CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 2019 CASE DIGESTS This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts
and prohibition asks the Courts to order
LECTURE 3
ARTICLE VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1: The executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines.
1) SCRA 42
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
2) Marcos v. Mangapus, 177 SCRA 668
FACTS
On February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced
into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of
the Republic under a revolutionary government. Mr. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But
Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family.
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years
of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within
the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioner’s contention:
the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has
enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied
to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius.
ISSUE
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
RULING
Yes.
The 1987 Constitution, brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It
would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the
power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law,
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and
that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy."
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has
the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote
their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is
also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the
officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the
people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the
Constitution reminds everyone that "sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them."
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons
who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from
whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to
be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither
absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms
of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms,
admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally
important public interests
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people.
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or
to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers
in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-
day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers
that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring
martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and
security.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though
still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and
defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws,
cannot shirk from that responsibility.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the
past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
3) Pontejos v. Ombudsman, 483 SCRA 83
FACTS:
In 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed a Complaint before the
Ombudsman against Emmanuel T. Pontejos(arbiter), Wilfredo
Imperial (regional director), and Carmencita Atos (clerk), all of them
officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
and one Roderick Ngo, a private individual.
Aquino accused Pontejos and Atos of conspiring to exact
money in exchange for a favorable decision of a case against Ngo then
pending in the HLURB. He further averred rhat Pontejos acted as his
counsel during the time when the latter was the hearing officer of the
case. Atos allegedly received P10,000 in check, which was part of the
consideration for a favorable decision. During preliminary
investigation, affidavits were adduced in order to corroborate
Aquino’s allegations.
It must be noted that Aquino had three (3) pending cases in
the HLURB. One, against buyers of lots in a subdivision which he
allegedly failed to develop; two, against Hammercon, Inc for
revocation of registration and license; and lastly, against Hammercon
again for specific performance and rescission of contract.
Respondents filed separate separate counter-affidavits to
refute the charges. They claimed that the meetings mentioned by
Aquino (in of the affidavits) did not take place. Neither did they
receive any money from him.
Ruling of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman (ODO)
Found probable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of
estafa, direct bribery and illegal practice of profession in violation of
RA 6713.
There was estafa because Pontejos allegedly made false
pretenses to Aquino in order to receive P25,000 and assured him that
Hammercon’s license (as mentioned above) will be cancelled. He is
guilty of direct bribery for demanding and receiving P100,000 from
Aquino in exchange for a favorable decision. Further, Pontejos should
be charged with unauthorized practice of law for providing legal
services to Aquino and receiving litigation expenses.
The ODO ruled that Atos should be extended immunity from
criminal prosecution and discharged as state witness. According to
him, Atos was merely a subordinate who could have acted only upon
the prodding of Pontejos, and she “did not appear to be most guilty.”
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when
it granted an immunity to Ms. Atos to become a state witness
RULING
Petition is Unmeritorious.
The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is
executive in character. It is the prosecution that could essentially
determine the strength of pursuing a case against an accused. Such
prosecutorial powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an
accused in exchange for testimony against the other.
Mapa v. Sandiganbayan: The decision to grant immunity
from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process.
It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for
government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of a State to prosecute all who appear to be
guilty of having committed a crime.Its justification lies in the
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty
criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law.
It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to vest the
prosecutor the power to determine who can qualify as a witness and
be granted immunity from prosecution. The OMB was also vested
with the power to grant immunity from prosecution, thus:
"SEC. 17. Of the Ombudsman Act x x x.
"Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into
account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession and production of
documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth
in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. x x
x."
Pontejos relies on the Rules of Court, countering that an information
against the accused must first be filed in court prior to the discharge.
And that the prosecution could only recommend, but not grant
immunity.
The Court has already held that this contention of Pontejos in only
applicable to cases already filed in court. The trial court is given the
power to discharge an accused as a state witness only because it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime of the accused. As stated
earlier, the power to choose who to discharge as a witness is an
executive function. Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative.
Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act requires conformity with the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, this should be read as requiring the following
circumstances prior to discharge:
1. Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused sought to
be discharged;
2. No direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed except the testimony of the said accused;
3. The testimony of the said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
4. Said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
5. Said accused has not any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Indeed, there must be a standard to follow in the exercise of the
prosecutor’s discretion. The decision to grant immunity cannot be
made capriciously. Should there be unjust favoritism, the Court may
exercise its certiorari power.
In the present case, certiorari is not proper. Pontejos’ allegations do
not show, much less allege, grave abuse of discretion in granting
immunity to Atos. The OMB considered Atos’ position, record and
involvement in the case prior to the discharge.
4) Banda v. Ermita, 618 SCRA 499
FACTS:
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on
their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed during the term of former President
Corazon C. Aquino, by virtue of E.O. No. 285 which provided, among
others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government
Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA).
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. - xxx The
Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and
accountable forms of national, provincial, city and municipal
governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette,
General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development
information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs,
including government publications, aside from those enumerated
above, but not in an exclusive basis. The Office shall be attached to
the Philippine Information Agency.
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed E.O. No. 378,
amending Section 6 of E.O. No. 285 by removing the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of
government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to E.O. No. 378,
government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding,
subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier
be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered
by the NPO. E.O. No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving E.O. No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure
as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that:
1. it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to
amend or repeal E.O. No. 285 issued by former President
Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and
2. E.O. No. 378 violates petitioners' security of tenure, because
it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal
E.O. No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order;
(2) Whether or not former President Aquino's E.O. No. 285 is a
legislative enactment, as the same was issued while President Aquino
still had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution and thus,
only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order
No. 285.
RULING:
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President
has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with the President's constitutionally granted power
of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation
of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the
Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an
agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office
of the President. Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President (a) to
restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System,
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or
offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa. Concomitant to such
power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the
President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the
offices in the Office of President Proper but also the rest of the Office
of the President and the Executive Branch, the President implicitly has
the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the
functional and internal structure of the Office of the President,
including the modification of functions of such executive agencies as
the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO
nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another
agency. Under the assailed E.O. No. 378, the NPO remains the main
printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and
publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging
efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private
sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of
election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of
the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere
alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity
of its printing responsibility to election forms.
Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision
of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid
and binding for all intents and purposes. Notably, in the present case,
the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004
(the year of the issuance of E.O. No. 378), likewise gave the President
the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any
department or agency in the Executive Branch. The appropriations law
recognize the power of the President to reorganize even executive
offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the
power to implement structural, functional, and operational
adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or
realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such
reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the
NPO's appropriations to its own income under E.O. No. 378, the same
is statutorily authorized by the appropriations law.
The issuance of E.O. No. 378 by President Arroyo is an
exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, "in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." This is a matter
already well-entrenched in jurisprudence.
To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in
E.O. No. 378 limiting the appropriation of the NPO to its own income.
As jurisprudence has provided, the Court has noted certain provisions
in the general appropriations laws as likewise reflecting the power of
the President to reorganize executive offices or agencies even to the
extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Petitioners' contention that the issuance of E.O. No. 378 is an invalid
exercise of legislative power on the part of the President has no legal
leg to stand on. In all, E.O. No. 378, which purports to institute
necessary reforms in government in order to improve and upgrade
efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the functions
of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform
it into a self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is
well within the prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing
delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office.
As pointed out in the separate concurring opinion of our
learned colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the objective
behind E.O. No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state policy
contained in R.A. No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform
Act to encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to
private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified. To be very
clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to
the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies
of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the
Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the
power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance
with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because
the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition,"
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition"
is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there
is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize
agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject
to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith. If
the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions,
which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government
employees, would be valid. Also, there is no such thing as an absolute
right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices,
which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.
A careful review of the records will show that petitioners
utterly failed to substantiate their claim. They failed to allege, much
less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO's
budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the
position, or removal from office, of any employee. Neither did
petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that the
changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations
that had nothing to do with improving the efficiency of, or
encouraging operational economy in, the said agency. In sum, the
Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in President Arroyo's issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
5) Review Center v. Garcia, 583 SCRA 42 (Review Center v.
Ermita)
FACTS:
On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In
June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that
handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during
the examination period... among the examinees reviewing at the R.A.
Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.
George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the
incumbent President of the Philippine Nurses Association.
On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on 22
August 2006.
Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo) replaced all the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing.
President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing
Board Examinations.
On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of
all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an
organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to
"amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that
giving permits to... operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations
will effectively abolish independent review centers.
EO 566 authorized CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers.
In a letter dated 3 January 2007,[6] Chairman Puno wrote petitioner,
through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig, that to suspend the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of
EO 566.
On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007,
petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations] praying for a ruling:
Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from
the coverage of the CHED;
Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers
to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-
recognized professional associations with recognized programs, or in
the alternative, to convert into schools; and
Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722
(RA 7722)[9] limiting the CHED's coverage to public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs
in post-secondary educational institutions.
CHED was given the authority to regulate and establish review centers
under EO 566.
While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the
mandates of CHED under Republic Act 7722, however, on September
8, 2006, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, issued
Executive Order No. 566 directing the Commission on Higher
Education to regulate the establishment and operation of review
centers and similar entities in the entire country.
With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is
the agency that is mandated to regulate the establishment and
operation of all review centers as provided for under Section 4 of the
Executive Order which provides that "No review center or similar...
entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the
favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the
issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review
classes. x x x"
Pertinent provision of the IRR:
Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate - Only CHED
recognized, accredited and reputable HEIs may be authorized to
establish and operate review center/course by the CHED upon full
compliance with the conditions and requirements provided herein and
in other pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In addition, a consortium
or consortia of qualified schools and/or entities may establish and
operate review centers or conduct review classes upon compliance
with the provisions of these Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of
legislative power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rule-
making power.
RULING:
The petition has merit.
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court
must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would... cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this
Court is not a trier of facts.
The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the exercise of this Court of its
primary jurisdiction
The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department
when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary
jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing
aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an... action due to its
importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine
whether the other branches of the Government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution.
EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722
The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term "programs x x x
of higher learning" is broad enough to include programs offered by
review centers.
We do not agree.
Section 3 of RA 7722 provides:
Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance
of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education
is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), and attached to
the Office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its
coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well... as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and private. (Emphasis supplied)
Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994
(Implementing Rules of RA 7722)[24] defines an institution of higher
learning or a program of higher learning.
Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing Rules provide:
Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the Commission
shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well
as degree granting programs in all post-secondary educational
institutions, public and private.
These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational
institutions offering tertiary degree programs.
The establishment, conversion, or elevation of degree-granting
institutions shall be within the responsibility of the Commission.
Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering
tertiary degree or post-secondary programs. In fact, Republic Act No.
8292 or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 covers
chartered state universities and colleges. State universities and
colleges... primarily offer degree courses and programs.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's
coverage under RA 7722. The CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is
limited to public and private institutions of higher education and
degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational... institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities
Usurpation of Legislative Power
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend
the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the
authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them,[32] and this power
is vested with the Congress under Section 1,... Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not
indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign
and... unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines.
MAIN ISSUE RELATING TO ARTICLE VII
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.
He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices.
This... means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions
of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the... maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies
and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end,
he... can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties
as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative...
policy. x x x.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is
also an invalid exercise of the CHED's quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-
making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations.[36]
The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the
confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers... review
centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher
education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Exercise of Police Power
Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be
exercised by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a
valid delegation
Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing
the President... to regulate the operations of non-degree granting
review centers.
Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate Law
There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve
the integrity of licensure examinations. The PRC has the power to
adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure
examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to...
refer to the conduct of the examinations
These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation
of review centers.
However, this power has nothing to do with the regulation of review
centers. The PRC has the power to bar PRB members from conducting
review classes in review centers. However, to interpret this power to
extend to the power to regulate review centers is clearly an
unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981.
Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform "such
other functions and duties as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions" of RA 8981 does not extend to the regulation of review
centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981 that mentions
regulation by the
PRC of review centers.
Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar entities whose
reviewees will not even... take any licensure examination given by the
PRC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the petition-in-
intervention. We DECLARE Executive Order No. 566 and
Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30, series
of 2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.
6) Biraogo v. Truth Commission, 637 SCRA 78
FACTS: Prior to the May 2010 elections, Sen. Benigno Aquino III
declared his strong condemnation of graft and corruption. To make his
campaign slogan real, President Aquino signed Executive Order No.
1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission(PTC) of 2010." PTC is an ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. It shall have all the powers of an investigative
body but has no quasi-judicial powers. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations.
Before the Court are two consolidated cases, both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of EO No. 1. The first case is
instituted by Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
and the second is instituted by Edcel Lagman, et al., as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives. They assail that EO No. 1
is violative of the legislative power of congress as provided in the
Constitution as it usurps the authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds thereof.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) questioned the standing of the
petitioners and averred that E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers
of Congress to create a public office because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of
1987 (E.O. No. 292).
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation
of powers by usurping the powers of the Congress in creating the
PTC?
RULING: NO. The allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the
faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well
as head of government and whatever powers inherent in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create
ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
7) Senate v. Ermirta, G.R. No. 169659, April 20, 2006
Congress has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
FACTS:
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them
to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group (North Rail Project).
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering
the North Rail Project. Subsequently, the President issued E.O.
464. Section 1 provides: Appearance by Heads of Departments
Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions
on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of
the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress. Section 3 further
provides: Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress.
– All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall
secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle
of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive
privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Then, 3 petitions were filed
questioning the constitutionality of EO 464 which allowed
executive department heads to invoke executive privilege.
ISSUE
W/N EO 464 is constitutional.
