tRepublic of the Philippines to be imputed to a lower court or to the Court
SUPREME COURT of Appeals, there must be a showing that there
Manila was a disregard by it of a rule or principle of law seasonably raised. x x x There is no reason SECOND DIVISION why this Court should depart from its constant holding that a question of law save in very G.R. Nos. L-33138-39 June 27, 1975 exceptional circumstances cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS Same; Same; Facts of case at bar differ COMPANY, INC. and ANDRES I. from Corpus vs. Paje.—Petitioners, ILAGAN, petitioners, moreover, ignored the crucial distinction that is vs. readily discernible between the facts in Corpus COURT OF APPEALS, SOTERO CARDEMA, v. Paje and the facts in the present case. As EUFROCINA ALCALDE CARDEMA, was pointed out in the opinion of Justice MELQUISEDEC P. ELIZONDO and MAXIMA Capistrano, the civil action for damages was T. ALCALDE, respondents. made to rest “upon the same criminal negligence” of which the defendant Felardo Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for Paje was acquitted in the criminal action. From petitioners. Manuel S. Gerong for private the opening paragraph of the opinion of the respondents. Court of Appeals, now sought to be reviewed, it is quite apparent that the liability of petitioners Civil law; Quasi-delict; Appeals; A was not predicated on criminal negligence but question of law, save in very exceptional rather on a quasi-delict which, as is clearly circumstances, cannot be raised for the pointed out by the Civil Code, is an first time on appeal.—The principal reliance independent source of obligation, x x x As a of petitioners is on that portion of the opinion matter of fact, in Corpus, the civil complaint of Justice Capistrano in Corpus v. Paje which was dismissed by the lower court precisely on reads thus: “As reckless imprudence or criminal the ground that the action based upon the negligence is not one of the three crimes quasi-delict had prescribed. That certainly mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there cannot be said of the present litigation. is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said Same; Same; Judgments; Portion of offense. Hence, homicide through reckless ponencia in Corpuz vs. Paje regarding imprudence or criminal negligence comes filing of separate civil action based on under the general rule that the acquittal of the criminal negligence is not doctrinal in defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his character.—It does not admit of doubt civil liability based upon the same criminal act therefore that the invocation of Corpus v. Paje notwithstanding that the injured party reserved is misplaced considering the dissimilarity in the his right to institute a separate civil action. . . .” facts of the case and the equally relevant From which, they would infer that “the criminal consideration that the portion of the ponencia action against petitioner Ilagan must first be of Justice Capistrano, insofar as it could be resolved by respondent Court of Appeals and, made to lend support to petitioners’ plea, is not until final resolution thereon, it is premature to doctrinal in character, lacking one vote for it to proceed in the two civil cases.” That is to rely be the expression of the opinion of this Court. on a frail reed, to clutch at straws. As pointed out in the brief for private respondents, such Same; Same; A separate civil action an objection was never raised in the lower based on quasi delict may be filed court as well as in the Court of Appeals and independently of and notwithstanding the therefore came too late. Moreover, the facts pendency of, the criminal action against are dissimilar and therefore its ruling cannot the offender because responsibility for control. x x x It is well-settled that for an error fault or negligence based on quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from civil consequences of such culpable conduct by the liability arising from negligence under the invocation of Corpus v. Paje.2 It does not Penal Code.—Nor is this all. It is to misread suffice. It has the appearance of a mere the opinion of Justice Capistrano in Paje if it is afterthought, a last-ditch attempt to escape made to yield a significance that would under liability. Moreover, it is not applicable, even on the circumstance of this case reduce to a the assumption that it is doctrinal, which is not barren form of words the jural concept of a the case. No persuasiveness attaches to such a quasidelict as an independent source of plea, when it is considered further that the obligation. The law is anything but that. The opinion of Justice Capistrano is misread. There Civil Code speaks unequivocally to the is another objection based on the amount of contrary. Article 2176 provides: “Whoever by damages awarded. It is equally unavailing. The act or omission causes damage to another, appealed decision is in conformity with law. there being fault or negligence, is obliged to There is no choice but to affirm. pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing The appealed decision starts with this contractual relation between the parties, is statement of the case: "Civil Cases Nos. B-390 called a quasi-delict and is governed by the and B-391 of the Court of First Instance of provisions of this Chapter.” x x x What is more, Laguna are for the recovery of actual, there is this new provision in Article 2177: compensatory, and moral damages, with “Responsibility for fault or negligence under attorney's fees, arising from a vehicular the preceding article is entirely separate and accident. It is alleged in both complaints that distinct from the civil liability arising from the accident was due to the notorious negligence under the Penal Code. But the negligence of the defendant driver, Andres I. plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the Ilagan, who drove the bus of his co-defendant, same act or omission of the defendant.” This Batangas Transportation Company, now Court in appropriate cases has given force and BLTBCo, without regard to existing traffic rules effectivity to the mandates thus so clearly and regulations, and without due attention to expressed. the welfare and safety of his passengers and those of oncoming vehicles, resulting in the Same; Same; Life expectancy is an death of the owner — driver of the Chevrolet important element in fixing of amount of car, Ricardo de los Reyes, and his companion, damages recoverable in death cases Jean Elizondo, and causing serious physical arising from negligence.—In the traditional injuries to Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema. The legal parlance, to quote Chief Justice serious physical injuries suffered by Eufrocina Concepcion, “life expectancy is not only Alcalde Cardema is the subject of the relevant, but, also, an important element in complaint in Civil Case No. B-390, and the fixing the amount recoverable. . .” death of Jean Elizondo in Civil Case No. B-391. The defenses in both cases are that there was FERNANDO, J.: no negligence on the part of the driver defendant, Andres I. Ilagan, in driving and For a collision caused by the negligence of now operating the Batangas Transportation Co. bus petitioner Andres I. Ilagan, a driver of petitioner bearing plate No. 5716; that Ilagan had driven Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc., a the bus in a careful and prudent manner, and suit was brought and damages awarded to the accident was beyond his control and was private respondents,1 both by the lower court unforeseen despite the observation of and thereafter respondent Court of Appeals. extraordinary diligence; that the accident was Hence this appeal by certiorari. The facts as set due to the negligence of Ricardo de los Reyes, forth in a well-written decision by Justice Jose or was fortuitous in character; and that N. Leuterio of respondent Court would leave no defendant company had exercised and doubt as to the reckless manner in which the continues to exercise extraordinary diligence in bus was driven. The law as is but proper and the management, supervision and operation of just exacts responsibility for the injury inflicted. its vehicles and personnel, including its drivers, There is, however, an effort to avoid the in order to avoid injury to persons and to prevent accidents, as far as human care and be travelling on the middle of the right lane foresight can provide, using the utmost and not close to the center line. That he was diligence of a very cautious person, with due travelling close to the center line corroborates regard for all the circumstances. The two the evidence for the plaintiffs that he overtook cases, having arisen from the same incident, a big cargo truck, and consequently took the were tried jointly by agreement of the left lane going south or the right lane going parties."3 Then comes that portion dealing with north, or the lane of De los Reyes, who was the facts: "On February 18, 1963, Ricardo de travelling north. To overtake the cargo truck, los Reyes left Calamba, Laguna, at about 5 Ilagan had to run faster than the cargo truck, o'clock in the-morning, driving his Chevrolet so that Ilagan's testimony that he was running car bearing Plate No. 7188 bound for Manila. only at about 40 kms. per hour at the time of Seated on the front seat beside him was his the accident obviously cannot be true. At that son, Eduardo de los Reyes, and directly behind hour in the morning at about 6.00 o'clock, and Ricardo was Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema, a this is supported by the evidence, there were cousin of Ricardo's wife. On the right of very few vehicles travelling on the Super Eufrocina was her niece, Jean Elizondo, and on Highway. The cargo truck certainly must be the latter's right was Ursula Bayan. When he travelling at least 40 kms. if not more than 40 reached the Manila South Super Highway, kms. per hour. To overtake the cargo truck, the about 500 meters from the Air Force Station, in appellant must have to run not less than 60 a straight and level road, BTCO bus No. 316, kms. per hour. Hence, the testimonies of bearing Plate No. 5716, driven by the Cardema and