Selga V Brar: CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS - 3B, 2016-2017

CIVPRO CASE DIGESTS | 3B, 2016-2017
7. SELGA v BRAR
FACTS:
 Francisco Entierro died intestate and left behind a parcel of land in Negros Occidental.
 Francisco’s spouse, Basilia Tabile (Basilia), and (5) legitimate children (collectively referred to as Basilia, et al.), executed a Deed
of Sale with Declaration of Heirship. In said Deed, they declared themselves to be Francisco’s only heirs who inherited the subject
property; and at the same time, sold the subject property to petitioners, spouses Tobias Selga and Ceferina Garancho Selga,
for P120,000.00. By reason of said sale, TCT No. T-10273 in Francisco’s name was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134408 in
petitioners’ names.
 Seven years later, respondent Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, filed before Branch 55 of
the RTC of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental (RTC-Branch 55) a Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages against
petitioners, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 276. Respondent claimed that she was one of the legitimate children of
Francisco and Basilia, and that she had been pretreated and illegally deprived of her rightful share and interests in the subject
property as one of Francisco’s legal heirs. Among respondent’s allegations in her Complaint was:
o That as one of the co-heirs of the undivided portion of the questioned lot 1138-A, [herein respondent] is legally entitled
to redeem the said property from the [herein petitioners] for the price said [petitioners] have paid her coheirs as
appearing in the Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship, Annex "B."4
 RTC-Branch 55 annulled the Deed of Sale with Declaration of heirship adjudicating ownership of the subject Lot in the name of
Sony Entierro Brar being one of the legitimate heirs entitled to one eleventh (1/11) share. Unsatisfied, respondent filed an appeal,
but subsequently moved to withdraw her appeal. The Decision eventually attained finality.
 In a Letter dated August 11, 1997, respondent informed petitioners that she was exercising her right to redeem her share in the
subject property. In their Reply-Letter, petitioners’ counsel rejected respondent’s demand. This prompted respondent to institute
a Complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56. In their
Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 576, petitioners invoked the defenses of res judicata and/or forum shopping, arguing
that the cause of action pleaded by respondent was among those that had already been litigated in Civil Case No. 276 before
RTC-Branch 55. In its Decision dated July 27, 2001, RTC-Branch 56 agreed with petitioners and dismissed Civil Case No. 573.
 Respondents appealed the aforementioned judgment of RTC-Branch 56 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the assailed July 27, 2001 Decision of RTC-Branch 56. The Court of Appeals held that respondent had
validly exercised her right to redemption of the subject property. The appellate court further ruled that Civil Case No. 573 before
RTC-Branch 56 was not barred by the final judgment in Civil Case No. 276 of RTC-Branch 55.
 Supreme Court:
o Petitioners: insisted that respondent’s right to redemption of the subject property from petitioners was among the
causes of action already litigated in Civil Case No. 276 before RTC Branch 55; and the very same cause of action
between the same parties involving the same subject matter was merely duplicated in Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-
Branch 56. Thus, the prior final judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 276 already barred Civil Case No. 573.
o Respondent: countered that Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 involving her legal right to redeem the subject
property from petitioners cannot be deemed barred by the final judgment in Civil Case No. 276 rendered by
RTCBranch 55 because said issue was not explicitly ruled upon in the latter case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present action is barred by res judicata in view of the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 276.
HELD:
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c). Res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the prosecution of a second action exists
when there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final
as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In contrast, res judicata under the second concept or
estoppel by judgment exists when there is identity of parties and subject matter but the causes of action are completely distinct. The first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
herein.
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.It is not disputed that
the Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276 had become final and executory. Petitioners no longer
appealed the said decision, while respondent withdrew her appeal of the same before the Court of Appeals.
There is also no question that RTC-Branch 55 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 276, and that its Decision
dated May 8, 1996 was a judgment on the merits, i.e., one rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by
the parties at the trial of the case.
Controversy herein arises from the fourth requirement: the identity of parties, subject matter and, particularly, the causes of action
between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573.
There is identity of parties. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573 were both instituted by respondent against petitioners.
There is also identity of subject matter. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573 both involved respondent’s rights and interests over
the subject property as Francisco’s legitimate child and compulsory heir. Finally, there is identity of causes of action.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." The
cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et al., to petitioners without
respondent’s knowledge and consent, hence, depriving respondent of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject
property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the sale of respondent’s share in the subject property, the legal redemption by
respondent of her co-heirs’ share sold to petitioners, and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but
they were the remedies and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her.
The allegations in respondent’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 573 initially give the impression that the cause of action therein was petitioners’
refusal to heed respondent’s demand to redeem petitioners’ ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property. But a closer study of
said Complaint, as well as the trial proceedings before RTC-Branch 56, reveal that respondent’s right to redeem petitioners’ ten-eleventh
(10/11) share in the subject property also arose from the sale of the said subject property to petitioners by respondent’s co-heirs and co-
owners, alleged to be without respondent’s knowledge or consent – the very same cause of action at the crux of Civil Case No. 276.
Therefore, Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 should be dismissed, being barred by res judicata, given the final and executory
Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276. We stress that res judicata, in the concept of bar by prior judgment,
renders the judgment or final order conclusive between the parties and their privies, not just with respect to a matter directly adjudged,
but also any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto.
8. Garcua-Quiazon vs. Belen

FACTS:
 Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise
represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of
her late father’s estate.
 Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their
claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix
of Eliseo’s estate.
 RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond The Court
of Appeals affirmed RTC. It held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent
was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2.Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed
in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided
at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as
a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.
9. Barrazona vs. RTC Br. 61 of Baguio