RULING
CONSTITUTIONAL FOR SECTION 1 AND 2(a). The power of
inquiry of Congress is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. An exemption to such
Congressional power falls under the rubric of executive privilege,
which is also a constitutional concept. Executive privilege,
however, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. The validity of a claim
thereof depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. Executive officials are NOT exempt
from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Validity of Section 1 The requirement then
to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is
only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.
For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied
to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless
a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Validity of
Section 2(a) Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding
only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what
is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be
conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President
regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
Unconstitutionality of Section 2(b) and 3 Section 3 of E.O. 464
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. Whenever an official invokes E.O.
464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a
head of office authorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged, and that the President has
not reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of
privilege, which implied claim is not accompanied by any specific
allegation of the basis thereof. Certainly, Congress has the right
to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President,
or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and
that the President has not overturned that determination. Such
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged. That the message is
couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a
claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to
make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive
branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted.
It is merely implied. It does not provide for precise and certain
reasons for the claim, which deprives the Congress to determine
whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to
information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in
aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert
it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefore. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means
then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to
divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall
not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire
into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value – our right as a people to
take part in government.
8) Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS:
This is regarding the contract entered into by DOTC with ZTE
for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project. In
connection with this NBN Project, Senate passed various
Resolutions and pending bills, which it then used as basis for
initiating an investigation.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending
invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the
NBN Project. Neri, petitioner, was among those invited.
He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26
and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26
hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates.
Neri appeared before the Committees and testified for about 11 hours
on matters concerning the NBN Project, a project awarded by the
DOTC to ZTE.
Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
informed PGMA of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on PGMA and his
discussions relating to the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.”
Committees persisted in knowing Neri’s answers to (a) whether
PGMA followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether she directed him to approve it.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on
November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show
cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. On Nov. 29, Neri’s replied that he manifested that it was
not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the
only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and
testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He requested that
he be furbished “in advance as to what else” he “needs to clarify.”
Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice
of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees
and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter
and contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his
conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions." According to him, these
discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials on the country's diplomatic relations and
economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines." He also emphasizes
that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President
and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?

RULING: Yes.
IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations --
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But,
the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative
that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published
rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for
them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received”
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need:
xxx presidential communications are presumptively privileged and
that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public
need by the branch seeking access to conversations xxxx Here, the
record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to
the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions
veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function
under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same
Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that “the oversight function of
Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is conceded that it is
difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and
an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this
regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the
manner of inquiry is conducted.
EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: “Demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial” (US v. Nixon)
does not apply --
In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the
information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law
and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be
disclosed. This is the reason why the US Court was quick to “limit the
scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with
the balance between the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality xxx and congressional demands for information.”
Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita
stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or
the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the
President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case,
Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege
on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to
her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic
secrets.
Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on
Matters of Public Concern
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. The provision (Section 7, Article III) itself provides the
limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are
Sec. 7, RA 6713, Art. 229, RPC, Sec. 3(k), RA 3019, and Sec. 24(e),
Rule 130, ROC. These are in addition to what our body of
jurisprudence clarifies as confidential and what our Constitution
considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege.
Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
certain information. We find the information subject of this case
belonging to such kind.
Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis Right of the People
to Information on Matters of Public Concern: More than anything else,
though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s
right to public information. The former cannot claim that every
legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.
xxx
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as
justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to
the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power,
they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it
may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give
way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those
pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided
cases.
9) Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
FACTS
Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens
and taxpayers requested, via the petition for mandamus and
prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The
Congress, through the House Committee called for an inquiry into the
JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive refused to give them the
said copies until the negotiation was completed.
JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the
Philippine government with Japan, concerned with trade in goods,
rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition
policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the
negotiation process are privileged
• Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress,
exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties,
from the negotiation process
RULING
YES in both cases.
Executive Privilege
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the
right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
“information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest.”
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that
while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion
before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA
is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these
offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with
Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be
open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter
Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears
noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter,
normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators
have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance
in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears
emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as
Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged
does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances.
Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made
may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the
disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the
deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It
may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential
character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and
presidential communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege
for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of
exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such
negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential
communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through
the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the
President, particularly in its capacity as “the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege
accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the
content of the information per se, but because the information is part
of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest,
must be presumed confidential.
Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a
logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative
process.
Treaty-making power of the President
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is
Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department.
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs
to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be delegation of
that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into
treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only
to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided
under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the
President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the
conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into
treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence,
since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing
vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty
negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been
given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private
citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to
present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is
critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that
do not include treaty-negotiation.
The Court holds that, in determining whether an information is
covered by the right to information, a specific “showing of need” for
such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the
same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government
has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the
information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding
it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that information is
vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability
to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and
economic decision-making.
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties
present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance, that
they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in
degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such
cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests
is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving
fundamental rights.
However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the
privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is
indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome
the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is
a matter of public concern, without any further showing required?
Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege
of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be
whether an information is a matter of public concern.
10) Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (Privilege of Immunity
from Suit)
FACTS
These are consolidated cases in which Informations for libel were filed
against petitioner Beltran. Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in
an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
ISSUE
Whether the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing
of a complaint-affidavit.
RULING
YES. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by
any other person. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
11) Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools
Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon
recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was
reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of
its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining
the implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted
the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of
Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper
because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the
doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Issues:
1.Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential
immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his
security of tenure.
Ruling:
1. NO.
Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper
because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the
doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the
petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.

Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the
courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ submission that the petition of private respondent with the
Court of Appeals is improper for failing to show that petitioners
constituted themselves into a "court" conducting a "proceeding" and
for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted beyond their
jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or ministerial functions, is
barren of merit. Private respondent has clearly averred that the
petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private
respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure. And
petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a
ministerial duty, such that they could be subject to charges of
insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order.
What is more, where an administrative department acts with grave
abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside
the administrative determination thus reached.
2. YES.
After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent
court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be
indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of
Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education."
It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than
temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the
(reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing
in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of
tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of
Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not
only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals
(Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals,
183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs.
Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible
even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the
transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure
him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would
in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of
office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31
SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to
be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to
the MIST cannot be countenanced.
12) Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146740-15, March 2, 2001
FACTS:
· Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
· Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
· House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon
was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker
Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
· Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner.
21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
· When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
· January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call
for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument
on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize
the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
· January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together
with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.
General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we
wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.
· January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and
his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
· January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency.
· February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted."
· February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution."
ISSUES:
· Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
· Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
HELD:
· Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
· In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write
any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
 Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking
of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
· Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
· An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
· Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President xxx.
· What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
· In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
13) David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence
in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation
of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the
rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on
the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices
in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of
ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected
of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the
Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation,
alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly.
ISSUE
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is
unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
3.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning
the constitutionality of the proclamation?
4.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever
the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

RULING
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar
as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result
in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that
under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the
absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned
public utility and private business affected with public interest.
Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled
is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
3.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In
People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for
they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017.
4.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires,
the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest only if there is
congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of
appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the
best assurance that due process of law would be observed
Section 2: No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
1) Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 221697, March 8,
2016
FACTS
Petitioner was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
parish church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar. Parental care and
custody over her was passed on to Emiliano Militar and his wife, three
days after she was found. Emiliano reported and registered petitioner
as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar- Iloilo. In her
Foundling Certificate, petitioner was given the name “Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.” Five years later, petitioner was adopted
by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.
A petition for her adoption was filed with the MTC of San Juan City,
which was granted on May 13, 1974. Consequently, petitoner’s name
was changed to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.”
Petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies
at the University of the Philippines but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of America in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College. She came home to
the Philippines to marry her husband, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the United States of America. Desirous of being with her husband
who was then based in the US, she and her husband flew back to the
US two days after their wedding. On October 18, 2001, she became a
naturalized American citizen.
On April 8, 2004, petitioner came back to the Philippines to
support her father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections.
She returned to the US three months later. On December 13, 2004,
petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s
deteriorating medical condition. Unfortunately, petitioner’s father’s
condition deteriorated which eventually led to his untimely demise.
Petitioner stayed until February 3, 2005 to take care of her father’s
funeral arrangements, as well as, to assist in the settlement of his
estate.
In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, petitioner
and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines, sometime in the first quarter of 2005. Finally, petitioner
came home to the Philippines on May 24, 2005 and without delay,
secured a Tax identification Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Her three children immediately followed while her husband
was forced to stay in the US to complete pending projects, as well as,
to arrange the sale of their family home there. The petitioner and her
children briefly stayed at her mother’s place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City in the second half of
2005.
On February 14, 2006, petitioner made a quick trip to the US to
supervise the disposal of some of the family’s remaining household
belongings. She travelled back to the Philippines on March 11, 2006.
The US family home was sold on April 27, 2006 and petitioner’s
husband arrived in the country on May 4, 2006. In early 2006,
petitioner’s husband acquired a lot in Quezon City where they built
their family home, where up to this day, they have been residing in.
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225). Under the same act, she filed
with the Bureau of Immigration a sworn petition to reacquire
Philippine Citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children. The petition was
granted thus the issuance by the Bureau of Immigration of
identification Certificates in petitioner’s name and in the names of her
three children.
Petitioner registered as a voter of barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City on August 31, 2006. She also secured from the Department
of Foreign Affairs a new Philippine passport, which was renewed on
March 18, 2014.
Petitioner was appointed Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board on October 6, 2010.
Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship on October 20, 2010. The
following day, petitioner submitted the said Affidavit to the Bureau of
Immigration and took her oath of office as Chairperson. From then on,
petitioner stopped using her American passport. On July 12, 2011
petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in
Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States.” On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul issued to
the petitioner a “Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States”, effective October 21, 2010.
On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein
she answered “ six (6) years and six (6) months” to the question
“Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
Petitioner was proclaimed Senator on May 16, 2013.
 On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency
for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, petitioner declared that she
is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to
the day before May 9, 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months, counted from May 24, 2005.
Estrella Elamparo filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel
said COC which was raffled to the COMELEC Second Division,
contending that petitioner committed material representation when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years and eleven
months up to the day before the May 2016 Elections.
Aside from the petition filed by Elamparo, three separate petitions
filed by Francisco Tatad, Antonio Contreras and Amado Valdez were
consolidated and raffled to COMELEC First Division. Tatad alleges
that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify
her for the Presidency. He further theorized that since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural—
born citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status. Valdez alleges that petitioner’s repatriation under RA 9225 did
not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen, and further
argues that petitioner’s own admission in her COC for Senator that she
had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six years and
six months prior to the May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Contreras’ petition limited the attack to the residency issue, claiming
that petitioner’s 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the
ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency
required for said candidacy, and that she made false entry in her COC
when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten
years and eleven months for, as Contreras contends, the reckoning
period for computing petitioner’s residency in the Philippines should
be the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine Citizenship was
approved by the Bureau of Immigration, that is, July 18, 2006.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of the cancellation of the
COC. COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-
born citizen, that she failed to complete the 10-year residency
requirement and that she committed material misrepresentation in her
COC, thus she is not qualified for the elective position of President.
Petitioner filed two separate Motions for Reconsideration, which were
denied. Thus, the Petition for Certiorari with urgent prayer for the
issuance of an Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order/Status Quo
Ante-Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUES
1. Can the COMELEC as a judge in disqualifying petitioner for
the position of President
2. Is petitioner, being a foundling, a natural-born citizen?
3. Did petitioner satisfy the residency requirement making her
eligible to run for the position of President?
4. Did petitioner commit material misrepresentation when she
filled out her COC?
RULING
1) COMELEC IS NOT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION
TO RULE ON THE DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES
RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of
petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive
ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation.
The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such
issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution.
As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate
sought to be disqualified is “guilty of or found by the Commission to
be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.” Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned,
Rule 25[1] and Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules are flipsides of one
to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment
of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a
candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established
in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by
statutes, be executive order, or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
2) FOUNDLINGS ARE CONSIDERED BY THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND BY INTERNATIONAL AS
NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY
WHERE THEY ARE FOUND.
As a matter of law, foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the
intent of the framers.
The deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The
Court finds no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee
the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to
render social justice.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino
at best. THIS IS ERRONEOUS. In the first place, “having to perform
an act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In
this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the
child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents not the citizenship of
the child, Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceeding to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the
election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect
it.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. The common
thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child and the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws embodies the principle
that “a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of
birth.” Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness provides for the principle that a foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found. These
principles in these two conventions while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of International Law.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor
to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, does not
mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not
a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131 effectively
affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness"
merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
3) PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION RESULTED
TO THE ACQUISITION OF NATURAL-BORN
CITIZENSHIP
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.
The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of
natural citizen as implying “that natural-born citizenship must begin
at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth.” RA No.
9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to
determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it
fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress’ determination. More importantly, COMELEC’s position
that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected where
the phrase “from birth” was clarified to mean “at the time of birth.”
Neither is “repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s
citizenship. There are only two types of citizens under the 1987
Constitution: natural-born and naturalized. There is no third category
for repatriated citizens.
4) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT
FALSE REPRESENTATION WHEN SHE
FILLED OUT HER COC
When petitioner immigrated to the US in 1991, she lost her
original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites
to acquire a new domicile (1) Residence or bodily presence in a new
locality; (2) An intention to remain there; and (3) An intention to
abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence[2] showing that she and her
family abandoned their US domiciles and relocated to the Philippines
for good. However, the COMELEC refused to consider that
petitioner’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005.
The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented
by the petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that
the petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in
July 2006.
COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look of RA No. 6768,
as amended[3] shows that there is no overriding intent to treat
balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year.
Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized
abroad and “comes or returns to the Philippines.” Given the law’s
express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say
in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish
his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends
to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012
COC as binding and conclusive admission against the petitioner. It
could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate ‘s mistake
as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy,
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual
has satisfied the Constitution’s residency qualification requirement.
When petitioner claimed to have been a resident for ten years and
eleven months, she could do so in good faith. For another, it could not
be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the
SET as early as August 2015 and the matter was first brought up in the
media on June 2, 2015. From the time therefore when the matter was
discussed in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC
and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
In the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of
the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly
diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits. The
Petition is GRANTED.
[1] Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is
a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution. A Petition to Disqualify a
Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.
[2] petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May
2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad;
e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006
with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with
the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their
dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing
enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding
years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging
donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the
U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing
sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner
indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005;
affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner
on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until
the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the
Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
[3] “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program”
Section 3: There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same
manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the
same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation.
1) Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013
FACTS
Agra was concurrently appointed as Acting Solicitor General and as
Acting Secretary of Justice by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (PGMA). Petitioner is assailing these appointments as
violations to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner’s contentions- the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution does not distinguish between an appointment
or designation of a Member of the Cabinet in an acting or temporary
capacity, on the one hand, and one in a permanent capacity, on the
other hand; and that Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless Members
of the Cabinet, are not exempt from the constitutional ban.
Respondents’ contentions- Agra’s concurrent designations as the
Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General were only in
a temporary capacity. Thus the only effect was to confer additional
duties to him. As the Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of
Justice, Agra was not "holding" both offices in the strict constitutional
sense. They argue that an appointment within the given context must
be regular and permanent, not a mere designation.
Petitioner’s counter arguments – There was no "prevailing special
circumstance" that justified the non-application to Agra of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He says that the temporariness of
the appointment or designation is not an excuse to disregard the
constitutional ban against holding of multiple offices by the Members
of the Cabinet.
ISSUE
Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?
RULING
YES.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his or her
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
In Funa v. Ermita, this Court was held that while all other appointive
officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal
severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language
used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting
as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and
(3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or
temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned
or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard,
to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less
than the actual performance of the functions and duties of the office.
Indeed, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it
is without question that the declared objective of Section 13, supra, is
to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently
is to "open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important
constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department
and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the guise
of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."
Also, in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under
the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice
President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied
by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without
additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.
Section 4: The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person
who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more
than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at
any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
1) Anson-Roa v. Arroyo, H.R. No. 162384, March 24, 2004
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
2) Pimentel v. Joint Committee, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004
FACTS
Sen. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the
ajournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. He prays for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease
and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth
Congress, all its pending matters and proceedings terminate upon its
expiration (citing Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution).
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the precedents set by the
1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop
the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee.
ISSUE
Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President upon
its adjournment sine die is null and void.
RULING
The instant petition is DISMISSED. The petition has no basis under
the constitution. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not
terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular
session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Art. VI of the
Constitution does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular
annual legislative sessions.
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a
close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11,
2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as
being the National Board of Canvassers. The joint public session
cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated task.
3) Lopez v. Senate, G.R.No. 163556, June 8, 2004
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
4) Tecson v. Lim, 424 SCRA 277
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
5) Macalintal v. PET, 635 SCRA 783
FACTS
Atty. Macalintal filed a petition that question the constitutionality of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progency of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The petitioner highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of
Buac vs. COMELEC which declared that contests involving the
President and the Vice-President fell within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of quasi-judicial power. On this
point, petitioner reiterated that the constitution of PET, with the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members
thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and
of other Courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented that the petition
was unspecified and without statutory basis and that the liberal
approach in its preparation is a violation of the well-known rules of
practice and pleading in this jurisdiction.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
2. Whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
RULING The petition was dismissed.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily
reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In
the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise
thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
constitutional provision.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is
equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
Petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and,
thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article certiorari filed by the proper party — if there is a showing that the
VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established lack or excess of jurisdiction.
by law.” Consistent with our presidential system of government, the
function of “dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
a presidential or vice-presidential election disputes, it performs what
demandable and enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice. With
is essentially a judicial power.
the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to
include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
or instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded
it remained absolute. by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts
of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
power. designated. As intended by the framers of the Constitution, the PET is
to be an independent institution, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or
metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
Sections 7, 8, and 11:
At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as well as
1) Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146740-15, March 2, 2001
congressional and senatorial — exclusive and original jurisdiction is
lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and
FACTS: On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President.
Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on
speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in
President. n a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker
essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for
representatives. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House
impeachment trial of the petitioner. On December 7, the impeachment
Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the
trial started. January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call
COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their
for petitioner's resignation. On January 19, the fall from power of the
decisions are still subject to judicial review — via a petition for
petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. January 20 turned to be
the day of surrender. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of
the Presidency.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner
filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in
any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR
No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(YES)
(2) Whether or not Petitioner is President on leave and respondent
Arroyo is only an Acting President. (NO)
RULING: VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito
Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the
de jure 14 th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
RATIO: (1) YES. The issue brings under the microscope the meaning
of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution. Resignation is not a high
level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral.
It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act
and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito
Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer. The Angara Diary reveals that at 2:30 p.m.,
the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and
stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election
for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium
that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."
Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently. Significantly, the
petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and
dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. At 10:00
p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes)
guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace." This
is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had
to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace
period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time. The pressure
continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up
Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para
magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly
transfer of power." There was no defiance to the request. Secretary
Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem
was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and
the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the
petitioner, viz: The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.
(I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm
tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear
my name, then I will go."
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving
the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed
his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office
of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final
act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
(2) NO. An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. House
of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 97 which
states: "RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO
OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS
A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House
Resolution No. 178 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 100
which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES. On the same date, February 7, the Senate
likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT
COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO. Both houses of Congress started
sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses
of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim
of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the
decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo
as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold
that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in
Baker vs. Carr, there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the
power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
Section 13
1) Rafael v. Embroidery and Appaerel Control Board, 21 SCRA
336
FACTS
Petitioner, who was engaged in the manufacture of embroidery and
apparel products for the purpose of exportation, using imported raw
materials and doing business under the style `El Barato Alce
Company,"
RA No. 3137 was enacted, creating "an embroidery and apparel
control and inspection board covering control, issuance of entry
permits, and inspection of conditionally tax-free raw material
importations by local embroidery apparel manufacturers and the
corresponding liquidation of re-exportations thereof as Philippine-
made embroideries and apparels."
SECS. 2 of said Act provide:
"Section 2. This license required hereof under Section One of this Act
shall be dully issued by an Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board which is hereby created and hereinafter referred to
as the Board, composed of (1) A representative from the Bureau of
Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of
Finance; (2) A representative from the Central Bank to be designated
by its Governor; (3) A representative from the Department of
Commerce and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry; (4) A representative from the National
Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; (5) A
representative from the private sector coming from the Association of
Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines. The Board shall
have the over-all control and shall administer the checks and counter-
checks of consigned textile, leather gloves, raw materials and/or
supplies to embroidery and apparel manufacturers and corresponding
counter-checks for liquidations of said goods prior to re-exportations.
No other government instrumentality or agency shall be authorized to
qualify or question the validity of license so issued by the Board.
Questions of legality and interpretation of any license so issued shall
be decided exclusively by the Board subject to appeal to courts of
competent jurisdiction."
In compliance with these provisions the Apparel Control and
Inspection Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) was
subsequently constituted with the representative from the Bureau of
Customs as Chairman and the representatives from the Central Bank,
the Department of Commerce and Industry, and the National
Economic Council as members, each of them having been previously
designated by their respective department heads.
Upon recommendation of the Philippine Association of Embroidery
and Apparel Exporters, Inc., the Department of Finance named
Quintin Santiago, association president, as the representative from the
private sector. However, another organization, the Philippine
Chamber of Embroidery and Apparel Producers, Inc., to which
petitioner was affiliated, questioned the choice of Santiago, apparently
because its own nominee to the Board had been rejected. In upholding
its original choice, the Board made reference to a letter of Senator
Alejandro D. Almendras, principal author of Republic Act 3137,
stating that the association referred to in Section 2 of said Act was
none other than the respondent association itself. On the basis of said
letter the Board adopted on September 15, 1961 Resolution No. 2
(series of 1961) stating "that the Board entertains no doubt that the
P.A.E.A.E. Inc. is the association referred to in Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 3137 and that it is the only association entitled to
representation in the Board from the private sector."
The Board requested petitioner to "submit to pertinent data called for
in the attached form of application for license which should be duly
accomplished before a notary public." Unwilling to comply with the
Board’s request, petitioner filed an action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the court a quo (Civil Case No. 49087) for
the purpose of enjoining or restraining respondents from enforcing the
provisions of Republic Act 3137.
Petitioner points to several features of Republic Act 3137 to support
his claim of invalidity. The first is found in section 2, providing for the
composition of the Board. The argument is that while Congress may
create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein; that
the members of the Board can only be appointed by the President in
accordance with Article VII, Sec. 10 subsection 3 2 of the
Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and
members of the Board should come from specified offices, it is
equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed,
thereby infringing the constitutional power of the President to make
appointments.
ISSUE
Whether or not R.A. 3137 infringes the constitutional power
of the president to make appointments.
RULING
NO. An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute reveals that
for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only
be designed by the respective department heads. With the exception
of the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In
order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the
offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not
hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs cannot, under
the Act, be designated representative from that office. The same is true
with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No new
appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the
representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in
addition to those they already perform under their original
appointments.
". . . we do not think that, because additional duties germane to the
offices already held by them were devolved upon them by the Act, it
was necessary that they should be again appointed by the President . .
. It cannot be doubted, and it has frequently been the case, that
Congress may increase the power and duties of an existing office
without thereby rendering it necessary that the incumbent should be
again nominated and appointed." (Shoemaker v. United States, 147
U.S. 170, 185)
Inasmuch as nothing in the Act, nor in the records of the case for the
matter, suggests that the designated representatives to the Board will
lose or forfeit their original appointments in their "parent" offices, it is
evident that for purposes of their tenure on the Board they can be
considered as merely on detail, subject to recall by their respective
chiefs.
The arrangement envisioned in section 2 is in no wise incompatible
with or violative of the established doctrine that "the appointing power
is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations
maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of
securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and
from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications
to the given appointive office." (Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903,
911).
It is significant that Congress took care to specify that the
representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central
Bank, Department of Commerce and Industry and the National
Economic Council. The obvious reason must be because these
departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a direct
relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof
into embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation
abroad.There is no attempt in Republic Act 3137 to deprive the
President of his power to make appointments, and therefore on this
point we rule that the law is not unconstitutional.
2) De la Cruz v. COA, G.R.No. 138489, November 27, 2001
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
3) Espiritu v. Lutgarda, G.R.No. 204964, Octobere 15, 2014
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga,
enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, classifying areas in Barangay
Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land.
Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario)
allegedly requested the City Zoning Administrator to exempt from the
zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay
Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City. The land is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11809 with an area of 164.7605
hectares.
The request was allegedly approved on March 7, 1980 by Engineer
Roque L. Dungca, Angeles City Development Coordinator/Zoning
Administrator, and the lots were allegedly reclassified as non-
agricultural or industrial lots.
On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(Republic Act No. 6657) was enacted.
On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia
R. Asperilla filed an application for exemption with the Department
of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.
On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M.
Pagdanganan (Secretary Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the
application for exemption. Citing Department of Justice Opinion No.
44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands classified
as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its
coverage.
On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario's landholdings, led by
Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu), filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order.
1.Under Zoning Ordinance, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Resolution, and Angeles City Council Resolution, the landholdings
were classified as agricultural, not industrial.
2.As per certifications by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, the landholdings were within the agricultural zone, and there
was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the area into other
land uses.
The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian
Reform, this time headed by Secretary Pangandaman. Hence, on June
15, 2006, then Secretary Pangandaman issued an order granting the
motion for reconsideration and revoking the earlier order of then
Secretary of Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan.
Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita
Montgomery in Barangay Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and not
at Asperilla's address in Cubao, Quezon City, which was her address
on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of the order
on January 26, 2007.
Acting on del Rosario's motion for reconsideration, Secretary
Pangandaman found that the certifications issued by the HLURB
classified the landholdings as agricultural before June 15, 1988. Based
on the ocular inspections conducted by the Center for Land Use
Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained
agricultural and was planted with sugarcane and corn.
Accordingly, Secretary Pangandaman denied del Rosario's motion.
Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the President
on March 27, 2008. But, her appeal was dismissed by the Deputy
Executive Secretary of Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite.
Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals arguing (1) that she was denied due process when the order
of Secretary Pangandaman was "erroneously sent to another address"
and (2) that the decision of.then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was
void since he had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange
Commission two months prior to the rendering of the decision.
COURT OF APPEALS
Petition granted. Del Rosario was indeed prevented from participating
in the proceedings that led to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman's
order when the notices were sent to her other address on record. It also
found that the decision issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary
Gaite was void since it violated Article VII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now
come before this court via a petition for review on certiorari, seeking
to set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals.In particular, petitioners
argue that respondent was not denied due process as she was able to
actively participate in the proceedings before the Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Respondent was deprived of due process
(2) Whether or not Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's decision is
presumed valid, effective, and binding
(3) Whether or not respondent's landholdings were agricultural and not
industrial
HELD:
1. NO. Respondent was not deprived of due process
Court of appeals findings: Since she was not notified, she [del Rosario]
was not able to participate in the proceedings leading to the issuance
of the Pangandaman Order. The absence of notice that resulted in the
inability of [del Rosario] to be heard indubitably confirms her claim
of lack of due process.
