CASES
to work, whether or not they are members of LAKAS.
Duty to Bargain Collectively:
Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan v Marcelo Enterprises, 118 SCRA 422
This case involves several issues:
When the CBA was about to reach its expiration date, LAKAS requested for
renegotiation with the company and submitted its proposal. It turns out however that
several unions were likewise demanding for renegotiation. The company, instead of
submitting a counter proposal to LAKAS, informed the union of the existence of the
conflicting demands from the other unions and suggested that the unions file the
necessary complaint in court to finally determine who is the authorized representative.
LAKAS claims that management refused to bargain with it when it did not submit a
counter proposal.
Held: Management did not ignore the demand for collective bargaining although it did
not submit a counter proposal. There exists in this case a real issue as to representation
and management’s suggestion that the unions file the necessary complaint in view of
the fact that there are several unions claiming to represent the employees does not
constitute failure or refusal to bargain.
Because of the company’s alleged refusal to bargain, LAKAS staged a strike.
Held: Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of several unions is the
legitimate representative of employees, it is ULP for one of the contending unions to
stage a strike and demand that the employer sit down with it for collective bargaining.
The company asked the striking workers to fill up forms on when they are available for
work. The union says this is ULP. The company says it merely wanted to know when
the workers would show up for work so it can come up with a reasonable working
schedule. It reasons that the two strikes staged by the employees resulted in the
complete paralysis of the company’s business and it cannot just readmit all returning
workers in one big force or as each demanded readmission.
Held: An employer may be justified in requiring a reasonable scheduling of working
hours of returning striking employees and inquiring into their time availabilities. The
Court took judicial cognizance of the fact that companies whose businesses were
completely paralyzed by major strikes cannot resume full operation at once.
Not all the striking workers were allowed to return to work.
Held: It should be noted that only those who refused to fill up the questionnaire were
not readmitted. All those who filled up their respective forms were scheduled for work
and were readmitted. The stoppage of the employees’ work was not the direct
consequence of the company’s act. Their economic loss should not be shifted to the
employer.
LAKAS brought this action in behalf of all employees who were not allowed to return
Held: A labor union cannot bring an action I behalf of employees who are members of
another union even if said employees signed the complaint. The proper remedy is to
drop the union as party to the action and place the individual names of the employees
instead.
National Union of Restaurant Workers (PTUC) vs. CIR, 10 SCRA 843
On June 9, 1960, a complaint for unfair labor practice was lodged against the owners of
Tres Hermanas Restaurant, particularly Mrs. Felisa Herrera, on the ground, among
others, that respondents refused to bargain collectively with the complaining union;
respondents made a counter-proposal in the sense that they would bargain with said
union and would accept its demands if the same would become a company union, and
one Martin Briones, and employee, was separated from the service because he was
found to be the organizer and adviser of the complaining union.
Held: There was no refusal to bargain collectively. The letter sent by the union to
respondents contains certain marks, opposite each demand, such as a check for those
demands to which Mrs. Felisa Herrera was agreeable, a cross signifying the disapproval
of Mrs. Herrera, and a circle regarding those demands which were left open for
discussion on some future occasion that the parties may deem convenient. Such
markings were made during the discussion of the demands in the meeting called by
respondents on May 3, 1960 at their restaurant in Quezon City. The court a quo
concluded that the fact that respondent Herrera had agreed to some of the demands
shows that she did not refuse to bargain collectively with the complaining union.
The inference that respondents did not refuse to bargain collectively with the
complaining union because they accepted some of the demands while they refused the
others even leaving open other demands for future discussion is correct. The fact is that
respondents did not ignore the letter sent by the union so much so that they called a
meeting to discuss its demands, as already stated elsewhere.
Liberty Flour Mills Employees vs. Liberty Flou Mills, Inc., December 29, 1989
The petitioners, after organizing another union filed a certification election among the
rank-in-file employees, are terminated because o a ―union shop clause‖ 1 in the CBA.
The SC affirmed the decision that such dismissal was valid since the purpose
of self-organization, collective bargaining, negotiation, and peaceful assembly
including the right to strike in accordance with the law will not work if every worker
were to choose his own separate way instead of joining hi co-employees.
Colegio de San Juan de Letran vs. Associatio of Employees and Faculty of Letran,
340 SCRA 587
1
A ―Union Shop Claus‖ in CBA is a clause that requires union membership in good
standing as a requirement for continued employment.
