CRIMINAL PROCEDUREBAR REVIEW GUIDE 2018

(Rules 110-127, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure)

Justice Magdangal M. de Leon

I. GENERAL MATTERS
A. Distinguish jurisdiction over subject matter from jurisdiction over
person of the accused
• Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter - the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong
- conferred by law (either by the Constitution or statute and those
necessarily implied to make the express powers effective), parties cannot
choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide
their disputes; important to determine the nature of the cause of action
and of the relief sought.
- lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised
at any time even for the first time on appeal as the right to question such
jurisdiction is never waived.
• Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused
- the person charged with the offense must have been brought into
its forum for trial; an accused must first be placed in the custody of the
law forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the
court;
- may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance;
- objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition
by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
• Garcia vs. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. (G.R. No. 172505, October 1,
2014)
- Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In
criminal cases, the imposable penalty of the crime charged in the
information determines the court that has jurisdiction over the case.
- that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties
did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not
precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
case.
- trial court's lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties'
silence on the matter. The failure of the parties to raise the matter of
jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of the parties.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and
cannot be waived by the parties.
B. Requisites for exercise of criminal jurisdiction
(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take
cognizance of (jurisdiction over the subject matter)
(2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial
jurisdiction (jurisdiction over the territory) - territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused
(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought into
its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary
submission to the court (jurisdiction over the person of the accused).
• Exceptions: to the Jurisdiction over the Territory
(Extraterritorial Offenses – Article 2, RPC)
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these
islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding
number
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the
law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
C. Jurisdiction of criminal courts
- authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the
punishment for it.
• Treñas vs. People (G. R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012)
- The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
VENUE of the action but is an essential element of JURISDICTION. It
is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
D. When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution
(Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hon.
Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014)
- as a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or
injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal
prosecution. Exceptions:
1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused;
2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance; and
10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
II. PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES
A. Criminal actions, how instituted – Sec. 1, Rule 110
• Institution – for offenses which require a preliminary investigation,
the criminal action is instituted by filing the complaint with the proper
officer for preliminary investigation.
• Commencement – when the complaint or information is filed in
court.
• Where preliminary investigation is required (penalty at least 4
years, 2 months and 1 day) - complaint filed with proper officers
(Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 112)
Proper officer–officers authorized by law to conduct preliminary
investigation:
1. provincial or city prosecutor
2. national and regional state prosecutor
3. Ombudsman – offenses that fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan
4. Chief Legal Officer of Comelec with respect to election officers
N.B. MTC and MCTC Judges – no longer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation. (A.M. No. 05-8-26, Oct. 3, 2005)
• “All other offenses” – those which are penalized lower than at
least 4 yrs 2 mos and 1 day without regard to the fine.
Where preliminary investigation is not required – complaint or
information filed with MTC or complaint with office of the prosecutor.
Complaint or information filed directly with MTC and MCTC – similar
to complaint or information defined in Secs. 3 and 4 and must allege
facts necessary to comply with sufficiency requirements in Sec. 6.
Complaint with the office of the prosecutor – similar to complaint filed
for purposes of preliminary investigation.
• Effect of institution of the criminal action on the prescriptive
period (Sec. 1 (b), last par.)
The institution of the criminal action shall INTERRUPT the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Hon. Judge
Nelson F. Lidua Sr. (G.R. No. 169588, October
7, 2013)
- In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; 2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
- commencement of the prescription period, Art.
91 of RPC
“Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.”
- when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who
then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling
the prescription period.
- Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No.
102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc (running of the prescriptive period shall
be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any
date before that), is applicable to ordinances and their prescriptive
period.
People vs. Pangilinan (G.R. No. 152662, June
13, 2012)
- No distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription.
- the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against
the accused interrupts the period of prescription.
- commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted
the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under
BP Blg. 22.
People vs. Bautista (G.R. No. 168641,
April 27, 2007)
Slight physical injuries, Manila - Filing of complaint with prosecutor’s
office suspends running of prescriptive period, not approval of the
investigating prosecutor’s recommendation for filing of information.
• Rule of prescription for violation of special law
Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ, .G R. No. 167571,
November 25, 2008 - BP 22
- Filing of complaint with prosecutor’s office interrupted the period
of prescription. DOJ and CA
- offense already prescribed under Act 3326 under which offenses
prescribe in 4 years
Form of complaint or information (WNA) – Sec. 2 Section 2. The
Complaint or information. –
The complaint or information shall be
a) in writing,
b) in the name of the People of the
Philippines and
c) against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved.
In all criminal prosecutions, the real offended party is the People of the
Philippines for a crime is an outrage against, and its vindication is in
favor of, the people in a sovereign state.
However, a crime is also an outrage against the offended or aggrieved
party, the victim of the crime. Thus, he is entitled to intervene in its
prosecution in cases where the civil action is impliedly instituted therein.
Hence, complaint which is filed with the MTC or prosecutor for
preliminary investigation is usually in the name of the offended party as
complainant.
• Definition and distinction between complaint and information –
Secs. 3 and 4
Section 3. Complaint defined. — A complaint is a sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated.
Filed in court for the commencement of a criminal prosecution for a
crime, usually cognizable by the MTC, subscribed by a peace officer or
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.
OR
Filed by offended party in private crimes or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.
“Sworn written statement” - must be under oath.
Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court.
Charge sheet filed by the prosecutor in court. Unlike complaint, which
must be under oath and filed either in the MTC or with the prosecutor’s
office, the information does not have to be under oath and is always filed
in court.
B. Who may file criminal actions, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio
Criminal actions in general – Sec. 5, first par. (as amended by
A.M. No. 02-2-07-
SC, April 10, 2002, effective May 1, 2002)
All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in
the event of lack of public prosecutors,
the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the
case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute
the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the
case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Prosecution of private crimes (adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, acts of lasciviousness, defamation imputing said crimes) –
Sec. 5, 2nd to 5th pars.
- correlate with Art. 344 and Art. 360, last par.,(RPC)
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions x x x
The crimes of adultery and concubinage SHALL NOT BE
PROSECUTED except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including the guilty parties, if both alive, nor, in any case, if the offended
party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders (MAY BE
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED).
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness SHALL
NOT BE PROSECUTED except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been EXPRESSLY PARDONED by any of them. If the
offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the
complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the
State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the
prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of
lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended
party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents,
grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action
granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all
other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein
provided, except as stated in the preceding paragraph.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of
the offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of
and upon complaint filed by the offended party.
The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the
provisions thereof.
Art. 344, Art. 360, last par., Revised Penal
Code
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case,
if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as
the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned
crimes.
Art. 360, last par.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at
the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
(As amended by R.A. 1289, approved June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363,
approved June 19, 1965).
Nature of requirement in Sec. 5, Rule 110 and Art. 344
N.B. 1. Crimes prosecuted upon complaint of offended party:
a. Adultery and concubinage – can only be filed by offended spouse
b. Seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness – exclusive and
successive rule: offended party, parents, grandparents, guardian
c. Criminal actions for defamation which consist in the imputation of
an offense mentioned above.
2. Rape was excluded as a private crime in view of RA
8353, Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (took effect on October 22, 1997)
reclassifying rape as a crime against persons and is now a “public
crime.”
3. Complaint required in Art. 344 has been imposed out of
consideration for the offended party and her family who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a
public trial (People vs. Tanada, 166 SCRA 361 [1988].
4. Compliance with Rule 110, Section 5 is jurisdictional and not
merely a formal requirement (People vs. Sunpongco, G.R. No. 42665,
June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 222).
Who may file complaints committed against children under
Sec. 27, RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act)
a) Offended party;
b) Parents or guardians;
c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of
consanguinity;
d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring
institution
e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development;
f) Barangay chairman; or
g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the
violation occurred.
Punzalan vs. Plata (G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013) - slight oral
defamation, other light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief,
and theft
- the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to
the public prosecutor; prosecution of crimes lies with the executive
department of the government whose principal power and responsibility
is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed.
- it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed
offenders. The rule is based not only upon the respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
executive department but upon practicality as well.
People vs. Go (G.R. No. 201644, September
24, 2014) - estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents
- a petition for certiorari which sought the dismissal of the criminal
cases should not have been resolved by the CA, without the People, as
represented by the OSG, having first been impleaded. This stems from
the recognition that the People is an indispensable party to the
proceedings.
- While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a
ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said party may
still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it
remains essential – as it is jurisdictional – that any indispensable party
be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders judgment. This
is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Villalon vs. Chan (G.R. No. 196508, September
24, 2014) - bigamy
- failure to implead the “People of the Philippines” as a party-
respondent is not a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of her
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA because: (1) a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions alleged to have acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a special civil action
separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the
petitioners. For these reasons, the “People of the Philippines” need not
be impleaded as
a party in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Worldwide Web Corp vs. People (G.R. No. 161106,
January 13, 2014)
- an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity
of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party
personality to question an order quashing search warrants.
Francisco vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 177720, February 18,
2009) - Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a[2].
-A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the
name of the People of the Philippines.
The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the
prosecution of crimes, EXCEPT in cases that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio (adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness), or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of
preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the “offended party”
but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject
thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
Uy vs. People (G.R. No. 174899, September
11, 2008) – Estafa
Claim – accused denied due process when he was convicted of estafa
instead pf BP 22 violation because private complainant’s demand letter
was for alleged violation of BP 22.
Held – Criminal actions are under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. After going over the complaint, prosecutor found probable
cause to charge accuse with estafa, not violation of BP 22.
Adaza vs.Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007- Estafa
When accused has already been arraigned, DOJ must not give due
course to appeal or petition for review and must dismiss the same. When
accused unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived
the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to
appeal the result thereof to the DOJ secretary. Crespo vs. Mogul,
Roberts vs.CA and Marcelo vs. CA not applicable because accused
therein had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review
was filed with
DOJ.
Crespo vs. Mogul (G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 152 SCRA 462) –
Estafa
Issue: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary ot
Justice to whom a case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
- It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint
or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended
party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or
not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
-The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction
and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by
law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are
shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their
office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an
investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
- However, once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or
that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. -
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
C. Criminal actions, when enjoined (Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Hon.
Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014)
- as a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or
injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal
prosecution. Exceptions:
1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused;
2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance; and
10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
De Jesus vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos.
164166 & 164173-80, October 17, 2007)
- settled rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either
through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except
in the following instances:
1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;
4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for
vengeance;
10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied;
11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
D. Control of prosecution (Sec. 5, Rule 110) Who must prosecute
criminal actions
– all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be
under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
Matters within the control and supervision of the Prosecutor:
1. what case to file;
2. whom to prosecute;
3. manner of prosecution; and
4. right to withdraw information before arraignment even without
notice and hearing
Hasegawa vs. Giron (G.R. No. 184536, August
14, 2013)
- the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations,
or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an
offender.
- the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on
his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the
evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in
court; prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not
subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have
been made with grave abuse of discretion.
• People vs. Diu (G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013)
- robbery with homicide
- prosecutors have a wide range of discretion in determining
whether, what, and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
Leviste vs. Alameda (G.R. No. 182677, August
3, 2010)
- All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a
witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the
reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court,
the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control
of the prosecution of the case.Thus, in cases where the private
complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action,
and is granted the authority to prosecute,the private
complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.
Matters within the control of the Court after the case is filed:
1. suspension of arraignment;
2. reinvestigation;
3. prosecution by the fiscal;
4. dismissal of the case; and
5. downgrading of offense or dropping of accused even before plea
Limitations on control by the Court:
1. Prosecution is entitled to notice and hearing;
2. Prosecution's stand to maintain prosecution should be respected by
the court ; and
3. court must make its own assessment of evidence in granting or
dismissing
Department of Justice vs. Alaon (G.R. No.
189596, April 23, 2014)
- once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court.
- a motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or
that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
E. Sufficiency of complaint or information (Sec. 6, Rule 110)
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
N a) name of the accused; (Sec. 7)
D b) designation of the offense given by the statute; (Sec. 8)
A c) acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (Sec.
9)
N d) name of the offended party; (Sec.12)
A e) approximate date of the commission of the offense (see Sec 11);
and
P f) place where the offense was committed.
(Sec. 10)
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
People vs. Bayabos (G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015)
- Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of
Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be
“sufficient.”
One of the key components of a “sufficient information” is the statement
of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the
complaint. The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary
and concise enough to enable persons of common understanding to
know the offense being charged against them. This approach is intended
to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
they have purportedly committed. The information need not be in the
same kind of language used in the law relied upon
Enrile vs. Manalastas (G.R. No. 166414,
October 22, 2014) - less serious physical injuries
- fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in
a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged
therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense; To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer
to the law defining the offense charged.
- complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the
offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly
amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being
evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial.
Rosaldes vs. People (G.R. No. 173988, October
8, 2014) - child abuse, violation of Republic Act No. 7610
- Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge against
the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance
to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the
information through a MOTION TO QUASH on the ground that the
information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did
not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her WAIVER of
the challenge.
People vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, February 13,
2013
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
Merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun,
without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly
and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to
kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could
serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery
constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was
nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
Valid information
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the
offense and the actual acts or omissions constitutive thereof. It is not
necessary to state therein the precise date the offense was committed,
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. And as earlier
mentioned, in rape cases, the date or time of commission of the offense
is not an essential ingredient of said crime. (People vs. Colentava, G.R.
No. 190348, February 9, 2015)
Name of the accused (Sec. 7, Rule 110)
• Su Zhi Shan @ Alvin Ching So vs. People (G.R. No. 169933, March 9,
2007)- drug pushing/selling
- erroneous designation in the Information of the name of the
accused does not vitiate it if it is clearly proven that the person accused
and brought to court is the person who committed the crime; the
information charging petitioner was prepared after he was arrested
and while he was in custody.
There could, therefore, be no doubt that the person who was arrested and
brought to court is the same person charged in the information.
- whether there lived another person with the same name as the
accused in the area where the buy-bust operation was conducted is
immaterial, the identity of the therein accused as the person who sold the
marijuana to the poseur-buyers having been established.
People vs. Cagadas Jr. (G.R. No. 88044, January 23, 1991)
- Where the accused Roberto Cultura was indicted in the
information as “Jose” Cultura, his father’s name, but it was clearly
proven that he was part of the group that killed the victim and did not
raise the question of his identity at the arraignment and acquiesced to be
tried under that name, he is deemed to have waived the right to raise the
question of his identity for the first time on appeal.
- For the accused is deemed to have acquiesced to the name by
which he had been identified in the information, and he is estopped, after
the trial and his conviction under said name, to raise the question of his
identity on appeal.
San Diego vs. Hernandez(24 SCRA 110 (1968)-
Frustrated murder
- Where the accused has been sued as John Doe in an information
filed in due form, and after due investigation by the fiscal his identity
became known, his true name may be inserted without further need of
preliminary investigation where one had already been properly
conducted pursuant to the charter of Quezon City and the nature of the
crime is not changed.
F. Designation of offense (Sec. 8, Rule 110)
People vs. Feliciano, Jr. (G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014) murder
-An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the
charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense; test of
sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly. (citing People v. Wilson Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482
(2002)
- every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly
proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.
Matrido vs. People (G.R. No. 179061, July 13,
2009) - Qualified theft
- Credit and collection manager of Empire East Land Holdings –
failed to remit payments received from its clients.
Claim on appeal to CA from her conviction – despite her indictment for
qualified theft, the prosecution was trying to prove estafa during trial,
thus violating her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.
Held: Allegations in the information determine the nature of the offense,
not the technical name given by public prosecutor. The recital of facts
and circumstances in the information sufficiently constituted the crime
of qualified theft.
Guy vs. People (G.R. No. 167088, March 20, 2009) Violation of Sec. 3
(e), RA 3019, Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
- Accused are officers and employees of City Engineer’s Office,
Barangay Chairman and Treasurer, Tacloban City, conspired with owner
of Amago Construction in the construction of 3 infrastructure projects
which had material defects and were overpriced.
- Convicted by Sandiganbayan.
Claim: SB failed to acquire jurisdiction over them because the 3
informations failed to state the specific factual allegations to indicate
connection between discharge of their official duties and commission of
the offenses charged. Held: Specific acts of accused need not be
described in detail – sufficient particularity to make sure accused fully
understands what he is being charged with.
Flores vs. Layosa (G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337) -
Falsification of public records – NFA
Falsified daily time record of security guard
If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can
decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the
statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it
describes the crime defined by law.
