISMISSED and the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042, CANCELLED.
The writ of preliminary injunction, insofar as it relates to the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
121042, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.[20]

On October 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration of
the afore-quoted decision.[21]

On December 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[22]

Hence, this appeal.[23]

Petitioners Submissions

First, U.P. contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously allowed Segundinas motion to dismiss
as Segundina has yet to prove in a full-blown hearing whether her reconstituted title traces its
roots to OCT No. 17. According to U.P., the issuance of Segundinas title was highly
anomalous.[24]
Second, U.P. assails the issuance of OCT No. 17 in LRC Case No. Q-239 as void ab initio.
According to U.P., the Court of First Instance never acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case Q-239 as
the requisite signature approval of the Director of Lands...over the survey plan...was nowhere to
be found.[25]

Third, U.P. asserts that the Court of Appeals ruled on unestablished factual issues...by admitting
all the photocopies annexed to respondent (Segundina) Rosarios petition as evidence despite
the fact that they all still remained subject to authentication and examination by the parties
before the trial court.[26]

Fourth, U. P. attacks the verification of Segundinas petition in the Court of Appeals as defective.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

We outline the history of the title that Segundina holds (Title No. 121042): First, the land was
originally covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, which the Court of First Instance
declared as not encroaching on the property of U.P. and as absolutely owned by Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos. Thus, OCT No. 17 was issued in her name. Second, OCT No. 17 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was issued. Third, Rosario Alcovendas Vda.
de Ramos executed an absolute deed of sale over the land in favor of Segundina. Fourth,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was burned in the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall.
Fifth, Title No. 223619 was reconstituted and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was
issued in its place. Sixth, Segundina registered the deed of absolute sale. Thus, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 was
issued in Segundinas name.

In LRC Q-329 the trial court declared U.P. as having no interest in the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 121042. However, UPs contention that OCT No. 17 is void for lack of the
requisite signature approval of the Director of Landsover the survey plan[27] is worth looking
into.

P. D. No. 1529[28] requires the Director of Lands to sign and approve the survey plan for the
land applied for, otherwise, the title is void.

Sec. 17. What and where to file - The application for land registration shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file
together with the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan
approved by the Bureau of Lands.

The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all the annexes (emphasis
ours).

No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the
Director of Lands.[29] The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands,
the same are of no value.[30]

Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the survey plan was nowhere to be found is
an important jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the trial court. In Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[31] this Court stated that void ab initio land titles issued cannot
ripen into private ownership. Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to OCT
No. 17, her claim would have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its source.[32]

Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the qualification that If the parcel of land is
found to be inside decreed properties, this plan is automatically cancelled.[33]

Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is inside decreed property is an issue of fact that can
be best determined by the trial court after an examination of the evidence. We find meritorious
the trial courts rationale for denying Segundinas motion to dismiss. We quote:

To establish their respective rights over the disputed property, both plaintiff and respondents
submitted documentary exhibits, the genuineness and authenticity of which can only be proved
in a full blown trial.

There is no pretense that the foregoing conflicting claims entail determination of facts. It, thus,
become imperative that both parties be given their day in Court to avoid the danger of
committing a grave injustice if they were denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in their
behalf.

It is within this context that the Court considers it appropriate under the present stage of the
action to DENY the instant motion.[34]

Pending final ruling on the merits of the case, Segundinas motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on September 18, 1998, in CA-G. R. SP No. 47783.

In lieu thereof, the Court orders the case REMANDED to the trial court for trial on the merits.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15620 September 30, 1963

ANTONIO M. PATERNO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

JOSE V. SALUD, respondent

Montenegro, Madayag and Viola for petitioners.

Laurel Law Offices for respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Antonio Paterno and his sister Margarita Paterno Vda. de Javier brought on November 8, 1952
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas an action to recover from Jose V. Salud a parcel of
land containing an area of 5 hectares situated in San Juan de Bolbok, Batangas, as well as the
value of the crops harvested therefrom since 1950 and damages.

Defendant claims to be the owner of the land which plaintiffs seek to recover having been in
adverse possession thereof since 1890 and having registered it in his name Registration Case No.
23 of the same court on April 16, 1940 for which he obtained a torrens title. By way of
counterclaim, defendant seeks in turn to recover plaintiffs a strip of land with an area of 1-1/2
hectares also situated in the same municipality.

On May 31, 1954, after the reception of the evidence the court a quo rendered judgment
ordering defends reconvey to plaintiffs the land mentioned in their complaint free from any lien
or incumbrance, to pay P2,000.00 as moral damages, P224.00 as Actual damages and P2,000.00
as attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. The court dismissed defendant's counterclaim.

When the case was taken to the Court of Appeals, decision was reversed. The court not only
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to reconvey to defend the land subject-matter
of his counterclaim consisting 1-1/2 hectares, with costs. Plaintiffs interposed the present
petition for review.

It appears from plaintiffs' evidence that on March 1912, Jose T. Paterno, as administrator of the
estate Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno, acquired at an auction sale certain parcels of land that
were levied in execution belonging to Esteban de Villa, among others, one of following
description: "No. 5, Terreno en dicho barrio Libato, de 1200 metros cuadrados de superficie,
lindante al Norte rio Lawaye; al Este Francisco Marasigan; al Sur estero Lapa; y al Oeste
Benedicto de Villa." From 1915 to 1927 Paterno leased this parcel of land together with the
other parcels acquired at the auction sale to Esteban de Villa and Pia de Villa. In 1924, Paterno
desiring have all the lands so acquired registered under the Registration Act, ordered their
survey as described in the tax declarations and in the notice of sale, and it was discovered that
the area of parcel No. 5 was not 1,200 sq. m. as described therein but 30.5285 hectares.

In March, 1926, Paterno sought the registration of lands acquired in the auction sale in the
name of estate of Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno but parcel 5 was not included because its
plan had not yet been a proved when the petition for registration was filed. In 1927, all these
lands were adjudicated to Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, daughter of the late Maximino
Molo Agustin Paterno as her share in the estate. In that year, the lease of the lands to the De
Villas was not renewed and so their possession was returned to the Paternos who appointed
Felix Lontok as their overseer. Sometime thereafter, apparently acceding to the plea of the De
Villas, Concepcion Paterno agreed to retain only the eastern portion of the land, with an area of
5 hectares, leaving the rest with an area of 25 hectares to be subdivided between the De Villas.

In 1943, Concepcion Paterno died leaving all the lands she owned in Batangas, including the one
in question, to plaintiffs as her heirs. Hence, from 1927, when the lease to the De Villas was
terminated, to 1949, plaintiffs had been in possession of the lot with an area of 5 hectares first
thru their overseer Felix Lontok, who later became himself its lessee. In 1950, however,
defendant wrested the possession of the land in question from plaintiffs in the manner they
explained during the trial of the case.

Thus, according to plaintiffs, defendant secured in 1931 a plan for the land in question which
was approved by the Bureau of Lands. In 1946, he declared this property for taxation under Tax
Declaration No. 2209. This was later cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4410 with the excuse that
it was a correction of Tax Declaration No. 19566. In 1947, defendant filed a petition for
registration of the land omitting to mention therein the claims of Jose T. Paterno and
Concepcion Paterno although in the plan on which his petition for registration was based it was
stated that the land described therein was identical to, that surveyed for Concepcion Paterno
and was part of a much larger tract of land surveyed for Jose T. Paterno. Defendant was ordered
to amend his petition by including these two as claimants. This he did but he gave their
addresses as San Juan, Batangas, although he knew they never lived there. No copy of the
petition was served on their overseer Felix Lontok. The petition was heard without opposition,
and on April 16, 1948 the court issued a decree In favor of defendant over the land in question.
In 1950, armed with this decree, defendant wrested the possession of the land from plaintiffs
and reaped the harvest there from of some 20 to 25 cavanes of palay since that year. In the
meantime, defendant mortgaged the land to Philippine National Bank. Attempts were made to
settle the controversy amicably, and when this Proved in the present action was taken by the
plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' theory, therefore, may be stated as follows: The land in question was originally a
portion of a bigger parcel of land whose area was found to be 30.5285 hectares which was
purchased by Jose T. Paterno, as administrator of the estate of Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno
at an auction sale involving the properties of Esteban Villa. This land was later adjudicated to
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, who, upon her death, bequeathed it, together with other
lands, to plaintiffs.

Defendant's evidence, on the other hand, discloses on June 25, 1881 Baltazar de Villa owned,
among a parcel of land of the following description: "La tercera partida de candidad de unos
veinte cavanes aproximados de semilla de palay, cuyos confines, al Este las tierras de Da Antonia
de Villa, al Oeste las de Don Vicente de Villa, al Norte el Rio denominado Lawaye, y al Sur las
tierras de Dña. Paula de Mercado con riachuelo denominado Lapa en Medio," (Possessory
informacion Exhibit 6-a.) Baltazar de Villa is the father of Esteban de Villa and de Villa, while Pia
de Villa is the mother of Jose V. Salud, defendant herein.

In 1912, Jose T. Paterno, as administrator of the estate of Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno,
bought at an auction sale certain lands belonging to Esteban de Villa pursuant to a levy in
execution issued to enforce a judgment obtained against Esteban de Villa. Among the lands so
purchased was one described as follows: "No. 5. Terreno en dicho barrio de Libato, de 1200
metros cuadrados de superficie, lindante al Norte rio Lawaye; al Este Francisco Marasigan; al Sur
estero Lapa; y al Oeste Benedicto de Villa.".1awphîl.nèt

After Pia de Villa acquired the parcel of land covered by the possessory information Exhibit 6-A
from her father Baltazar, she immediately entered into its possession with the exception of
some portions thereof which she later sold, and continued in said possession until her death. Of
said land, Pia donated a portion containing 12 hectares to Vicente de Villa; sold another
containing 8 hectares to Antonio Adapon; and a portion thereof situated on the eastern portion
part containing an area of 5 hectares was transmitted by succession to her son Jose V. Salud. On
April 16, 1948, defendant Salud sought the registration of this parcel of land, together with
others that belonged to him, for which he secured a torrens title in the manner outlined
elsewhere in this decision.

We may, therefore, say that defendant's theory is as follows: Neither the land in question, nor
the larger tract of land containing 30.5285 hectares of which it was originally a part, was
included in the auction in 1912 of the properties of Esteban de Villa, and so none was
transmitted by plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest to Concepcion Vda. de Padilla, nor devised or
transmitted by the, latter to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs failed to identify the parcel of land which they
claim to be their own. The land in question belonged to defendant's mother Pia de Villa, from
whom he derived his title. And the land which properly belong to plaintiffs is the strip of 1,200 sq.
m. on the eastern edge of another property belonging to defendant which was used by the
Paternos as a road to the provincial highway, which land was the one bought at the auction sale
in 1912.

Predicated upon the evidence presented by both parties in relation to the issues raised by them,
the Court of Appeals reached the following conclusion:.

After a careful perusal of the proofs of record, we are of the firm belief that the land in question
and the bigger Parcel of 30.5285 hectares of which it was originally a part, were not included in
the auction in 1912 of the properties of Esteban de Villa; that these lands were not transmitted
by Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno to Concepcion P. de Padilla; that the land in question was
not devised or transmitted by Concepcion de Padilla to plaintiffs; and that plaintiffs failed to
identify conclusively the land in question over which they claim ownership; that the land in
question belonged to defendant's mother Pia de Villa, from whom he derived his title; and that
plaintiffs' land is the strip of 1,200 square meters used by them as a road from other property
belonging to them, to the Provincial highway.

The evidence of record fully justifies the above finding. It appears that among the lands bought
by the administrator of the estate of Maximino Molo Agustin Pat at the auction sale of the
properties of Esteban de Villa which was of particular interest in this case is the described in the
notice of sale as follows. "No. 5. Terreno en dicho barrio de Libato, de 1200 metros cuadrados
superficie, lindante al Norte rio Lawaya; al Este Francisco Marasigan; al Sur estero Lapa; y al
Oeste Benedicto de Villa." This land only carries an area of 1,200 sq. m. There is nothing to show
that this forms part an original parcel of land containing an area of 30.528 hectares which in
1912 also belonged to Esteban de Villa. The only thing that plaintiffs claim to bolster up their
contention is that when this parcel of land was survey in 1924, together with other parcels of
land bought in auction sale, as a preparatory step for their registration under the Land
Registration Act, it was discovered the parcel No. 5, which was sold to them by the sheriff in
1912, had an area of not only 1,200 sq. m. but 30.528 hectares, which claim certainly is
untenable because a piece of land having an area of 1,200 sq. m. cannot be said be identical to
one having an area of 30.5285 hectares which is more than 250 times bigger. Contrary to
plaintiffs' contention, the boundaries of the two properties are not also the same. The identical
and natural boundaries are only on the north and south - Lawaye river on the north and Lapa
creek on the south; there being no natural boundaries on the east and west, as there are on the
sides merely names of adjoining owners. There is no evidence that these adjoining owners do
not own other land which adjoin other properties of Esteban de Villa al these rivers. This great
difference in area was not satisfactorily explained.

While there are authorities that uphold the proposition that in identifying a particular piece of
land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be considered,1 however, this only
holds true when the boundaries given are, sufficiently certain and the identity of the land
proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can
be disregarded or ignored. Otherwise, the area stated in the document should be followed.2
Thus, in a case where a petitioner claimed in his application to be entitled to the registration of a
parcel of land whose area after the survey turned out to be 626 hectares while the grant given
to him only mentions 92 hectares, the court rejected the claim after laying down the following
principle: "While the proposition of law laid down by the court below may be true to the effect
that natural boundaries will prevail over area, yet when the land sought to be registered is
almost seven times as much as that described in the deed, the evidence as to natural boundaries
must be very clear and convincing before that rule can be applied."3 (Emphasis supplied)
Plaintiffs' contention was, therefore, properly rejected by the Court of Appeals it appearing that
it is only on the north and south sides of the property in question where the natural boundaries
are identical because on the east and west there are no natural boundaries but only the names
of adjoining owners who were not shown not to own other properties adjoining those of
Esteban de Villa. The discrepancy in the measurement of the two pieces of land is so great that
there could hardly be any room to suppose that a 30-hectare land area might have been
wrongly or inaccurately estimated to be only 1,200 sq. m.