1
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The issue in this case is whether petitioner is
guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally
suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by another
legitimate labor organization.
Held: It is noteworthy in Art. 255, it is required that both parties of the performance
of the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to this
requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner. On the other hand,
petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation.
Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to
make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after
the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any counter-
proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second
notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that
the Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for
failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor Code
governing the procedure in collective bargaining
San Miguel Corp. Employees Union-PTGWO v Confesor, 262 SCRA 81
SMC was restructured. Two of its divisions were turned into separate distinct
corporations. The union insists on uniting the employees of the 2 new corporations into
one bargaining unit. The Court ruled that the employees from the new corporations
constituted separate bargaining units for the following reasons:
1. The workers are employed by two different employers as a consequence
of incorporation (separate juridical personality)
2. The members of a bargaining unit must have mutual interests.
Considering the spin-off, the companies will consequently have their
respective and distinctive concerns in terms of nature of work, wages,
hours of work and other conditions of employment.
MERALCO Cases
Facts: A CBA was entered into with a term of 5 years. Nearing its 3 rd year of
effectivity, the parties met to renegotiate. The remaining 2 years of the CBA, which is
the subject of the renegotiation in this case, was for the period 1 December 1995 to 30
November 1997.
MERALCO v Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173
Nearing the 3rd year of the effectivity of the CBA, the parties met to renegotiate. Unable
to come to an agreement during the renegotiation, and there existing the imminence of a
strike, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The Secretary
resolved the issue through an order setting forth the approved economic demands. The
effective date of the Secretary’s order is in question.
Held: The date of effectivity shall be as agreed upon by the parties. The law requires
that a CBA be renegotiated within 3 years from its execution. If there is no agreement
reached within 6 months from the expiry of the 3 years that follow the execution of the
CBA, the law expressly gives the parties, and not anybody else, the discretion to fix the
effectivity of the agreement. In the absence of a new CBA, the parties must maintain
the status quo and must continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement until a new agreement is reached.
MERALCO v Quisumbing, 326 SCRA 172
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision in the immediately preceding case.
Held: CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last
CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or
their union. In the absence of such agreement, the award shall retroact to the first day
after the 6-month period following the last day of the CBA, should there be one, or, in
the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity as part
of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
MERALCO v Quisumbing, 326 SCRA 172
This is a Motion for Partial Modification of the decision in the immediately preceding
case.
Held: The arbitral award shall retroact to the first day after the 6-month period
following the expiration of the last day of the CBA. The CBA in this case expired on 1
December 1997. The first day after the 6-month period is 1 June 1996. The CBA shall
be effective from 1 June 1996 to 31 May 1998 (effective for 2 years).
New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. Inc. v NLRC, 328 SCRA 404
Until a new CBA has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty bound to
keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception or qualification as
to which of the economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and
effect. Therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in
said agreement.
Further, when a CBA is entered into by a union representing the employees and the
employer, even non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the agreement.
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service Inc. v Roldan-Confesor, 272 SCRA 161
The signing of the agreement is not determinative of the question whether the
agreement was entered into within the 6 months from the expiry of the previous
2
agreement. The point of reckoning is the meeting of the minds. (Marlon: prove meeting
of the minds through the minutes)
Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing-UWP vs. NLRC, 7 September
1998
The union claims the benefits of an agreement allegedly entered into during the
negotiation, as per the minutes, but was not incorporated in the CBA as written.
Held: The union may not validly claim that the proposal embodied in the minutes of
the negotiation forms part of the CBA. The CBA is the law between the parties and
compliance therewith is mandated by the law.
Note: The minutes is determinative only of the moment when there was a meeting of
the minds. As to what was particularly agreed upon, it is the CBA as written which
shall control.
Rivera vs. Espiritu, 374 SCRA 351
B. Jurisdictional Requirements:
Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179
While it is the mutual obligation of labor and management to bargain collectively, the
employer is not under any legal duty to initiate negotiation. The mechanics of collective
bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional pre-conditions are
present:
1. Possession of status of majority representation of the employees’
representative in accordance with any means of selection or designation as
provided in the Labor Code;
2. Proof of majority representation; and
3. Demand to bargain.
When these requisites are present and the company still refuses to submit a
counter-proposal, such refusal, if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process,
may indicate bad faith and be regarded as ULP. In this case, the court found the
company guilty of ULP where it was shown that it refused to make a counter proposal,
stalled the negotiation by a series of postponements and non-appearance at the hearings
conducted, and unduly delayed the submission of its financial statements.