FACTS:
 San Realty & Development Corp. owns a building located at Naguilian cor. Asin Road, Baguio City.
 Vangie Barrazona is leasing Unit 203 A and B of said building for a period of 2 years, from 15 July 2001 to 30 June 2003. Php 400
per sqm. For Unit 203 A and Php 500 per sqm for Unit 203 B.
 Since August 2001, Barrazona defaulted in her monthly rentals and failed to pay the same despite repeated demands by San
Realty.
 On 14 May 2002, San Realty filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages before RTC Branch 61 of Baguio.
 On 3 June 2002, Barrazona filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. She contends that the allegations in the complaint
clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (unlawful detainer) ---an action within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the MTC. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint alleges that Barrazona failed to pay her rentals and San Realty previously
demanded for its payment and for Barrazona to vacate the leased premises.
 The RTC denied the motion.
 Barrazona filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the jurisdiction of RTC Branch 61.
ISSUE:
Is the action instituted by San Realty one for ejectment?
HELD:
YES. The basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint
at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
This allegation of the complaint clearly shows that respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay her overdue rentals and
to vacate the premises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in writing was on March 27, 2002. Respondent thus complied with
Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, while the complaint is captioned "Collection of Sum of Money with Damages," the allegations therein show that respondent’s
action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
10. MAGBANUA v JUNSAY