Another factor that argues against plaintiffs' claim is the fact that the inventory and partition of
the estate of Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno does not show that the land in question was ever
transmitted to Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest. Nor does
the inventory of the estate of the late Concepcion Paterno de Padilla, which includes all her real
properties in Batangas, makes any mention of the property in question. For this reason, the
Court of Appeals could bring its mind to conform to the claim of plaintiffs the land in question is
the one included in the action sale held in 1912 of the properties of Esteban de Villa and which
was later handed down to them by their predecessor-in-interest Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, as may be seen from the following comment:.

... Moreover, the inventory and partition of the estate of Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno,
shows that the property in question was never transmitted to said Concepcion de Padilla
(Exhibits HH-1 & HH-39). The inventory of Concepcion de Padilla's estate, which included all her
real properties in tangos, failed to mention the property in question. (Exhibit 3). The inventory
mentioned properties of various areas, registered under the Torrens system in the name of
Concepcion Paterno; and the property in question was not then registered under the Torrens
system. It was shown that this inventory was presented by her administratrix before the probate
court and the same was approved by said court, without the objection of the plaintiffs,
notwithstanding their awareness of the pendency of the administration proceedings. Again, in
the project of partition Concepcion de Padilla's estate (Exhibit 4), wherein various properties in
Batangas were adjudicated to the plaintiffs, the property in question was not included. It is
worthy to note that plaintiffs, the administratrix and other instituted heirs, signed the said
project of partition, which was presented to and approved by the court (Exhibit 5). Again, it is
conceded that the project was denominated "partial" project of partition. But this does not refer
to any undiscovered "residuary estate" in Batangas, not adjudicated to the plaintiffs, but the
interest and participation of the deceased testatrix on the properties under administration in
cases Nos. 46058 to 46063, CFI of Manila - to the testate estate of Concepcion's husband
Narciso Padilla (Exh. 4 clause 11). They do not refer to the properties of Concepcion de Padilla in
Batangas, for as far her Batangas properties are concerned, the project of partition was
complete. In fact, answering the question "Are you sure that all properties within the jurisdiction
of the province of Batangas, left by your aunt Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla were
enumerated in that inventory?", plaintiff Antonio Paterno said: "Yes" (t.s.n. p. 117 March 19,
1953), which inventory heretofore stated, does not include the property in question (Exhibit 3).
If, as alleged by plaintiff Antonio Paterno, early as 1929 or 1930, he already knew of his aunt
Concepcion's desire to have all her Batangas properties registered, it not satisfactorily explained
why he or his aunt had not commenced registration proceedings of the land under
consideration, notwithstanding the fact that he received the plan, surveyor's certificate and
technical description of the land (Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2), after the death of his aunt in 1943 and
that the property was allegedly adjudicated to him in 1946. This coupled with the other facts
and factors heretofore discussed, can only, mean that plaintiffs did not acquire the land in
question from their aunt Concepcion de Padilla.
Plaintiffs tried to trace the history of the land in question thru an elaborate exposition of the
chain of tax declarations covering it since 1923, but this cannot help them any as long as the
fundamental question relative to the identity of the land is not resolved. And here, as we have
said, this is not the case. The lower court emphasized the circumstance that the Tax Declaration
No. 8100 in the name of Pia de Villa (Exhibit KK-8) which superseded Exhibit KK-7 was cancelled
in 1922 by Tax Declaration No. 8388 in the name of Jose T. Paterno. But it should be noted that
said Tax Declaration No. 8388 was in the following year 1923 cancelled partially by Tax
Declaration No. 8624 in the name of Pia de Villa, which declares an area of 25.6876 hectares and
by Tax Declaration No. 8623 in the name of Jose T. Paterno which declares an area of 1,200 sq.
m., assessed at P30.00, and for which the tax paid was only P0.26. The position of plaintiffs is
rendered more doubtful by the fact that Pia de Villa and not Esteban de Villa was the declared
owner in 1918 of the large tract of land of which the 5 hectares in question forms part as shown
by the very diagram made by plaintiffs. This can only mean that after the auction sale in 1912,
Pia de Villa was the owner of the entire property in 1918, and that what was sold to Jose T.
Paterno was in fact another land of 1,200 sq. m. owned by Esteban de Villa.

On the other hand, defendant has proven that the property in question belonged to his mother
Pia de Villa from whom he derived his title. The original parcel of land described in the
possessory information title Exhibit 6-a was inherited by Pia de Villa upon the death of her
father Baltazar de Villa. Pia's ownership was even admitted by Plaintiffs. Pia commenced
possession of said land and continued therein until her death except with regard to certain
portions which he disposed of to wit: by donation to Vicente de Villa (1-1/2 hectares), by sale to
Bonifacio Hernandez (5 hectares), and by mortgage to one Adapon (8 hectares), thereby leaving
her five hectares on easternmost portion to her son Jose V. Salud which is land in question. She
declared said piece of land in name for taxation purposes and as early as 1914 she paid the taxes
thereon. Even when she was still alive Pia already adjudicated said property to her son,
defendant herein, although she continued possessing and administer it. Plaintiffs' claim that the
land in question was mortgaged to the Paternos by the De Villa family who owed some money
to Maximino Molo Agustin Paterno whose mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold at
public auction cannot be entertained, for the evidence reveals that it was Esteban de Villa alone,
and not Pia de Villa, again whom the execution was levied upon and that the property sold were
those of Esteban de Villa which, already stated, do not include the property in question.

We believe, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring defendant owner of the
parcel of land claimed in his counterclaim. The evidence shows that plaintiff predecessor-in-
interest Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Villa secured in 1928 Original Certificate of Title No. 49
over a parcel of land of which the land involved here was a part. This parcel of land was
originally acquired by the Paternos in 1912. This was leased to Esteban Villa and Pia de Villa from
1917 to 1925; surveyed Jose T. Paterno on September 25, 1924; was the subject of petition for
registration by the Paternos in 1926, due notice of which was given to the De Villas, and upon
the death of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, it was transmitted to plaintiffs by succession.
Since the land in question was registered in the name of the Paternos in 1928 and it was only on
November 19, 1952, date of defendant' answer, that he sought its reconveyance to him, that
title became indefeasible under Section 38, Act No. 496, a amended by Act No. 3630. Here there
is no proof of irregularity in the issuance of the title, nor in the proceeding incident thereto, nor
is there any claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of said title. Even then, the period of one
year within which intrinsic fraud can be claimed has long expired. This land should, therefore, be
adjudicated to plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that the land claimed in the
complaint belongs to defendant and therefore the complaint should be dismissed. With regard
to defendant's counterclaim, the land therein claimed should be adjudicated to plaintiffs. No
costs.

Bengzon. C.J., Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., and Paredes, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9,
1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan, Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC
No. N-206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided
jointly.

G.R. No. L-35778:

On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for
registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of
Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.

On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of
the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.

On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the
application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging
to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.

On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:

Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during the hearing of
August 8, 1972 that this land, subject matter of this application, was a subject of cadastral
proceeding and that this land was assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41), this
case is ordered re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his
report and/or comment as to whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five
(5) days from receipt hereof.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the lower court a
report stating.

That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely inside Lot
No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad.
Record No. 1097.

xxx xxx xxx

Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62
years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same from
his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938;
that about 8 hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that
kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in
1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous,
open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner.

Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito
Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since 1938, applicant has
possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes
and Silvestre Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between
applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the other; that eighteen (18)
hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.

While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land of the
applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less; that said Luisito Martinez inherited the
land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango
trees on the land,

G.R. No. L-35779:

On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act
No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206,
L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality
of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less,
and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly described and
Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and
(LRC) SWO-13431, respectively.

On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.

On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten
(10) days if the land subject of the application has been issued patents or is the subject of any
pending application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the
Commissioner of Land Registration to submit within the same period his report if the land
applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the
lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have been
passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised
Administrative Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration
Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation stating "that Plans (LRC)
SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, when plotted on the
Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission does not appear to overlap with any previously
titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said Land Registration application will
be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable
Court is received in this Commission to determine whether or not a patent or title has in the
meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."

At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court issued an
Order of General Default against all persons, with the exception of the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo
Martinez represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their respective
oppositions,

On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of
Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.

Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in
her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito
del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support of her application for
registration. On the other hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and
submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the provincial fiscal's office in
this case.

At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified
that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner
since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly
possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of
the land for the years 1970-1972.

Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones working
on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents, on their request to owner Elisa
Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares
of these lands were planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting
vegetables.

Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had known
Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; that she was the one managing the planting
and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also
named Agapito del Rosario worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas
informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.

At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government,
submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of
Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya,
Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as
shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for
Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B,
Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972."

The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on
the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who
was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as
witness to prove that the applicant had possessed the land as owners.

In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9,
1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them
in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.

In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the
Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is without
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496.
Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by
voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration
proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.

It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land
subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey
of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some
portions of Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared
Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."

In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the
petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or
within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such
as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot
numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in
which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in
possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the Government to
him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of time property was
held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known,
during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in possession or
occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and
manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value;
and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as
known. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.

In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the
aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they
were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would
have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public
lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.

Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land,
under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole
world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already
determined by final judgment. 2

Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over
the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted
that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only
portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the
land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of
the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period
required by law.

Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the
Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration Commission
has no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No.
6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are
expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of
the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4

WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18814 July 31, 1962

ANACLETO P. NAVARRO, applicant-appellant,

vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.

Francisco Ventura for applicant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an appeal by Anacleto P. Navarro from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated July 1, 1959, dismissing his application for registration of lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan PSU-
117149, both residential properties located in Malate along the Dewey Boulevard.

The application was filed on February 6, 1958 and docketed as Case No. N-53, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-
14566. The Director of Lands interposed an opposition, alleging that the lots applied for are part
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. Evidence was submitted by
the applicant on February 11 and March 30, 1959, after which the hearing was adjourned to
June 18. On May 8 of the same year the Director of Lands filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds: (1) that the application was barred by prior judgment and (2) that the same was
improper application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48, paragraph (b),
of Public Land Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, which applies only to public
agricultural lands and not to those which are residential in character. The trial court, in its order
from which this appeal has been taken, sustained the motion on both grounds.

It appears that sometime in 1950 the Director of Lands instituted a cadastral proceeding in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (G.L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. 6, G.L.R.C. Cad. Case No. 1) to settle and
adjudicate title to the same lots now in litigation. The Republic of the Philippines claimed them
as part of the public domain. One Caridad Guillen Cortez filed an answer and was later on
substituted by appellant Anacleto P. Navarro, who sought registration of the properties in his
name pursuant to the provision of Section 48, paragraph (b), of the Public Land Act. In the
decision of the aforesaid Court dated July 17, 1954 his claim was denied and the two lots were
declared public lands. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision
of affirmance on June 29, 1957 (CA-G.R. No. L-13983-R). Still unsatisfied, Navarro elevated the
case to this Court for review by certiorari, but the petition was dismissed "for being factual and
for lack of merit" in a resolution dated September 6, 1957.

The plea of res judicata must be upheld. The requisites of this plea are: (1) the former judgment
must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the
first and second actions, (a) identity of parties (b) identity of subject matter and (c) identity of
cause of action. The only controversy here is with respect to the last element, namely, identity
of cause of action, the others being concededly present. In the case of De la Rosa vs. Director of
Lands, et al., G.R. No. L-6311, Feb. 28, 1955; 53 O.G. No. 13, p. 4092 this Court held:

The parcel of land (Lot No. 4) sought to be registered being the same lot already declared public
land in Land Registration Case No. 295, G.L.R.O. No. 30055, where the herein appellant and the
Director of Lands were parties and the applicant therein failed to establish title secured from the
Spanish Government or possession of the land in accordance with the Public Land Act then in
force, the decision in the former case declaring Lot No. 4 as part of the public domain must be
deemed res judicata.

The cause of action in both the present case and the former cadastral proceeding is the
registration of the two lots in question. The specific issue involved is whether the lots applied for
are part of the public domain or have so far been possessed by appellant that he must be
deemed to have acquired title thereto which is sufficient for registration in his name. The
declaration by final judgment in the cadastral proceeding that they are public lands settled this
issue once and for all.

It is contended that the basis for such declaration was the insufficiency of appellant's evidence
in the former case to prove continuous possession by him and by his predecessors-in-interest
since July 26, 1894, as required by the Public Land Law before its amendment by Republic Act
No. 1942, and that since in the present case his claim is based on possession only for a period of
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of his new application in 1958, in accordance with
the amendatory law, the issue has entirely changed and consequently he should have been
allowed to prove such claim. Even on this theory, however, we note that both in the decision of
the Court of First Instance in the cadastral case and in the decision of affirmance rendered by
the Court of Appeals, the fact as well as the length of the alleged possession of appellant and his
predecessors-in-interest were placed in issue and duly passed upon. The appellate court stated
therein:

The evidence of appellant Anacleto P. Navarro stems mainly from his own testimony. He
declared that since 1936, he was lessee of the two lots from the spouses Emilio Arceo and
Margarita Jimenez. He fenced it and built a dike because when it was low tide, part of the land
was submerged in water. He made fillings on the property, planted coconuts thereon and built
two houses, which were destroyed during the liberation of Manila. Sometime later he heard
that the property was sold to Rosario Dumlao, who, in turn, sold it to Bernardino Landeta; that
thereafter the latter sold the land to Caridad Guillen Cortez from whom he (appellant Anacleto
P. Navarro) leased and later bought to property. Appellant Navarro admits that neither Caridad
Guillen Cortez nor her predecessors ever declared the land in question for taxation purposes;
and that none of them paid taxes on said land.

We start with the statement that it is a rule long familiar in this jurisdiction that all lands are
presumed to be a part of the public domain; that to overcome this presumption, evidence must
be more than a mere preponderance and that vague and indecisive proofs are insufficient even
in the absence of opposition on the part of the government.

Considering the averment in appellant's answer to the effect that his title over the two lots is
supposed to have been derived from Margarita Jimenez, the question of whether or not the
latter, that is Margarita Jimenez, ever became owner of the property looms large in the
resolution of the present case. To begin with, it is well to remember, as a pivotal point, that said
Margarita Jimenez only claims ownership over Lot No. 2 which is the smaller of the two lots. Of
course, she made a statement that Lot No. 1 is not included in her claim, but that if, in fairness,
it be disclosed at the hearing that some of it is really owned by her, she would also include that
portion in her claim. This vague and uncertain claim to Lot No. 1 remains what it is, uncertain.
Unable to pin-point her alleged property, Margarita Jimenez, was, during the course of the trial,
taken to the place. And true enough, she laid claim to Lot No. 2 and also but to a small fraction
of Lot No. 1.

