G.R. No.

81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay
City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay

narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay

ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang

panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako.

Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako
ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils.
ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng
ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC
Card
ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom

said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
 YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE
MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH
FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE
CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF
LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205
which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment
agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be
used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you
have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and

Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of

the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution

under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita
B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty.
Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by
Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and
Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615
R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner
was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team
served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who
voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development
(Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers —
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

Gentlemen:
 On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last
January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was
contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are
the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing,
hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November
3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1,
Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine

Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5)
others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the
Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the
personal properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation,
together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute
robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND

PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for
shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours
from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action,
civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important

matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with
the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be
barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as
one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the
Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that
mayors may not exercise this power:

xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered.
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local
Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated,
rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been
manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and
issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be
validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution,
who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue
warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was
meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to
be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause
for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally
interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he
stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to
issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge
and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that
extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential
Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory
powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the
power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal
recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the
Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the
arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national
 security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the
Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or
non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities
constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or
premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other
implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for
overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a
deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by
Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an
undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to
carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11

xxx xxx xxx

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that
when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in
the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of
express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil.
534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence
is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go
Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949,
956). 12

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional.
It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
 Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment
agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be
used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you
have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and

Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of

the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing

laws. 13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration

constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo

equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/
recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like
used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM"
newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters
and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other

publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE

FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;

and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
 In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of
Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void
by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to
"seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant
which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate
Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the
crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the
English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to
search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode
would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,

whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 19-24; emphases in the original.

2 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.

3 See Ponsica v. Ignalaga, No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647;
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578,
March 16, 1989.

4 Ponsica, supra, 662-663.

5 Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, supra, 21.

6 Pres. Decree No. 1693, "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 38 OF THE LABOR

CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC
SABOTAGE."

7 Supra, sec. 1.

8 Pres. Decree No. 2018, "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLES 38 AND 39 OF

THE LABOR CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF
ECONOMIC SABOTAGE AND PUNISHABLE WITH IMPRISONMENT."

9 No. L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562.

10 Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, No. L-10280, September 30, 1963, 9
SCRA 27; Vivo v. Montesa, No. L-24576, 24 SCRA 155.

11 Go Tek v. Deportation Board, No. L-23846, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 17.

12 Supra, 21-22.

13 Rollo, id., 15.

14 Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA
800, 814-816.
G.R. Nos. 142915-16 February 27, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee

vs.
ROBERT CHIU y WAN and MARK ANTHONY MOLINA y DELA PEÑA, accused.
ROBERT CHIU y WAN, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95,
convicting the appellant Robert Chiu y Wan a.k.a. Robert Chu in Criminal Case No. 98-79368 for
violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
(possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu) and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of ₱1,000,000, and convicting
him and accused Mark Anthony Molina in Criminal Case No. 98-79369 for violation of Section 15
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, involving the sale of 1.13
grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride and sentencing them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as
the minimum penalty, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum penalty.2

The Indictments

On November 3, 1998, appellant Robert Chiu was charged of violating Section 16, Article III in
relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article 1 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, in
an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-79368. The accusatory portion of the said
Information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of November 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 220.40 grams of white
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, a
regulated drug without the necessary license and/or prescription, therefore, in violation of said
law.3

On the same date, another Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-79369 was filed,
charging the appellant and Mark Anthony Molina for violation of Section 15, Article III in relation
to Section 2(e)(f)(o), Article 1 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of November 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully sell or offer for sale 1.13 grams of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, which is a regulated drug.4

The appellant and Mark Anthony Molina were arraigned, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not
guilty to the charges against them.

The Case for the Prosecution5

Sometime in September 1998, the Central Police District Criminal Investigation Unit, Special
Operations Group, headed by SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez and PO1 Jose R. Salazar,
conducted surveillance operations on a suspected shabu dealer, Daniel Henares. In a test-buy
operation held on October 5, 1998, Salazar, with the assistance of a civilian informant, bought a
sachet of shabu worth ₱2,000.00 from Henares at his residence in San Juan, Metro Manila. A
few days later, on October 11, 1998,6 Henares was apprehended for the said sale.7

During the tactical interrogation conducted by the policemen, Henares admitted that he acquired
the illegal drugs from appellant Robert Chiu, a resident of No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong
Lipunan, Cubao, Q.C.8 Fernandez and other police officers of the Special Operations Group
conducted surveillance operations at the appellant’s residence. They learned that Molina’s father
owned the house that the appellant was renting.9 The police officers then decided to conduct a
test-buy operation against the appellant. Fernandez and Salazar were designated as the poseur-
buyers. A female informant, who also happened to be a "close friend" of the appellant, would
then introduce them to the latter.

