[ G.R. NO.

80762, March 19, 1990 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES AND ROGELIO LANIDA, ACCUSED. CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J.:

In a decision[1] dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida," found all
the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remained at large and not yet arraigned, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in
the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs."[2] The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner,
and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency
of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now Department,
of Justice, Parole Division.[3]

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [4] on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that
the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other
respects, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos,[5] the appellate court certified this case
to us for review.[6]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened
from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada,
and thus would like to surrender to the authorities, Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress
smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion,
Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal building. [7] Upon reaching the
Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police-
Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla, the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta
was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident
allegedly occurred.[8] There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. [9]
The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the
immediate surroundings.[10] The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that
same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police sub-station in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two
members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting their
own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the
following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Puncture wound, 1 cm in width, 9 cm in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right
axillary pit.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm in width and 9 cm in length
with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm wound exit.

3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm in width.

4. Incised wound, 4 cm long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right
nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm in width, 10.5 cm in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of
the 5th rib left.

6. Stab wound, 2 cm in width, 9.5 cm in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the
8th intercostal space.

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 7. Puncture wound, 1 cm in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm in width, 11 cm in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla, left.

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm in width, and 5 cm in length, medial aspect, palm right.

11. Stab wound, 4 cm in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the right thoracic
cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm in width, 10 cm in length, located at the medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm in width, 4.5 cm in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm in width, 2 cm in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.

JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.

Rural Health Physicia
Ajuy, Iloilo[11]

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs,
heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased."[12]

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the
Ajuy police force.[13]

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated
August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to
kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit
and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd
D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious
wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.[14]
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria16 who claimed
to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of
which an Amended Information,17 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the
crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;

Page 2 of 258
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt.
(ret.) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the
widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Peñacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981
after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy.18 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured
wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility
that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the
number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were used is high.19 The police authorities and the
P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada
testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other
matters.

By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30
when he testified on July 27, 1982,20 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where
he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home;21 he took a short-cut route.22 While passing at the vicinity of the
Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help.23 Curiosity, prompted him to approach the place where the
shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana trees.24 From where he stood, he
allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and taking turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing
platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight.25 Huntoria further recounted that after the
accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was
situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". [25] Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he
saw to his mother and to his wife[26] before he went to sleep[27] Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he
witnessed for fear of his life.[28] In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of
helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla,
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981.[29]

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep[30] in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime[31] when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.[32]

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of
the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
x x x Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27,
1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailants at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that
Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because
the assailants were moving around the victim.

As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id.,
pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People v. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): “The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is
of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '… the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and
their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant himself admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good
terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should
implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility is beyond question.[33]
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi.[34] The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court
on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:

Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the Supreme
Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Redo, 128 SCRA 43
(1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).[35]

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.

To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
sworn statements[36] even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch [37] he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no
indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proffered on where the
killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the
version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
Page 3 of 258
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the "linasan" is the truth, then
blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.

The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned
to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal complaint [38] four other unnamed persons, aside from the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or
more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas'
testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too
impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in
the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors
because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon
was used by each of them.

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance by the herein
accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerada and were in constant movement, I could not determine who did the
hacking.

ATTY. GATON:

The interpretation is not clear.

COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or the hacking or the 'labu' or 'bunu' is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their arms,
Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the
stabbing blow.

ATTY. GATON:

Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerada?
A Yes, sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes, sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because according to you it
was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.[39]

(Underscoring supplied.)
Page 4 of 258
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of
the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the
evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court
of Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
ART. 4. Criminal liability.-- Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

(Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
ART. 3. Definition,-- Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.

Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world."[40] In this instance, there
must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal
witness did not say, because he could not, whether the appellant "hacked" or "stabbed" the victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act
was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code
previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above,
while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And
this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not
him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the other five accused? And pursuing this
argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal
wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including
even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly,
there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime
he had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,[41] here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity.[42] If the silence of an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful,[43] the more it should be
for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily
explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by
the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, [44] why did he finally volunteer to testify
considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original information,[45] thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present
when he testified.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In
fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd
Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience and secondly the
victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.[46]

xxx xxx xxx

Page 5 of 258
 (Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socio-economic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence
itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek
ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that
material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of
Lloyd Penacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased
landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he
ceased to be employed as early as May 1981.[47] Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved
quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective
wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family.[48] Given all the foregoing circumstances,
we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful--it is contrary to
our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any
possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to
summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old[49] father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was
indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, [50] we seriously doubt that
the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodio, Jr., Nerio, and Augusto), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense,[51] under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is
not beyond cavil, it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of
the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.[52]

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Page 6 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM ALIAS “BONG” (AT LARGE),
ROBERT DELIM (AT LARGE), AND RONALD DELIM ALIAS “BONG”, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,[1] dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding
accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias “Bong” and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder under an
Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
“That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth,
brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of
Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.”[2]
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-
large.