ALU vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 173 SCRA 178
Collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely:
(1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees' representative
in accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the
Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code.
LECTURE
DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
You must know the elements of the duty to bargain collectively by heart!
What is the duty to bargain collectively?
It is the mutual obligation both of the employer and employee to:
- meet and convene
- promptly and expeditiously
- in good faith
- negotiate
- the TACOE/ grievance machinery
- execute a written document (CBA)
- respect the CBA—not to terminate or modify the CBA during its lifetime;
contract bar rule
It is an obligation because it is mandatory-it must be done, otherwise,
nonperformance will merit a sanction. A CBA made by labor may be imposed on
management even without negotiations. Aside from that, management may be found
guilty of ULP. Also, the LLO may exercise its right to strike.
Meet and convene. What does that mean? Meet in person and face-to-face. The
bargaining representative has the primary obligation to start the bargaining process.
How is it started? The bargaining representative submits a proposal, management
submits a counter-proposal, and then they meet and bargain at the bargaining table.
How does a proposal look like? It is in the form of a draft CBA containing all the
provisions labor wants in the CBA. Management replies usually by giving a letter
saying labor’s request cannot be granted. That starts the bargaining process.
Each side is represented by a panel, one for the bargaining agent, and for
management, to bargain collectively. If they fail to meet within ten days, is that a
3
violation of the right? The law says to meet promptly and expeditiously. If not, it will
be a violation of the duty. It depends on the circumstances for delay. If management
failed to submit a counter-proposal on time, or meet on time, and has no good reason to
do so, then it may be a violation.
Now, if they have met promptly and expeditiously, but not in good faith, it
may be a violation. For instance, it manifests bad faith when the management sends as
panel people who don’t know anything about bargaining, not the usual people who
represent management in collective bargaining. That’s why the union usually asks for
authorization from the management, that will ensure the union that whatever the panel
says will bind management.
Example of bad faith – management comes to the bargaining table and
announces deadlock na tayo on the first day of negotiations.
Convening promptly and expeditiously in good faith to negotiate. On the first
day, the union usually asks for the moon. Management usually digs deep deep down.
Then each panel adjusts its demands and try to meet in the middle. Hopefully they end
up both happy, because they get into a position which is better than the minimum
demand they were willing to settle on. Sometimes they do, oftentimes they don’t-which
leads to a deadlock. That’s how negotiations happen. A lot has to do with psychological
warfare.
Remember the Labor Code states that there is no compulsion to agree to a
proposal or submit to a concession. The obligation to negotiate is merely an obligation
to be flexible and not to give in always to the demand of the other parties. The Code
states the negotiations must be as to the TACOE and grievance machinery. These two
factors are the coverage of the obligations. These are the mandatory negotiable
provisions. Matters over and above that is no longer an obligation but the parties may
negotiate on such matters if they wish to do so, though it wouldn’t be a violation of the
duty if not tackled.
Written agreement. Negotiations must end with a written agreement which
should be registered. Registration is necessary to protect the local/chapter’s legal
personality. Also, it is to protect the status of the union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent which status cannot be challenged until after the lapse of 4 years and
300 days. It may be challenged only within the 60-day freedom period. Otherwise, rival
unions may file a petition for certification election anytime. Actually, management
itself may ask for registration for the CBA. In fact, it is mgt. who pays the filing fees. It
is also for mgt.’s protection, because it will ensure industrial peace for at least five
years.
What is the term of a CBA? Five years as to representation and three years as
to non-representation provisions are concerned. The three-year period may be shortened
by agreement of the parties.
For example: CBA entered into on January 25, 2002. It will be effective until
January 24, 2007 (representation) and January 24, 2005 (non-representation
provisions). However, the parties may validly agree that the non-representation
provisions be negotiated on January 24, 2004. The law says the other provisions shall
be renegotiated not later than three years. Hence, they may negotiate on the second
year.
*Keep in mind that the duty to renegotiate is different from the effectivity of
the economic provisions of the CBA. The law does not limit its effectivity, unlike the
representation status which the law says it must be for a term of five years. So, the CBA
may say the economic provisions shall be valid for 5 years, or any number of years, but
the union has to demand renegotiation within the three years, anytime within the three
year period.
