2.

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself
a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).

Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case
No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.

Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc.
No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.

Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment
and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th
Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter
of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any
PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done
not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we
are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC
Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of
Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996,
and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also
attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his
conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his
IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership
fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt
of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997
the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member
in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is
in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were
as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February
14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed
and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
 Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed
to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge
was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony,
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or
privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with
such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for
him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this
case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three
months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more
particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President
Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section
4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as
an example.
 xxx xxx xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992
have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only
a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years
and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid
his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995,
1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number
for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a
"limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such
as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed
sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside
as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership
or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
 CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later,
is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to
all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 4-9.

2
Id., p. 11.

3
Id., p. 13.

4
Records, pp. 35-42.

5
Id., pp. 39-40.

6
Records, p. 57.

7
Rollo, p. 38.

8
Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-41.
3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183952 September 9, 2013

CZARINA T. MALVAR, Petitioner,

vs.
KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC. and/or BIENVENIDO BAUTISTA, KRAFT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Although the practice of law is not a business, an attorney is entitled to be properly compensated for
the professional services rendered for the client, who is bound by her express agreement to duly
compensate the attorney. The client may not deny her attorney such just compensation.

The Case

The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in a labor
litigation, but has mutated into a dispute over attorney's fees between the winning employee and her
attorney after she entered into a compromise agreement with her employer under circumstances that
the attorney has bewailed as designed to prevent the recovery of just professional fees.

Antecedents

On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) hired Czarina Malvar (Malvar) as its Corporate
Planning Manager. From then on, she gradually rose from the ranks, becoming in 1996 the Vice
President for Finance in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods International (KFI),KFPI’s mother
company. On November 29, 1999, respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista, as Chairman of the Board of
KFPI and concurrently the Vice President and Area Director for Southeast Asia of KFI, sent Malvar a
memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for possible
breach of trust and confidence and for willful violation of company rules and regulations. Following the
submission of her written explanation, an investigating body was formed. In due time, she was placed
under preventive suspension with pay. Ultimately, on March 16, 2000, she was served a notice of
termination.

Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI
and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a decision dated April 30,
2001,1 the Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and ordered her
reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus
attorney’s fees.
On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but additionally ruled that
Malvar was entitled to "any and all stock options and bonuses she was entitled to or would have been
entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment," as well as to moral and
exemplary damages.2

KFPI and Bautista sought the reconsideration of the NLRC’s decision, but the NLRC denied their
motion to that effect.3

Undaunted, KFPI and Bautista assailed the adverse outcome before the CA on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP
No. 69660), contending that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. However, the
petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA on December 22, 2004, but with the CA reversing the
order of reinstatement and instead directing the payment of separation pay to Malvar, and also
reducing the amounts awarded as moral and exemplary damages. 4

After the judgment in her favor became final and executory on March14, 2006, Malvar moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution.5 The Executive Labor Arbiter then referred the case to the Research
and Computation Unit (RCU) of the NLRC for the computation of the monetary awards under the
judgment. The RCU’s computation ultimately arrived at the total sum of ₱41,627,593.75. 6

On November 9, 2006, however, Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno issued an order, 7 finding that the
RCU’s computation lacked legal basis for including the salary increases that the decision promulgated
in CA-G.R. SP No. 69660 did not include. Hence, Labor Arbiter Reyno reduced Malvar’s total monetary
award to ₱27,786,378.11, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in so far as the computation of complainant’s other benefits and
allowances are concerned, the same are in order. However, insofar as the computation of her
backwages and other monetary benefits (separation pay, unpaid salary for January 1 to 26,
2005,holiday pay, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay, 13th month pay), the same are hereby
recomputed as follows:

1. Separation Pay
8/1/88-1/26/05 = 16 yrs
₱344,575.83 x 16 = 5,513,213.28
2. Unpaid Salary
1/1-26/05 = 87 mos.
₱344,575.83 x 87 = 299,780.97
3. Holiday Pay

4/1/00-1/26/05 = 55 holidays
₱4,134,910/12 mos/20.83 days x 55 days 909,825.77
4. Unpaid 13th month pay for Dec 2000 344,575.83
5. Sick Leave Pay
Year 1999 to 2004 = 6 yrs
 ₱344,575.88/20.83 x 15 days x 6 = 1,488,805.79
Year 2005
₱344,575.83/20.83 x 15/12 x 1 20,677.86 1,509,483.65

6. Vacation Leave Pay

Year 1999 to 2004 = 6 years
₱344,575.88/20.83 x 22 days x 6 = 2,183,581.83

Year 2005
₱344,575.83/20.83 x 22/12 x 1 30,327.55 2,213,909.36

10,790,788.86
Backwages (from 3/7/00-4/30/01, award in LA Sytian’s Decision 4,651,773.75

Allowances & Other Benefits:

Management Incentive Plan 7,355,166.58
Cash Dividend on Philip Morris Shares 2,711,646.00

Car Maintenance 381,702.92

Gas Allowance 198,000.00
Entitlement to a Company Driver 438,650.00
Rice Subsidy 58,650.00
Moral Damages 500,000.00

Exemplary Damages 200,000.00

Attorney’s Fees 500,000.00
Entitlement to Philip Sch G Subject to
"Share Option Grant" Market Price

27,786,378.11

SO ORDERED.

Both parties appealed the computation to the NLRC, which, on April19, 2007, rendered its decision
setting aside Labor Arbiter Reyno’s November 9, 2006 order, and adopting the computation by the
RCU.8

In its resolution dated May 31, 2007,9 the NLRC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
Malvar filed a second motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision of the
NLRC rendered on April 19, 2007. After the writ of execution was issued, a partial enforcement as
effected by garnishing the respondents’ funds deposited with Citibank worth 37,391,696.06. 10

On July 27, 2007, the respondents went to the CA on certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction), assailing the NLRC’s setting aside
of the computation by Labor Arbiter Reyno (CA-G.R. SP No. 99865). The petition mainly argued that
the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion in ruling that: (a) the inclusion of the salary increases and
other monetary benefits in the award to Malvar was final and executory; and (b) the finality of the ruling
in CA-G.R. SP No. 69660 precluded the respondents from challenging the inclusion of the salary
increases and other monetary benefits. The CA issued a TRO, enjoining the NLRC and Malvar from
implementing the NLRC’s decision.11

On April 17, 2008, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 99865,12 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Petition is GRANTED and the 19 April 2007 Decision
of the NLRC and the 31May 2007 Resolution in NLRC NCR 30-07-02316-00 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

The matter of computation of monetary awards for private respondent is hereby REMANDED to the
Labor Arbiter and he is DIRECTED to recompute the monetary award due to private respondent based
on her salary at the time of her termination, without including projected salary increases. In computing
the said benefits, the Labor Arbiter is further directed to DISREGARD monetary awards arising from:
(a) the management incentive plan and (b) the share option grant, including cash dividends arising
therefrom without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate remedy by the private respondent in the
proper forum. Private respondent’s allowances for car maintenance and gasoline are likewise
DELETED unless private respondent proves, by appropriate receipts, her entitlement thereto.

With respect to the Motion to Exclude the Undisputed Amount of ₱14,252,192.12 from the coverage
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to order its immediate release, the same is hereby GRANTED
for reasons stated therefor, which amount shall be deducted from the amount to be given to private
respondent after proper computation.

As regards the Motions for Reconsideration of the Resolution denying the Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition and the Omnibus Motion dated 30 October 2007, both motions are hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

Malvar sought reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion on July30, 2008. 14

Aggrieved, Malvar appealed to the Court, assailing the CA’s decision.

On December 9, 2010, while her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and the respondents
entered into a compromise agreement, the pertinent dispositive portion of which is quoted as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the covenants and understanding between the parties
herein, the parties hereto have entered into this Agreement on the following terms and conditions:

1. Simultaneously upon execution of this Agreement in the presence of Ms. Malvar’s attorney, KFPI
shall pay Ms. Malvar the amount of Philippine Pesos Forty Million (Php 40,000,000.00), which is in
addition to the Philippine Pesos Fourteen Million Two Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand One Hundred
Ninety-Two and Twelve Centavos (Php14,252,192.12) already paid to and received by Ms. Malvar
from KFPI in August2008 (both amounts constituting the "Compromise Payment").

The Compromise Payment includes full and complete payment and settlement of Ms. Malvar’s salaries
and wages up to the last day of her employment, allowances, 13th and 14th month pay, cash
conversion of her accrued vacation, sick and emergency leaves, separation pay, retirement pay and
such other benefits, entitlements, claims for stock, stock options or other forms of equity compensation
whether vested or otherwise and claims of any and all kinds against KFPI and KFI and Altria Group,
Inc., their predecessors-in-interest, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or successors-in-
interest, affiliates and subsidiaries, up to the last day of the aforesaid cessation of her employment.