At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts[3]—

Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an
Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was “adopted” by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto’s wife,
Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon,
Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit
Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.

On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them were
Modesto and Rita’s two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly
barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while
Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert and
Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the
intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and
ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24,
1999.

As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the
night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted
to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan,
around 200 meters away from Modesto’s house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives
returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy
reported the incident to the police authorities.

At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel
Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was
already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the
cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.

When informed of the discovery of Modesto’s cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the scene
and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.[5] Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names
and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at
a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police investigators.[6]
Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers
scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.

The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
“SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
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- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto – occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
- GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.”[7]
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police investigators were able to confirm that
Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.[8]

Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional Trial
Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[9]

To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.[10]

Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison,
Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modesto’s house.

He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized that Rita and Randy falsely
implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.

Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte
where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-
block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.

Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon’s alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in Pangasinan during his employment. His
sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the
distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that
he was a resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.[11]

Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived with his
sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied
setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.

The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim
(for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as
provided for by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as
moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus
fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.

The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of
Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.”[12]
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed
firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief, assail the decision
alleging that:
“I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III
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THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ DEFENSE OF ALIBI.”[13]
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping.
During the deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged with
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused
“willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while)
Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter.” They
submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend
that the fact that the Information went further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal
charge being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated –
these being conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed
to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for
kidnapping the victim.

It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime
charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged
such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo
Puno, et al.,[14] that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended
party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended
by the malefactor. This Court further held:
“x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking
away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the
offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims’ liberty
does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.”[15]
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim’s liberty does not constitute the felony of
kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. [16] The crime committed
would either be homicide or murder.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative
of what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.

Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes.
Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal
consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act.[17] Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular
purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for
a crime requiring specific intent.[18] Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the
accused as established by the evidence on record.[19]

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular
criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive
for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for
the crime charged such as murder.[20] The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial.[21] Crime
is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is
no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.[22] In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the
victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him
and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely
incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the
malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.[23] Irrefragably then,
the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon,
Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.

In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[24]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendant’s agency in the commission of the act.[25] Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes.[26] In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead;
(b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide;
and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death.[27] To prove the
felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in
other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If
the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.[28]
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In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also
sustained seven (7) stab wounds,[29] defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in
the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the
malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom.[30] As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:[31]
“This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases.
Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that
every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the
homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the
slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.”
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. [32] What was once a rule of account respectability
is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as
indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
“x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”[33]
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being
confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense
charged.[34] For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[35] If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-appellants, in confabulation
with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:

1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on
Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out of his house:

“FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked answered Marlon Delim.
Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he answered
Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they do then when they entered
your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, ‘Stay in your house,’ and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.

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Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir.”[36]

2. Randy’s account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:

“PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the evening while preparing for your supper
three (3) armed men entered inside your house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your house, are these three (3) persons who entered
your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir.”[37]

3. 2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood
guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:

“FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons, what did you and your mother do while these three
persons were taking out of your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and
Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his name was asked, answered, Leon Delim).”[38]

4. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy
were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives and police
authorities.

5. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found under the thick bushes in a
grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was
already in the state of decomposition:

“Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?
A The same place and at 3:00 o’clock P.M., we were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 o’clock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when you saw him dead?

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A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic).”[39]

6. The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state of decomposition,
with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds
and defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:

“PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper extremities are flexed and both lower extremities
are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so many worms coming out from the
injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition
that they will bury immediately. Whether they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.

And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area,
right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.

And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward
(POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.

And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd,
left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial
aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir.”[40]

7. The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the distention of his scrotum and penis
are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to six
days.[41] Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states:

“Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:

Time Since Death Condition of the Body
Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters
48 hours
present. Moving maggots seen.
Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair and nails loose. Tissues
72 hours
soft and discolored.”[42]

8. The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver
which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent
with and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on
January 23, 1999.

9. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were nowhere to be found:

“COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be found, they all left the place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.

