DOMINGA FIEL, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JULIO BANAWA, ET AL.

, defendants
and appellants
1979-03-26 | No. 56284-R

GUTIERREZ, H.E., J.:

Dominga Fiel, who lived in a common law relationship with Natalio Banawa for 25 years, filed a complaint on March 3, 1971 for the
annulment of a partition of the properties allegedly owned in common by her and the letter.

The lower Court summarized the facts of the case, in a substatially correct manner, as follows:

It appears that Natalio Manawa, a widower, started living Dominga Fiel as his common-law wife during the early part of the year
1945 up to his death on June 29, 1970. Natalio Banawa died, a victim of robbery and murder.

Upon his death, Natalio Banawa wwas survived by his brothers and nephews, the defendants herein. His wife died ahead of him.
He had no children.

On October 22, 1970, Emiliano Cuering, one of the nephews of the late Natalio Banawa, brought Atty. Percival Catane of
Oroquieta City to the house of Natalio Banawa and his common-law wife Dominga Fiel, in Baga, Tangub City, to draw the
document of partition of properties of Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa. The partition was very much delayed because of the
wrangling and disagreement had among them. Because of the advice of Atty. Catane to Dominga Fiel, the later signed the
partition, Dominga Fiel was not given a copy of the partition. She was given only the third of the properties under the partition
while two birds were given to the brothers and nephews of Natalio Banawa upon the advice of Atty. Percival Catane.

A few months after, Dominga Fiel realized that her share in a partition was very much less than what she ought to received. She
therefore consulted a lawyer, Atty. Valeriano S. Kaamino, who advised her, to secure a copy of said petition. On November 24,
1970, Dominga Fiel went to Atty. Percival B. Catane at Oroquieta City and secured a copy of the partition. On March 3, 1971,
this complaintwas filed.

On April 1, 1971, the dependants through their counsel, Atty. Liliano B. Neri, filed an answer to the complaint which was
amended on November 23, 1972. The answer alleges that plaintiff freely gave her consent to the partition; in fact, she
implemented it by receiving shares of the state; that it was the plaintiff who concealed some properties by reason of which, they
were not included in the partition; that the properties desired to be partition were acquired through the efforts of Natalio Banawa
from whom Dominga Fiel and her son, Francisco Potestas, were dependents; that francisco went through college through the
support of Natalio Banawa; that the donation made by Natalio Banawa to plaintiff were procured through fraud and undue
influence and that said donations are in violation of Article 739 of the Civil Code; that pursuant Article 485 of said Code; the
share of each co- owner shall be proportionate to their respective interests; that the plaintiff voluntarily left the house where she
and Natalio Banawa used to live; that the plaintiff did not bring into the partition the properties of Natalio Banawa such as Lot
1076, Tangub Cadastre, sold under pacto de retro to Natalio Banawa by Marcela Alhas on November 22, 1966; three parcels of
residential lots portion of Lot 5196, Cadastral Case No. 5, located at Labinay, 400, 600 and 800 square meters in area,
respectively; a parcel of land leased to Natalio Banawa for 20 years from May 29, 1970, located at Manga, Tangub City;
Cadastral Lot 4026 Case 5, located at Labinay, Ozamin City, 50,000 square meters n area; coco and corn land sitauted at
Villaba, Tangub City, 3,7568 in area, and some personal properties and household furnitures and large cattles.

In the instant case, the partition as made on October 22, 1970, and the action to amend it was filed on March 3, 1971, or in less
than 5 months.

On February 4, 1974, the lower court rendered its decision ordering the plaintiff and the defendants to devide the properties which the
Court found to be owned in common by Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa, one half to Dominga Fiel and the other half to the heir of
Natalio Banawa.

The defendants raised four assignments of errors in their appeal, namely--

First Assignment of Error

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 The lower court erred in not giving force and effect to the deed of partition executed by the parties on October 22, 1970.

Second Assignment of Error

The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the donationsmade by Natalo Banawa to
Dominga Fiel.

Third Assignment of Error

The lower Court erred in not finding that there was no informal civil partnership between Natalio Banawa and Dominga fiel.

Fourth Assignment of Error

The Lower Court erred in not dismissing the compliant.

The third assignment of error is material to the determination of the merits of this appeal and affects the
first and assigned errors. We, therefore, discuss it first.

Philippine law does not recognized common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife in the community where they live maybe considered legally "married" in common law jurisdiction but
not in the philippines. At the same time, our law cannot brush aside the fact that such relationship are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties which must be governed by law.
For want of a better term, we call the relationship as "common-law relationships" or even "common-law
marriages" erroneous through the latter term maybe.