Villas that the bus was running defendant, Andres I. Ilagan and coming from fast. The testimonies of Viñas and Cardema the opposite direction on its way to Lemery, that the bus suddenly swerved to the left is suddenly overtook a big cargo truck. In so further corroborated by Ilagan's testimony that doing, the bus took the left or the lane on he did not see the rut. He did not see the rut which De los Reyes was travelling. Ricardo de because he was following the cargo truck and los Reyes swerved to the right to avoid the bus was running fast. His attention at that time was but it was too late. The bus was running so fast focused on the cargo truck and the left lane. that notwithstanding that the Chevrolet car And further proving that the appellant was was almost touching the shoulder of the road, running at a high speed was the fact that after the bus hit the car on the left front side up to the impact, his bus ran for another 30 feet and the driver's door. The bus continued travelling would have ran farther had it not fallen into the to the left and landed in an oblique but upright canal. In suddenly overtaking the big cargo position on a canal about 30 feet from the truck, Ilagan had acted with reckless point of impact after narrowly missing an imprudence, for he should have seen, and electric post. The car landed on the shoulder of must have seen the Chevrolet car coming from the road about 15 feet from the point of the opposite direction. It is reckless impact. The point of impact was fixed by imprudence to overtake a vehicle and take the Policeman Guadarama at about the middle of left lane when another vehicle is coming from the left lane, where he found earth and broken the opposite direction. Due regard for the glasses. Ricardo de los Reyes, Eufrocina safety of his passengers and other vehicles Alcalde Cardema, and Jean Elizondo were demand that a driver should not overtake brought to the Philippine General Hospital. another vehicle and take the left lane unless Ricardo de los Reyes died before he could be the road is clear and overtaking can be done brought to the operating room. Jean Elizondo safely. This precaution Ilagan had failed to take. was dead upon arrival to the PGH."4 The Instead, he recklessly and imprudently took the reckless manner in which petitioner Ilagan was left lane without regard to oncoming vehicles. driving was clearly set forth by Justice Leuterio This imprudence resulted in death to two in his opinion thus: "By the appellants own persons and serious physical injuries to admission, he was travelling on the inner lane Eufrocina. To say that the accident was due to of the highway going south. It does not appear the negligence of Ricardo de los Reyes, who that there were vehicles towards his right. under the doctrine of the last clear chance, Under the circumstances, he would ordinarily should have avoided the accident, or, that at least De los Reyes was guilty of contributory (Rule 111 Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal negligence, is to add insult to injury, and to action by acquittal of the defendant on the desecrate the memory of one who can no ground that the criminal act charged against longer defend himself. De los Reyes was in his him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also proper lane and where he had a right to be. the civil action for damages based upon the Nevertheless, he did what he could do under same the circumstances to avoid the accident. He act,"7 From which, they would infer that "the swerved to the right to avoid the onrushing criminal action against petitioner Ilagan must bus, but the appellant was running so fast and first be resolved by respondent Court of his act was so sudden that all his efforts to Appeals and, until final resolution thereon, it is avoid the bus were rendered futile. We cannot premature to proceed in the two civil cases."8 understand how de los Reyes could be charged with negligence, or even contributory Petitioners would make much of the above- negligence, when there is absolutely no cited portion of the opinion of Justice evidence that de los Reyes, who was where he Capistrano. That is to rely on a frail reed, to had a right to be, had seen the bus in time to clutch at straws. As pointed out in the brief for avoid the accident. Contributory negligence private respondents, such an objection was cannot be presumed, and the appellants are as never raised in the lower court as well as in the much duty-bound to prove this defense as it Court of Appeals and therefore came too late. was the duty of the plaintiffs to prove Moreover, the facts are dissimilar, and defendant's negligence. By the way, there is therefore its ruling cannot control. It cannot absolutely no evidence in the record that de los escape attention likewise that less than a Reyes was trying to overtake another vehicle majority of the Court gave their approval to the before the accident."5 opinion penned by Justice Capistrano. The most serious objection though is that the With such undisputable facts, it is difficult to interpretation sought to be fastened by imagine an instance