On the face of this uncertain evidence, we are persuaded to state that right at this point, Lot No.
1 should be excluded from appellant's claim and declared public land.

Inspite of the averment that the two lots in controversy constitute privately owned property,
the evidence is unanimous to the effect that none of the alleged owners ever declared the land
for taxation purposes. None of them ever paid taxes on the property. It has been truthfully said
that tax declarations and tax receipts constitute evidence of great weight in support of
possession or ownership. Tupaz, et al. vs. Ricamora, et al., 37 Gaceta Official, No. 28, pp. 617,
618; Director of Lands vs. Aaron, et al., CA-G.R. No. 10337-R, October 28, 1954; Director of Lands
vs. Baligod, et al., CA-G.R. No. 8749-R, May 13, 1955; Director of Lands vs. Depositario, et al., CA-
G.R. No. 10308-R, May 20, 1955; Angeles, et al. vs. Duran, et al., CA-G.R. No. 16233-R, March 4,
1957. Any owner, the most ignorant included, knows his obligation of seeing to it that his real
property is declared for taxation purposes and that he regularly pay the taxes thereon. This
obligation could perhaps have escaped the attention of one person. But to say that all the
alleged owners from Juana Guinto, thru Margarita Jimenez and her husband Francisco Arceo,
Bernardino Landeta, Caridad Guillen Cortez and finally appellant Anacleto P. Navarro forgot to
declare the property for taxation purposes and to pay the taxes thereon, is utterly unbelievable.
Moraza vs. El Director de Terrenos, 37 Gaceta Official, No. 129, pp. 2819, 2821. Paraphrasing Mr.
Justice Torres in Cruzado vs. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil. 17, 35, none of the foregoing persons
ever did "believe himself to be the owner of the land he claims."

One look at the sketch, Exhibit 1, and sketch, Exhibit 2, of the Director of Lands, will readily show
why lots 1 and 2 in question could not have been private property. The whole of Lot No. 1 and
part of Lot No. 2 were originally under water forming part of Manila Bay; while the remainder or
upper portion of Lot No. 2 forms part of the mouth of Estero Maytubig which flows into the Bay.

Then there is the oral evidence for the government.

Novardo Advincula, Civil Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, testified as follows: When the
government proposed to extend Dewey Boulevard, he was assigned to locate the right of way
from Cortabitarte to Libertad. He used the plan Exhibit 1 of the Bureau of Lands and was guided
by the technical description furnished by the said bureau in his job to locate exactly the
proposed line of the right of way. In 1939 he made an ocular inspection of the place. It was then
that he found that the two lots in question were under water; so much so, that at that time
there were bancas tied to the poles in that place and that there were no improvements on the
land. Of course, the place at present is no longer under water as it was drained and filled up by
the Bureau of Public Works which dredged the Manila Bay and pumped the dredged soil from
the Bay into the area and throughout Dewey Boulevard Extension. This filling was made before
the war.

Another witness, Enrique Alcantara, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, testified: He knows the
land in question because he was ordered by the Chief Surveyor to identify the adjoining owners;
that the land, consisting of the two lots described in plan Exhibit A has not been included in the
cadastral survey in 1913-1914 because the said lands were outside the shore-line of Manila Bay.
He likewise declared that he executed survey of Dewey Boulevard Extension in 1935; that at that
time he had to wade from Vito Cruz to Libertad for the reason that the water thereon was hip
deep and that Lots Nos. 1 and 2 were under water and no improvements were found thereon. In
1951, so this witness continued, he made an investigation of the adjoining owners of the land in
question and that, then he found that said lots were already filled up. Not knowing who the
owners of the two lots were, he tried to gather information from the Office of the City Assessor
of Manila. The said Office gave out a written statement to the effect that the lots aforesaid
definitely were never declared for taxation or assessment purposes. The fact that the property
in question was under water prior to the filling thereof is corroborated by appellant Navarro
himself. Navarro testified that in the year he leased the land, he built a dike as part of the land
was submerged under water during low tide. During the course of the ocular inspection,
Margarita Jimenez declared that the land she was claiming became high "thru the sand thrown
from the sea by means of the machinery" probably belonging to the government. Tr. ocular
inspection, p. 8.

True it is, that there is testimony in the record calculated to show that when Margarita Jimenez
and her husband acquired this property in 1907, they were informed by their vendor, Jacinto
Villalon — not Juana Guinto — that said Villalon had been in possession of the land since the
Spanish regime. However, the exact date such alleged possession by Villalon commenced has
not been established, and neither appellant nor any of his alleged predecessors in interest, has
shown acquisition of the land by composition title from the Spanish government or by
possessory information title or by any of the legal modes of acquiring public lands.

Upon the facts, the conclusion is irresistible that appellant's evidence is utterly inadequate to
support his claim of ownership over the lots in question.
It is quite clear from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals, in dismissing appellant's claim in
the cadastral case, found it as a fact that he had not possessed the lands in question for even
the thirty years now asserted by him. Such finding is conclusive on the question of possession
and precludes any new litigation concerning it.

The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not
to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate. (National Bank vs.
Barreto, 52 Phil. 818, 824; Escudero vs. Flores, et al., G.R. No. L-7401, June 25, 1955).

One further point may be noted: When Republic Act No. 1942 was approved on June 22, 1957,
appellant's appeal in the cadastral case was still pending in the Court of Appeals and after it was
decided therein he filed before us a petition for review by certiorari, invoking precisely the
provision of the new law requiring only continuous possession, under claim of ownership, for a
period of thirty years to entitle the possessor to apply for judicial confirmation of his imperfect
title. The dismissal of the petition by this Court for lack of merit, therefore, constituted an
adjudication of appellant's claim in the light of such new legislation.

Having thus sustained appellee's plea that this case is already barred by prior judgment, we
deem it unnecessary to pass upon the second legal point raised by him, namely, that the lots in
question being residential in character, they do not fall within the purview of Section 48,
paragraph (b), of the Public Land Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, and hence cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
Regala, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

150 Phil. 801

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Direct appeal taken, by Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc. from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Palawan dismissing the former's application for registration and confirmation
of title over a parcel of land of 414.5144 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of
Panacan, municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan, and more particularly described in
amended plan SC-4782 AMD.

Said application, filed on February 14, 1961, relies upon section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 2061, upon the ground that through its predecessor
in interest, appellant had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and lawful possession
of the land since 1912, under a bonafide claim of acquisition and ownership.

The Director of Lands opposed the application, alleging that it involves a public land covered by
appellant's sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that the land was not awarded to
appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof as determined by an appraisal committee in
July, 1950; and that appellant has no valid title to be confirmed, its possession being, not that of
an owner, but, merely, that of a (sales) applicant of a portion of the public domain.

In due course, the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered judgment sustaining the
opposition of the Director of Lands and, accordingly, dismissing the application. Hence, this
appeal, upon the ground that the lower court had erred in holding that:

1. " * * * the possession and occupation by the applicant-appellant of the land subject of the
application is not the possession and occupation contemplated by the law (subsection [b]),
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942)."

2. " * * * the applicant-appellant's possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application did not exclude the Bureau of Lands."

3. " * * * if the possession and occupation by the applicant-appellant of the land subject of the
application were to be considered as falling under sub-section (b) of section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 there will be many instances
where the government will be defrauded."

4. " * * * the only remedy of applicant-appellant is to continue with its sales application and that
it cannot choose the remedy of confirmation of title because it would be defrauding the
government."

Appellant invokes section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942, which reads:

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

"(a) * * * ***

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for con-firmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."[1]

More particularly, appellant maintains that it is entitled to the registration applied for pursuant
to the above-quoted provision, which authorizes the confirmation of claims of "those who * * *
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application * * *."

In this connection, the lower court had made the following findings of fact:

"Sometime on April 19, 1920, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. filed Sales
Application No. 4782 over a parcel of public land consisting of 1,024 hectares located at
Panacan, Aborlan, Palawan (see Exhs. '1' and '13-A' status Report). The application was given
due course by the Bureau of Lands. Sometime in December, 1930, the Palawan Agricultural and
Industrial Company, Inc. requested the Director of Lands that it be permitted to reduce the area
applied for to 680 hectares because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and
claimed by others, (Exhs. '2' and '2-A'). On November 13, 1933, the Director of Lands wrote a
letter to the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. advising the latter that it had
recommended to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18.00 per hectare
for the land it had applied for sale (Exh. '3'). On November 27, 1934, the Director of Lands
issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied for consisting of 764.0683 hectares setting
the date of bidding for February 27, 1935 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan (Exh. '4'). According to
the records, this auction sale set for February 27, 1935 did not take place because of the request
of the applicant for post-ponement. On June 5, 1936, the applicant wrote to the Director of
Lands praying that its Sales Application No. 4782 be not cancelled, in view of the demand of the
Director of Lands that the sales application be cancelled for lack of interest and that the
company be given time to comply with the condition required by the Bureau of Lands, (Exh. '5').

"According to Exhs. 'G', 'G-1', 'G-2' and 'G-4', Tax Declarations Nos. 342, 1414, 1425 and 1750,
respectively, the applicant had declared the land applied for, for taxation purposes. On the
faced of these exhibits, the following appears: On Tax Decla-ration No. 342 'Purchase
Application'; on Tax Declarations Nos. 1414, 1425 and 1720, appear the words 'S.A. No. 4782'.
In February, 1936, the company protested to the Provincial Treasurer that the land applied for
by it be not subject to real estate taxes, (Exh. '6').

"It also appears from the records that applicant had paid for the necessary expenses for the
survey and had cooperated with the Bureau of Lands surveyor for the survey of the land, (Exhs.
'7', '11' and '20'). On June 13, 1939, a resurvey was ordered by the Director of Lands,
preparatory to the requirement of public bidding, (Exh. '19').

"The land applied for was again set to be sold at a public bidding on May 19, 1941, but the
bidding was again postponed because the applicant company requested its suspension because
it asked for the reconsideration of the appraised value set by the Director of Lands, (Exh. '8'). On
March 24, 1950, the applicant, thru its Attorney Almario, wrote a petition to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources asking that time appraised value be reduced.

"On July 24, 1950, pursuant to the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, a
committee of appraisal reappraised the property and fixed the price of P100.00 per hectare,
(Exhs. '10', '16', '17' and '18').

"On October 9, 1950, the applicant, thru its counsel, Atty. Clemente C. Fontanilla, asked for the
reconsideration of the appraisal, (Exh. '18'). The Bureau of Lands stood pat.

"Since the time the applicant had applied for the land, it took possession thereof partially and
improved portion thereof planting coconuts and other crops. The value of improvements are
reflected in the various tax declarations. The total area, as finally surveyed is 415.5144 hectares
under Amd Plan No. Sc-4782, SWO-34910. This plan as well as the survey was undertaken and
prepared by a public land surveyor instructed to make the survey. The land covered by this plan
is the same land applied for by the applicant under SA-4782, and it is the same plan that was
submitted by the applicant in these registration proceedings.

"On November 24, 1961, in reply to a subpoena issued by the District Land Office of Palawan,
the applicant thru its president, advised the latter for the first time that he will not submit to the
investigation set because they want to wait for the result of their application involving the
present case which was filed sometime in March, 1961."[2]
It is obvious from the foregoing facts which are not and can not be disputed in this direct appeal,
which, as such, is limited to questions of law that appellant's possession of the land in question
was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of its
refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant
manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land
under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the application was submitted. The
trial court was, therefore, fully justified in concluding that applicant's possession was not that of
an owner, as required by law.

This conclusion is assailed upon the ground that said section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141 originally provided that:

"* * * ***

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter."

and that Republic Act No. 1942, which became effective on June 22, 1957, amended said
paragraph (b), not only by dispensing with the requirement that the possession begin not later
than July 26, 1894, but, also by eliminating the phrase "except as against the Government,"
qualifying the possession "under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership" therein called
for.

We find no merit in this pretense, for, under both the original and the amended provision, it is
essential that the applicant hold that land "under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownnership," and appellant herein had never made such claim, except in its present application
for registration, filed on February 14, 1961. All of its acts prior thereto, including its real estate
tax declarations, charac-terized its possession of the land as that of a "sales applicant," and,
consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its
owner. Moreover, the elimination of the qualifying expression "except as against the
Government," found in said section 48(b) as originally enacted, bolsters up the view taken by
the lower court. Indeed, it suggests that the "bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,"
under the amendment by Republic Act No. 1942, must be adverse to the whole world, including
the Government.

Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:

"In the mind of the Court, the possession and occupation by the applicant company of the land
sought to be registered, is not the possession and occupation contemplated by the present law
on this matter (Sub-section (b) Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will be many instances where the
government will be defrauded. If confirmation or registration of title can be done, as it is being
done now by the applicant company, a possessor and occupant of a public agricultural land
under the administration of the Bureau of Lands who has applied for the purchase of the same
will just sit on his right, making the application pending for more than 30 years while he
possesses and occupies the land, declare the same for taxation purposes, pay the corresponding
taxes religiously and consistently, and then after a lapse of 30 years, will abandon his sales
application and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or registration of title. Such
situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators when they passed Republic Act No.
1942, for had it been their intention, our legislators would have been a party to an act of
defrauding our government. * * * "

Appellant brands this process of reasoning as "illogical" and "contrary to law," because,
pursuant to section 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 2061,
the benefits of section 48(b) of the former are available not later than December 31, 1968, so
that those whose possession had not as yet lasted 30 years could not seek a confirmation of
their title. We do not see the violation of the rules of logic or of law alluded to by appellant.
The fact is that, were we to accept its own process of reasoning which we cannot, it being
contrary to the clear and natural import of said section 48(b), as amended appellant could have
sought confirmation of its alleged title as early as 1942 or 1950,[3] or long before December 31,
1968.

WHEREFORE , the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. 117247. April 12, 1996]

MANUEL I. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESMERALDO PONCE, respondents.