Page 12 of 258
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir.”[43]

10. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto and Rita:

“COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your husband’s name is Modesto Delim are they
related with each other?
A Yes, sir.”[44]
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong circumstantial evidence of their guilt for
the death of Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is
admissible in evidence against them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact,
killed Modesto.[45]

It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that
they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on
the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be
concluded that a person or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of
judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.[46] In this case, the inscrutable facts are that
Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hogtied, put a piece of cloth in
his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was
found concealed under the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot
wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having
been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or
influences moving the mind.[47] The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply because the malefactors
had no motive to kill Modesto.

Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut the same and explain what
happened to the victim after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after taking him,
or the victim may have been able to escape and that thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.

Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald
and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[48] Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of
the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. [49] To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. [50] It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not
who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.[51] This is based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of
the common plan:
“x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the acts and declarations of his
principal. ‘What is so done by an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere instrument.’ Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D.
& M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). ‘If the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its
existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he
does as the agent of the co-conspirators.’ R. v. O’Connell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.”[52]
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the acts,
words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all. [53]

In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into
said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned
Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The
overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to
achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were – (a) to act
as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police authorities and their
Page 13 of 258
relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.[54] Patently, Leon, a lookout
for the group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto.[55] Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Ronald
nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation.[56] If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another, each person
concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all
engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual
presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime. [57]

Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were marred by inconsistencies:

1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy claimed that the malefactors
proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;

2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their house. She later changed her testimony and
declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;

3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the three men brought out the
victim, the two other accused entered the house and guarded them there;

4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was accompanied by her son Randy.
However, Randy testified that he was alone when he looked for his father from January 24 to 26, 1999.[58]

We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies
of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the
witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or ill
motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight.[59] The
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in
mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a person’s sense of observation is impaired by many factors including the shocking
effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the
witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.[60] Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to minor, collateral
or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts. [61] Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only
serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. [62]

Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the true meaning of answers to isolated
questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers
thereto.[63]

Randy’s testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought
his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the
direction to which they went. While it may be true that when asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of
them, however, Rita had been consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon’s counsel
never cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their house to give her an
opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
“Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.”[64]
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired impeachment of her.[65] As to whether Rita and
Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact
is that Leon stood guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.

This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite
intense and grueling cross-examination, they responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of
the shocking events which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding
their credibility.

Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence and probative weight to their evidence to
prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.

We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution because the same is easy to
concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.[66] It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit
approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a
place other than the situs criminis at the time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said
crime.[67] They failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the
culprits. The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of Modesto
and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced
fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime. With respect
to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on
January 29, 1999.

Page 14 of 258
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial court
likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The Office
of the Solicitor General contends that indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder
defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself.
Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime.[68] As this Court held:
“No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of
defendant.”[69] Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. [70] Although the victim may have been defenseless at
the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against
the accused.[71] In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness
or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although
he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[72]
What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio Francisco[73] is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from
their superiority in strength.[74] In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their
numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was
not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.[75]

In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion temporal in its full period.

Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information
that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of
violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.[76] Neither
can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8
of the Revised Rules of Court.[77] Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it
had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.[78]

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.

Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages
should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[79] The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.[80] In
addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[81]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald
Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Vitug.

Page 15 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 109250, September 05, 1997 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NORIEL LACERNA Y CORDERO & MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR,
ACCUSED. MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The unrelenting and pervading war against illegal drugs has absorbed the attention of all branches of government, both national and local, as well as
media, parents, educators, churches and the public at large. This case is one more intrepid battle in such all-out war. Herein appellant seeks
acquittal on the ground that his acts did not constitute the crime of “giving away prohibited drugs” penalized by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended (The Dangerous Drugs Act). Nonetheless, he cannot escape the law because the very same deeds, which appellant admits to have
performed, show his culpability for “illegal possession of prohibited drugs” -- penalized in Section 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended -- which is necessarily
included in the crime charged in the Information.

Statement of the Case

This ruling is explained by the Court as it resolves this appeal from the Decision,[1] dated February 24, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 16,[2] convicting Appellant Marlon Lacerna y Aranador “of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended x x x.”

Asst. City Prosecutor of Manila Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. charged appellant and Noriel Lacerna in an Information,[3] dated September 16, 1992, which
reads as follows:[4]

The undersigned accuses NORIEL LACERNA Y CORDERO and MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR of a violation of Section 4 Art. II, in relation to
Section 21, Art. IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, xxx

“That on or about September 12, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver or give away
to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and jointly sell, deliver or give away to another the following, to wit:

Eighteen (18) blocks of marijuana

flowering tops - weight – 18.235 kilograms

which is a prohibited drug.”

