SAN VICENTE VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner SanVicente was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong. Petitioner SanVicente fatally shot
the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted to
rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.
Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the parking space in front of the Far East Bank and Trust Company
Branch along Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene were calibers, bullets and an ATM card in
the name of Violeta Sanvicente.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP
Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon City which reads as follows:
“According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above he just withdrew from the Far East Bank and Trust
Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him to grab the
money he has just withdrew (sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot
upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun. After a brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot the
deceased in the defense of his person and money. My client will submit a formal statement during the proper preliminary
investigation, if needed. In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and depression and was advised to
undergo medical treatment and confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no
objection if you assigned police escort/guard under your supervision pending his confinement.”
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, which included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel to P/Maj.
Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL. The trial court admitted all the prosecutions exhibits.
Petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive
identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent,
hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
RTC: dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
CA: reversed RTC’s decision. It found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from
establishing the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it claimed, positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator of
the crime charged.
ISSUE: WON the letter of the petitioner (EXHIBIT LL) is a confession or an admission
HELD: ADMISSION.
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement
stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other
hand, is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.
Only recently in People v. Licayan, the Court distinguished confession and admission in this wise: A confession is an
acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession, because of the unmistakable
qualification in its last paragraph that: For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without
admission of guilt on the part of my client. . .
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected the prosecutions motion to have Exhibit LL further
identified in the manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the proposed testimony of petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who
incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of privileged communication, it
would, more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting communicated by
petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the
latter. More specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or
assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to
better advice his client or manage the litigation.
Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases: (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment nor can an
attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity; x x x.
It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon petitioner himself to testify although he too was a signatory of Exhibit LL.
Apparently, it was aware that petitioner could well invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse to answer its questions.
The prosecution then attempted to draw out what it could not constitutionally extract from his lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously,
said Exhibit LL had earlier been admitted in evidence by the trial court in its Order dated August 27, 1996. What was objectionable
was the prosecutions sole reliance on the document without proof of other facts to establish its case against petitioner because of
its mistaken assumption that the same was a confession.
Rule 132, Section 20of the Rules of Court provides the following means of authenticating the document:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Thus, the due execution of a document can be proved through the testimony of: (1) the person/s who executed it; (2) the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered or who, after
its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures therein or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument
previously confirmed the execution thereof.
Thus, respondent could have called to the witness stand P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, the addressee of Exhibit LL, to identify the said
document since it was supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the signatures appearing on the document which can
be readily obtained or witnesses who are familiar with them could have also been presented. The prosecution did not. Neither did
it subpoena P/Senior Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who prepared the detailed Police Report of the incident used as the basis
of the inquest proceedings, nor were any eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding that there appeared to be at least two
eyewitnesses to the incident.
It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is the prosecution that determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and
factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. Stated differently, the determination of what
evidence to adduce to bolster a successful prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain of prosecutorial discretion.
Indeed, courts generally can not interfere with the prosecutors discretion as to control over criminal prosecutions. However, it is
the court which ultimately determines whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain an indictment, thus, the care with which the
prosecution must build up its case against the accused can not be gainsaid because, as has been stated time and again, in any
criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.[44]
If at all, the foregoing acts of the prosecution underscores just how careless and haphazard it had been in building up a case
against the petitioner. For such, it has nothing but itself to blame if the trial court in assaying the proof it adduced found the same
wanting. It will neither be allowed to sweep its procedural miscues under the rug, so to speak, on the pretext that it was denied
due process when the trial court supposedly prevented it from presenting Exhibit LL. To be more precise, the trial court had
admitted Exhibit LL in evidence but rejected the further admission of the document in the manner that it wanted. Verily, the
prosecution can not have its cake and eat it too.
Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the letter marked as Exhibit LL is hearsay inasmuch as its probative force depends in
whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. The
term as used in the law of evidence signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from
whom it is elicited, and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the
court may have in him. Its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third persons not sworn as witnesses to that
fact and consequently not subject to cross-examination. In short, it is the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of
what he has heard from others. Thus, in one case we stated that [w]hen evidence is based on what was supposedly told the
witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay. In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements
in the letter were made by petitioners counsel, who even began his narration of the events with the phrase: According to my client.
The second and third incidents actually support petitioners innocence because were he indeed guilty of the felony, he would not
likely have surrendered even before the warrant was issued for his arrest. Courts go by the biblical truism that the the wicked flee
when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.