At about 8:00 p.m. of October 19, 1998, Fernandez and Salazar, together with the female
informant, proceeded to the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao,
Quezon City. When the guard on duty saw the female informant, he opened the gate and led her,
Salazar and Fernandez to the house, which was approximately fifteen meters from the road. The
informant introduced Fernandez and Salazar to the appellant as buyers of shabu. Salazar was
able to purchase ₱3,000.00 worth of the prohibited drug from the appellant. PNP Forensic
Chemist Edwin Zata examined the drugs and submitted Physical Sciences Report No. D-3418-
98, which stated that the drug gave positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug.10

On October 26, 1998, Fernandez filed with the RTC of Pasay City an application for a search
warrant for the search of the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan (Crame),
Cubao, Quezon City, entitled and docketed as People vs. Robert Chiu, Search Warrant No. 98-
0059.11 Attached to the application were the following: (a) Fernandez’ affidavit showing that the
house subject of the search was occupied by the appellant; (b) the deposition of Salazar;12 (c)
the request for the examination of 2.19 grams of shabu earlier purchased from the appellant; (d)
the results of the forensic examination;13 and, (e) a sketch of the house, prepared by Salazar.14

On October 26, 1998, Executive Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 109,
conducted an inquiry into the application. Fernandez testified that although the subject of the
search and the objects to be seized were located in Quezon City, the application for the search
warrant was filed in Pasay City because of the possibility that the regulated drug would be
removed therefrom by the appellant.15 Moreover, there was a need for confidentiality; if the
policemen filed their application in the RTC of Quezon City, there was a possibility that the
information would reach Molina and the appellant. Salazar gave the same response when
questioned by the court.16 The court then issued an Order granting the application and issued
Search Warrant No. 98-005917 which commanded the search any time of the day or night of the
house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan (Crame), Cubao, Quezon City, and to
seize the substances, articles and objects therein described.18

To make certain that the appellant was in the house to be searched when the search warrant
was to be implemented, police operatives led by Fernandez and Salazar decided to conduct
another buy-bust operation against the appellant. Fernandez prepared a ₱1,000.00 peso bill for
the purchase of shabu and placed his initials thereon.19

On November 1, 1998, Fernandez, Salazar, two other officers and the female informant,
stationed themselves at the Petron gasoline station located two blocks from the subject
premises. At about 9:00 a.m., Salazar and the lady informant proceeded to the house at No. 29
North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. The security guard opened the
gate and led the two inside. Salazar informed the appellant that he wanted to buy shabu worth
₱1,000.00 because he had a prospective buyer. The appellant asked Molina to get the shabu
from the room upstairs. The latter did as he was told and when he returned, handed over to the
appellant a plastic sachet containing approximately 1.13 grams of the white crystalline substance
which, in turn, was handed over to Salazar.20 Salazar later reported to Fernandez that the
appellant was in the house. Armed with the search warrant, Fernandez, Salazar, PO1 Gerardo
Granado, PO1 Corpuz and other police operatives forthwith proceeded to the house. The
appellant was just about to leave. Fernandez and the members of the team identified themselves
as police officers and told the appellant that they were in the house to execute the search
warrant issued by Judge Lopez. They showed the warrant to the appellant. After the appellant
read the same, Fernandez suggested that the appellant voluntarily surrender the articles and
substances listed therein. The appellant accompanied Salazar and Fernandez to the second
floor and pointed to his room where the shabu was kept.21

Fernandez had Barangay Chairman Emmanuel Gozun and Barangay Kagawad Oscar Joves
summoned to the house to witness the search to be conducted. When the barangay officials
arrived, Fernandez, Salazar and the other police officers, accompanied by the barangay officials,
searched the rooms of the house and found a Giordano bag containing the following items:

1. undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules placed inside a transparent plastic

envelope;

2. one (1) pc. weighing scale;

3. one (1) cal. .38 revolver "ARMSCOR" bearing SN 71539;

4. five (5) rds. of cal. 38 ammunitions;

5. two (2) rolls of aluminum foils;

6. seven (7) pcs. tooter;

7. one (1) pc. forceps.