The Court of Appeals, however, did not take into consideration that
respondent was still able to file a motion for reconsideration of
Secretary Pangandaman's order, albeit beyond the allowable period to
file. Despite being filed late, Secretary Pangandaman still gave due
course to the motion and resolved it on its merits.
When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing
Secretary Pangandaman's order, she was able to completely and
exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion was on
the basis of the merits of her arguments and any other evidence she
was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable opportunity
to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of due process.
2. Yes, Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's decision is presumed
valid, effective, and binding
Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution states:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet; and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities
and Exchange Commission on March 16, 2009. It is also alleged that
he has already lost his authority as Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs when he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009 since
he is constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his
tenure. This, however, is not conclusive since no evidence was
presented as to when he accepted the appointment, took his oath of
office, or assumed the position.
Assuming that Gaite's appointment became effective on March 16,
2009, he can be considered a de facto officer at the time he rendered
the decision dated May 7, 2009.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public
or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the
President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to
be valid, binding, and effective. With Gaite being a public officer, his
acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity,
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was
rendered ultra vires, other than her allegation that Gaite had already
been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and convincing
evidence on the contrary, the decision dated May 7, 2009 is
conclusively presumed to have been rendered in the regular course of
business.
3. Respondent's landholdings were agricultural, not industrial

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, lands were classified
into agricultural, residential, or industrial by law or by zoning
ordinances enacted by local government units. It is undeniable that
local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands.
Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (The Local Autonomy Act of 1959)
specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the
National Planning Commission. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the
local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land
within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the
present, but also on the future projection of needs.
It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and
municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an
area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential,
commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power granted to them
under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the
same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for
non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and
compliance with their zoning ordinances.
While there is no specific and express authority given to DAR in the
CARP law to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands
to non-agricultural uses, because Section 65 only refers to conversions
effected after five years from date of the award, we opined that the
authority of the DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses applies only to conversions
made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of R.A. No.
6657, solely on the basis of our interpretation of DAR's mandate and
the comprehensive coverage of the land reform program.
It is conceded that under the laws in force prior to the enactment and
effective date of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR had likewise the authority,
to authorize conversions of agricultural lands to other uses, but always
in coordination with other concerned agencies. Under R.A. No. 3344,
as amended by R.A. No. 6389, an agricultural lessee may, by order of
the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is
shown that the "landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes."
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with
respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657
to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on
June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of
R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and the extensive
coverage of the agrarian reform program.
4) Funa v. Ermita, 612 SCRA 308
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
5) Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria
M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of
Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera
in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on
March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the
petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of
Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties
as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the
antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the
Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated
him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that
on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting
Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile
tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a
district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and
that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to
perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding
the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is
settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional
question that petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or
temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates
that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet
in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government
or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was
concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to
occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the
office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section
13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of
the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to
apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of
Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates
of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of
officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the
Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting
Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested with a
cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless
remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra.
Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions
under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly
pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if
“allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the
case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal
objection to a government official occupying two government offices
and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether
incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v.
Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense
that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
5) Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R.No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013
The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in
order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on
March 5, 2010,... President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity;[1] that on April 7, 2010,
the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of
Agra's concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
that
Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as
such on August 5, 2010.
Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that
on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel
when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General
in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as
the
Secretary of Justice;[3] that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to
run for Congress representing a district in Quezon
Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his
position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as
the Acting Solicitor General
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that
Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting
capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
What may differentiate this challenge from those in the others is that
the appointments being hereby challenged were in acting or temporary
capacities.
Still, the petitioner submits that the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not distinguish... between an
appointment or designation of a Member of the Cabinet in an acting
or temporary capacity, on the one hand, and one in a permanent
capacity, on the other hand; and that Acting Secretaries, being
nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not exempt from the
constitutional... ban.
He emphasizes that the position of the Solicitor General is not an ex
officio position in relation to the position of the Secretary of Justice,
considering that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is an
independent and autonomous office attached to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).[8] He insists that the fact that Agra was
extended an appointment as the Acting Solicitor General shows that
he did not occupy that office in an ex officio capacity because an ex
officio position does not require... any further warrant or appointment.
Respondents contend, in contrast, that Agra's concurrent designations
as the Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General were
only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of which was to confer
additional duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor General and
Acting Secretary of Justice, Agra was not "holding" both offices in the
strict constitutional sense.[9] They argue that an appointment, to be
covered by the constitutional prohibition, must be regular and
permanent, instead of a mere designation.
Respondents further contend that, even on the assumption that Agra's
concurrent designation constituted "holding of multiple offices," his
continued service as the Acting Solicitor General was akin to a hold-
over; that upon Agra's designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice,...
his term as the Acting Solicitor General expired in view of the
constitutional prohibition against holding of multiple offices by the
Members of the Cabinet; that under the principle of hold-over, Agra
continued his service as the Acting Solicitor General "until his
successor is... elected and qualified"[10] to "prevent a hiatus in the
government pending the time when a successor may be chosen and
inducted into office;"[11] and that during his continued service as the
Acting Solicitor General, he did not receive... any salaries and
emoluments from the OSG after becoming the Acting Secretary of
Justice on March 5, 2010
ISSUE:Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?
RULING:The petition is meritorious.
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and
void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
1.
Requisites of judicial review not in issue... the Court has time and...
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded
certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material
interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.
This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously
has "far-reaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules
that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
In Funa v. Ermita,[21] the Court recognized the locus standi of the
petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer because the
issue raised therein involved a subject of transcendental importance
whose resolution was necessary to... promulgate rules to guide the
Bench, Bar, and the public in similar cases.
It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by
Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities,
was an issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue
involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to... a
situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by
reason of its transcendental importance to the people.
1.
Unconstitutionality of Agra's concurrent designation as Acting
Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or...
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or...
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their... subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not...
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided.
The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and the Members of his Cabinet in... so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned
or government controlled-corporations was concerned.[
In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the
office, or to be in possession and... administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and
duties of the office.
ndeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution
makes no reference to the nature of the... appointment or designation.
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without
question that the avowed objective of Section 13,... supra, is to prevent
the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra's designation as the
Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which
he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two
positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence... of
holding the other
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13,
supra, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the Constitution
("Unless otherwise allowed by law or the... primary functions of his
position") to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice
versa. Thus, the Court has said
To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that
his holding of the other office was "allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position." To claim the exemption of his concurrent
designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under
Section
13, supra, he needed to establish herein that his concurrent designation
was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he did not do so.
The foregoing provisions of the applicable laws show that one position
was not derived from the other. Indeed, the powers and functions of
the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by
the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ,[40] is not a constituent unit of the latter,[41] as, in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and
autonomous.
With the enactment of Republic Act No.
9417,[43] the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and
has the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives,
salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals.[
Moreover, the magnitude of the scope of work of the Solicitor General,
if added to the equally demanding tasks of the Secretary of Justice, is
obviously too much for any one official to bear. Apart from the sure
peril of political pressure, the concurrent holding of the two...
positions, even if they are not entirely incompatible, may affect sound
government operations and the proper performance of duties.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting
Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested with a
cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he... nonetheless
remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra.
Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions
under the latter constitutional provision
While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in
general to all elective and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII,
thereof applies in particular to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries.
Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General
are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department
of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are
such as to render it improper, from considerations of public... policy,
for one person to retain both,[48] an incompatibility between the
offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra's designation
as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation
as the Acting Solicitor General, to be... void for being in violation of
the express provisions of the Constitution.
1.
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Agra's concurrent
appointment;... the de facto officer doctrine
In view of the application of the stricter prohibition under Section 13,
supra, Agra did not validly hold the position of Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his holding of the position of Acting
Solicitor General. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a... de
jure officer for the entire period of his tenure as the Acting Secretary
of Justice. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects,
legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired
That notwithstanding, Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as
Acting Secretary of Justice.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is
no de jure, officer, a de facto... officer, who, in good faith has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action to recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This... doctrine is, undoubtedly,
supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments... received by the respondents by
virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may
therefore be retained by them.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as... valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions
of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was
his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if
he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for... the office.
Agra's official actions covered by this clarification... extend to but are
not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review
filed in the Department of Justice, and the issuance of department
orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of
criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and
prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto
C. Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity
with his position as the Acting Solicitor General for being...
unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was a de
facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.
Principles:
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and...
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be... the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so
that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple government... offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to... refer only to
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself,... the only
exceptions acceptable under the law for holding two offices... the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),... Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. (Bold emphasis
supplied.)
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,[32] the only two
exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice President to become a... member of the Cabinet;
and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13,
Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
officials' offices
The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers
to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position." Ex officio... likewise denotes an "act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office."
An ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of
his title to a certain... office, and without further warrant or
appointment.
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
1) De Castro v. JBC, 615 SCRA 666
FACTS
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision
of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to
resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of
nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that
the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover
the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of
stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art VII?
RULING
NO.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in
disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1 The contention has no basis.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed,
or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not
control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and
foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution
itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision
rendered en banc or in division.
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their
insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated
in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted
from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern
either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only
Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 16: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
1) Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, MR in G.R. No. 196271, Feb
2012
FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to
November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same
date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June
30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM
regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court,
the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE
Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?
RULING
YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open
to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as
ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in
the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected
in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections
in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those
elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last
also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume
office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend
the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered
and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution;
they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like
the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in
a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create
a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the
new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and
an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed
– is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA
No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had
the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA
No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court
cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since
COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions
of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders
of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution
of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing
the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May
13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself
has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom
that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary
can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call
of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively
legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare
an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power
rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening
act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot
be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of
less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum,
while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation
of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint
ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim
measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of
OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined
for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus,
the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority
to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that
the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political
units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this
alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read
as a law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs
in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different
from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May
2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner
it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from
its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.
2) Velicaria – Grafel v. Office of the President, 758 SCRA 414
FACTS
The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No.
203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-
Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty.
Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed
Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R.
No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed
Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B.
Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners;
and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty.
Tamondong), who was appointed member of the Board of Directors
of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All
petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO
2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than
800 appointments to various positions in several government offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the
cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010,
was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on
midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety."
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this
exception.
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President
Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments.
ISSUES:
(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, and
(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.
RULING:
Both Yes.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid
(which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment:
(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided
for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the
exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment
calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a
discretion.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according
to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal;
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There
should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper
to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated
and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but
never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that
signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and
authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e.,
handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be
accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.
(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to
declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2
remains valid and constitutional.
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming
office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment.
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a
valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths
of office during the appointment ban.
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to
declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2
remains valid and constitutional.
3) Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549
FACTS: Petitioners, Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who
are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law
professors, seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from
disbursing payments for Mison’s salaries and emoluments on the
ground that Mison’s appointment by President Corazon Aquino as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason
of its not havingv been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the
constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of
the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there
are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President
without the confirmation from COA is constitutional.
RULING: Yes. The President acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting
his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all
the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads,
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention.
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments
is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position
of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
4) Pimentel v. Ermita, 471 SCRA 587
FACTS
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular
session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments,
assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments,
whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first
having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress
is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of
appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO
292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President
shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided
for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. —
(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to
perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other
cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]
ISSUE
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries while Congress is in session.
RULING
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office
for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego
of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office
of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting
capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only
during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s
issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon
the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the
undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s
interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
5) Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13
FACTS
The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto
proceeding involving two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy
revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as the
rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold office.
The resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the
provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.
Facts:
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven
members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original
founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law,
President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP's charter, which converted
the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free
from the "pressure or influence of politics."
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed
seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace
the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees.
Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court
questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to
the CCP Board.
Endriga’s contention:
The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies
in the CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority
of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only
one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]."
Endriga claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant
may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada
appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant and maintained
that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could
only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or
other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified
since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the
statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board.
Rufino’s contention:
the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP
Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of
the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the
authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would
be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15
authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers
lower in rank" than the appointing power.
Every President who assumes office naturally wants to appoint his or
her own trustees to the CCP Board. A frontal clash will thus
periodically arise between the President's constitutional power to
appoint under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and the
CCP trustees' power to elect their fellow trustees under Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15.
ISSUE
Whether of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is valid with respect to the
manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board.
RULING
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 Repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution
Interpreting Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
At the heart of the controversy is Section 6(b) of PD 15, as amended,
which reads:
Board of Trustees. — The governing powers and authority of the
corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11)
Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
(b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to termination of term,
resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be provided in the
By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the
trustees held at the next regular meeting following occurrence of such
vacancy. The elected trustee shall then hold office for a complete term
of four years unless sooner terminated by reason of resignation,
incapacity, death or other cause. Should only one trustee survive, the
vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation
with the ranking officers of the Center. Such officers shall be
designated in the Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for any reason
the Board be left entirely vacant, the same shall be filled by the
President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the
aforementioned ranking officers of the Center.
The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that
vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the
remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies
shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant,
the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting
in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the
remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for
a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does
not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than two
consecutive terms.
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the
Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of
the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group
refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case
involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of
officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second
and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the
law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing
the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the
CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments,
Agencies, Commissions, or Boards
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress
could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The clear
intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the
subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express
language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to
only one conclusion — the officers whom the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank
than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has
the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If
it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise
of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of
subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the
commission or board. The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest
the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads"
of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads"
refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their
members, for several reasons.
Also, the 1987 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint
"in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards." This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which states that the "Supreme Court shall appoint
all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law," making the Supreme Court en banc the appointing
power. In sharp contrast, when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive branch, it
vests the power "in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards." Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the
CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of
the CCP.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow
trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a
situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank
as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
6) Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254
FACTS
The controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law),
amending the Labor Code was approved. Section 13 thereof provides
that:
“The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and
other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to
any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall
be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.”
