G.R. No. 155555.
August 16, 2005 17213 in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24,
20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for
failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the
parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of
the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal,
herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on
November 2, 1964.9 In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married
to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-
issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent,
"Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by
respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of
Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint15against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself
when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her
name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT
in respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be awarded to
them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling,
among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of
the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. 16 (Underscoring
supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an account of the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without
resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on
the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures
(sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the
preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be
determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an
ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish",
while in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent
not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to
establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2,
Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court’s ratio
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Court’s following ruling
in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void.
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In
such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable,
however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was the validity of the two
marriagescontracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the
bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and
Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño
contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was:
which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the
deceased Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was
valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased
Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants
and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x
x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly
ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or
allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an
appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x
x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,22 thus affirmed the trial court’s dismissal
of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred
when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of
action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a
later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to
render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-
trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA
decision bereversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the
instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the
court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements
in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the
issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of
Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name
of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a
reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case;
and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, they had established their status as compulsory
heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners
executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered
on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the
therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions
thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint
for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the
therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have
not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—except the allegations that they are the legal
heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance
of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . 27 (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper
recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 andSolivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance
of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his
petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived
by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage
to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines
another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam
thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse
of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on
Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil
case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and
Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the
decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the
special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a
decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring,inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not
the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was
whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in
1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially
correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the
persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that
Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he
other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to
prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged
status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have declared, in
the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is
improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
[p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In
the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the
decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the
decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring
Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court
denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion,
Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed
the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues,
"whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition
and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate]
proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court held that "[i]n
the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-
equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending,
but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her
claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein
petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in
the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother,
following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition
on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately
deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a
motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other
things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’ agreement to suspend
action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of
the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said
case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground
that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality
and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which
she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the
civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court,
by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case
be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had
not been "legally terminated" as Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not been
delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action
to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83
Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings,or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court
or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of
(Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.,
455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case
for hearing, butallowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no longer" the two
lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs
to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the
special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under
the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had
been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost
the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask
for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s
estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered
and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec.
6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.37
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no
doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to
a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties
to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a
decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C.
ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147,
entitled "Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint
filed by the respondents herein.1
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an
aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu. 2
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico,
Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with
Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On
April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia
Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March
21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of
Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same
property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and
new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot
1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3)
TCT No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4) TCT No. T-
98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580
covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering
Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the
name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.3
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah
Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other
hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera
Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned ½ pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of
land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters –
Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother
of respondent Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’ rights and took possession of the
1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the
land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of
land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann
by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and
Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and
Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the
sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.4
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that
certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16,
1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2)
Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No.
1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by
Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in
the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation
of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto
Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed
a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. 5 They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property. 6
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that the
respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera since they can not demand the partition of the real property without first being declared
as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a
special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed
with the hearing of the case.8 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was
similarly denied.9
Hence this petition.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary
civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate
and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-
questioned documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.10 A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. 11
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an
action in court.12A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to be considered a
real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 14 A plaintiff is a real
party in interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant
is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the
legal right of the former.15 The purpose of the rule is to protect persons against undue and
unnecessary litigation.16 It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of having before it
the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.17 Thus, a plaintiff’s right to institute an
ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to
recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for
reconveyance and partition,18 or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or
documents related thereto,19 this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is
improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the
court in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court
had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file
one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has
lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can
no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution
or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. 22
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the "Declaration of
Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the
allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely
one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out
by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del
Rosario23 is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be
the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the
subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners’ predecessor and by virtue of succession
have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it — except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays — that they
have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of
who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This
must take precedence over the action for reconveyance. 24
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate
their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.
Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding
to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial
court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted
by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for
in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to
protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the
issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to
establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.
Furthermore, in Portugal,25 the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be
achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the case that the
only property left by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have
already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case,
however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property left by the deceased
Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann
presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears
that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed
one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds
that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29,
2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a
petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle
precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed
a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was
alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental
rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De
Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral
court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named
oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession
thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. 2 Among these
lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion
(married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros
Oriental.3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot
No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia
Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the
parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion
was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs
of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate
Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June
1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open
and continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration
has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus,
Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of
registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued
by the Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was
rendered a few months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in
December of 1941.
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered
its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings. 5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary
evidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC
rendered a Decision6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival
of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941
Decision.1avvphi1.net
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of
action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least,
Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the
Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in
its Decision7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for
enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special"
proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have
been especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with the 1941
decision considering that it had been established that the original records in the 1941 case had
already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG
notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be
enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic
does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the
original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise
still belonged to the State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10 and Heirs of
Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action
instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void
because the judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before the
action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription
did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of
land, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of
registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become final. The Court
dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners'
omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite
jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that
"neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case." 12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13 decided in 1961,
wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case
wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and
enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error],
except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the
Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after
five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers
to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner
in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless
the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. x x x
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or
issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no
motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered.14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land
registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et
al. v. De Banuvar, et al.15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a
decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by
prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with
approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court
some years later in Rodil v. Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v.
Ibanez, etc., and Poras17and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of
the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the
land never prescribes.19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription
and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3)
cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases
later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court
of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially
absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the
Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and
educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the
five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration
cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no
provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle
enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or
extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some
other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to
establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such
extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the
finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the
decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the
issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain
any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No.
1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood
and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a
writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
not applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the
registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a
certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has
become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration
as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall
be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The
original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be
sent, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and
the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the
prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing
the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its
clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and
the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration
and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the
officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or
review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the
decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the
failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land
registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property
ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the
judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time
decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be
filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need
for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since
revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the
assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be
with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains.
If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or
order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no
impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical
value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the
promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though
prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial
evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought
to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude
the issuance of the decree of registration.
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the
Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that
neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express
declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite
distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action
for land registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title
previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose
in a land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the
revival of the order of cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which
was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of
prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure
relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived
attained finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps
with good reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring
the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held interest in the subject property,
having divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the
action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the rules of
prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point,
relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum
shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to
employ the rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is
worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in
reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more
unconventional than that inShipside. The property involved therein was the subject of two
separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a
different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this
accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final
judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already been registered in
the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the
petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action
to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two (2)
years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the
execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score.
Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and
indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to
the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The
Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to
exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property, marked by their inability to
oppose the other application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within
the five (5) -year reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its
application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that
matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would
have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already been executed and
which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those
circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration
authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it
be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable,
considering the earlier decree of registration over the same property accorded to a different party.
The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final judgment, with which the
corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by
another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well.
Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta.
Ana as precedent.25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of
Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases.
Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta.
Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final
judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or
modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands
not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating
the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision
constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates’ title over the subject
property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate as res judicata only after the
decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final
decision’s status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res
judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case
altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic’s arguments on this point do not
dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the
standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-
in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted
failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this
case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original
adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration
albeit still in the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest.
Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any
compelling argument to dispute such proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc,
Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order
of September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner’s Report2 and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the
Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institutesummary proceedings for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court’s order
by filing a Notice of Appeal.3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and
served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order of disapproval having been
denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of
Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of
the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a
record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republic’s petition on procedural
and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to
attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13,
2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order
disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial
court’s] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively
dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. On this score alone,
the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the
substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the
presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the
period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the
petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or
 final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
(b) Escheat;
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is
defined as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999). (d) Trustees;

Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is (e) Adoption;
in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition
merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee
spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a
cause of action that can be enforced against any person. (g) Hospitalization of insane persons;

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 (h) Habeas corpus;
denying OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999
disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in
the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its (i) Change of name;
Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (l) Constitution of family home;

Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein (m) Declaration of absence and death;
multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in (n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. – In the absence of special provisions, the
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004 rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
Resolution9 requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
postmaster’s notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the
Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
RULE 72 succession.
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. – Rules of special proceedings are

provided for in the following: Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant
of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court
appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386,
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18,
paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and alllaws, decrees,
to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring
executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent
supplied)
therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court
seals the case in petitioner’s favor.
in disapproving petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her
desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the appellate court.
Petitioner’s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial
court’s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is
not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given
the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct
petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioner’s failure to submit copy of the trial court’s order granting the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court’s observation that petitioner was
also assailing it, petitioner’s 8-page petition10filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely
having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing
discussion.
SO ORDERED.

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY
LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

xxx

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
vs.
apply in all casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL
Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA,
technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
x x x,
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent
to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of
public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is
reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed
by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering
the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443
without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while
each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the
Six children.1âwphi1.nêt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square
meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT
No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT
No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under
TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership
over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his
second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name
of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano
already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may
not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January
1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that
a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are
prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally
prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being
a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance /
annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in
a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the)
sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law
and the facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
 "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to
definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In
special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which
are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of
ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct
and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid
of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in
favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it
must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case
at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants
and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-
appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court.
From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject
to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 andMendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In
essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived". 15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as
the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership,
yet if the interested parties are all heirs,or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation
seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve
settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. 18 The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir
or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation
had prejudiced the legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction
the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 16680 September 13, 1920
BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.
Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged
in the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge
of the Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint
assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his
services and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased
person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit
him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in
law exists for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a)
Section 57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No.
267; (d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila
only. Act No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-
62 of Act No. 190 provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace.
Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of
assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors
to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be
provided, . . . ."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly
authorized by said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section
1 of Act No. 190, which gives us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction
is made between an "action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action"
means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a
'special proceeding."
In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the
Legislature itself, we are driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action"
and a "special proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean
"special proceeding."
There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a
formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or
by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
(People vs. County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides.
The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion.
Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings for
the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate testimony;
to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code
Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)
From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the
judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the
demurrer is hereby overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby
ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge appointing the assessors described
in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to
costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and
his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending
civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo
Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with
the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge
Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5
Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No.
11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of
the required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions
with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the
estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of
Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying
them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First,
they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the
intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest
required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, 18 not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim.
The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and
also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were
declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not
necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right
to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our
focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and
to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of
hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person
interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which
allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the
decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time
and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent,
after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to
creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. 19 However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages
of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate.
Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 22 and it does provide us
with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the
case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to
whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to
implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator
be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not
be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of
the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the
intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to
their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said
proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a
far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and
cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule
or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule
88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from
the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What
practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings
without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered
nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim
and caprice of the heirs x x x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this
court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed
to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action." 24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that
by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
against it. upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their
right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act
which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners. instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85
in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates;
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of
the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be
the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory,
duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of
the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should
their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the
intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and,
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes
upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with
and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court
processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims,
would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases. appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court,
do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but
with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be
a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still,
apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court
even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating
heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge,
the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the
praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the
interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating
that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy
persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said: is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with
all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to
the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
to fulfill such purpose.
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against
Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.
They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26 All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as
we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on
Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons
under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus
Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money
claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification
against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be
dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail? 2
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules
of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this
Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 3
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules
governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shoppingfor
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and
the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions.5
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors'
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of
the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion
is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a
cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.7(Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not
being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
8 discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment
of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing
fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the
action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money
claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the
estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de
Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed
if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite
action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices:
(1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter
with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon
receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other
paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel,
or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or
other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing
were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not
done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of
personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personalservice and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth,whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light
of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only
when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must
then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the
prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be
done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service
would not be practicable.Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol,
Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have
entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of
"may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or
not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary
to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11,
Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)1âwphi1
In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such
distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why
service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been
allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed." 11 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that
it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v.
Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not
been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its
discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest
of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for
the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the
debts and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As
we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The
plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires
the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in
order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute
the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a
written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is
hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in
accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.