Company Philippine Suburban sold to PHHC a land in 1960.

The sale was not registered until 1961.

A provincial Treasurer requested the buyer withhold 30K from the purchase price to be paid to the seller. Said
amount was realty tax for 1961. The amount was paid under protest, with a letter requesting for refund to sec of
finance. Such request was denied.

The seller petitioned for refund claiming that it ceased to be the owner upon the execution of DAS in 1960, and,
consequently, under no obligation to pay the real property tax for the year 1961.

Since the delivery of possession, coupled with the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, had consummated the
sale and transferred the title to the purchaser, we, therefore, hold that the payment of the real estate tax after such
transfer is the responsibility of the purchaser. However, in the case at bar, the purchaser PHHC is a government
entity not subject to real property tax.

***********************************************************************************

PNB vs CA

In 1978, spouses mortgaged 2 parcels of land to PNB for a 24k loan. In 1984, PNB extra-judicially foreclosed
the mortgage and was the only bidder at the public auction sale and on the same day, a Certificate of Sale over
said lots was issued in favor of PNB and was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title. Since the mortgagors
failed to redeem the property, PNB filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was granted.

Before implementation of the writ, petitioner Montano filed a Motion for the Dissolution of the Writ of
Possession alleging that he was instituted as tenant on the subject property even before 1972 by the former
owners of the land; the two lots are the subject matters of CAR Case before the same Regional Trial Court. He
was issued a certification by the Cabiao-San Isidro Agrarian Reform Team that he is an agricultural lessee in the
subject landholding and in line with the ruling in "Clapano vs. Gapultos" that possession of property is given to a
purchaser in Extra-Judicial foreclosure unless a third-party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor, he is to be considered a "third person".
The RTC granted Montano's motion to dissolve the writ of possession. CA favored Montano.

Whether PNB is entitled to a Writ of Possession of the land in question

PNB is not entitled to a Writ of Possession. The Court ruled that, granting that PNB’s title over the subject
property has been consolidated or confirmed in its favor, it is not still entitled to a Writ of Possession, as the
same may be issued in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage only if the debtor is in possession and no
third person had intervened. Such requisite is evidently lacking in the case at bar as it has been established that
Montano has been in possession and finally adjudged as the tenant of the subject landholding, it is evident that
petitioner PNB is not entitled to a Writ of Possession, as possession of the land in question has been granted by
law to private respondent Montano as tenant of subject landholding.
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law. As an incident of ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner form
donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Sec. 7 of R.A.
No. 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to
work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is established.
Northern Motors vs Herrera

In 1970, Ralph Taguba excuted a promisory note for the payment arrangements and on the same date executed in
favor of plaintiff a chattel mortgage over a 1966 Impala sedan, which deed of mortgage — under which it
appears in effect that the said car was purchased by defendant Taguba from plaintiff on installment basis. That
under the terms of the mortgage, upon default in the payment of any installment or interest due, the total
principal sum remaining unpaid, with accrued interest, shall at once become due and payable and the mortgaged
car shall, on demand, be delivered by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. Defendant only paid only a sum of money
and refused to pay the remaining. Pursuant to the terms of the chattel mortgage, defendant Taguba failed and
refused to make such delivery back to the mortaggee. Plaintiff prayed that upon approval of the bond a writ of
replevin be issued for the seizure of the car.

An Order was issued by respondent judge denying petitioner's prayer for a writ of replevin because the rules
"require that an affidavit be submitted alleging that the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, or that he is
entitled to its possession"; and therefore the affidavit attached to the complaint is insufficient, for it is clear
therefrom that plaintiff "is not the owner of the motor vehicle mortgaged to it; and it is not entitled to its posses-
sion merely because the mortgagor has failed to pay the account guaranteed by the mortgage."

Whether writ can be used to recover property

Yes, when the debtor defaults, and the creditor desires to foreclose the mortgaged chattel, he must necessarily
take the mortgaged property in his hands, but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the
creditor must institute an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly. Rule 60 in applying for an order
for replevin, the plaintiff most show that he is "the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof" There can be no question that persons having a spe cial right of property in the
goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor.
Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an
action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he
may find them.