PEOPLE VS MUIT
FACTS: Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, Hermano and Ferraer were charged with kidnapping for ransom with homicide and
carnapping in two separate information. Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was utilized as a state witness.
All appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignments.
Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the latter’s house in Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.),
Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his
house as a safehouse for their visitor. Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told
Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they
will get would be shared equally among them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came and
they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri. They had dinner and chatted until
midnight. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in a big
paper bag, and a green backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package contained guns. Ferraer brought the package inside his
room; he inspected the contents before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton contained a shotgun and the green
backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also showed him their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists.
On the same date, Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero, carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan
and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site in Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from the Pajero and,
along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman of
ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss.
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of the Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see that the
three engineers who stood together suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man standing
near the three engineers. The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. Seraspe heard one of them say, Sarge, nandito
na ang ating pakay. They then drove the pajero away.
That same afternoon, Supt. Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In
the meantime, two teams were organized to intercept the Pajero. They proceeded to the barricade. Upon arrival, the policemen
flagged down the Pajero and shoot out transpired between the accused and police. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the
driver and the front passenger who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who
turned out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero.
On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting place but did
not find Hermanos group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. He thought that he had been
left behind when he did not see the group, so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer what
happened to their operation. Worried that something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for
the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
The prosecution presented several witnesses; and Atty. Mallare, the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in
executing their respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecutions documentary
evidence such as the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, both were assisted by their counsels. Muit executed
two extra judicial confessions which were witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his brother, Dominador Muit
(Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, stated that he was arrested by the CIDG at his house. At the CIDG Detention Center, he was questioned
about the guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly tortured when he denied any knowledge about the
kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already
signed the statement. He denied any participation in the crimes charged against him.
Pancho, Jr. claimed that the police tortured him and forced him to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He
denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged against him.
On the other hand, Muit claimed that he was in Lipa City, near the place of the shootout when the police arrested him. He denied
having any knowledge of the crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He
claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.
RTC: found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty. Only the cases involving the charges of carnapping and kidnapping for
ransom which resulted in the death of the victim were automatically appealed to this Court. It held that mere denials and alibis of
appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution’s witnesses. It found the prosecution’s witnesses more
credible than appellants, whose self-serving statements were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability.
The RTC did not give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through torture as
these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration
and after the execution of their statements. And the RTC noted that even without appellant’s extra judicial confessions, there was
still sufficient evidence on record to hold them guilty.
CA: affirmed RTC’s decision. The prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one another in the
planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed extra judicial confessions, duly assisted
by their counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping. As for Muit, other than his extra judicial confession, he was also
positively identified during the kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the sworn
statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them
HELD: NO.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b)
the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is
illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The essence of
the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to
effect the same. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in the
botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of
their counsels and family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and
execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held
liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the
commission of a crime. Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual
conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the
crime is immaterial.
The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly planned the kidnapping in
Ferraers house and patiently waited for the day when the victim would be at the construction site.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to consummate their common plan. The
roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one
who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the groups
informant.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them. There is nothing on record to
support appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of
voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given by
appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified
that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and
informed them of their constitutional rights. Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed
his two extra judicial confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador.
Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muits case,
he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered
them to lay prostrate on the ground.
Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations done on them. These claims
of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during trial; appellants did not even inform their family
members who visited them while they were imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity
to complain of the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he was brought there. Claims of torture are
easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and independent corroborating evidence.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecution’s case against Romeo. The
rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such
exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could
have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical
is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual
participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and
circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as
interlocking confessions.
Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraers
testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.

PEOPLE VS SATORRE

FACTS: Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with Murder.

Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that her husband, Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she
was asleep, she was awakened by a gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she found her dead husband lying
on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on his head.

Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997, his fellow barangay kagawad, Pio
Alvarado, fetched him from his house and, together, they went to verify a report regarding a dead person on the porch of the
Saraum residence. Upon confirming the incident, they reported the matter to the Carcar Police. Rufino further narrated that
appellants father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan. They looked for appellant in the
house of his brother, Felix Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already left. Nevertheless, appellants brothers,
Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufinos house and surrendered the gun which was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.

Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar,
Cebu where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was detained.

Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu testified that Abraham Satorre
and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he
killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with
appellant where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the
use of a handgun which he wrestled from his possession.

Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of Pantilgans death was gunshot wound.

Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from Pantilgans head wound was fired from the gun
surrendered by appellants brothers to the Carcar Police.

Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the incident. He alleged
that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn
in his farm. He denied having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated
that he could not even remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares.

Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having accompanied appellant to Castaares house to surrender
him.

Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant to Castaares house to surrender. His other
brother, Felix, also testified that he never surrendered any firearm to anybody.

RTC: convicted the accused Satorre.

ISSUE: WON the oral extrajudicial confession is made voluntarily and shall be admissible as evidence
HELD: NO.

In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by the Barangay Captain, is
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a competent and independent counsel of his choice. In
effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The bare allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt.

Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact.
A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein. Both may be given in evidence against the person admitting
or confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person,
voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime.

Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a confession. Since the
declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial confession.

The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral extrajudicial confession given to Barangay Captain Cynthia
Castaares and two barangay kagawads. According to the trial court, their testimonies were positive and convincing. Appellants
retraction of his oral extrajudicial confession should not be given much credence in the assessment of evidence. However,
appellant disputes the admissibility and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the alleged oral extrajudicial
confession.

There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is
concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.

The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a
high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely made. The term voluntary means that the
accused speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature
and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the
time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in
evidence hinges on its voluntariness.

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the
accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs
when the confession is an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the testimony of
a witness who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was voluntarily made. Neither
can the confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed
therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not only the admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such
confession was indeed made, but more significantly whether it was made voluntarily.

On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it was
made must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings of the accused. This is the position taken by the
courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want of it must
also be taken into account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act.

In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade. Granting that he made the confession in
the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its consequences.
This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience.
What we are saying is that due to the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral
confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.

At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are
not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and
hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when
uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or informal in character. It
may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible in
evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds
weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after
being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by
witnesses.

Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence. According to Barangay Captain
Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle between him and the deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter
hit him on the head with a piece of wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the entrance wound on
the deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that the victim was probably lying down when he was
shot.