FACTS:
 Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in the residence of complainant and herein respondent Pilar S.
Junsay was charged as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery before the RTC of Bacolod City.
 The records show that only petitioner Rosemarie was tried, Her co-accused, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo, remain at
large.
 The case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession made by petitioner, admitting her participation in the crime of
Robbery. The defense contested the admissibility of the confession, and averred that the same was made under duress.
 On 20 December 1985, the RTC of Bacolod City, rendered a Decision, acquitting petitioner. The RTC held:
o The evidence for accused [herein petitioner Rosemarie] more particularly the Medical Certificate and the testimony
of the attending physician as well as the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers guilty has clearly
establish (sic) the fact that accused was physically maltreated by the investigating officers in an attempt to force her
to confess her participation in the robbery. X X X X X X The decretal portion of the RTC Decision pronounced:
o IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THEREFORE, this Court finds the evidence for the prosecution not only insufficient to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima facie case against her
for having participated in the robbery subject of the above entitled case and therefore ACQUITS accused on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence.
 Petitioner Rosemarie together with co-petitioner (Rosemarie’s father) filed with the RTC, Branch 51, Bacolod City, a Complaint
for Damages against respondent Pilar. Respondent Pilar was the employer of petitioner Rosemarie, while respondents Ibarra
and Juanito were members of the police force of Bacolod City, and assigned at the Police Station in Bacolod City.
 The Complaint, alleged, inter alia, that by reason of respondents false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing Criminal Case
No. 28 for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie, the latter suffered untold pain, shame, humiliation, worry, and mental anguish,
which if assessed in monetary terms will not be less than P200,000.00. It was further alleged therein that Conrado, Rosemaries
father, lost his job and his entire family suffered. Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and mental torture
due to the filing of the false criminal charge against her. They sought moral and exemplary damages, including attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings and expenses incurred in connection with Rosemarie’s defense. They similarly
prayed for payment of the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the instant case.
 Respondent Pilar filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, as
crystallized in Article 1146[14] of the Civil Code. From the time the cause of action arose to the filing of the Complaint, four years
and eight months had already lapsed.
 Petitioners filed an Opposition contending that their cause of action is not for damages based on the physical injuries suffered
by Rosemarie during the investigation of the criminal case nor the violation of her rights for the indignities foisted upon her by
the respondents from 18 July 1982, and several days thereafter. They posited that the damages sought are for the malicious
prosecution of Rosemarie. They reasoned that the baseless filing of the criminal case for Robbery against Rosemarie, despite
her protestations of innocence and the lack of evidence against her, caused her family to incur expenses and subjected her
to untold shame and humiliation.
 Petitioners postulated that as the Complaint for Damages is for malicious prosecution, the prescriptive period should be counted
from the date of Rosemarie’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. 28, or on 20 December 1985, and not from 18 July 1982, the date
when respondents injured the rights of Rosemarie. From the time judgment in Criminal Case No. 28 was rendered to the filing of
the Complaint in the instant case, not more than one year and three months had passed.
 The RTC issued an Order denying respondents Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It found that the cause of action of petitioners
Complaint was based on malicious prosecution.
 Respondent Pilar filed before the RTC an Answer, dated 18 May 1988, disclaiming petitioner’s allegation that she maltreated
petitioner Rosemarie while the latter was being investigated by the police authorities.
 Petitioners alleged that respondent Pilar cannot claim lack of knowledge of the maltreatment and indignities suffered by
petitioner Rosemarie because she herself participated in such maltreatment. Petitioners further contended, inter alia, that they
have a proper and valid cause of action against the respondents, including petitioner Conrado who suffered and incurred
expenses to defend his daughter, Rosemarie, who was then a minor against unjust accusation, maltreatment and torture.
 On 25 July 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. The RTC applied the established rule that for a malicious
prosecution suit to succeed, two indispensable elements must be shown to exist, to wit: (a) malice and (b) absence of probable
cause. It found that the elements were not successfully shown by petitioners. It held that the mere filing of a suit does not render
a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate.
 Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal and The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners have a valid cause of action against respondents.
RULING
NO.
In this jurisdiction, the term malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of
such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions,
the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a
cause of action or probable cause.
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a
malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself
the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action,
the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive.
The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation
of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.[42]
We shall proceed to determine whether in the prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of Robbery, all four elements were in
attendance.
It is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.
On the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause means such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[44] Thus,
a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.[45]
Anent the question of whether the prosecutor acted without probable cause in bringing the action against petitioner Rosemarie, we
find no reason to depart from the conclusions reached by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The filing of Criminal Case No. 28 for
Robbery was not without probable cause.
Indeed, during the investigation petitioner Rosemarie admitted her participation in the commission of the incident complained of.
The inadmissibility of the aforesaid admission on the ground that the same was extracted under duress was an evidentiary matter, which
does not detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemarie’s admission; there was reason for the respondents to believe that the
suit was not unfounded, and that the crime was committed.
Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by
legal malice.
Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there was no proof of a sinister
design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her co-
accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only be expected to bring the matter to the authorities.
There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. At the
risk of redundancy, we stress that the proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate must not be violated. Mere
filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate.[51] There was no other explanation or motive as to why respondents would institute baseless
prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood between respondent Pilar and petitioner
Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery.
We also do not find the actuations of respondents Ibarra and Juanito to be impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the action
against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to their duties as police officers. The same was made subsequent to the
report of respondent Pilar of the commission of the crime, and the investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then, mistakes
committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith,[52] which was not established in the case at bar.
Moreover, as was clear from the outset, the instant case is a suit seeking damages for malicious prosecution, and not for the violations
and maltreatment that respondents allegedly committed against petitioner Rosemarie in extracting the admission from her. At any rate,
the RTC had ruled that the instant case is not an action on the injuries allegedly suffered by petitioner Rosemarie, but rather for malicious
prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking damages for her injuries should have been deemed prescribed.
5. UMALE vs CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167246; July 20, 2011
FACTS: On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner, George Leonard S. Umale, agreed to
lease, for a period of two (2) years, an eight hundred sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by
the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd.
Partnership through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that no shopping arcades or retail stores, restaurants, etc. shall be allowed to be established on the property, except with the
prior written consent from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership and
(2) that the respondent and/or its successors-in-interest shall become member/s of the Ortigas Center Association, Inc.
(Association), and shall abide by its rules and regulations.
Before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Pasig City Branch 68. Respondent's ground for ejectment in this 1st Civil Case (No. 8084) was the petitioners violation of stipulations
in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. Under this contract, the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for
light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers canteen, and may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondents
prior written consent. The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot, without
first securing the required written consent from the respondent, and the necessary permits. The petitioner also subleased the property.
The MTC Br. 68 favored the respondent as to the ejectment case which was affirmed in toto by RTC-Branch 155, Pasig City. However, the
case was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, Pasig City because the Presiding Judge of inhibited himself from resolving the petitioners
motion for reconsideration. The RTC-Branch 267 granted the petitioners motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Br 68
decision. Accordingly, the Civil Case was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the
CA.
During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed a 2nd Civil Case (No. 9210) for unlawful detainer against the
petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71, Pasig City. This time, the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties
lease contract.
MTC-Branch 71 rendered a decision in favor of the respondent ordering the petitioner to peacefully vacate the premises, ordered to pay
herein respondent damages for the use of the property after the expiration of the lease contract, attorneys fees with cost of suit. With
respect to the commercial units built by petitioner on the subject land, he is hereby ordered to remove the same and to restore the
subject land in the same condition as it was received by petitioner.
On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed the 2nd Civil Case on the ground
of litis pendentia.
Respondent's Argument- it filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA and argued that there exists no litis
pendentia between the first and second Civil Cases because the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment, i.e., the first case
was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract. The
respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the
first case.
Petitioner's Argument - litis pendentia exists between the two ejectment cases filed against him because of their identity with one another
and that any judgment on the first case will amount to res judicata on the other. The petitioner argues that the respondent reiterated
the ground of violations of the lease contract, with the additional ground of the expiration of the lease contract in the second ejectment
case. Also, the petitioner alleges that all of the elements of litis pendentia are present in this case, thus, he prays for the reversal and
setting aside of the assailed CA decision and resolution, and for the dismissal of the complaint in the 2nd Civil Case on the ground of litis
pendentia and/or forum shopping.
CA's ruling- nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68, and ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the
two civil cases have different causes of action. The decision of the MTC- Branch 71 was ordered reinstated. Hence, petitioner filed petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1) WON there is litis pendencia;

2) WON the two Civil Cases have the same cauases of action HELD:
1. There was no litis pendentia