G. Cause of the accusation (Sec. 9, Rule 110) Constitutional Basis -
Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution Statutory Basis – Section
1(b), Rule 115
People vs. Umawid (G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014) - In criminal cases,
where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process requires
that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information. (citing Burgos v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123144, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 385)
Consigna vs. People (G.R. No. 175750-51, April
2, 2014) - estafa as penalized under Art. 315
(2)(a) of the RPC
- the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint
or information.
- What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (citing People vs.
Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649-650 (2005)
• Place of commission (Sec. 10, Rule 110)
U.S. vs. Cunanan (GR No. L-8267, Dec. 27,1913, 26 Phil 376
Abandoning steamship as a seaman.
The place of commission of the offense must be stated in the complaint
or information when it is a material ingredient of the offense charged or
is necessary for its identification. The failure to show that the offense
was committed within the jurisdiction of the trial court is a fatal defect,
and the complaint or information may be quashed.
People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975)
Light threat, frustrated theft
Unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the
offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime
was committed not at the place alleged in the information, provided the
place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court
N.B. There are crimes which make the place of commission essential,
such as trespass to dwelling (Art. 280, RPC) and violation of domicile
(Art. 129, RPC). In such cases, the specific place must be alleged in the
information.
• Date of commission of the offense (Sec.
11, Rule 110)
People vs. Delfin (G.R. No. 201572, July 9,
2014) - murder
- In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity
or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for
the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission
be approximated.
The foregoing rule, is not absolute. Variance in the date of commission
of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in
evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces
the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer
pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective
allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence
nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the
right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.
The proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on
June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The period of almost five
years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one
cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that
committed by the Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in
1947. Under this impression the accused, who came to court prepared to
face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in
1952,
were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by
evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The
variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional
right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them
and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover,
they cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not
charged.(People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 (1956) Reiterated in People v.
Hon. Reyes,195
Phil. 94, 100-101 (1981)
People vs. Balinog (G.R. No. 194833, July 2, 2014)
- In statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to prove
that the victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Corpuz vs. People (G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014) - Article
315(Estafa) paragraph 1, (b) of the RPC
- aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the
prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information
ipso facto defective.
- an information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof.
Bacasmas vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.
189343, July 10, 2013) - violation of Section 3Corrupt practices of
public officers, (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
- date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been
committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time;
- it adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation
against petitioners,namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The
use of the three phrases –
“manifest partiality,” “evident bad faith” and
“inexcusable negligence” - in the same Information does not mean that
three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the
offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes
provided by the law.
People vs. Garcia , G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011 Qualified theft
- accused teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch; Date not
a material ingredient of offense.
• Name of offended party – (Sec. 12, Rule 110)
Senador vs. People, G.R. No. 201620, March
6, 2013 – estafa
- variance between the allegations of the information and the
evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused
to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the
offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused.
- if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable,
such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the
designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the
acquittal of the accused.
- if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such
as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze,
an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial
- the subject matter of the offense herein does not refer to money or
any other generic property. Instead, the information specified the subject
of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of
P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and
proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Senador and
presented during trial, which enumerates these
"various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685
- it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is
applicable to the present case, not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The
error in the designation of the offended party in the information is
immaterial and did not violate Senador’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
H. Duplicity of the offense; exception
(Sec. 13, Rule 110)
Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. — A complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses.
• Duplicitous information - single complaint or information that charges
more than one offense
Correlate with - Section 3, Rule 120
Section 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. — When two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and
law in each offense.
General Rule: “one offense, one complaint" rule Exceptions:
1. compound crimes – where the law prescribes a single punishment
for various offenses
2. complex crimes – (Art. 48)
3. special complex crimes
4. continuous crimes or delito continuado
5. crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes
6. crimes of which another offense is an ingredient
Soriano vs. People (G.R. NO. 159517-18, June 30, 2009)
- Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense.
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012 - LPB
- As a rule, an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation. The accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.
- Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and
Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to
falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from
another person. In other words, the falsification is a NECESSARY
MEANS of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to
CONCEAL the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed.
- In the instant case, the falsified or erroneous entries were used in
order to conceal the proceeds of the sale, thus, constitute two separate
offenses of estafa and falsification. Not being Estafa Through
Falsification of Documents, there was no need to allege falsification.
Furthermore, since only estafa was charged (though also possibly liable
for falsification as a separate offense), Y is properly convicted thereof.
There is no necessity of alleging falsification as it is not an element of
estafa.
I. Amendment or substitution of complaint or information (Sec. 14,
Rule 110)
- correlate with Sec. 4, Rule 117
(Motion to Quash)
• BEFORE PLEA - Amendments in form and substance: General rule –
must be made before the accused enters his plea
Exception:
if the amendment/s downgrade/s the nature of the offense charged in, or
excludes any accused from the complaint/information, it can be made
only upon motion of the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court.
AFTER PLEA - ONLY formal amendment and with leave of court, and
such amendment will NOT prejudice the rights of the accused.
Substantial amendments can never be made after the accused has
pleaded.
Mendez vs. People (G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014) estafa
- there is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial
amendment. According to jurisprudence, substantial matters in the
complaint or information consist of the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend
the information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as
the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to
the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14.
- once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section
14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment,
particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the
accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right
which is given life during the arraignment of the accused of the charge
of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially
begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the
recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the
prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
Leviste vs. Alameda (G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010) -
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT consists of the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court.
- The following have been held to be mere FORMAL
AMENDMENTS: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do
not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right
of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and
material facts, and merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
- test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other (DAEA)
Formal Amendments
Mendez vs. People (G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014) - amendments that
do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original
one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume are considered merely as formal amendments
- the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment of an information pertains to the availability of the same
defense and evidence that the accused previously had under the original
information. This test, however, must be read together with the
characteristic thread of formal amendments, which is to maintain the
nature of the crime or the essence of the offense charged.
- amendments sought by the prosecution pertain to
(i) the alleged change in the date in the
commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the
phrase “doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical
Group;” (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s
operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase “for income earned.” Court
held that these are mere formal amendments, as the nature of the crime
or the essence of the offense charged under the amended information
remained consistent, thus petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
- citing Almeda v. Judge Villaluz, prosecution wanted to
additionally allege recidivism and habitual delinquency in the original
information. In allowing the amendment, the Court observed that the
amendment sought relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction. Since they do not have the
effect of charging an offense different from the one charged
(qualified theft of a motor vehicle) in the information, nor do they tend
to correct any defect in the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
subjectmatter, the amendment sought is merely formal.
- citing Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, the prosecution sought during
trial to amend the information from frustrated to consummated murder
since the victim died after the information for frustrated murder was
filed. The accused refused to be arraigned under the amended
information without the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. In
sustaining the admission of the amended information, the Court
reasoned that the additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of
the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in
determining the proper penalty for the crime. Again, there is no change
in the nature of offense charged; nor is there a change in the
prosecution’s theory that the accused committed a felonious act with
intent to kill the victim; nor does the amendment affect whatever defense
the accused originally may have.
Kummer vs. People (G.R. No. 174461,
September 11, 2013)
- A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the
disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an
amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the
proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused
might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made,
and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information, as amended. -- Defense available,
Evidence applicable (DAEA)
Substantial amendments
Leviste vs. Alameda (G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010)
- whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to
murder is considered a substantial amendment. Amendment involved in
the present case consists of additional averments of the circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense
charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and material element
of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance to adduce evidence
on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially
varies the prosecution's original theory of the case and certainly affects
not just the form but the weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner
- factual milieus in Buhat v. CA (333 Phil. 562 (1996) and Pacoy v.
Cajigal (G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007) wherein the amendment
of the caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not
considered substantial because there was no real change in the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the
Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were already
clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out that the
original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior
strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended
Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in
the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar
circumstances obtains in the present case.
J. Venue of criminal actions
Place where action is to be instituted (Sec. 15, Rule 110)
General rule:
In the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Offense committed in a train, aircraft, or vehicle in the course of its trip:
In the court of any municipality or territory where said train, aircraft, or
vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of departure and
arrival.
Offense committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage:
In the court of the first point of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage.
Crime committed outside of Philippines but punishable under Art. 2 of
RPC:
Court where the criminal action is first filed.
(Sec.15, Rule 110).
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People (G.R. No.
192565, February 28, 2012)
- the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the
affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed.
- When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath
in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to
the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the
place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was
taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material
ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue
shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of
the crime committed.
Bonifacio vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati
(GR. No. 184800, May 5, 2010) - libel
- Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle
acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as
amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution
of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
- In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal
action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed,
the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where
he was actually residing at that time.
Whenever possible, the place where the written defamationwas
printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That
allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the
libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of
the action.
- the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the
venue by availing of the second.
Foz, Jr. vs. People (G.R. No 167764, October 9, 2009) Libel -
information filed in RTC Iloilo City.
Panay News – Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an
incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the
expense of the people. Accused convicted, appealed to CA, affirmed,
petition for review with SC.
Venue of libel - place (1) where publication was first printed and
published or province (2) where offended party actually resided at time
of commission of the offense. Information failed to comply with venue
requirements for libel under Art. 360. Decision convicting petitioners
should be aside for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction
Rigor vs. People (G.R. No. 144887, November 17,
2004) EXAMPLES
- violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes. In such crimes, some acts material and essential to
the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court
of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. Hence, a
person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
K. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action (Sec. 16, Rule
110)
- correlate with Sec. 12, Rule 110 (Name of the offended party)
Lee Pue Liong a.k.a. Paul Lee vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee (G.R. No. 181658,
August 7, 2013 ) – perjury
- citing Garcia v. Court of Appeals (334 Phil. 621, 631-632 (1997),
from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a
crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly
liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is
civilly liable is the offended party.
- Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose
person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured
by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate
entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of.
Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the
substantive law,
to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to
the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his
civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate
or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third
and unrelated party (citing Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon.Sandiganbayan, 487
Phil. 384 [2004])
- where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in
the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the
Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of
enforcing
the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always
subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
• When private offended party may bring special civil action of certiorari
in criminal
proceedings
Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, G.R. No.126210,
March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA 588 Estafa –
Hagonoy, Bulacan
- In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect
of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In
so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of
the said complainant."
- Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or
defend actions on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the
right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in
criminal proceedings before the courts of law.
• Who represents People in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court
Ong vs. Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009
Robbery – Makati City
RTC dismissed case for lack of probable cause pursuant to Rule 112,
Sec. 6 (a). Private complainant Elvira Ong filed petition for certiorari
and mandamus with CA.
Held: Only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions before the
CA or SC on behalf of the People of the Philippines. However, offended
party may appeal the civil aspect despite acquittal of accused. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case. He may file
certiorari petition qjestioning the decision of the trial court on
jurisdictional grounds. The action may be prosecuted in the name of said
complainant.
III. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
A. Rule on implied institution of civil action with criminal action
Civil liabilities that may arise from a criminal act
• -correlate with: Arts. 100-113, Revised Penal Code
Arts. 29, 32, 33, 34, 2176, 2180, 2184, Civil
Code
Daluraya vs. Marla Oliva (G.R. No. 210148, December 8, 2014)
- Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
• Two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant
effects on the civil liability of the accused
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator
of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action,
if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.
Second is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
• - The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Ways of instituting civil actions in criminal cases
General Rule: deemed instituted with criminal action.
Exceptions:
(1) waiver
(2) reservation of right to institute separately,
(3) prior institution of civil action (Sec.1.)
Exceptions to these exceptions:
claims arising out of a dishonored check under BP22 where no
reservation to file such civil action shall be allowed.
claims arising from an offense which is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan (Sec. 4,
PD 1606, as amended by RA 8249)
Co vs. Muñoz (G.R. No. 181986, December 4,
2013)
- procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil liability ex
delicto may be enforced: (1) through a civil action that is deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action; (2) through a civil action that
is filed separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon
reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action
• When to reserve – Sec. 1, 2nd par.
- No reservation required and civil action not suspended when act
constituting a crime is at the same time a violation of Arts. 32, 33, 34
(independent civil actions) and 2176 (quasidelicts) of Civil Code.
• Criminal actions for violation of BP 22, civil action is deemed included
and a reservation to file such separately is not allowed.
Nissan Gallery-Ortigas vs. Felipe (G.R. No.
199067, November 11, 2013 )
- if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the necessary
penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be
imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the
imposition of the civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or
omission from which it might arise exists.
- Felipe was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was
not sufficiently established. Nevertheless, the act or omission from
which her civil liability arose, which was the making or the issuing of
the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her acquittal from the
criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not
relieve her of the corresponding civil liability.
B. When civil action may proceed independently (Sec. 3, Rule 111)
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cuaresma (G.R. No.
200055, September 10, 2014), citing Casupanan vs. Laroya, 436 Phil.
582 (2002)
- There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action
can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
- as a result of a vehicular accident, a party involved therein filed a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
against the other party, who, in turn, filed a civil suit against the party
instituting the criminal action, We held that the party filing the separate
civil action cannot be liable for forum shopping because the law (Arts.
2176 & 2177 of the Civil Code), and the rules (Sec. 1, Rule 111)
expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action. ; Either the private complainant or
the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
C. When separate civil action is suspended (Sec. 2, Rule 111)
- After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until FINAL JUDGMENT
has been entered in the criminal action. (Deferment)
- If the criminal action is filed after the separate civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be SUSPENDED in whatever
stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension
shall last until FINAL JUDGMENT is rendered in the criminal action.
(Suspension)
- Before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be CONSOLIDATED
with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly. (Consolidation)
- During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period
of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately
or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (Tolling of
prescriptive period)
- Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.
Romero vs. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009
- acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment
of civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate
civil action be instituted.
• Garcia vs. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. (G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014)
If the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the
trial court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to
reserve the right to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex
delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed.
The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private
complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the
state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.
-the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto
before the Regional Trial Court or institute a separate civil action prior
to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as to the civil
aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.
D. Effect of death of the accused or convict on civil action (Sec. 4, Rule
111)
The accused’s death after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime.
However, the independent civil action instituted or which is thereafter
instituted may be continued against the legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may
be. The accused’s heirs may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Cabugao vs. People (G.R. No. 163879, July 30,
2014)
- the effect of death, pending appeal of the conviction of petitioner Dr.
Ynzon with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities should be in
accordance with People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2,
1994, 236 SCRA 239, wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the
accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxxxxxxxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3.Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.(Please see Sec. 4, Rule 111, 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions
of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
- death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil
liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but by contract and
the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based and in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 111.
- upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party
desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained
of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the other sources of
obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. If the same act or
omission complained of arises from quasidelict, as in this case, a
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator
of the estate of the accused.
Datu vs. People (G.R. No. 169718,
December 13, 2010)
In light of this supervening event (death of petitioner) which occurred
while petitioner’s appeal of the judgment of his conviction was pending
resolution before this Court, we are constrained by both law and
jurisprudence to dismiss the present case for the appeal has been
rendered moot.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code instructs us that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the offender, to wit:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
His civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,
is likewise extinguished by his death. Since his appeal was still pending
before this Court, there was no final judgment of conviction upon which
an award of civil indemnity could be based.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the death of petitioner extinguished
his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the assailed Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated March 31, 2005, affirming petitioner’s
conviction by the trial court, had become ineffectual.
• Judgment in civil action not a bar – Sec. 5
A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from
civil liability is NOT A BAR to a criminal action against the defendant
for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.
E. Prejudicial question
• Suspension of criminal action by reason of prejudicial question–
Sec. 6, Rule 111. A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may
be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in
court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
• Elements of prejudicial question – Sec. 7, Rule 111
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Sps. Gaditano vs. San Miguel Corporation (G.R.
No. 188767, July 24, 2013)
- A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
-material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal
investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial
question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC is
not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to
its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners’ savings
account. The source of the funds of petitioners’ savings account is no
longer SMC’s concern. The matter is between petitioners and AsiaTrust
Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is
whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer
products.
- If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in
one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined
first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.
Pimentel vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 172060,
September 13, 2010)
- Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal
case for Parricide
- There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case.
- relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element
in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder
or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
- The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be
held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Jacinto (G.R. No. 154622, August 3,
2010, 626 SCRA 315)
- A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case.
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as
follows: (i) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
- A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. Not every defense raised in a civil action
will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal
action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to
the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution should
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined
first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.
De Zuzuarregui vs. Villarosa(G.R. No. 183788,
April 5, 2010)
- For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal
action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.
- The determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended
on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and
issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with the
issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in
the civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.
Abunado vs. People (G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA
562)
- A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
• The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had
already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
Reyes vs. Rossi, G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013
The action for rescission is not a prejudicial question to the B.P. 22
criminal proceedings.
Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a
prejudicial question, Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action
will be determinative of whether or not he was criminally liable for the
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the contract
would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of
sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result
in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Reyes is wrong.