Article 114 of the civil code applies the rules of co-ownership to the properties acquired during the period
of the "common law relationship" as follows:

ART. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-
ownership.

The appellants cite jurisprudence (Aznar v. Cristensen Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055 and Olnangan v. Gallego
CA-G.R. No. 22140, April 11, 1962) which hold that Article 144 requires that the man and woman,thus
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties must
have been acquired through the work and industry of both or either of them.

The second requisite is fulfilled.

We are convinced from the records that Natalio Banawa disposed of his properties after he became a
widower and that it was upon commencing his relationship with the plaintiff that the two set up a sari-sari
store and went into the buying and selling of cereals which led to the acquisition of the disputed
properties. While the testimony about the two starting their business with the gift from the plaintiff's
parents maybe an exaggeration, the evidence sufficiently establishes the common nature of the
acquisition of the properties listed by the trial court in its decision.

The appellants' invocation of Article 144 raises a more serious objection. The cited cases rule that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to the contract marriage. The
plaintiff-appellee admitted that she was legally married to Eusebio Porestas and that Eusebio Potestss
was still alive when she testified in the trial court. The argument in appelle's brief that she and Potestas
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are in pari delicto is beside the point. The fact that Potestas lives with another woman does not free the
appelle from requirements of Article 144.

However, the reason behind the cited rulings leads us to affirm the existence of co-ownership. Where
both man and woman are married to living spouses, Article 144 does not apply because the earnings
and income of either the man or the woman or the woman pertain to his or her real, legal, and existing
conjugal partnership. In this case, however, Natalio Banawa was a widower with mo children when he
and the plaintiff started to accumulate the disputed properties. There was no legal conjugal partnership
and no children to whom his share of their earnings would accrue. The defendants are only brothers and
nephews. There appears to be no question from the records that the disputed properties were acquired
through the couples joint efforts and from the work or labor of the man alone. On the combined strength
of legal and equitable considerations, we rule that the co-ownership rules provided by Article 144 of the
Civil Code are applicable. Dominga Fiel should received one half of the fruits and earnings of her joint
effort with Natalio Banawa. The properties in part came from her own sweat, brains, and efforts.

Our ruling is buttressed by the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co. v. Teodoro (20 SCRA 463) through then Mr. Justice Makalintal that the requirement of "no
impediment to a valid marriage" is not yet a definite and unequivocal rule. According ti the court:

The decision cited under the first ground are Christensen vs. Garcia, 56 O.G. No. 16, p. 3199;
Samson vs. Salaysay, 56 O.G. No. 11, p. 2401; and Osmena vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. No. 20, p.
5526. In a proper case, where it may be necessary to do so in order to resolved an avoidable
issue, the precise scope of the two impediment to a valid marriage" in the said decision will
undoubtedly deserve closer examination, since it establishes an exception to the broad terms of
Article 144. For one thing, a situation may arise involving a conflict of rights between a co-
ownership under that provision and an existing conjugal partnership formed by s prior marriage
where, for instance, the husband in such marriage lives with another woman and with his salary or
wages acquires properties during the extra-marital cohabitation. A ruling would then be in order to
determine which-as between the co-ownership and the conjugal partnership-could claim
ascendancy insofar as the properties are concerned.

The first assignment of error disputes a factual finding of the lower Court. According to Dominga Fiel
when she signed the document of partition on October 22, 1970, she was still in,a state of shock, fear,
mental anguish, and hysteria because she and Natalio Banawa were the victims of a robbery which
resulted in the death of her common-law husband. The surviving brothers and nephews of Banawa
allegedly used intimidation and duress to force her into giving the former of two thirds of tha couples
common properties while she received only one third. The appellants, onthe other hand, contend that the
document of partition was voluntarily signed by the plaintiff after a full and complete exchange of views
among the contracting parties and that she should be boumd by her own voluntary acts.

The lower Court did not state why it did not give force and effects to the deed of partition and instead,
simply disregarded it. We agree, however, with the results of its unstated findings. The appellants have
not pointed to any evidence in the records to explain why Dominga Fiel would voluntarily and knowingly
give up what she had struggled to acquire with Banawa over a period of 25 years and waive part of her
share in a co-ownership under Article 144. On the other hand, the appellee has given the background of
her signature on the deed. She convinced the trial court that she was not in her correct senses when the
defendants used intimidation, pressure, and influence to sign a document she did not eve understand
and a copy of which was not furnished to her. We therefore see no error in the lower Court's disregarding
the deed of partition and deciding the case on some other grounds. The Court witness for both parties
and ascertain who was lying and who was telling the truth.