As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Litis pendentia exists when the following
requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by
the parties; and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
2. Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the same evidence
would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as the same evidence test), or whether the defenses
in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case
existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the
first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case
was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000,
the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in
the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration
of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as
a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first
ejectment case.
Restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract
as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of
the lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer
because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case,
was the expiration of the lease contract. Similarly, we do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping in filing the second civil case.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Considering our pronouncement that not all the
requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the respondent committed no forum shopping.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT vs. SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Action involved & parties – 2 consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court concerning Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) allowing the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait.
G.R. No. 180771 - original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and
to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal laws
Petitioners – “Resident Marine Mammals” involving toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting in Tañon
Strait, and seeking their protection are Gloria Estenzo Ramos & Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (the Stewards)
G.R. No. 181527 - original Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus seeking to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of DENR Region 7 in connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from
implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon
Strait Oil Exploration Project
Petitioners - Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC) an organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk
in Region 7
Facts:
1. A Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) was entered into by the Government of the Philippines through the
Department of Energy (DOE) and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) on June 13, 2002. Such contract involved geological
and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
2. December 21, 2004 - DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in the Tañon Strait.
3. JAPEX was to drill a well in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected
seascape.
4. Resolution No. 2007-001 was issued by the Protected Area Management Board of Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) adopting the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an
ECC.
5. The EMB of DENR Region 7 granted an environmental compliance certificate (ECC) to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project, hence, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province which
lasted until February 8, 2008.
6. 2 separate original petitions were filed by petitioners with SC seeking respondents to be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for violation
of the 1987 Constitution.
7. Motion to Strike its name as a respondent – was filed by Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX
claiming that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities.
8. Such motion was opposed by petitioners on the following grounds which was also adopted by FIDEC:
a. It was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory.
b. SOS admitted that "it is in law a privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration activities in Tañon Strait under the
instructions of its principal, JAPEX.
c. It would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case.
9. Petitioners asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a co-respondent or as a substitute for its parent company, JAPEX. JAPEX
during all this time, did not file any comment at all.
10. SC issued and personally served a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the
September 23, 2008 Resolution requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
11. Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification filed by JAPEX by way of special appearance where it requested to be clarified as to
whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been
impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
12. Motion for Extension of Time to file its Memorandum – filed by JAPEX PH also by special appearance
13. SC issued Resolution (April 24, 2012) - granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification, and stating that:
a) it considers JAPEX PH - a real party-in-interest in these cases
b) Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court - a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
c) JAPEX PH has no separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, JAPEX Company, Ltd. which was the party impleaded in
this case because it was established as a mere branch office, for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business transactions here in
the Philippines.
d) Section 128 of the Corporation Code – the function of a resident agent is to receive summons or legal processes that may be served
in all actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation.
Petitioners' Allegations:
1. Adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait:
a. A study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent due to the destruction
of the "payao" or "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef"
2. The ECC obtained by JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-
requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
3. Respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and private
respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental
Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations.
4. Petitioners, through the Stewards, claim that they have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in this suit.
a. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. – they assert their right to sue and the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in
multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.
b. The Stewards have right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to
build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the
Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
c. SC may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction
Respondents' Allegations:
1. petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition
2. SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions
3. the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
4. public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46
5. petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief
6. the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated
by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008
7. Resident Marine Mammals have no standing under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either
natural or juridical persons.
a. Non-applicability of Oposa case since the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.
Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
b. The Stewards cannot claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an
action. The Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision
in this case.
c. Invoking the alter ego principle in political law - respondents claim that absent any proof that former President Arroyo had
disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own. Issues:
1. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771
2. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
Ruling:
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
1. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows for a "citizen suit" and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before
our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain
a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene
in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation
in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
2. Rationale for this rule - to further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws
and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology
of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran.
3. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has
been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure."
4. Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet
unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."
Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution
as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
5. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards
are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
On the main issue - Service Contract No. 46 is declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ATTY. ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON vs. SPOUSES
ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993
August 22, 2012
FACTS: On Sept. 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of US$300,000.00 from Theodore and
Nancy Ang (petitioners). As security, the respondents issued a promissory note with an interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
payable upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents defaulted. In 2006, the debt aggregated to a total of
US$719,671.23, inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of
the demand letter issued, the respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation.
In the same year, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin
B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in
behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents. However,
the respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of
the petitioners’ action was improperly laid, the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of
the place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in Los
Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper.
PETITIONERS: Maintain that their complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents may be filed in the RTC of Quezon
City. Invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they insist that Atty. Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in
interest in the case below and can prosecute the same before the RTC of Quezon City, where he resides.
RESPONDENTS: Assert that the petitioners are proscribed from filing their complaint in the RTC of Quezon City. They assert that the
residence of Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative, is immaterial to the determination of the venue of the petitioners’ complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the complaint in RTC Quezon City is proper