The issue in the criminal actions for violation of B.P. 22 is whether or
not Reyes issued the dishonored checks knowing them to be without
funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action
for rescission which he filed is whether or not the breach in the
fulfilment of Rossi’s obligation warranted the rescission of the
conditional sale.
If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Reyes would be found to
have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the
contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be
absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks
because, as the elements of B.P. 22 show, he already committed the
violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time
when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His
obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the
drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment
of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. The
criminal proceedings for the violation of B.P. 22 could proceed despite
the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale.
Consing, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded
party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a
pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through
falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. It is well
settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical
injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. Under Rule
111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
F. Rule on filing fees in civil action deemed instituted with the criminal
action
(Sec. 1 (b), 2nd par. , Rule 111
General Rule: No filing fees are required for amounts of actual damages
Exception:
- criminal actions for for violation of B.P. 22, in which the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the face value of the check
as the actual damages.
Where the amount of damages (moral, exemplary damages, other
damages), other than actual damages, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon filing thereof in court.
In any other case, that is, when the amount of damages is not so alleged,
the corresponding filing fees need NOT be paid and shall simply
constitute a first lien on the judgment, EXCEPT on an award for actual
damages.
• Simon vs. Chan (G.R. No. 157547, February 23,
2011) citing Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation, G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005,
465 SCRA 454, 459-461
- Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of
the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22,
the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the
complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are
filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to
collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is
not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed
before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also
expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting
two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single
suit shall be filed and tried.
IV. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Definition: Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. (Sec. 1, 1st par., Rule 112)
Ocampo vs. Abando (G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014)
- A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.” It is conducted
to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of
a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
- In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due
process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an
opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to
the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether
the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
• When required:
Preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of
a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and (1) day without
regard to the fine.(Sec. 1, 2nd par., Rule 112)
Exception: when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant. (Sec. 6,
Rule 112 as amended by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC) – Inquest proceedings
Exceptions to the exception: (Instances when preliminary investigation
may be asked by the accused)
1. Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a PI, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the RPC, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
2. After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the
time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation.
• Estrada vs. Ombudsman (G.R. Nos. 212140-
41, January 21, 2015)
Four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where
probable cause is needed to be established:
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause
is based only on the likelihood, or probability, of guilt.
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the INVESTIGATING
OFFICER, to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A
preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least
four years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the JUDGE, to determine
whether a warrant of arrest or a commitment order, if the accused has
already been arrested, shall be issued and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a PEACE OFFICER OR A
PRIVATE PERSON making a
warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the JUDGE, to determine whether a
search warrant shall be issued, and only upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
.
A.Nature of right - the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are merely statutory rights, not constitutional due process
rights
Preliminary investigation – respondent has no right to cross-examine
complainant’s witnesses and to be furnished copies of affidavits of his
co-respondents
The respondent in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-
examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or crossexamine.
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the
complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these
Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The right of the
respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally
ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine." (Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
212140-41, January 21, 2015)
Are the constitutional due process requirements prescribed in Ang Tibay
applicable to preliminary investigation? NO.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, as amplified in GSIS v. CA, are not
applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory
law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary
investigations without running afoul with the constitutional requirements
of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The
present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply, and
were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and
obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a
decision against the respondent in the administrative case. In preliminary
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To
apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations
will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable
cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay,
as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the
respondent has no such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-
finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary
investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and
hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same
public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This
explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to
preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements
in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This
will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending
in all courts throughout the country.(Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
212140-41, January 21, 2015)
Enrile vs. Manalastas (G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014) -
preliminary investigation, the occasion for the submission of the parties’
respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their
separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the information. It is not yet a
trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not
approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is
only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the
accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused be removed.
Agdeppa vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014 citing Uy v.
Office of the Ombudsman (578 Phil. 635, 655 (2008)
- A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on
trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public
trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct
useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a component of due process in administering criminal
justice.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound for trial and before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and
penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
To deny the accused’s claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive
him of the full measure of his right to due process.
- A complainant cannot insist that a preliminary investigation be
held when the complaint was dismissed outright because of palpable
lack of merit. It goes against the very nature and purpose of preliminary
investigation to still drag the respondent/accused through the rigors of
such an investigation so as to aid the complainant in substantiating an
accusation/charge that is evidently baseless from the very beginning.
Arroyo vs. DOJ (G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012)
- A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal
justice system which spells for an individual the difference between
months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one
hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have
characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not a mere
formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due
process in criminal justice.
- In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the
petitioners basic due process rights such as the right to be furnished a
copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents,
and the right to submit counter-affidavits, and other supporting
documents in her defense.
Budiongan, Jr. vs. Dela Cruz, Jr. (G.R. NO. 170288,
September 22, 2006)
- The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right,
but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If
absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information
invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the
denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Waiver of right to preliminary investigation.
Roallos vs. People (G.R. No. 198389, December 11,2013)
-the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised.
The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary
investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial
without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. This is to allow
the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own
investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which,
necessarily “involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence
already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the
initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the
Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation.”
B. Purposes of Preliminary Investigation
People vs. Yecyec (G.R. No. 183551, November 12, 2014) citing
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals 344 Phil. 207, 226 (1997)
- The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free
respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of
defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the
reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose.
Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the
burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting alleged
offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless
charges.
Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as
may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of
the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the
charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement
of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.
Pestilos vs. Generoso (G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial.
• - probable cause - the existence of facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted.
• Two Kinds of Determination of Probable Cause: People vs.
Andrade (G.R. No.
187000, November 24, 2014)
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasijudicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether
or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of
the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on
the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Shu vs. Dee (G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014) -It is well-settled that in
order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime
charged should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of
preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie
case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Thus,
probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction.
C. Who may Conduct Determination of Existence of Probable Cause
Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (Sec. 2, Rule
112, as amended by A.M. No 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on
October 3, 2005)
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(c) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
COMELEC (Election Officers in NCR, Provincial
Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys,
Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and
lawyers of the Law Department.
Ombudsman
PCGG
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R.
No. 115906, September 29, 1994, 237 SCRA 242)
- PCGG has the power to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
for forfeiture of allegedly ill-gotten wealth although not committed by
the respondent or defendant in close association with former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
People vs. Borje (G.R. No. 170046, December
10, 2014)
- in crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, the determination of probable cause during the
preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function
that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is empowered to
determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause
exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as
defined by law.
- courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause believing that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
necessitating the filing of the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. This rule is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. - unless it is
shown that the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause was done in a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
this Court will not interfere with the same.
Ejercito vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 212398, November
25, 2014)
- Under COMELEC Resolution No. 9386, all lawyers in the
COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region
("NCR"), Provincial Election
Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant
Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and lawyers of
the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation
of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which
may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by
the COMELEC.
Agdeppa vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 146376, April 23, 2014) citing
M.A. Jimenez
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 155307,
June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 381, 392-394.)
- determination of probable cause against those in public office
during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to
investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any
person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. It has the discretion to determine whether a
criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be
filed or not.
Shu vs. Dee (G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014) - The determination of
probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first
place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation.
The prosecutor’s ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final
determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify
or affirm the prosecutor’s determination.
- It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; when he
grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the
contemplation of law. [N.B. Remedy is Rule 65 petition with the Court
of Appeals]
Peña Vs. Martizano (A.M. No. Mtj-02-1451, May
30, 2003)
- When the facts stated in the complaint plainly described an
election offense, only the Commission on Elections (Comelec) had the
exclusive power to preliminarily investigate and to prosecute election
offenses; Comelec, through its authorized legal officers, has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations of all election
offenses and to prosecute them (Sec. 265,
Omnibus Election Code)
Procedure (Sec. 3)
a. Filing of the complaint accompanied by the affidavits and
supporting documents
b. Within 10 days from filing - The investigating officer issues a
subpoena
c. The investigating officer dismisses the complaint
d. Within 10 days from receipt - Respondent shall submit a counter-
affidavit and other supporting documents
e. Within 10 days from receipt of counteraffidavit OR from the
expiration of the period of their submission
f. Clarificatory Hearing (OPTIONAL)
g. Resolution of the investigating prosecutor Estrada vs.
Ombudsman (G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015)
- It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to crossexamine the witnesses which the
complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit
a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
crossexamine.
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the
complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these
Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The right of the
respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant,"
as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga
that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit
a counteraffidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine."
D. Resolution of investigating prosecutor ( Sec. 4,
Rule 112)
• If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.
• If the investigating prosecutor finds no ground to continue with the
inquiry he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of
the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or
to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act
on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
Soriano vs. Marcelo (G.R. No. 160772, July 13,
2009, 592 SCRA 394)
- Conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining
whether there exists probable cause to prosecute a person for the
commission of a crime,
including the determination of whether to conclude, reopen or dismiss
the criminal complaint subject of the preliminary investigation, is a
matter that rests within the sound discretion of the provincial or city
prosecutor. This is clear from the provision of Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which specifically states that no
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
fiscal without the prior written authority of the provincial or city fiscal
or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy
• Plopinio vs. Liza Zabala-Cariño (A.M. No. P-082458 (Formerly
OCA IPI No. 08-2755-P), March 22, 2010)
- A person shall be considered formally charged: x x x x
In criminal proceedings - (a) upon the finding of the existence of
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor and the consequent filing
of an information in court with the required prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy;
(b) upon the finding of the existence of probable cause by the public
prosecutor or by the judge in cases not requiring a preliminary
investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure; or (c)
upon the finding of cause or ground to hold the accused for trial pursuant
to Section 13 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Manlavi vs. Gacott Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293, May 9, 1995)
The provision that “no complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor” applies to the
conduct of the preliminary investigation which is within the control of
the public prosecutor. It has no application in a case where the
information is already filed before the proper court
• Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the
complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy
on the ground
that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the
information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor
or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
Guidelines for the documentation of a resolution by an investigating
prosecutor, who after conducting preliminary investigation, finds no
probable cause and recommends a dismissal of the criminal complaint:
Abanadovs. Bayona [A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804 (Formerly A.M. OCA
I.P.I. No. 09-2179-MTJ), July 30, 2012]
1. the investigating prosecutor prepares a resolution recommending
the dismissal and containing the following:
a. summary of the facts of the case;
b. concise statement of the issues therein; and
c. his findings and recommendations.
2. within five days from the date of his resolution, the investigating
fiscal shall forward his resolution to the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor, as the case may be, for review;
3. if the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is reversed by the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, the latter may file the
information himself or direct another assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so;
4. the resolution of the investigating prosecutor shall be strictly
confidential and may not be released to the parties, their counsels and/or
any other unauthorized person until the same shall have been finally
acted upon by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor or his duly
authorized assistant and approved for promulgation and release to the
parties; and
5. that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
complainant's affidavit, the sworn statements of the prosecution's
witnesses, the respondent's counter-affidavit and the sworn statements of
his witnesses and such other evidence, as far as practicable, shall be
attached to the
information
E. Review
CIRCULAR NO. 70
SUBJECT: 2000 National Prosecution
Service (NPS) RULE ON APPEAL
• Scope - appeals from resolutions of the Chief
State Prosecutor, Regional State
Prosecutors and Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases subject of
preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation. (Sec. 1)
• Where to Appeal - Secretary of Justice
• Period to appeal - within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed.
• How appeal taken - by filing a verified petition for review with the
Office of the Secretary,
Department of Justice, and by furnishing copies thereof to the adverse
party and the Prosecution Office issuing the appealed resolution.
• Action on the petition - Secretary of Justice may:
Dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without
merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
• If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had
already been arraigned.
Note: Any arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar
the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review.
• Effect of the appeal - Unless the Secretary of Justice directs
otherwise, the appeal shall not hold the filing of the corresponding
information in court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the
appealed resolution.
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending
resolution of the appeal,
the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
• Disposition of the appeal - The Secretary may reverse, affirm or
modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion,
dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3
hereof; That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided
has not been complied with;
That there is no showing of any reversible error;
That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it
suspends the proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial
question;
That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was
taken;
That the offense has already prescribed; and
That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal.
• Motion for reconsideration - The aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse party and the
Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof
of such service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
When DOJ Secretary reverses or modifies prosecutor’s resolution – Sec.
4, last par.
He shall direct the prosecutor concerned either a. to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation; or
b. to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with
notice to the parties.
Note: SAME rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by
the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Verzano, Jr. vs. Paro (G.R. No. 171643, August
8, 2010) citing Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 113216, September 5,
1997)
- the justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of
despite the filing of an information in court;
- where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only
after an Information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend
arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved.
F. When Warrant of Arrest may Issue (Sec. 5, Rule 112)
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to
establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest or a
commitment order.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information.
Hao vs. People (G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014)
- Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon
the filing of the criminal complaint or information. He may: a) dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from
notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause.
Mendoza v. People (G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014)
- the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is
not mandatory. The
court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” -
“once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.”
G. Cases NOT Requiring a Preliminary Investigation ( Sec. 8, Rule
112)
1. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure ( Sec. 8, Rule 112)
If filed with the prosecutor (par. a)
• offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this
Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based
on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
If filed with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in
Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed.(par. b)
If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall dismiss the complaint or information.
If the judge finds sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had
already been arrested, and hold the latter for trial.
Note: the judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead
of a warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary to place the accused
under custody.
2. If the complaint or information was filed after the accused was
lawfully arrested without warrant.
3. If the offense is punishable by fine only.
H. Remedies of accused if there was no preliminary investigation
1. Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a PI, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the RPC, as amended, in the presence of his counsel (Sec.6, 2nd
par., Rule 112)
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of
12 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent;
18 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent, and 36 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
2. The waiver by the person lawfully arrested of the provisions of
Art. 125 of the RPC does not preclude him from applying for bail;
3. After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the
time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation. (Sec.6,
3rd par., Rule 112)
I. Inquest
Definition: an informal and summary investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and
detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for
the purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under
custody and correspondingly be charged in court. [Sec. 1, New Rules on
Inquest, DOJ Department Circular No. 61
(September 21, 1993)]
Note: Memorandum of Agreement between the
DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman Effective April 29, 2012.
• Inquest of complaints for crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan shall be conducted by the OMB; Provided, that inquest
of such complaints for crimes committed outside the National Capital
Judicial Region may be conducted by the city/provincial prosecutors
who are authorized to approve and file the Information before the
respective Clerks of Court of RTC, pursuant to Ombudsman Adm. Order
No. 11-94.
V. ARREST
Definition: (Sec. 1, Rule 113)
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)
- Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the
taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same rule, an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
A. Arrest, how made (Sec. 2, Rule 113)
• by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested; or
• by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. no violence or unnecessary force shall be used; person
arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention
Pestilos vs. Generoso (G.R. No. 182601,
November 10, 2014)
- An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical
restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other
and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
B. Arrest Without Warrant, When Lawful (Sec. 5, Rule 113)
Par. (a) Sec. 5 - When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing
or is attempting to commit an offense (IN
FLAGRANTE DELICTO)
Elements:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
Peope vs. Usman (G.R. No. 201100, February 4, 2015)
- a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.
Since accused-appellant was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante
delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was
caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot.
People of the Philippines v. Noel Bartolome,
G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013
The accused discredits the validity of his arrest by contending that the
arrest resulted from an instigation, not from a legitimate entrapment. A
buybust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means
of arresting violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-
bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-
bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not
prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations.
The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the
solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminals course of
conduct. In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a "decoy
solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation.
Valid Arrests:
People vs. Araza (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)
-Araza was clearly apprehended in flagrante delicto as he was then
committing a crime
(sniffing shabu) in the presence of PO1 Talacca; his warrantless arrest is
valid pursuant to Section 5(a) of the above-quoted
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
People vs. Adriano (G.R. No. 208169, October 8, 2014)
- A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is
caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the
operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the
violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or
used in the commission of the crime." - Adriano was caught in the act of
committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught
selling illegal shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the plain view
of the arresting officers.
People vs. Marcelo (G.R. No. 181541, August
18, 2014)
-appellant was apprehended after she exchanged the shabu in her
possession for the marked money of the poseur-buyer. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only authorized
but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant.
People vs. Tancinco (G.R. No. 200598, June 18, 2014)
-lawfully arrested without a warrant after information of his being armed
and engaging in a pot session with other persons was given to the police
officers who then investigated and pursued the lead of the Barangay
Intelligence Network (BIN) informant. Incident to the lawful warrantless
arrest of Tancinco is a search on his person made by the police officers
which then yielded his illegal possession of shabu.