SYLLABUS

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; ELEMENT OF IDENTITY OF

CAUSES OF ACTION; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. - It is evident that one of the elements of res
judicata is lacking in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared that identity of causes of action
between Case No. B-46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they both sought registration of the land
formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that the basis for claiming such registration
was different in each case. In Case No. B-46, applicants-spouses Arcadio Ramirez and Marta
Ygonia (herein petitioners parents) claimed that their possession of the land, tacked to that of
their predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al., (allegedly from 1943 onwards), was sufficient to vest
title in them by acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, in LRC Case No. B-526, petitioner
claimed that the duration of possession by his parents (commencing allegedly in 1958),
combined with his own possession (counted from 1988 when he purchased the accretion from
his parents) gave him sufficient title thereto by acquisitive prescription. In other words, because
of the different relevant periods of possession being referred to, the basis of the application in
Case No. B-46 is actually different from that in Case No. 526. Stated in another way, the right to
relief in one case rests upon a set of facts different from that upon which the other case
depended. Hence, there was no res judicata to bar the proceedings in LRC Case No. B-526.

DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:

REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT THE PROPER LEGAL REMEDY IN CASE
AT BAR. - A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not the proper
remedy, especially in this case where the private respondent was not even an oppositor, and
even if he were his remedy would have been an ordinary appeal, which cannot be substituted by
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Manuel I. Ramirez for and in his own behalf.

Renato B. Damasing for private respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Does the judgment in a land registration case denying the application filed in court in 1957 by
the parents of the herein petitioner for the registration of land allegedly formed by alluvial
deposits, which judgment was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1968 and became
final, constitute res judicata as to bar a subsequent application by the herein petitioner to
register the same property?

This is the question tackled by this Court in the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision[1] dated September 6, 1994 of the respondent Court[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 33735,
and the subsequent Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

By a Resolution dated October 23, 1995, the First Division of this Court transferred the instant
case to the Third. After careful deliberation on the submissions of the parties, this case was
assigned to the undersigned ponente, who assumed his position as a member of the Court on
October 10, 1995, for the writing of the herein Decision.

Antecedent Facts

In August, 1929, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Government of the Phil. Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose,[4] declaring that two parcels of land bordering on Laguna de Bay and
identified as Lots 1 and 2 form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging
to the Colegio de San Jose. Ten years later, the Colegio de San Jose sold the said two lots,
together with an adjoining unregistered land, to the Government. The three parcels of land
acquired by the Government became known as the Tunasan Homesite. The Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), which was charged with the administration and disposition of the
homesite, caused the subdivision thereof into small lots for the purpose of selling them to bona
fide occupants.

In December, 1940, Lot 17, Block 78 of the Tunasan Homesite, which was part of Lot 2, and
containing an area of 5,158 square meters, was sold by the RPA to Apolonio Diaz. In May, 1948,
Lot 19 of the same homesite, which was also a part of Lot 2, with an area of 1,170 square
meters, was acquired by Apolonio Diaz, although his son Pastor Diaz was made to appear as the
vendee. In January, 1955, the heirs of Apolonio Diaz transferred their rights to both Lots 17 and
19 to Marta Ygonia, wife of Arcadio Ramirez (said spouses being the parents of herein
petitioner), who paid the balance of the purchase price for the lots. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources approved the deeds of transfer of rights executed by the heirs of
Apolonio Diaz, and in July, 1958, the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale in
favor of Marta Ygonia over Lots 17 and 19.

An original application for registration was filed by spouses Marta Ygonia and Arcadio Ramirez
(docketed as LRC Case No. B-46) with the then Court of First Instance of Laguna in May, 1957. It
had for its subject matter a parcel of land on the eastern side of Lot 17, with an area of 11,055
square meters (later increased to 11,311 sq. meters), which was claimed by the applicants as an
accretion to their land gradually formed by alluvial deposits.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the grounds that the applicants did not
possess sufficient title to the land sought to be registered, and that the land in question is a part
of the public domain. Canuto Ponce (herein private respondents predecessor) also filed an
opposition claiming that the land applied for is foreshore land covered by a revocable permit
granted to him in June 1956 by the Bureau of Lands. The Land Tenure Administration likewise
opposed the application on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, on the ground that,
inasmuch as the Government was the previous owner of Lots 17 and 19, and considering that
only the two lots -excluding the accretion - were sold to the predecessors of the applicant-
spouses, the latter cannot claim ownership of the accretion and the same should be declared as
part of the Governments patrimonial property.

The principal question raised, both in the lower court and on appeal before the Court of Appeals
(in CA-G.R. No. 2893 8-R) was simply whether the accretion came into existence only in 1943, as
the applicant-spouses claimed, or as far back as 1918, as maintained by the oppositors. As the
appellate Court noted, resolution of said question rested on the credibility of witnesses
presented. In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court a quo found for the oppositors, and
denied the application for registration, holding that the accretion, based on preponderance of
evidence, must have been gradual and dated back even before the acquisition of the Tunasan
Homesite by the Government in 1939.

The appellate court upheld the findings of the lower court since the applicants-spouses failed to
show any fact or circumstance of weight which was overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial
court, and since the testimonies of the witnesses for the applicants-spouses were either not
credible or else tended to support the oppositors position instead. The appellate court further
stated:

Considering that the Colegio de San Jose was the owner of Lot 2 (of which lots 17 and 19 are
part) to which the accretion in question is contiguous, it follows that the Colegio de San Jose also
became the owner of said accretion at the time of its formation. Neither the applicants nor their
predecessors can lay a claim of ownership over the land because it is clear from the documents
that the property sold by the Government to Apolonio Diaz which was in turn conveyed to the
applicants (herein petitioners parents) was just a little more than one-half hectare. True it is that
the applicants tried to prove that the heirs of Apolonio Diaz verbally agreed with them to
include the accretion in the transfer deeds, but such oral evidence cannot prevail over the
solemn recitals of the documents. Besides, the heirs of Apolonio Diaz cannot pretend to convey
what did not belong to them.

As a final attempt to have the land in dispute decreed in their names, the applicants claim that
their possession of the land, tacked to that of their predecessors, is sufficient to vest title in
them by acquisitive prescription. However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that from 1918 to
1940 it was Juan Ponce who was in possession of the land, and the possession of Canuto Ponce
commenced from 1940 and extends up to the time this case was being tried. There is therefore
no basis for the applicants claim of acquisitive prescription.[5]

The decision of the Court of Appeals in the above case, promulgated on July 6, 1968, became
final and executory for failure of the applicants-spouses (parents of herein petitioner) to appeal
therefrom.

However, that was not to be the end of the story. Herein petitioner, as the buyer of Lots 17 and
19 from his parents, filed on May 17, 1989, in LRC Case No. B-526, before the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna, Branch XXV, Bian, Laguna,[6] an application for registration of the same land
formed by accretion. After due publication, mailing and posting of notices, the petition was
called for hearing.

Among petitioners witnesses was Mario Lantican, chief of the Forest Engineering and
Infrastructure Unit at Los Baos, Laguna, who testified that the function of said office is to know
whether the property involved is alienable and disposable. He testified that he conducted an
inspection to determine the status of the subject property and prepared a report to the effect
that the land is indeed disposable.

The trial court also noted the following findings in its Order of May 13, 1991:

The REPORT of the Community Environment and Natural Resources states that the parcel of
land, after it has been inspected/investigated, was verified to be within the alienable and
disposable land under the Land Certification Project No. 10-A of San Pedro, Laguna certified and
declared as such on September 28, 1981 pursuant to the Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1627 per BFIC Map No. 3004 (Exh. T). Likewise, (sic) the Director of the Land Management
Bureau in its COMPLIANCE WITH REPORT, dated December 12, 1990, states that the land
applied for registration is not covered by any kind of public land application filed by third
persons, nor by any patent issued by said office (Exh. U).[7]

Thereafter, the court a quo, considering the testimonial and documentary evidence on record,
ruled that applicant (herein petitioner) possessed an imperfect title to the accretion, which
could already be confirmed and registered, and ordered[8] registration and confirmation of title
over the claimed accretion in favor of herein petitioner, and issuance of a decree of registration.
Pursuant to said order a decree of registration was eventually issued, followed by an original
certificate of title.

It was only a matter of time before herein private respondent - son of the late Canuto Ponce -
became aware of the situation. He filed a special civil action for certiorari on February 14, 1994
(which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action) seeking to annul the
land decree issued in favor of petitioner and the judicial proceedings had in LRC Case No. B-526.

In its assailed Decision of September 6, 1994, the respondent Court upheld herein private
respondents contention that the judgment in LRC Case No. B-526 approving the application over
the accretion was improper since the earlier application in Case No. B-46 had been denied,
which denial, as previously affirmed by the respondent Court in CA-G.R. No. 28938-R,
constituted res judicata. The respondent Court ratiocinated:

There is merit in petitioners principal submission that res judicata had set in when private
respondent applied for registration in 1989 over the same lot because of the previous rejection
of the application of private respondents parents in 1960.

All of the requisites of res judicata x x x

xxx xxx xxx

are present which prevent private respondent from relitigating the same issue of registration of
the identical lot. There is no question that the judgment in Case No. B-46 (p. 27, Rollo) became
final after it was affirmed in CA-G.R. No. 28938-R on July 6, 1968 (p. 39, Rollo) which was not
appealed. There is equally no doubt that Case No. B-46 was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the same subject matter and parties. Moreover, there was, between Case No.
B-46 and LRC Case No. B-526, identity of parties, of subject matter and parties (should be cause
of action). The fact that private respondent was not a party in the first registration case (p. 88,
Rollo) is of no moment because private respondent is a successor-in-interest of his parents who
acquired the disputed lot by title in 1988 subsequent to the commencement of the first
registration case in 1960 (Section 49[b], Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, only substantial
identity of parties is required (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; 2 Martin, Rules of Court, 1982
Ed., p. 425).

Similarly, there is identity of subject matter from a mere perusal of Case No. B-46 (p. 13, Rollo)
and Case No. B-526 (p. 48, Rollo) which refer to the same property consisting of 11,311 sq. m.
Lastly, there is no dispute that identity of causes of action between Case No. B-46 and Case No.
B-526 exist since they both sought registration of the land formed by alluvial deposits. (CA
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 36.)

Thus, the respondent Court ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given DUE COURSE. The Order in LRC Case No. B-526 dated
May 13, 1991 and Decree No. N-198605 issued by the LRA pursuant thereto are hereby SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the application (in) LRC Case No. B-526 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

The Issues

The instant petition for review on certiorari raises two issues:

I. Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals committed grave error in the interpretation and application
of the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly on the issue of public domain and

II. Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals committed grave error when it violated the provisions of
Section 38 of Act No. 496, as amended (The Land Registration Act) relative to the doctrine of
non-collateral attack of a decree or title.

However, as we shall soon see, the resolution of this case hinges on the first issue, and there is
really no need to delve into the second.

The Main Issue: Res Judicata

Petitioner argues that res judicata did not apply in the instant case because of the ruling of this
Court in the Case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,[9] which quoted from the decision in
an earlier but similarly titled case, Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,[10] as follows:

But granting for a moment, that the defenses (sic) of res judicata was properly raised by the
petitioner herein, We still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of.
The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent
Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not
the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act.

A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant
from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, and as long as said public lands remains alienable and disposable (now Sections 3 and
4, P.D. No. 1073). (italics supplied)[11]

After careful deliberation and consultation, we find ourselves in agreement with petitioners
contention. Seen from the perspective offered by the aforequoted ruling, it is evident that one
of the elements of res judicata is lacking in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared that
identity of causes of action between Case No. B-46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they both
sought registration of the land formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that the basis
for claiming such registration was different in each case. In Case No. B-46, applicants-spouses
Arcadio Ramirez and Marta Ygonia (herein petitioners parents) claimed that their possession of
the land, tacked to that of their predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al. (allegedly from 1943
onwards), was sufficient to vest title in them by acquisitive prescription.[12] On the other hand,
in LRC Case No. B-526, petitioner claimed that the duration of possession by his parents
(commencing allegedly in 1958), combined with his own possession (counted from 1988 when
he purchased the accretion from his parents) gave him sufficient title thereto by acquisitive
prescription.[13]

In other words, because of the different relevant periods of possession being referred to, the
basis of the application in Case No. B-46 is actually different from that in Case No. B-526. Stated
in another way, the right to relief in one case rests upon a set of facts different from that upon
which the other case depended. Hence, there was no res judicata to bar the proceedings in LRC
Case No. B-526.

Incidentally, the Solicitor General reached essentially the same conclusion in his Comment filed
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33735 before the respondent Court.[14]

As to the parties pleas[15] before the respondent Court for the issuance of an order to cause the
taking of a verification survey to determine whether they are referring to the same parcel of
land or to two different properties, suffice it to say that the disposition of this case is not a bar
to such a survey.[16]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the Order dated May 13, 1991 issued
by the RTC of Laguna, Br. XXV granting registration and confirmation of title in favor of
petitioner is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19940 August 14, 1965

FERNANDEZ KIDPALOS, applicant-appellant,

vs.

BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-19941 August 14, 1965

WALDO KIDPALOS, applicant-appellant,

vs.

BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-19942 August 14, 1965

NABOS VALENCIANO, applicant-appellant,

vs.

BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-19943 August 14, 1965

MAGLIA CAYAPA, applicant-appellant,

vs.

BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-19944 August 14, 1965

SANDO LAMPACAN, BASATEN LAMPACAN, CONSING LAMPACAN and TOPAYNA LAMPACAN,

applicants-appellants,

vs.

BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.

Bienvenido L. Garcia for applicants-appellants.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for oppositor-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal from orders of dismissal of five applications for registration of land on the ground
of res judicata, by order of June 17, 1960, issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, in
its cases Nos. N-40, N-41, N-42, N-43 and N-44.

The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa, Nabos Valenciano, Waldo
Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and Ipang Lebos Vda. de Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining
Company and the Director of Mines in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos.
457, 458, 460, 463 and 549), seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of
certain parcels of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet,
Mountain Province; to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio
Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs; and to recover damages
from the Company. The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding
with the lode patent applications of The Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings
erected on the land in question demolished at the latter's expense. The defendant Baguio Gold
Mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930,
asked for dismissal of the action and damages.

After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al., had failed to
substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter rendered judgment, on July 31, 1958,
finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor
General Stimson, and that it formed part of the Public domain; that from 1927 to 1933, one
George Icard and his son, Joseph, had entered and located therein certain mining claims,
subsequently sold and transferred to the Baguio Gold Mining Company; that the latter had
occupied the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts required by the mining laws to
entitle it to mineral patents therefor until the recent World War II; that after the war the claims
were validated by Act No. 4268 of the Philippine Legislature; that the Mining Company had
acquired beneficial title to the claims by its locations, although the corresponding patents were
still in process at the Bureau of Mines; that "the appellee mining company has acquired a
superior title to that of the plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under litigation" (Rec.
App., pp. 186-220). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the actions by
the Court of First Instance.