Pursuant to said law, President Cory Aquino appointed the
Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing public,
workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the
appointees may qualify and enter the performance of the duties of the
office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
issues Administrative Order No. 161, designating the places of
assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Prohibition as he questions
the constitutionality and legality of permanent appointments extended
by President Aquino, without submitting the same to the Commission
on Appointments (CA) for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the
Labor Code as amended by RA 6715.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
1. Mandatory compliance with RA 6715, which has in its favor
the presumption of validity;
2. RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of
the executive contained in Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
3. Mison and Bautista rulings are not applicable to the case at
bar.
Solicitor General’s Answer:
1. RA 6715 transgresses Section 16, Article 7 by expanding the
confirmation powers of the CA without constitutional basis.
2. Mison and Bautista are applicable.
As interpreted by this Honorable Court in the
Mison case, confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of
executive departments, ambassadors, public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, such as the members of the various
Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the
other officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law and to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to
expand the list of officers whose appointments must
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
the Constitution would have said so by adding the
phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end
of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of
the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has
 significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
ISSUE
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation
by the CA of other officers appointed by the President additional to
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
RULING
Section 13 of RA 6715 is unconstitutional.
Mison Case:
“. . . there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from
time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.”
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 refers to all other officers of
the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in
Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not
among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise
entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative.
Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court
respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully,
however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending
Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and
Member of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as
we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate
of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
7) Tarrosa v. Singson, 232 SCRA 553
FACTS:
Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko
Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos. Petitioner argues that respondent
Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for
confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. The petition is
anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of
the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
"SEC. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and
functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko
Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board,
composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the
Philippines for a term of six (6) years.
The seven (7) members are:
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the
Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral
shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the
Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate
a Deputy Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such
event, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as
acting Chairman x x x"
Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not
among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that:
"SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department,
agencies, commissions, or boards xxx"
Respondents also aver that the Bangko Sentral has its own
budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to
the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress can, by law, expand the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII
of the Constitution. — NO
RULING:
The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto
proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges
that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only
be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by
another.”
In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, we held that the petitioner
therein, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo
warranto to oust the respondent from said office as a mere usurper.
Likewise in Greene v. Knox, it was held that the question of title to an
office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not
be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person
holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the
one entitled to occupy the said office.
 It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought
by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled
citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief
and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental
machinery. Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of
petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of
whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and
emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. Likewise, the
Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6,
R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry
into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is
indispensable for the determination of the case.
However for the information of all concerned, we call
attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, with Justice Isagani A.
Cruz dissenting, where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand
the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII
of the Constitution.
Section 17: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
1) Lacson-Magallanes v. Puno, 21 SCRA 395
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a
1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of
Bansalan, Province of Davao. Magallanes ceded his rights and
interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the public land to plaintiff
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. Then, the portion Magallanes
ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as
pasture land and declared agricultural land.
Hence, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the
purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering
the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his
nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants
of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands rendered a decision on giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose
Paño and his companions
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
— on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that
the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of
the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public
interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they
have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land
(northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of
Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be
subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporiton's right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion”
Paño then took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President, through his Executive Secretary has
the power to amend, modify or alter the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources? YES

2. Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary (by
Authority of the President) is contrary to law and of no legal force and
effect (because of undue delegation of power by the President to the
Executive secretary)? NO.
RULING:
1. YES. The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive
departments.4 Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege
to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their
acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context,
it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of
a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office
of the President.5This Court has recognized this practice in several
cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved by the
Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's appeal.6
In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal
was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for
non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power
of control over the executive departments.8 And control simply means
"the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
2. NO. Although, the Constitution, as petitioner asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may
be delegated to the Executive Secretary and that it is the constitutional
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
However, The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the
Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf
and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands,
may issue.
NOTE: But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary
is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone
of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department
head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot
intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department
secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that
where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of
the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is
to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority
of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President
may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do
so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the Chief Executive,
and cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
2) Ang-Angco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619
FACTS: Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a
letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special
permit to withdraw units of Pepsi-cola concentrates from the customs
house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance
of foreign exchange and were not covered by any Central Bank release
certificate.
Failing to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, the
counsel of the Pepsi-ColaFar East Trade Development Co., Inc.,
approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to
secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates. The
importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank,
Mr. Ang-Angco advised the counsel to try to secure the necessary
release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had
jurisdiction over the case.
Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, from the No-Dollar Import Office, wrote a letter
addressed to Mr. Ang-Angco, stating that his office had no objection
to the release the concentrates but that it could not take action on the
request as "the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar
Import Office within the contemplation of R.A. No.1410."
Pepsi-Cola Co. counsel showed to Mr. Ang-Angco the letter from Mr.
Lopez. But upon perusing it, Mr. Ang-Angco still hesitated to grant
the release. He suggested instead amending the letter in order to
remove the ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to
amend the letter stating that the same was neither a permit nor a
release. Mr. Ang-Angco contacted Secretary of Finance Hernandez
via telephone and read to him the letter, to which the Secretary
verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said
certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, though still in doubt as to the
propriety of the suggested action, finally authorized the release of the
concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs
charges, fees and taxes.
Upon knowing the release of the concentrates, Commissioner of
Customs Manuel P. Manahan immediately ordered their seizure but
only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. And he
filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-
Angco charging him of grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength
of this complaint, President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an
investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco, resulting to the
latter’s suspension. But on April 1,1957, Collector Ang-Angco was
reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez. The decision,
however, on the administrative case against him remained pending
until the death of President Magsaysay.
After around three years from the termination of the investigation
during which period Ang-Angco had already been discharging the
duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by
authority of President Garcia, rendered a decision on the case on
February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service", and considering him resigned
effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the
Bureau of Customs.
Upon knowing this decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-
Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to
the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him
from office. Denied of his Motions, Ang-Angco filed before this Court
the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a
petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The
Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for
injunction.
The herein action of Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo as
authorized by the President was questioned by the Petitioner: That the
Exec. Secretary violated Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959
which vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers
and employees in the classified service;
That since petitioner is an officer who belongs to the classified civil
service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the
Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he
cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard
of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Respondent Castillo contended that the power of control given by the
Constitution to the President over officers and employees in the
executive department can only be limited by the Constitution and not
by Congress, for to permit Congress to do so would be to diminish the
authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which is
tantamount to amending the Constitution itself (Hebron v. Reyes, L-
9124, July 28, 1958).
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to take direct action on
the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in
spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959
RULING: No. The court discussed the power of control given to
President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in the
executive department which is now in by respondents as justification
to override the specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of
control couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner
its extent and scope.
"The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," to
distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the
power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department.
Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over
the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of
the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or
action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
President's control over the executive department only refers to
matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or definite
course or method adopted and followed by a government, body, or
individual, and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer
comes within the meaning of control over a specific policy of
government.
Here, we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently
in conflict, the power of control by the President embodied in Section
10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to those who are in the
civil service of our government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It
is our duty to reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in
a manner that may give to both full force and effect and the only
logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the manner
we do it in this decision.
There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the
President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they
are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service
for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove
is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not
with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified
service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent
Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in taking
direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without
submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary
to law and should be set aside.
3) Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
FACTS
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor
Vehicles Office with payment of back salaries in a petition filed before
this Court on April 1, 1964.
He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20,
1958 and two days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath
of office as such after having been informed of his nomination by then
Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a
letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the
Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the
Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the
latter informed the former of the findings made by his Committee
concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed
by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up in
the letter, as follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses
to the government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or
intentional toleration of the same, facilitating thereby the commission
of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy unsatisfactory
accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman Roces
recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief
Aurelio de Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming
under the Motor Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be
appointed thereafter; that having been officially informed of the
content of said letter, then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring
him to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should
be taken against him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that
petitioner answered the letter as required wherein he explained and
refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges contained in the
letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as
Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created
an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the
charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to
undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by
Special Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation
said committee submitted its report to the President of the Philippines
who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the
removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of petitioner's
removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting
administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his
removal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant petition
before this Court.
Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the
charges contained in the letter of Congressman Roces were not
directed against him but against his office in general for the truth is
that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross
inefficiency and negligence in the performance of his duties as Chief
of the Motor Vehicles Office. Respondents also denied that petitioner
was investigated without being accorded due process is required by
law for in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present
his defense, to secure the attendance of witnesses, and to produce
documents in his behalf in a manner consistent with administrative due
process. Respondent also averred that the President of the Philippines,
contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and
remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the
non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 2260. Respondents finally averred that the letter of
Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in effect a valid administrative
complaint because it contained specific charges which constitute just
causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be
sworn to for the Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner,
is empowered to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio
pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, without need of
any previous verified complaint.
ISSUE
Whether thePresident has jurisdiction to investigate and remove the
Administrator from office even if the latter is under the control and
supervision of theDepartment of Public Works.
RULING
No error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the
investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is
concerned, even if he is under the control and supervision of the
Department of Public Works, in view of the reason we have already
stated that he is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under
the jurisdiction of the President. The following rationale supports this
view:

Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the
Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive
departments which is now involved by respondent as justification to
override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act. This power of
control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific
manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v.
Reyes, supra, occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean
"the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," to
distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the
power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department.
Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over
the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of
the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or
action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used
in administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section
79 (c) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his
department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of
the chiefs of said bureaus or offices," and under Section 74 of the same
Code, the President's control over the executive department only
refers to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled
or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government,
body or individual, and it cannot be said that the removal of an
inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a specific
policy of government. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., supra)
With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted
against petitioner which led to his separation are illegal simply
because the charges preferred against him by Congressman Roces
were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260,
this much we can say: said proceedings having been commenced
against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief Executive who was
his immediate administrative head, the same may be commenced by
him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to
Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, the pertinent provisions of
which are is follows:
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government
officer or employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office
concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any person which shall
be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a
complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head
or chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take
action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances of the
case, so warrant.
Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of
quo warranto which seeks petitioners reinstatement to his former
position as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, we are of the
opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for having been filed more
than one year after its cause of action had accrued. As this Court has
aptly said: "a delay of slightly over one (1) year was considered
sufficient ... to be an action for mandamus, by reason of laches or
abandonment of office. We see no reason to depart from said view in
the present case, petitioner herein having allowed about a year and a
half to elapse before seeking reinstatement."
4) Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
FACTS: The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from
office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province
of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-
Governor of said province while private respondents Loreto P.
Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio
and Napoleon Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of
the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging
petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private
respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner
belligerently barged into the Hall. Petitioner angrily kicked the door
and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close
behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who
encircled the area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an
offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported
by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150
million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were
intended to harass them into approving this loan; that fortunately, no
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of
quorum and the proposed legislative measure was not considered; that
private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva
Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred
without prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that
the provincial budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that
the province could not afford to contract another obligation; that
petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private respondents was
a serious insult to the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed grave
danger to private respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents
prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner.
President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session
Hall," i.e., the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan, did not appear to justify
"the use of force, intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed
the then Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG)
Robert Barbers to "take appropriate preemptive and investigative
actions," but to "break not the peace." Acting upon the instructions of
the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against
him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes.
In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit his
verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with
such documentary evidence that he has in support thereof, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt. Immediately thereafter, Secretary
Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and
private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy.
The parties entered into an agreement. However, the peace agreement
was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated
their letter complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer
to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt.
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring
petitioner in default and to have waived his right to present evidence.
Private respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte.
Respondent was hereby declared in default.
On June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to
Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter complaint was not verified
on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the
DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him
to answer the complaint.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days
pending investigation of the charges against him. Secretary Barbers
directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the implementation
of the order of preventive suspension.
In petitioner's stead, Secretary Barbers designated Vice-Governor
Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor until such time as petitioner's
temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to exist. Forthwith,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the
order of default.
In the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's petition. A few days after filing the petition before this
Court, petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction." Petitioner alleged that
subsequent to the institution of this petition, the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the case
finding him guilty of the offenses charged. His finding was based on
the position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the
parties. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of complainants'
witnesses to be "more natural, reasonable and probable" than those of
herein petitioner Joson's. On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary,
by authority of the President, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the
penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.
ISSUE: Whether the DILG Secretary, in his resolution, was
exercising the powers of the President which are clearly vested by law
only upon the President or the Executive Secretary, and thus his action
is contrary to law
RULING: In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the
jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over the case. He
contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that has
jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the power to
discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the
DILG Secretary. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions
against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the
Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to
these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive
Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not
the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary,
the Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases
against elective local officials is derived from his power of general
supervision over local governments. The power to discipline evidently
includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the
President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No.
23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power
to discipline. Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
5) Hutchison v. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000
FACTS
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in leading
national daily newspapers and in one international publication,1 an
invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and
operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone. Out of seven, three were declared qualified bidders: (1)
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (or ICTSI); (2) a
consortium consisting of Royal Port Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg
Port Consulting GMBH (or RPSI); and (3) Hutchison Ports
Philippines Limited (or HPPL), representing a consortium composed
of HPPL, Guoco Holdings (Phils.), Inc. and Unicol Management
Services, Inc. All three qualified bidders were required to submit their
respective formal bid package on or before July 1, 1996 by the
SBMA’s Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (or SBMA-
PBAC).
Thereafter, the services of three (3) international consultants2
recommended by the World Bank for their expertise were hired by
SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of the bidders,
and to ensure that there would be a transparent and comprehensive
review of the submitted bids. The SBMA also hired the firm of Davis,
Langdon and Seah Philippines, Inc. to assist in the evaluation of the
bids and in the negotiation process after the winning bidder is chosen.