UCPB vs Basco

Facts:

Respondent Basco had been employed with petitioner UCPB for 17 years and also worked as an underwriter
with Coco Life, a subsidiary of UCPB. Respondent was terminated of his employment with the bank for grave
abuse of discretion and authority and breach of trust as Bank Operations Manager and thereafter filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The FVP of UCPB issued a memorandum to its Security Department instructing
it not to allow respondent access to all bank premises. Respondent’s counsel requested for reconsideration but
petitioner bank informed him that the request could not be granted. Sometime after, respondent went to
petitioner’s Makati branch to receive a check and deposit money for a friend. Respondent alleges that while
waiting for his transaction, two security guards approached him and told him to leave the premises. Respondent
pleaded that he be allowed to finish his transactions before leaving and was allowed. Thereafter, respondent was
motioned by a bank employee to get the check he was to receive but the security guard tapped and prevented him
from approaching. The bank employee then walked towards the respondent to hand him the check. Because of
tremendous humiliation and embarrassment, respondent instituted this action for damages against petitioner with
the RTC. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed but deleted the awards for moral and
exemplary damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner bank abused its right when it issued, through petitioner Ongsiapco, the
Memorandum barring the respondent access to all bank premises;

Ruling: Yes, Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel
or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. We agree with the
respondent bank that it has the right to exclude certain individuals from its premises or to limit their access
thereto as to time, to protect, not only its premises and records, but also the persons of its personnel and its
customers/clients while in the premises. After all, by its very nature, the business of the petitioner bank is so
impressed with public trust; banks are mandated to exercise a higher degree of diligence in the handling of its
affairs than that expected of an ordinary business enterprise. Banks handle transactions involving millions of
pesos and properties worth considerable sums of money. The banking business will thrive only as long as it
maintains the trust and confidence of its customers/clients. Indeed, the very nature of their work, the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of officials and employees of the bank is far greater than those
of ordinary officers and employees in the other business firms. Hence, no effort must be spared by banks and
their officers and employees to ensure and preserve the trust and confidence of the general public and its
customers/clients, as well as the integrity of its records and the safety and well being of its customers/clients
while in its premises. For the said purpose, banks may impose reasonable conditions or limitations to access by
non-employees to its premises and records, such as the exclusion of non-employees from the working areas for
employees, even absent any imminent or actual unlawful aggression on or an invasion of its properties or
usurpation thereof, provided that such limitations are not contrary to the law. [General Rule]

On its face, the Memorandum barred the respondent, a stockholder of the petitioner bank and one of its
depositors, from gaining access to all bank premises under all circumstances. The said Memorandum is all-
embracing and admits of no exceptions whatsoever. Moreover, the security guards were enjoined to strictly
implement the same. We agree that the petitioner may prohibit non-employees from entering the working area of
the ATM section. However, under the said Memorandum, even if the respondent wished to go to the bank to
encash a check drawn and issued to him by a depositor of the petitioner bank in payment of an obligation, or to
withdraw from his account therein, or to transact business with the said bank and exercise his right as a
depositor, he could not do so as he was barred from entry into the bank. Even if the respondent wanted to go to
the petitioner bank to confer with the corporate secretary in connection with his shares of stock therein, he could
not do so, since as stated in the Memorandum of petitioner Ongsiapco, he would not be allowed access to all the
bank premises. The said Memorandum, as worded, violates the right of the respondent as a stockholder or a
depositor of the petitioner bank, for being capricious and arbitrary.

The Memorandum even contravenes Article XII, paragraph 4 (4.1 and 4.2) of the Code of Ethics issued by the
petitioner bank itself, which provides that one whose employment had been terminated by the petitioner bank
may, nevertheless, be allowed access to bank premises, thus:

4.1 As a client of the Bank in the transaction of a regular bank-client activity.

4.2 When the offending party is on official business concerning his employment with the Bank with the
prior approval and supervision of the Head of HRD or of the Division Head, or of the Branch Head in
case of branches
Padre vs Badillo

In an earlier case, herein defendants, the Badillos, filed a case on Ownership and Recovery of Possession with
damages against petitioner’s mother, Concesa Padre. The RTC ruled in favour of the Badillo’s declaring them the
lawful owner of the 5/6 portion of Lot no. 4080. The decision became final and executory on November 1986.

On December 1997, the Badillos filed another case against those who occupy a portion of their property which
included some of the defendants of the previous case. The defendants re-entered the property and despite
repeated demands they refused to vacate the same. Since Concesa Padre has passed away, her son, Nilo Padre
was impleaded in the case The MTC ruled in favour of the plaintiffs reviving the previous judgment of the RTC.
Nilo mentions that MTC lacks jurisdiction and Prescription.