of a clearer case of liability petitioners, considering that as pointed out in rightfully imposed by law on the parties the appealed decision this is an action based responsible for the injury afflicted. Even on culpa aquiliana, is its disregard of codal petitioners could not possibly be unaware till provisions as well as of an impressive number such indeed should be the case. That may of pronouncements of this Tribunal. explain why stress is laid in their brief on a procedural objection invoking Corpus v. It is undoubted that it is only when this case 6 Paje. To repeat, it is impressed with futility. Nor was elevated to this Court in this appeal is there any validity to the contention finding by certiorari that the opinion of Justice fault with the award of damages. Capistrano in Corpus v. Pale was invoked. It is well-settled that for an error to be imputed to a 1. The principal reliance of petitioners is on lower court or to the Court of Appeals, there that portion of the opinion of Justice Capistrano must be a showing that there was a disregard in Corpus v. Paje which reads thus: "As reckless by it of a rule or principle of law seasonably imprudence or criminal negligence is not one raised. In an attempt to evade the applicability to the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of of this norm, petitioners, in their reply brief, the Civil Code, there is no independent civil could only allege that such decision "did not action for damages that may be instituted in come to the attention of many legal connection with said offense. Hence, homicide practitioners until the full text thereof was through reckless imprudence or criminal reproduced in the Supreme Courts Reports, negligence comes under the general rule that Annotated." 9 If that were so, such negligence the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal should not prejudice private action is a bar to his civil liability based upon respondents. Corpus v. Paje was decided on the same criminal act notwithstanding that the July 31, 1969. The decision of the Court of injured party reserved his right to institute a Appeals was promulgated on November 19, separate civil action (Chantangeo vs. Abarao, 1970. There was thus a period of one year and supra). In the language of the Rules of Court four months within which such a point could be pressed. What is more, there was likewise the character lacking one vote for it to be the additional time for filing a motion for expression of the opinion of this Court. 13 reconsideration where this issue could be submitted for resolution. Petitioners did Nor is this all. It is to misread the opinion of neither; they only have themselves then to Justice Capistrano in Paje if it is made to yield a blame. There is no reason why this Court significance that would under the should depart from its constant holding that a circumstances of this case reduce to a barren question of law save in very exceptional form of words the jural concept of a quasi- circumstances cannot be raised for the first delict as an independent source of obligation. time on appeal. 10 The law is anything but that. The Civil Code speaks unequivocally to the contrary. Article Petitioners, moreover, ignored the crucial 2176 provides: "Whoever by act or omission distinction that is readily discernible between causes damage to another, there being fault or the facts in Corpus v. Pajeand the facts in the negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage present case. As was pointed out in the opinion done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no of Justice Capistrano, the civil action for existing contractual relations between the damages was made to rest "upon the same parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed criminal negligence" of which the defendant by the provisions of this Chapter." 14 The Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal liability of an employer is made clear, under action. From the opening paragraph of the Article 2180 in this wise: "Employers shall be opinion of the Court of Appeals, now sought to liable for the damages caused by their be reviewed, it is quite apparent that the employees and household helpers acting within liability of petitioners was not predicated on the scope of their assigned tasks, even though; criminal negligence but rather on a quasi-delict the former are not engaged in any business or which, as is clearly pointed out by the Civil industry." 15 So it was under the former Civil Code, is an independent source of Code, although there is a slight difference in obligation. 11 The accident in Corpus occurred phraseology. 16 What is more, there is this new on December 23, 1956 and the civil action was provision in Article 2177: "Responsibility for not instituted until November 21, 1961 during fault or negligence under the preceding article the pendency of the appeal in a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct from the civil in the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, in liability arising from negligence under the Penal this case, it was only a matter of months, the Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages mishap having taken place on February 18, twice for the same act or omission of the 1963 and the case being filed in July of the defendant." 