Zalameda vs. People (G.R. No. 183656, September
4, 2009)
- a "tip" from a concerned citizen that a "pot session" was in
progress at the petitioner's house; the police did not have enough time to
secure a search warrant considering the "time element" involved in the
process (i.e., a pot session may not be for an extended period of time and
it was then 5:15 a.m.); police immediately proceeded to the identified
place and verified from a slightly opened door and saw the petitioner
and Villaflor "sniffing smoke" or "sumisinghot ng shabu".
- There was sufficient probable cause for the police officers to
believe that the petitioner and Villaflor were then and there committing a
crime. As it turned out, the petitioner indeed possessed a prohibited drug
and, together with Villaflor, was even using a prohibited drug and
likewise illegally possessed drug paraphernalia, contrary to law. When
an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only
authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant
Invalid Arrests:
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)
- The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the
police operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding
a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such
acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
People vs. Andaya (G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014)
- confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated
to be the poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-
bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from
the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of
the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between
the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur
buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between
him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue
against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had
directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the
poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur
buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
People vs. Cogaed, (G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
- At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was
not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua,
for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected,
“two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”; Both
elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt
acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed
was in possession of drugs at that time.
People vs. Edaño, (G.R. No. 188133, July 07,
2014)
- In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise that could be
properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of
PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe
testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each
other when he approached them; there was no exchange of money and
drugs when he approached the car.
People vs. Villareal, (G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013)
- NOT a case of an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest; a previous
arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5,
Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest.
-Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no
other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the
acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s
hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
Par. (b) Sec. 5 - When an offense has just been committed and he
(officer or private person) has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it (HOT PURSUIT )
Elements:
Pestilos vs. Generoso (G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
(1)an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
- following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause
objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of
compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable
arrests.
- an offense has just been committed means that there must be a
large measure of IMMEDIACY between the time the offense was
committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of
time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.
- the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
- personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of
the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime
- probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual
belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.
- In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is
incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have
complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically, the (a) requirement of immediacy; the (b) police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the (c)
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought
to be arrested committed the crime.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint
of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded
to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling;
the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners
as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and
Atty. Generosolived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time
that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the
arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were
well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at
the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers'
personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02
Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners
following Atty. Generoso's account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply
violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to
follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other
words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the
petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending
policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the
crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as
the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but
was in connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier
had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges
against them before taking them to
Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
• People vs. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013
- Personal knowledge of past criminal records is insufficient; to interpret
“personal knowledge” as referring to a person’s reputation or past
criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless
arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal
infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under
Section 5. Par. (c) Sec. 5 - When a person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another (ARREST OF
ESCAPED PRISONER)
Reason: escapee is in continuous commission of a crime (evasion of
service of sentence)
In cases falling under in flagrante and hot pursuit exceptions, where to
deliver person arrested – Sec. 5, last par.
“xxx persons arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112.”
Fourth instance – when person previously lawfully arrested escapes or is
rescued – Sec.
13
“Arrest after escape or rescue - If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is
rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a
warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines”
C. Method of Arrest
a. By officer with a warrant
Duty of arresting officer – Sec. 3
• to arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police station or
jail without unnecessary delay
• execution of warrant
Execution of warrant – Sec. 4
• head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered
shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its
receipt; and
• the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a
report to the judge who issued the warrant within ten (10) days after the
expiration of the period
- In case of his failure to execute, he shall state the reasons therefor.
• Method of arrest of officer by virtue of a warrant – Sec. 7
the officer shall inform the person to be arrested:
(1) the cause his arrest; and
(2) the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest
Exceptions:
• he flees;
• forcibly resists before the officer had an opportunity to inform him;
and
• when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest
Note: the officer need not have the warrant of arrest in his possession at
the time of the arrest BUT must show the same after the arrest, if the
person arrested so requires.
b. By officer without warrant - Sec. 8
• The officer shall inform the person to be arrested of: his authority
the cause of the arrest
Exceptions:
-If the person to be arrested:
• is engaged in the commission of the crime
• is pursued immediately after the commission
• escapes, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has the
opportunity to inform him
-Giving him such information will imperil the arrest
c. By private person – Sec. 9
• The private person shall inform the person to be arrested of:
the intention to arrest him the cause of the arrest
Exceptions: (same in Sec. 8)
• Time of making arrest – Sec. 6
When arrest may be made – any day and at any time of the day or night
(Colorado vs. Agapito (A.M. No. MTJ-
06-1658 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ],July 3, 2007)
Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday,
causing him to languish in jail for two days and two nights. Respondent
cannot be held administratively liable for this particular matter. It is of
no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a
Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made
on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued.
Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant
of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
I. Requisites of a Valid Warrant of Arrest
Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution
“Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.”
Requisites:
(1) Issued upon probable cause;
(2) Determined personally by the judge;
(3) After evaluation of the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause;
(4) Particularly describe the person to be arrested; and
(5) In connection with the specific offense or crime
Ocampo vs. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014, citing People
v. Grey, G.R. No.
180109, July 26, 2010
- Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a
hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof; Judge’s personal
examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest;
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report
and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission
of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.
E. Determination of Probable Cause for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
- correlate with Sec. 5, Rule 112 (Procedure in determining the
existence of probable cause for issuance of Warrant of Arrest)
• Hao vs. People (G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014)
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the person
sought to be arrested. This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal
information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to
address the necessity of placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice.
Aguinaldo vs. Ventus (G.R. No. 176033, March
11, 2015)
- Pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation,
or petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest
previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only
take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover,
judges should take note of the following:
1.If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court
should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the public
prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before
the period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be more than
the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of the motion to
suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed with the
arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
2. If there is a pending petition for review before
the DOJ, the court may suspend the proceedings upon motion by the
parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused
and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on
or before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be
more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment
as scheduled and without further delay.
F. Distinguish probable cause of fiscal from that of a judge
• Estrada vs. Ombudsman (G.R. Nos.
212140-41, January 21, 2015)
- Judicial determination of probable cause is considered separate
from the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation.
- Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries
are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors
and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the Prosecutor.
- The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a
necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings
on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no
confusion as to their distinct objectives.
• Hao vs. People (G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014)
- To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance
with the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by
the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine
the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused. In doing so, he
need not conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally review
the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely
on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the
contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that
there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial.
However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which
to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of
probable cause to issue an arrest order.
This responsibility of determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less
than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could
ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by
forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution
finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence
on hand as to enable the judge to make his personal and separate judicial
finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
- Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the
case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined
by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging
them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply
for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required,
rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such
as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to
verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause.
The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution we repeat, commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.
VI. BAIL
Definition: bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter
specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property
bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (Sec. 1, Rule 114)
David vs. Agbay (G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015) - distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other
reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when
a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally
CUSTODY OVER THE BODY OF THE ACCUSED. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.
A. Nature
Sec. 13, Art. III, Constitution
“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
• Leviste vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010
Bail is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question:
what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been
proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and
final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's
interest in assuring the accused's presence at trial.
B. When a matter of right; exceptions
(Sec. 4, Rule 114)
• Bail is a MATTER OF RIGHT, when:
a. before or after conviction by the MTC or
b. before conviction by RTC of all offenses punishable by a penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua
Exceptions:
1. When the evidence of guilt is strong in capital offenses or offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Exception to the
exception: when accused charged with a capital offense is a minor, he is
entitled to bail regardless of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
2. Bail in extradition proceedings
3. Right to bail is not available in the military.
4. After judgment has become final. (Sec. 24)
5. After the accused has commenced to serve his sentence
C. When a MATTER OF DISCRETION
(Sec. 5, Rule 114)
Bail is discretionary, when:
a. Before conviction, in offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
b. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense NOT punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment Note: Should the court
grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
• If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances: (BailNegating Circumstances)
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
RECIDIVIST
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; ESCAPED
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
PROBATION
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail;
FLIGHT RISK or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal. CRIME RISK
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
Qui vs. People (G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012)
- pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence
of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail
pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave
as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
- In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided
by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted
by the trial court.
• Leviste vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010
- Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment.
On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, then bail shall be DENIED.
- In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal
may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the
appellate court's denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of
discretion.
- In the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if
the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion
will thereby be committed.
- Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for
bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate
court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and
(2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant's case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,
the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than
those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either
allow or disallow bail.
- if the appellant's case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
court's stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the
circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient
to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.
D. Hearing of application for bail in capital offenses
Gacad vs. Clapis (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012) citing Gacal
vs. Infante (A.M. No.
RTJ-04-1845, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535) - The respondent judge
in that case was held guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules
when he granted bail to the accused charged with murder without
conducting a hearing and despite the absence of a petition for bail from
the accused. The Court emphasized that bail cannot be allowed to a
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice
to the prosecution; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
- Judge Clapis had already been administratively sanctioned, for his
failure to hear and consider the evidence of the prosecution in granting
bail to the accused. Therefore, we now impose upon him the extreme
administrative penalty of dismissal from the service.
Gacal vs. Infante (A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845
[FORMERLY A.M. NO. IPI NO. 03-1831-RTJ],
October 5, 2011 ]
Duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended);
(2) Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless or whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8, id); and
(3) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the [bail bond], otherwise, petition should be denied.
Villanueva vs. Buaya (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2241-RTJ), November 22, 2010)
- The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail
hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the
grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge.
In order for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing
should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of
the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused.
- whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a
petition for bail is required in order for the court to consider the
guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing
the amount of bail. This Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even
if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an
application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the
prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the
strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of
bail.
Atty. Franklin G. Gacal vs. Judge Jaime I.
Infante, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in
Alabel, Sarangani, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845,
October 5, 2011
A hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail
is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in
criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Even if the accused did not file an application for bail and even if the
public prosecutor had recommended bail, a hearing should still be held.
Such hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. The public prosecutor’s
recommendation of bail was not material in deciding whether to conduct
the mandatory hearing or not. Also, even if the prosecution did not
oppose the grant of bail to the accused as in fact it recommended bail
and that the prosecution did not want to adduce evidence were irrelevant
and did not dispense with the bail hearing. - LPB
Burden of Proof in Bail application
Gacad vs. Clapis, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 534)
Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that “at the hearing of an application for
bail filed by the person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.”
This rule presupposes that: (1) an application for
bail was filed, and (2) the judge notified the prosecutor and conducted a
bail hearing for the prosecution to adduce evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused.
E. Guidelines in fixing amount of bail (Sec.
9, Rule 114)
The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the
following factors:
a) Financial ability of the accused.
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense.
c) Penalty for the offense charged.
d) Character and reputation of the accused.
e) Age and health of the accused.
f) Weight of the evidence against the accused.
g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial.
h) Forfeiture of other bail.
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested.
j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Note: Excessive bail shall not be required.
F. Bail when not required ( Sec. 16, Rule 114)
1) Violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense
punishable by a penalty not exceeding 6 months imprisonment, and/or a
fine of P2,000 where the person is unable to post the required cash or
bail bond. (S1 RA No.6306).
2) Criminal cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
except:
when the accused failed to appear when required; when the accused is a
recidivist; a fugitive from justice; charged with physical injuries; has no
known residence (Secs. 10, 12, RSP)
3) When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more
than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense
charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after 30 days of preventive imprisonment. (S16 R114).
4) In cases not requiring preliminary investigation nor covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure where the MTC judge is satisfied that there
is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, in which case he
may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest. (Sec 8(b), Rule 112).
Cervantes vs. Pangilinan (A.M. No. MTJ-08-
1709 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1225MTJ], July 31, 2009)
- bail is not generally required for violation of municipal or city
ordinances, and for criminal offenses when the prescribed penalty is not
higher than arresto mayor or fine of P2,000 or both, as in the case for
Slander against complainant which is covered by Art. 358 of the Revised
Penal Code.
G. Increase or reduction of bail (Sec. 20,
Rule 114)
• Court may either increase or reduce the amount of bail after the
accused is admitted to bail and upon good cause.
Increased Bail:
- the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the
increased amount within a reasonable period.
H. Forfeiture and cancellation of bail (Secs.
21-22, Rule 114)
Forfeiture:
• When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these
Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as
required, his bail shall be declared or ordered forfeited
• In the order of forfeiture of the bail, the bondsmen shall be given
30 days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why
no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their
bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
• (a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his
non-production; and
• (b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when
first required to do so.
• Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered
against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail.
The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
Cancellation:
• Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be canceled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.
Note: The bail shall be be deemed automatically canceled upon a)
acquittal of the accused, b) dismissal of the case, or c) execution of the
judgment of conviction.
Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro (G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010)
- Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman
potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period
granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused's status to
that of a fugitive without standing.
I. Application not a bar to objections in illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation (Sec. 26, Rule 114)
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging or assailing the:
validity of his arrest; or legality of the warrant issued; or regularity of
the preliminary investigation; or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation
Note: Provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
Borlongan vs. Pena (G.R. No. 143591, May 5,
2010)
- The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily
enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking
his objections thereto.
- Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
is intended to modify previous rulings that an application for bail or the
admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his
right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or
irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this
Court in People vs. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because
precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural
rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application.
Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even
without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of
their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time
of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already
in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in
resolving the petitioner's petition for certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.
- When the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there
was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same
with the Court of Appeals or SC. The posting of bail bond was a matter
of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be
deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.
J. Hold departure order & Bureau of Immigration watchlist
(DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 41, JUNE 7,
2010)
Section 1. Hold Departure Order. – The Secretary of Justice may issue
an HDO, under any of the following instances:
(a) Against the accused, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases
falling within the jurisdiction of courts below the Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs).
If the case against the accused is pending trial, the application under oath
of an interested party must be supported by:
(i) a certified true copy of the complaint or information and
(ii) a Certification from the Clerk of Court concerned that criminal
case is still pending.
(b) Against the alien whose presence is required either as a defendant,
respondent, or witness in a civil or labor case pending litigation, or any
case before an administrative agency of the government.
The application under oath of an interested party must be supported by:
(i) a certified true copy of the subpoena or summons issued against
the alien, &
(ii) a certified true copy complaint in civil, labor or administrative case
where the presence of the alien is required.
The Secretary of Justice may likewise issue an HDO against any person,
either motu proprio, or upon the request by the
Head of a Department of the Government; the
Head of a constitutional body or commission; the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the
Judiciary; the
Senate President or the House Speaker for the
Legislature, when the adverse party is the Government or any
of its agencies or instrumentalities, or in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health.
Section 4. HDO/WLO Validity. – The validity period of any HDO/WLO
issued pursuant to this Circular shall be reckoned from the date of its
issuance. The HDO shall be valid for five (5) years unless sooner
terminated. On the other hand, the WLO shall be valid for sixty (60)
days unless sooner terminated or extended, for a non-extendible period
of not more than sixty (60) days.
VII. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. Rights of Accused at the Trial (Sect. 1, Rule 115)
• In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment.
The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to
the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically
ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the
accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall
be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an
accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his
right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is
regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself
in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-
examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall
not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial.
Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness
who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by
law.
a. To be presumed innocent
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution: SEC. 14. (1) No
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and x x x
Macayan, Jr. vs. People (G.R. No. 175842,
March 18, 2015)
- Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in
the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of
an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays
such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to
discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused
must be acquitted.
People vs. Estibal (G.R. No. 208749, November
26, 2014) citing People v. Ganguso (320 Phil. 324 (1995)
- An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which
the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard
is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that
burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he
would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding the possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the
offense charged.
Atienza vs. People (G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014)
- The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence, failing which, the presumption of innocence prevails and the
accused should be acquitted. This, despite the fact that his innocence
may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or even absence of
defense.
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction, Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be
better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
b. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution:
SEC. 14..
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x be be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
Patula vs. People (G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012) - The importance of
the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in
the information should never be taken for granted by the State. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in
the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than
that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if
duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.
- charging appellants with illegal possession when the information
filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation brought against them. The rule is that when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information,
and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged.
An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
- where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly
informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or
offenses included therein
c. To be present and defend in person OR by counsel
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution:
SEC. 14.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused x x x shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel x x x
Right to counsel – Sec. 11, Art. III, Philippine
Constitution
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasijudicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Tanenggee vs. People (G.R. No. 179448, June 26,
2013) citing Remolona v. Civil Service Commission
[414 Phil. 590, 599 (2001]
- the right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
People vs. Lara (G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012)
- The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a
police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation;
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course
of the line-up
Belleza vs. Macasa (A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009)
- accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic
rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.