2. In consideration of the Compromise Payment, Ms. Malvar hereby freely and voluntarily releases
and forever discharges KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors or successors-in-
interest, stockholders, officers, including Mr. Bautista who was impleaded in the Labor Case as a party
respondent, directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and subsidiaries from any and all
manner of action, cause of action, sum of money, damages, claims and demands whatsoever in law
or in equity which Ms. Malvar or her heirs, successors and assigns had, or now have against KFPI
and/or KFI and/or Altria Group, Inc., including but not limited to, unpaid wages, salaries, separation
pay, retirement pay, holiday pay, allowances, 13th and 14th month pay, claims for stock, stock options
or other forms of equity compensation whether vested or otherwise whether arising from her
employment contract, company grant, present and future contractual commitments, company policies
or practices, or otherwise, in connection with Ms. Malvar’s employment with KFPI. 15

xxxx

Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, 16 praying that the appeal be
immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise agreement, and that the case be
considered closed and terminated.

Intervention

Before the Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court received on
February 15, 2011 a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights17 from The Law Firm
of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo18 (Intervenor), whereby the Intervenor sought, among others, that both Malvar and
KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the Intervenor’s contingent fees.

The Motion for Intervention relevantly averred:

xxxx

Lawyers, oftentimes, are caricatured as alligators or some other specie of voracious carnivore;
perceived also as leeches sucking dry the blood of their adversaries, and even their own clients they
are sworn to serve and protect! As we lay down the facts in this case, this popular, rather unpopular,
perception will be shown wrong. This case is a reversal of this perception.

xxxx
Here, it is the lawyer who is eaten up alive by the warring but conspiring litigants who finally settled
their differences without the knowledge, much less, participation, of Petitioner’s counsel that labored
hard and did everything to champion her cause.

xxxx

This Motion for Intervention will illustrate an aberration from the norm where the lawyer ends up
seeking protection from his client’s and Respondents’ indecent and cunning maneuverings. x x x.

xxxx

On 18 March 2008 Petitioner engaged the professional services of Intervenor x x x on a contingency

basis whereby the former agreed in writing to pay the latter contingency fees amounting to almost
₱19,600,000.00 (10% of her total claim of almost ₱196,000,000.00 in connection with her labor case
against Respondents. x x x.

xxxx

According to their agreement (Annex "A"), Petitioner bound herself to pay Intervenor contingency fees
as follows (a) 10% of ₱14,252, 192.12 upon its collection; (b) 10% of the remaining balance of
₱41,627,593.75; and (c)10% of the value of the stock options Petitioner claims to be entitled to, or
roughly ₱154,000,000.00 as of April 2008.

xxxx

Intervenor’s efforts resulted in the award and partial release of Petitioner’s claim amounting to
₱14,252,192.12 out of which Petitioner paid Intervenor 10% or ₱1,425,219.21 as contingency fees
pursuant to their engagement agreement (Annex "A"). Copy of the check payment of Petitioner
payable to Intervenor’s Of Counsel is attached as Annex "C".

xxxx

On 12 September 2008 Intervenor filed an exhaustive Petition for Review with the Supreme Court
containing 70 pages, including its Annexes "A" to "R", or a total of 419 pages against Respondents to
collect on the balance of Petitioner’s claims amounting to at least ₱27,000,000.00 and
₱154,000,000.00 the latter representing the estimated value of Petitioner’s stock options as of April
2008.

xxxx

On 15 January 2009 Respondents filed their Comment to the Petition for Review.

xxxx

On 13 April 2009 Intervenor, in behalf of Petitioner, filed its Reply to the Comment.

xxxx

All the pleadings in this Petition have already been submitted on time with nothing more to be done
except to await the Resolution of this Honorable Court which, should the petition be decided in her
favor, Petitioner would stand to gain ₱182,000,000.00, more or less, which victory would be largely
through the efforts of Intervenor. 19 (Bold emphasis supplied).

xxxx

It appears that in July 2009, to the Intervenor’s surprise, Malvar unceremoniously and without any
justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case. 20 Hence, on
October 5,2009, the Intervenor reluctantly filed a Manifestation (With Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
for Petitioner),21 in which it spelled out: (a) the terms of and conditions of the Intervenor’s engagement
as counsel; (b) the type of legal services already rendered by the Intervenor for Malvar; (c) the absence
of any legitimate reason for the termination of their attorney-client relationship; (d) the reluctance of
the Intervenor to withdraw as Malvar’s counsel; and (e) the desire of the Intervenor to assert and claim
its contingent fee notwithstanding its withdrawal as counsel. The Intervenor prayed that the Court
furnish it with copies of resolutions, decisions and other legal papers issued or to be issued after its
withdrawal as counsel of Malvar in the interest of protecting its interest as her attorney.

The Intervenor indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed
the Intervenor, because it had done everything legally possible to serve and protect her interest. It
added that it could not recall any instance of conflict or misunderstanding with her, for, on the contrary,
she had even commended it for its dedication and devotion to her case through her following letter to
Justice Bellosillo, to wit:

July 16, 2008

Justice Josue Belocillo (sic)

Dear Justice,

It is almost morning of July 17 as I write this letter to you. Let me first thank you for your continued and
unrelenting lead, help and support in the case. You have been our "rock" as far as this case is
concerned. Jun and I are forever grateful to you for all your help. I just thought I’d express to you what
is in the innermost of my heart as we proceed in the case. It has been around four months now since
we met mid-March early this year.

The most important and immediate aspect of the case at this time for me is the collection of the
undisputed amount of Pesos 14million which the Court has clearly directed and ordered the NLRC to
execute. The only impending constraint for NLRC to execute and collect this amount from the already
garnished amount of Pesos 41 million at Citibank is the MR of Kraft on the Order of the Court (CA) to
execute collection. We need to get a denial of this motion for NLRC to execute immediately. We
already obtained commitment from NLRC that all it needed to execute collection is the denial of the
MR. Jun and I applaud your initiative and efforts to mediate with Romulo on potential settlement.
However, as I expressed to you in several instances, I have serious reservations on the willingness of
Romulo to settle within reasonable amounts specifically as it relates to the stock options. Let us
continue to pursue this route vigorously while not setting aside our efforts to influence the CA to DENY
their Motion on the Undisputed amount of Pesos 14million.

At this point, I cannot overemphasize to you our need for funds. We have made financial commitments
that require us to raise some amount. But we can barely meet our day to day business and personal
requirements given our current situation right now.

Thank you po for your understanding and support. 22

According to the Intervenor, it was certain that the compromise agreement was authored by the
respondents to evade a possible loss of ₱182,000,000.00 or more as a result of the labor litigation,
but considering the Intervenor’s interest in the case as well as its resolve in pursuing Malvar’s interest,
they saw the Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the compromise agreement that it was then
brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to remove the Intervenor was to have her terminate its
services as her legal counsel. This prompted the Intervenor to bring the matter to the attention of the
Court to enable it to recover in full its compensation based on its written agreement with her, averring
thus:

xxxx

28. Upon execution of the Compromise Agreement and pursuant thereto, Petitioner immediately
received (supposedly) from Respondents₱40,000,000.00. But despite the settlement between the
parties, Petitioner did not pay Intervenor its just compensation as set forth in their engagement
agreement; instead, she immediately moved to Dismiss/Withdraw the Present Petition.

29. To parties’ minds, with the dismissal by Petitioner of Intervenor as her counsel, both Petitioner and
Respondents probably thought they would be able to settle the case without any cost to them, with
Petitioner saving on Intervenor’s contingent fees while Respondents able to take advantage of the
absence of Intervenor in determining the settlement price.

30. The parties cannot be any more mistaken. Pursuant to the Second Paragraph of Section 26, Rule
138, of the Revised Rules of Court quoted in paragraph 3 hereof, Intervenor is still entitled to recover
from Petitioner the full compensation it deserves as stipulated in its contract.

31. All the elements for the full recovery of Intervenor’s compensation are present. First, the contract
between the Intervenor and Petitioner is reduced into writing. Second, Intervenor is dismissed without
justifiable cause and at the stage of proceedings where there is nothing more to be done but to await
the Decision or Resolution of the Present Petition.23

xxxx

In support of the Motion for Intervention, the Intervenor cites the rulings in Aro v. Nañawa 24 and Law
Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals, 25 particularly the following passage:

x x x. While We here reaffirm the rule that "the client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit
without the intervention of his lawyer," We hold that when such compromise is entered into in fraud of
the lawyer, with intent to deprive him of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to
the said fees and that when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in confabulation with the
adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer’s contingent interest or such interest appears of record
and who would benefit under such compromise, the better practice is to settle the matter of the
attorney’s fees in the same proceeding, after hearing all the affected parties and without prejudice to
the finality of the compromise agreement in so far as it does not adversely affect the right of the
lawyer.26 x x x.