Issue: The question that should be settled is whether the RTC correctly affirmed the MTC ruling that it has
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 104.

The Badillo family would have been correct in seeking judicial recourse from the MTC had the case been an
action for ejectment, i.e., one of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court wherein essential facts
constituting forcible entry29 have been averred and the suit filed within one year from the time of unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, as the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over such
suit.30 However, as the alleged dispossession occurred in 1990, the one-year period to bring a case for forcible
entry had expired since the Badillos filed their suit only in December 1997. We thus construe that the remedy
they availed of is the plenary action of accion publiciana, which may be instituted within 10 years. 31 "It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers
to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty."

Whether the case filed by the Badillo family is a real or a personal action is irrelevant. Determining whether an
action is real or personal is for the purpose only of determining venue. In the case at bar, the question raised
concerns jurisdiction, not venue.

Although the Badillo family correctly filed a case for accion publiciana, they pleaded their case before the wrong
court. In civil cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction only if the assessed value of the subject property or interest therein does not exceed ₱20,000.00. 33 As
the assessed value of the property subject matter of this case is ₱26,940.00, and since more than one year had
expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction properly belongs to the RTC. 34 Hence, the MTC has no judicial
authority at all to try the case in the first place. "A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void;
hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or
collaterally.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated July 21 and September 20, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 23 in Special Civil Action No. A-927 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Municipal Trial Court of San Isidro, Northern Samar is DIRECTED to dismiss Civil Case No. 104 for lack of
jurisdiction.

Barrientos vs rapal
Mario Rapal acquired a 235 square meter parcel of land, the said parcel of land was said to be a portion of the
estate of the late Don Mariano. Thereafter, respondent constructed a semi-concrete house on the lot and took
actual possession of the property by himself and through his caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.

Sometime in 1993, respondent allowed petitioner Bienvenido Barrientos and his family to stay on the subject
property as caretakers on the condition that petitioner shall vacate the premises when respondent would need the
property. However, when respondent demanded petitioner to vacate the subject property, the last of which was
made on July 14, 1997, petitioner refused to leave the lot.

Thus, on April 13, 1998, respondent filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and rendered a
Decision3 in favor of the respondent,

RTC reversed decision, reasoning that respondent has not shown any prior lawful possession of the property in
question.

CA reinstate the decision of the MeTC, reversing RTC decision. They determined who between the parties was
first in possession and concluded that respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the lot.

WHETHER THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CAN BE INITIALLY RESOLVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION.

The petition is without merit.

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and
forcible entry suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore physical possession
of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are
intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to
enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and
pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of
ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality. From the various evidence submitted by the
respondent, it can be clearly inferred that respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. The fact that
the Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form submitted by the respondent himself bears no indication that
it was tampered. Thus, based on the evidence presented by the respondent, it can be deduced that petitioner's
occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner was initially permitted by respondent to
occupy the lot as acaretaker. Petitioner even admitted this fact in his Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification
Form. Moreover, all other supporting evidence, such as the Census Survey Certificate17 and construction
material receipts, bolster the fact that respondent was in prior possession of the property before petitioner
entered the same by mere tolerance of the respondent.

Samelo vs Manotok Services

Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land, the respondent
entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot, The lease contract was for a period of
one (1) year, the expiration of the lease contract he petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without
paying the rent. the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that
she vacate the subject premises and pay compensation for its use and occupancy.5 The petitioner, however,
refused to heed these demands.
The respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) and rendered decision in favor of Manotok. The MeTC held that the only issue to be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de facto, and that therespondent had established its
right of possession over the subject premises. It added that the petitioner’s right under the lease contract already
ceased upon the expiration of the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner is already estopped from
questioning the right of the respondent over the subject premises when she entered into a contract of lease with
the respondent.

RTC set aside the MeTC’s decision, and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The respondent had no
right to collect rentals as it failed to show that it had authority to administer the subject premises and to enter into
a contract of lease with the petitioner.

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and reinstated the MeTC judgment. It explained that in an
action involving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the title of his landlord or
assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of
the agreement between themselves.

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject premises “An action for unlawful detainer exists
when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee
or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied."16 "The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved."17
"Thus, when the relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the
parties to inject the question of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw light on the
right of possession." Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing
leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has
previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original
contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. "An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion
will set in when the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has
expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing
leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor."20 As earlier discussed, all these requisites have been
fulfilled in the present case.