Libuit vs. People (G.R. No. 154363, September 14, 2005)
- The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused
who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one
is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where
the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel
of his own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of
evidence for the defense arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself
alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
Gutang vs. People (G.R. No. 135406, July 11,
2000)
The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody
and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is
guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
d. To testify as a witness in his own behalf
subject to cross-examination ; and
his silence will not prejudice him
e. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
People vs. Fieldad (G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014)
- the taking of paraffin tests does not violate the right of the accused
against self incrimination; His right against self
incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his
hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion
and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in
this case.
Dela Cruz vs. People (G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
- constitutional right of an accused against selfincrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.
f. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused xxx shall enjoy the right x x
x to meet witnesses face to face xxx”
Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015
- A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a
trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as
the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
Go vs. People (G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012) - right of confrontation,
is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a
twofold purpose:
(1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe
the deportment of witnesses; the constitutional requirement “insures that
the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by
the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-
examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing
out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the
witness and assess his credibility.”
- right of confrontation is intended “to secure the accused in the right to
be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at
the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the
accused an opportunity of crossexamination,” it is properly viewed as a
guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials.
Victoriano vs. People (G.R. Nos. 171322-24,
November 30, 2006)
-the right to confront and cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses,
the same is indeed a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
crossexamination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-
examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness
will be received or allowed to remain in the record. In the instant case,
petitioner's counsel did not cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses
due to his failure to cooperate in preparing his defense.
g. To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution:
SEC. 14.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused xxx shall enjoy the right xxx
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf xxx”
See Rule 21 (Subpoena) of Rules of Court
h. To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
Section 14 (2) and Sec. 16, Article III of the
1987Constitution SEC. 14.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused xxx shall enjoy the right to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial xxx”
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
RA 8493 or “Speedy Trial Act of 1998”
Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products (G.R. No.
183994, June 30, 2014)
- “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In
determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the
delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay;
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as
the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings
which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must
be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the
Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a
policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of
a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable
length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial
Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the
Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al.
(A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011) - the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must
be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to
a fair trial.
i. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the
manner prescribed by law.
See Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
B. Rights of persons under custodial investigation
Sec.12 (1), Art. III of the Constitution (Miranda Rights)
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person
Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the
Duties of the Arresting,
Detaining, and Investigating Officers, and Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof)
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall
at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) x x x inform the latter (person being investigated), in a language
known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice,
who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot
afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by
the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumb-marked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to
read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer
in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no
effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a
valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers
and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by
him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and
of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation
shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly
accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international
non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the
President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her
spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent
or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
NOTE: "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
De Castro vs. People (G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015)
- These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an
official proceeding for the investigation and prosecution for crime. They
exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal indictment and trial for
a criminal offense; They arise at the very inception of the criminal
process – when a person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal
offense. For what a person says or does during custodial investigation
will eventually be used as evidence against him at the trial and, more
often than not, will be the linchpin of his eventual conviction.
His trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right
against self-incrimination and to counsel. This is the logic behind what
we now call as the Miranda doctrine; We must, therefore, be careful to
note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never intended to
hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime
involving persons not under restraint.
- The accused in the case before us may not be said to be under
custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by any
police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary
manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was
free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or
pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her
to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology
recognize to have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the
invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
Luspo vs. People (G.R. No. 188487, October 22, 2014)
- custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rule on
custodial investigation begins to operate as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the
interrogation is then aimed on a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory
questions that tend to elicit incriminating statements.
People vs. Chavez (G.R. No. 207950,
September 22, 2014)
- The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to
ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the “inherently compelling pressures” “generated
by the custodial setting itself,” “which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist,”
and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular
confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by
incustody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are
by questioning of persons suspected of felonies
- even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer
must be apprised of their Miranda rights.
VIII. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (Rule 116)
• Kummer vs. People (G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013)
- Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and
in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed. Procedural due process requires that the accused
be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment,
the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty
that could be possibly meted against him.
It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of
freedom, even of his life,depending on the nature of the imputed crime.
- The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended
information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only
to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments.
• Taglay vs. Daray (G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012)
-Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least
to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.
As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot
be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of
arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial
court.
Options of the accused before arraignment and plea
a. Bill of particulars – Sec. 9
The accused may, xxx move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
b. Suspension of Arraignment – Sec. 11 (See discussion below)
A. Arraignment and Plea, how made
( Sec. 1, Rule 116)
Arraignment:
Sec. 1 (a), Rule 116
shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information;
reading the same (complaint or information) in the language or
dialect known to him; and
asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
Note: The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information.
Plea:
Sec. 1 (b), Rule 116
the accused must be present at the arraignment and
must personally enter his plea.
Note: Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to
do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
Private offended party at the arraignment (Sec.
1[f], Rule 116)
The private offended party shall be required to appear at the
arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil
liability, and other matters requiring his presence.
In case of his failure to appear despite due notice, the court may
allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the
trial prosecutor alone.
B. When should plea of not guilty be entered
1. When the accused so pleaded.
2. When the accused refuses to plead.
3. When the accused enters a conditional plea of guilty or one entered
subject to the provision that a certain penalty be imposed upon him.
4. When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence
or introduces evidence of self-defense.
5. Where in admitting the act charged, he sets up matters of defense
or lawful justification.
6. When the plea is indefinite or ambiguous.
C. When may accused enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense (plea
bargaining)
1. At arraignment, the accused with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
2. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed
to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
3. After prosecution rested its case, allowed only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged.
D. Accused pleads guilty to capital offense, what the court should do
(Sec. 3, Rule 116)
• When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, court shall:
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; and
shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability.
Note: accused may also present evidence on his behalf (People vs. Lopit,
G.R No.177742,
December 17, 2008)
People vs. Gambao (G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)
Duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense. The trial court is mandated:
1. to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
2. to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability, and
3. to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
E. Searching inquiry
People vs. Gambao (G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)
- searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a
free and informed judgment. The inquiry must focus on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
• Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge
must conduct a “searching inquiry,” we have held that the following
guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such
as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of
the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a
lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty
should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged
and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of
his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation
of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known
and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading
guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the
tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
• People vs. Janjalani (G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011)
- searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by
the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of
their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
F. Improvident Plea
- a plea without information as to all the circumstances affecting it;
based upon a mistaken assumption or misleading information or advice
• At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court
may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be
substituted by a plea of not guilty. (Sec. 5, Rule 116)
People vs. Gambao (G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013)
- As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are
set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea
is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this
case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the
offense charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is made,
whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission of the crime by the accused.
G. Grounds for suspension of arraignment
(Sec. 11, Rule 116)
Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in
the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question.
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
• Aguinaldo vs. Ventus (G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015)
- while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the
accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
- it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of the proceedings in
the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice
Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored
on the rule provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12,
dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for the disposition of
appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy- five (75) days.
• Hao vs. People (G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014)
- the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an
unqualified right; while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground
for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office.
IX. MOTION TO QUASH
- the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges
the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects apparent on its face. The complaints only needed to aver
the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and
how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for
such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence,
the complaints were not quashable. (Enrile vs. Manalastas, G.R. No.
166414, October 22, 2014)
• Time to Move to Quash (Sec. 1, Rule 117)
- at any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to
quash the complaint or information
• Form and Contents (Sec. 2, Rule 117)
WSD
shall be in writing
signed by the accused or his counsel; and
shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds
A. Grounds (Sec. 3, Rule 117) FLLOCMELD
(a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; F
(b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; L
(c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; L
(d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; O
(e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form; C
(f) more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
for various offenses is prescribed by law; M
(g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; E
(h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification; L
(i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. D
Absence of preliminary investigation not a ground for motion to quash
Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos.
101421-22, February 10, 1994)
The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however, does not
warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the
proceedings already had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity
of an information adversely affected by deficiencies in the preliminary
investigation.
Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to HOLD IN ABEYANCE any further
proceedings therein and to REMAND the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the
outcome of which shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its
appropriate action.
B. Distinguish from demurrer to evidence Motion to Quash (Rule 117)
compared to Demurrer to Evidence (Sec. 23, Rule 119)
MOTION TO QUASH DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Filed before the defendant enters Filed after the prosecution
his plea has rested its case
Does not go into the merits of the Based upon the inadequacy case
but is anchored on matters of the evidence adduced by not directly
related to the question the prosecution in support of of guilt or
innocence of the accused the accusation
Governed by Rule 117 of the Rules Governed by Rule 119 of the on
Criminal Procedure Rules on Criminal Procedure
Does not require a prior leave of May be filed by the accused
court either with leave or without
leave of court
• Amendment of complaint or information (Sec. 4, rule 117)
If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment – court shall order that
an amendment be made.
If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the fact charged does
not constitute an offense – prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment
Note: The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment,
or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite
the amendment
People vs. Andrade (G.R. No. 187000, November
24, 2014)
- If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the
motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to
file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in
the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by
amendment. Corollary to this rule, the court should give the prosecution
an opportunity to amend the information.
- the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations; even
granting that the information in question is defective, it appearing that
the defects thereof can be cured by amendment, the lower court should
not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the Fiscal to amend
the information. When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the
complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a
new information be filed, and save the necessity of appealing the case on
technical grounds when the complaint might easily be amended.
People vs. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013)
- The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein,
which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters
extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To be sure, a
motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact.
Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be filed except when the information is
quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.
C. Effects of sustaining the motion to quash (Sec. 5)
• General Rule: Court may order that another complaint or information
be filed
Exceptions: if the Motion to Quash was based on the ff:
criminal action or liability has been extinguished E
double jeopardy D
If in custody, the accused shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail
Exceptions:
when there is no order sustaining the motion to quash
when there is an order sustaining the motion, but no new
information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause
Exception to the exceptions:
if accused is also in custody for another charge.
D. EXCEPTION to the rule that sustaining the motion is not a bar to
another prosecution (Sec. 6, Rule 117)
Motion to quash was based on the grounds:
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished (Sec. 3(g),
Rule 117;
that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. (Sec. 3 (i), Rule 117)
Note: if motion to quash is based on the ground of prescription - Article
89 of the RPC provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of
totally extinguishing the criminal liability.
E. Double jeopardy (Sec. 7, Rule 117)
• Sec. 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
• “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If the act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for
the same act.”
• Kinds of Double Jeopardy: (People vs.
Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996)
double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
• - one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act,
provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense
charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case.
 double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes
a violation of an
ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the
law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain
the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long
as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging
said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving
the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal
in either case.
• Requisites of Double Jeopardy: (Quiambao vs. People,
G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014)
(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
• A first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
Note:
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening
facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former
charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or
were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent
of the prosecutor and of the offended party, except as provided in section
1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in
whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the
event of conviction for the graver offense.
Bonsubre, Jr., vs. Yerro (G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015)
- a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused’s right to a
speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held that
where after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration
of the order of dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the
accused can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was
actually an acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered. (citing
People vs. Judge Hernandez, 531 Phil. 289 (2006).
Rimando vs. Sps. Aldaba (G.R. No. 203583,
October 13, 2014)
- while filing of the two sets of
Informations under the provisions of BP 22 and under the provisions of
the RPC, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed
by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one
offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of
offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements
of an offense in one law and another law
as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the
rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the
two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the SAME OFFENSE.
Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself
give rise to double jeopardy.
People vs. Torres (G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014)
- when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. In other words, when appellant
appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder,
he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on
double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct
errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Thus, appellant could
not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling
of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in
the Information instead of murder.
Quiambao vs. People (G.R. No. 185267,
September 17, 2014)
- void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. No
legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
Therefore it cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.
Villareal vs. Aliga (G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014)
- double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where
there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of
a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances.
Braza vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 195032, February 20,
2013)
- same criminal act may give rise to two or more separate and
distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as there is
variance between the elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine
of double jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing
the accused from the risk of being prosecuted twice for the SAME
OFFENSE, and not a different one.
- there is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent
information charges another and different offense, although arising from
the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
- there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the same
transaction. A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019 and those of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law,
however, will disclose that there is neither identity nor exclusive
inclusion between the two offenses. Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law share a
common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not
inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included
among or do not form part of those enumerated in the other. For double
jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass
or include those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibits
refers to IDENTITY OF ELEMENTS in the two offenses.
• Bangayan vs. Bangayan (G.R. No. 172777, October 19,
2011)
- only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right
against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the
opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a
sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court
prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence
and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence;
and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not
ready for trial and adjudication.
F. Provisional dismissal (Sec. 8, Rule 117)
Definition: a case is dismissed without prejudice to its being refiled or
revived; dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof.
Requisites: Bonsubre, Jr., vs. Yerro (G.R. No. 205952,
February 11, 2015)
a. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the
accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
b. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
c. The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally; and
d. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
• When dismissal becomes permanent:
 ONE (1) YEAR after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both
TWO (2) YEARS after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived of offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years
• Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products (G.R. No. 183994, June 30,
2014)
- In this case, no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal
or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at
least three days before said hearing; fact is that it was only in open court
that Co moved for provisional dismissal “considering that, as per
records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her
complaint.”
- Importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for
provisional dismissal: Such notice may be served on the offended party
or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one,
or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the
offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with
him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing.
The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the
motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory.
Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts
to make witnesses unavailable;
or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release
of the accused from detention would enable him to > threaten and kill
the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or >flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the > destruction or loss
of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and > prejudice the
rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the
accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the
consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his
property.
• Los Baños vs. Pedro (G.R. No. 173588, April
22, 2009) Motion to Quash vs. Provisional Dismissal
- A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly
state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly
suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are
those that are
TEMPORARY in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice
to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent
(i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case).
Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are
those barred by the principle of double jeopardy by the previous
extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the
dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section
8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not
provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to
a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to
quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of
the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to
quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics
under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the
grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate
remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy.
Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a
motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional
dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8
obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the
consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also
answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be
treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117
unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to
quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or
information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by
amendment.
Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the
complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances
mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand,
specifies the limit of the refiling that Section 5 allows - it cannot be done
where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the
ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section
6.
• Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor (Sec.
9)
• General Rule:
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections.
• Exceptions: MTQ is based on
(a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) the criminal action or liability has beenextinguished;
(d) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. FLED Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation vs.
Romars International Gases Corporation (G.R.
No. 189669, February 16, 2015)
- In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial
court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the
motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they
filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one
involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
- Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash search
warrants? YES
- the omnibus motion rule embodied in
Section 8, Rule 1omnibus 5, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands
that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise,
said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court
could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by
prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
- The omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search
warrants; that “the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused
may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing.
X. PRE-TRIAL
• Pre-trial in criminal cases is mandatory;
Objective: to achieve an expeditious resolution of the case
When : after arraignment and within 30 days from the time the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court shall
order a pretrial conference.
Exception: unless a shorter period is provided by law (Sec. 1, 1st par. ,
Rule 118)
National Power Corporation vs. Adiong [A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2060 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2498- RTJ), July 27, 2011]
Respondent judge failed to conduct the pre-trial conference itself. It is
elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial conference is
mandatory and failure to do so is inexcusable. When the law or
procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court,
not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure,
as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and
warrants a corresponding penalty.
. Matters to be considered during pre-trial (Sec.
1, Rule 118)
a. Plea bargaining;
b. stipulation of facts;
c. marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
d. waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
e. modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and
f. such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
B. What the court should do when prosecution and offended party agree
to the plea offered by the accused
Form
• Court approval is required as to the matters referred in Sec. 1, Rule
118
• Must be in writing
• Signed by the accused
• Signed by the counsel
Effect
• Binding on the parties who made
• Become judicial admissions of the facts stipulated
C. Pre-trial agreement
• Agreements or admissions made and entered during the pre-trial
conference; court approval is required on matters referred to in Sec. 1.
Plea bargaining (except those which the law do not allow plea
bargaining i.e. Sec. 23, RA
9165 or Dangerous Drugs Act)
Stipulation of facts
marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
 modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and
such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
People vs. Likiran (G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014)
-Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118,
meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by
the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was
signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its
admission.
D. Non-appearance during pre-trial (sec. 3, Rule 118)
• Court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following
concur:
(1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND
(2) counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse.
Garayblas vs. Ong (G.R. Nos. 174507-30,
August 3, 2011)
- Pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose
of, the case at its early stage; during pre-trial, attorneys must make a full
disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would
be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court
or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or
by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial.
E. Pre-trial order (Sec. 4, Rule 118)
• Issued by the court after pre-trial conference reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidenced marked
• Purpose:
oBind the parties oLimit the trial to matters not disposed of oControl the
course of the action during trial
Note: can be modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice
People vs. Villanueva (G.R. No. 181829, September 1, 2010)
- to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him
but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized
agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into
without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-
trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused of
the facts agreed upon. In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial
Order was not signed by both appellant and his counsel.