On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the testimonial evidence of prosecution
witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the killing. We cannot affirm appellants conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established because of appellants personal
circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. The doubts surrounding the alleged
oral confession, the conduct of the investigation as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential precedents cited by the trial court do not
lead to the same moral certainty of appellant’s guilt.

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA (RULE 130 SEC 28-34)

TAMARGO V. AWINGAN, G.R. NO. 177727, [JANUARY 19, 2010]

Facts: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of
August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the
crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain
Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he
(Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the
sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.

After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Geron's affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued
a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. On February 2, 2004, the
corresponding Informations for murder were filed against them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to
Branch 27 for the death of Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail Franzielle. Columna
was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial.

On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his
participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and
one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place,
Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila. On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor who subjected
him to clarificatory questions.

Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in Buguey,
Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his
candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo
had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged
as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.

During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columna's unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3,
2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna's jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8,
2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he
implicated had no participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004
wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.

Due to the submission of Columna's letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable
Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna
categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and
denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus, on November 10, 2004, the
investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.

 Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice (DOJ).  On May 30,
2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for
murder. He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation
and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the
cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.

However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas' motion for reconsideration (MR) and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations.  This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against
respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. As a result, on August 22, 2005, the
trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioner's MR. The
RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an order dated October 26,
2005. Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same.

CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and
evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was no probable
cause against all the accused.

Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the
earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna's recantation.

Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her evaluation and assessment only to
evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that
Columna's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Issue: whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.

Held: Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have seen that, aside from the pieces of
evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on them. Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna's
extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule
on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.  Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.The reason for this rule is
that: on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against
him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man
should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the  res inter alios acta  rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may
be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the
extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it
is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the
common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot
be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses
against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to
prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial
confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to
prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial
confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

BANK OF COMMERCE V. MANALO, G.R. NO. 158149, [FEBRUARY 9, 2006]

Facts: The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known as the Xavierville Estate
Subdivision, with an area of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of the property into residential lots, which was then offered
for sale to individual lot buyers. 

On September 8, 1967, XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos, as vendor, and The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM),
as vendee, executed a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" over some residential lots in the subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, with
an area of 907.5 square meters, and Lot 2, Block 2, with an area of 832.80 square meters. The transaction was subject to the
approval of the Board of Directors of OBM, and was covered by real estate mortgages in favor of the Philippine National Bank as
security for its account amounting to P5,187,000.00, and the Central Bank of the Philippines as security for advances amounting
to P22,185,193.74.  Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM. 

Sometime in 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr. Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in
business of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps under the business name Hurricane Commercial, Inc. For P34,887.66,
Manalo, Jr. installed a water pump at Ramos' residence at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
Manalo, Jr. then proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as part of the
downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated February 8, 1972, Ramos
requested Manalo, Jr. to choose which lots he wanted to buy so that the price of the lots and the terms of payment could be
fixed and incorporated in the conditional sale.  Manalo, Jr. met with Ramos and informed him that he and his wife Perla had
chosen Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2 with a total area of 1,740.3 square meters. In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo,
Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. He also pegged the price of the lots at P200.00 per square meter, or a total of
P348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 less the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos,
payable on or before December 31, 1972; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the
same date, but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance of the downpayment would fall due
then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within five (5) days from receipt of the notice of resumption of such
selling operations. It was also stated in the letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce improvements thereon
subject to the rules and regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter agreement. 

The spouses Manalo took possession of the property on September 2, 1972, constructed a house thereon, and installed a fence
around the perimeter of the lots.

In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their monthly installments until they were assured that they would be
issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased.    The spouses Manalo were notified of the resumption of the selling
operations of XEI. However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to prepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their signature. On August 14, 1973, Perla Manalo went to the
XEI office and requested that the payment of the amount representing the balance of the downpayment be deferred, which,
however, XEI rejected. On August 10, 1973, XEI furnished her with a statement of their account as of July 31, 1973, showing that
they had a balance of P34,724.34 on the downpayment of the two lots after deducting the account of Ramos, plus
P3,819.68  interest thereon from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973, and that the interests on the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of P278,448.00 from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973 amounted to P30,629.28. The spouses were informed
that they were being billed for said unpaid interests. 

On January 25, 1974, the spouses Manalo received another statement of account from XEI, inclusive of interests on the
purchase price of the lots.  In a letter dated April 6, 1974 to XEI, Manalo, Jr. stated they had not yet received the notice of
resumption of Lei's selling operations, and that there had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they should
not be charged with interest on the balance of the downpayment on the property.  Further, they demanded that a deed of
conditional sale over the two lots be transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Consequently,
the spouses refused to pay the balance of the downpayment of the purchase price.

Sometime in June 1976, Manalo, Jr. constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his house. In a letter dated June 17, 1976,
XEI informed Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he remove the same, on the
ground, among others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he had purchased on installment basis from XEI. Manalo,
Jr. did not respond. XEI reiterated its demand on September 15, 1977.

Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the receivables for lots already contracted and those yet
to be sold. On December 8, 1977, OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their
contract of conditional sale" and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies as provided in
their contract of conditional sale. 

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-265822 over Lot 1, Block
2, and TCT No. T-265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of the OBM. The lien in favor of the Central Bank of the Philippines was
annotated at the dorsal portion of said title, which was later cancelled on August 4, 1980. 

Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the
president of Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as of January 31, 1983, Manalo, Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the
subdivision. CBM reiterated in its letter to Ng that, as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the subdivision. 