The Intervenor prays for the following reliefs:

a) Granting the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights in favor of the Intervenor;

b) Directing both Petitioner and Respondents jointly and severally to pay Intervenor its
contingent fees;
 c) Granting a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments; and

d) Holding in Abeyance in the meantime the Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw

Case filed by Petitioner and granting the Motion only after Intervenor has been fully paid its
just compensation; and

e) Other reliefs just and equitable.27

Opposing the Motion for Intervention, 28 Malvar stresses that there was no truth to the Intervenor’s
claim to defraud it of its professional fees; that the Intervenor lacked the legal capacity to intervene
because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned from the Intervenor and Atty.
Richard B. Dasal became barred from private practice upon his appointment as head of the Legal
Department of the Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, a government subsidiary; and
that Atty. Llasos and Atty. Dasal had personally handled her case.

Malvar adds that even assuming, arguendo, that the Intervenor still existed as a law firm, it was still
not entitled to intervene for the following reasons, namely: firstly, it failed to attend to her multiple pleas
and inquiries regarding the case, as when communications to the Intervenor through text messages
were left unanswered; secondly, maintaining that this was a justifiable cause to dismiss its services,
the Intervenor only heeded her repeated demands to withdraw from the case when Atty. Dasal was
confronted about his appointment to the government subsidiary; thirdly, it was misleading and grossly
erroneous for the Intervenor to claim that it had rendered to her full and satisfactory services when the
truth was that its participation was strictly limited to the preparation, finalization and submission of the
petition for review with the Supreme Court; and finally, while the Intervenor withdrew its services on
October 5, 2009, the compromise agreement was executed with the respondents on December 9,2010
and notarized on December 14, 2010, after more than a year and two months, dispelling any badge
of bad faith on their end.

On June 21, 2011, the respondents filed their comment to the Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention.

On November 18, 2011, the Intervenor submitted its position on the respondent’s comment dated June
21, 2011,29and thereafter the respondents sent in their reply. 30

Issues

The issues for our consideration and determination are two fold, namely: (a) whether or not Malvar’s
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the execution of the compromise agreement was
proper; and (b) whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights can prosper, and,
if so, how much could it recover as attorney’s fees.

Ruling of the Court

We shall decide the issues accordingly.

1.

Client’s right to settle litigation

by compromise agreement, and
to terminate counsel; limitations
A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid
litigation, or put an end to one already commenced. 31 The client may enter into a compromise
agreement with the adverse party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is rendered therein. 32 If
the compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy, its judicial approval is in order.33 A compromise agreement, once approved by final order
of the court, has the force of res judicata between the parties and will not be disturbed except for vices
of consent or forgery.34

A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the attorney, for the
former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the litigation and
may at anytime, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before
judgment, even without the attorney’s intervention. 35 It is important for the client to show, however, that
the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third persons who are not parties to the
agreement.36

By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any
time with or without cause.37 But this right of the client is not unlimited because good faith is required
in terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates
that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The right is also subject to the
right of the attorney to be compensated. This is clear from Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at anytime from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client
and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,
the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the
contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his
rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and reasonable compensation
for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in
good faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of the client should be reasonably
compensated for his service.38

2.

Compromise agreement is to be approved

despite favorable action on the
Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention

On considerations of equity and fairness, the Court disapproves of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing
or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees.39 Thus, the Court grants the Intervenor’s
Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenor’s right
to its stipulated professional fees that would be denied under the compromise agreement. The Court
does so in the interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering professional services on
contingent fee basis.

Nonetheless, the claim for attorney’s fees does not void or nullify the compromise agreement between
Malvar and the respondents. There being no obstacles to its approval, the Court approves the
compromise agreement. The Court adds, however, that the Intervenor is not left without a remedy, for
the payment of its adequate and reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement of
the litigation without its participation and conformity. It remains entitled to the compensation, and its
right is safeguarded by the Court because its members are officers of the Court who are as entitled to
judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as the client
is against their abuses as her counsel. In other words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that
the attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just
fees. Even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the
subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the
legitimate compensation for professional services rendered. 40

The basis of the intervention is the written agreement on contingent fees contained in the engagement
executed on March 19, 2008 between Malvar and the Intervenor, 41 the pertinent portion of which
stipulated that the Intervenor would "collect ten percent (10%) of the amount of Ph₱14,252,192.12
upon its collection and another ten percent (10%) of the remaining balance of Ph₱41,627,593.75 upon
collection thereof, and also ten percent (10%) of whatever is the value of the stock option you are
entitled to under the Decision." There is no question that such arrangement was a contingent fee
agreement that was valid in this jurisdiction, provided the fees therein fixed were reasonable. 42

We hold that the contingent fee of 10% of ₱41,627,593.75 and 10% of the value of the stock option
was reasonable. The ₱41,627,593.75 was already awarded to Malvar by the NLRC but the award
became the subject of the appeal in this Court because the CA reversed the NLRC. Be that as it may,
her subsequent change of mind on the amount sought from the respondents as reflected in the
compromise agreement should not negate or bar the Intervenor’s recovery of the agreed attorney’s
fees.

Considering that in the event of a dispute between the attorney and the client as to the amount of fees,
and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove
the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into account the facts
determinative thereof,43 the history of the Intervenor’s legal representation of Malvar can provide a
helpful predicate for resolving the dispute between her and the Intervenor.

The records reveal that on March 18, 2008, Malvar engaged the professional services of the Intervenor
to represent her in the case of illegal dismissal. At that time, the case was pending in the CA at the
respondents’ instance after the NLRC had set aside the RCU’s computation of Malvar’s backwages
and monetary benefits, and had upheld the computation arrived at by the NLRC Computation Unit. On
April 17, 2008, the CA set aside the assailed resolution of the NLRC, and remanded the case to the
Labor Arbiter for the computation of her monetary awards. It was at this juncture that the Intervenor
commenced its legal service, which included the following incidents, namely:

a) Upon the assumption of its professional duties as Malvar’s counsel, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2008 consisting of
thirty-eight pages was filed before the Court of Appeals on May 6, 2008.
 b) On June 2, 2009, Intervenors filed a Comment to Respondents’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, said Comment consisted 8 pages.

c) In the execution proceedings before Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno, Intervenor prepared and
filed on Malvar’s behalf an "Ex-Parte Motion to Release to Complainant the Undisputed
amount of ₱14,252,192.12" in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-07-02716-00.

d) On July 29, 2000, Intervenor prepared and filed before theLabor Arbiter a Comment to
Respondents’ Opposition to the "Ex-Parte Motion to Release" and a "Motion Reiterating
Immediate Implementation of the Writ of Execution"

e) On August 6, 2008, Intervenor prepared and filed before the Labor Arbiter Malvar’s Motion
Reiterating Motion to Release the Amount of ₱14,252,192.12. 44

The decision promulgated on April 17, 200845 and the resolution promulgated on July 30, 200846 by
the CA prompted Malvar to appeal on August 15, 2008 to this Court with the assistance of the
Intervenor. All the subsequent pleadings, including the reply of April 13, 2009, 47 were prepared and
filed in Malvar’s behalf by the Intervenor.

Malvar should accept that the practice of law was not limited to the conduct of cases or litigations in
court but embraced also the preparation of pleadings and other papers incidental to the cases or
litigations as well as the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of the
clients.48 Consequently, fairness and justice demand that the Intervenor be accorded full recognition
as her counsel who discharged its responsibility for Malvar’s cause to its successful end.

But, as earlier pointed out, although a client may dismiss her lawyer at any time, the dismissal must
be for a justifiable cause if a written contract between the lawyer and the client exists. 49

Considering the undisputed existence of the written agreement on contingent fees, the question
begging to be answered is: Was the Intervenor dismissed for a justifiable cause?

We do not think so.

In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just
fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth
of the Intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her
lawyer by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell
short of being justifiable.

The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo, who represented the Intervenor, debunked
her allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because she thereby lavishly lauded the Intervenor for
its dedication and devotion to the prosecution of her case and to the protection of her interests. Also
significant was that the attorney-client relationship between her and the Intervenor was not severed
upon Atty. Dasal’s appointment to public office and Atty. Llasos’ resignation from the law firm. In other
words, the Intervenor remained as her counsel of record, for, as we held in Rilloraza, Africa, De
Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,50 a client who employs a law firm
engages the entire law firm; hence, the resignation, retirement or separation from the law firm of the
handling lawyer does not terminate the relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a
replacement.
The stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the Intervenors, not being contrary to
law, morals, public policy, public order or good customs, were valid and binding on her. They expressly
gave rise to the right of the Intervenor to demand compensation. In a word, she could not simply walk
away from her contractual obligations towards the Intervenor, for Article 1159 of the Civil Code
provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties and should
be complied with in good faith.

To be sure, the Intervenor’s withdrawal from the case neither cancelled nor terminated the written
agreement on the contingent attorney’s fees. Nor did the withdrawal constitute a waiver of the
agreement. On the contrary, the agreement continued between them because the Intervenor’s
Manifestation (with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner)explicitly called upon the Court to
safeguard its rights under the written agreement, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned counsel respectfully pray that instant Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner be granted and their attorney’s lien pursuant to the written
agreement be reflected in the judgment or decision that may be rendered hereafter conformably with
par. 2, Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Undersigned counsel further requests that they be furnished copy of the decision, resolutions and
other legal processes of this Honorable Court to enable them to protect their interests. 51

Were the respondents also liable?

