Abangan vs Abangan

GR. No. 13431. November 12, 1919

Facts:
- Ana Abangan's will executed on July 1916.
- The will was probated containing two sheets.
- the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin
Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses.
- The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses.
- Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor
numbered by letters
- According to appellants' contention, the omission signing the left margin are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied.
- The appellants also alleged that the records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the
will is written.

Issue:

1. Is the will valid even without the sign on the left margin of each sheet by the testator and witnesses?
YES
2. Is the appellant correct in his allegation that the testatrix does not know the dialect in her will? NO

Held:
On the first issue, in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only
the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both
sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

The testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies,
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.

On the second issue, the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of
Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any
proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which her will is written.

[G.R. No. L-1787. August 27, 1948.]

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellee, v. AGUSTIN LIBORO,

Facts: in the lower court, Liboro opposed unsuccessful the probate of what purports to be the last will and
testament of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83, almost six months after the document in question
was executed. The appellant impugns the will for its silence on the testator’s understanding of the
language used in the testament.
Issue: Is the knowledge of the testator of the language need to be expressed in the will?
Held: No, There is no statutory requirement that the testator’s understanding of the language used in the
will be expressed therein. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.

Here, there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in
a Tagalog region, from which the court said “a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog
dialect.”

ACOP V. PIRASO

FACTS: Piraso lived and executed a will in the City of Baguio. However, the probate of the will was denied
for having been written in English when in fact, records contain positive proof that Piraso knew no other
language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano.
Part of the judgment reads: “The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect,
although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion
that his will should have been written in that dialect. “
ISSUE: Can the presumption apply?
HELD: No.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:

"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator," etc.
Nor can the presumption in favor of a will established by this court in Abangan v. Abangan (40 Phil., 476),
to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless
there is proof to the contrary, even be invoked in support of the probate of said document, because, in
the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the
deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that said
Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not
know the English language in which the will is written. So that even if such a presumption could have been
raised in this case it would have been wholly contradicted and destroyed.

G.R. No. L-2862 April 21, 1952

TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES,
vs.
DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL

Facts:
This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of Maria
Zuñiga Vda. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29, 1945.
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition
based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented their respective
evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the
deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish
language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the
deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Did the testatrix know the language in which the will was written?

Held:
Yes, there are several evidence to this claim. First, it is an undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza
española, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to Spain. Second, the letters
submitted as evidence by the oppositor is written in Spanish by the deceased, it possessed the Spanish
language. Hence, oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the
presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written, which
presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs.
Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we have the very
attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. It
is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only
mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language
in which the will was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this
ground.

Payad v. Tolentino
G.R. No. L-42258, January 15, 1936

FACTS: Both parties in this case appeal from an order of the trial court denying the probate of the alleged
will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased. That court found that the will in question was executed by the
deceased on the date appearing thereon, September 7, 1933, one day before the death of the testatrix,
contrary to the contention of the oppositor that it was executed after her death. The court, however,
denied probate on the ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of
law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused Attorney Almario to write her name at her
express direction.
The appeal of the oppositor-appellant is based upon the alleged failure of the trial court in not finding
that the will in question was executed after the death of Leoncia Tolentino, or that she was mentally and
physically incapable of executing said will one day before her death. After a careful examination of the
evidence on these points we find no reason for setting aside the conclusion of the trial court as set forth
above. The assignments of the oppositor-appellant are therefore overruled.
As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the trial court denied probate of the will
on the sole ground that the attestation clause does not state that the testratrix requested Attorney
Almario to write her name.
ISSUE: Whether the attestation clause was in conformity with the requirements laid down by the law
RULING: Yes. The evidence of record established the fact that Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney
Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and every age of time questioned will and the said attorney
merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney
Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed for placing her thumb mark on each and every page
thereof "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark."
It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the
testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testratrix signed the will in
question in accordance with law.
The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased,
is hereby admitted

IN RE:WILL OF TAN DUICO

Matias vs. Salud

G.R. L-10907 June 29, 1957
Ponente: Concepcion, J.

Facts:

This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. The
document consist of 3 pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the siganture of
the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the
thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause
appears signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears
the same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte'
underneath it.