2 . Whether or not Atty. Aceron, being an attorney-in-fact is a real party in interest
HELD: 1. No. The case should have been filed with the RTC of Bacolod City. The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money
against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of
choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has
been instituted at the time the action is commenced. However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such
case may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides. Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California,
USA while the respondents reside in Bacolod City. Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners’ complaint against the respondents
may only be filed in the RTC of Bacolod City – the court of the place where the respondents reside. The petitioners, being residents of Los
Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of their complaint.
2. No. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real party in interest
in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment
of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive
law, has the right sought to be enforced.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file the complaint below
against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners – the real parties in interest. To stress, the right
sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real
party in interest. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest.
The petitioner’s reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty. Aceron is likewise a party in
interest in the case below is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that: Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where
the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name
and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as the real party in
interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary
shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of the case.
Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on venue as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff
would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest", as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-à-vis Section 3 of
the same Rule. The petition is denied.
------rex-----
[G.R. No. 121171. December 29, 1998]
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS S. CABARRUS, SR., JESUS S. CABARRUS, JR., JAIME T. CABARRUS, JOSE
MIGUEL CABARRUS, ALEJANDRO S.
PASTOR, JR., ANTONIO U. MIRANDA, and MIGUEL M. ANTONIO, as Minority Stock Holders of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation,
respondents.
Facts:
The development, exploration and utilization of the mineral deposits in the Surigao Mineral Reservation have been authorized by Republic
Act No. 1828, by virtue of which law, a Memorandum of Agreement was drawn on July 3, 1968, whereby the Republic of the Philippines
thru the Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, granted Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) the exclusive right to explore,
develop and exploit nickel, cobalt and other minerals in the Surigao mineral reservation.
The Philippine Government undertook to support the financing of MMIC by purchase of MMIC debenture and extension of guarantees.
The government then issued debenture bonds in favor of MMIC which enabled the latter to take out loans from the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The loans were mortgaged by MMIC’s assets.
By 1984, DBP and PNBs financial exposure both in loans and in equity in MMIC had reached tremendous proportions, and MMIC was
having a difficult time meeting its financial obligations. MMIC had an outstanding loan with DBP in the amount of P13,792,607,565.92 as
of August 31, 1984 and in the amount of P8,789,028,249.38 as of July 15, 1984 or a total Government exposure of Twenty Two Billion Six
Hundred Sixty-Eight Million Five Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy and 05/100 (P22,668,537,770.05), Philippine
Currency.
In order to mitigate MMIC’s loan liability, a financial restructuring plan (FRP) was drafted in the presence of MMIC’s representatives as
well as representatives from DBP and PNB. The two banks however never formally approved the said FRP. In August and September 1984,
as the various loans and advances made by DBP and PNB to MMIC had become overdue and since any restructuring program relative
to the loans was no longer feasible, and in compliance with the directive of Presidential Decree No. 385, DBP and PNB as mortgagees
of MMIC assets, decided to exercise their right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgages in accordance with the Mortgage Trust
Agreement.
The foreclosed assets were sold to PNB as the lone bidder and were assigned to three newly formed corporations, namely, Nonoc Mining
Corporation, Maricalum Mining and Industrial Corporation, and Island Cement Corporation.
In 1986, these assets were transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
On February 28, 1985, Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., together with the other stockholders of MMIC, filed a derivative suit against DBP and PNB
before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, for Annulment of Foreclosures, Specific Performance and Damages. The suit, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9900, prayed that the court: (1) annul the foreclosure, restore the foreclosed assets to MMIC, and require the banks to account
for their use and operation in the interim; (2) direct the banks to honor and perform their commitments under the alleged FRP; and (3)
pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs.
In the course of the trial, private respondents and petitioner APT, as successor of the DBP and PNBs interest in MMIC, mutually agreed to
submit the case to arbitration by entering into a Compromise and Arbitration Agreement to determine (a) Whether PLAINTIFFS have the
capacity or the personality to institute this derivative suit in behalf of the MMIC or its directors; (b) Whether or not the actions leading to,
and including, the PNB-DBP foreclosure of the MMIC assets were proper, valid and in good faith.
After conducting several hearings, the Arbitration Committee rendered a majority decision in favour of MMIC. Motions for
reconsiderations were filed by both parties but the same were denied. In 1994, private respondents filed in the same Civil Case No. 9900
an Application/Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award.” Petitioner countered with an opposition arguing that a dismissal of Civil
Case No. 9900 was merely a qualified dismissal to pave the way for the submission of the controversy to arbitration, and operated simply
as “a mere suspension of the proceedings.” In an Order dated November 28, 1994, the trial court confirmed the award of the Arbitration
Committee.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award
Held:
Admittedly the correct procedure was for the parties to go back to the court where the case was pending to have the award confirmed
by said court. However, Branch 62 made the fatal mistake of issuing a final order dismissing the case. While Branch 62 should have merely
suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither of the parties questioned said dismissal. Thus, both parties as well as said court are
bound by such error.
It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents do, that petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge that the case was merely
stayed until arbitration finished, as again, the order of Branch 62 in very clear terms stated that the complaint was dismissed. By its own
action, Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction over the vase. It could not have validly reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere motion
of one of the parties. The Rules of Court is specific on how a new case may be initiated and such is not done by mere motion in a
particular branch of the RTC. Consequently, as there was no pending action to speak of, the petition to confirm the arbitral award should
have been filed as a new case and raffled accordingly to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court.
Estoppel
The Court of Appeals ruled that APT was already estopped to question the jurisdiction of the RTC to confirm the arbitral award because
it sought affirmative relief in said court by asking that the arbitral award be vacated.
The rule is that Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this
defense may de done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor for the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that
jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.
Petitioners situation is different because from the outset, it has consistently held the position that the RTC, Branch 62 had no jurisdiction to
confirm the arbitral award; consequently, it cannot be said that it was estopped from questioning the RTCs jurisdiction. Petitioners prayer
for the setting aside of the arbitral award was not inconsistent with its disavowal of the courts jurisdiction. Nature and limits of the
Arbitrators powers
As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts.[29] Courts are
without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators.[30]
They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and will not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of
the arbitrators, since any other rule would make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.[31] Errors of law and fact, or
an erroneous decision of matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly
made.[32] Judicial review of an arbitration is, thus, more limited than judicial review of a trial.[33]
Nonetheless, the arbitrators awards is not absolute and without exceptions. The arbitrators cannot resolve issues beyond the scope of
the submission agreement.[34] The parties to such an agreement are bound by the arbitrators award only to the extent and in the
manner prescribed by the contract and only if the award is rendered in conformity thereto.
Accordingly, Section 20 of R.A. 876 provides:
SEC. 20. Form and contents of award. The award must be made in writing and signed and acknowledged by a majority of the
arbitrators, if more than one; and by the sole arbitrator, if there is only one. Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the award.
The arbitrators in their award may grant any remedy or relief which they deem just and equitable and within the scope of the
agreement of the parties, which shall include, but not be limited to, the specific performance of a contract. xxx
The arbitrators shall have the power to decide only those matters which have been submitted to them. The terms of the award shall be
confined to such disputes. (Underscoring ours).
PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. vs. TINGHIL
G.R. No. 159121; February 3, 2005
FACTS: Sometime in 1993, [Petitioner] Pamplona Plantations Company, Inc. (company for brevity) was organized for the purpose of taking
over the operations of the coconut and sugar plantation of Hacienda Pamplona located in Pamplona, Negros Oriental. It appears that
Hacienda Pamplona was formerly owned by a certain Mr. Bower who had in his employ several agricultural workers.
When the company took over the operation of Hacienda Pamplona in 1993, it did not absorb all the workers of Hacienda Pamplona.