In a letter dated August 5, 1986, the CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it
(CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction. She agreed to have a conference meeting with
CBM officers where she informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the property. When
asked to prove her claim, she promised to send the documents to CBM. However, she failed to do so. On September 5, 1986,
CBM reiterated its demand that it be furnished with the documents promised, but Perla Manalo did not respond.

On July 27, 1987, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51618. CBM claimed that the spouses had been unlawfully occupying the
property without its consent and that despite its demands, they refused to vacate the property. The latter alleged that they, as
vendors, and XEI, as vendee, had a contract of sale over the lots which had not yet been rescinded. 

While the case was pending, the spouses Manalo wrote CBM to offer an amicable settlement, promising to abide by the
purchase price of the property (P313,172.34), per agreement with XEI, through Ramos. However, on July 28, 1988, CBM wrote
the spouses, through counsel, proposing that the price of P1,500.00 per square meter of the property was a reasonable starting
point for negotiation of the settlement. The spouses rejected the counter proposal, emphasizing that they would abide by their
original agreement with XEI. CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of the issues raised. 

In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. After CBM filed its complaint against the spouses
Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City on October 31, 1989.

The plaintiffs alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them by
the defendant's remote predecessor-in-interest, as might be or stipulated in the contract of sale, but no contract was
forthcoming; they constructed their house worth P2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo, Jr., informed the
defendant, through its counsel, on October 15, 1988 that he would abide by the terms and conditions of his original agreement
with the defendant's predecessor-in-interest; during the hearing of the ejectment case on October 16, 1988, they offered to pay
P313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of payment was rejected, so that the
subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to third parties. Plaintiffs further alleged that upon payment of the
P313,172.34, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots, sufficient in
form and substance to transfer title thereto free and clear of any and all liens and encumbrances of whatever kind and nature.

Trial court ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the plaintiffs, the parties had a "complete
contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had already partially consummated the same. It declared that the failure of the
defendant to notify the plaintiffs of the resumption of its selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale did not
prevent the defendant's obligation to convey titles to the lots from acquiring binding effect. CA sustained.

Issue:

Held: Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove
habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat that,
before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity
and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is
semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of
habit.

However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of
conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed
amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative
to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed
by XEI and other lot buyers  merely  to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it
acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to
pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It further failed to prove that the trial court admitted the said
deeds as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.

The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference
of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the
danger of prejudice and confusion. In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly
represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough
to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and
uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.

However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove usage, habit or pattern of
conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the
right to pay the P278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably because of respondents' belief that the manner of payment of the said
amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the
subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of service,
had executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts
of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay
the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record that XEI
granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots.
It bears stressing that the respondents failed and refused to pay the balance of the downpayment and of the purchase
price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 despite notice to them of the resumption by XEI of its selling operations. The
respondents enjoyed possession of the property without paying a centavo. On the other hand, XEI and OBM failed and refused
to transmit a contract of conditional sale to the respondents. The respondents could have at least consigned the balance of the
downpayment after notice of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI and filed an action to compel XEI or OBM to transmit
to them the said contract; however, they failed to do so.

PEOPLE V. RAQUEL, G.R. NO. 119005, [DECEMBER 2, 1996]

Facts: At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a
neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed
men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man took her husband's
gun and left hurriedly.

She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away.

George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found
one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado
Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of
the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled
immediately after the shooting incident.

appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in their brief in this wise:Accused
Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to
Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with
Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities
accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name
of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.

On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay. Before July
4, he entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan.

Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that
he was going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also
asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986,
several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even
accompanied them to Tunggol where they arrested his son Valeriano.

T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd
Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty
on July 4, 1986.

On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly.

Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite
absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.

Held: No. The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. Even the corroborating
witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement
executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5, 1986. A thorough review of the records of this
case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of
accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from
jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these
are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the
disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

The  res inter alios  rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts
of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking
appellants to the crime. Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in
violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.  These rights, both constitutional and
statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.

OFFER OF COMPROMISE (RULE 130, SECTION 27)

PEOPLE V. ERGUIZA, G.R. NO. 171348, [NOVEMBER 26, 2008]

Facts: The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old girl. And although the Court may be moved
by compassion and sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law. Basic is the rule that for conviction of
a crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt — conviction with moral certainty.

PROSECUTION'S VERSION:

On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high school student, together with
her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather
fallen mangoes. When they were bound for home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA's short pants got hooked on the
fence. AAA asked Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.

While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry
threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise. 

Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed his
maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground. Thereafter, he removed her short pants and panty, mounted
himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts and made push and pull movements. He likewise raised AAA's
"sando" and mashed her breast. AAA felt pain when accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her private
part after Larry made the push and pull movements.

Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise he would kill her and all the members of her family and then he
ran away.

AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having spent her tears, she wore her panty and short pants and proceeded
to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep. After staying for some time at the store, AAA decided to
come (sic) home. Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed. Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept mum on the incident.

On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother (BBB's mother), a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult
her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAA's throat and the absence of her monthly period. After examining AAA,
her grandmother told BBB that her daughter was pregnant.EIASDT

BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA refused to talk. After much prodding, and in the presence of her
Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by accused-appellant.