In view of the affirmance of the decision of the trial court by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs-
appellants therein resorted to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. L-16649 to

L-16653). The latter, however, declined review in a resolution reading as follows:

In G.R. Nos. L-16649-53 (Maglia Cayapa vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), acting on the petition for
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on July 31, 1958, THE COURT RESOLVED
to dismiss the same on the ground that the issues raised are factual and have no merit, but
without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by petitioner before the same court
regarding the properties herein involved, it appearing that the Court of Appeals, in touching
incidentally on the question of ownership, did so without interfering with the merits of said
registration proceedings. (Emphasis Supplied.)

While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had filed in
Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration, and moved to
dismiss the applications. Proceedings were originally held in abeyance until the appeals in the
preceeding, cases were decided.

The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the oppositor Baguio
Gold Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of
First Instance. The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants then directly appealed to
this Supreme Court.

They assail the order of dismissal of the court below claiming that there could not be res
judicata because (1) the 1960 resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing their petition for
review of the Court of Appeals decision in favor of Baguio Gold Mining Company contained the
reservation "without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by petitioner" (which are the
cases now at bar); and (2) that the former judgment's dispositive portion provided only for
dismissal of the appellant's previous complaint against Baguio Gold Mining Company, and it is
only this dispositive portion that is binding on the parties to the former litigation.

It thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present registration
proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that the parties are the same
(the applicants-appellants Lampacan in Registration Case No. N-44, L.R.C. Record No. N-11914,
now G.R. No. L-19944, being the heirs and successors of the former plaintiff Ipang Lebos Vda. de
Lampacan in the preceding law suit). It is now denied either that the former judgment of the
Court of Appeals was rendered on the merits of the case.

Neither is it disputable that the causes of action in both cases are identical, since in both the
appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the land in dispute, allegedly
invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. While the former cases were reivindicatory
in character and the ones presently before us are land registration proceedings, such difference
in forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule
that a different remedy sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the
former adjudication (Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 322; Juan vs. Go Cotoy, 26 Phil. 328;
Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Francisco vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 1; Sarabia vs. Sec. of
Agriculture, L-16002, May 23, 1961, and cases cited therein). Since there can be no registration
of land without applicant being its owner, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in the
previous litigation declaring that the mining company's title is superior to that of appellant's
should be conclusive on the question in the present case.

Much reliance is placed by appellants on the statements made in this Court's 1960 resolution
declining review of the former judgment of the Court of Appeals,

without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by petitioner before the same court
regarding the properties herein involved, it appearing that the Court of Appeals in touching
incidentally on the question of ownership, did so without interfering with the merits of the
registration proceedings.

The words quoted merely establish that the decision in the reivindicatory action decided by the
Court should not be considered as having decided the pending registration proceedings, since
the nature of both proceedings were different, one being a personal action and the registration
being one in rem. The Court of First Instance could not, in other words, automatically apply the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the registration proceedings. And the reason is plain; the
pronouncement, of the judgment in the former case would not necessarily preclude relitigation
of the issues if res judicata is not invoked, since res judicata is a matter of defense and does not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act on a second suit between the parties on the same
subject matter (cf. Rule 16, Sec. 1 [f], Revised Rules of Court). But the defense having been set
up in the present proceedings, the trial court acted properly in considering and resolving the
same.

Appellants likewise argue that only the dispositive portion of a judgment concludes the parties
and the previous adjudication was merely that appellants' reivindicatory suit should be
dismissed. We find this view unduly restrictive of the salutary rule that issues once previously
threshed out and finally adjudicated should no longer be relitigated between the same parties
on the same subject matter and cause of action. This is the substance of res judicata, without
which multiplicity of actions will be unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that —

Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. (30 Am. Jur. 930)

Or, as stated in Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:

... . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts settled and adjudicated as to causes of
action: Whitaker v. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is
compulsive on the parties as to all points directly involved in it and necessarily determined:
Shirland v. Union Nat Bank, 65 Iowa 96; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 249.

When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final
judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the
same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which, from
motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done The estoppel is not confined to the
judgment, but extend to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or the groundwork upon
which it must have been founded. It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on
which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could
have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the
conclusion: Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; 96 Am. Dec. 733: Board, etc. v. Mineral Point R.R.
Co., 24 Vis. 124; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 257; Wells on Res Adjudicata, sec. 226: 1 Herman
on Estoppel, sec. 111.

In consonance with the foregoing principles, we hold that the findings in the former judgment
(that the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the mining company is superior
to that of appellants), being the basis of the sentence of dismissal, conclude the applicants in the
present case, the previous adjudication being final and rendered on the merits, and there being
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of
these land registration proceeding, by the Court of First Instance of Baguio was in order and
conformable to law.

That at present the law permits registration applicants to proceed on the basis of 30 years'
open, adverse, and uninterrupted possession as owner, instead of requiring, as of yore
continuous adverse possession as owner since 1894, does not help appellants at all. The vesting
of title to the lands in question in the appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company has effectively
interrupted and rendered discontinuous the possession claimed by applicants.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the
ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
and Zaldivar, concur.

G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994

ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN, respondents.

Bautista, Salva, Arrieta, Salva for petitioner.

Arthem Maceda Potian for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1993, which dismissed the petition for certiorari
in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28391-92.

On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to
private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner
Ong Ching Po, died in January 1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986. The
said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the
document was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 9260 dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.

According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to
petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she
demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners
refused to vacate the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong
Ching Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court dismissed
her case. The dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought
the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of
Sale written in Chinese with the letter head "Sincere Trading Co." (Exh. "B"). An English
translation of said document (Exh. "C") read as follows:

Deed of Sale

I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot located on
No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square meters including a one-
story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed and signed the
government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong
(sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely serve
as proof of the sale.

Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another document in
favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the
purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the
reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.

Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong

(Exhibits for the plaintiff, p. 4)

On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to
his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private
respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David Ong
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 53, Manila, docketed as Case No. 85-33962.

On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong
Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No.

86-36818. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with Civil Case No.

85-33962. On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.
On appeal by petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the said court affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.

Hence, this petition.

II

According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred:

(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B" and its translation, Exh. "C") in favor of
petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and

(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and private
respondent (Rollo, pp. 17-18).

As stated by petitioners themselves, what is in dispute ". . . is not so much as to which between
Exhibit "A" and "Exhibit "B" is more weighty, but whether this document is what it purports to
be (i.e., a deed of conveyance in favor of Soledad Parian [private respondent] or it was only
resorted to or executed as a subterfuge because the real buyer (Ong Ching Po) was an alien and
it was agreed upon between Ong Ching Po and his brother (Ong Yee, Soledad Parian's husband)
that the land be registered in the name of Soledad Parian in order to avoid legal complications
and to facilitate registration and transfer and that the said title would be transferred by Soledad
to Ong Ching Po or his successors-in-interest and that she would be holding the title in trust for
him" (Rollo, pp. 19-20).

We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent
as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an
alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous
contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

Assuming that Exhibit "B" is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot
claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.

Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.

Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
domain.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
domain.

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the
Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of
the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which
was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has been
established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor of
private respondent (Exh. "A") is a notarized document.

To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law on said document, petitioners claim that
private respondent admitted that she did not pay anything as consideration for the purported
sale in her favor. In the same breath, petitioners said that private respondent implied in her
deposition that it was her husband who paid for the property. It appears, therefore, that the
sale was financed out of conjugal funds and that it was her husband who handled the
transaction for the purchase of the property. Such transaction is a common practice in Filipino-
family affairs.

It is not correct to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the
law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance.
Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." If what
petitioners meant was that private respondent never lived in the building constructed on said
land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo.

There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po
as trustor and private respondent as trustee. Not even Exhibit "B" can be considered as such a
document because private respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said
"deed of sale," was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express
trust will not suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No express trust
concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence."

Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can
prove an implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with
extreme caution, because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao, 70
SCRA 65 [1976]). It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose,
equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf. De Leon v. Molo-Peckson, et al., 116 Phil. 1267 [1962]).
Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to
introduce the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner
Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing
Corporation and was engaged in business.

The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" and its translation, Exhibit "C",
because these documents had not been properly authenticated.

Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and lost or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed.
But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v.
Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 [1993]).

Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of
sale, Exhibit "B".

The due execution of the document may be established by the person or persons who executed
it; by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or by any person who was
present and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution
thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar, supra).

Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the
trial court rejected her claim and held:

If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness?
Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only on
September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where she apparently resided,
or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court does not believe that she was present during
the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions
to the contrary (Decision p. 6, Records p. 414).

As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed
of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in their possession, private respondent
explained that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they
moved to Iloilo.

As observed by the Court of Appeals:

We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as
even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to his appointment
or employment (Rollo,

p. 10).

It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her
husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3621)

VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3622)

JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3623)

DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
defendant-appellant.

Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.

Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the
Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623.1

On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially
the same allegations.2

In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the
three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the
barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of
Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited
said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his
father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three
parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed
the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of
land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands
of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over
said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax
Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the
permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to
plaintiffs.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two
parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La
Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an
aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were
inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same
from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the
children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and
they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of
the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said
products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands
surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose
in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over
said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942
and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured
permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs
collected monthly rentals from them.

In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of
agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan,
province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land
was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from
his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and
cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his
children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and
possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as
owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land,
planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products
harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land
sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the
Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership
over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after
securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and
plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.

The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that
sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the
defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and
representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and
other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and
destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements
consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements
such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in
question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the
rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their
respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or
constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the
original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa
Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz,
and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned
in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land
(known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate)
contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed
as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No.
7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the
decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of
parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were
made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7,
1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the
decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree
No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land
(Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681
is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision
for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914
in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a
void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the
decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in
the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1
as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the
application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning
because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and
technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical
description appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that
the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants
knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of
the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the
complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of
their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs
over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and
cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of
title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void.3

The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and
entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in their respective
complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration,
dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null
and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null
and void; (4) to declare null and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title No.
735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared
valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor
of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs
the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same;
(7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents and representatives from
disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases.

The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.

Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other
defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of
the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were
all declared in default.

On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three
cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20, 1955.

On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted
by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September
26, 1955.

On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for
reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26, 1955.

On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three
cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of
ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains special and affirmative
defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res
judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156
which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case
the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the
complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants;
(3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state sufficient cause of action, had
prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the
parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No.
7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the
requirements for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the
defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as therein specified.

The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional parties as
plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial court. The defendant, J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its answers to the
original complaints as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the fact that the
amendments to the complaints consist merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as
well as necessary parties-plaintiffs.4

On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1) the actions were barred by
the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs
had not presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a
motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition
to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to
dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to
withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss.5

After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows:

A — Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and
void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever;

B — Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the
Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;

C — Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;

D — Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and
entitled to the possession of the parcels of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their
respective complaints;

E — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the
plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and
Exh. "VV");

F — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the
plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");

G — Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the
plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");

H — Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month
as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;

I — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a
month, as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to
them;.

J — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a
month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to
them; .

K — Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .

L — The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit."6

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965.
However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on
February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February
12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and
amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29,
1965.8

Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the
following errors:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or
was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:

(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;

(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as
applied for and as published in the Official Gazette;

(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;

(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.

II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in
accordance with the law and that, therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land
remains unregistered.

III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear
and decide the same.

IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription and laches,
and in denying the motions to dismiss filed on said grounds.

V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying
the motion to dismiss filed on said ground.

VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from OCT
735.

VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith
and for value.

VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding
damages to, the appellees.

IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing
appellant to pay the costs of these suits.

As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and
the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership
and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective
complaints...."

The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and
the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been rendered without
jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No.
7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 is null and void because the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be
valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all
Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective
complaints.

We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous
documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the conclusions of the trial court
are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this Court.

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial
court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as Parcel 1, having an area of
8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having
an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three
parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square
meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate
area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case
No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of
Parcel 1.9 The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by
the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the
parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.10 It is shown in the survey
plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved
in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh.
29).

The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio
Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of
Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land,
designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of
8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The
application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other
parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing
on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing, containing the
technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the
Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land
Registration issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Insular
Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte
(Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the
plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered
into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the
application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on
condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further
agreed "that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions
established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On
December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No.
7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the
plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that
were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief
of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to
whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original
plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered
by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans
did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings
in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the
adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings
in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6)
undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y
de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one
sixth (1/6) undivided portion.

In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh.
22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did
not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan.

On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring
that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of
Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were
the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion
mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land applied for be registered in the names of
the applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance with the decision and
the amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a
communication to the registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the
decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration be based
upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of
Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July
6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7, 1914
in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in
accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of
8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area
of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice
of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2
has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters
from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and in the notice
of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a
decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to
be registered.

Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de
la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).

1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio because,
according to said court, that title was based on Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No.
7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court
of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.

As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land:
Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The
records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous lots, and most
of those lots had sold to numerous parties — Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision
known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual
and entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the
station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and
others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided,
transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and these transfer
certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title
emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of No. 735.

The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735
would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 — which admittedly includes
the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire area included in
Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less,
and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land
claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less.
In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over
two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial
court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any qualification.

The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision
in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings, after the original application and
notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication
regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the
description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and
description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed
on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration,
as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).

We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without
jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration
court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to
the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the
court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or
by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the
survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment
consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended
application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court
can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by
the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as
the decision concerns the newly included land.11 The reason is because without a new
publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be
prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.12 But if the amendment consists in the
exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of
the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.14

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied
the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas
that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case; and
the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine
whether the amended plan included lands or areas not included in the original plan. In
compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed
the court that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision
of the Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh.
24), We read the following:

Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se

enmendaron los planos unidos a los mismos para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido
objeto de oposicion.

xxx xxx xxx

POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se
ordena:

"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales ...."15

On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a
report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We read the following:.

Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de

fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los
planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar:

1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y
3.a, del Expedients No. 7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere
el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la
1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos
originales.16

And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated
March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey Division was taken into
consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied for by the applicants as
described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown
that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously
included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the
Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in
order to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application
for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431
upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based.

Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and void in the three cases
now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183)
the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acuña
and others) precisely upon the ground that during the registration proceedings, which brought
about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was
ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged
that the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of
registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of recovering
from Pascual Acuña and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda
located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan
del Monte Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none
of the defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed
that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the material facts
were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens
title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This
property was then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older
certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from
Or Certificate of Title No. 735.17 The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs
of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the
ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the registration
proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended,
and no publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding the question of the non-
publication of the amended plan, this Court said:

Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the
Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void, and in support of this contention it stated that, during
the course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for the amendment
of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is
supposed the court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this
connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs.
Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the
rule stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additional
land, different from that included in the original survey is intended to be brought within the
process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of
certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited
cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded
comprehended any part of the land which had been usurped. 18

The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña,
supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this Court because what was involved in
said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land
involved in these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case
states that the action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the
Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acuña and others
"certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of
Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte."19 But what
matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case that is: that when the
original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to include land
not previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the registration of
the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in
the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before
this Court.

The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should
have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced
in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area
stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of
Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as
published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's
decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies
between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the
original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the amended plan,
boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a
republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional
areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court."20

Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is
bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact that
the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10
square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on
this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this
increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land
Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of
Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his
report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not
include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in
compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC
No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor
"despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing
circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was already included in the
original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been
inaccurate; and the error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended
plan was prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of
Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description appearing in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of
counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought
about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings
in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the
nearest millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the
survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute only".21 We
believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of
the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally
included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an
area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference
of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made
and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered
substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.

Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show
its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did not even attempt to
show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within the parcels that they are
claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was
separate and distinct from, and was added to, the land that was covered by the original survey
plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the
registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this
increase of 27.10 square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when
the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect. Neither
is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that
person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of
the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the report of the Chief of
the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of
Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is
amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in
the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order
the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan.22

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a
certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of
the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the
application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not
included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the
decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far — but only in so far — as the land
not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the
jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands
that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had
been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of
title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had
not acquired jurisdiction.23

And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no
jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most
that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar
as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly,
the lower court could not declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole
proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab
initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10
square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire
area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever",
without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and
given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have
a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The
trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that
emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer
certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder
of those transfer certificates of title.

It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of
some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the combined area of Parcel 1
and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that
both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which
have already been acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding
certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision
of the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all
transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court
would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had acquired
portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens title.
The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not
parties in the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere
to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases.

Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration
No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is
different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of hearing of the original
application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different description that
appears in the decree of registration, according to the lower court, is an amendment to the
Original survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should
have been republished; and because there was no such republication the registration court was
without jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error
in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on differences in the
names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1
along its southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in
the record.

In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are
stated as follows:

Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San
Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel
2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and the Roman
Catholic Church.

As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as
follows:
PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate):
On the E. by San Juan River; on the SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et
al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a
road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic Church ...

It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides,
as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in Decree of Registration No.
17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there appear some differences in
the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published
notice of hearing, it appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that
bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda,
Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the
decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the
Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda,
Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the
records, We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in
the notice of hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are
indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern
boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the
lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern
side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had
been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This
LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court
(Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands
on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC
1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than those
very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on
the southwest.

In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the
southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration the words "Santa
Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock &
Co." It will be remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was
ordered amended, and the surveyor, who prepared the amended plan must have found that
what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey
was already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This
can simply mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W.
Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from December,
1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was decided on March 7,
1914.

Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as
finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land Registration acted in consonance
with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the
actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the
recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of
the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the
amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the
correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in
LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered.

In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo vs.
Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:

We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in
the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan
which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land
registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no
such errors have been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the
land registered can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may be
corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by
approved surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final
decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos.

We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in
the three cases now before this Court are on the northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels
labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the
southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names
of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is
of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the
lots claimed by the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the
northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to
make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the
names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1,
because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases.

The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary
of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared that the lands situated
west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No.
7681. The lower court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and
awarded the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622
(appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the
evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant
submitted as their evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official
Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit
Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a
road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19
and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West,
and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice of
hearing as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans,
forming part of the evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes
alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte),
until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from
the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side
are the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29).
Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other
boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of the A.
Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas
had remained as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
This finding of the lower court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three
cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in
the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that
they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa
Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of
Rizal."24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and
the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil
cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735".25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the
parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735.26 The lower
court itself, at the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants
admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are found within
the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735"27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that
they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that
they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even
more than what the appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of
Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this
road had never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings and
rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous.

2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void
upon the ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book in
accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:

During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had
occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that
the Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2.
The sheet containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the
Title, which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land
described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the lands decreed
should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138,
Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of
Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been complied with. Said Section requires that
the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should
consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... 28

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property,
the clerk shall send a certified copy of such decision to the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act
numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to
the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is situated. The register of
deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book" in which a leaf,
or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the
register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be
signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....

The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry,
and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if
married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the
nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the
land as finally determined by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for
transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.

Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the
office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the property included in said
decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the
certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.

This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the
transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the registry.29

The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found
in the Registration Book in the office of the register of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50).30 We have
examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies
all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.

On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land
Registration Office that the decree of registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at
7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received for
transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that
it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila
on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared
owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the
lands covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical
descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on the sheets
constituting the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they
appear on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical
descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the
plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions
appearing on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the
technical descriptions appearing in the decree of registration.

We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do
not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical description is ordinarily
copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is the last part of the
technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the
second page and end on the first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions
of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the
lower court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book
in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and
void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no mention that in the
transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40
of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have also noted — and this fact is undenied —
that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No.
17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
(Exhibit 50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on
that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering
that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical
descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the
transcription of the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the
face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done
in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining
the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the
technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What
matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of
registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the
original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the provisions of
Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in the determination of the validity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496
should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This
Act shall be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its
general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as
was done by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the
decree in the registration book would render null and void the original certificate of title, then it
can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the register
of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an
employee in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration
regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that
he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an original certificate of
title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of
Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which
generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property31; to
make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land
absolute proof of such title32; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of
legality of title33; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and

indisputable.34

We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No.
17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands
claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are
properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower
court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the
very beginning and of no effect whatsoever. 35

In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and
void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found that the registration proceedings that
brought about the decree of registration upon which was based the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We
have held that the Land Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of
registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano
Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed
Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which
embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa
Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The
records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the registration
court had seen to it that no land which was not included in the original survey plan and not
covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings. We
have found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land Registration Office
pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was
fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of
Rizal. We have found also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the
three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735.

In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in
accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of land that are claimed by
the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate of title, what is left for this
Court to decide is whether or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of
land that they claim.

Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is
principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land mentioned and
described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish their objective through
alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC
No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired
nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they
seek the reconveyance to them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they cannot
secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants named in their
complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim.

It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite
stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.

It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had
been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the
certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the
land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who
procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third
party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no
reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from
the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.36

The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in
LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and void and that Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of
declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and
3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the
parcels of land claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower
court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any
statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1
and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the six
parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.

In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show,
that the lower court was correct in annulling Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and in
adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land
claimed by them in their complaints.

But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued
as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that said
certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of
registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands
covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern",
and such decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree.
Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first
instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent
purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period
of one year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is
incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No.
17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any
petition for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from
July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.

Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.37

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an
applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la
Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were
registered as the original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the
original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the
parties named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de
la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these defendants (without
naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named in the three complaints
only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the
other defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared in default.38 It had to happen
that way because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the
ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had
already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to
be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.

The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties
of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a litigation in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.39 During the pendency of the case the properties of the Mayorasgo
Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute,
upon payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997, which
was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13,
1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and assignment
(Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith
issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and
assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the
case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of
title emanating therefrom.40

The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 — which was formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 — clearly indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a regular
transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).

The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad
faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain such a finding of the lower
court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a
purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the
incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the
same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D.
Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when
businesses are promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not
surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of persons
with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and
interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the
properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently approved,
by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly
if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration,
thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the
title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the latter was
also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for value —
even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason
family. The records of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale
of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.

Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in
bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors in interest were in
possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases.
The conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the registered
property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen
that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land
and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by them
declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax
declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the
back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under
Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-
Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili).41 These annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors
of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands
were already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the lands in
question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.42 This is borne by the
statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the
time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where these three were
pending, as follows:

3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which
they are subdividing into small lots for sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2
hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of preliminary
injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having
secured a final judgment against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment
before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of the
execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the
beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which their respective houses stand be not
touched and their possession thereof be respected by defendant J. M. & Co. In other words,
each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on
which the house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these
three or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond
of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever damages he may suffer
by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained

of. 43
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens
certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands
covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title
derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the
lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.

It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of
D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason
y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997
from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not
agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on
bad faith.

The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels claimed by appellees
into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had purchased the subdivision lots, and
the purchasers in turn were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they
bought, based on the transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The
buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and
because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The
purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital,
even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and void all
transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of
Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded
when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under
said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that
are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six
parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought,
are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their
titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the
decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law.44
The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can
rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible.45

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three
cases now before this Court must fail..

It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land
which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors
in interest of the appellees — or any person, for that matter — had not filed a petition for the
review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8,
1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed
any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of
registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in
each of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be
entertained.46 Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance of the lands in
question be entertained because such action had already prescribed, barred by laches,
considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the
complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41
years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed
by the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons
who procured the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six
parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who were innocent
purchase for value. This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997.
As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was
conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled
and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It
has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision.
Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued
transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that
an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less
against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are
claimed by the appellees.47

Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original registered owners that
procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 — even supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.

4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding the validity
and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of this Court in those cases
are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the
three cases now at bar.

(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil., 183),
where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that issued the decree which was the
basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.

(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No.
L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming, either by themselves or
by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of title.

We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of
this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these three cases.

On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio,
Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano
Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now
before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and
Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that
Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land
described in paragraph 2 of their complaint — Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin
claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the
complaint48 that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner,
had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels,
of land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use
of armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the
defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which
included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been
enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the issuance of the title; that the silence
and inaction of the defendants since the date of their original certificate of title showed that
said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that
plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such
that defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants
did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as
described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register of
deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz,
and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same
to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to
execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the
plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the corresponding certificate
be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:

The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set
forth in their complaint, which parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose,
Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present;
that on July 8, 1914, defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land,
which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as
owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants
caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any
action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the "due
process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really are
arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration
proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal notice, because registration is
to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the defendants since the issuance of their
title shows that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of action and that, if it does, the same is
barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but
with new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included
in the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that
defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to
continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended complaint was
denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also
denied. Hence the appeal.

In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:

Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is
erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the action, even with the
amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and
amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on
July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original
and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the
registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof
were served on them and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the
plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during the registration
proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the whole world,
whether served with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the
decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and
quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act).
The supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years
was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the registration proceedings, and their
supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the
registration proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to
continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or right thereto,
because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession
(Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land
Registration Act).

Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acuña case, supra, this
Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree of registration, in
pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is
conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-
in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim
any right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.

But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over
portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin,
joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose
Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined
by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.

In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases
had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs of the persons who were
alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the
complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged
owner of the three parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in
interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to
include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described
in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged
owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in
interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.

In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant
therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the cause of action (assuming
there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case
is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the
First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to
the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses
the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence,
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not
presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also
denied by the lower court.49

In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision
in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in these three cases, ruling that there is no
identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of action, between Civil Case No.
Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.

It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial
court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the
motion to dismiss filed on said ground."50

Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the
appellees in the three cases at bar?

In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of
cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).

We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the
merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have to determine is whether between Civil
Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R.
Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and
of cause of action.

In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject
matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated December 18, 1957, which was based on the
agreement of the parties, it is stated

That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same
parcels of land litigated in them cases Nos. 3621, 8622 and
3623. 51

We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original
complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998),
that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact that the defendants
had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land described in the
complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in
actual, open and continuous possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were
wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the
three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and
deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners and
possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial
and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that
was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three
cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs.52
It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or
purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land.

As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between
Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It
appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose
Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the
defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were
Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed
Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No.
735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the natural persons surnamed
Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family that secured the
registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta
Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties
defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-
156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.

After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a
bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No.
26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual
Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise
of the considered view that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action
of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.

In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two
brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that these three original plaintiffs
had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all
the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of
the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin;
(2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5)
the heirs of Felipa Benin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan
Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622
was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.

In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended
complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers who were already
dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died,
and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided,
the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa
Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.

It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who
was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara,
who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-156.

It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantara
case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and cause of
action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and
3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156
and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and
Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case
No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a
previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in
interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil
Case No. 3623.53

We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.

It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the
three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of
Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership
over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors
in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their
claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs
and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.

When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels of land specified in their
complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and had been in possession of the
same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto
Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the
source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all
the other plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso
Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in
1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681
were taking place before the Court of Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido
Pili were living. The records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative,
had filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of
them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431
that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.

It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias
Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not
only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs
in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in
those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is
different from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No
Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that
claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based on the
alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest — in Civil Case No. 3621
the common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common
predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common
predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of
ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto
Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must
be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who
necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No.
L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in
interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and
possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a
similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin,
of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate of title. As We
have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died
in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914.

And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to
plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 —
the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still the ruling of this Court in that former
case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the
proceedings in the registration court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of
ownership of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be said that the
interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or
successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156
(G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs
or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case
No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim
rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil
Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).

(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November
23, 1960) 55, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was also in question, this Court ruled on
issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio
Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their
complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio
Santiago had since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly,
continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded
and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of their
predecessor that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited
by his eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the
land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came
to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City Civil Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the
children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina
Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already become

final57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, excluding and
rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also
alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include the
parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the
parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of
the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never brought within the
jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application
and publication in the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel
of land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of their
complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs prayed, that
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them;
that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
(37679) included the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered
of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found included in transfer Certificate of
Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be
ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only those lands
included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration.

Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that there was no cause of
action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any,
had prescribed.