The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the execution of
the compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its attorney’s fees.
Thereby, they would be solidarily liable with her for the attorney’s fees as stipulated in the written
agreement under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered with the Intervenor’s professional
relationship with Malvar.

The respondents insist that they were not bound by the written agreement, and should not be held
liable under it.
1âwphi1

We disagree with the respondents’ insistence. The respondents were complicit in Malvar’s move to
deprive the Intervenor of its duly earned contingent fees.

First of all, the unusual timing of Malvar’s letter terminating the Intervenor’s legal representation of her,
of her Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, and of the execution of compromise agreement manifested
her desire to evade her legal obligation to pay to the Intervenor its attorney’s fees for the legal services
rendered. The objective of her withdrawal of the case was to release the respondents from all her
claims and causes of action in consideration of the settlement in the stated amount of ₱40,000.000.00,
a sum that was measly compared to what she was legally entitled to, which, to begin with, already
included the ₱41,627,593.75 and the value of the stock option already awarded to her. In other words,
she thereby waived more than what she was lawfully expected to receive from the respondents.

Secondly, the respondents suddenly turned around from their strong stance of berating her demand
as offensive to all precepts of justice and fair play and as a form of unjust enrichment for her to a
surprisingly generous surrender to her demand, allowing to her through their compromise agreement
the additional amount of ₱40,000,000.00 on top of the₱14,252,192.12 already received by her in
August 2008. The softening unavoidably gives the impression that they were now categorically
conceding that Malvar deserved much more. Under those circumstances, it is plausible to conclude
that her termination of the Intervenor’s services was instigated by their prodding in order to remove
the Intervenor from the picture for being a solid obstruction to the settlement for a much lower liability,
and thereby save for themselves and for her some more amount.

Thirdly, the compromise agreement was silent on the Intervenor’s contingent fee, indicating that the
objective of the compromise agreement was to secure a huge discount from its liability towards Malvar.

Finally, contrary to the stipulation in the compromise agreement, only Malvar, minus the respondents,
filed the Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case.

At this juncture, the Court notes that the compromise agreement would have Malvar waive even the
substantial stock options already awarded by the NLRC’s decision,52 which ordered the respondents
to pay to her, among others, the value of the stock options and all other bonuses she was entitled to
or would have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment. This ruling
was affirmed by the CA.53 But the waiver could not negate the Intervenor’s right to 10% of the value of
the stock options she was legally entitled to under the decisions of the NLRC and the CA, for that right
was expressly stated in the written agreement between her and the Intervenor. Thus, the Intervenor
should be declared entitled to recover full compensation in accordance with the written agreement
because it did not assent to the waiver of the stock options, and did not waive its right to that part of
its compensation.

These circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed an escape from greater liability
towards the Intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay. It cannot be simply
assumed that only Malvar would be liable towards the Intervenor at that point, considering that the
Intervenor, had it joined the negotiations as her lawyer, would have tenaciously fought all the way for
her to receive literally everything that she was entitled to, especially the benefits from the stock option.
Her rush to settle because of her financial concerns could have led her to accept the respondents’
offer, which offer could be further reduced by the Intervenor’s expected demand for compensation.
Thereby, she and the respondents became joint tort-feasors who acted adversely against the interests
of the Intervenor. Joint tort-feasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done,
if done for their benefit.54

They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent
of each other, unite in causing a single injury. 55 Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tort-feasors
are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the
Court said in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals:56

x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances
of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because
it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result
and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. x x x
Joint tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors
that individual participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the other.57 To stress,
joint tort-feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. 58 Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the
respondents should be held solidarily liable to the Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these
circumstances except in this light.

That the value of the stock options that Malvar waived under the compromise agreement has not been
fixed as yet is no hindrance to the implementation of this decision in favor of the Intervenor. The
valuation could be reliably made at a subsequent time from the finality of this adjudication. It is enough
for the Court to hold the respondents and Malvar solidarily liable for the 10% of that value of the stock
options.

As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court can shirk from enforcing the contractual
stipulations in the manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the courts, whether trial or
appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the courts save
the parties from disadvantageous provisions. 59The same precepts hold sway when it comes to
enforcing fee arrangements entered into in writing between clients and attorneys. In the exercise of
their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts are bound to respect and
protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the
Law Profession.60 Hence, the Court must thwart any and every effort of clients already served by their
attorneys’ worthy services to deprive them of their hard-earned compensation. Truly, the duty of the
courts is not only to see to it that attorneys act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that
attorneys are paid their just and lawful fees.61

WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft Food
Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm,
represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, its stipulated contingent fees of 10% of
₱41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to 10% of the value of the stock option. No
pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 132-141.

2 Id. at 143-173.

3 Id. at 83.

4Id. at 175-187; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired), with Associate Justice
Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this
Court) concurring.

5 Id. at 292-300.

6 Id. at 188-189.

7 Id. at 216-221.

8 Id. at 273-288.

9 Id. at 290-291.

10 Id. at 91.

11 Id. at 96-97.

12 Id. at 450-485.

13 Id. at 483-485.

14 Id. at 487-500.

15 Id. at 733-734.

16 Id. at 744.

17 Id. at 755-765.

18 Id. at 756.
19 Id. at 755-757.

20 Id. at 725.

21 Id. at 718-722.

22 Id. at 770.

23 Id. at 761.

24 No. L-24163, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1090.

25 G.R. No. 90983, September 27, 1991, 202 SCRA 16.

26 Supra note 24, at 1105.

27 Rollo, p. 763.

28 Id. at 792-798.

29 Id. at 802-807.

30 Id. at 809-811.

31 Article 2028, Civil Code.

32 Supra note 24, at 1098, citing Jackson v. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84 Pac. 798.

33 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143108-09, September 26, 2001, 366 SCRA 87, 90.

34Article 2037 and Article 2038, Civil Code; see San Antonio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
121810,December 7, 2001, 371 SCRA 536, 543.

35Gubat v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010, 613 SCRA 742,
758-759.

36University of the East v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 93310- 12,
November 21,1991, 204 SCRA 254, 262.

37 Francisco v. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 571, 580.

38Traders Royal Bank Employees Union–Independent v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120592, March 14,
1997, 269SCRA 733, 743.

39 Supra note 24, at 1105.

40 Supra note 35, at 759-760.

41 Rollo, pp. 768-769.

42 Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995, 245 SCRA 30, 36-37.

43National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24,
2011,656 SCRA 60, 96-97.

44 Rollo, pp. 719-720.

45 Id. at 80-116.

46 Id. at 118-130.

47 Id. at 720.

48 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 213.

49 Section 26 (2), Rule 138, Rules of Court.

50 G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 566, 574.

51 Rollo, p. 721.

52 Id. at 171-172.

53 Id. at 186-187.

54 Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., G.R. No. 160283, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 177, 186.

Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1979, pp. 752-753, citing Bowen v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins.
55

Co., 270 N.C. 486, 155 S.E. 2d 238, 242.

56 G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30, 84.

57Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 155173,
November 23,2004, 443 SCRA 522, 545.

58 Id.

Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 157480,
59

May 6, 2005,458 SCRA 164, 166.

60 Matute v. Matute, No. L-27832, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 35, 37.

61National Power Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association v. National Power

Corporation, G.R. No. 156208, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 417, 437.
4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified
to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently,
the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take
and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before
the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before
the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do
so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.
And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office
and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.),
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place,
although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our
Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals,
or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or
patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines
for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right
to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section
25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29,
the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is
warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent
was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not
being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license,
purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production,
the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve
the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge,
training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to
cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in
the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
 the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.
(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether
it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial
function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of
law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the
article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to

hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring
to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members
of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States
Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar
to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled
to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of
applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall
only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless
he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order
that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed
upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must
be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
 The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for
three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before
the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his
office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising.
The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence
to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may
take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is
silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent
Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the
Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area
are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the
Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.
5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
 part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155
NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of
the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
 MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different
one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating
in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing
of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed
of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer
is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme
for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but
with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
 Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served
as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and
since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and
the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance
of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (
Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which
in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule
of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
 are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery."
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment
is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation,
the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of
bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers,
p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
 Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that
is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the
answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

 We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter,
not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of
COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a
reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the
solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance
or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter,
means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a
law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-
L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified
for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is
not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials
is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the
exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether
or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a
doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged
in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of
the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and
not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice
of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear
stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because
there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr.
Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged
in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced
law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have
if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened
to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the
United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist
of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated

companies
 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts
as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor
at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without
adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice
of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
 instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that
is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection.
... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and
act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto
for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep
his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services."
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means
'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State
v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
 informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional,
incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in
the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission
may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices
as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing
the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the
position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of
COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a
reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the
solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance
or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter,
means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a
law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-
L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified
for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is
not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials
is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the
exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether
or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a
doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged
in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of
the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and
not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice
of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear
stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because
there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr.
Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged
in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced
law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have
if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened
to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the
United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist
of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated

companies
 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts
as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People
ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor
at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without
adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice
of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
 instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that
is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection.
... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and
act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto
for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep
his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services."
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means
'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State
v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
 informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional,
incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in
the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission
may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices
as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing
the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the
position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT

CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.

