Vitug v. CA
805 of the
183 SCRA 755
Facts:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court
involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Vitug, who
died on November 1980, naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, SC upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs.
Vitug’s estate with her widower, petitioner Romarico Vitug,
pending probate.
On January 1985, Romarico filed a motion asking for authority from
the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties
belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate
in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were
personal funds.
On April 1985, Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground
that the same funds withdrawn from savings account no. 35342-
038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate,
and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She
also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for
inventory and for “concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”
Romarico insists that the said funds are his exclusive property
having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement
executed with his late wife and the bank on June 1970.
Issue:
WON the survivorship agreement is a will.
WON it is valid
Held:
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa,
which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a
personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies
with duties to take effect after his death. In other words, the
bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the
monies of the savings account in question were in the nature of
conjugal funds.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of
conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belonged
exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.
It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other.
It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of
the deceased’s assets because it is the separate property of
Romarico.
Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares
or complies with duties to take effect after his death.
Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its
operation or effect must not be violative of the law (i.e. used as a
cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud
of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).
Aluad v. Aluad
G.R. 176943
Facts:
Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad, and respondent Zenaido ALuad
were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad and Crispin
Aluad. On November 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled
“Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos” in favor of
petitioners’ mother Maria, covering all the six lots which Matilde
inherited from her husband Crispin. On August 1991, Matilde sold
Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Subsequently or on January 1992, Matilde executed a last
will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677 and 682 to Maria,
and her “remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 to
respondent.
RTC declared the plaintiffs as rightful owners but the CA reversed
the TC’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually
a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but
did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the
Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no
attestation clause which is not in accordance with Art.
Civil Code.
Issue:
WON the Deed of Donation complied with the formalities of a will
Held:
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation “to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer
the ownership of the 6 lots to petitioners’ mother during her
lifetime. Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her
the right to dispose them. That the donation is mortis causa is
fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay the
taxes for the said properties which remained under her name;
appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which
OCTs were issued under her name. The donation being then mortis
causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they
were note, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more
witnesses following Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Further, the
witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the
will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the
pages of the will.
Rabadilla v. CA
G.R. No. 113725
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA dated 23
December 1993, in CA-GR No. CV035555, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the RTC in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner) as heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix
Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated before
the CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the
subject land was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and the TCT thereto was issued in his name. Dr. Rabadilla died and
was survived by his wife Rufina and their children.
Respondent brought a complaint before the RTC in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the
subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, because
it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the
will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the
land was mortgaged to the PNB, which is a violation of the will.
Issue:
Won the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the
right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because
the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer,
lessee or mortgagee
Held:
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the
face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will,
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made. Such construction as will substation and uphold the Will in
all its parts must be adopted.
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation
to deliver 100 piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella.
Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer; lessee, or mortgagee should
they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the
obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena shall seize
the property and turn it over to the testatrix’s near descendants.
The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix’s near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly
imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on
his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in
case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to
the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Seangio vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 140371-72
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio before RTC – Manila.
Petitioners opposed contending that Segundo left a holographic
Will disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio,
for cause, thus, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the
Will. A petition for the probate of the holographic Will of Segundo
was subsequently filed by petitioners before the RTC. Private
respondents moved for its dismissal on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Art. 783 of the Civil
Code as the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance and
nothing else. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss contending that disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent and that the rule on preterition does not
apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir
or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The RTC
issued its order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings as
the will clearly shows that there is preterition since the other heirs
were omitted. Art. 854 of the NCC thus applies. Petitioner filed a
motion or reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
Issue:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as
a holographic will
Held:
A holographic will, as provided under Art. 810 of the Civil Code,
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in
or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s documents, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while
it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition
in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition
of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of
the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed
by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to
that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is
contrary to law, morals or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.
Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon
G.R. No. L-24561
Facts:
IN 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate
granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the
appellants.
Valdez left a will executed in February 1960 and written in
Pampango dialect. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs
and 6 grandchildren.
In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties
(assessed at P1.8M) which included real and personal properties
and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Dev’t. Co.
During the probate proceedings, Marina (Appellee) was named the
executor of the deceased’s estate.
In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in
accordance with her testamentary disposition where she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her
entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs.
Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the
estate as follows: a) the legitime computed for each compulsory
heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or
properties specifically given to them based on the will; b) Marina
and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in
the will less the cash/properties to complete their respective
legitime.
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-
partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive
considerably less.
The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing
that Arts. 906 and 907, NCC specifically provide that when the
legitime is impaired or prejudiced. The same shall be completed.
The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld,
it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a
violation of Art. 791, NCC.
Issue:
WON the will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this
case
Held:
Art. 788 and 791 of the Civil Code states that “If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, the
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred” and “The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy. “In Villanueva v. Juico, for violation of these rules
of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, Section 59 of the Rules of
Court, the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned
the lower court’s decision and stressed that “the intention and
wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,
relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of
the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise.
In re Will of Rev. Abadia
G.R. No. L-7188
Facts:
Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting
to be the last will and testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which
was executed on Sept. 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some
cousins and nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his estate
if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial court ruled in favor of
Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a holographic
will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it was executed
and at the same time of the testator’s death, such form of a will is
already allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since the NCC
is already enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the
testator which according to the trial court is controlling factor and
may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the
holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of the case
shall be considered and not the time of its execution
Held:
No. the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforced at
the time of the testator’s death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by
the court but by the time the instrument was executed, as
supported by Art. 795 of the NCC. One reason in support of the rule
is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his
estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn
expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy
or bequest then becomes a completed act.
When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon
his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, an his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession and
no subsequent law with more liberal requirements for which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of
their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general
rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills. Hence, the
Trial court’s decision was reversed.
In re will of Jose Riosa
G.R. No. L-14074
Facts:
Jose Riosa made a will in January 1908, disposing of his entire
estate. The will was executed according to the law in force at that
time, complying with all the requisites then required. He died on
April 1917. However, between the execution of the will and his
death, the law on formalities on execution of wills was amended by
Act. 2645. It added formalities required such as signatures on each
page of the will. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the
making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the
testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.

Issue:
WON the will is valid

Held:
Yes. The validity of the execution of a will must be the statutes in
force at the time of its execution and statutes subsequently
enacted have no retroactive effect.

All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective

operation unless the intention of the Legislature to give them a
retroactive effective is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the retrospective effect.

The language of Act. No. 2645 gives no indication of retroactive

effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the SC on
cases having special application to testamentary succession.

Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of

property which must be complied with as a completed act at the
time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned,
as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No.
2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that
date.

The court considered 3 views in addressing the issue:

a. Validity of wills are tested by the laws in force at the time of

death of the testator (considered the right of one to make a
will as an inchoate right). This view was rejected by the court.
“the act of bequeathing or devising is something more than
inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed
act when the will is executed and attested according to the
law, although it does not take effect on the property until a
future time.”
b. Validity of wills must be tested by statutes in force at the
time of execution. This view is the one adopted by SC
c. Statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they
increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so
as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when
they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so
as to aid wills defectively executed according the law in force
at the time of their making.