Some, however, were hired by the company during harvest season as coconut hookers or sakador, coconut filers, coconut haulers,
coconut scoopers or lugiteros, and charcoal makers.
Sometime in 1995, Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation was established for the purpose of engaging in the business of operating
tourist resorts, hotels, and inns, with complementary facilities, such as restaurants, bars, boutiques, service shops, entertainment, golf
courses, tennis courts, and other land and aquatic sports and leisure facilities.
On 15 December 1996, the Pamplona Plantation Labor Independent Union (PAPLIU) conducted an organizational meeting wherein
several [respondents] who are either union members or officers participated in said meeting.
Upon learning that some of the [respondents] attended the said meeting, [Petitioner] Jose Luis Bondoc, manager of the company, did
not allow [respondents] to work anymore in the plantation.
Thereafter, on various dates, [respondents] filed their respective complaints with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII,
Dumaguete City against [petitioners] for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment, overtime pay, premium pay for rest day
and holidays, service incentive leave pay, damages, attorneys fees and 13th month pay.
On 09 October 1997, [respondent] Carlito Tinghil amended his complaint to implead Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation x x x.
On 31 August 1998, Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez rendered a decision finding [respondents], except Rufino Bacubac, Antonio Caolas
and Felix Torres who were complainants in another case, to be entitled to separation pay.
[Petitioners] appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to [the] NLRC. In the assailed decision dated 19 July 2000, the
NLRCs Fourth Division reversed the Labor Arbiter, ruling that [respondents], except Carlito Tinghil, failed to implead Pamplona Plantation
Leisure Corporation, an indispensable party and that there exist no employer-employee relation between the parties.
[Respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by [the] NLRC in a Resolution dated 06 December 2000.[8]
Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CA held that respondents were employees of petitioner-company. Finding there was a power to hire, the appellate court considered
the admission of petitioners in their Comment that they had hired respondents as coconut filers, coconut scoopers, charcoal makers, or
as pieceworkers. The fact that respondents were paid by piecework did not mean that they were not employees of the company.
Further, the CA ruled that petitioners necessarily exercised control over the work they performed, since the latter were working within the
premises of the plantation. According to the CA, the mere existence -- not necessarily the actual exercise -- of the right to control the
manner of doing work sufficed to meet the fourth element of an employer-employee relation.
The appellate court also held that respondents were regular employees, because the tasks they performed were necessary and
indispensable to the operation of the company. Since there was no compliance with the twin requirements of a valid and/or authorized
cause and of procedural due process, their dismissal was illegal.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for the non-joinder of the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation.
HELD: Granting for the sake of argument that the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation is an indispensable party that should be
impleaded, NLRCs outright dismissal of the Complaints was still erroneous.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply
with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the NLRC did not require respondents
to implead the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation as respondent; instead, the Commission summarily dismissed the Complaints.
In any event, there is no need to implead the leisure corporation because, insofar as respondents are concerned, the leisure corporation
and petitioner-company are one and the same entity. Salvador v. Court of Appeals has held that this Court has full powers, apart from
that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-
plaintiff the real party-in-interest.
In Alonso v. Villamor, we had the occasion to state thus:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice
to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration
of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means
best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become
the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The controlling principle in the interpretation of procedural rules is liberality, so that they may promote their object and assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. When the rules are applied to labor cases, this
liberal interpretation must be upheld with even greater vigor. Without in any way depriving the employer of its legal rights, the thrust of
statutes and rules governing labor cases has been to benefit workers and avoid subjecting them to great delays and hardships. This
intent holds especially in this case, in which the plaintiffs are poor laborers.
----cos agon----
12. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.:
An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal action because it does not
affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
FACTS:
On 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo,
Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, TCT No. 261331 and TCT No. 261332, were
previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage
Contract. The Manila RTC declared the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory and
was entered in the book of entries of judgment.
The petitioner then filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to
Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose
the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After holding the public auction, the sheriff
awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00.
Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522.155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC.
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated
no cause of action; and that the plaintiff’s claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished.
The Makati RTC denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no res judicata; that the complaint stated a sufficient
cause of action to recover the deficiency; and that there was nothing to support the claim that the obligation had been abandoned
or extinguished apart from the respondents’ contention that the properties had been subjected to expropriation by the City of Manila.
The respondents moved for reconsideration, reiterating their grounds earlier made in their motion to dismiss. The petitioner adopted its
comment/opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the first time their objection on the ground of improper venue contending
that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real
action that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were located.
The Makati RTC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit; and held that it is improper to dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue is indeed improperly laid, since the said ground was not raised in
the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
Upon appeal, the CA granted the petition for certiorari of the respondents holding that a suit for recovery of the deficiency after the
foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract; it is
upon a written contract and upon an obligation of the mortgage-debtor to pay the deficiency which is created by law. As such, the
venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
Thus, the suit for judgment on the deficiency filed by respondent BPI against petitioners Yujuico, being an action emanating from the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage contract between them, must necessarily be filed also at the RTC of Manila, not at the RTC of
Makati. The CA denied the respondents’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration and the petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration on
December 7, 2006.
Issues:
Is the CA correct in ruling that the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage?
Ruling of the Court:
No.
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a
real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the
action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may
include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.
The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for
which reason the action is considered a transitory one. Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover
the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil Case No. 03-450 in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the
main office of the petitioner was located.
Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is correct in our view, that it would be improper to dismiss Civil Case No. 03-450
on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been improperly laid, considering that the respondents had not raised
such ground in their Motion to Dismiss. As earlier indicated, they came to raise the objection of improper venue for the first time only in
their reply to the petitioner’s comment on their Motion for Reconsideration. They did so belatedly.
We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably
raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue
is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the defendant
seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue.
Petition is granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC orders reinstated.
OCHOA VS CHINA BANKING
G.R. No. 192877
March 23, 2011
FACTS: Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners’
complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, but not on
respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with the same court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action was filed in the right venue
RULING: The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise
known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages." Sections 1
and 2 thereof clearly state:
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security
for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner
in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within said
province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building
of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
The case at bar involves petitioners’ mortgaged real property located in Parañaque City over which respondent bank was granted a
special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section 2, the sale can only be made in Parañaque City.
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties 6 and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be
made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of
actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court] defines an action in this wise:
"Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong."
It is clear that the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an "action or suit" is the filing of the same with a "court of