8. one (1) bottle of ethyl alcohol;

9. seven (7) pcs. lighter;

10. several pcs. of transparent plastic envelopes;

11. three (3) pcs. (sic) of scissors.22

During the search, the appellant and Mark Anthony Molina stayed in the sala. The appellant and
Mark Anthony Molina were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City, where they were detained.
An Inventory23 of the articles seized based on the search warrant was prepared in the presence
of the barangay officials. The appellant did not sign the inventory but signed an Affidavit of
Orderly Search24 in the presence of the barangay chairman and barangay kagawad. Fernandez,
Salazar and Granado executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension.25

On November 1, 1998, Police Superintendent Cecilio Aguila transmitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory two heat-sealed plastic bags containing white crystalline substances weighing 1.13
grams,26 and another sachet containing white crystalline substances weighing 220.40
grams.27 The first sachet contained the shabu purchased by Salazar on November 1, 1998 while
the second sachet contained the shabu which Fernandez and Salazar found when the search
warrant was implemented. As requested, Forensic Chemist Isidro Cariño conducted a qualitative
examination28 of about 10 grams of the 220.40 grams contained in the second sachet and of the
substances contained in the first sachet. He signed Physical Sciences Report No. D-3594-98
stating that the specimens gave positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.29

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant testified and adduced documentary evidence that he and his wife, Macrina Chiu,
were residents of No. 29-B Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City. He was a naturalized
Filipino citizen. He and his wife had been renting the said house from its owner, Aurora Perez,
since November 1, 1987.30 However, when they could no longer afford to pay the monthly rental,
he and his family were impelled to transfer to his parents’ house at Estacio Street, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City. His wife operated a beauty parlor while he was engaged in the business of
buying and selling motor vehicles, motorbikes and generators for which he earned between
₱40,000.00 to ₱60,000.00 a month. The appellant first met Mark Anthony Molina in 1997, and
thereafter, was a frequent visitor at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao,
Quezon City. He had sold Molina’s motorbike but had not yet taken delivery thereof because it
needed some repairs.

The appellant testified that he was out with friends in the evening of October 31, 1998. At about
5:00 a.m. the next day, or on November 1, 1998, he was on his way home. However, since the
members of his household were probably still asleep and no one would open the gate for him, he
decided to go to Molina’s house at North Road and find out how the repairs on the motorcycle
were coming along. He stayed there until late that morning. He had ₱5,000.00 in his wallet which
he intended to lend to his friend who lives in the Molina compound. He also intended to visit the
graves of his loved ones at the cemetery.

When the appellant was about to leave at 8:30 a.m., Fernandez and Salazar barged into the
house, identified themselves as policemen and demanded to know if he was Robert Chiu. When
he replied that he was, the policemen handcuffed him. The police officers went to the second
floor where they herded Molina, his son and his girlfriend to the ground floor. The policemen
were carrying a Giordano bag. Fernandez had Salazar fetch Barangay Chairman Gozun and
Barangay Kagawad Joves. The appellant then signed the Inventory Report and the Affidavit of
Orderly Search. The policemen confiscated two guns, one of which was placed in a box. The
appellant and Molina were then brought to Camp Karingal on board the latter’s L-300 van.
Fernandez then divested him of his wallet, and was told that he would be released if he could
furnish information on the dealings and whereabouts of a drug pusher named Palit Ulo. He
pleaded to Fernandez to return the ₱5,000.00 to him, but Fernandez got a chair and hit him with
it. The appellant parried the chair with his left elbow. Fernandez then brought him out of the
room. When he asked Fernandez what he wanted, the latter remained silent. Fernandez later
returned him to the sala. At 9:30 p.m. that evening, he and Molina were brought to the police
station for inquest.

The appellant further testified that on October 19, 1998, he was in Alabang visiting a friend. He
denied selling shabu to Salazar in the house at North Road.