On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle, went to the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the
incident. Then the police brought her to YYY District Hospital  where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said hospital
conducted the examination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made the following findings:

"Q. . . . No extragenital injuries noted. Complete healed hymenal laceration 11:00 o'clock. . . . . In layman's term, Dr. Sison found
no physical injury from the breast, the body except the genital area wherein he found a significant laceration
complete (sic) healed over 11:00 o'clock". Dr. Sison also testified that a single sexual intercourse could make a woman pregnant.
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after she was raped and that no amount of money could bring
back the lost reputation of her daughter.

CCC (AAA's father), testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered
P50,000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his house for the wedding reception, Larry left at
around 4:00 o'clock p.m.

DEFENSE'S VERSION

On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of CCC's house from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his mother Albina Erguiza instructed him to fetch a  "hilot"  as his wife
Josie was already experiencing labor pains. He proceeded to fetch the "hilot" Juanita Angeles and stayed in their house until his
wife delivered a baby at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 6, 2000.

Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed fetched her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his
wife who was experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby at about 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left
his wife's side until the latter gave birth.

Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is the daughter of her "balae" Spouses CCC and BBB; that her son
Larry, her husband and two others left CCC and BBB's residence at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on January 5, 2000; that
she went to Spouses CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of rape against her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking
for P1,000,000.00 which was later reduced to P250,000.00 and that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.00. Joy Agbuya testified
that she and AAA were at the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5, 2000; that she never left AAA when her short
pants got hooked; that they went together to the store of Auntie Beth where they parted.

Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that the house of Larry was a walking distance of about three minutes
from the mango orchard; that if one runs fast, it would only take a minute to reach his house; and that he could not recall having
seen Larry in the orchard.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In the case at bar, the CA upheld the conclusion of the RTC in finding the
complainant credible. The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age, like AAA, deserve full credence and should
not be dismissed as mere fabrication especially where they have absolutely no motive to testify against the accused-appellant as
in this case. Larry even admitted that AAA had no ill motive for charging him with rape. The Supreme Court in several cases,
ruled that full credence is accorded the testimony of a rape victim who has shown no ill motive to testify against the accused.
This being so, the trial court did not err in giving full credence to AAA's testimony.

Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she was with appellant at the house of CCC and BBB
preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and appellant's brother Carlito. She said that they left the house of CCC at
around 5:00 p.m. Albina narrated that when they arrived home, at around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as
the wife of appellant was having some labor pains. She said that appellant and the hilot arrived at around 5:30 p.m. According to
Albina appellant never left their house.

On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she had an altercation with BBB regarding the bills and that they never resolved
their quarrel. She spoke to BBB and CCC because she learned that they were falsely accusing appellant of raping AAA. After
talking to BBB and CCC, she and her husband confronted appellant and asked if he had raped complainant, which appellant
denied. Albina claimed that CCC and BBB were demanding P1,000,000.00 and that they later reduced it to P250,000.00. Albina
said that she offered P5,000.00 to BBB and CCC only to preserve their relationship as in-laws and for peace.

In sum, with the exception of the claim of AAA that she was raped by appellant, other evidence presented by the prosecution did
not identify appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. aIETCA

Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on certain points, more notably the
claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case. This, however, was denied by Albina, who claimed
that it was BBB and CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00.

The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of
compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. In the case at bar, the offer of
compromise was first testified to by BBB on cross-examination.

Issue: Whether or not the compromise offer of the parents of appellant may be used to prove his guilt?

Held: No. The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant as evidence of his
guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to
settle was allegedly made. ICDSca

An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself. Although the Court
has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we
believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been
present or at least authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not present at
the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. 

In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to the testimonies of Albina, on the one hand,
and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the victim, respectively. Their testimonies relating to the
offer of settlement simply contradict each other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not consider the alleged offer of
settlement in resolving the case.

Thus, the Court now considers the testimonies of Juanita and Joy.

Testimony of Juanita Angeles - Juanita, a hilot, testified that appellant fetched her at around 5:10 in the afternoon of January 5,
2000. She asserted that they arrived at the house of appellant at 5:30 p.m. She said that appellant's wife gave birth at dawn at
3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000. Juanita said that appellant was with her the entire time and never left the house.

Testimony of Joy Agbuya - For a better perspective on the testimony of Joy, it is necessary to repeat the testimony of AAA. AAA
testified that on January 5, 2000, she was accompanied by 12-year-old Joy and the latter's brother Ricky Agbuya (Ricky) to the
mango orchard at the back of the elementary school to pick fallen mangoes. Further, complainant claims that she was left behind
by Joy and Ricky when her shorts got hooked to the fence and that while she was unhooking her pants from the fence, appellant
grabbed her and raped her.

Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule.  Thus, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.  The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

CORPUS DELICTI

RIMORIN, SR. V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 146481, [APRIL 30, 2003]

Facts: Petitioner was found guilty of smuggling 305 cases of blue seal cigarettes under the Tariff and Customs Code.

Corpus delicti  in its legal sense refers to the fact of the commission of the crime, not to the physical body of the
deceased or to the ashes of a burned building or — as in the present case — to the smuggled cigarettes. The corpus delicti may
be proven by the credible testimony of a sole witness, not necessarily by physical evidence such as those aforementioned.

The Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution's version of the facts thus:

"On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, then Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities
somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at nighttime and the smuggled
goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being escorted by some police and military personnel. He fielded three
surveillance stake-out teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they
were to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis of his
investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered in the name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.

"At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men returned to the same area, with Col.
Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information
given to him, the said cargo truck will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in said place. COSAC stands
for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About 3:00
a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of same day.