justice." Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be categorized under either term.
Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any court of justice but with
the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. By no stretch of the imagination can the office of the sheriff come
under the category of a court of justice.
Verily then, with respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing
particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue
of Actions.
Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions arising from or related to the mortgage, such as
petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.
-----duran-----
UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI-MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997
FACTS:
On October 28, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a "Dealership Agreement
for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The contract contained, among others:
1) a stipulation reading: "All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon
City," and
2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch
in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Some 5 years later, or more, UNIMASTERS filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban City against KUBOTA, a certain Reynaldo Go, and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order. The action was docketed and assigned to Branch 6.
RTC right away issued a restraining order enjoining METROBANK from "authorizing or effecting payment of any alleged obligation of
UNIMASTERS to defendant KUBOTA arising out of or in connection with purchases made by defendant Go against the credit line caused
to be established by UNIMASTERS for and in the amount of P2 million covered by defendant METROBANK or by way of charging
UNIMASTERS for any amount paid and released to defendant KUBOTA by the Head Office of METROBANK in Makati, Metro-Manila. The
Court also set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing on January 10, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
On January 4, 1994 KUBOTA thus prayed for dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue (said motion being set for hearing on
January 11, 1994); and for the transfer of the injunction hearing to January 11, 1994 because its counsel was not available on January 10
due to a prior commitment before another court.
KUBOTA claims that notwithstanding that its motion to transfer hearing had been granted, the RTC went ahead with the hearing on the
injunction incident on January 10, 1994 during which it received the direct testimony of
UNIMASTERS' general manager, Wilford Chan; that KUBOTA's counsel was "shocked" when he learned of this on the morning of the 11th,
but was nonetheless instructed to proceed to cross-examine the witness; that when said counsel remonstrated that this was unfair, the
Court reset the hearing to the afternoon of that same day, at which time Wilford Chan was recalled to the stand to repeat his direct
testimony. It appears that cross-examination of Chan was then undertaken by KUBOTA's lawyer with the "express reservation that KUBOTA
was not thereby waiving and/or abandoning its motion to dismiss;" and that in the course of the cross-examination, exhibits (numbered
from 1 to 20) were presented by said attorney who afterwards submitted a memorandum in lieu of testimonial evidence.
RTC: authorised the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a bond of P2,000,000 and denied KUBOTA's motion to dismiss.
It maintained that UNIMASTERS Conglomeration is holding its principal place of business in the City of Tacloban while the defendant
KUBOTA is holding its principal place of business in Quezon City. The proper venue therefore pursuant to Rules of Court would either be
Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila (sic), as agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership
Agreement, are additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of Court. The filing, therefore, of this complaint in the Regional
Trial Court in Tacloban City is proper.
Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals. It contended, more particularly, that:
(1) the RTC had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of UNIMASTERS’ action considering that venue was improperly
laid,"
(2) UNIMASTERS had in truth "failed to prove that it is entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction;" and
(3) the RTC gravely erred "in denying the motion to dismiss.
CA: agreed with KUBOTA that -- in line with the Rules of Court and this Court's relevant rulings The stipulation respecting venue in its
Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to "the proper courts
of Quezon City.” The participation of KUBOTA's counsel at the hearing on the injunction incident did not in the premises operate as a
waiver or abandonment of its objection to venue; that assuming that KUBOTA's standard printed invoices provided that the venue of
actions thereunder should be laid at the Court of the City of Manila, this was inconsequential since such provision would govern "suits or
legal actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not actions under the Dealership Agreement between KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS,
the venue of which was controlled by paragraph No. 7 thereof; and that no impediment precludes issuance of a TRO or injunctive writ
by the Quezon City RTC against METROBANK-Tacloban since the same "may be served on the principal office of METROBANK in Makati
and would be binding on and enforceable against, METROBANK branch in Tacloban. CA denied motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. WON the participation by the lawyer of KUBOTA at the injunction hearing operated as a waiver of its objection to venue
2. What construction should be placed on the stipulation in the Dealership Agreement that "(a)ll suits arising out of this Agreement
shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City?”
3. WON this stipulation had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and limiting litigation between
UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
HELD:
4. NO. The record shows that when KUBOTA's counsel appeared before the Trial Court in the morning of January 11, 1994 and was
then informed that he should cross-examine UNIMASTERS' witness, who had testified the day before, said counsel drew attention to the
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and insistently attempted to argue the matter and have it ruled upon at the time;
and when the Court made known its intention (a) "to (resolve first the) issue (of) the injunction then rule on the motion to dismiss," and (b)
consequently its desire to forthwith conclude the examination of the witness on the injunction incident, and for that purpose reset the
hearing in the afternoon of that day, the 11th, so that the matter might be resolved before the lapse of the temporary restraining order
on the 13th, KUBOTA's lawyer told the Court: "Your Honor, we are not waiving our right to submit the Motion to Dismiss.”It is plain that
under these circumstances, no waiver or abandonment can be imputed to KUBOTA.
5. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or personal, or
involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written
agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another."Parties may by stipulation
waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or
prejudicial to third persons. It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation
would be against public policy.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically).
As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should
be deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties' convenience. In other words,
stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for
the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues
indicated in said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear
and categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4,
for their actions. This is easier said than done, however, as an examination of precedents involving venue covenants will immediately
disclose. In a line of cases, the Court construed the venue stipulations involved as merely permissive (13). There are cases however, where
stipulations on venue were held to be restrictive, or mandatory.
Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their agreement governing the venue of actions between them. That
ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is the foundation of venue regulations, and that that construction should
be adopted which most conduces thereto. Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is that they do not negate
but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear,
by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and
exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory
or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the
venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to
characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing
their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them,regardless of the general precepts
of Rule 4; and any doubt or uncertainty as to the parties' intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or
mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without stable standards, which could
well result in precedents in hopeless inconsistency.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City.
Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.”
In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban
City or Quezon City.
But the contract between them provides that "All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon
City," without mention of Tacloban City.
1. In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question should receive a negative answer.
Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between
them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same
desire and intention -- the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon
City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
One last word, respecting KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of UNIMASTERS’ action
considering that venue was improperly laid." This is not an accurate statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but
venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. This is fundamental.The action at bar, for the recovery of damages
in an amount considerably in excess of P20,000.00, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court.
Assuming that venue were improperly laid in the Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a
procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that
the subject matter is within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, the
RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action.
This is true also of real actions. Thus, even if a case "affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property"were commenced in a province or city other than that "where the property or any part thereof
lies,"if no objection is seasonably made in a motion to dismiss, the objection is deemed waived, and the Regional Trial Court would be
acting entirely within its competence and authority in proceeding to try and decide the suit.
Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs Warren Luyaben