The Case for the Accused Mark Anthony Molina

Molina testified that he was the Vice-President for Operations of the ARB Construction Company,
a family corporation which developed residential subdivisions in Las Piñas, Cavite, Novaliches
and Muntinlupa. He was also a member of the Board of Directors of the Immaculada Concepcion
Colleges in Bacoor, Cavite, also owned and controlled by his family. As vice-president of the
ARB Construction Company, he received ₱20,000.00 a month, and as a member of the Board of
Directors of the school, he received ₱12,000.00 a month. He had a six-bedroom house in
Soldier’s Hill, Muntinlupa City, constructed on a 1,400-square-meter lot. He had it rented for
₱20,000.00 a month since 1994 as he and his wife Ditas Alcorez had by then separated. He and
his four-year-old son lived with his parents at No. 54 Van Durren, North Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.

The office of the ARB Construction Company was located at No. 27 North Road, Barangay
Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Q.C., adjacent to the office at No. 29 North Road, was a two-storey
house owned by the company. There were two bedrooms in the second floor where he and his
son Miguel Raphael and his girlfriend Rosemarie "Pinky" Abaya slept. There was a sala and a
kitchen on the ground floor, and there was a motor pool beside the house. The ARB Construction
Company engaged the services of the Viscayno Security Agency to provide security services to
the office. Rodelito Adriano was assigned to guard the house at No. 29 North Road.

Molina stated that he met the appellant Chiu for the first time when they were introduced to each
other by Chester Tan, a dealer of computer equipments. As the appellant was an electrician and
a very good salesman of used cars, they became business partners. The appellant often went to
his house at No. 29 North Road, and even used to sleep there two or three times a week. Molina
confirmed that the appellant had just sold his 1957 Model EMW motorcycle.

In the afternoon of October 30, 1998, a certain Mang Elio visited Molina at No. 29 North Road.
He was carrying a plastic bag and wanted to see the motorcycle in the garage. Shortly after
midnight, Mang Elio told Molina that he was leaving to visit a relative. Mang Elio left his plastic
bag, and Abaya later took it. In the meantime, Molina sought the appellant’s help in putting up his
1957 Model EMW motorcycle for sale. The appellant arrived in the house in the early morning of
November 1, 1998. Molina, his son, and Abaya, were still asleep in one of the rooms at the
second floor. At about 9:00 a.m., Fernandez suddenly barged into the room and identified himself
as a policeman. Fernandez pointed a gun at Molina and ordered the three of them to go
downstairs. They did as they were told and in the sala, saw Salazar, security guards Adriano and
Cortes, and the appellant, who was already handcuffed.

Fernandez showed Molina the search warrant issued by Judge Lopez. Momentarily, Joves and
Gozun arrived and witnessed the police officers search the two bedrooms in the second floor.
After thirty minutes, the barangay officials and the police officers came down, carrying with them
the Giordano bag left by Mang Elio. The policemen prepared an inventory of the items contained
in the bag.

Molina complained that one of his guns which was taken by the policemen was not included in
the inventory. The policemen demanded ₱200,000.00 from him, and had him call his mother, but
the latter refused to give money. Molina, his maid, the appellant, and Abaya, were brought to
Camp Karingal on board the L-300 van owned by the ARB Construction Company. Fernandez
later asked him to testify against the appellant and declare that the latter owned the plastic bag.
Fernandez warned that he would be charged for the sale of shabu if he refused to do so. Molina
did not accept Fernandez’ offer.

Molina testified that he had no idea whether shabu was sold to Salazar in the morning of
November 1, 1998.

On January 27, 2000, the trial court promulgated a decision finding the appellants guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-98-79368, the Court finds the accused Robert Chiu y Wan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, involving the illegal possession of 220.40
grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as "shabu," a regulated drug,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a FINE of
One Million Pesos; and

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-98-79369, the Court finds both accused, Robert Chiu y Wan and
Mark Anthony Molina y dela Peña, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violation of Section 15 of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659,
involving the sale of 1.13 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as
"shabu," a regulated drug, and are hereby sentenced each to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional
 medium, as the minimum penalty, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as
the maximum penalty.

Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the costs.