All the consultants, after such review and evaluation unanimously
concluded that HPPL’s Business Plan was "far superior to that of the
two other bidders
The following day, ICTSI filed a letter-appeal with SBMA’s Board of
Directors requesting the nullification and reversal of the above-quoted
resolution rejecting ICTSI’s bid while awarding the same to HPPL.
But even before the SBMA Board could act on the appeal, ICTSI filed
a similar appeal before the Office of the President. As recommended
by the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, the financial bids were re-
evaluated, with the assistance of Commission on Audit. Despite this,
HPPL was still declared the winning bidder.
HPPL alleged and argued therein that a binding and legally
enforceable contract had been established between HPPL and
defendant SBMA under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, considering
that SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL was the
winning bidder. Having accepted HPPL’s offer to operate and develop
the proposed container terminal, defendant SBMA is duty-bound to
comply with its obligation by commencing negotiations and drawing
up a Concession Agreement with plaintiff HPPL. HPPL also pointed
out that the bidding procedure followed by the SBMA faithfully
complied with existing laws and rules established by SBMA itself.
ISSUE
whether or not the Office of the President can set aside the award made
by SBMA in favor of plaintiff HPPL and if so, can the Office of the
President direct the SBMA to conduct a re-bidding of the proposed
project.
RULING
YES, the President can set aside the award. Though the SBMA Board
of Directors, by resolution, may have declared HPPL as the winning
bidder, said award cannot be said to be final and unassailable. The
SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are subject to the control
and supervision of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken
by SBMA require the approval of the President of the Philippines
under Letter of Instruction No. 620, which places the SBMA under its
ambit as an instrumentality, defined in Section 10 thereof as an
"agency of the national government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions
and government owned and controlled corporations."
As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct control
of the Office of the President, particularly when contracts and/or
projects undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts of
money. Specifically, Letter of Instruction No. 620 dated October 27,
1997 mandates that the approval of the President is required in all
contracts of the national government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations involving two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) and above,
awarded through public bidding or negotiation. The President may,
within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the
SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. It is well-established
that the discretion to accept or reject any bid, or even recall the award
thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally
interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless
it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield
unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the memorandum
setting aside the award previously declared by the SBMA in favor of
HPPL and directing that a rebidding be conducted, the same was,
within the authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his
prerogative. Consequently, petitioner HPPL acquired no clear and
unmistakable right as the award announced by the SBMA prior to the
President’s revocation thereof was not final and binding.
6) KMU v. Director –General of NEDA, 487 SCRA 623
(President’s Power of Control)
FACTS
On April 13, 2005, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420
directing all government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format
for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the
citizen's right to privacy.
ISSUE
Whether the President’s issuance of EO 420 constitutes a usurpation
of legislative power.
RULING
NO. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the "President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their
functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection
and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility,
and convenience to the public. The President's constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation.
The President's power of control, however, is limited to the Executive
branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative
power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power -
the President's constitutional power of control over the Executive
department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal
any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420
reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility
and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an
executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID
card system requires a special appropriation because there is no
existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card
system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the
independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all
citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when
the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal
data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose,
such that the citizen's right to privacy is infringed.
7) Natl Artist for Lit Almario v. Exec Sec, G.R. No. 1289028, July
16, 2013
FACTS: On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1001and, upon recommendation of the Board
of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created
the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded
to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters.
In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first
National Artist.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law
Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was
signed into law. It established the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national
culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to
promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the
arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the
two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National
Artists Award.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87
nominees were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary
shortlist of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out
of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final
deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation
Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board
of Commissioners and the living National Artists.From the 13 names
in the second shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon
namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by
the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile,
the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from
various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing
private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose
Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors
purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons
to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring
Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009.
Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were
issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to
the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29,
2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select
those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set
the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this
petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for
restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be
conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse
of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the
rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National
Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name
National Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion
on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed
by former President Arroyo.
RULING: YES.
Legal Standing. The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality
of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest.
They must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way.
In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right
or privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of
National Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno. In
particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership
in the Order of National Artists.
Equal Protection. It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-
Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive
Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and
Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent
Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them
were treated differently and considered favorably when they were
exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has
been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and
established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional
position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of
the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established
guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect.
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of
National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie
for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of
petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.
Limits of the President's Discretion. The "power to recommend"
includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which
is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to
whom it is made."
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists,
the President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the
NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President's discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards
meaningless. The Presidents power must be exercised in accordance
with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President
The President's discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully
execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best
construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
grant of power.
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP
Boards in connection with the conferment of the Order of National
Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized by two laws,
namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic
Act No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15,
1973 constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards
Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the category
of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to
"draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National
Artists".
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the
conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP
decided to work together and jointly administer the National Artist
Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection
and administration of the National Artist Award. An administrative
regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law.
Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of
National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the
NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force
and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies,including the President himself/herself as
chief executor of laws.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process
and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant
laws, the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of
National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not
have considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any
person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order
No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the
President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists."
Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have
properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and
meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective
mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant
laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft
the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and
implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary
measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists
are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
Section 18: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
1) IBP v. Zamora, supra.
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and
PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that
the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in
violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in
the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in
the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP.
2) Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
FACTS
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an
“angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons” assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital
Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless
arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were
thereafter effected.
On 06 May 2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of
a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Petitioners, Panfilo Lacson, Cezar
Mancao and Michael Rey Aquino filed with an urgent application for
the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and Miriam Santiago filed mandamus and/or review of the
factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order. The petitions
assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact an in law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional
RULING
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against
Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a “state of
rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being
an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the
constitutional prerogative to “determine or interpret” what took place
on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the
governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution expressly provides that “[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion…” thus,
we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R.
No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
 xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is
not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since
matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of testual standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information necessary
to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has
a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may
be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the
state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may
be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss
of human lives and mass destruction of property. xxx
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no
longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
3) David v. Arroyo, supra.
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017
declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress.
. .rebellion. . .,†and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take
care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017,
directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on
the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3)
it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of
PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section
18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first
provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an
act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on
Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power
to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely
an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17,
Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar
as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to
declare“a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress
to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
 Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state
of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President
has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by
which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever
is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism”
have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
4) Ampatuan v. DILG, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
FACTS
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome Maguindanao
massacre, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) issued
Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency."
She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence" in the said places.
xxxx
Petitioners’ contentions-
xxxx
The President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops
and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the President’s emergency powers…
Respondents’ contentions -
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the PGMA
issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy,
but to restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the
proclamation pursuant to her "calling out" power as Commander-in-
Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power
rests solely on her wisdom. She must use her judgment based on
intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her
to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence
wherever and whenever they may be.
xxxx
ISSUE
Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
RULING
YES. Petition is DISMISSED.
The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution.
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to
her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, the Constitution clearly
entrusts to the President the determination of the need for calling out
the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
The Court said:
If the petitioner does not, by way of proof, support the assertion that
the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The
factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
measurable and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors
which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides, the absence of
any textual standard that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such a judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain significant information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may not require technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. The decision to call out
the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done
swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners were unable to show that the declaration of a state of
emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and
Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the "calling out"
power had no factual basis.
But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with,
the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the President’s
decision to call out the armed forces, as follows:
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families
engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also a known
fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold
elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the rest of
Mindanao.
Considering the fact that the main victims of the brutal bloodshed are
members of the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the
brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family,
both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported
retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional
offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
xxxx
The warring factions, the Ampatuans and Mangudadatus have
respective private armies. Apart from their own personal forces, both
clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who
support them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three
hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus. What could be worse than the
armed clash of two warring clans and their armed supporters,
especially in light of intelligence reports on the potential involvement
of rebel armed groups (RAGs). One RAG was reported to have
planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show
support and sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the
age-old territorial dispute between the said RAG and the Ampatuan
family.
xxxx
On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was
reported to have received three million pesos (₱3,000,000.00) from
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The
said faction is a force to reckon with because the group is well capable
of launching a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the
people and the authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x
x engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project
In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support the
Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has the strength of
about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two (372)
firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction has the strength of
about four hundred (400) persons and three hundred (300) firearms
and was reported to be moving towards Maguindanao to support the
Mangudadatu clan in its armed fight against the Ampatuans.
It can be gleaned from the OSG statements that the imminence of
violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation
1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further
bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports
also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-
powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus,
to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President
had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to
control the propagation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed
groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the
affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of
state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly
no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.
5) Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
FACTS:
On 15 January 2009, three members from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of
the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andreas Notter, a Swiss
national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an
Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino
for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men
who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden
Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked
Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1,
Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in
the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for
the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures
during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon
the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence.

Petitioners filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it
threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioners contended that Proclamation No. 1 and
its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and
void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra
vires, as Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and
465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial
Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and
disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or
sedition. Furthermore, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu
authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as evidenced by
Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its
regular session.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Proclamation No. 1-09 issued by Gov Tan
is issued ultra vires.
RULING:
Yes, it was unconstitutional. It has already been established
that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII
of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel,
in his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 541
(1939)]: “With reference to the Executive Department of the
government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily
visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of
Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that ‘The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.’ This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other.” Corollarily, it is only
the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution,
as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof.
6) Lagman v. Medialdea, supra.
FACTS
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days,
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao. In accordance with Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25, 2017,
submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades,
Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which
only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute
terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City; established several
checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and
private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government
forces; and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from
the Philippine Government and their capability to deprive the duly
constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their powers and
prerogatives.The Report also highlighted the strategic location of
Marawi City; the role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a
whole; and the possible tragic repercussions once it falls under the
control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate
declared that it found “no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation
216. The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad
Group petitioned the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of
President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial law.
ISSUE
1. W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to
invoke the mode of review required by the Court;
2. A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not
arbitrary in his appreciation of facts? B. Is the President required to
obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of
National Defense? C. Is the President is required to take into account
only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent
events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
RULING
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special
and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The phrase “in an
appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose
of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by
the Court.
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full
complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of
the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of
all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition
for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare martial law
is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it
would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is
made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only
on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to
declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of
this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is
sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on
facts or information known by or available to the President at the time
he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are
found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by
him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the
time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past
events should be from the present depends on the President.
Section 19: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
1) Diego v. People, 755 SCRA 260
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
2) Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844
FACTS
Petitioner Llamas is the incumbent vice governor of Tarlac
while private respondent Ocampo is the incumbent governor. Oscar
Orbos is the Executive Secretary who is being impleaded in this case.
In 1989 Llamas filed a verified complaint against Governor Ocampo
alleging the governor’s violations of BP 337 or the Local Government
Code and RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Llamas maintains that in 1988 Ocampo entered into a loan agreement
with a non-profit organization headed by Ocampo himself and
controlled by the latter's brother -in-law. According to the petitioner
such loan agreement is grossly inimical to the interest of the provincial
government for it was never authorized and approved by the
Provincial Board. On the other hand, respondent governor maintains
the legality of the loan agreement.
After trial, the Department of Local Government rendered a decision
finding respondent guilty and penalized him with suspension from
office for a period of 90 days. Thereafter, petitioner Llamas took his
oath as acting governor. However on May 15, 1991, without
completing the 90 days of suspension respondent governor was
ordered to reassume his office by virtue of a resolution issued by
Executive Secretary Orbos, by authority of the President granting
executive clemency to the governor.
Petitioner contends that the issuance of the said resolution constitutes
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the executive clemency
could only be granted by the President ONLY in CRIMINAL
CASES. According to him, the qualifying phrase “after conviction
by final judgment” under Article VII Section 19 of the 1987
Constitution applies solely to criminal cases and no other law allows
the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been
“convicted” in an administrative case.
ISSUE
Whether the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases.
RULING
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered
under criminal or administrative cases. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos, if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the
sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from
the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It
is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all
administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government.
3) Torres v. Gonzales, 132 SCRA 272
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
(Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was was granted
conditional pardon by the president on condition that he "would
not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". He
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with 20 counts of
estafa (pending trial) while in 1985, he was convicted of sedition
(pending appeal). In 1986, Justice Secretary Gonzales petitioned
for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
SC questioning the validity of the arrest order. He claimed that he
did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been
convicted by final judgment of 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime
of sedition.
Issue:
Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of
his condition pardon?
Held:
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of
a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt
of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor
by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct,
substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be
made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty
of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is
an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny
4) People v. Casido, 269 SCRA 360
FACTS: In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that "the
conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19
January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal. In a
Comment for the members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant
of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter Committee), dated 28 August
1996, two members of the Committee's Secretariat, namely, Nilo C.
Mariano (Assistant Chief Prosecutor) and Nestor J. Ballacillo
(Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General), submitted the
following explanation in compliance with the above-mentioned
resolution:
XXX
8. Prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an "Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal" which was received by the Supreme Court on
January 11, 1996. Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first
whether the counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their appeal or
that the NGO lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion to Withdraw
their Appeal. It was upon the honest belief of the Secretariat that the
NGO lawyers would perform their agreed undertaking, that the
Secretariat indorsed the applications for conditional pardon of subject
prisoners for favorable action by the Committee, and thereafter by the
President.
XXX
9. There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the
Presidential Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII, of the
Constitution, but that what happened was a clear misappreciation of
fact.
Earlier, or on 1 October 1996, the Court received from Hon. Manuel
C. Herrera, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, a letter,
dated 26 September 1996 addressed to Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., wherein the former informed the Court that the applications for
amnesty of accused- appellants Franklin A. Alcorin and William O.