4 14 SCRA 109.
6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment
against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty.
Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962
at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat
Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked
with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a
mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live
Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel
Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime
on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x
 8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial
support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit,
Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish
but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood
his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years
due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom
he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties
with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated
from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. 4 Atty. Garrido alleged
that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10)
years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the
bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them
was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty.
Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as
they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido
build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to
this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty.
Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal complaint
for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity7 (of marriage)
Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied
this motion for lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since
Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not
committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the
acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline also denied this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents,
arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. 11

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner
San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment.12 The
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and
adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30,
2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality
required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied
his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that
under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment.
He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-
Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She
recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that
disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts
and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty.
Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty.
Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by
the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. 15 The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her
own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of
the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing
of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession.
From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 17 the possession
of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental
or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to the practice only creates
the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may
be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. 19

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the
Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit
applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings
as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing
or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after
she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted,
but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 20 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the community’s sense of decency. 21 We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.22

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently
used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent’s pattern of misconduct undermined
the institutions of marriage and family – institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited
the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his
first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent’s act of contracting the second marriage was
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the
Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity.
We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only
corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during
the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this
Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married
to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited
relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence
of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission
of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages
were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions
on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act
of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past
actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,29 and
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to obey the
laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when
he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a
good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and
distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession
and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended
and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from
unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected
of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the
watchful public eye and community approbation. 33Needless to state, those whose conduct – both
public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings,
accordingly penalized.34

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got
married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a
condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x
Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that
he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate
in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. 37 The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already
knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already
had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper
advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had
an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she
lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values,
whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would
not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby
effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from his wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact
remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency
would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a
twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido
from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death
of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than
this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family
and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside
of the prism of law.1avvphi1

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the
strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage
to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country.
Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second
marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia’s claim that she agreed
to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid
marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong 39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they
wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into
the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
"husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with
her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia
did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of
Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly immoral.
Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also
unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his
vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous
marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting
to the point of shocking the community’s sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully
wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and
did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her
duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. 40 In Barrientos v.
Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was
admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show
the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is
one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children
with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated
violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what
under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic
and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity
of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question.
She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in
a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon
7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia
from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on wellness leave)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(on leave)
JOSE P. PEREZ
JOSE C. MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On wellness leave.

** On leave.

1 Rollo, pp. 1-2, Vol. I.

2 Id. at 9.

3 Id. at 14-16.

4 Atty. Garrido submitted a Sworn Statement of Pablito G. Uplos, his secretary who attested
that he was the one who delivered the money for the financial support of Maelotisea and their
children.

5 Rollo, pp. 29-30, Vol. I.

6 Id. at 90-91.
7 Civil Case No. Q-95-25688, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City.

8 Rollo, pp. 142-144, Vol. I.

9 Id. at 167-168 and 182-183; Order dated February 7, 2003.

10 Rollo, pp. 192-193, Vol. I.

11 Id. at 195-196; Order dated November 7, 2003.

12 Id. at 290-293, Vol. I.

Wilkie v. Limos, A.C. 7505, Oct. 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1, 8 and Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, 393
13

Phil 554, 551 (2000).

14In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil 399, 400 (1928); Calo v. Degamo, A.C. No. 516, Aug. 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 447, 450; In re Lanuevo, 160 Phil 935, 981 (1975); Agripino Brillantes, 166 Phil 449,
461 (1977); Pangan v. Ramos, 194 Phil 1, 8 (1981).

15Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 1, 9 and Tomlinii v. Moya,
A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006, 483 SCRA 154, 159.

16 Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, supra note 13, at 551-552.

17 A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 658, 664.

18 Ibid.

19 Id. at 665.

20 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 314.

21St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) and Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz,
A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624.

22 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 314.

23 424 SCRA 42, 54 (2004) cited in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 315.

24 101 Phil.313, 314 (1957) cited in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 315.

25 Supra note 20, at 308.

26 Rollo, p. 4, Vol. I.

27 In re Atty. Rovero, 189 Phil 605, 606 (1980).

28Namely: (1) "I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein;" (2) "I will do no falsehood or consent to its
commission"; (3) "and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients x x x"

29 SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys. – It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.

30Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect
for law and legal processes.

31 Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331, 339.

32 Id. at 338.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Rollo, p. 292, Vol. II.

36Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600; citing Bar Matter No.
1154, 431 SCRA 146, 149 (2004).

37 Id. at 609.

38 Id. at 609-610.

39 Rollo, p. 29, Vol. I.

40 Advincula v. Macabata, supra note 36, at 609.

41 A.C. No. 1512, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 30, 40.

42 Tapucar v. Tapucar, supra note 31, at 339.

7
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400 February 1, 1999

CARLOS DIONISIO, complainant,

vs.
HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint1 dated October 8, 1997, herein complainant Carlos Dionisio charged herein
respondent Judge Zosimo Escano with allegedly using court facilities (bulletin board) in advertising for
attractive waitresses and personable waiters and cooks for possible employment in their restaurant
business. In addition, respondent judge is also said to have caused the construction of an extension
office along the corridor called "Office of Negotiable Cases" after respondent Judge acquitted a certain
Hung.2

Meanwhile, in an October 19, 1997 Manila Bulletin issue, the advertisement 3 of Fontana Café &
Restaurant appeared accepting applications for attractive waitresses and female vocalists which
reads:

URGENTLY NEEDED

Attractive Waitresses

Female Vocalists

Bartenders-Male/Female

***********

Fontana Café & Restaurant

Dampa, Ninoy Aquino Avenue

Parañaque, Metro Manila

or
 RTC, Branch 259

Parañaque Municipal Hall

Tel. 825-57-32/826-00-11 loc. 226

Taking note of this advertisement, a staff member of ABS-CBN's public service show "Hoy Gising!"
disguised as an applicant was sent to conduct a videotaped investigation on the veracity of the
advertisement. The incidents of the investigation were aired live on televesion in their regular program.
This tape was also made part of the complaint submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
aforesaid staff member was able to ferret out the following admissions from respondent Judge Escano
inside his chamber at RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque Municipal Hall where he conducted the interview:

As to the ownership of the said establishment, respondent admitted: "Ako ang may-
ari. Ako mismo ang owner."

As to the nature of the business establishment, respondent Judge has this to say:
"Ngayon, ang concept nitong pubhouse, lalo itong lugar ko, itong pangalan ay Fontana
Café, ang ano ay we will be catering to classes A and B." He further added: "Yung
mga lalake target natin, may come on tayo diyan."

Respondent Judge even continued to say: "I will be requiring yung mga waitress, yung
medyo naka-mini or depende sa mga uniporme. Tapos yung medyo paseksi din dito
(respondent was making gestures on the upper part of his body, obviously referring to
just above the breast). Yung konti lang naman, yung medyo paduda, alam mo na, I
hope you are getting me, yung medyo nakaano nang konti yon."

He further elucidates: "May mga customers tayo na mga DOM. Medyo hahawak-
hawak sa kamay." For singers, he explained, "Pagkanta mo ron, hindi yung
nakaganyan ka, kwan ka. Magsuot ka ng medyo makatawag pansin sa mga lalaki
Siempre lalake, mga crowd natin lalaki. Kung umikot makikita pati panty, pati ano.
Paseksihan na yon, eh. That's the Entertainment World Today."

When respondent Judge was asked to give his comment on the news report against him, he admitted
the contents of the interview but clarified that the business establishment is merely a restaurant, a sort
of watering hole for some friends.

In answer to the complaint filed by Carlos Dionisio, respondent Judge explained that after his wife was
issued a Certificate of Registration of Business from the Department of Trade and Industry 4 and before
the construction of the restaurant was about to be finished, his wife requested his assistance for the
hiring of its personnel. He thought that, considering the difficulty of locating their residence which is
about three (3) kilometers from the main gate of Better Living Subdivision, it would be convenient for
him to conduct the screening of the applicants in his office. With this arrangement, respondent Judge
posted the notice at the Court bulletin board without realizing that it may later on create in the minds
of some people the perception that he was misusing the court facilities. However, when the said matter
was brought to his attention, respondent Judge immediately ordered the removal of said posters.