17 This Court in appropriate cases same year, when the civil action precisely to has given force and effectivity to the mandates hold petitioners liable for the quasi-delict was thus so clearly expressed. That was the tenor filed by private respondent. As a matter of fact, of decisions when the former Civil Code was in Corpus, the civil complaint was dismissed by still operative, starting from Donaldson, Sim the lower court precisely on the ground that and Co. v, Smith, Bell and Co. 18 promulgated in the action based upon the quasi-delict had 1902. Then, in 1907 in the leading case prescribed. 12 That certainly cannot be said of of Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific the present litigation. From the beginning both Co., 19 Manresa was quoted to the effect parties were fully aware that it was the that culpa or negligence or culpa aquiliana is negligence of petitioner Ilagan as driver of an independent source of obligation between petitioner Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus two persons not so formerly bound by any Company, Inc. that gave rise to the civil suit. It juridical tie. The civil liability that may arise does not admit of doubt therefore that the according to Justice Tracey in his opinion "was invocation of Corpus v. Paje is misplaced not intended to be merged in the criminal ... . considering the dissimilarity in the facts of the Where an individual is civilly liable for a case and the equally relevant consideration negligent act or omission, it is not required that that the portion of the ponencia of Justice the injured party should seek out a third person Capistrano, insofar as it could be made to lend criminally liable whose prosecution must be a support to petitioner's plea, is not doctrinal in condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right." 20 As was well put by Justice Torres MRR Hospital. The fees of Dr. Alcantara of in Novo v. Ainsworth, 21 decided in 1913: "This P3,000.00 is reasonable and moderate liability is contracted without agreement or considering that he had performed two consent of the person found liable, on the operations, and Eufrocina was under the care principle that in all cases where harm, loss, or of Dr. Alcantara for 72 days in the hospital and damage has been caused to a person or to his even after her discharge from the hospital, she rights by an act or omission, the aggrieved had to report for follow-up examination. There party is entitled to be is even the probability of another operation indemnified ... ." 22 Justice Fisher in another should there be a tissue reaction. The award of leading case, Cangco v. Manila Railroad P3,000.00 for reduction of income of Eufrocina Co. 23 turned once more to Manresa's Cardema is also reasonable because as a result formulation of the basic doctrine that "liability of the injuries which she had suffered and arising from extracontractual culpa is always because of the operations, Eufrocina Cardema based upon a voluntary act or omission which, can no longer engage in her former occupation without willful intent, but by mere negligence of maintaining a boarding house. The award of or inattention, has caused damage to P4,000.00 moral damages is reasonable another." 24 As correctly stressed by Justice considering the serious injuries that she had Street, what was set forth in Article 1902 of the suffered consisting of broken bones, the former Civil Code is a "general doctrine of operations that she underwent, and her jurisprudence." 25 physical pain and suffering. The award of the attorney's fees of P1,000.00 is likewise The first assigned error relying on the rather moderate because she was forced to litigate to forced interpretation accorded certain enforce her claim. The award of P8,000.00 for passages in Corpus v. Paje is thus clearly bereft the death of Jean Elizondo is even below the of any persuasive force. amount now allowed for death due to the act of the defendant. At the time of her death, Jean 2. It is not too far-fetched to impute to Elizondo was 18 years old, a bright student, petitioners an awareness that to deny liability and was in the second year college taking up under the circumstances would be an chemical engineering. Obviously, if she had indefensible posture, devoid of support in law lived, she would have finished her course and no less than in morals. That may explain why in would have earned much more than P8,000.00. the next two errors assigned, what is sought is Moral damages awarded at P6,000.00 is merely to minimize the amount of the damages likewise reasonable. One would never know the for which they were held liable by the Court of pain, the sleepless nights, the torment that one Appeals. In their second and third assignment suffers for the loss of a child in the prime of of errors, they would seek a reduction of life. Certainly, the amount of P6,000.00 cannot P4,988.84 found by both the