Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by
the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to
General Order No.2 of the President “for being participants or for having given aid and comfort
in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
Government by force…” General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the
power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial
law subject to judicial inquiry?; and

2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance with the declaration of martial law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4
Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present
cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law
has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related
to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or
rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically
suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

CABANAS VS PILAPIL
58 SCRA 183

Facts:

1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He
likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be
administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old
hence, Francisco took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the
child Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor
and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy
and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the
parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards
the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor
to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective
claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition
of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were
between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly
the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77

FACTS

Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties
left by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered
the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to
Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed by
the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots.
One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot
1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion
and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over
the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion
and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary
of said company.

A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against
Judge Asuncion alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion
of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition case; and • that he violated
Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a
private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred to Justice
Palma of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in
connection with the complaints filed against him.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which was among those properties involved in the partition
case.

2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H)
of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer

HELD

1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others from
acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this
case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period.
Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did
NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who
earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge
Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating
Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of
Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,
having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without any
intervention of Judge Asuncion.

Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was
IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canonsof Judicial
Ethics requires that judges’ official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It
was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have purchased the property that was
or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he
and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause
doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.

2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and
officials of the department of public prosecution in active servicefrom engaging in commerce,
either in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which
they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of
the new sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said
provision.

Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers are considered to have
committed corrupt practices, which include having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision because there is no showing
that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of
Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the corporation in which he participated has
obviously no relation to his judicial office.

Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does NOT apply to members of the
Judiciary, who are covered under RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of the 1973
Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA 296, the power to remove or dismiss judges is vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the CSC, and only on 2 grounds—serious misconduct and
inefficiency. Under the 1973 Constitution, only the SC can discipline judges of the inferior
courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered as subordinate
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

civil service officers or employees because the Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the
Judiciary department. Moreover, only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to
the jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges, however, are not within this classification, as they are
considered to be non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential
appointee.

Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds judges to abstain from making
personal investments in enterprises, which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court. Judge
Asuncion and his wife, however, had withdrawn from the corporation and sold their shares to
third parties only 22 days after its incorporation, which indicates that Judge Asuncion realized
that their interest in the corporation contravenes said Canon. The Court even commended the
spouses for such act.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Republic vs. Villasor

54 SCRA 83

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City
of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan,
and International Construction Corporation, respondents.

Facts:
 The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory
by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
 Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued.
And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with
several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
 The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
 Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties
of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

Held:
 No

Ratio:
 What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Wylie vs Rarang
209 SCRA 357

FACTS:

Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James
Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.

Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal
assigned as merchandise control guard.

M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station
supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US
Naval Base station.

The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of
interest to military personnel.

One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry."

On February 3, 1978, the POD made a publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE
INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain person named “Auring” who is described as a disgrace to
her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal.

The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost
Marshal and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to when petitioner M. H.
Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.

The private respondent the filed an action for damages alleging that the article constituted false,
injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published
and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel.

The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the
defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official
functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; and the
United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued
without its consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.

Facts:

Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and
replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued
pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT
within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances.

Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive
due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without
first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents
enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not
to other transportation services.

Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators
and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab
operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or
requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to
the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year
ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.

The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially
enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in
this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to
other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the
equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed.

It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is
given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were
deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents
had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of
public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be
desired by the BOT.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Balacuit v CFI
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the
ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6
month imprisonment.

The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from
being enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.

Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is
ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is
not within the power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of
Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for
theaters and not admission rates.

The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general
welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:
W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets for children below seven (7) is
constitutional?

Ruling:

NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property.

There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The
petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business
entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in
charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to
purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to
such performances.

Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms
of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.The ticket which
represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the
absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear
right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an
act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the
regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of
property.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

DIDIPIO VS GOZUN
G.R. No. 157882 – 485 SCRA 586 – Police Power – Eminent Domain

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos
signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA
with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to
explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage
of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the
RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In
seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40
which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking”• of private property for private
purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and
allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking
provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation
of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such
circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”•

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved
but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as
section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be
provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the
property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the
mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned
in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise
entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Santiago v. Guingona Jr.