Now, as long as management can comply with the three-year deadline, then
they are not forced to negotiate earlier than three years. What is the practical
implication of that? If the union makes a demand one year after CBA’s effectivity,
management can ignore that and such act is not ULP. Management still has the
remaining two years to comply and mgt. can opt not to renegotiate at that point. It
would be reasonable however to demand renegotiation when nearing the end of the
third year. It is difficult to peg a cut-off point. It depends on the circumstances and the
possible reasons of management. But if the parties choose to renegotiate one year after,
they may do so - there is no prohibition, but neither is it a duty. There is no ULP at this
point.
But can the parties renegotiate one year after the effectivity of the CBA? Yes.
There is no prohibition. Can they renegotiate every year after that? Yes, there is no
prohibition. Assuming they renegotiated the non-representation CBA provisions on Jan.
24, 2003- the first year of the CBA. Will that be good until January 24, 2007? Since it
is a renegotiation, it is a new agreement. It will be up to the parties if they choose to
make the new agreement subsist up to January 24, 2007. It is entirely up to them to
decide the term of effectivity of the CBA’s non-representation provisions. BUT despite
whatever term they agree upon, they have to renegotiate in by January 25, 2006 –
within three years from the last renegotiation and execution of the CBA.
The overlapping of the terms in representation and non-representation is quite
complicated. In the end of the fifth year, there may be a new bargaining representative,
but the non-representation provisions may have been extended beyond the fifth year.
The overlapping according to jurisprudence is to promote industrial peace. The new
representative must respect the non-representation provisions. So, from 1997 to 1998, it
is considered the trial period, an adjustment period. The new agent cannot demand
negotiations kasi may one year pa. Mgt. won’t negotiate as well. But this scenario does
not promote industrial peace. The new agent of course is a rival union and won’t be
happy with the CBA entered into between management and the old agent who is a rival
union. In fact the CBA is always an issue in certification elections—‖Palpak naman ang
CBA na yan‖.
That’s why unions/bargaining agents seek to avoid this scenario-sinasabay nila
ang effectivity ng non-representation provisions sa representation aspect ng CBA.
Ginagawang parehong 5 years. In fact I have not seen a CBA that has extended its non-
4
representation aspects beyond five years. On management’s side, why will they agree to
extend the term of the CBA beyond the authority of the bargaining agent?
Now, the parties may agree that the modified provisions take effect until 2009-
even beyond the period of representation. Then the bargaining agent’s status is
challenged by a rival union. Such CBA will still be effective, and if the rival union wins
as the new bargaining agent, they have to respect the CBA. The new agent can demand
renegotiation but it may take effect only after 2009.
The reckoning point for the three year period for renegotiation is the last day
of the last negotiations. That should be the interpretiation of ―execution of the CBA‖.
Because when you renegotiate, you are executing new provisions.
My interpretation of renegotiation is that the parties have to reopen
negotiations within three years, not that they have to agree on new provisions within
three years. What is the reason for the three year rule? Many economic developments
can occur within three years. That makes a need to revisit the positions of the parties,
and to fix the CBA to favor labor. I doubt the CBA can ever be adjusted to something
lower than what labor is already receiving. That would be a violation of the non-
diminution rule. Such benefits already enjoyed can only be improved, not diminished in
the CBA.
Many CBAs have annual wage increase plans. So for instance, year 1=P100,
year 2=P200, year 3=P300, year 4=P400 and year 5=P500. By the third year, they
entered into negotiations, they can modify the agreement as to the fourth and fifth year
since it has not yet been given. For instance, the company was hit with the economic
recession, and so the parties agree year four and five=P100 and P200 instead of the
original agreement. It’s a valid agreement. It does not go against the non-diminution of
benefits rule because it has not yet been given to the workers. It is something the
workers do not yet enjoy.
When the parties enter into a binding agreement to renegotiate one year after,
but both mutually agree to defer it to another year, that would be a valid agreement. On
the other hand, if one of the parties refuse to meet one year later as originally agreed
upon, the other party may declare deadlock.
Now, when the parties renegotiate, then they agree not to change anything,
that is a valid renegotiation. The three years to next renegotiate shall be reckoned from
the execution of the CBA agreeing not to change anything in the old CBA.
If there is no renegotiation within the three years, there is no duty to negotiate
anymore. The three year period lapses the union loses the right to demand
renegotiation. This is much like the rule in Obligations and Contracts. As soon as one
party demands, the other incurs in delay. Hence if there is no demand, there is no delay.
Management is not incurring in delay if Labor does not demand. there is no duty If it is
not demanded, and the three year period lapsed, there is no duty to negotiate anymore.