lower court and assuage the loss of a daughter. Attorney's fees the Court of Appeals as actual hospital in the amount of P2,000.00 likewise is expenses incurred by private respondent reasonable, defendant company having forced Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema and of P8,000.00 plaintiff to litigate. We also take into for the loss of earnings of the deceased consideration that the defendant is a big daughter, Jean Elizondo, of private respondents corporation operating hundreds of vehicles. Melquisedec P. Elizondo and Maxima T. Alcalde. Certainly the amount awarded is not Reference to the appealed decision should incompatible with the resources of the readily make obvious that no such errors were appellant company. It is after all a part of the committed. Thus: "We have examined the overhead expenses of the defendant." 26 It may damages awarded by the Court a quo and we be added that the finding as to the amount of find them to be moderate and reasonable. The P4,988.84 for the hospitalization expenses is award of P4,988.84 for the hospitalization of essentially one of fact and is not to be Eutrocina Alcalde Cardema is supported by the disturbed on appeal. It ill behooves petitioners statement of account of the Manila Railroad to complain about the "speculative" character Hospital. It was certified to by Eufrocina of the amount of P8,000.00 for the death of Cardema and by the supervising auditor of the Jean Elizondo. The victim of their misdeed was at the threshold of youth, a lass of eighteen, 8 Ibid, 5. then in the second year of a chemical engineering course, and in the language of the 9 Reply Brief for the Petitioners, decision, "a bright student." 1äwphï1.ñët 27 If 2. any body could complain then, it is her parents. What was awarded, as noted by Justice 10 Cf. Ng Cho Cio v. Ng Diong, Leuterio, was admittedly less than that allowed L-14832, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA by law. There ought to be a realization even on 275; City of Manila v. Ebay, the part of petitioners that what was said by L-15872, April 26, 1961, 1 Justice Malcolm in Bernal v. House 28 is more SCRA 1086; Republic v. than just mere rhetoric. As was so vividly put Aricheta, L-15589, May 31, by him, "there is not enough money in the 1961, 2 SCRA 469; Zambales entire world to compensate a mother for the Chromite v. Robles, L-16182, death of her child." 29 In the traditional legal Aug. 29, 1961, 2 SCRA 1051; parlance, to quote Chief Justice Concepcion, Republic v. Albert, L-12996, Jan. "life expectancy is not only relevant, but, also, 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 173; Ferrer v. an important element in fixing the amount Commissioner of Internal recoverable ... . 30 It would be then to disregard Revenue, L-16021, Aug. 31, what has been so constantly and 1962, 5 SCRA 1022; Rebodos v. uninterruptedly adhered to if petitioners would Workmen's Compensation have their way. To allow such a thing to happen Commission, L-18737, Nov. 29, would be a grave disservice to the law. 31 1962, 6 SCRA 717; J. M. Tuason Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938; November 19, 1970 is affirmed. Costs against Mendoza v. Mella, L-18752, July petitioners. 30, 1966 17 SCRA 788; Dirige v. Biranya, L-22033, July 30, Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., 1966, 11 SCRA 840; Ramos v. JJ., concur. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., L- 22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA Footnotes 289; Sumemariz v. Development Bank, L-23764, 1 Sotero Cardema, Eufrocina Dec. 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1374; Alcalde Cardema, Melquisedec Manila Port Service v. Court of P. Elizondo and Maxima T. Appeals, L-21890, March 29, Alcalde. 1968, 22 SCRA 1364; San Miguel Brewery v. Vda. de Joves, L-24258 June 26, 1968, 2 L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 23 SCRA 1093; Luzon Surety v. SCRA 1062. Vda. de Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969,30 3 Decision, Annex C to Petition, SCRA 111; De Tañedo v. De la 1-2. Cruz, L-27667, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 63, Atlas Consolidated 4 Ibid. 34. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-22439, May 29, 5 Ibid, 10-12. 1970, 33 SCRA 132; Reparations Commission v. 6 L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 Northern Lines, L-24835, July SCRA 1062. 31, 1970. 34 SCRA 203; Velasco v. Manila Electric Co., 7 Brief for the Petitioners, 4-5. L-18390, Dec. 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 556; Bashier v. Commission on Elections, L- directors of an establishment 33692, Feb. 24, 1972, 43 SCRA or business are equally liable 238; National Marketing for any damages caused by Corporation v. Federation, L- their employees while engaged 22578, Jan. 31, 1973, 49 SCRA in the branch of the service in 238; Arangco v. Baloso, L- which employed, or on 28617, Jan. 31, 1973, 49 SCRA occasion of the performance of 296; Gonzaga v. Court of their duties." Appeals, L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 17 Article 2177 of the Civil SCRA 381. Code.