On the allegation of an Office of "Negotiable Cases," respondent Judge clarified that the structure was
constructed by the Municipal Government of Parañaque to utilize the open space in front of Branch
259. The said office now serves as stockroom and as office for the Clerk of Court, Legal Researcher,
Interpreter, the Sheriff and all other male personnel of the court who used to work inside the courtroom.
As regards the complainant's allusion to the case of People vs. Xiao Jia Hung, et al., respondent Judge
pointed out that the acquittal of the accused was anchored mainly on the absolute absence of hard
evidence and proof worthy to overturn the presumption of innocence.

On March 3, 1998, respondent Judge supplemented the aforesaid Answer contending therein that he
has been fair and just in rendering his decisions as a special criminal court Judge. To manifest such
impartiality, he attached his performance record for the year 1997 with comparative data 5 from other
branches of the RTC, Parañaque, photocopies of his decisions in People vs. Richard Ong,
et. al. 6 and People vs. Xiao Jia Hung, et. al.7

Subsequently, this administrative matter was referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation on January 19, 19988 which was later on assigned to Justice Minerva P. Gonza-
Reyes.

During the investigation, Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes was able to establish, inter alia, that the
respondent Judge posted the advertisement for "attractive waitresses and personable waiters" for the
restaurant in the court bulletin board for more than a week, even two weeks; that he removed the
notices when his attention was celled by some lawyers; that he was able to interview about five
applicants; that the suggestions he made to the applicants during the screening regarding the wearing
of dresses with short skirts and low necklines which were recorded on videotape by the personnel of
the "Hoy Gising!" program were true; and that the establishment was originally intended as a "pub" or
drinking place, but is now operated as a cafe.

Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice submitted her report and recommendation,
the pertinent portion of which reads:

. . ., the plea of Judge Escano that he merely wanted to help his wife to establish a
legitimate business to help augment his judge's income, the apologies tendered to the
Supreme Court and his peers in the judiciary for any embarrassment (he) might have
caused the institution, and the fact that the infraction was committed for a short time,
as he promptly desisted when his attention was called, may mitigate the penalty which
is hereby recommended to be a fine of P15,000.00.

With respect to the charge that Judge Escano is maintaining an Office of Negotiable
Cases, which he denied, the same is not substantiated and is recommended for
dismissal.

Respectfully submitted. 9

Time and again we have adhered to the rule that one who occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well
as his official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. 10 Because
appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Ceasar's wife, a
judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 11 It is with this exacting standard, not only of
decency but also of morality, that we have consistently avowed to promote confidence in the Judiciary.
And this Court will not hesitate to wield its disciplinary power to those erring personnel under its
supervision.

The Code of Judicial Ethics provides in so far as pertinent:

Canon II
 Rule 2.00 — A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.

Canon V

Rule 5.02. — A Judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to
reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of
judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before
the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests to
minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification, and if necessary,
divest such investments and interests. Divestment shall be made within one year from
the effectivity of this Code or from appointment, as the case may be.

Rule 5.03. — Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold and
manage investments but should not serve as a officer, director, advisor, or employee
of any business except as director, or non-legal consultant of a family business.

Judge Zosimo Escano has behaved in a manner unbecoming of his judicial robe, betrayed the people's
high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general. It is of no
import that respondent Judge's act of using the court's facilities be motivated by a good cause, no
matter how honorable. The moment such act deviates from purposes not directly related to the
functioning and operation for which the courts of justice has been established, it must be immediately
rectified. In Bautista vs. Costelo, Jr., 12 we have held that "the prohibition against the use of halls of
justice for purposes other than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity
including their grounds. Otherwise, if the prohibition is not thus construed, acts tending to degrade
courts would go unpunished on the pretext that they are not committed 'within the Halls of Justice'."

The excuse advanced by respondent Judge that in order for the prospective applicants not to have
difficulty of locating their residence it would be more convenient if the screening was made inside his
court, is a reason lacking in circumspection and delicadeza. It over-extends his authority as judge by
failing to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing immorality. For judges are enjoined to
avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true
not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities, including their private lives.
Judges must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. 13 For no
position exacts a greater demand or moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the judiciary. 14

And as correctly pointed by the Investigating Justice, the acts of posting advertisements for the
restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court address to receive the applications,
and of screening applicants in his court constitute involvement in private business and improper use
of office facilities for the promotion of the family business in violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
The restriction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code of Judicial Ethics on judges with
regard to their own business interests is based on the possible interference which may be created by
these business involvements in the exercise of their judicial duties which may tend to corrode the
respect and dignity of the courts as the bastion of justice. Judges must not allow themselves to be
distracted from the performance of their judicial tasks by other lawful enterprises. 15 It has been a time
honored rule that judges and all court employees should endeavor to maintain at all times the
confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice. 16

As to the other charge that respondent Judge has caused the construction of an extension office
known as the "Office of Negotiable Cases" after he acquitted a certain Hung, we have carefully
reviewed the records of this case and find no evidence to substantiate that such office exists. In the
absence of proof necessary to have a contrary holding, we find no reason to disbelieve the contention
of respondent Judge that the extension office was constructed by the Municipal Government of
Parañaque as a stockroom and as office for some court personnel. The complainant in this case
admittedly being "incognito" for fear of placing his source of livelihood at peril, has failed to fully support
such claim. The Rules, even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent judge should
be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. 17 For before any member of the judiciary
could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence,
especially since the charge is penal in character. 18

Furthermore, we likewise find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusion of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 96-62 entitled "People vs. Jia Hung, et al.". The Court
understands the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike, would at times encounter in procedural
bureaucracy, but imperative justice requires proper observance of indiputable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 19 For if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his
remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court
Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. Divergence of opinion between a trial judge
and a party's counsel as to admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias and partiality. 20

While concededly, the Investigating Justice considered certain mitigating circumstances in favor of the
respondent Judge in imposing the fine of P15,000.00 for his misconduct, this Court, however, is of the
opinion that such penalty is not commensurate to the disgraceful actuation of respondent Judge. The
gravity of the charge against the respondent Judge merits a more severe penalty of suspension. For
as officers of the court, judges are duty bound to scrupulously adhere and hold sacred the tenets of
their profession and they must be reminded, lest they have already conveniently forgotten, that a
certificate of service is not merely a means to one's paycheck. 21 A judge should not only possess
proficiency in law, but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a
virtuous and upright man. 22

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Zosimo Escano is hereby meted the penalty
of SUSPENSION from service for six (6) months which shall start upon receipt of notice hereof WITH
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo and Buena, JJ., concur.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 1.

2 Respondent in Criminal Case No. 96-662 entitled "People vs. Xiao Jia Hung alias Jose Lim,"
for violation of Sec. 15 Art. III RA 6425 as amended; Rollo, pp. 119-139.

3 Rollo, p. 23.

4 Annex "A," Comment/Answer of Respondent Judge Escano; Rollo, p. 10.

5 Rollo, pp. 34-80.

6 Crim. Case No. 96-460, Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide; Rollo, pp. 81-118.

7 Crim. Case No. 96-662 for Violation of Sec. 15. Art. III, RA 6425 as amended; Rollo, pp. 119-
139.

8 Resolution of the Supreme Court, Second Division; Rollo, p. 29.

9 Rollo, pp. 142-145.

10 Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; Conde vs. Superable, 29 SCRA 727; Otero vs.
Esguerra, 57 SCRA 57; Jakosalem vs. Judge Cordovez, 58 SCRA 11; Jugueta vs. Boncaros,
60 SCRA 27.

11 Palang vs. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776.

12 254 SCRA 148.

13 San Juan vs. Bagalacsa, 283 SCRA 416; Dysico vs. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275.

14 Naval vs. Panday, 275 SCRA 654.

15 Albos vs. Alaba, 231 SCRA 68.

16 Re: Issuance of Subpoena to Prisoner Nicanor De Guzman, Jr., 278 SCRA 18.

17 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Pascual, 259 SCRA 604.

18 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Pascual, supra.

19 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Myrna Alvarez, A.M. No. CA-98-8-P, March 11,
1998, citing Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 228 SCRA 718.

20 Go vs. CA, 221 SCRA 397; Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 541.

21 Re: Judge Fernando P. Agdamag, 254 SCRA 644.

22 Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354.

8

EN BANC

July 25, 2017

A.C. No. 1346

PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a complaint which Paces Industrial Corporation (Paces) filed against its former lawyer, Atty.
Edgardo M. Salandanan, for allegedly committing malpractice and/or gross misconduct when he
represented conflicting interests.

The procedural and factual antecedents of the instant case are as follows:

Sometime in October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and later became its
Director, Treasurer, Administrative Officer, Vice-President for Finance, then its counsel. As lawyer for
Paces, he appeared for it in several cases such as in Sisenando Malveda, et al. v. Paces
Corporation (NLRC R-04 Case No. 11-3114-73) and Land & Housing Development Corporation v.
Paces Corporation (Civil Case No. 18791). In the latter case, Salandanan failed to file the Answer,
after filing a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, which the court had denied. As a result, an order of default
was issued against Paces. Salandanan never withdrew his appearance in the case nor notified Paces
to get the services of another lawyer. Subsequently, a decision was rendered against Paces which
later became final and executory.