Casido were "favorably acted" upon by the National Amnesty
Commission on 22 February 1996.
In its Comment to the aforesaid letter (submitted in compliance with
our Resolution of 7 October 1996), the Office of the Solicitor General
alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, "in an effort to seek
their release at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the
Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon
(PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty
Commission (NAC)"; then contended that since amnesty, unlike
pardon, may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes even after conviction, as held in
Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, the amnesty then granted accused-
appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "rendered moot and
academic the question of the premature pardon granted to them.
ISSUE: Whether or amnesty applies in thicase and not pardon. (YES)
RULING: YES. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
resolved that the release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and
Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty
granted them and this case is dismissed with costs de officio.
RATIO: We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. The theory
of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated
on a wrong contention of the nature or character of an amnesty.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the
Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes
of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored
by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from
the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"
(article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been
extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by
final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty,
for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in
Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon.
As to the "pardon," we find unsatisfactory the Explanation of the
Secretariat of the Committee. It borders on the absurd that its members
were unaware of the resolutions of this Court in People v. Hinlo 4 and
People v. Salle. 5 As early as 1991, this Court, in People v. Sepada,
cited in our Resolution of 30 July 1996 in this case, already stressed
in no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole
or pardon could be extended.
5) Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34
FACTS
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered
on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos to
remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the
municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal.
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo
C. Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the crime of estafa and
sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the accessories
provided by law. Notwithstanding his conviction, Teofilo C. Santos
continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon,
Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937,
seated as the municipal president of that municipality. On August 22,
1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election
Code, was approved by the National Assembly, section 94, paragraph
(b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been
"declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property." In
view of this provision, the respondent forthwith applied to His
Excellency, the President, for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing
date of August 15, 1939. Upon the favorable recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December 24, 1939,
granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public
office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no
money or property responsibility."
On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed
a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the
list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that
the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357. After hearing, the court below rendered
its decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive portion of which
declared that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent on
December 24, 1939, has had the effect of excluding the respondent
from the disqualification created by section 94, subsection (b) of the
New Election Code. The petition for exclusion of the respondent
Teofilo C. Santos was denied.
Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which
he impugns the decision of the court below on the several grounds
stated in the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that the
pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, to
the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondent
to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning
power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative
prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an
unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and
(c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory
penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these
propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature
and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the
Nation by the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not pardon granted by the President to the respondent,
Teofilo C. Santos, restored the said respondent to the full enjoyment
of his political rights
RULING
YES.
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:
"(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may
deem pro to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of the National Assembly."
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise
of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a)
that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power
does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign
authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority
to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction
without which there would be no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to
such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to
respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute
insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
(Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24, 1939.) While there are
cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power does
not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the
learned judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a
matter exclusively in the hands of the State and not in the hands of the
Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then, there are cases to
the contrary (Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth v.
Heath, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the
disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment
of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in
the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there
would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this
nature except through legislative action.
6) Monsanto v. Factoran 170 SCRA 190
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
7) Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, Jan. 21, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence
and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as
long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who
have reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six
and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me
by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored
to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in
full, including all writs and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in
pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his
tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
this pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October,
in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of President. During that time, his
candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) A "Petition
to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed by
Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) A petition for
"Disqualification as Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C.
Pormento (Pormento); and (3) A "Petition to Disqualify Estrada
Ejercito, Joseph M. from Running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada,
Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou Estrada.
COMELEC Second Division:
Dismissed all 3 petitions on the uniform grounds that (i) the
Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president;
and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former
President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for
a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto
were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections,
however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the second
highest number of votes.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into
the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a
Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before
the COMELEC.
Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former
President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of
his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing Him to
Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification."
She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which
state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases
supplied.)
COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for utter lack of
merit.
“Risos Vidal failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the
standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically
that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President
Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will
no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in
wastage of government resources."
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was
denied.
Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present
petition.
While this case was pending before the Court, the elections were
conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into
office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local
board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the
City of Manila.
Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of
Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case. Lim subscribed to
Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to
run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed
to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that
former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public
office, all the votes obtained by the latter should be declared stray, and,
being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim)
should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the position of
Mayor of the City of Manila.
According to Risos-Vidal, the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express
acceptance thereof. The "acceptance," she claims, is an indication of
the conditional nature of the pardon.
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon
which former President Estrada must be disqualified from running for
and holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in
Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues
that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude; such
that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold
public elective office.
Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to make available to
former President Estrada the exception provided under Section 12 of
the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or
plenary.
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo.
RULING: The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts
of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by
the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be
in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to
pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the
said Articles contain specific textual commands which must be strictly
followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the
disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their
accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that
of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running
for any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former
President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but
it provides for an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
Risos-Vidal’s declaration wherein the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional
on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the
former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon
itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part
of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the
3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the
pardon extended to former President Estrada.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon
granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a
clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or
support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-in intervention
are DISMISSED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections,
Second Division, and the Resolution of the Commission on Elections,
En banc, are AFFIRMED.
Section 20: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for
loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which would have
the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
1) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TRB, G.R. 181293, February 23, 2015
FACTS:Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March
1977 by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1112[1] in order to
supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection
of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private... secto
.D. 1113[2] was issued granting to the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine
National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege,
and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll... facilities
in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30
years starting 1 May 1977
TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement,[3]
which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to
PNCC under P.D. 1113.
.D. 1113 was amended by P.D. 1894,[4] which granted PNCC the
right, privilege, and authority to construct, maintain, and operate
the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways,
together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto.
September 1993, PNCC entered into an agreement[5] with PT
Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA), a limited liability
company organized and established under the laws of the
Republic of Indonesia, whereby the latter committed to provide
PNCC with a... pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME
project.
In order to accelerate the actual implementation of both the MME
and the MMS projects, PNCC and CITRA entered into a second
agreement.[7] Through that agreement,... CITRA committed to
finance and undertake the preparation, updating, and
revalidation of previous studies on the construction, operation,
and maintenance of the projects.
As a result of the feasibility and related studies, PNCC and
CITRA submitted, through the TRB, a Joint Investment Proposal
(JIP) to the Republic of the Philippines.[8] The JIP embodied the
implementation schedule for the financing, design and
construction... of the MMS in three stages: the South Metro
Manila Skyway, the North Metro Manila Skyway, and the Central
Metro Manila Skywa
August 1995, PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint
Venture Agreement[10] and created the Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation (CMMTC).
On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines through
the TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as
Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(STOA)[11] covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase
1 of the South Metro
Manila Skyway... operation and maintenance of the project roads
became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of
the PNCC
Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC,
which undertook and performed the latter's obligations under the
STOA.
18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB,
CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA).
ASTOA incorporated the amendments, revisions, and
modifications necessary to... cover the design and construction of
Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the
ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in
performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway.
(E.O.) 497
January 2006, Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved
the ASTOA through the challenged Memorandum dated 20 July
1.
21 December 2007, PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC entered into the
assailed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[16] providing for
the successful and seamless assumption by SOMCO of the
operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila
Skyway. Under the MOA,... PSC received the amount of ?320
million which was used for the settlement of its liabilities arising
from the consequent retrenchment or separation of its affected
employees.
TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC)[17]
to SOMCO
2007, authorizing the latter to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway effective 10:00 p.m. on 31 December
2007.
January 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway
Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint
against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO.
The complaint was for injunction and... prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary
restraining order, and sought to prohibit the implementation of
the ASTOA and the MOA, as well as the assumption of the toll
operations by SOMCO.[21] Petitioners PSCEU and
PTMSDWO also sought the subsequent nullification of the
ASTOA and the MOA for being contrary to law and for being
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was
exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC,... By agreeing to the
arrangement whereby SOMCO would replace PSC in the toll
operations and... management, PNCC seriously breached the
terms and conditions of its undertaking under the franchise and
effectively abdicated its rights and privileges in favor of SOMCO.
OMCO was highly irregular and contrary to law, because 1) it did
not indicate the conditions that shall be imposed on SOMCO as
provided under P.D. 1112;[41] 2) none of the requirements on
public bidding, negotiations, or... even publication was complied
with before the issuance of the TOC to SOMCO; 3) applying the
stricter "grandfather rule," SOMCO does not qualify as a facility
operator as defined under R.A. 6957,[42] as amended by R.A.
7718;[43] and 4)... there were no public notices and hearings
conducted wherein all legitimate issues and concerns about the
transfer of the toll operations would have been properly
ventilated.
approval by the DOTC Secretary of the ASTOA could not take
the place of the presidential approval required under P.D.
1113[44] and P.D. 1894[45] concerning the franchise granted to
PNCC.
ll respondents counter that petitioners do not have the requisite
legal standing to file the petition.
All... p... titioners violate the hierarchy of courts... espondents
argue that nothing in the ASTOA, the approval thereof by the
DOTC Secretary, the MOA, or the TOC was violative of the
Constitution.
authority to operate a public utility can be granted by
administrative agencies when authorized by law.
P.D. 1112, the TRB is empowered to grant authority and enter into
contracts for the construction, operation, and... maintenance of a
toll facility,[57] such as the ASTOA in this case. Also, the ASTOA
was an amendment, not to the legislative franchise of PNCC, but
to the STOA previously executed between the Republic of the
Philippines through the TRB, PNCC, and
CMMTC
PNCC's franchise was never sold, transferred, or otherwise
assigned to SOMCO[59] in the same way that PSC's previous
assumption of the operation and maintenance of the South Metro
Manila Skyway did not amount to a... sale, transfer or assignment
of PNCC's franchise... no valid objection to the approval of the
ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary, because he was authorized by
the President to do so by virtue of E.O. 497.
no merit in the claim that the TOC granted to SOMCO was highly
irregular and contrary to law. First, the TOC clearly states that
the toll operation and maintenance by SOMCO shall be regulated
by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with
P.D. 1112, the STOA, the toll operations and maintenance rules
and regulations, and lawful orders, instructions, and conditions
that may be imposed from time to time.[64] Second, there is no
need to comply with the public bidding and negotiation...
requirements, because the South Metro Manila Skyway is an
ongoing project, not a new one.[65] Furthermore, the STOA,
which was the basis for the ASTOA, was concluded way before the
effectivity of R.A. 9184[66] in 2003.[67]
SOMCO is a Filipino corporation with substantial 72% Filipino
ownership.[68] Fourth, the law requires prior notice and hearing
only in an administrative body's exercise of quasi-judicial
functions[69] In this case, the transfer... of the toll operations and
maintenance to SOMCO was a contractual arrangement entered
into in accordance with law.[70]
Finally, the assumption of the toll operation and maintenance by
SOMCO is not disadvantageous to the government. Petitioners
belittle the P2.5 million capitalization of SOMCO, considering
that PSC's capitalization at the time it was incorporated was
merely P500,000.
ASTOA, PNCC shall get a direct share in the toll revenues without
any corollary obligation, unlike the arrangement in the STOA
whereby PNCC's 10% share in the toll revenues was intended
primarily for the toll operation and maintenance by
PSC.[72]... no reason to fear that the assumption by SOMCO
would result in poor delivery of toll services. CITRA and the other
shareholders of SOMCO are entities with experience and proven
track record in toll operations.[73]
Also, SOMCO hired or absorbed more than 300 PSC
employees,[74] who brought with them their work expertise and
experience.
ISSUE: Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC
Secretary was valid; and
RULING:
Approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was approval by
the President.
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in
matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require
the President to act personally, executive and administrative
functions are exercised through executive departments headed by
cabinet secretaries,... whose acts are presumptively the acts of the
President unless disapproved by the latter... power to grant
franchises or issue authorizations for the operation of a public
utility is not exclusively exercised by Congress. Second, except
where the situation falls within that special class that demands the
exclusive and personal exercise by the President of
constitutionally vested power,[117] the President acts through
alter egos whose acts are as if the Chief Executive's own.
Third, no lease, transfer, grant of usufruct, sale, or assignment of
franchise by PNCC or its merger with another company ever took
place... creation of the TRB and the grant of franchise to PNCC
were made in the light of the recognition on the part of the
government that the private sector had to be involved as an
alternative source of financing for the pursuance of national
infrastructure projects. As the... franchise holder for the
construction, maintenance and operation of infrastructure toll
facilities, PNCC was equipped with the right and privilege, but not
necessarily the means, to undertake the project. This is where
joint ventures with private investors become... necessary.
In joint ventures with investor companies, PNCC contributes the
franchise it possesses, while the partner contributes the financing
both necessary for the construction, maintenance, and operation
of the toll facilities. PNCC did not thereby lease, transfer, grant
the usufruct... of, sell, or assign its franchise or other rights or
privileges. This remains true even though the partnership
acquires a distinct and separate personality from that of the joint
venturers or leads to the formation of a new company that is the
product of such joint venture, such... as PSC and SOMCO in this
case.
Petitioners have not shown that the transfer of toll operations to
SOMCO was grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Gross" means glaring, reprehensible, culpable, flagrant, and
shocking.[120] It requires that the mere... allegation shows that
the disadvantage on the part of the government is unmistakable,
obvious, and certain.
Allegations petitioners are nothing more than speculations,
apprehensions, and supposition.