GR No. 134577

Petition: Special Civil Action. Quo Warranto

Petitioners: Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago and Sen. Francisco S. Tatad
Respondent: Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan
Ponente: J. Panganiban
Date: 18 September 1998

Facts:
 27 June 1998 – Senate convened first reg. session, 11th Congress
o Sen. Fernan elected as Senate President (20 to 2); Sen. Tatad had also been
nominated, by Sen. Santiago
 Sen. Ople, Senate President Pro Tempore
 Sen. Drilon, Majority Leader
o By the end of the session, no consensus/decision on who would be Minority
Leader
 Sen. Tatad manifested that he would be assuming the position of minority
leader
 The contention: those who had voted for Fernan constituted the
“majority”; those who didn’t (Tatad and Santiago), the “minority”
 Sen. Flavier: Lakas-NUCD-UMDP (7 members, thus, a minority) had
chosen Sen. Guingona as the Minority Leader
 30 July 1998 – Majority Leader said he had received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas
Senators, stating that they had selected Guingona as the Minority Leader
o Senate President formally recognized Sen. Guingona as Minority Leader
 31 July 1998 – Sen. Santiago and Tatad filed petition for quo warranto

Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
 Sec 16(1), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as
it may deem necessary.

 Sec. 16(3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

 Sec 1, Par. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

 Definition: political question (Tanada v. Cuenco [1957])

Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure.

 Quo warranto proceedings

Legal remedy to determine the right to a contested public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment. (Lota v. CA [1961]) In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful,
the person suing must show that he/she has a clear right to the contested office or to
use/exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent.

Issues:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition? (YES)
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? (NO)
3. Was Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
Minority Leader? (NO)
4. Did Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the Minority
Leader? (NO)

Ruling/Ratio Decidendi:
1. YES.
 Within the jurisdiction of the court to inquire if Senate (or its officials) violated
the Consti. or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions.
 Doctrine: jurisdiction over subject matter of a case, determined by the allegations
of the complaint, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. (Alleje v CA [1995], Sarmiento v. CA [1995], Times Broadcasting
Network v. CA [1997], Chico v. CA [1998])
o Petitioners’ allegation: Sec 16(1), Art. VI not observed in selection of
Senate Minority Leader: invoke SC’s judicial power to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion.
 Invoked Avelino v. Cuenco: tackled scope of SC’s judicial review
– questions involving interpretation/application of a provision of
the Consti. or law, including rules of either house of Congress
(even acts political in nature, whenever there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies); in the case, SC assumed jurisdiction in deciding who was
the rightful Senate President – resolution hinged on the
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a

quorum.
o Respondents’ comment: issue an internal matter pertaining exclusively to
the domain of the legislature – SC cannot exercise jurisdiction w/o
transgressing separation-of-powers.
 No Constitutional issue involved: Consti. does not provide for the
office of a minority leader in the Senate: Senate has full discretion
to provide for office, and procedure in selecting its occupant
 Avelino does not apply: no question involving
interpretation/application of Consti., laws, or rules of Senate.
 Other examples of SC exercising jurisdiction over acts of Exec./Legis.:
o Lansang v. Garcia (1971): SC has authority to inquire into existence of
factual bases required by the Consti. for suspension of writ of habeas
corpus – not to supplant Executive, only to check if Executive went
beyond constitutional limits of his jurisdiction.
o Javellana v. Executive Secretary (1973)
 Judicial Power to check grave abuse of discretion more explicitly granted to the
SC in the 1987 Consti. (Sec 1, Art. VIII)
o Tanada v. Angara (1997): petitioners sought to nullify Senate concurrence
in ratifying the WTO Agreement – right and duty of judiciary to settle
issues where one branch of gov’t infringed Consti.; but SC should only
strike down acts of co-equal branches on two grounds, (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality, or (2) grave abuse of discretion
 Some post-1987 Consti. examples of cases where SC decided it did not have
jurisdiction:
o Co v. HRET (1991): full authority conferred upon HRET as sole judges of
all contests relating to election returns, qualifications of members – no
grave abuse of discretion.
o Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997): on whether a bill had been properly
approved by the legislative body – matter concerned with internal
procedure of the House.
2. NO.
 Congress has the power/prerogative to provide for its officers: to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.
o To intrude on the jurisdiction of the legislature (in the case) would amount
to Judicial Legislation – a clear breach of separation-of-powers.
o In the absence of Consti. prov., laws, or specific rules – SC devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of acts of the Senate.
 Petitioners’ argument:
o “Majority” must take its definition from Sec. 16(1), Art. VI: “Majority” =
those who voted for Senate President; thus, “Minority” = those who did
not vote for Senate President.
 Thus, Guingona cannot be Senate Minority Leader because (1) he
voted for Fernan and (2) the bloc of Senators who voted for him
also voted for Fernan
 SC: argument has no clear support – from Consti.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