F. Referral of some cases for court annexed mediation and judicial
dispute resolution (
A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA)
• Purpose
• to put an end to pending litigation through a compromise
agreement of the parties and thereby help solve the ever-passing
problem of court docket congestion
• to empower the parties to resolve their own disputes and give
practical effect to the State Policy, viz: “to actively promote party
autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the parties to
make their own arrangement to resolve disputes.”
• Three (3) Stages
1. Court Annexed Mediation (CAM)
The judge refers the parties to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
for mediation by trained and accredited mediators.
2. Failing to secure a Settlement in the first stage,
Second Attempt – JDR Stage
JDR Judge sequentially becomes a mediator conciliator-early neutral
evaluator in a continuing effort to secure a settlement still failing this
attempt, the mediator-judge must turn-over the case to another judge
who will try to settle the case.
• Note: The trial judge shall continue with the pre-trial proper and
proceed to try and decide the case.
3. Appeal referred to PMC- Appeals Court Mediation
(PMC-ACM)
• Cases covered by CAM and JDR
• All civil cases, settlement of estates, and cases covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure, except those which by law may not be
compromised (e.g., Annulment of Marriage)
• Cases covered by the Lupong Tagapamayapa under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 508, as amended by R.A. No.
7160)
• Civil aspect of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.22.
• The civil aspect of quasi-offenses under Title 14 of the Revised
Penal Code
• Civil aspect of Estafa and Libel cases where damages are sought.
(A.M. No.0I-I0-5-SCPHILJA, dated October 16, 200I. AM. No. 04-204-
SC, dated July 20, 2004 and effective August 16, 2004).
• Special proceedings for the settlement of estates
• All habeas corpus decided by the first level courts in the absence of
the RTC judge, that are brought up on appeal from the special
jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under Dec. 35 of Judiciary
Reorgamization Act of 1980.
• Cases may be referred to JDR even during the trial stage upon
written motion of one or both of the parties indicating willingness to
discuss a possible compromise.
• If full settlement is reached, the parties, assisted by their respective
counsels, shall draft the compromise agreement which shall be
submitted to the court for judgment upon compromise or other
appropriate actions.
• If partial settlement is reached the parties shall, assisted by their
respective counsels, submit the terms thereof for the appropriate actions
of the court.
XI. TRIAL
• Definition: examination before the competent tribunal according to
the laws of the land, of facts put in issue in a case for the purpose of
determining such issue.
• When: after a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have
AT LEAST 15 DAYS to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence
WITHIN 30 DAYS from receipt of the pretrial order. (Sec. 1,Rule 119)
A. Instances when presence of accused is required by law
• Upon arraignment and in entering plea;
• During the pre-trial conference, when required by the court;
• During the trial, when required by the court for purposes of
identification;
• During the promulgation of the judgment, unless it is for a light
offense in which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative.
B. Requisite before trial can be suspended on account of absence of
witness
1. the witness is material and appears to the court to be so;
2. party who applies has been guilty of no neglect;
3. witnesses can be had at the time to which the trial is deferred and
no similar evidence could be obtained; and
4.affidavit showing the existence of the above circumstances must be
filed.
• Factors in granting continuance (Sec. 4, Rule 119)
• Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding
would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or
result in a miscarriage of justice; and
• Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and
complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution,
or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the
periods of time established therein.
Go-Bangayan vs. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (G.R. No. 201061, July 03,
2013)
- It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of
the trial court; by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them; continued failure to
present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court
showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case.
C. Trial in absentia
• Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution " x x x after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable."
• Requisites: (Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No.
166980, April 3, 2007)
(1) the accused has already been arraigned,
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and
(3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable, are, as reflected above, present
in the case.
• Time limit within which the accused must be brought to trial
• The arraignment of the accused shall be held within 30 days from
the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
(S1[g] R116).
• The trial shall commence within 30 days from receipt of the pre-
trial order. (S1 R119) as extended (Sec. 6, Rule 119).
D. Remedy when accused is not brought to trial within the prescribed
period (Sec. 9, Rule 119)
• The information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the
ground of denial of his right to speedy trial.
Note: the accused shall have the burden of proving the motion, BUT the
prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to
establish the exclusion/s of time under
Sec. 3 Rule 119.
• Dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy
Note: provided that the requisites of double jeopardy under Sec. 7 Rule
117 are met, the dismissal would amount to an acquittal.
• The judge’s decision on whether there was a violation of the right
to a speedy trial is of course subject to review by the special civil action
for certiorari if made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction.
• Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall
constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.
E. Requisites for discharge of accused to become a state witness (Sec.
17)
1.Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
2.The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its
case;
3.The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge;
4.The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
5.The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude
Jimenez, Jr. vs. People (G.R. No. 209195,
September 17, 2014)
- it is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s
preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a
state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in
reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in
the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on
the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
- in requiring a hearing in support of the discharge, the essential
objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for or against the
discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court’s tangible and
concrete basis – independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's
persuasions – in granting or denying the motion for discharge. We
emphasize, in saying this, that actual hearing is not required provided
that the parties have both presented their sides on the merits of the
motion.
People vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 185729-32,
June 26, 2013)
- Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining those
conditions; the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and
the considerations presented by the prosecuting officer; A trial judge
cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty
at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in
the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused
in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint.
If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the
formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as to the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence;
as to which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one; and the like, the
judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the information
furnished by the prosecuting officer.
Pontejos v. Desierto (G.R. No. 148600, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 64)
- Sec. 17, Rule 119 is applicable only to cases already filed in court.
The trial court is given the power to discharge an accused as a state
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime
and the accused; power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an
executive function. Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative. The fact
that an individual had not been previously charged or included in an
information does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person
as a witness.
Sec. 17, Rule 119, Rules of Court
The discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with
their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon
motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. Sec. 10 of Republic
Act No.
6981
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special
laws;
Two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness (Ampatuan, Jr. vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291,
April 3, 2013)

The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the
discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed
by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed,
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material
points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude. except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said
accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said
accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not
at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. this
Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a
State An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint
by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section
9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his
petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other
requirements of this Act. Nothing in Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

• Other Modes to be state Witness oSec. 10 of Republic Act No. 6981

oSec. 17 of R.A. 6770, Power of the
Ombudsman to grant immunity oImmunity under P.D. No. 749
oImmunity under E.O. No. 14-A
oImmunity under Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 or R.A. 9165 oImmunity and Protection under the
Human
Security Act of 2007 or R.A 9372
F. Effects of discharge of accused as state witness
1. evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically
form part of the trial
Note: if the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible as evidence.
2. Discharge of the accused operates as an acquittal and bar for
further prosecution for the same offense.
Exceptions:
1. Unless accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in
accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis of his
discharge.
2. Failure to testify refers exclusively to defendant's will or fault.
3. Extrajudicial confession: when an accused who turns state's
evidence on a promise of immunity but later retracts and fails to keep his
part of the agreement, his confession of his participation in the
commission of the crime is admissible as evidence against him.
4. Once discharged even if one or all of the conditions required for
his discharge did not really exist, that fact does not affect the legal
consequences of the discharge and the admissibility of his testimony if
otherwise admissible and credible.
G. Demurrer to evidence (Sec. 23, Rule 119)
• An objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised
in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt.
After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence:
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard; or
(2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.
Note: The motion for leave of court to file a demurrer shall specifically
state the grounds and shall be filed within a nonextendible period of five
(5) days after the prosecution rests its case.
Effects:
• If filed with leave of court and was denied by the court – accused
may ADDUCE EVIDENCE in his defense
• If filed without leave of court and was denied by the court –
accused WAIVES the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
• If granted – accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a
non-extendible period of 10 days from notice. The prosecution may
oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
• Order denying the motion for leave of court to file a demurrer or
the demurrer itself is not reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.
People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, Mar. 30, 2011).
The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, which states, “When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.” Under the rule, the
RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present
evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for
her demurrer to evidence,
thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to
present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness
and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to
evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively
waived her right to present her evidence.
People vs. Go (G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014)
- Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto
is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the
judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To
be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused.” Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the
court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient
enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
- grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. As to effect,
the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot
be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The
order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When grave
abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null
and void.
People vs. Uy (G.R. No. 158157, September
30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668)
This Court finds that the trial court committed not only gross reversible
error of judgment but also was actuated with grave abuse of discretion,
exceeding the parameters of its jurisdiction, in holding that Panangin’s
retracting of his confession shows that the execution thereof was
involuntary and that in any event it was inadmissible as it was "a fruit of
[a] poisonous tree."
The trial court blindly accepted the claim of the defense that the
confession was not made voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit
executed by Panangin on July 1, 2002 or more than 5 months after his
sworn statementconfession was given and after the prosecution rested its
case, which affidavit Panangin was not even called to identify and affirm
at the witness stand, hence, hearsay.
The decision of the trial court undoubtedly deprived the prosecution of
due process as it was not given the opportunity to check the veracity of
Panangin’s alleged retraction
Does the grant of demurrer to evidence for lack of jurisdiction constitute
acquittal? NO.
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).
•After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence
with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have
jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged
(Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction
for which she can be held criminally liable. •Accordingly, the RTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case" and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.
*** In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence
and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide
the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This
being the case, the RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an
acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. (Asistio vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
Remedy from denial of demurrer to evidence - certiorari
Rule 119, Sec. 23 provides that ‘”The order denying the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.”
However, the Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari filed by
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas against
the denial by the Sandiganbayan of their respective demurrers to
evidence, thus:
“The Court inevitably concludes that the Sandiganbayan completely
ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently charge conspiracy
to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of
evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least
P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate crimes. The
Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari;
ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No.
SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and
September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to
evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO
AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release
from detention of said petitioners “(Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People
of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 220598, July 19,
2016)
• Reopening — At any time before finality of the judgment of
conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in
either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The
proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
granting it.(Sec. 24)
XII. JUDGMENT
Definition ( Sec. 1, Rule 120)
- is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty
of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty
and civil liability, if any. Sec. 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
“No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
A. Requisites of a judgment
1. must be written in the official language;
2. personally and directly prepared by the judge;
3. signed by him; and
4. contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law
upon which it is based.
B. Contents of judgment (Sec. 2)
• If it is of CONVICTION, the judgment shall state:
(a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any;
(b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused
by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
• If it is of ACQUITTAL, the judgment shall state:
(a) whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
(b) the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist
• People vs. Lizada (G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003)
- purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading
the decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of
the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has
formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be
assured from a reading of the decision of the trial court that they were
accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge.
• Judgment for two or more offenses
(Sec. 3, Rule 120)
• General Rule: (Sec. 13, Rule110) Complaint or information must
charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses.
• General Rule: (Sec. 3(f), Rule 117)
The accused may move to quash the complaint or information xxx on
the ground (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law.
Exception:
• Defect is waived when the accused fails to move for quashal
Where the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may:
1. Convict him of as many offenses as there are charged and proved;
Exception: if one of the offenses has been a necessary means for
committing the other offense and where both have been the result of a
single act and
2. Impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately
the findings of fact and law in each offense.
Exception: maximum duration of the offense should be in accordance
with the ”three-fold rule” on the penalty. The maximum duration of the
principal penalty which the herein petitioner has to serve under his
conviction in the 17 cases in question is threefold of 6 months and 1 day,
or 18 months and 3 days. The maximum duration of his sentence cannot
exceed threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of
the penalties imposed upon him
• Variance Doctrine
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. –
When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.
Examples: 1. murder charged, homicide proved (conviction: homicide)
2. robbery charged, theft proved (conviction: theft) 3.
homicide charged, murder proved (conviction: homicide) 3. theft
charged, robbery proved (conviction: theft) 4. rape charged, acts of
lasciviousness proved
(conviction: acts of lasciviousness)
People vs. Noque (G.R. No. 175319,
January 15, 2010)
The only issue raised by the appellant in this petition is that his
conviction for the sale and possession of shabu, despite the fact that
what was established and proven was the sale and possession of
ephedrine, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him since the charges in the
Informations are for selling and possessing methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the
Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which
define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and possession of regulated
drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and
possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are
immediately followed by the qualifying phrase “which is a regulated
drug”. Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in the
Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by
the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.
On March 17, 1988, pursuant to Section 20(8) of RA 6425, as amended,
the Dangerous Drugs Board in its Board Regulation No. 2, S. 1988,
classified as regulated drug all raw materials of ephedrine, as well as
preparations containing the said drug. The chemical formula of
ephedrine is C10 H15 NO, whereas that of methamphetamine is C10
H15 N. The only difference between ephedrine and methamphetamine
is the presence of a single atom of oxygen in the former.
The removal of the oxygen in ephedrine will produce methamphetamine.
With ephedrine containing fifty percent (50%) of methamphetamine
hydrochloride if the oxygen content in the former is removed, the nearly
680 grams of ephedrine seized from the appellant contains about 340
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are
included in the crimes proved. Under these provisions, the offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the information and the
evidence does not alter the nature of the offense,
nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a
discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In
other words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has not
been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific
crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of
lesser crimes or offenses included therein.
People vs. Leonardo (G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010)
Accused charged with 13 counts of rape of 12 year old girl in relation to
RA 7610. Convicted of 6 counts of rape and 5 counts of acts of
lasciviousness performed on a child. Touching breasts and vagina
constitutes sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA 7160, which
was the offense proved, following the variance doctrine.
People vs. Rellota (G.R. No. 18103, July 3, 2010)
Accused sentenced to 2 counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape of
12 year old girl. Supreme Court modified the judgment. 1 count is only
for acts of lasciviousness as defined under Revised Penal Code in
relation to Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7160, following variance doctrine.
People vs. Cuaycong (G.R. No. 196051, October 2, 2013)
Accused convicted of 2 counts of statutory rape of 7 year old daughter of
live-in patner. Supreme Court modified judgment because one count of
rape by carnal knowledge not proved – only penile penetration of
victim’s anus. First mode (rape by carnal knowledge) not necessarily
included in second mode (rape thru sexual assault) and vice versa.
Charge is rape by carnal knowledge so accused cannot be convicted of
rape thru sexual assault without violating his right to be informed of
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Ricalde vs.People (G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015)
Accused convicted of rape thru sexual assault by inserting penis into
anus of 10-year old boy under 2nd paragraph of Art. 266-A, Revised
Penal Code, committed "[b ]y any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person."
There is no variance between the offense charged and the offense proved
because the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all elements of
rape thru sexual assault.
Conviction affirmed but penalty modified from 4 years, 2 months and 1
day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum (imposed by RTC), to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, which is the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
below 12 years old, under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III, RA 7160 (child
prostitution and other sexual abuse).
Teves vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 154182,
December 17, 2004)
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether a public official charged
with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license
in favor of a business enterprise in which he has a pecuniary interest
may be convicted, together with his spouse, of violation of that same
provision premised on his mere possession of such interest.
The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful
intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which
is possession of prohibited interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or
any law.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute
or form part of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently,
the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus
finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of
petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
C. Promulgation of judgment (Sec. 6, Rule 120)
• is an official proclamation or announcement of the decision of the
court
• consists of reading the judgment in the presence of the accused and
any judge of the court in which it was rendered
Who may promulgate the judgment
1. Judge of the court in which it was rendered
2. Clerk of the said court in the absence of the judge who rendered
judgment
3. Executive Judge of the RTC having jurisdiction over the place of
confinement or detention – if accused is confined or detained and upon
the request of the judge who rendered judgment.
Payumo vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 151911,
July 25, 2011)
- Promulgation of the decision is an important part of the decision-
making process.
Promulgation signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or justices
who signed the decision continued to support it which could be inferred
from his silence or failure to withdraw his vote despite being able to do
so. A decision or resolution of the court becomes such, only from the
moment of its promulgation.
- A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is
promulgated and not before. It is an elementary doctrine that for a
judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during
the incumbency of the judge who penned it; the judge who pens the
decision is still an incumbent judge, that is, a judge of the same court,
albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is
promulgated; a judge who died, resigned, retired, had been dismissed,
promoted to a higher court or appointed to another office with
inconsistent functions, would no longer be considered an incumbent
member of the court and his decision written thereafter would be invalid.
Indeed, one who is no longer a member of the court at the time the final
decision or resolution is signed and promulgated cannot validly take part
in that decision or resolution; when a judge or a member of the
collegiate court, who had earlier signed or registered his vote, has
vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of the decision or
resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.