11 "According to Article 1157 of 18 2 Phil. 766. Cf. Johnson v.
the Civil Code, "obligations David, 5 Phil. 663 (1906) and arise from law; contracts; Batarra v. Marcos, 7 Phil. 156 quasi-contracts; acts or (1906). omissions punished by law; and quasi-delicts." 19 7 Phil. 359.
12 When therefore four Justices 20 Ibid, 364. Cf. Almeida v.
of the Court, Justice Dizon, the Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178 (1907); then Justice, now Chief Justice, Ullmann v. Ullmann and Co., 10 Makalintal, Justices Sanchez Phil. 459 (1908); Samson v. and Teehankee concurred in Dionisio, 11 Phil. 538 (1908); the result, it may be assumed Taylor v. Manila Electric that their concurrence was Railroad Co., 16 Phil. 8 (1910). based on the same ground as that of prescription. Two other 21 26 Phil. 380. Justices, J. B. L. Reyes and Zaldivar, did not take part. 22 Ibid, 385-386. Cf. Algarra v. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 284 (1914); 13 The then Chief Justice Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 Concepcion and Justice Castro (1915); Yamada v. Manila Fernando and Barredo Railroad, 33 Phil. 8 (1915); Cerf concurred in the opinion of v. Medel, 33 Phil. 37 (1915); Justice Capistrano. Carlos v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 34 Phil. 55 (1916). 14 Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 23 38 Phil. 768 (1918).
15 Article 2180 of the Civil
24 Ibid, 773. Cf. Manila Railroad Code. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 876 (1918); Daywalt v. 16 According to Article 1902 of Corporacion de Padres the former Civil Code. "Any Agustinos, 39 Phil. 587 (1919); person who by an act or Yu Biao Sontua v. Ossorio, 43 omission causes damage to Phil. 511 (1922); Sing Juco and another by his fault or Sing Bengeo v. Sunyantong, 43 negligence shall be liable for Phil. 589 (1922); Borromeo v. the damage done." Article Manila Electric, 44 Phil. 165 insofar as pertinent was (1922). worded thus: "Owners or 25 Verzosa and Ruiz v. Lim, 45 Surro, 93 Phil. 472 (1953); Phil. 416 (1923). Cf. Borromeo Marchan v. Mendoza, L-24471, v. Manila Electric, 44 Phil. 165 Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 888; (1922); Agdoro v. Philippine Saludares v. Martinez, L-27335, Mining Industrial Co., 45 Phil. Oct. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 745; 816 (1924); Bishop of Nueva Longao v. Fakat, L-23978, Dec. Caceres v. Mun. of Tabaco, 46 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 866; Palisoc Phil. 271 (1924); Lopez v. v. Brillantes, L-29025, Oct. 4, Duruelo, 52 Phil. 229 (1928); 1971,41 SCRA 548. Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. 900 (1929); Bernal v. House and Tacloban Electric and Ice Plant, 54 Phil. 327 (1930) Enizon v. Norton and Harrison, 55 Phil. 18 (1930); Walter A. Smith and Co. v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber, 55 Phil. 517 (1930); San Carlos Milling v. Bank of the P. I., 59 Phil. 59 (1933); Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942); Castro v. Acro Taxicab, 82 Phil. 359 (1948); Sudario v. Acro Taxicab, 86 Phil. 1 (1944); Philippine National Bank v. Bagamaspad, 89 Phil. 365 (1951); Connel Bros. Co. v. Aduna, 91 Phil. 79 (1952); Diana v. Batangas Transportation, 93 Phil. 391 (1963).
26 Decision, Annex C to Petition 17-19.
27 Ibid, 18.
28 54 Phil. 327 (1930).
29 Ibid, 330.
30 Villa Rey Transit v. Court of
Appeals, L-25499, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511, 516.
31 Cf. Manzanares v. Moreta,
38 Phil. 821 (1918), Agdero v. Philippine Mining Industrial Co., 45 Phil. 816 (1924), Bernal v. House, 54 Phil. 3Z7 (1930); Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 427(l930); Alcantara v.