And such act is not ULP
Now for example January 24, 2002, expiration of the CBA. The
union/bargaining agent was not changed. Starting February 1, negotiations started, and
ended September 1, 2002. When is the agreement of the parties reckoned? From the
meeting of the minds, not at the time of signing. Meeting of the minds is when the
parties come to an agreement. In the absence of formal signing, this is proven by the
very provisions of the CBA. Remember too that only the written provisions of the CBA
may be enforced. If the agreed provisions (while at the negotiating table) are not in the
written CBA, sorry na lang!! So the panel must read the written CBA before agreeing to
be bound by it. But what usually happens is minamadali ang signing para makuha agad
ng union ang signing bonus. Management takes advantage of that by removing some
provisions in the CBA formerly agreed upon.
When is the effectivity of the new CBA? Two scenarios:
1. If the meeting of the minds happened within 6 months from expiration of the old
CBA. So if they entered into the agreement by July 24, 2002 the new CBA will
take effect, will retroact to January 25, 2002. This is automatically operative by
law. No agreement between the parties is needed.
2. If the meeting of the minds happened beyond 6 months, like the above scenario,
then the parties will determine when the new CBA will take effect. There is no
automatic retroactivity. Such will happen only if the parties agree to it. Now, in the
absence of any agreement,
For instance, nag-deadlock. Nag-strike. The Sec. Of Labor assumed
jurisdiction and imposed a decision-a CBA, on the parties. He did not state a date when
the new CBA shall be effective. As ruled in the three Meralco cases:
1. For example the decision became final June 12, 2002-within the 6 month period. In
this case the law automatically operates so the new CBA retroacts to the date of the
old CBA’s expiry.
2. If the decision became final beyond the six month period, it retroacts automatically
to the end of the six month period. Generally, the Secretary of Labor can decree
retroactivity. But the Court said the retroactivity should only operate the day after
the six month period. So the Secretary can make it retroact only starting July 25,
2002 or beyond such date. This ruling of the Court misinterpreted Art. 253-A,
thinking that when the law talks of ―such date‖ in the last phrase of the Code, refers
to the six month period. Erroneous! ―Such date‖ refers to the date of expiry of the
old CBA. So I believe there is no reason for the Court to limit the Secretary’s
power.
The first decision was the good decision-it was congruent with the codal
provision stating that only the parties can agree to retroactivity, so the Secretary cannot
decree retroactivity if the parties do not as well. But this was reversed in the second
Meralco case. This case has no basis to say that the decision retroacts automatically to
the end of the six month period. The hard part is an arbitral award can supplant the
parties’ agreement insofar as retroactivity is concerned. So the Secretary can decree
retroactivity but his freedom to choose the period when it retroacts is limited by the
decision.
5

C. BARGAINING UNIT
OMNIBUS RULES, BOOK V AS AMENDED BY D.O. 40
(d) "Bargaining Unit" refers to a group of employees sharing mutual
interests within a given employer unit, comprised of all or less than
all of the entire body of employees in the employer unit or any
specific occupational or geographical grouping within such employer
unit.
(t) "Exclusive Bargaining Representative" refers to a legitimate labor
union duly recognized or certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative or agent of all the employees in a
bargaining unit.
CASES
San Miguel Corporation v Laguesma, 236 SCRA 595
The regular sales personnel (55 in all) of Magnolia Dairy Products, employed in
different sales offices in the North Luzon Area, wish to form one bargaining unit. The
company insists that each of the sales offices in should be considered as a separate
bargaining unit so that negotiations would be more expeditious.
Held: The Court allowed all the employees to be part of a single bargaining unit saying
that it is not the convenience of the employer that constituted the determinative factor in
forming an appropriate bargaining unit (and 55 na nga lang sila).
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining
unit are:
1. The will of the employees (Globe Doctrine)
2. Affinity and unity of the employees’ interest (Substantial Mutual Interest
Rule)
3. Prior collective bargaining history
4. Similarity of employment status
However, the court has ruled that prior collective bargaining history is
neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit. The test of grouping is commonality or mutuality of
interest.
University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 211 SCRA 451
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the proper
collective bargaining unit. Apart from the single descriptive word "appropriate," in
Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act which was subsequently incorporated into the
Labor Code with minor changes, no specific guide for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit can be found in the statutes. Case law fortunately furnishes some
guidelines.