On December 4, 1973, E.E. Black Ltd., through its counsel, sent a letter to Paces regarding the latter's
outstanding obligation to it in the amount of ₱96,5 l 3.91. In the negotiations that transpired thereafter,
Salandanan was the one who represented Paces. He was likewise entrusted with the documents
relative to the agreement between Paces and E.E. Black Ltd.

Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the stockholders and
officers in the corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out their
shareholdings in the company to the group of Mr. Nicolas C. Balderama on May 27, 1974.
After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but now,
representing E.E. Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application for preliminary
attachment against Paces for the collection of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in
obtaining an order of attachment, writ of attachment, and notices of garnishment to various entities
which Paces had business dealings with.

Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E.
Black Ltd., he represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full extent, all the information he had
acquired as its stockholder, officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he was
never employed nor paid as a counsel by Paces. There was no client-lawyer contract between them.
He maintained that his being a lawyer was merely coincidental to his being a stockholder-officer and
did not automatically make him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect to its account with
E.E. Black Ltd. He added that whatever knowledge or information he had obtained on the operation
of Paces only took place in the regular, routinary course of business as him being an investor,
stockholder, and officer, but never as a lawyer of the company.

After a thorough and careful review of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended Salandanan's suspension for one (1) year on November 2,
2011.1 On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-
1202 adopting and approving, with modification, the aforementioned recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A, " and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that the
Respondent violated the conflict of interest rule, Atty. Edgardo M Salandanan is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years.

On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-413,3 denying
Salandanan's motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-120.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provide:

CANON 15 - A LA WYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx

Rule 15. 03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Under the aforecited rules, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases.4 Conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In short, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon
in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of said duty. 5 The prohibition is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.6

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the following five (5) rationales: 7

First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A
client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such confidence is
an objective important in itself.

Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the lawyer's
professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client's behalf,
the client's expectation of effective representation could be compromised.

Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard confidential information pertaining to it.
Preventing the use of confidential information against the interests of the client to benefit the lawyer's
personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose, is facilitated
through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.

Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to
make a gift or grant in the lawyer's favor. 1âwphi1

Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both
sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation.

Even the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client's
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment.
Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon
17 of the CPR expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned
duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client
is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client's
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them. It even survives the death of the client. 8

It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon
the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.9

Here, contrary to Salandanan's futile defense, he sufficiently represented or intervened for Paces in
its negotiations for the payment of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. The letters he sent to the counsel
of E.E. Black Ltd. identified him as the Treasurer of Paces. Previously, he had likewise represented
Paces in two (2) different cases. It is clear, therefore, that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces,
but it later became his duty to oppose the same for E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was
eventually opposed by him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had indisputably
obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights and obligations of Paces which had been placed in
him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led him to the identification of those attachable
properties and business organizations that eventually made the attachment and garnishment against
Paces a success. To allow him to utilize said information for his own personal interest or for the benefit
of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate the element of confidence which lies at the
very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship.

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the
same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially
related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the
relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. 10 It behooves lawyers, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.11 The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree.12

In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of the conflict of interest,
Salandanan should have either outrightly declined representing and entering his appearance as
counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E. Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another lawyer.
Unfortunately, he did neither, and must necessarily suffer the dire consequences. 13

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP's finding that Salandanan
represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable for the same. 14

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan
from the practice of law for three (3) years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning
that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and
entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator,
as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero, dated
November 2, 2011; rollo, pp. 224-228.

2
Rollo, p. 223.

3
Id. at 231.

4
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Ramos, 717 Phil. 536, 544 (2013).

5
Id.

6
Id.

7
Samson v. Atty. Era, 714 Phil. 101, 112-113 (2013).

8
Id.
 9
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Ramos, supra note 4, at 545.

10
Supra note 7, at 111.

11
Supra note 4.

12
Supra note 7, at 112.

13
Id. at 113.

14
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Ramos, supra note 4, at 545.

9
RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of
the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may,
upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice
after taking the following oath of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in

the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who,
being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United
States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced
at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they
have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without
examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than
those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary
of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school
of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and
social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study
of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or
college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course
of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects
as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk
of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before
the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file
within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within
sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice,
satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional
standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and
citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the
clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten
(10) days before the beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this
rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and
Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure,
Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and
Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall
be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each
examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee
to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the
examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take
place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman
of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and
International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law
(morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law
(afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar

examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of
the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for
one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one
year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official
reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the
committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall
they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision
of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and
further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the
court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social
Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and
International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th
after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report
on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed
with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the
report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show
the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes
as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify
under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the
same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take
and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of
the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon
its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate
shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted
to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as
are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding,
or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent
to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in
any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to
the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion
on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer
of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall
not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client
and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,
the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the
contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his
rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings
in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement
of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement,
the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking
or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice
to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional
aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and
unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of
justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render
the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be
provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to
be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever
such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than
the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less
grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five
Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other
person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the
Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the
aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to
appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees
and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and
after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon
the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same
right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

10
RULE 139-B

Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service.

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator.

A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Section 2. National Grievance Investigators. — The Board of Governors shall appoint from among
IBP members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3)
investigators to investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form
prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court.

An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity
of affinity to any of the parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted
as counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a
party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the members present, there
being a quorum, may order his disqualification.

Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote of at least six (6)
members of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases of
disqualification or removal shall be final.

Section 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. — The National Grievance Investigators
shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP
Board of Governors.
Section 4. Chapter assistance to complainant. — The proper IBP Chapter may assist the
complainant(s) in the preparation and filing of his complaint(s).

Section 5. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall
direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within
fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows
to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed
by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be
furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu propio or upon
timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the complainant.

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,

compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension
proceedings against the respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May
27, 1993 re Bar Matter 356).

Section 6. Verification and service of answer. — The answer shall be verified. The original and five
(5) legible copies of the answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy
thereof on the complainant or his counsel.

Section 7. Administrative counsel. — The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member
of the Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation
in case of need for such assistance.

Section 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the
power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to
defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if
upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall
be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the
Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings,
if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted
to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.

Section 9. Depositions. — Depositions may be taken in accordance with the Rules of Court with leave
of the investigator(s).

Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any member of the Board of Governors, the
President of any Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.
Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before diplomatic or consular representative of the
Philippine Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or designated by the Board
of Governors.

Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a deposition shall be taken may be
designated by the Investigator to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition.

Section 10. Report of Investigator. — Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the
investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the
transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of the report
need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce
substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies.

Section 11. Defects. — No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the
Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of
justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant,
including invalidation of the entire proceedings.

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of
the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
Report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is

less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a
decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme
Court orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their
counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigation. — In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer
the case for investigation to the Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6
to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other Court-designated Investigator. — Based upon the
evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the
Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.

C. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. — After receipt of respondent's answer or
lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice
of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the
investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

Section 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. 1 — The Court
of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named
in Rule 138, Section 27 2, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Section 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement
of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the
Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the
suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Section 19. Expenses. — All reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary
and disbarment proceedings are lawfull charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.

Section 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. — This Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall
supersede the present Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All
cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule
except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.

Footnotes

1 This section and the following Section 17 sepersede Section 9 of Rule 139.

2 The text of Rule 138, Section 27 reads: "SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended form
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
11
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > December 2016 Decisions > A.C. No. 11394, December
01, 2016 - MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA,
Respondent.:

A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016 - MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.