o Judicial definition of “majority”: number greater than half or more than

half of any total. (Perez v. De la Cruz [1969], Perfecto concurring opinion
in Avelino v. Cuenca)
o Consti. requirement: Senate President must get votes of more than one half
of all the Senators – does not provide that members who will not vote for
him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority”.
 Precedent cited by Guingona: in 8th Congress, nomination of Sen.
Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the
minority – Sen. Joseph Estrada.
o SC: unlike with selection of Senate President, Consti. is not explicit in the
manner of selecting the Minority Leader – must be prescribed by the
Senate. (Consti. vests in each house of Congress the power to determine
the rules of its proceedings. [Sec. 16(3), Art. VI])
 SC: neither has argument have clear support of Rules: the Rules of the Senate do
not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
3. NO.
 Petitioners unable to prove clearly and sufficiently their entitlement to the office
of the Senate minority leader.
o Absent any clear-cut guidelines, no way to establish that illegality or
irregularity tainted Guingona’s assumption of the office of the Senate
minority leader.
4. NO.
 Fernan not guilty of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment”, or of “an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility”.
o Guingona belongs to Lakas, a minority party
o Recognition came after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, where
both sides allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Decision: Petition Dismissed

Dissenting Opinion: J. Mendoza

 Centered on whether the SC had jurisdiction over the case: Mendoza disagreed with the
majority and opined that the SC did not have jurisdiction.
o Political question: SC must respect internal affairs of its co-equal branches
o Courts have no power to inquire into the internal org. of a house of Congress,
except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a specific
constitutional limitation is involved.
 For this reason, the SC had, in the past, declined to assume jurisdiction
over cases involving the discipline of members of the Legis. (Alejandrino
v. Quezon [1924] – suspension of a Senator for assaulting a fellow
Senator; Osmena v. Pendatun [1960] – suspension of a Senator for
imputing bribery to Pres. Garcia) and the interpretation of rules of
procedure of a house (Arroyo v. De Venecia).

Principles:
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
CONCEPCION, J.

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders No. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President and as a taxpayer, instituted a special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well
as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. He
alleged that the said EOs were null and void, as Sec 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No.
2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If
the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which
is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

Issue:

Whether or not the power to create barrios has been duly delegated by Congress to the President
of the Philippines

Ruling.

No. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried
out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid
the evil effects above referred to. Wherefore, the Executive Orders in question are hereby
declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement
by the municipalities referred to.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES
E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “Guidelines in
the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” (Guidelines)
issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his
request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as
Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the
PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

Issues:
1. whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
2. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?;

Ruling:
1. Authority of the PNP Chief

It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

The power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in Congress. Any attempt to
abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non
potest delegari” – “delegated power may not be delegated.”

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal
corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and
directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and
regulations.