515 SCRA 519
February 12, 2007
Facts:
Luyaben, resident of Kalinga, filed with the Kalinga RTC a complaint for damages against Auction in Malinta Inc. (Malinta) on the ground
that Malinta failed to deliver the wheel loader after Luyaben tendered payment being the highest bidder in an auction conducted by
Malinta. Malinta moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Malinta argued that the correct venue is the RTC of
Valenzuela City pursuant to stipulation in the Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement which states that all court litigation
procedures shall be conducted in the appropriate courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of
improper venue because there was a clear intention of the parties to limit the venue. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the resolution of
RTC and reinstated the complaint. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in the parties Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement effectively limited the venue
exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City.
Held:
No, the stipulation in the parties agreement did not effectively limited the venue exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela. Under
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, all other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found at
the election of the plaintiff. However, Section 2 Rule 4 of the Rules of court does not apply where the parties before the filing of the action
have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. In this case, the stipulation in the parties agreement evidently lacks the restrictive
and qualifying words that will limit venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City. Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be
considered as an additional venue to those mentioned under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The venue in the case was properly
laid down with the RTC of Kalinga.

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(a) finality of the former judgment;

(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and

8. Garcua-Quiazon vs. Belen

1.Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

2.Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

9. Barrazona vs. RTC Br. 61 of Baguio

Is the action instituted by San Realty one for ejectment?

10. MAGBANUA v JUNSAY

Whether or not petitioners have a valid cause of action against respondents.

5. UMALE vs CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 167246; July 20, 2011

Partnership through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the following conditions:

1) WON there is litis pendencia;

1. There was no litis pendentia

c. SC may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction

Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards

ALAN and EM ANG

G.R. No. 186993

August 22, 2012

2 . Whether or not Atty. Aceron, being an attorney-in-fact is a real party in interest

[G.R. No. 121171. December 29, 1998]

Accordingly, Section 20 of R.A. 876 provides:

PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. vs. TINGHIL

G.R. No. 159121; February 3, 2005

Hence, this Petition.

In Alonso v. Villamor, we had the occasion to state thus:

Ruling of the Court:

OCHOA VS CHINA BANKING

G.R. No. 192877

March 23, 2011

G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997

The contract contained, among others:

Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs Warren Luyaben

February 12, 2007

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