GUEVARRA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment
filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations
of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and
Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical
Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws2 and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand,
respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who
filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical
procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and
making her ill in 2009.4

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular

online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His
posts include the following excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice
here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's
ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some
ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No
goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday
- You will go down in Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK
QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September
22 at 11:18pm)5

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through
her office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag
talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang
kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up
apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)6

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon.
Kaya lang, histado ko na kung sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman
mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at
10:31pm)7

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO

AKO KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO
HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola
budget daw niya runs into tens of millions.... (September 15 at 3:57pm)8

Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed
the news of a picket demonstration in front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how
television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the story when the next rallies will
have the following numbers 100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran
pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at
Tomas Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)9

Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my
reputation is worth that much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot
daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince editors to pin me down with
something eh alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga
sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka
lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect
your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon
sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas
[ni]Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)10

Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on
national television to expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng
Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that the much needed
partial restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000
Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain permanently disabled for the
rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am)11

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID
UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October
27, 2009)12

Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which
side you'll be taking- just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang
binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)13
chanrobleslaw
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook
account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well
as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable
cause,14 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we
will paralyze the operations of all her clinic and seek out her patients and
customers to boycott her. [So] far, good response – 70% decrease in her July
sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)15

Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after
Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there
is real-and-present danger that surgeries like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs
which have been performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of
something going wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's]
hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)16

Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and
trained doctors, they nearly killed a client of mine, medical malpractice, use of
banned substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in flawless clinic, a patient
who had a simple facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)17

Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and
friends in Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20.
Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not a certified plastic surgeon:
Boycott Belo, Flawless Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at
6:23pm)18

Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-
making machines, dapat convert them into public health clinics!!! instead
of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at
2:16am)19

Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell
all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic
because it has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)20

Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT

ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a place where there will be no facebook
so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out more about our anti-
quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm)21
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT
BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at
12:17arn)22

Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard
- BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will
vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya
niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am)23

Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group.
To all my friends and comrades, please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have
2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled their lipo from belo. Please
help me shut down the Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral
and legal obligation to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)24
chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that
allegedly threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis
and without proof,25 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she
will be jailed for plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will
be in the middle of a criminal prosecution. The General Surgeon of France
will have a Philippine version. By October and November, some congressmen I
have spoken with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional
inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery!
(September 22 at 11:31pm)26

Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison -
from Vicky Belo after she gets convicted too for criminal negligence
and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)27

Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical
Group for its criminal negligence which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over
a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr. Belo
herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by
her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic
Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm) 28
chanrobleslaw
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were
sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women,29 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest
cebuana chic chick there nowadays? haven't been there for quite some time... pa-
chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-and-below naprends diyan (August
10 at 8:36pm)30

Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will
soon picket the belo clinic there, can u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo
si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)31
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts
of attacks na against me. to thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines,
can u issue a certification that i am so not like your type? at yung preferred ko
lang aythin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)32
chanrobleslaw
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the
object to extort money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by
respondent on a comment on his Facebook post:33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)

Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman,

maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)34
chanrobleslaw
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were
designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and
all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident
from his demand letter35 dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant
complaint for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.

In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his
constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,37 asserting that the posts quoted by
complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to
be shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part.38 He
also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and
contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client,
Norcio, had filed against complainant.39 He denied that the remarks were vulgar
and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against
complainant.40 He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her,
explaining that he sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of
the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against
her. 41 Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who
is, therefore, the subject of fair comment.42

After the mandatory conference had been terminated,43 the parties were directed
to file their respective position papers.44 Thereafter, the IBP, through the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for clarificatory hearing.45 Upon
termination thereof, the case was deemed submitted for
report/recommendation.46

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from
the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.48 It held respondent liable for violation of
Rule 7.03,49 Rule 8.01,50 and Rule 19.0151 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for having posted the above-quoted remarks on his Facebook
account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his
posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react
thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed
against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient
evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose
alleged crimes against Norcio had not been established.52

In a Resolution53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no specific act
attributed to him that would warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He
also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an employee of BMGI had
already been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.55

In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially
granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6)
months suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified
complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's
findings, except as to the penalty imposed on respondent.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the
purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his
Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming
that they were "private remarks" on his "private account"57 that can only be
viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she
violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

The defense is untenable.

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one
(1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.58 Social
media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users
to generate and share content. There are various classifications 59 of social media
platforms and one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as
Facebook.60

Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit

information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share information
such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another." 61 Users register at
this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other
users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when
they update their profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on
Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user's privacy
settings.62

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook
was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a
user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,63 the South
Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this
ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but with the cautionary
advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to
protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however not foolproof." 64

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online
social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said
user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,
in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.65

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However,
the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or
features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its
privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate
his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were
visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best,
self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.66

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts
were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the
same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile
- will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its
users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way";

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;
 (3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds;
and

(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others
who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible
only to his or her own Facebook friends.67
chanrobleslaw
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not
guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not
belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the
user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when
the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends."68 Under the circumstances, therefore,
respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.

Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written
in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.

Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.69 While the freedom of expression
and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected
rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code
stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may
not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name
or reputation or bring them into disrepute.71

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they

were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of
complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng
Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating
that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and
reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well
as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant and
BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling
BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all
these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed
against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal
negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and

his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant
through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation
of the following provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding.
chanrobleslaw
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that
he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful,
firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way
by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public

personage who is exposed to criticism72 does not justify respondent's disrespectful
language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.73 In this case, respondent's
remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former
must be administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to
the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct,
the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any misconduct,
which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them."74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally
recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of

violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa,

JJ., concur.

12
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy),
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013
Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P.
Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of
school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in
August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis
(Judge Tormis),then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City,
as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in
his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several
times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis
Mondragon Tormis (Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict."4 She
was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang
(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided
to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis" 5 (Lachica v. Tormis),
her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a
cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then
pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein
and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her
mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount
of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled,
"People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending
before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated
thatJudge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a
result of the investigations, he recommended sanctionsagainst Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used
Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but
never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the
investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and
credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges
and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not
emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams werealso discussed during meetings of RTC judges
and in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and
resolvedcases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the
legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge
Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute
his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not
also brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he
admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and thatdrug
dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested thatFrancis should be removed from
the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the
influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines
the persons to be appointed as court employees. JudgeTormis, however, allowed her drug dependent
son to apply for a position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted
a cash bail bond of 6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011. He claimed
though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No.
03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on
weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the
procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a
Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The
Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his
fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March
21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge
Tormiscould not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the
performance of his judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with
the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her
law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of
her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s
administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams,
but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet
resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware
that administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her
brother, Francis, as a "drug addict."

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to
discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia
and was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in
the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the
conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the
evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-blown
investigation should be conducted by the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. 11

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter,
the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice
Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in
class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of
delicadezabordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of
behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not
be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of his official duties did
not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of whatwas just and fair not only in the
performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he discussed the marriage scam
involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the
administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge
Paredes was not the Executive Judge ofthe MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the
Guiguiocase; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before
accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption
judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of. In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge
Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage
scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA
held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment
thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge
Tormis never intervened in the present case; that ifhe indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge
Tormis, she should havefiled a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of
drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the Judiciary. 14

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was
inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case
of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be
models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like
any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary." 16

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively liable
for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the
exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence, 17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions,
but also inhis other professional endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when the latter
discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being
investigated. She cited, as basis for JudgeParedes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguiocase, Justice Diy
absolved him ofany liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient
evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down
in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the
following: (1) a Fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out
with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.18

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.19

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge
Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered
as "misconduct." They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus,
Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make
any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order
to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. 21 The
rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 22 where it was stated that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; thatfacts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.23 Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving
Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact,
the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24In 2010, he still could
not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution.
Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes
violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing
the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in
bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage
scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class
discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely
discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for
Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound,"25 as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge
Tormisas a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence
and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. Heshould choose his words and exercise more
caution and control inexpressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty
tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language. 26

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code
and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes
demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being
discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge
Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled
to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression,
they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedomof
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary ofwhich he is a part. He
should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been
more circumspect inhis language. Beinga judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and
to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable
for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should
be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge not only in the performance of his judicial
duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code
mandates:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases supplied)
1âwphi1

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be
tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge mustbe free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.27

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case,Justice Diy correctly found that
it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court findsmerit in the position of Judge Paredes that
the approval, as well as the receipt, ofthe cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bailbond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge
Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section
14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on
Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule
also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt
of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes
merely followed said procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his act of receiving the
cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed
either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of
arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of
arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized
to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of
their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely
exercising powers incidental to his functions as anExecutive Judge since he was the only judge
available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was
made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assignedto the court where the Guioguio case was then
pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond.
Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on
Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient
evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances is admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and
ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order
No. 1910, dated January 12, 2015.
1
Rollo, pp. 353-379.

2
Id. at 129-130.

3
Id. at 2-4.

4
Id. at 2.

5
Docketed as A.M.No. MTJ-05-1609.

6
Rollo, p. 7.

7
Id. at 64-71.

8
Id. at 19-29.

9
Id. at 101-110.

10
Id. at 117-128.

11
Id. at 129.

12
Id. at 286-292.

13
Id. at 299-304.

14
Id. at 361.

15
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC.

16
Italization supplied.

Cited Corea v. Belen,A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010, 627 SCRA 13, 17-18, citing
17

Velasco v. Angeles, 557 Phil. 1, 28 (2007).

18
Rollo, pp. 378-379.

Judge Buenaventura v. Mabalot, A. M. Nos. P-09-2726 & P-10-2884, August 28, 2013, 704
19

SCRA 1, 17, citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January
18, 2011, 639 SCRA 633, 638.

20
Id. at 16.

21
Marantan v. Diokno, G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA 164, 171.

22
238 Phil. 543 (1987).

23
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 403.

24
See facts on p. 6.
25
Rollo, p. 375.

26
Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. Citations omitted.

27
Decena v. Judge Malanyaon,A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 264, 281,
citing Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 276 Phil. 70, 81-82 (1991).

28
Rollo, pp. 376-378.