• Instances of promulgation of judgment in absentia
• Two instances when a Judgment may be
Promulgated in absentia (Sec. 6, Rule 120
1. when the judgment is for a light offense, in which case, the
accused's counsel or representative may stand for him; and
2. in cases where despite due notice to the accused or his bondsman
or warden and counsel, the accused failed to appear at the promulgation
of the decision.
Reyes vs. Mangino (A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575, January 31,
2005, 450 SCRA 27)
There are two instances when judgment may be promulgated even
without the personal presence of the accused: (1) when the judgment is
for a light offense, in which case, the counsel for the accused or a
representative may stand for him; and (2) in cases where despite due
notice to the accused or his bondsman or warden and counsel, the
accused failed to appear at the promulgation of the decision. The
evident purpose of this latter exception is to afford the offended party
the opportunity to enforce the award of civil indemnity which could not
otherwise be effected if the decision cannot be pronounced on account of
the absence of the accused.
• Requisites for promulgation in absentia
1. recording the judgment in the criminal docket
2. serving a copy thereof on the accused at their last known address
or through counsel.
Note: If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was
without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies of filing a
motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from
the judgment of conviction
(Rule 122) and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however,
the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice.
Salvador v. Chua, G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015)
The personal presence of the accused at the promulgation of the
judgment was mandatory because the offense of which he was found
guilty was not a light felony. The promulgation of the judgment of
conviction may be done in absentia. The accused who fails to appear at
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies
available under the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a)
the filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule 121), and
(b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court
in order to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date
of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon:
(a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail
himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence.
Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he
should be allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from
notice of the order finding his absence justified and allowing him the
available remedies from the judgment of conviction (Rule 120, Sec. 6)
Villena vs. People (G.R. No. 184091,
January 31, 2011)
Petitioners’ mere filing of notices of appeal through their new counsel,
therein only explaining their absence during the promulgation of
judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender, despite the fact that
said notices were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the
purported date when their new counsel personally secured a copy of the
judgment of conviction from the RTC. The term “surrender” under
Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted
accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against him. The
filing of notices of appeal cannot suffice as a physical and voluntary
submission of petitioners to the RTC’s jurisdiction. It is only upon
petitioners’ valid surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can
avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent compliance with these
requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from
their conviction, were properly denied due course.
D. When does judgment become final (four instances – LSWP) (Sec. 7,
Rule 120)
A judgment becomes final:
1. After the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; or
2. When the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served;
or
3. When the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal; or
4. When the accused has applied for probation.
Modification of Judgment (Sec. 7)
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified
or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.

Villareal vs. People (G.R. No. 151258,

December 01, 2014)
- Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it
can be culled from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may
appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This
rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict against
putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double
jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s
waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
- It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced
in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on
criminal judgments; that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the
state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal
judgment; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the
decision’s error or correctness.
De Vera vs. De Vera G.R. No. 172832, April 6, 2009)
- in judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be
corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for
reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision; Significantly, the
present Rules retained the phrase "upon motion of the accused."
Obviously, the requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect
him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or
penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.
Entry of Judgment – Sec. 8
Section 8. Entry of judgment. — After a judgment has become final, it
shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36.
XIII. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Ybiernas vs. Tanco-Gabaldon (G.R. No. 178925,
June 1, 2011)
- New trial is a remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment
or prevent the failure of justice; The grant or denial of a new trial is,
generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.
• New trial or reconsideration may be granted at any time before the
judgment of conviction becomes final:
o On motion of the accused; or o On motion of the court but with the
consent of the accused
A. Grounds for New Trial (Sec, 2, Rule 121)
1. Errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused have been committed during the trial;
2. New and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment.
Payumo vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 151911,
July 25, 2011)
- mistakes of the attorney as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or immateriality of a certain evidence,
the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a
new trial.
Ceniza-Manantan vs. People (G.R. No. 156248,
August 28, 2007)
- Error of the defense counsel in the conduct of the trial is neither an
error of law nor an irregularity upon which a motion for new trial may
be presented; the foregoing rule admits of exceptions: in cases where
(1) the counsel's mistake is so great and serious that the client is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) the counsel is guilty of
gross negligence resulting in the client's deprivation of liberty or
property without due process of law, the client is not bound by his
counsel's mistakes, and a new trial may be conducted.
B. Grounds for Reconsideration (Sec. 3)
a. Errors of law in the judgment, which require no further
proceedings
b. Errors of fact in the judgment, which require no further
proceedings
• Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court : SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. –
The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Section 2, Rule 37:
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice
thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or
grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the
movant on the adverse party.
Section 4, Rule 121:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a
new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the
grounds on which it is based. x x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
• Posadas vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 168951
& 169000, July 17, 2013)
- Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in
conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.. Basic is the
rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for
those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the
rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to
all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof
of service.
- under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the
requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement
renders the motion defective. “As a rule, a motion without a notice of
hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.”
C. Requisites before a new trial may be granted on ground of newly-
discovered evidence
• Requisites for newly discovered evidence:
(Tadeja vs. People, G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013)
(a) evidence is discovered after trial;
(b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and
(d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted.
Note: The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable
diligence; hence, the term “newly discovered.”
Ybiernas vs. Tanco-Gabaldon (G.R. No. 178925,
June 1, 2011, citing Custodio v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 96027-28, March 8, 2005)
- The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence is whether the [proffered] evidence is in fact
a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by
due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered
has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered,
and a predictive one, i.e., when it should or could have been discovered.
It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We
have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is
essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang
into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the
party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before
or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
Rules do not give an exact definition of DUE DILIGENCE, and whether
the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the
phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice
to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both
a time component and a good faith component.
The movant for a new trial must not only (a) act in a timely fashion in
gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must (b) act reasonably
and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant
acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
N.B. “Berry Rule” – The standards followed by the courts in
determining the propriety of motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
D. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration
• If granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial All the proceedings and evidence not affected
by the commission of such errors and irregularities shall stand, but those
affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may in the
interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
• If granted on the ground of newly discovered evidenceThe
evidence already taken shall stand, and the newly discovered and such
other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence
already in the record.
NOTE: In all cases, when the court grants a trial or reconsideration, the
original judgment shall be set aside and a new judgment rendered
accordingly.
E. Application of Neypes doctrine incriminal cases
• the remedies of motion for reconsideration and motion for new
trial may be availed of at any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, which is within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation
of the judgment (Sec.
1, Rule 121)
• In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a fresh period of
15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court to be counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. (fresh period rule)
o Neypes ruling applicable to criminal cases (Yu vs. Samson-Tatad, G.
R. No. 171979,
February 9, 2011; Rodriguez vs. People, G.R.
No. 192799, October 24, 2012)
Correlate with Section 6 of Rule 122
XIV. APPEAL (Rule 122)
An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine
the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The appellate
court may, and generally does, look into the entire records to ensure that
no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court. (Geroche vs. People, G.R. No. 179080,
November 26, 2014)
• The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.
• Who may Appeal
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy (Sec. 1, Rule 122)
Any party refers to the:
•accused
•prosecution
•offended party
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People (G.R. No.
147703, April 14, 2004)
Both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed
in double jeopardy. The prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that
the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. The offended
parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil
liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of
conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
The State cannot file a motion for reconsideration nor appeal from
a judgment of acquittal based on the merits of the case due to double
jeopardy.
A judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
the accused under double jeopardy, violating Section 21, Article III of
the Constitution. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the
accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he
has already been absolved. (People vs. Lejano, G.R. No. 176389,
January 18, 2011)
The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the
State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double
jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the
CA. (People vs.
Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos.
168188-89, June 16, 2006; People vs.
Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000)
Exceptions:
On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is
possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court
that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss
of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the
State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
(People vs. Lejano, G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011)
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is
burdened to establish that the court a quo acted without jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
(People vs.
Sandiganbayan(First Division), G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006)
A judgment or order of acquittal may be challenged in a petition for
certiorari for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, i.e., the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or that the trial was a sham. In
such cases, double jeopardy will not attach. The petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point
so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
(Sanvicente vs. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002;
Philippine Savings Bank vs.
Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912 September 26, 2005).
•A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable; a verdict
of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of
such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in
jeopardy for the same offense.” True, the finality of acquittal rule is not
one without exception as when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such a case, the
judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the extraordinary writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (People vs. Banig
(G.R. No. 177137, August 23, 2012)
A review of the sufficiency of evidence and of the propriety of
acquittal lies outside the function of certiorari (People vs. Bans, G.R.
No. 104147, December 8, 1994). Whether or not the evidence
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused cannot be
resolved in a special civil action of certiorari (People vs. Court of
Appeals (Eleventh Division), G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004).
Certiorari will only lie to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Purported errors of judgment or those involving
misappreciation of evidence or errors of law cannot be raised and be
reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. A writ of certiorari can only correct
errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse
of discretion, not those which call for the evaluation of evidence and
factual findings. (Villareal vs. Aliga, G.R. No 166995, January 13, 2014)
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been
filed instead of herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the
court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy would be violated (Villareal vs. Aliga, G.R. No 166995,
January 13, 2014)
 Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines filed with the
Court is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. For being the wrong remedy taken by
petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly
dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the
trial court by appeal without violating private respondent’s right against
double jeopardy.(People vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007)
A. Effect of an Appeal
• Appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review
and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the
liberty of the accused, this Court has meticulously and thoroughly
reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds that there is
merit in the appeal. (People vs.
Dahil, G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015).
• Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the
appellate court. Hence, accused-appellants’ appeal conferred upon the
appellate court full jurisdiction and rendered it competent to examine the
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law. (People vs. Tibayan, G.R.
Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015)
• Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or
final order shall be stayed as to the appealing party. (Sec. 11[c], Rule
122). There is no motion for execution pending appeal of a judgment of
conviction.
Note: the execution of a judgment or final order of indirect contempt
shall not be suspended by an appeal unless the person adjudged in
contempt files a bond. (Sec.
11, Rule 71).
B. Where to appeal (Sec. 2, Rule 122)
• to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – in cases decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC);
• to the Court of Appeals (CA) or to the Supreme Court (SC) –
proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the RTC
• to the Supreme Court (SC) – in cases decided by the CA
C. How appeal taken
(a) The appeal to the RTC or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice
of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and by serving a copy of the notice of appeal upon the
adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the RTC is
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is
imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which
arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall
be by notice of appeal to the CA in accordance with S3(a) R122.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the RTC imposed
the death penalty. The CA shall automatically review the judgment.
(e) Except where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, an appeal to the SC shall be by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Transmission of Records to RTC
(within 5 days from perfection of appeal)
Notice to Parties
(by the Clerk of Court, upon receipt of the complete record, TSN and
evidence)
Submission of memoranda/briefs
(within 15 days from receipt of Notice) DECISION
(after submission of such pleadings or upon the expiration of the period
to file the same)
Appeal by prosecution from order of dismissal of a criminal case shall
not constitute double jeopardy if:
1. dismissal made upon motion, or with express consent of accused
2. dismissal not an acquittal or based upon consideration of evidence
or merits of case
3. question to be passed upon by appellate court purely legal so that
should dismissal be found incorrect, case would have to be
REMANDED to court of origin for further proceedings, to determine
guilt or innocence of accused
• No double jeopardy –
1.where state is deprived of fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case
2.where dismissal of information or complaint is purely capricious or
devoid of reason
3.where there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be heard
• Order granting motion to quash is final.
Prosecution may appeal an order granting motion to quash, except:
1.where ground for dismissal is that criminal action or liability has been
extinguished.
2.where ground is that accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Certiorari is appropriate remedy to assail an order granting bail (Pobre
vs. CA, 463 SCRA 50).
Appeal from MTC to RTC
Where MTC has jurisdiction over offense ( 3 &
6, Rule 122) – notice of appeal within 15 days from promulgation or
from notice of final order appealed from.
Appeal from RTC to CA
Original jurisdiction of RTC
- Ordinary appeal (Sec. 3 (a), Rule 122) – notice of appeal within 15
days from promulgation or from notice of final order appealed from.
Where RTC imposes reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion, or arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed – NOTICE
OF APPEAL to CA (Sec. 3 (c), Rule 122, as am. by A.M. No. 00-5-03-
SC dated October 15, 2004 pursuant to People vs. Mateo).
o Intermediate review by CA of cases where penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment would minimize the possibility
of an error of judgment (People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 4,
2004).
 Mandatory review by SC is only required for cases where the penalty
imposed is death. [However, death penalty is prohibited by RA 9346,
June 24, 2006]. Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a review of the trial court decision is conducted only
when the accused files a notice of appeal. Neither the Decision in Mateo
nor the abolition of the death penalty has changed this (People vs.
Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007)
Appellate jurisdiction of RTC
- Petition for review under Rule 42 (Sec. 3 (b), Rule 122).
Appeal from CA and SB to SC
- Petition for review under Rule 45 (Sec. 3 (e), Rule 122; Sec. 7, PD
1616, as am. by RA 8249).
Exceptions:
• CA – where CA imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed
NOTICE OF APPEAL to SC (Sec. 13 (c),
Rule 124, as am. by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC).
SB – where SB imposes reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
Original jurisdiction
Reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or lesser penalty imposed, etc.
NOTICE OF APPEAL to SC
Appellate jurisdiction
Where SB finds that death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment should be imposed, will render judgment but refrain from
making entry of judgment and certify case and elevate entire record to
SC for review (Section 7, PD 1606, as amended by RA 8249 and Rule
X, Revised Internal Rules of Sandiganbayan, as reiterated in SC
Resolution dated October 12, 2004).
Fugitive from justice waives his right to appeal
• Accused escaped from detention and was tried in absentia
(Moslares vs. CA, 291 SCRA 340).
• Accused escaped during pendency of appeal (People vs. Codilla,
224 SCRA 104).
Ramirez vs. People (G.R. No. 197832, October 2, 2013)
- In exceptional cases, the Court has in fact relaxed the period for
perfecting an appeal on grounds of substantial justice or when there are
other special and meritorious circumstances and issues; the Court
considered the one-day late filing of the prosecution’s notice of appeal
as excusable given the diligent efforts exerted by the private prosecutor
in following up its filing with the public prosecutor.
D. Effect of appeal by any of several accused (Sec. 11)
• An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall NOT
affect those who did not appeal, EXCEPT insofar as the judgment of the
apellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
• The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not
affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from;
• Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or
final order appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party.
• Benabaye vs. People (G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015)
- appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review
of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. Considering
that under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall
benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from
their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the
conviction became final and executory,
Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa is likewise applicable to
Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag is
similarly without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal
charge against him as may be warranted under the circumstances
pertinent to him.
• Villareal vs. People (G.R. No. 151258, December 1, 2014)
- The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing
party is concerned. The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. Any
residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including the
authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment the complete
records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.
Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to
wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to
enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power
and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally
disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent
event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
• People vs. Olivo (G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009)
- present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our
pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely
favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra.
He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit
from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions
and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-
accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which
we subsequently reversed.
E. Grounds for dismissal of appeal
(a) Appellant fails to file his brief within the prescribed time, except
where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
(b) Appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees
to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (Sec. 8 Rule
124).
(c) Failure to file the notice of appeal within the prescribed period.
(d) Failure to pay the docket or other lawful fees.
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of
copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by the
Rules.
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or
of page references to the record.
(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the
correction or completion of the record within the time limited by the
court in its order.
(h) Failure of the appellant to comply with orders, circulars, or
directives of the court without justifiable cause.
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not
appealable. Sec.1, Rule 50; Sec.18, Rule 124 (application of certain rules
of civil procedure in criminal cases)
• Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Piccio
(G.R. No. 193681, August 6, 2014)
- jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG
that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People.
The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by
the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners
who are mere complaining witnesses.
For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in
interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent
them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the SC. In view of
the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails
of the suit,
An appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by
the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the
offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of
the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even
without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving
his interest in the civil aspect of the case.
Diaz vs. People (G.R. No. 180677, February 18,
2013)
- The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the
dismissal of the appeal upon failure to file the appellant’s brief is not
mandatory, but discretionary. The the failure to serve and file the
required number of copies of the appellant’s brief within the time
provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of
causing the outright dismissal of the appeal.
This means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is
lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may still allow the appeal
to proceed despite the late filing of the appellant’s brief, when the
circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to dismiss the appeal,
then, the CA is bound to exercise its sound discretion upon taking all the
pertinent circumstances into due consideration.
Guidelines in confronting the issue of nonfiling of the Appellant's Brief:
Beatingo vs. Gasis (G.R. No. 179641, February 9, 2011)
1. The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal
when no appellant's brief is filed within the reglementary period
prescribed by the rules;
2. The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an
appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory;
3. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary
period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the
appeal
4. In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow
the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the court's leniency[,] it
is imperative that:
(a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court's liberality;
(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the
procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice;
(c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;
(d) there is no contention that the appellee's cause was prejudiced;
(e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.