The plastic sachets containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu"

(Exhs. "D-1" and "D-2") are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby ordered to deliver or cause the safe delivery of the said items to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for safekeeping and disposition after the finality of this judgment.31

The appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. According to the appellant,
Fernandez and Salazar did not adduce evidence before Pasay City Judge Lopez to prove the
urgency of issuing a search warrant in a court having jurisdiction other than the place where the
said warrant would be enforced. Consequently, any evidence obtained based on the said search
warrant was inadmissible. Furthermore, the search warrant was antedated. It was, likewise,
asserted that the Physical Sciences Report submitted by Forensic Chemist Isidro Cariño was
unreliable because of the court’s failure to conduct a qualitative examination of the specimen.

The appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime charged because (a) Forensic Chemist Edwin Zata did not testify and identify
Physical Sciences Report No. D-3418-98;32 (b) the appellant signed the Affidavit of Orderly
Search33 but did not sign the Inventory Receipt;34 (c) the appellant was a victim of extortion
perpetrated by Fernandez and Salazar; (d) the collective testimonies of Fernandez and Salazar
were incredible; and, (e) Daniel Henares was not informed of his constitutional rights when he
was interrogated by the policemen.

The trial court issued an order denying the appellant’s motion. He then appealed the decision.
The accused Mark Anthony Molina did not appeal the decision.

In his Brief, the appellant reiterated the grounds in his motion for the reconsideration of the trial
court’s decision and assigned the same grounds as errors which merit the Court’s perusal.

The appellant asserts that there was no compelling reason for Fernandez and Salazar to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the Executive Judge of the Pasay City RTC. The appellant
asserts that confidentiality is not a compelling consideration for urgency contemplated in SC
Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987, and as held by this Court in Malaloan vs. Court of
Appeals,35 and Ilano vs. Court of Appeals.36 The appellant finally posits that the application for a
search warrant should have been filed in the RTC of Quezon City which had primary jurisdiction
over the matter. Consequently, the appellant insists, the search warrant issued by Judge Lopez
was defective and the articles/objects seized on the basis thereof were inadmissible in evidence.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that:

The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City correctly issued the search warrant in this case, albeit it
was served in Quezon City. It has been settled that there is no law or rule which prohibits a
branch of a regional trial court to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction. After all, a search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals (244 SCRA 346 [1995]), this Honorable Court
reiterating the ruling in Malaloan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (232 SCRA 249 [1994]) held
that when necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place, a court may issue a search warrant covering a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. What
is important is the strict implementation of the search warrant within the premises specifically
described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court
(Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume Two, 1995 Edition, pp. 533-535).37
The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.

Section 1, SC Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987, which was in force when the application for
a search warrant was filed, provides viz:

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violations of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes
against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of
firearms and/or ammunitions and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court
under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.

In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,38 we held that a search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, such application for a search
warrant may be filed in territorial jurisdiction other than where the illegal articles sought to be
seized are located. We also held that Circular No. 1939 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the Executive Judge mentioned therein; it is not a mandate for the exclusion of all
other courts and that a court whose territory does not embrace the place to be searched may
issue a search warrant where the application is necessitated and justified by compelling
consideration of urgency, subject, time and place, thus:

Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves
directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other
judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act
only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. The phrase above- quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the
assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and
not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts…40

"Urgent" means pressing; calling for immediate attention.41 The court must take into account and
consider not only the "subject" but the time and place of the enforcement of the search warrant
as well. The determination of the existence of compelling considerations of urgency, and the
subject, time and place necessitating and justifying the filing of an application for a search
warrant with a court other than the court having territorial jurisdiction over the place to be
searched and things to be seized or where the materials are found is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court where the application is filed, subject to review by the appellate court
in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

In this case, Fernandez filed the application for a search warrant with the Pasay City RTC
instead of the Quezon City RTC because of the possibility that the shabu would be removed by
the appellant from No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. Indeed,
as shown by the evidence, the appellant had a residence other than No. 29 North Road where he
sold shabu. There was also the pervading concern of the police officers that if they filed the
application in Quezon City where the appellant plied his illicit activities, it may somehow come to
the knowledge of Molina and the appellant, thus, rendering the enforcement of any search
warrant issued by the court to be a useless effort. We find and so hold that Judge Lopez did not
err in taking cognizance of and granting the questioned application for a search warrant.