The basic test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to
be appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective
bargaining. The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping is community or
mutuality of interests. And this is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining
unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
Golden Farms vs. Secretary, 234 SCRA 517
In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In
contradistinction, the petitioner's daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the
cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner have very little in common with its daily paid rank-and-file
employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary rates, and
skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been
excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. This
dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining
unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise
would deny this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes
of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it will also expose them
to the exploitations of management. So we held in University of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer-Calleja, where we sanctioned the formation of two (2) separate bargaining units
within the establishment, viz: "[T]he dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the
nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working conditions of
the academic and non-academic personal dictate the separation of these two categories
of employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two separate
bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic employees, and
the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that will best assure
to all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.‖
Mechanical Department Labor Union Sa PNR vs. CIR, 24 SCRA 925
Under the "Globe doctrine" (Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294) applied in
Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February 1958,
6
bargaining units may be formed through separation of new units from existing ones
whenever plebiscites had shown the workers' desire to have their own representatives.
In the case at bar, the appeal of the Mechanical Department Labor Union, questioning
the applicability under the circumstances of the Globe doctrine of considering the will
of the employees in determining what union should represent them, is premature, since
the result of the ordered plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan Shops (who
desire to form a new bargaining unit) may be adverse to the formation of a separate
unit, in which event, all questions raised in this case would be rendered moot and
academic.
Held: Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted
because the workers of the Caloocan Shops (one of the four main divisions or units of
the Mechanical Department of the PNR) do not require different skills from the rest of
the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company. This question is
primarily one of fact. The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in
that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working
conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment
and machineries found in said ships, while the others only perform minor repairs. It is
easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special
skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the
rest of the workers. In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two
(2) years; hence, such agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by
proper elections, of a new bargaining representative.
Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency vs. Secretary, 224
SCRA 682
Under the amendment of Art. 287 by R.A. 7641 on 7 January 1993, respondent
Federico appears to be entitled to retirement pay. But can he avail himself of this
provision considering that it took effect subsequent to his filing of the complaint? This
brings to mind the principle reiterated in Allied that police power legislation intended to
promote public welfare applies to existing contracts and can therefore be given
retroactive effect. Actually, the case at bench no longer presents a novel issue.
The issue that had to be resolved next was whether to grant retirement benefits by
applying retroactively Art. 287 as amended by R.A. 7641. At this point we emphasized
the circumstances, based on Oro, that must concur before the law could be given
retroactive effect: (a) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the
employer at the time the statute took effect; and, (b) the claimant was in compliance
with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits. It
was quite clear in CJC, as held by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, that private
respondents had ceased to be employees of petitioner by reason of their voluntary
resignation before the statute went into effect. Moreover, at the time they stopped
working for petitioner, they had not yet reached the age of sixty (60) years. The end
result was that they were neither entitled to retirement benefits. Nevertheless, the Court
stressed that there was nothing to prevent the employer from voluntarily giving the
employees some financial assistance on an ex gratia basis. Returning to the present
case, although the second circumstance exists, respondent Federico severed his
employment relationship with petitioners when he tendered his "letter of resignation"
on 16 September 1991 or prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7641. In fact, the issue before
public respondents was not the existence of employee-employer relationship between
the parties; rather, considering the cessation of his service, whether he was entitled to
monetary awards. On the authority of CJC, private respondent therefore cannot seek the
beneficial provision of R.A. 7641 and must settle for the financial assistance of
P10,000.00 offered by petitioners and directed to be released to him by the Labor
Arbiter.
International School Alliance of Educators v Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13
The International School employs 2 kinds of teachers: foreign hires and local hires. The
foreign hires enjoy greater benefits than local hires. The issue is whether local hires and
foreign hires could be part of a single bargaining unit.
Held: Foreign hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as local hires. It does not
appear that foreign hires have indicated their intention to be grouped with local hires.
The collective bargaining history of the school also shows that these groups were
always treated separately. Foreign hires have limited tenure; local hires have security of
tenure. Although foreign hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local hires, they are accorded certain benefits not accorded to local
hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign hires, and justify
their exclusion from the bargaining unit.
De La Salle University v De La Salle University Employees Association, 330 SCRA
363
The employees of DLSU and the College of St. Benilde wish to form one bargaining
unit.
Held: DLSU and CSB, although affiliated, are two separate juridical personalities. The
employees of the two schools are effectively employees of two different employers and
thus cannot form one bargaining unit. There is no evidence in this case to justify the
piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.
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