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The second assignment of error questions the validity of donations made by Natalio Banawa to Dominga
fiel during their common law relationship. the lower Court excluded and donated properties from the
partition and identified them as-

Paragraph 1 of the partition recites that Natalio Banawa donated a parcel of land, portion of Lot
No. 5197, Case 5, located at Labinay, Ozamis City, in favor of Dominga Fiel (Exhibit C) March 15,
1945. This lot should not be included in the partition.

Paragraph 3, Lot of 640 square meters located at Baga, Tangaub City, and the house therein
situated, together with the furnitures enumerated in the deed of donation dated September 4,
1963, Doc. No. 47, Page No. 8, Book No. 1, series of 1963, (Exhibit F) were donated to plaintiff
Dominga Fiel by the late Natalio Banawa. This should not be included in the partition.

We agree with the appellants that these lots should be included in the properties owned in common by
the deceased and the plaintiff because Natalio Banawa could not validly make a donation to Dominga
Fiel while they were living together.

Article 739 of the Civil Code expressly provides that donations made between persons guilty of adultery
or concubinage at that time of donation are void. Not merely voidable but void. There is no question that
Dominga Fiel was living in adultery with Natalio Banawa when the latter donated the two lots to her. She
herself admitted in open court that she was legally married to another man who was still alive when
Banawa was robbed and killed and who is apparently alive until the present. The lower Court erred that
"final conviction of the donee or donor is required as a condition precedent before a donation of this
nature can be declared void." The adultery or concubinage need to be prove in a criminal action. In the
same civil action for declaration of nullity, the guilt may be proved by mere preponderance of evidence.
(Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Vol. II, p. 625 Eight Edition, 1975). The nullity of the donations was
raised squarely in the defendants' answer.

There is another reason, moreover, why the donations should be invalidated. The case for Dominga Fiel
is built around her relationship with Natalio Banawa. The two were almost like husband and wife except
that they were never married and could not have contracted a marriage even if they wanted to do so.
The ruling of Buenaventura v. Bautista (50 O.G. No. 8, p. 3679, August, 1954) applies to them. This
Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes ruled:

While article 1335 speaks of spouses, still, if the policy of the law is, as,it has always been, to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor., a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law;
"porque no se enganen despohandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno," started the
parties (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law IV), restating the rationale "No mutuato amore invicen spoliarentur" of
the pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply
the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years
bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, to that the law, seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum,
fr. 1), "it would not subsist, less the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better." So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

We find the donation upon which the donee (plaintiff) premises his cause of action not only
unauthenticated, but null and void as contrary to the public policy.

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The donation are, therefore, null and void not only because of Article 739 but also because they are
contrary to public policy.

In Matabuena v. Cervanres (38 SCRA 284) the Supreme Court thought Mr. Justice Fernando also ruled
that:

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the
marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

The appellants have also raised the applicability of Article 114 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 114. The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any property by gratuitous title,
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth
degree.

Natalio Banawa is not an ascendants, descendants, parent-in-law, or close collateral relative. As a "
spouse", he could not donate. As a non-spouse, there is no express consent of the donee's legitimate
husband. The finding of the loeer Court that silence of Eusebio Potestas may,be considered implied
consent is error. There is nothing in the records to even remotely suggest 5hat Potestas knew about the
donation, much less consented to it. It is true that Article 144 prohibits donations to the wife without the
husband's consent to avoid suspicion and scandal. While there can be no suspicion or scandal in this
case, the fact remains that the donations will form part of the conjugal partnership of the estranged and
legitimate Potestas spouses. At any rate, even if we disregard this point raised by the appellants, the
donation ls,are still void because of the reason,earlier mentioned.

The fourth assignment of error is a mere consiquence of the other assigned errors.

The appelle raised her own assignment of error in hr brief. The records do not show that she appealed
from the judgement of the lower Court. We, therefore, disregard it.

Wherefore, the judgement of the lower Court is hereby modified to conclude the portion of Lot No. 5197,
C-5 mentioned in Paragraph One and the lot and house mentioned in Paragraph three of the agreement
of partition among he properties owned in co-ownership by Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa. in
all,other respects, the judgement appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Judgement modifed.

Gaviola, Jr. And Paras, JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

________________________
Footnote

* Vol. 24, C.A.R. (2s), p.

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