Additionally, the appellant did not raise, at the trial court, the issues of the validity of the search
warrant, the propriety of its enforcement in Quezon City, as well as the admissibility of the shabu
against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized. The appellant’s objection to the
admissibility of the search warrant was grounded merely on the "lack of veracity (sic)" thereof.
Such omission constituted a waiver by the appellant of the protection under Section 2, Article II of
the Constitution.42
The appellant’s contention that the date of the trial court’s issuance of the search warrant which
appears to be "October 21, 1998" was altered and made to appear "October 26, 1998" without
authority from the issuing judge is belied by the records. Even a cursory reading of the search
warrant will readily show that the date "October 21, 1998" originally typewritten on the search
warrant was altered and changed with the authority of Judge Lopez as shown by the latter’s
initials beside the date "26th day of October 1998." The alteration was authenticated by no less
than the Executive Judge herself.

Case law has it that the forensic chemist is not mandated to examine the entire mass of shabu
confiscated by the policemen, in this case, 220.40 grams. It is enough that a sample of the said
substance be subjected to qualitative examination. In People vs. Julian Fernandez,43 and People
vs. Medenilla,44 we held that a sample taken from one package is logically presumed to be
representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by the accused
himself. The appellant failed to adduce such evidence.

There was no need for the prosecution to present Forensic Chemist Edwin Zata because the
shabu he examined was not the subject of the cases filed against the appellant in the trial court.
The prosecution presented Forensic Chemist Isidro Cariño who affirmed the veracity of his report
on his examination of the shabu subject of the charges against the appellant.

The bare fact that Daniel Henares was not informed of his constitutional rights when he
confessed to the police officers that the shabu he had sold to Salazar on October 19, 1998 was
from the appellant, is irrelevant in this case. The appellant was not arrested on the basis of the
information relayed by Daniel Henares to the police officers. A "test-buy" operation was
conducted against the appellant on October 19, 1998 before the application for a search warrant
was filed by the police officers with Judge Lopez on October 26, 1998. The appellant was
arrested by the police officers only after the sale of shabu by the appellant to Salazar on March
1, 1998 and the subsequent implementation of the search warrant on the said date.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-79368 and 98-79369 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on leave.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Judge Diosdado Madarang Peralta, now Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on January 27, 2000.

2 Rollo, p. 66.

3 Records, p. 1.

4 Id. at 199.

5The prosecution presented Forensic Chemist Isidro Cariño, SPO1 Edgardo C.

Fernandez and PO1 Jose Salazar.
6 TSN, 21 January 1999, p. 21.

7 Exhibit "W," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 54-55.

8 TSN, 21 January 1999, p. 20.

9 TSN, 9 February 1999, p. 11.

10 Exhibit "I," Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

11 Exhibit "E," Id. at 57.

12 Exhibit "G," Id. at 59.

13
Exhibits "H" to "H-3" and "I."

14 Exhibit "J."

15 Exhibit "N-2."

16 Exhibit "N-4."

17 Exhibit "M."

18 Exhibit "K."

19 Exhibit "U-1."

20 TSN, 2 February 1999, p. 30 (PO1 Jose Salazar).

21 Exhibit "D-2."

22 Exhibit "S."

23 Ibid.

24 Exhibit "T."

25 Exhibit "R."

26 Exhibit "C-1."

27 Exhibits "D-1" and "D-2."

28 Exhibit "A."

29 Exhibit "C."

30 Exhibit "8."

31 Records, pp. 133-134.

32 Exhibit "I."
33 Exhibit "T."

34 Exhibit "S."

35 232 SCRA 249 (1994).

36 244 SCRA 346 (1995).

37 Rollo, pp. 131-132.

38 Supra.

39The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000,
provides that:

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.— An application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.

40 Malaloan vs. CA, supra, pp. 261-262.

41 City of Lakewood vs. Mormayer, 154 Northern Reporter 20, p. 77 (1958).

42 People vs. Mantung, 310 SCRA 819 (1999).

43 372 SCRA 608 (2001).

44 355 SCRA 172 (2001).

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134217. May 11, 2000.]