5. In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and
6. Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate
excuse as to call for the appellate court's indulgence except:
7. (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of
the client's liberty or property; or
(c) where the interests of justice so require.
Remedy from DOJ decision on probable cause finding of the public
prosecutor – Rule 65
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government
does not make it a quasijudicial office or agency. Its preliminary
investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the
DOJ exercise a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. A
petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to
review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasijudicial officers,
agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43.
In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an
officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of
the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary
of Justice performed an essentially EXECUTIVE FUNCTION to
determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was
committed, and whether there was 'probable cause to believe that the
respondents were guilty thereof.
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his
determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the
writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice
exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it must amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had
jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without
authority.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be
the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. (De Lima vs. Reyes,
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016)
Issues of facts and arguments cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal
Canoy basically insists that he was deprived of his fundamental right to
be heard when the trial court convicted him without affording him the
opportunity to present his defense; and that the RTC did not consider the
fact that the seized lumber were found in the place owned by his mother
who also operated a lumber business.
The CA was correct in disregarding the abovementioned arguments, for
the reason that all of them were raised only on appeal. This is in
consonance with the well-settled principle that issues of fact and
arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower courts
will not be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. (Canoy vs. People, G.R. No.
21464, January 21, 2015)
Appeal from RTC in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction –
Rule 42
It did not matter that the appeal of the petitioner, as represented in her
petition for review on certiorari, seemingly involved only a question of
law. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over appeals
involving pure questions of law as expressly set forth under Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is restricted to such questions
arising in the first instance in the lower courts. In contrast, her appeal of
the ruling of the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s appellate jurisdiction
should be brought to the CA by petition for review, and could also focus
on a question of law only. Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
precisely states that the petition for review shall set forth concisely
therein a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law or both, allegedly committed by the
RTC, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the
appeal. Her advantage under that mode of appeal is to give her the
benefit of an intermediate
Her advantage under that mode of appeal is to give her the benefit of an
intermediate review by the CA. Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s
appeal is denied because of her disregard of the law and the Rules of
Court. Considering that appeal is a mere statutory right, her appeal of the
affirmance of her convictions by the RTC should comply with the rules
prescribed by the law or rules of procedure establishing her right to
appeal; otherwise, the right is waived. (Deato vs. People, G.R. No.
175519, January 21, 2015)
Appeal by accused - waiver of rule against double jeopardy
When accused appeals from the decision of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon
to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the accusedappellant. (People vs. CA, G.R No. 183652,
February
25, 2015)
The rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case
open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. (Benabaye vs. People, G.R No. 203466, February 25, 2015)
Two kinds of acquittal and their effects on the civil liability of the
accused
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him. (Daluraya vs. Marla Oliva, G.R. No. 210148, December
8, 2014)
Factual findings of Court of Appeals binding on
Supreme Court
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, the review on
appeal of a decision in a criminal case wherein the the Court of Appeals
imposes a penalty other than reclusion perpetua or llfe imprisonment, is
by petition for review on certiorari.
The errors imputed by petitioner upon the CA all pertain to
“appreciation of evidence” or factual errors which are not within the
province of a Rule 45 petition.
Petitioner’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and
re-examination of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.
The petition must therefore be denied on this basis because “one, the
petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only
legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not
disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken,
absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
or contrary to the findings reach by the court of origin,” which was not
shown to be the case here. (Rogelio Roque vs. People, G.R. No.
193169, April 6, 2015) - MDC
Exceptions to rule that factual findings of lower courts are binding on
the Supreme Court
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)
When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. (Macayan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015)
Failure to file memorandum on appeal not ground for dismissal in
criminal cases
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to
dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in
criminal cases, because Rule 122, Section 9(c) imposes on the RTC the
duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case
and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed,” upon the
submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration
of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s
appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the
memorandum on appeal. (Sanico vs. People, G.R. No. 198753, March
25, 2015)
XV. SEARCH
AND
SEIZURE
Search - examination of a person’s house or other buildings or premises
or his person for the discovery of contraband or illicit or stolen property
or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal
action for some offense with which he is charged.
Seizure - physical taking of the thing in custody
A. Nature of search warrant Search warrant defined – Sec. 1
“A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and
bring it before the court.” Worldwide vs. People (G.R. No. 161106,
January 13, 2014)
A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Mendoza
(G.R. No. 170425, April 23, 2012), citing United
Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, 500 Phil. 342 [2005] - A search warrant
proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a
prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely
for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary
because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is
commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a
search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such
an action.
B. Distinguish from warrant of arrest
Warrant of Arrest:
Order directed to the peace officer to execute the warrant by taking the
person into custody so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the crime.
Requisites:
Hao vs. People, (G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014)
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal
evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced that probable
cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s finding of probable
cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information. Probable
cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable
cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Ocampo vs. Abando, (G.R. No. 176830,
February 11, 2014)
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested." Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination
under oath
or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled
that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the
judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a
warrant of arrest. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the existence of
probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no
probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the
submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence.
Summary of requisites:
(1) Issued upon probable cause;
(2) Determined personally by the judge;
(3) After evaluation of the prosecutor’s report supporting documents
showing the existence of probable cause;
(4) Particularly describe the person to be arrested; and
(5) In connection with the specific offense or crime
• May be served on any day and at any time of the day or night
• Does not become stale
• Searching examination of witnesses is not enough
• Judge is merely called upon to examine and evaluate the report of
the prosecutor and the evidence submitted.
Search Warrant:
Order in writing in the name of the Republic of the Philippines signed by
the judge and directed to the peace officer to search personal property
described therein and to bring it in court
Requisites: (Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 126)
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Alvarez (G.R. No.
179408, March 05, 2014)
(1) the existence of probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them;
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
• To be served only in daytime unless the affidavit alleges that the
property is on the person or in the place to be searched.
• Valid for 10 days only
• Must personally conduct an examination of the complainant and
the witnesses
• Examination must be probing; not enough to merely adopt the Q &
A of previous investigator.
C. Application for search warrant, where filed
Gen. Rule: Sec. 2 par.(a)
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
Exceptions: Sec. 2 par (b);
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
and last par.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
• A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC (Clarifying the
Guidelines on the Application for the
Enforceability of Search Warrants)
The following are authorized to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs
and illegal possession of firearms:
- Executive Judge and Vice Executive
Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City
Applications for search warrants are filed by:
Philippine National Police (PNP)
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOC-TF)
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACTTF)
Sps. Marimla vs. People (G.R. No. 158467, October 16, 2009)
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI,
PAOC-TF and REACTTF from delegating their ministerial duty of
endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads.
Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may
perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as
long as it is not inconsistent with law.
• Requisites for issuing search warrant –Sec.
2, Art. III, Constitution and Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 126
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Retired SPO4 Laud vs. People (G.R. No. 199032,
November 19, 2014)
- was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or
those which are issued for more than one specific offense.
- a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific
offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule; where several
counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant
uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is
not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search
warrant herein issued does not violate the onespecific-offense rule
(Citing Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, 329 Phil. 875 [1996
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Alvarez (G.R. No.
179408, March 5, 2014)
Requirements for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined personally by
the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known
to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
- Should any of these requisites be absent, the party aggrieved by the
issuance and enforcement of the search warrant may file a MOTION TO
QUASH the search warrant with the issuing court or with the court
where the action is subsequently instituted.
People vs. Tuan (G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 226)
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness
D. Probable cause
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is
such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched. (HPS Software and
Communication Corporation vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLOT),
G.R. No. 170217, December 10, 2012)
Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of Justice (G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
- Facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched; referring to “factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.
Century Chinese Medicine Co. vs. People ( G.R. No.
188526, November 11, 2013)
- The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves,
"probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial.
HPS Software and Communication Corporation vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), G.R. No.
170217, December 10, 2012) citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp,
Inc.,481 Phil. 550 (2004).
- The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves,
“probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a
full-blown trial.
Tan vs. Tiong Gue (G.R. No. 174570, December 15, 2010)
- a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in
connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on
the basis of the applicant's personal knowledge and his or her witnesses;
cannot utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued
in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified
Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.
People vs. Mamaril (G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010)
- There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree
upon the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
- A magistrate's determination of a probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as
long as there was substantial basis for that determination
Santos vs. Pryce Gases, Inc. (G. R. No. 165122,
November 23, 2007)
- A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that
it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings
of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to
the clear dictates of reason.
E. Personal examination by judge of the applicant and witnesses
Examination of complainant by the judge – Sec. 5
SEC.5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with the affidavits
submitted.
Century Chinese Medicine Co. vs. People
(G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013)
- A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence
of a probable cause, meaning “the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.”
- when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may
present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or
his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and
is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.
Yao, Sr. vs. People(G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007)
- The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there
is no hardand-fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his
investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro
forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.
F. Particularity of place to be searched and things to be seized
Retired SPO4 Laud vs. People (G.R. No. 199032,
November 19, 2014)
- description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.
Del Castillo vs. People (G.R. No.185128, January 30,
2012, 664 SCRA 430)
- the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness; Here, the
Search Warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized
by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of
the petitioner.
- While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellant's control or possession. Theprosecution must prove that the
petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in
the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs.
With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under
petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.
Ty v. De Jemil (G.R. No. 182147, December
15, 2010, 638 SCRA 671, 689)
- The law does not require that the property to be seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrants is directed.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized.
Yao, Sr. vs. People(G.R. No. 168306, June 19,
2007)
- There is nothing in the provisions of law concerning the issuance
of a search warrant which directly or indirectly mandates that the
applicant of the search warrant or his witnesses should state in their
affidavits the fact that they used different names while conducting
undercover investigations, or to divulge such fact during the preliminary
examination.
G. Personal property to be seized
Personal property to be seized – Sec. 3
Section 3. Personal property to be seized.
— A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
Retired SPO4 Laud vs. People (G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014)
- “Personal property” in the foregoing context actually refers to the
thing’s mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a
particular person. Article 416 of the Civil Code, which Laud himself
cites,states that in general, all things which can be transported from
place to place are deemed to be personal property. Considering that
human remains can generally be transported from place to place, and
considering further that they qualify under the phrase “subject of the
offense” given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti, it follows that
they may be valid subjects of a search warrant under the above-cited
criminal procedure provision.
- the description points to no other than the things that bear a direct
relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived
that the description is already specific as the circumstances would
ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies would have naturally
decomposed over time.
Worldwide vs. People (G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014)
Search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and
minute detail; warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to
readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized; A search warrant fulfills
the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs.
Alvarez (G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014)
Does not require technical accuracy in the description of the property to
be seized. Specificity is satisfied if the personal properties' description is
as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be so described.
The nature of the description should vary according to whether the
identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern. One of the
tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be
seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued.

H. Exceptions to search warrant requirement

a) Search incidental to lawful arrest
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
People vs. Araza (G.R. No. 190623, November
17, 2014)
- The Constitution states that failure to secure a judicial warrant
prior to the actual search and consequent seizure would render it
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding constitutional prohibition, however,
admits of the following exceptions; having been lawfully arrested, the
warrantless search that followed was undoubtedly incidental to a lawful
arrest, which as mentioned, is an exception to the constitutional
prohibition on warrantless search and seizure. Conversely, the shabu
seized from Araza is admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the
offense charged.
People vs. Calantiao (G.R. No. 203984, June
18, 2014)
- Purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the
person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
- It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to
(1) protect law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them
by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) prevent evidence from
being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the
arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and
within the reach of the arrestee.
People vs. Nuevas (G.R. No. 170233, February
22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463)
- search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search
preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if
Buy-bust operation
People vs. Collado (G.R. No. 185719, June
17, 2013)
- The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made
in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; the subsequent
search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid.
People vs. Araneta (G.R. No. 191064, October
20, 2010)
- search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a
buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was
definitely legal for the buybust team to arrest, and search, them on the
spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending
drug pushers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards
is undertaken.
• Invalid Search
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)
- A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the
process cannot be reversed; Here, the search preceded the arrest of
Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search.
b) Consented search ((waiver of right)
• Requisites: People vs. Nuevas (G.R. NO.
170233, February 22, 2007
(1) the right exists
(2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
c) Search of moving vehicle
• People vs. Mariacos (G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010)
Justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
d) Check points; body checks in airport • Abenes vs. Court of
Appeals (G. R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007)
- not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed; as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact,
these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive. (Citing People v. Escaño, 380 Phil. 719, 733-734 [2000])
- firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the
policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
People vs. Vicenerao (G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004)
- Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists
e) Plain view situation
Elements- Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No.
190623, November 17, 2014)
(1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area;
(2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
People v. Mariacos (G.R. No. 188611, June 21, 2010,
621 SCRA 327)
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
Applicable
Miclat, Jr. vs. People (G.R. No. 176077,
August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539)
- What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search
or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched,
and the character of the articles procured.
People vs. Nuevas (G.R. No. 170233, February
22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463)
- An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where
the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant; if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized;
if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that
the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
• Not applicable
People vs. Calantiao (G.R. No. 203984, June
18, 2014)
- Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in this case because the
police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in
Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search
incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 164815,
September 3, 2009)
-"plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made
solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke
regularity in the performance of official functions.
f) Stop and frisk situation or “Terry search”
• Invalid Search
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 190623,
November 17, 2014)
- no valid “stop-and-frisk” search; coming out from the house of a
drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous
movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of
an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu
in his possession, or that he was probably committing a crime in the
presence of the officer.
People vs. Cogaed, (G.R. No. 200334, July 30,
2014
- He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious. moreover, criminal, about riding
a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made
by the police officer but by the jeepney driver; Two-Fold Interest:
• the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection;
and
• safety and self-preservation
Esquillo vs. People (G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010)
- essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons
or contraband concealed about him.
- The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in
petitioner's possession later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative-
was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a
cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a
police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting
suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer
had identified himself.
g) Enforcement of customs laws Tarriff and Customs Code authorizes
customs officer to:
a. Enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse;
b. Inspect/search/examine any vessel/aircraft and any trunk/
package/box/ envelope or any person on board
c. Stop and examine any vehicle/boat/person suspected of
holding/conveying any dutiable/prohibited articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law.
Salvador vs. People (G.R. No. 146706, August 15, 2005)
- law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs
and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search
warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is
reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced
into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may
likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected
of holding or conveying the said articles.
h) Remedies from unlawful search and seizure
1) Motion to quash search or to suppress evidence obtained by the
unlawful search warrant;
Where to file
General Rule: A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the
court where the action has been instituted.
Exception:
If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and
resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such
court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently
filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.”
Basis of Motion to suppress evidence
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Note: If no motion to suppress
evidence was filed, the aggrieved party may still object to the evidence
so obtained when the same is offered, invoking Sec. 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution.
What may be raised in the Motion to Quash
a. Existence or non-existence of probable cause at the time of
issuance of the Search
Warrant
b. Compliance with procedural and substantial requirements
1. Employ any means to prevent the search
An officer cannot insist on entering private premises without a search
warrant. Thus, the person to be search may resist the search and employ
any means necessary to prevent it, without incurring any liability.
2. File criminal actions against the Officer
Article 129, Revised Penal Code (Search warrants maliciously obtained
and abuse in the service of those legally obtained)
3. Replevin, if the objects are illegally
possessed
Santos vs. Pryce Gases, Inc. (G. R. No.
165122, November 23, 2007)
- Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
XVI. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
A. Nature
Those which are resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or
protection of his rights or interest and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action.
The requisites and procedure for availing of these provisional remedies
shall be the same as those for civil actions.
Note: Provisional remedies under Rule 127 are proper only where the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto has not been
expressly waived of the right to institute such civil action separately is
not severed in those cases where reservation may be made.
B. Kinds of Provisional Remedies
• Provisional remedies in civil actions – Rules 57 to 61
• Attachment (Rule 57)
• Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)
• Receivership (Rule 59)
• Delivery of Personal Property (Rule 60)
• Support Pendente Lite (Rule 61)
• Provisional remedies in criminal cases
(Rule 127)
Attachment
Rules on attachment in criminal cases – Sec. 2
Sec. 2. Attachment. When the civil action is properly instituted in the
criminal action as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the
property of the accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered from the accused in the following cases:
(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or
property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of
the accused who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney,
factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such,
or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation
of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his
property, or is about to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines.
Note: Less grounds than those under Rule 57, Sec. 1 [Sec. 2, a, b, c, d
similar to Sec. 1, a, b, e, f]