German Management
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was
occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the
premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property
which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court.
alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the
Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farm holdings some twelve
to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27;

Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry

Regional Trial Court sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court.

CA court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court. The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an
action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.

Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.

It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.

The respondents said that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to
the promulgation of P.D. No. 27 private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case
against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time
petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that
the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable
possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen
years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which
states, "(I) n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor
who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a
Thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

The decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Catillo vs Cruz
Facts:
Respondent Cruz spouses leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They refused to vacate
the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for
local projects.
The local government filed charges in the MTC, which in turn decided against the spouses.
RTC affirmed the decision.
The spouses didn’t vacate and continued to file cases in the Malolos RTC. The court suspended
the demolition against the property, a determination of the property bounds, and a remanding of the case by
means of a writ of injunction.
The respondents filed a MFR in the MTC. The court ruled in their favor and issued another demolition order.
In order to stop the demolition, the spouses parked container vans around the property.
Superintendent Castillo was told by the mayor to enter the property for maintaining its possession.
Respondents refused. The y filed for a Petition for a writ of amparo and habeas data in Malolos RTC
The same people claimed that the respondents entered the property forcefully with heavy equipment and
arrested them. RTC ruled in their favor.

Issue: Is the writ of amparo and habeas data the correct remedy for the spouses predicament?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutionalrights.
As a response to extrajudicial killings, the court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on Oct. 24, 2007
and the Rule on Habeas Data on 2008. This power was inherent in the Constitutional grant to the courts to
promulgate rules for human rights.
Definitions of the Writs:
a. Writ of Amparo- an available course of action “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity”
b. Writ of Habeas Data- a course that can be taken when the “right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person”.
The limitation of the writs was in the protection of rights of life, liberty, and security.
Sec of National Defense v Manalo- limitation of the Amparo was to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
There must be a violation of these rights by means of an unlawful act. There must be a connection between the
acts and effects of the aforementioned rights.
Tapuz v Del Rosario- “What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
The same case states that the court will only issue the writ after determining the facts ‘ existence from the
supporting affidavits of thNotably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.”
There was no threat to the said rights by the petitioners use of force. They were only protecting property rights.
Their affidavit said: “Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming “IN
POSSESSION.”
Regarding habeas data, there was no allegation of the data collection requirement.
The writs cant be used to stall the execution of a property dispute decision.
The filing should have been barred after their arrest. This was due to the institution of criminal proceedings
running first. They may avail of the reliefs as a motion.

Bejar vs Caluag
On August 2, 2002, the late Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 12, Manila, a complaint for illegal detainer and damages against
Maricel Caluag

Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of light materials consisting of wood and galvanized iron roof
built on government-owned land

On December 21, 1981, plaintiff sold one-half (1/2) portion of the said residential housewith an area of twenty-
two feet in length and fifteen feet in width to Fernando Mijares

Subsequently, plaintiff became the owner in fee simple of the government land where his residential house was
built including the one-half portion he sold to Fernando Mijares,

On September 2, 1991, Fernando Mijares, sold his residential house to Maricel Caluag to be used as a warehouse
for her business

plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand letter to defendant for the latter to vacate the portion of the
property

Despite formal demand from the plaintiff on April 19, 2002, defendant failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to vacate said portion of the property

The MeTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case for want of jurisdiction, holding that the actual issue between
the parties is the enforceability of the subsequent sale by Fernando Mijares to respondent of the subject property;
and that, therefore, jurisdiction properly lies with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

RTC rendered its Decision reversing the Order of dismissal of the MeTC The RTC held that the issue in Civil
Case is who has better possession of the disputed property. The RTC then directed the MeTC to hear the case on
the merits.

Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review, Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
judgment. dismissing Almario Bejar's complaint for lack of jurisdiction is hereby REINSTATED.

In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is who between the contending
parties has better possession of the contested property. By contrast, an accion publiciana, also known as accion
plenaria de posesion,4 is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order to
determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title but within the period prescribed in the
statute of limitations. The second distinction involves jurisdiction. An accion publiciana may only be filed with
the RTC, while a complaint for unlawful detainer or forcible entry may only be filed with the first level courts
earlier mentioned.

An examination of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV does not show that
Almario Bejar was deprived of his possession of the property by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
RTC Decision is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila, for
further proceedings with dispatch.