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA
DEMORAL-SAVAGE, Petitioners, v. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12,
Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO
SABJON and DANTE SOSMENA, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by
GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of
certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay,
Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied by respondent Judge as well as their
motion to reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition for certiorari.chanrobles.com.ph:red

The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza,
president and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), 1 Supervising
Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for
search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. 2 The application sought the authorization
to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, and to
seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which were allegedly the object of unfair
competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was issued by respondent Judge on 16
October 1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following day by NBI agents. 3 Seized from the
factory were several pieces of furniture, indicated in the Inventory Sheet attached to the Return of
Search Warrant and all items seized have remained in NBI custody up to the present. 4

On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they
were accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c)
the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did not particularly
describe the things to be seized. 5

On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash where they additionally
alleged that the assailed warrant was applied for without a certification against forum shopping. 6
On 30 January 1998 respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash and the Supplemental Motion to
Quash. 7 On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of their motion to quash and
alleged substantially the same grounds found in their original Motion to Quash but adding thereto
two (2) new grounds, namely: (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and,
(b) respondent court failed to "substantiate" the order sought to be reconsidered. 8 The denial of
their last motion 9 prompted petitioners to come to this Court.

The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a) questions involving jurisdiction
over the offense; (b) the need for a certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the existence of the
crime

Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not
designated as a special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for IPR. The courts
enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including Art. 189 of the
Revised Penal Code committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The sala of Judge
Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated Special Court for IPR for the 7th
Judicial Region. 10 Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96 was issued
providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the Regional Trial
Courts. 11

The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative orders.
But the Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to
its original jurisdiction. 12 The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be
effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. 13 In the instant case, the premises searched located in
Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court. 14

Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts for IPR.
Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try and decide" cases involving
violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all matters
(including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction
is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg. 129, and not by a procedural rule,
much less by an administrative order. 15 The power to issue search warrants for violations of IPR has
not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
113-95.

Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should have been dismissed outright
since it was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, citing as authority therefor
Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 16 In that case, we sustained the quashal of the
search warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum shopping as private respondent
sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he was denied by the courts
of Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here there is no allegation of forum-shopping,
only failure to acquire a certification against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended
requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of "applications." 17
In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such certification
even from "applications." Our ruling in Washington Distillers required no such certification from
applications for search warrants. Hence, the absence of such certification will not result in the
dismissal of an application for search warrant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving design patents punishable
under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan Herrero seems to agree
as he filed the corresponding Information against petitioners on 17 March 1998. 18 However, since
the IPR Code took effect on 1 January 1998 any discussion contrary to the view herein expressed
would be pointless. The repealing clause of the Code provides —

All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic Act No 165, as amended;
Republic Act No 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential
Decree No 49, including Presidential Decree 285, as amended, are hereby repealed (Emphasis ours)
19

The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents,
referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the
repeal of the article.

The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The
assailed acts specifically alleged were the manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture
similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing any license or patent for the same, for the
purpose of deceiving or defrauding .Mendco and the buying public. 20 The Code defines "unfair
competition" thus —

168.2 Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which
he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for
those of the one having established such goodwill, or shall commit any acts calculated to produce
said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

168.3 In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair
competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in
which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their
appearance which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are
those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise
clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his
legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in
selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce
the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services
in the mind of the public; orchanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any
other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit goods, businesses or services of
another. 21

There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the
controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all,
for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused, 22 for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication or any equitable consideration. 23 Respondents invoke jurisprudence to
support their contention that unfair competition" exists in this case. 24 However, we are prevented
from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in the IPR
Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent infringement as defined
by the same Code —

SECTION 76. Civil Action for Infringement. — 76.1. The making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing a patented product or a product obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process,
or the use of a patented process without authorization of the patentee constitutes patent
infringement.25cralaw:red

Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code, we
are constrained to invoke the provisions of the Code. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such application would be beneficial to the
accused. 26 Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability attaching
to the acts alleged, then that Code must be applied here.

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. 27 Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search
warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its
face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in petitioners’
Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and void,
all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with
established jurisprudence. 28

In petitioners’ Reply with Additional Information they allege that the trial court denied their motion
to transfer their case to a Special Court for IPR. We have gone through the records and we fail to find
any trace of such motion or even a copy of the order denying it. All that appears in the records is a
copy of an order granting a similar motion filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with regard to Search
Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12. 29 This attachment being immaterial we shall give it no further
attention.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998,
denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 dated 30 October 1997 and the
Supplemental Motion to Quash dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as well as the Order
dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 March 1998, is SET
ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
and respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by virtue of the illegal
search warrant.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

De Leon, Jr., J., is on leave.