This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and
her co-plaintiffs.58 Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the
judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not
operate as res judicata against them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they
did not derive their title from the defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:

We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the
appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11,
5727), can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were not parties to that suit
and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b).
There is authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent
litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit, has actually conducted
or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented
in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstance
is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies
inter se in relation to the property owned in common.

xxx xxx xxx

But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in
the former litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No.

L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the
Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants
herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado,
and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio
Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the
document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.

If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of
the document Annex A, then appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such
ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of action of their complaint,
predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights
resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no
invasion of dominical rights.

It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-
27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to
them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the
document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de
informacion posesoria nor a title by composision con el estado, and it did not establish the right
of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in
that previous case that the document was unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119
of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the three cases at
bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are
not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties
in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are
not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of
this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs
in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which
culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the
plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not
sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded
to any right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.

Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:

(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration
proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does
not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration
proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued
therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against
those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned
by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest
freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior
to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal
encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein).
In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance
of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed
from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a
decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired title by
prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court held:

It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to
establish a cause of action. If such prescription was completed before the registration of the
land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by the
decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after
the decree of registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription
cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).

Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and
indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result of the registration
proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are many other cases
where this Court has made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No.
735.60
In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as
contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it declared the appellees the
owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them, in these three cases.61

We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for
damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 62, considering, as the records show, that the
appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay damages in any form. 63 We believe that
the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a
good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to
embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in
Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed
by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73246 March 2, 1993

DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND J. ANTONIO ARANETA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Jimenez, Leynes & Associates for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

For review before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in the land registration case entitled
J. Antonio Araneta v. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, AC-G.R. CV. No.
00636,1 affirming the lower court's approval of the application for registration of a parcel of
land in favor of applicant therein, J. Antonio Araneta.

Evidence show that the land involved is actually an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen
Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area consists of 187,288 square
meters, more or less. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act No. 496, as amended.

The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that
the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its
predecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the (1973) new Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14.2

The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within
the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed their
oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn.
In an amended application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the
applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment,
there was no republication.

Evidence presented by the applicant include the testimony of Placido Orlando, fishery guard of
Pacific Farms, Inc., who said he has known the disputed land since he attained the age of reason
for some forty (40) years now; that when he first came to know the property it was then owned
by and in the possession of Paulino Castelo, Juan Ambrosio and Julio Castelo, and later on the
whole island was bought by Atty. Vicente Castelo who in turn sold it to J. Antonio Araneta.

Deposition by oral examination of Araneta was also presented, together with documents of sale,
tax declarations and receipts, and survey of property. Applicant, however, failed to present the
tracing cloth plan and instead submitted to the court certified copies thereof.

While this case is pending here in Court, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of
private respondent.3 Apparently, Antonio Araneta had assigned his rights to and interest in
Tambac Island to Amancio R. Garcia4 who in turn assigned his rights and interest in the same
property to Johnny A. Khonghun whose nationality was not alleged in the pleadings.

On October 4, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J.
Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the decision of the lower
court was affirmed on December 12, 1985.

Petitioners raised the following errors:

I. The lower court erred in adjudicating the lands subject of registration to applicant-appellee
despite his failure to present the original tracing cloth plan the submission of which is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character.

II. The lower court erred in not denying registration in favor of J. Antonio Araneta since the
amendment of the application was simply an attempt to avoid the application of the
constitutional provision disqualifying a private corporation — the Pacific Farms, Inc. in this case
— from acquiring lands of public domain.

III. The lower court erred in not declaring the land known as the "Tambac Island" not subject of
registration it being an island formed on the seas.

IV. The lower court erred in adjudicating the land to the applicant under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, despite
absence of any specific invocation of this law in the original and amended application.

V. The lower court erred in not granting the government's motion for reconsideration at least to
enable it to present proof of the status of the land as within the unclassified public forest, and
hence beyond the court's jurisdiction to adjudicate as private property.

VI. The lower court erred in not declaring that the applicant has failed to overthrow the
presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.

From the foregoing it appears that the more important issues are: 1) whether the presentation
of the tracing cloth plan is necessary; and 2) whether the land known as "Tambac Island" can be
subject to registration.
By mere consideration of the first assignment of error, We can right away glean the merit of the
petition.

Respondent claims that the tracing cloth plan is with the files of the Land Registration
Commission, and the only evidence that can be presented to that fact is the request for the
issuance of a certified copy thereof and the certified copy issued pursuant to the request.5
Respondent further argues that failure of the petitioners to object to the presentation of the
certified copy of the tracing cloth plan was the basis of the trial court's denial of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

In a very recent decision of this Court, entitled The Director of Lands v. The Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court and Lino Anit,6 We have ruled that the submission of the tracing
cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for registration. Reiterating Our ruling in Director of
Lands v. Reyes,7 We asserted that failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
fatal it being a statutory requirement of mandatory character.

It is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the
said plan. What is required is the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for and objection
to such requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly.8 This case is no different
from the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra wherein We said that if the original tracing
cloth plan was indeed with the Land Registration Commission, there is no reason why the
applicant cannot easily retrieve the same and submit it in evidence, it being an essential
requirement for registration.

As to the second assignment of error, We are inclined to agree with petitioners that the
amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc., as applicant, to the name of
J. Antonio Araneta Inc., was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. Our Constitution, whether
the 19739 or

1987, 10 prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease. Apparently realizing such prohibition, respondent amended its
application to conform with the mandates of the law.

However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the absence of republication of an
amended application for registration is a jurisdictional flaw. We should distinguish. Amendments
to the application may be due to change in parties or substantial change in the boundaries or
increase in the area of the land applied for.

In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended, nor Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, requires republication and
registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and
reasonable terms. 11 On the other hand, republication is required if the amendment is due to
substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for.

As to the fourth assignment of error. We do not see any relevant dispute in the lower court's
application of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instead of Act No. 496, in adjudicating the land to
the then applicant, assuming that the land involved is registrable. Both laws are existing and can
stand together. P.D. 1529 was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property, in order to facilitate effective implementation of said laws.12

The third, fifth and sixth assignment of errors are likewise meritorious and shall be discussed
forthwith together.
Respondent asserts that contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the reports of the District Land
Officer of Dagupan City, Land Inspector Perfecto Daroy and Supervising Land Examiner Teodoro
P. Nieva show that the subject property is an unclassified public land, not forest land. This claim
is rather misleading. The report of Supervising Land Examiner Nieva specifically states that the
"land is within the unclassified forest land" under the administrative jurisdiction of the then
Bureau of Forest Development.13 This was based on the reports of Land Inspector Daroy and
District Land Officer Feliciano Liggayu.

Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest
and Disposable or Alienable Lands.14 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural
lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of
the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are
not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so
released for alienation. 15 In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified
land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do
so. 16

This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a
positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. 17

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable.18

Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present evidence and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. 19

In this particular case, respondent presented proof that as early as 1921, the subject property
has been declared for tax purposes with receipts attached, in the names of respondent's
predecessors-in-interest. Nevertheless, in that span of time there had been no attempt to
register the same either under Act 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is also rather
intriguing that Vicente Castelo who acquired almost 90% of the property from Alejo Ambrosia,
et al. on June 18, 1958 and from Julio Castelo on June 19, 1958 immediately sold the same to
applicant J. Antonio Araneta on 3 July 1958.

According to the report of Land Investigator Daroy, the land was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Vicente Castelo only in 1958 and the purported old tax declarations are not on
file with the Provincial Assessor's Office.

In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by evidence.20 The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants or of their
predecessors-in-interest way back in 1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.21

Respondent's contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681, certified on August 8, 1927 which was
the basis of the report and recommendation of the Land Examiner, is too antiquated; that it
cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even presented in evidence, is not well taken. As
We have said in the case of Director of Lands v. CA:22

And the fact that BF Map LC No. 673 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within
unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering
the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission there was, in
fact.

Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an unclassified public land as of 1927 and
remains to be unclassified.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession

the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 23 The
conversion of subject property does not automatically render the property as alienable and
disposable.

In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the
unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. We reiterate that the
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 24

In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously consider the matter of the
reclassification of the land in question. The attempt of people to have disposable lands they
have been tilling for generations titled in their name should not only be viewed with
understanding attitude, but as a matter of policy encouraged. 25

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions of the courts a quo are
REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124242. January 21, 2005]

SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S.

BABASANTA, SPS. MIGUEL LU and PACITA ZAVALLA LU, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

From a coaptation of the records of this case, it appears that respondents Miguel Lu and Pacita
Zavalla, (hereinafter, the Spouses Lu) owned two (2) parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-39022 and TCT No. T-39023 both measuring 15,808 square meters or a
total of 3.1616 hectares.

On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land to respondent
Pablo Babasanta, (hereinafter, Babasanta) for the price of fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square
meter. Babasanta made a downpayment of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as evidenced by a
memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of the same date. Several other payments totaling two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) were made by Babasanta.

Sometime in May 1989, Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand the execution of a final
deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of the purchase price. In the same
letter, Babasanta notified the spouses about having received information that the spouses sold
the same property to another without his knowledge and consent. He demanded that the
second sale be cancelled and that a final deed of sale be issued in his favor.

In response, Pacita Lu wrote a letter to Babasanta wherein she acknowledged having agreed to
sell the property to him at fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter. She, however, reminded
Babasanta that when the balance of the purchase price became due, he requested for a
reduction of the price and when she refused, Babasanta backed out of the sale. Pacita added
that she returned the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Babasanta through Eugenio
Oya.

On 2 June 1989, respondent Babasanta, as plaintiff, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 31, of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages[1] against
his co-respondents herein, the Spouses Lu. Babasanta alleged that the lands covered by TCT No.
T- 39022 and T-39023 had been sold to him by the spouses at fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square
meter. Despite his repeated demands for the execution of a final deed of sale in his favor,
respondents allegedly refused.

In their Answer,[2] the Spouses Lu alleged that Pacita Lu obtained loans from Babasanta and
when the total advances of Pacita reached fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), the latter and
Babasanta, without the knowledge and consent of Miguel Lu, had verbally agreed to transform
the transaction into a contract to sell the two parcels of land to Babasanta with the fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to be considered as the downpayment for the property and the
balance to be paid on or before 31 December 1987. Respondents Lu added that as of November
1987, total payments made by Babasanta amounted to only two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) and the latter allegedly failed to pay the balance of two hundred sixty thousand
pesos (P260,000.00) despite repeated demands. Babasanta had purportedly asked Pacita for a
reduction of the price from fifteen pesos (P15.00) to twelve pesos (P12.00) per square meter
and when the Spouses Lu refused to grant Babasantas request, the latter rescinded the contract
to sell and declared that the original loan transaction just be carried out in that the spouses
would be indebted to him in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Accordingly, on 6 July 1989, they purchased Interbank Managers Check No. 05020269 in the
amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in the name of Babasanta to show that
she was able and willing to pay the balance of her loan obligation.

Babasanta later filed an Amended Complaint dated 17 January 1990[3] wherein he prayed for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order and the
inclusion of the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna as party defendant. He contended that
the issuance of a preliminary injunction was necessary to restrain the transfer or conveyance by
the Spouses Lu of the subject property to other persons.

The Spouses Lu filed their Opposition[4] to the amended complaint contending that it raised
new matters which seriously affect their substantive rights under the original complaint.
However, the trial court in its Order dated 17 January 1990[5] admitted the amended complaint.
On 19 January 1990, herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) filed a
Motion for Intervention[6] before the trial court. SLDC alleged that it had legal interest in the
subject matter under litigation because on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land involved, namely
Lot 1764-A and 1764-B, had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage.[7] It
alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and therefore it had a better right over the
property in litigation.

In his Opposition to SLDCs motion for intervention,[8] respondent Babasanta demurred and
argued that the latter had no legal interest in the case because the two parcels of land involved
herein had already been conveyed to him by the Spouses Lu and hence, the vendors were
without legal capacity to transfer or dispose of the two parcels of land to the intervenor.

Meanwhile, the trial court in its Order dated 21 March 1990 allowed SLDC to intervene. SLDC
filed its Complaint-in-Intervention on 19 April 1990.[9] Respondent Babasantas motion for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was likewise granted by the trial court in its Order dated 11
January 1991[10] conditioned upon his filing of a bond in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).

SLDC in its Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that on 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed
in its favor an Option to Buy the lots subject of the complaint. Accordingly, it paid an option
money in the amount of three hundred sixteen thousand one hundred sixty pesos (P316,160.00)
out of the total consideration for the purchase of the two lots of one million two hundred sixty-
four thousand six hundred forty pesos (P1,264,640.00). After the Spouses Lu received a total
amount of six hundred thirty-two thousand three hundred twenty pesos (P632,320.00) they
executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage in its favor. SLDC added that
the certificates of title over the property were delivered to it by the spouses clean and free from
any adverse claims and/or notice of lis pendens. SLDC further alleged that it only learned of the
filing of the complaint sometime in the early part of January 1990 which prompted it to file the
motion to intervene without delay. Claiming that it was a buyer in good faith, SLDC argued that
it had no obligation to look beyond the titles submitted to it by the Spouses Lu particularly
because Babasantas claims were not annotated on the certificates of title at the time the lands
were sold to it.

After a protracted trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on 30 July 1993 upholding the sale of the
property to SLDC. It ordered the Spouses Lu to pay Babasanta the sum of two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) with legal interest plus the further sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
as and for attorneys fees. On the complaint-in-intervention, the trial court ordered the Register
of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the
original of the TCT No. T-39022 (T-7218) and No. T-39023 (T-7219).

Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that since both Babasanta and SLDC
did not register the respective sales in their favor, ownership of the property should pertain to
the buyer who first acquired possession of the property. The trial court equated the execution of
a public instrument in favor of SLDC as sufficient delivery of the property to the latter. It
concluded that symbolic possession could be considered to have been first transferred to SLDC
and consequently ownership of the property pertained to SLDC who purchased the property in
good faith.

Respondent Babasanta appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals alleging in the
main that the trial court erred in concluding that SLDC is a purchaser in good faith and in
upholding the validity of the sale made by the Spouses Lu in favor of SLDC.
Respondent spouses likewise filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the
trial court erred in failing to consider that the contract to sell between them and Babasanta had
been novated when the latter abandoned the verbal contract of sale and declared that the
original loan transaction just be carried out. The Spouses Lu argued that since the properties
involved were conjugal, the trial court should have declared the verbal contract to sell between
Pacita Lu and Pablo Babasanta null and void ab initio for lack of knowledge and consent of
Miguel Lu. They further averred that the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint filed by
Babasanta; in awarding damages in his favor and in refusing to grant the reliefs prayed for in
their answer.