Act No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to
approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to
possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to
revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he may
deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s
powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance
with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementing
policies and instructions” on such “matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the
functions, powers and duties” of the PNP.

2. Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach
of the State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.

The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for
peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those
committed by the New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the
community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably,
the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in
general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly
oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside
of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences
may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms
is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to
hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of
all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other
hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND WENCESLAO

SALONGA v. JULITA B. FARRALES, GR No. L-47088, 1981-07-10
Facts:
The records disclose that on January 2, 1973, the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted
by her husband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with
the
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III,
Olongapo City, seeking the following relief:
The records disclose that on January 2, 1973, the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted
by her husband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with
the
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III,
Olongapo City, seeking the following relief:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:
"a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land containing an area of
156 Square Meters, more or less, where the house of strong materials of plaintiff exists.
"b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession or occupation
of the land by plaintiff, until a final decision is rendered in this case.
"c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and,... "d) Granting plaintiff such
other relief conformable to law, justice and equity.
icial admission, the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot subsequently take a position
contradictory thereto or inconsistent therewith (Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court; McDaniel
vs. Apacible, 44 Phil., 248
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil., 227). Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid
persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of the minds took place and,
accordingly,
Issues:
ting any possible arrangement for payment in... installments. On all fours to the case at bar,
therefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. NO. L?31018, June 29, 1973, which
was a case for specific... performance to compel the therein respondent Magdalena Estate, Inc. to
sell a parcel of land to petitioner per an alleged contract of sale in which the Supreme Court
ruled:
Ruling:
The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever
perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as vendees.
t appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did not
accept, but rejected the offer of... plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in
question. There being no consent there is, therefore, no contract to sell to speak of.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at
bar, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to... protection.
power of the Courts to grant.
As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at
bar, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to... protection. The
social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person
and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social... justice
cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the
Courts to grant.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083)

Nature of the case

Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which
allegedly infringed the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-
impairment of contracts; Environmental law; judicial review and the political question doctrine;
inter-generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and standing; Directive
principles; Negative obligation on State

Summary

An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country
and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to
the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they
represented others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter: “[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation,
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”. The
right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-
executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their
generation and for succeeding generations as “the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.”

Significance of the case

This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in cases relating to
forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of the Philippino Supreme Court to economic,
social and cultural rights has proved somewhat inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in
the enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989); Manila
Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but
at least one instance in which the Court made a statement that economic, social and cultural
rights are not real rights (see, Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150,
5 January 1994).
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that
the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., vs. CA

G.R. No. 112844 June 2, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in

Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent marine officers.

Public respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has repeatedly
disapproved petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition due to the following recurrent
violations against public respondent’s orders:

1). That Petitioner is ordered to cease operating without a renewal permit/recognition;

2.) That Petitioner is deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order
No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan.

3.) The Petitioner school has not acquired its own school site and building. The present school
campus is not conducive for training and is found to be very limited in space so that there is
difficulty for school development and expansion.

4.) That the petitioner is ordered to phase-out its Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation
courses.

Despite these violations, petitioner still continued to enrol students and still offered courses in
Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation. The DECS informed petitioner that it had
received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered
phased out.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-compliance with the DECS’ minimum
requirements and subsequently moved for reconsideration regarding the phasing out of the two
Marine courses stated above. Both motions were denied by the DECS.

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal, the DECS issued a Closure
Order. Thereafter, petitioner sought reconsideration of the Closure Order alleging compliance
with the DECS’ requirements.

The Office of the President dismissed the appeal finding no reason to disturb the DECS’ action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for another
ocular inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion
on the proposition that since it had made substantial improvements on school equipment and
facilities there existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer maritime courses. After
another circumspect review of the case, the Office of the President found no cogent reason to set
aside its previous resolution.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent Court of
Appeals by way of certiorari. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional
requirement of due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure
orders was not sufficiently disclosed.

Respondent CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law.

RULING:

Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a
hearing and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The
earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and
closure orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its
deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations.

We agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that —

As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment was
rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met (Lindo v.
COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also be noted that petitioner herein
repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of respondent DECS and
its motions were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing
and granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In connection therewith,
it has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the essence of procedural due
process and that any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
(Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278)

Petition DENIED.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL INC.,

petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR,
then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES,
in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON.
FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed
a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes
various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of
training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other related issuance,
principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.)
abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses
without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book
(ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life
liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for
brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on
February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying
petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was
made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a
consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued
by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper
regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate
subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects
either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every
one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the
police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional
leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed
fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted
deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and
other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

APCD vs PCA
G.R.NO. 110526, Feb. 10, 1998

Facts:

APCD assailed that PCA acted beyond its power in promulgating a Board Resolution no. 18-93
dated March 24, 1993 in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage
in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such
business. The contention of the APCD was that the Board Resolution of the PCA was an undue
exercise of legislative power by an administrative body which led to the procedural due process
requirement of consultation provided in PD. NO. 1644, E.O. 826 PCA Admin. Order no.002
series 1991. On the otherhand, the PCA contended that they the action of the petitioner was an
act of foruum shopping because they had a pending petition before the office of the President and
that they acted in adherence with the legislative power delegated to them.

Issue:

1. WON the said Board Resolution is NULL and VOID being unduely promulgated by
PCA.
2. WON the PCA must exercise the mere ministrant or optional function of the government
to provide protective regulations?

Ruling:

1. Yes, the said board resolution is null and void. The PCA was created through PD 232 on
June 30, 1973 “to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut
and other palm oil industry in all its aspects.” Because of that, the government limited the
opening of coconut processing plants which eventually also came to a point to prohibit it.
New plants can only be open through Executive Order No. 826 with provided economis
conditions; a) the existing market demand; b)the production capacity prevailing in the
country or locality; c) the level and flow of raw materials; and d) other circumstances
which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned. Through this, we
could see that the creation of PCA is to really regulate the new coconut plants and to give
some restriction to it by implementing legislated rules through the delegated legislative
power to them. That it must promulgate such kind of rules to protect the Philippine
coconut industries from its substandard quality and cut-throat competition.
2. No, it must not argue that just because it’s a ministrant or optional function of the
government to protect the welfare of the coconut industries could excuse them to
abandon the regulation of new coconut plant. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935
document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle.[18] Although the
present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy,[19] it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. This is clear from the following provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution
which, so far as pertinent, state:
Sec. 6. . . . Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

operate economic enterprises,subject to the duty of the State to promote

distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed. (Emphasis added)
At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the
government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of
an administrative agency to dismantle it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of
registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in
excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Lina v. Paño
G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001

Facts:

Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal for
the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro, Laguna.
It was denied on the ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province, including the
operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private respondent filed an action for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoining petitioners from
implementing or enforcing the subject resolution.

Issue:
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and
the denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid

Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the “objection” of the council to the said
game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-
executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views
which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise
contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case
could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of
lotto.

Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are

merely agents of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being the case, these councils, as
delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into
account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries
which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the
province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing
something already allowed by Congress.
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. NLRC

GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)

Facts:

In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the

Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter,
but due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that
the parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the
parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the
agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive
to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take
effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by
Presidential Decree 525.

This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company. The controversy
arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of
P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has
opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance
with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month,
contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early
as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell
well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the
other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct
from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.

On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation
of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in
accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this
order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one
dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor
that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to
1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules
implementing PD 1123.

The union filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8
February 1979. Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.

Held:
 Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests August 22 Session – Batch 1

The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was
already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April
1977. There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid
before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k
of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment
of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed
in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong
premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties
have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with
inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that
negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining
items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules
implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be
given weight; but, when it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement
between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation
and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope
of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is
not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it
goes beyond the scope of the law.The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set
aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the
increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily
effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company