The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat her
will and brought to her on January 1950. With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent
affixed her thumbmark at the foot of the document and the left margin of each page. It was also alleged
that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only able to do so on the lower half of page 2 due to
the pain in her right shoulder. The lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes Samonte
to write 'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after which the witnesses signed
at the foot of the attestation clause and the left hand margin of each page.

The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent.

The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the
testatrix and the witnesses signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially
directed to sign after the testatrix.
Issue: Is the thumbprint a sufficient compliance with the law despite the absence of a description of such
in the attestation clause

HELD: YES

The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person wrote the testatrix' name
at her request is not a fatal defect, The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a
requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.
As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be dependent on the aleatory
circumstances. Where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause
and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the authenticity of
the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature itself alone is not sufficient to refuse
probate when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law.

GARCIA vs LACUESTA

Facts:

Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect which is spoken
and understood by the testator. The will also contained an attestation clause which is signed by three
witnesses. The attestation clause states:

“We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was
signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin
of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in
Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in
letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the presence of the testator and
witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us
witnesses.”
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado,
followed below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged
also to have written a cross immediately after his name.
ISSUE: Is the attestation clause in the will valid?
Held: NO.
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino
Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. When the testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s name, this fact must be
recited in the attestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective.
Moreover, the cross appearing on the will is not the usual signature of Antero Mercado nor is it even one
of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the Court is not prepared to liken the
mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have
the trustworthiness oGf a thumbmark. Thus, the cross cannot be considered a valid signature.
BARUT VS. CABACUNGAN

FACTS: Pedro Barut applied for the probate of the will of Maria Salomon. It is alleged in the petition that
testatrix died on November 7, 1908 in Sinait, Ilocos Sur leaving the will dated March 3, 1907. The said will
was witnessed by 3 persons. From the terms it appears that the petitioner received a larger part of
decedent’s property. After this disposition, the testatrix revoked all other wills and stated that since she
is unable to read nor write, the will was read to her and that she instructed Severino Agapan, one of the
witnesses to sign her name in her behalf.

The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the relatives of the deceased on
various grounds, among them that a later will had been executed by the deceased.

The lower court ruled that the will is not entitled to probate on the sole ground that the handwriting of
the person who signed the name of the testatrix does not appear to be that of Agapan but that of another
witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dissimilarity in the handwriting is sufficient to deny the probate of the will? -
NO
We do not believe that the mere dissimilarity in writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the testatrix
was written by Severo Agayan at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses
to the will. It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and
in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.

NERA VS. RIMANDO

5971, FEBRUARY 29, 1911

FACTS:
There was a dispute as to the circumstances attending the signing of the will on the day of its execution:

1. whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the
time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures
2. whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the
smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the
outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument.

ISSUE:
Is the probate proceeding valid?

HELD:
YES. The Court admitted the first one and the will was admitted for probate.

However, if the 2nd circumstance had happened, had the subscribing witness been proven to have been
in the outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their
signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those
signatures under circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This
because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would
necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of
inscription of each signature."

The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in
the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon
the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions
and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper
direction they could have seen each other sign.

G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-
appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:

A petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of
Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof was
filed. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto.

On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on June
1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the
decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the
petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page,
it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three
(3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as
Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

ISSUE:

Did the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will render the will void? (NO)

RULING:
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the
petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page,
it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three
(3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as
Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed
in his presence.

We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both
original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty.
Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog,
a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix
and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in
a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses.

We hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due
to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of
probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of
the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional
or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory
requisites.

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown
by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures
in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public
likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

GABRIEL VS. MATEO

Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183

FACTS:

Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a
petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was
typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the following
grounds:

1. the will is not genuine;

2. will was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age
and sickness; and
4. the will was procured through undue influence.

The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision of
the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that
the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof
that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.

ISSUE:

Whether the credibility of a subscribing witness is material to the validity of a will.

RULING:

No, the law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the
community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and
accepted in court.
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article
821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win.
These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb,
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this
Code.
"Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness,
his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court.
It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such
that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions
propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to
read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article
821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the
good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is
proved otherwise by the opposing party.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION:
Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered credible as required
by Art. 805?

Yes, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art.
820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the
belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled
that: “Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that
the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given
matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony.”