On 4 October 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[11] which set aside the judgment
of the trial court. It declared that the sale between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu was valid and
subsisting and ordered the spouses to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of
Babasanta, and the latter to pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of two
hundred sixty thousand pesos (P260,000.00). The appellate court ruled that the Absolute Deed
of Sale with Mortgage in favor of SLDC was null and void on the ground that SLDC was a
purchaser in bad faith. The Spouses Lu were further ordered to return all payments made by
SLDC with legal interest and to pay attorneys fees to Babasanta.

SLDC and the Spouses Lu filed separate motions for reconsideration with the appellate
court.[12] However, in a Manifestation dated 20 December 1995,[13] the Spouses Lu informed
the appellate court that they are no longer contesting the decision dated 4 October 1995.

In its Resolution dated 11 March 1996,[14] the appellate court considered as withdrawn the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Spouses Lu in view of their manifestation of 20
December 1995. The appellate court denied SLDCs motion for reconsideration on the ground
that no new or substantial arguments were raised therein which would warrant modification or
reversal of the courts decision dated 4 October 1995.

Hence, this petition.

SLDC assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAN LORENZO WAS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD
FAITH BECAUSE WHEN THE SELLER PACITA ZAVALLA LU OBTAINED FROM IT THE CASH ADVANCE
OF P200,000.00, SAN LORENZO WAS PUT ON INQUIRY OF A PRIOR TRANSACTION ON THE
PROPERTY.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE ESTABLISHED FACT THAT THE
ALLEGED FIRST BUYER, RESPONDENT BABASANTA, WAS NOT IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY WHEN SAN LORENZO BOUGHT AND TOOK POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AND NO
ADVERSE CLAIM, LIEN, ENCUMBRANCE OR LIS PENDENS WAS ANNOTATED ON THE TITLES.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT
BABASANTA HAS SUBMITTED NO EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT SAN LORENZO WAS AWARE OF HIS
RIGHTS OR INTERESTS IN THE DISPUTED PROPERTY.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FULL CONCURRENCE
ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT UPHOLDING THE TITLE OF SAN LORENZO AS A BUYER AND FIRST POSSESSOR
IN GOOD FAITH. [15]
SLDC contended that the appellate court erred in concluding that it had prior notice of
Babasantas claim over the property merely on the basis of its having advanced the amount of
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) to Pacita Lu upon the latters representation that
she needed the money to pay her obligation to Babasanta. It argued that it had no reason to
suspect that Pacita was not telling the truth that the money would be used to pay her
indebtedness to Babasanta. At any rate, SLDC averred that the amount of two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) which it advanced to Pacita Lu would be deducted from the
balance of the purchase price still due from it and should not be construed as notice of the prior
sale of the land to Babasanta. It added that at no instance did Pacita Lu inform it that the lands
had been previously sold to Babasanta.

Moreover, SLDC stressed that after the execution of the sale in its favor it immediately took
possession of the property and asserted its rights as new owner as opposed to Babasanta who
has never exercised acts of ownership. Since the titles bore no adverse claim, encumbrance, or
lien at the time it was sold to it, SLDC argued that it had every reason to rely on the correctness
of the certificate of title and it was not obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. Invoking the presumption of good faith, it added that the burden
rests on Babasanta to prove that it was aware of the prior sale to him but the latter failed to do
so. SLDC pointed out that the notice of lis pendens was annotated only on 2 June 1989 long after
the sale of the property to it was consummated on 3 May 1989.

Meanwhile, in an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation dated 27 August 1999, the Spouses Lu informed
the Court that due to financial constraints they have no more interest to pursue their rights in
the instant case and submit themselves to the decision of the Court of Appeals.[16]

On the other hand, respondent Babasanta argued that SLDC could not have acquired ownership
of the property because it failed to comply with the requirement of registration of the sale in
good faith. He emphasized that at the time SLDC registered the sale in its favor on 30 June 1990,
there was already a notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the property made as early
as 2 June 1989. Hence, petitioners registration of the sale did not confer upon it any right.
Babasanta further asserted that petitioners bad faith in the acquisition of the property is evident
from the fact that it failed to make necessary inquiry regarding the purpose of the issuance of
the two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) managers check in his favor.

The core issue presented for resolution in the instant petition is who between SLDC and
Babasanta has a better right over the two parcels of land subject of the instant case in view of
the successive transactions executed by the Spouses Lu.

To prove the perfection of the contract of sale in his favor, Babasanta presented a document
signed by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
partial payment for 3.6 hectares of farm lot situated at Barangay Pulong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna.[17] While the receipt signed by Pacita did not mention the price for which the property
was being sold, this deficiency was supplied by Pacita Lus letter dated 29 May 1989[18] wherein
she admitted that she agreed to sell the 3.6 hectares of land to Babasanta for fifteen pesos
(P15.00) per square meter.

An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence presented by the parties,
irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is
a contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
Contracts, in general, are perfected by mere consent,[19] which is manifested by the meeting of
the offer and the acceptance upon the thing which are to constitute the contract. The offer must
be certain and the acceptance absolute.[20] Moreover, contracts shall be obligatory in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present.[21]

The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares of farm lot situated in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the ownership of the property until
full payment of the price which is a distinguishing feature of a contract to sell, the subsequent
acts of the parties convince us that the Spouses Lu never intended to transfer ownership to
Babasanta except upon full payment of the purchase price.

Babasantas letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein that despite his
repeated requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect
full payment of the price, Pacita Lu allegedly refused to do so. In effect, Babasanta himself
recognized that ownership of the property would not be transferred to him until such time as he
shall have effected full payment of the price. Moreover, had the sellers intended to transfer
title, they could have easily executed the document of sale in its required form simultaneously
with their acceptance of the partial payment, but they did not. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed
by Pacita Lu should legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell.

The distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale is quite germane. In a contract
of sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to
sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full
payment of the price.[22] In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover
ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell,
title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive
suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.[23]

The perfected contract to sell imposed upon Babasanta the obligation to pay the balance of the
purchase price. There being an obligation to pay the price, Babasanta should have made the
proper tender of payment and consignation of the price in court as required by law. Mere
sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to pay without the accompanying
payment is not considered a valid tender of payment.[24] Consignation of the amounts due in
court is essential in order to extinguish Babasantas obligation to pay the balance of the purchase
price. Glaringly absent from the records is any indication that Babasanta even attempted to
make the proper consignation of the amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the sellers
to convey title never acquired obligatory force.

On the assumption that the transaction between the parties is a contract of sale and not a
contract to sell, Babasantas claim of ownership should nevertheless fail.

Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent[25] and from that moment, the
parties may reciprocally demand performance.[26] The essential elements of a contract of sale,
to wit: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the
price; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation
which is established.[27]
The perfection of a contract of sale should not, however, be confused with its consummation. In
relation to the acquisition and transfer of ownership, it should be noted that sale is not a mode,
but merely a title. A mode is the legal means by which dominion or ownership is created,
transferred or destroyed, but title is only the legal basis by which to affect dominion or
ownership.[28] Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, ownership and other real rights over
property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession,
and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition. Contracts only constitute titles or rights to
the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing
the same.[29] Therefore, sale by itself does not transfer or affect ownership; the most that sale
does is to create the obligation to transfer ownership. It is tradition or delivery, as a
consequence of sale, that actually transfers ownership.

Explicitly, the law provides that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from
the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Article 1497 to 1501.[30] The
word delivered should not be taken restrictively to mean transfer of actual physical possession
of the property. The law recognizes two principal modes of delivery, to wit: (1) actual delivery;
and (2) legal or constructive delivery.

Actual delivery consists in placing the thing sold in the control and possession of the vendee.[31]
Legal or constructive delivery, on the other hand, may be had through any of the following ways:
the execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale;[32] symbolical tradition such as the
delivery of the keys of the place where the movable sold is being kept;[33] traditio longa manu
or by mere consent or agreement if the movable sold cannot yet be transferred to the
possession of the buyer at the time of the sale;[34] traditio brevi manu if the buyer already had
possession of the object even before the sale;[35] and traditio constitutum possessorium, where
the seller remains in possession of the property in a different capacity.[36]

Following the above disquisition, respondent Babasanta did not acquire ownership by the mere
execution of the receipt by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of partial payment for the property.
For one, the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu, though valid, was not
embodied in a public instrument. Hence, no constructive delivery of the lands could have been
effected. For another, Babasanta had not taken possession of the property at any time after the
perfection of the sale in his favor or exercised acts of dominion over it despite his assertions that
he was the rightful owner of the lands. Simply stated, there was no delivery to Babasanta,
whether actual or constructive, which is essential to transfer ownership of the property. Thus,
even on the assumption that the perfected contract between the parties was a sale, ownership
could not have passed to Babasanta in the absence of delivery, since in a contract of sale
ownership is transferred to the vendee only upon the delivery of the thing sold.[37]

However, it must be stressed that the juridical relationship between the parties in a double sale
is primarily governed by Article 1544 which lays down the rules of preference between the two
purchasers of the same property. It provides:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater
significance in case of double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an
immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in
good faith, shall be deemed the owner.[38] Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with
good faith that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his
vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his
vendor.[39]

Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds after it had acquired knowledge
of Babasantas claim. Babasanta, however, strongly argues that the registration of the sale by
SLDC was not sufficient to confer upon the latter any title to the property since the registration
was attended by bad faith. Specifically, he points out that at the time SLDC registered the sale
on 30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens on the file with the Register of Deeds,
the same having been filed one year before on 2 June 1989.

Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis pendens obliterate the
effects of delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly had occurred prior to SLDCs
knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta?

We do not hold so.

It must be stressed that as early as 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed the Option to
Buy in favor of SLDC upon receiving P316,160.00 as option money from SLDC. After SLDC had
paid more than one half of the agreed purchase price of P1,264,640.00, the Spouses Lu
subsequently executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor or SLDC. At the time
both deeds were executed, SLDC had no knowledge of the prior transaction of the Spouses Lu
with Babasanta. Simply stated, from the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment of
transfer and delivery of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the
subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect at all on the consummated sale between
SLDC and the Spouses Lu.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property.[40] Following the foregoing definition, we rule that SLDC qualifies as a buyer in
good faith since there is no evidence extant in the records that it had knowledge of the prior
transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the time of the sale of the property to SLDC, the vendors
were still the registered owners of the property and were in fact in possession of the lands. Time
and again, this Court has ruled that a person dealing with the owner of registered land is not
bound to go beyond the certificate of title as he is charged with notice of burdens on the
property which are noted on the face of the register or on the certificate of title.[41] In assailing
knowledge of the transaction between him and the Spouses Lu, Babasanta apparently relies on
the principle of constructive notice incorporated in Section 52 of the Property Registration
Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which reads, thus:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed, or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing,
or entering.

However, the constructive notice operates as suchby the express wording of Section 52from the
time of the registration of the notice of lis pendens which in this case was effected only on 2
June 1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDC had long been consummated insofar as the
obligation of the Spouses Lu to transfer ownership over the property to SLDC is concerned.

More fundamentally, given the superiority of the right of SLDC to the claim of Babasanta the
annotation of the notice of lis pendens cannot help Babasantas position a bit and it is irrelevant
to the good or bad faith characterization of SLDC as a purchaser. A notice of lis pendens, as the
Court held in Natao v. Esteban,[42] serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off
the same, unless he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. Precisely, in this case SLDC
has intervened in the pending litigation to protect its rights. Obviously, SLDCs faith in the merit
of its cause has been vindicated with the Courts present decision which is the ultimate
denouement on the controversy.

The Court of Appeals has made capital[43] of SLDCs averment in its Complaint-in-
Intervention[44] that at the instance of Pacita Lu it issued a check for P200,000.00 payable to
Babasanta and the confirmatory testimony of Pacita Lu herself on cross-examination.[45]
However, there is nothing in the said pleading and the testimony which explicitly relates the
amount to the transaction between the Spouses Lu and Babasanta for what they attest to is that
the amount was supposed to pay off the advances made by Babasanta to Pacita Lu. In any event,
the incident took place after the Spouses Lu had already executed the Deed of Absolute Sale
with Mortgage in favor of SLDC and therefore, as previously explained, it has no effect on the
legal position of SLDC.

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that SLDCs registration of the sale had been tainted by the prior
notice of lis pendens and assuming further for the same nonce that this is a case of double sale,
still Babasantas claim could not prevail over that of SLDCs. In Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,[46]
this Court had the occasion to rule that if a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he
has acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration constitutes a registration in bad faith
and does not confer upon him any right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is
no registration at all, and the buyer who has taken possession first of the property in good faith
shall be preferred.

In Abarquez, the first sale to the spouses Israel was notarized and registered only after the
second vendee, Abarquez, registered their deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds, but the
Israels were first in possession. This Court awarded the property to the Israels because
registration of the property by Abarquez lacked the element of good faith. While the facts in the
instant case substantially differ from that in Abarquez, we would not hesitate to rule in favor of
SLDC on the basis of its prior possession of the property in good faith. Be it noted that delivery
of the property to SLDC was immediately effected after the execution of the deed in its favor, at
which time SLDC had no knowledge at all of the prior transaction by the Spouses Lu in favor of
Babasanta.
The law speaks not only of one criterion. The first criterion is priority of entry in the registry of
property; there being no priority of such entry, the second is priority of possession; and, in the
absence of the two priorities, the third priority is of the date of title, with good faith as the
common critical element. Since SLDC acquired possession of the property in good faith in
contrast to Babasanta, who neither registered nor possessed the property at any time, SLDCs
right is definitely superior to that of Babasantas.

At any rate, the above discussion on the rules on double sale would be purely academic for as
earlier stated in this decision, the contract between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is not a
contract of sale but merely a contract to sell. In Dichoso v. Roxas,[47] we had the occasion to
rule that Article 1544 does not apply to a case where there was a sale to one party of the land
itself while the other contract was a mere promise to sell the land or at most an actual
assignment of the right to repurchase the same land. Accordingly, there was no double sale of
the same land in that case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, of San Pedro, Laguna is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.