"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd
COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on
board. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men
to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo
truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck which was going south. Almost by impulse, Col.
Lacson's car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH.
Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for less than 5 minutes, until said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the
foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car and they found several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal.
Pistol and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car, and his
companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, the four of them all
belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders. ICTDEa

"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside
said truck. The cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and
Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian."

On the other hand, petitioner's version of the facts is summarized by the CA as follows:

”Accused Pasay City Policeman Arturo Rimorin, was assigned at Manila International Airport (MIA for brevity)
Detachment, Pasay City. He tried to show that in the [latter] part of 1978 during the wake of a fellow police officer, he met a man
named Leonardo [a.k.a.] Boy. After that occasion, Boy would see him at Pasay City Police Station asking for some assistance.
Once Boy told him he will get rice at Sta. Maria, Bulacan and he asked him to just follow him. He consented. A truckload of rice
was brought from Sta. Maria to Quezon City. Boy gave him a sack of rice for providing company.

”In the afternoon of October 14, 1979 while he was at his Station at MIA, Boy came and requested that he [accompany]
him to Divisoria to haul household fixtures. By arrangement, they met at the gasoline station near Cartimar in Pasay City not later
than 2:30 a.m. of October 15. At the gasoline station, Boy introduced him to Gonzalo Vargas, a mechanic and who is his co-
accused herein. After boarding the truck, they went to the other gasoline station where he was introduced to Felicisimo Rieta
[a.k.a.] Sonny, who also boarded the truck. When he came to know that Rieta is a policeman from Kawit, he started entertaining
the thought that Leonardo had plenty of policemen friends.

”They passed Roxas Boulevard on their way to Divisoria. But he [noted] something unusual. Boy, who was on the
wheels, turned right before reaching Del Pan Bridge and proceeded to pass under the bridge, a route that will take them to Port
Area and not Divisoria. So he commented that it [was] not the route to Divisoria. Boy replied that there [would] be some cargo to
be loaded. At a small carinderia fronting the Delgado Bros., Boy pulled over after Rieta commented that he was hungry. So Rieta
alighted and Rimorin joined him. Rimorin asked Rieta what [would] be loaded in the truck but Rieta professed ignorance. After
about an hour, the truck arrived. Rimorin and Rieta boarded the truck and they drove towards Roxas Boulevard-Bonifacio Drive.
Rimorin noted one more unusual thing. He expected Boy to have driven towards Rotonda so they can go back to Divisoria but
Boy drove straight ahead at the corner of Aduana to Roxas Boulevard. So he asked why they . . . [weren't] going to Divisoria, but
Boy replied 'that there's no more space in the truck' and they'll just go the next day. But then, they were ordered to pull over by
men in a vehicle who upon alighting[,] poked guns at them. They introduced themselves as Metrocom [agents]. He noticed some
back-up vehicles. They were made to alight, lie on their belly . . . on the road and they were frisked. They were ordered to board
a Land Cruiser, one of the vehicles used by the Metrocom [agents] and they drove towards Bonifacio Drive. The Metrocom
[agents] intercepted another vehicle.

”Rimorin claims that he did not see the Metrocom men open their truck. They were hauled later to Camp Crame. There
he asked: 'What's this?' But a certain Barrameda, while pointing to a truck different from what they used, told them 'that's the
reason why you'll be jailed.' So he thought they were being framed up. It was only two to three days later that he saw the alleged
smuggled cigarettes at the office of the MISG when it was presented by the investigator. They were not present when these
alleged smuggled cigarettes were taken from the truck they rode in. On inquiry from the Metrocom men where their driver Boy
[was], the Metrocom men said he escaped. He thought there [was] something fishy in that claim. He also thought there was
something fishy in their apprehension. He wondered that they were the only persons during the apprehension, so how could
have Boy escaped? There was no possibility for escape when they were intercepted. Yet, out of the four, only three of them were
apprehended.

In affirming the RTC, the CA ruled that the defense of denial interposed by petitioner paled in comparison with the
overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence against him. In particular, it noted that while he and his co-accused raised
questions of fact in their appeal, they failed to show that the trial court had significantly erred in assessing the credibility of the
testimonies of witnesses for respondent.

Moreover, the CA held that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent's
cause, because the crime was established by other competent evidence.

Issue: Whether it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.

Held: Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling under the Tariff and Customs Code, because respondent failed
to present the seized contraband cigarettes in court. Equating the actual physical evidence — the 305 cases of blue seal
cigarettes — with the corpus delicti, he urges this Court to rule that the failure to present it was fatal to respondent's cause.

We disagree. The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of
the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom  or to the body of the person murdered. Hence, to prove the  corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven — say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and
(2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act. Since the  corpus delicti  is the fact of the
commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to
prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence. Both the RTC and
the CA ruled that the  corpus delicti  had been competently established by respondent's evidence, which consisted of the
testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.

So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo — customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau — categorically testify that the MISG had
turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.

We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to the narration of prosecution witnesses,
especially when they are public officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Moreover, it is
well-settled that findings of fact of lower courts are binding on this Court, absent any showing that they overlooked or
misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance. This doctrine applies particularly to this case in which the RTC's
findings, as far as petitioner is concerned, were affirmed by the appellate court.

POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION

PEOPLE V. CACHUELA, G.R. NO. 191752, [JUNE 10, 2013]

Facts: July 23, 2004, Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation  on board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSC's
Secretary and Sales Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the company's gun show in SM Megamall.
Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSC's firing range and the amount of the membership fee of
its gun club. He also asked the days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was WSC's only
female employee.

At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She
went to the back of the office where the firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy
answered from inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called
again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door because his hands were tied.

Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company's operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy's hands had been
tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered
the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company's gunsmith, Rex
Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.  Dr. Voltaire Nulud
conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and
abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol.

The National Bureau of Investigation  (NBI)  received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective
buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their
arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of
firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an entrapment operation against the
suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other persons involved in the
crime.

Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that they
would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI
Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and
talked to them, and brought them inside his house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired
from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents
arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The agents recovered four (4) firearms from Cachuela's house, including a .9
mm Bernardelli.

The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset also contacted. Ibañez directed the asset to bring
the prospective buyers to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to Imus and there met Ibañez whom they saw
inside a Nissan California car. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibañez where the firearms were. Ibañez
brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had legal documentation; they
then arrested Ibañez when they sensed that he was already becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez.

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the
robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy
in the crime.

The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and
Zaldy. The accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died.

 The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex
during the course of this robbery: (1) Ibañez visited WSC two days before the robbery and asked several questions from
Henessy; (2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53 firearms and several ammunitions worth P1,563,300.00 had been stolen; (3)
among the firearms stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number
FML 245; (4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing range; (5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds on
different parts of his body; (6) Cachuela and Ibañez were caught trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli, with serial number
T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock 30, with serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate entrapment operations; and (7)
Cachuela and Ibañez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms.

The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants' defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The
CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants' argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence,
pointing out that the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed to impute
any ill or improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment operations.

Issue: Whether or not there was a positive identification based on the circumstantial evidence presented.

Held: Yes. We note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Lino's testimony regarding Zaldy's
alleged out-of-court identification. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the persons
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had
been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-
up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not
indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or
contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants.

To our mind, Lino's failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders
unreliable Zaldy's out-of-court identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino's
testimony.

After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas' extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following
requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel[,] preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.”

At any rate, Nabilgas' extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter
alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused
because it is considered as hearsay against them.

An exception to the  res inter alias acta  rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the  Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common
object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside
from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged.
Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was
acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act[.]” To recall, Ibañez
was at WSC two days before the robbery, asking questions to the company's secretary. Several days after the robbery, the
appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they could
not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to their respective possession. The appellants likewise did not impute ill
motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against them. These factors lead to
no other conclusion than that the appellants, to the exclusion of others, had robbed WSC.

In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy's out-of-court identification and Nabilgas' extrajudicial confession, the
prosecution's case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if
the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to [a] fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the
accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others." There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the
appellants' participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime. 

"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may
be inferred based on reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the accused.”

We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act[.]”

To recall, Ibañez was at WSC two days before the robbery, asking questions to the company's secretary. Several days
after the robbery, the appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment
operations; they could not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to their respective possession. The appellants
likewise did not impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against
them. These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants, to the exclusion of others, had robbed WSC.

To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the lifeless body of Rex had been
discovered) matched with one of the guns recovered from Ibañez during the entrapment operation clinches the case against the
appellants insofar as establishing the nexus between the robbery and the victim's killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered
by Rex also came from the same caliber of gun recovered from Ibañez. In the final analysis, the prosecution sufficiently
established the direct and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, and that the death of Rex had been
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the same.

PEOPLE V. GIL, G.R. NO. 172468, [OCTOBER 15, 2008]

Facts: That on or about March 1, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and deliberately set fire on a residential house owned by ANGGE ARGUELLES, by then and there pouring kerosene
on a mattress placed in a room of said house then occupied by the said accused and ignited it with a lighter, knowing it to be
occupied by one or more persons, thereby causing as a consequence thereof, damage to the said house and adjacent houses in
the amount of more or less P2,000,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid amount of
P2,000,000.00, Philippine Currency; that on the occasion and by reason of said fire, one RODOLFO CABRERA, a resident/
occupant of said house sustained burn injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The RTC rendered its assailed decision convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime charged. According to the RTC, the prosecution had presented sufficient circumstantial
evidence, coupled with the written confession of the accused-appellant, to sustain her conviction of the crime charged. The RTC
admitted the oral and written confessions of the accused-appellant and found the prosecution witnesses more credible than the
accused-appellant. The motion for reconsideration or new trial of the accused-appellant was denied. This case was directly
elevated to this Court for mandatory review.

The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following: the testimony of  Kagawad  Rodolfo Lorenzo
about the behavior and remarks of the accused-appellant at the time she caused a public disturbance and threatened to cause
chaos and arson and to drag her neighbors into this turmoil, two days prior to the conflagration; the testimony of Ronnie
Gallardo that, when he saw the burning mattress in the room of the accused-appellant, the latter said to him in the
vernacular: "Pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo”.; the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at the time he tried
to chase the accused-appellant during the fire incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant remark: "Damay-damay na tayo
diyan, huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog”.; and the testimony of  Kagawad  William Lim that the accused-appellant
approached and admitted to him immediately after the incident that she was the person responsible for the conflagration.

Written statement executed by the accused-appellant admitting responsibility for conflagration before Kagawad William
Lim read: Voluntary Statement of Julie Gil y Villacorta, 24 years old single, stell bed worker, 1st year high school 603 Sulucan St., Sampaloc,
Manila, given to Kagawad William Lim y Bedor, of legal age, Barangay 395 Zone 41, Sampaloc, Manila, this 1 March 1998 on or about 1:10
P.M. Ako po ay si Julie V. Gil ay bolontaryong sumuko kay Kagawad William Lim sa salang Panununog sa inuupahang bahay ko sa No. 603
Sulucan St., Sampaloc, kaninang mga bandang 12:00 ng tanghali. Sinunog ko po ang tinitirhan ko dahil sa Pambabastos sa akin ng mga taong
kamaganak ng live in partner ko na si Trinidad Domingo 25 y old kaya ang ginawa ko ay kinuha ko ang kalan di bomba at pagkatapos ibinuhos
ko and laman kerosene gas sa kutson pero bago ko sinindihan bumaba muna ako, at saka ko sila sinabihan na lumabas na sila lahat sa iskinita
dahil susunogin ko na at damay damay na tayo at saka ako uli umakyat upang sindihan ang lighter at saka uli ako bumaba at saka umalis,
napadpad ako sa isang barangay at kusang sumuko sa Kagawad William Lim. Nakokonsensya ako kaya sinabi ko sa kanya ang aking
nagawang kasalanan. Wala ako sa sarili kong pagiisip ng sinunog ko ang aking tinitirhan dahil nakagamit po ako ng shabo.

According to [accused-appellant], the fire resulted from her defective gas stove which suddenly caught fire while she
was boiling water. When the stove caught fire, she got flustered and poured water on the stove. To her surprise, the fire got
bigger. Ronnie, who was also renting a room next to her with his mother, came and they helped each other to put off the fire.
When their efforts seemed unsuccessful, she told Ronnie: ". . . hindi na natin kayang patayin ang apoy, baba na lang po kami para
humingi ng tulong".  When they went out, people were already helping each other to contain the fire. She then left the place
passing through an alley.

The accused averred that a day prior to the incident she was very tired. She reported for work as a spring bed maker as
early as 6:00 a.m. and went home 2:00 a.m. the following day, March 1, 1998. Again, she woke up at 6:00 a.m. on the same day
to report for work.

According to the accused, it was William Lim who took custody of him for reasons unknown to her. Thereafter, they gave
her a paper with something written on it and they instructed her to copy the same in another paper. Confused, she did what was
told of her because they told her that it would be good for her.

Issue: Whether or not circumstantial evidence presented would constitute positive identification of the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime charged

Held: Yes. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very
act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused
in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a
crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads
to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all
others. If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of
others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be
no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled
that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence
of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
She was indeed the person who had the motive to commit the crime, and the series of events following her threat to
cause chaos and arson in her neighborhood — the fire that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well
as immediately before and after the fire — sufficiently points to the accused-appellant as the author of the said crime.

We are not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the accused-appellant that the fire was accidental,
and that she was arrested and forced by Kagawad William Lim to copy the contents of her written confession from a piece of
paper handed to her by the said barangay official.

In this case, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses testified consistently and truthfully. The chain of events
before, during, and after the fire — as narrated by the prosecution witnesses — established beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellant committed the acts alleged in the information, which constituted the crime of arson with homicide. The
accused-appellant failed to show any "misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance" that could alter the outcome of the case. She also did not show any credible motive why the prosecution witnesses
testified against her. Thus, this Court finds conclusive the findings and observation of the trial court that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were candid and trustworthy, and that the testimony of the accused-appellant was not impressed with
candor and honesty.

Regarding her extrajudicial confession, the plaintiff-appellee correctly adverted to the ruling in People v. Andan as to the
admissibility of the verbal confession made by the accused-appellant, which she made not only to Kagawad William Lim but also
to Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in progress. Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, even if the written extra-
judicial confession is disregarded, the evidence presented by the prosecution is more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

DOCUMENTED ALIBI

LEJANO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NOS. 176389 & 176864, [DECEMBER 14, 2010]

Facts: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally
slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom
gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.

Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one
of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez,
and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying
primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide
against Webb, et al.
 The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused
since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security
guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb's household, police officer Biong's former girlfriend,
and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita's husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took
place. Webb's alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America.
He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro's detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible
witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-
examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro's April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative,
accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit;
and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for
their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro's testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence
corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on  Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The
trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years
minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. The appellate court did not agree
that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela
and in executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request
of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela's cadaver, which specimen was then believed still
under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct
decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same
having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object
evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to
acquit on the ground that the government's failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.

Issue: Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro's testimony that he led the others in
committing the crime.

Held: Yes. To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime.

The courts below held that, despite his evidence,  Webb  was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took
place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned
before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and
Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27,
1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of  Webb  and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the
Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that  Webb, with his father's connections, can
arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp
on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how
could Webb fix a foreign airlines' passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his
name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration's record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well
as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there?
No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb's passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the
record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse
party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent, the practice when a party does
not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among
the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of  Webb's arrival in and departure from that country were
authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals
refused to accept these documents for the reason thatWebb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the
same. But this was unnecessary. Webb's passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international
practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true.

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by
the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office
on Webb's passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in
court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty,
in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said
that it had no record ofWebb entering the U.S.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the
passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have
been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go
back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines,
said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law
books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which
carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by
evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb's passport and the
certifications of the Philippine and U.S.' immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecution's
rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower court's minds.

Webb's documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the
U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro's testimony will not hold together.  Webb's participation is the anchor of Alfaro's story.
Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.