The aim in the establishment of toll facilities is to draw from
private resources the financing of government infrastructure
projects. Naturally, these private investors would want to receive
a reasonable return on their investments. Thus, the collection of
toll fees for the use... of public improvements has been authorized,
subject to supervision and regulation by the national government
As regards the P320... million settlement given to PSC, the amount
was to be used principally for the payment of its liabilities of PSC
arising... from the retrenchment of its employees. We note that
under the MOA, the residual assets of PSC shall still be offered
for sale to CMMTC, subject to valuation.[122] Thus, it would be
inaccurate to say that PSC would receive only P320 million for the
entire... arrangement.
understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a proven track
record in toll operations, considering that it was only the ASTOA
and the MOA that gave birth to it
2) Land Bank v. Atlanta Industries, 729 SCRA12
The terms and conditions of Loan Agreement were incorporated and
made part of the Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) that was
subsequently entered into by Land Bank with the City Government of
Iligan. This means that the SLA cannot be treated as an independent
and unrelated contract but as a conjunct of, or having a joint and
simultaneous occurrence with the Loan Agreement. Its nature and
consideration, being a mere accessory contract of Loan Agreement,
are the same as that of its principal contract. The accessory follows
the principal; and, concomitantly, accessory contracts should not be
read independently of the main contract.
FACTS: Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) entered into a
Loan Agreement for the implementation of the IBRD's "Support for
Strategic Local Development and Investment Project". The loan
facility was fully guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines and
conditioned upon the participation of at least two Local Government
Units by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) with Land Bank.
Land Bank entered into a SLA with the City Government of Iligan
to finance the development and expansion of the city's water
supply system. Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through
its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), conducted a public bidding
for the supply and delivery of various sizes of pipes and fittings using
the IBRD Procurement Guidelines. Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta)
participated in the said bidding and came up with the second to the
lowest bid. BAC informed Atlanta that the bidding was declared a
failure upon the recommendation of Land Bank due to the IBRD's
non-concurrence with the Bid Evaluation Report. Moreover, BAC
informed Atlanta of its disqualification from the bidding because it
lacked several documentary requirements. BAC conducted a re-
bidding of the project, this notwithstanding, Atlanta in a letter called
the BAC's attention to its use of Bidding Documents, which, as it
purported, not only failed to conform with the Third Edition of the
Philippine Bidding Documents for the Procurement of Goods (PBDs)
prescribed by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but
also contained numerous provisions that were not in accordance with
RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
Atlanta filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus to enjoin the
rebidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan, the
BAC, and Land Bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC declared the subject bidding null and void on the ground that
it was done contrary to the rules and procedure prescribed in RA 9184
and its IRR.
ISSUE: Is the SLA between the Land Bank and the City Government
of Iligan an executive agreement similar to Loan Agreement such that
the procurement of water pipes by the BAC of the City Government
of Iligan should be deemed exempt from the application of RA 9184?
RULING: Yes. RA 9184 recognizes the country's commitment to
abide by its obligations under any treaty or international or executive
agreement. As the parties have correctly discerned, Loan Agreement
is in the nature of an executive agreement, thus governed by
international law. Examining its features, Loan Agreement between
the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the
Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the Philippines
as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making capacity,
and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized
by world governments to provide loans conditioned upon the
guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is likewise
regarded a subject of international law and possessed of the capacity
to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states. The terms
and conditions of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH, being a project-
based and government-guaranteed loan facility, were incorporated and
made part of the SLA that was subsequently entered into by Land
Bank with the City Government of Iligan. Considering that Loan
Agreement expressly provides that the procurement of the goods to be
financed from the loan proceeds shall be in accordance with the IBRD
Guidelines, and that the accessory SLA contract merely follows its
principal's terms and conditions. The Court held that the procurement
of water pipes by the BAC of the City Government of Iligan is beyond
the purview of RA 9184.
Section 21: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
1) Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
FACTS
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign
rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a
petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542
which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency." Respondents
alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be
authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf
of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after
enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other
government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA
3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its
provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma,
that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter
should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.
ISSUE
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established.
Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and
void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
2) Bayan v. Zamora, supra.
FACTS
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of
America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized,
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory
by United States military personnel. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible
extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991,
the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have
extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On
July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met
with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the
complementing strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V.
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President
Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President,
acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the
VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
ISSUE
whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution
RULING
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions
requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or
international agreements.
Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: “No
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate.
Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : “After the expiration in 1991
of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other
contracting state”.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and
international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject
matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by
the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or
particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to
be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which
involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in
the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some
common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to
the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its
concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.
Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases and troops should apply
in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must
sufficiently meet the following requisites :
a) it must be under a treaty
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when
so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the
people in a national referendum
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State
There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The
third requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is
inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally
binding obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution.
The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the
VFA.
3) Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, supra.
FACTS
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive
Secretary dated 12 January 2016 which provides that EDCA was
not a treaty. Petitioners alleged that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that the
instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the
country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly,
in June 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the
completion of all necessary internal requirements for the
agreement to enter into force in the two countries.
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA
was the result of intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the
course of almost two years. After eight rounds of negotiations, the
Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the
Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President
Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. The OSG
clarified during the oral arguments that the Philippine and the
U.S. governments had yet to agree formally on the specific sites of
the Agreed Locations mentioned in the agreement. Two petitions
for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA. They primarily argue that it should
have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not
an executive agreement. On 10 November 2015, months after the
oral arguments were concluded and the parties ordered to file
their respective memoranda, the Senators adopted Senate
Resolution No. (SR) 105. The resolution expresses the "strong
sense” of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and
effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation
and concurrence.
ISSUE
Whether EDCA is an executive agreement which may dispense
with the requirement of Senate concurrence.
RULING
Yes.
The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in
the international sphere inheres in the person of the President.
This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion
to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. The
Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international
agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section
21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-
thirds of its members. Previously, treaties under the 1973
Constitution required ratification by a majority of the Batasang
Pambansa, except in instances wherein the President "may enter
into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare
and interest may require.” The responsibility of the President
when it comes to treaties and international agreements under the
present Constitution is therefore shared with the Senate. This
shared role, petitioners claim, is bypassed by EDCA.
However, framers of the 1987 Constitution held that the general
term "international agreement" as contemplated in Section 21,
Article VII, does not include executive agreements.
The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement
on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the
instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing
law or treaty.
Executive agreements such as EDCA, may dispense with the
requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate
with which they are concluded. EDCA implements the VFA and
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
RATIO
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted
scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on
the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty; 2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of the President's independent
powers under the Constitution. The raison d'etre of executive
agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative
authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a
domestic variation in international agreements. International
practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations
of international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion
of a treaty - which connotes a formal, solemn instrument - to
engagements concluded in modem, simplified forms that no
longer necessitate ratification. An international agreement may
take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration,
exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute,
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a
treaty and an international agreement or even an executive
agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining
international rights and obligations.
4) Abaya v. Ebdane, 315 SCRA 720
FACTS: · The Government of Japan and the Government of the
Philippines, through their respective representatives, namely, Mr.
Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an understanding
concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These
loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization
and development efforts.
· The assailed resolution recommended the award to private
respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the
implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I),
which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres
(Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the length of 79.818
kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.The DPWH caused
the publication of the “Invitation to Prequalify and to Bid” for the
implementation of the CP I project, in two leading national
newspapers, namely, the Manila Times and Manila Standard on
November 22 and 29, and December 5, 2002.
· A total of twenty-three (23) foreign and local contractors
responded to the invitation by submitting their accomplished
prequalification documents on January 23, 2003. In accordance with
the established prequalification criteria, eight contractors were
evaluated or considered eligible to bid as concurred by the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation (JBIC). Prior to the opening of the
respective bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget
for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of P738,710,563.67.
· The bid goes to private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation was corrected from the original P993,183,904.98 (with
variance of 34.45% from the ABC) to P952,564,821.71 (with variance
of 28.95% from the ABC) based on their letter clarification dated April
21, 2004.
· The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the contention that
the award of the contract to private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31 thereof which
reads: SEC. 31. Ceiling for Bid Prices. – The ABC shall be the upper
limit or ceiling for the Bid prices. Bid prices that exceed this ceiling
shall be disqualified outright from further participating in the bidding.
There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the award.
· The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement is neither an
international nor an executive agreement that would bar the
application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty,
an international or an executive agreement, the parties must be two
sovereigns or States whereas in the case of Loan Agreement No. PH-
P204, the parties are the Philippine Government and the JBIC, a
banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality
from the Japanese Government.
· The respondents however contend that foreign loan agreements,
including Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, as executive agreements
and, as such, should be observed pursuant to the fundamental principle
in international law of pactasuntservanda. The Constitution, the public
respondents emphasize, recognizes the enforceability of executive
agreements in the same way that it recognizes generally accepted
principles of international law as forming part of the law of the land.
This recognition allegedly buttresses the binding effect of executive
agreements to which the Philippine Government is a signatory. It is
pointed out by the public respondents that executive agreements are
essentially contracts governing the rights and obligations of the
parties. A contract, being the law between the parties, must be
faithfully adhered to by them. Guided by the fundamental rule of
pactasuntservanda, the Philippine Government bound itself to perform
in good faith its duties and obligations under Loan Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the loan agreement violates RA 9184 and the
section 21 of article 7 of the constitution.
RULING: · No: an exchange of notes is considered a form of an
executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive
action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress under
section 21 Article 7 of the Constitution. Executive agreement does not
require approval by the senate. Only treaties and other international
agreements that requires concurrence by atleast two-thirds of all the
members of the senate. Executive agreements sometimes take the form
of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated “agreements” or “protocols”.
· The fundamental principle of international law of
pactasuntservanda, which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA
9184 as it provides that “any treaty or international or executive
agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the
Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed,” the DPWH,
as the executing agency of the projects financed by Loan Agreement
No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation
of civil works for the CP I project to private respondent China Road
& Bridge Corporation.
· Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they
all have common features and international law has applied basically
the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of
long practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding
norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as
international customary law.
5) Pharmaceutical v. DOH, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007
FACTS:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For
purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their
capacity as officials of said executive agency. Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under
the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS),
a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of
the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued
herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions
of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of
said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not
only the Milk Code but also various international instruments
regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position
that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the
land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing
Rules & Regulations (RIRR) issued by the DOH is constitutional.
RULING:
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition by declaring NULL
AND VOID Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012, dated May 12, 2006, for being ultra vires and prohibited
the Department of Health from implementing the said provisions.
HELD:
The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by
respondents, namely, (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general
terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and
child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding,
ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women
are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy
and lactation; however, they do not contain specific provisions
regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The
international instruments that have specific provisions regarding
breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which
provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international
law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to
be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.
The Court held that the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties
as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
However, according to the Court, the ICMBS which was adopted by
the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through
local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that
has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS
per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the
ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk Code did not adopt the
provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope
of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed
if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-
Agency Committee (IAC).
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. The provisions
embodies the incorporation method.
Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination of two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms
of general or customary international law which are binding on all
states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the
principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and
due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of
“generally accepted principles of law” has also been depicted in this
wise:
Customary international means “a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation
[opinio juris].” This statement contains the two basic elements of
custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the
psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way
they do. The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is
the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration,
consistency, and generality of the practice of states. Once the existence
of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to
determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the
way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do
they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief
that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes
practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute “soft law” or
non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior. “Soft law” does not fall into any of the categories of
international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute
of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of
non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state
behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General
Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in
various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares
v. Rañada and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v.
Developers Group of Companies, Inc.
The Court stressed that for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed
by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such
rules (opinio juris). However, according to the Court, the respondents
have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced
or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have
respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said
WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature. Respondents failed to
establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are
customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the
land. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the
provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part
of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
May the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the
Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic
law?
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and
implement a national health plan within the framework of the
government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and
regulations concerning the implementation of established health
policies.
The crucial issue was whether the absolute prohibition on
advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk
substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as
part of the national health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child
feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005.
Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy
guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of
breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months,
extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate
complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3)
micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the
exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally
difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for
children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere
in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health
policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes
should be absolutely prohibited. Hence, the Court held that the
national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding
cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising
for breastmilk substitutes. The Milk Code does not contain a total
ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes but
instead specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising
and promotion. A total ban policy could be implemented only
pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the
constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature. The
Court emphasized that only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not
those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented
by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
The Court held that the Sec. 3 of the Milk Code's coverage is
not limited only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk
Code. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of
the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The
law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and
breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as “a
breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal nutritional
requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and
adapted to their physiological characteristics”; while under Section
4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to “any food, whether
manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to
breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to
satisfy the nutritional requirements of the infant.” An infant under
Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It
is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12
months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk
Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is
defined under Section 4(a) as “any food being marketed or otherwise
presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or
not suitable for that purpose.” This section conspicuously lacks
reference to any particular age-group of children. Hence, the
provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for
children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes
may also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age.
Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also
intends to protect and promote the nourishment of children more than
12 months old. Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls
within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can
be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to
be used by children aged over 12 months.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements
and advertising regulations under the RIRR are valid, the Court had to
discuss the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the
DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code, and
as delegated in particular under the Milk Code. Health is a legitimate
subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other
administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it.
The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to
further discuss it.. However, health information, particularly
advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk
substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by
the DOH. The 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to
carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, which is “to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.”
To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code
the power to “(6) propagate health information and educate the
population on important health, medical and environmental matters
which have health implications.” When it comes to information
regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk
Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter
referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate,
consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of
breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the
power to control such information. Further, DOH is authorized by the
Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk
vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products. The
DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and
to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6
through 9 of the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would
reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals
and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and
factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding
is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It bears emphasis,
however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control
information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes
is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the
power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the framers of the
constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form
of regulation for the public good. Despite the fact that “our present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not
call for removal of ‘protective regulations’. It must be clearly
explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how
such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk
manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)),
classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving
of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the
giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade
of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the
proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk
substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned
provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in
restraint of trade.
In fine, the Court held that except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest
of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective,
purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable
regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare
and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint
of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
6) Vinuya v. Romulo, 619 SCRA 533

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING