GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS
and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Manantan was charged by the Provincial Fiscal
of Isabela with reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. The alleged crime occurred on or about the 25th
day of September 1982 in the Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela. The provincial fiscal filed this information on
June 1, 1983 within the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela.
The accused was the driver and person-in-charged of an
automobile with the Plate No. NGA-816
Manantan willfully and recklessly drove the vehicle in
a negligent manner which ended up side swiping
a passenger jeepney. Which caused the jeepney to turn
turtle twice that ultimately ended with the death of Ruben
Nicolas a passenger of the jeepney.
In a decision dated June 30, 1988 which was later
promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court reached a
decision in favor of Manantan. With the subsequent
turn of events the private respondent spouses Nicolas
filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial
court’s judgment. The spouses Nicolas prayed that the
decision appealed from be modified and that the appellee
be ordered to pay indemnity and damages. The court
reached a decision wherein the Court of Appeals decided
in favor of the private respondents. With regard to the
civil liability the court a quo stated that during the time
that the accident occurred. Manantan was in a
state of heavily inebriated after consuming at least twelv
e bottles of beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The petitioner
opted for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it
vehemently.
ISSUE:
WON the acquittal of the accused also extinguished his
civil liability. - NO
RULING:
Civil Liability; Damages; Our law recognizes two kinds
of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
of the accused—
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
the author of the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only. This is the, situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.”
Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in
the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even
though both actions involve the same act or omission. The
reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner’s acquittal, the
Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29
applied, was not precluded from looking into the question
of petitioner’s negligence or reckless imprudence.
Judgments; A finding in the trial court’s judgment that “a
hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused
presented itself before the Court” and since said
“hypothesis is consistent with the record . . . the Court’s
mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction” clearly shows
that the acquittal of the accused was predicated on the
conclusion that his guilt had not been established with
moral certainty, an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt.—
Our scrutiny of the lower court’s decision in Criminal
Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
hence, petitioner’s civil liability was not extinguished by
his discharge. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the
same act or omission lies.