When the case was called for arraignment on October 7, 1992, appellant and his co-accused appeared without counsel but they alleged that they
had engaged the services of a certain Atty. Kangleon. Thus, the trial court provisionally appointed Atty. Rodolfo P. Libatique of the Public Attorney’s
Office as counsel de oficio, in case Atty. Kangleon did not appear for the arraignment on October 28, 1992. [5] Because the alleged counsel de parte
failed to show up during the arraignment on that date, Atty. Libatique assisted the accused who pleaded “not guilty.” [6]

After trial on the merits, the court a quo promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: [7]

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. The guilt of the accused Marlon Lacerna having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425, as
amended, he is found guilty of the same, sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. With costs.

II. The guilt for the crime charged of accused Noriel Lacerna not having been established beyond reasonable doubt he is hereby ACQUITTED. The
warden of the Manila City Jail is ordered to release his person, unless held on other charges.

The evidence seized in this case is to remain in the custody of the NBI Director as Drugs Custodian of the Dangerous Drugs Board. (RA 425, Sec.
36; Supreme Court Circular No. 9 dated July 18, 1973) to be properly disposed of after the final disposition of this case.”

Hence, only Marlon Lacerna (his co-accused having been acquitted) interposed this appeal direct to the Supreme Court in view of the life penalty
imposed.[8]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Carlito P. Valenzuela, Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual, and PO3 Rafael Melencio. Their
testimonies are summarized by the Solicitor General in the Appellee’s Brief as follows:[9]

Page 16 of 258
On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a member of the Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District (WPD),
was assigned to man the checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones Street. The assignment to
monitor strategic places in the city and barangays of Manila was a direct order from General Nazareno. Thus, he and his companion PO3 Angelito
Camero went about cruising the area in their Mobile Patrol car, with PO3 Valenzuela at the helm. At about 2:00 p.m., appellant and co-accused, who
were aboard a taxicab, passed by PO3 Valenzuela’s place of assignment, which was then heavy with traffic, looking suspicious (t.s.n., PO3
Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4; Nov. 20, 1992, pp. 2-7).

Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was seated at the left back seat of the taxi. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the
occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing to look at him. Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and
his companion stopped the vehicle, signaling the driver to park by the side of the road (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4).

PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police officers went about
searching the luggages in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the contents of
the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that the bag contained his vomit (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp.
4-5).

Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and
peeped inside. He found several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela opened one
of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant and co-accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused
readily affirmed. According to both Lacernas, the bag was a ‘padala’ of their uncle. Specifically, they claimed that the bag was sent by their uncle,
who happened to be in Baguio City, for shipment to Iloilo (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 5-7; Nov. 20, 1992, pp. 8-10).

Appellant and co-accused, and the plastic bag containing blocks of marijuana were brought by PO3 Valenzuela and PO3 Camero to the WPD
Headquarters on UN Avenue, Manila.[10] At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, both appellant and co-accused were turned over to PO3 Rafael
Melencio for investigation while the blocks were turned over to Lt. de Soto (tsn., PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 3-5. 20).

Lt. de Soto counted the blocks of marijuana, numbering eighteen (18) in all. Each block was wrapped in newspaper. After seeing what the contents
of the blocks were, the specimens (Exhs. ‘B’ to ‘B-19) were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further examination.[11] On the
other hand, PO3 Melencio investigated appellant and co-accused, informing them of their constitutional rights during a custodial investigation.
Thereafter, he prepared the Affidavit of Apprehension and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhs. ‘A’, ‘G’, List of Exhibits, pp. 1, 15; tsn., PO3
Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 15-24).

NBI Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual examined the eighteen (18) confiscated blocks which tested positive of containing marijuana (Exhs. ‘C’, ‘F’ to
‘F-9’. List of Exhibits, pp. 2-14; tsn., A. Pascual, Dec. 2, 1992, pp. 2-5).”

Version of the Defense

Appellant sets up the defense of denial, alleging that the blue plastic bag was owned by his uncle who requested him to bring it to Iloilo. He also
denied knowing that it contained marijuana. In his Brief prepared by the Public Attorney’s Office, he narrated his version of the factual circumstances
of this case, as follows:[12]

“On September 12, 1992, at about 2:00 P.M., accused Marlon and Noriel Lacerna were riding in a taxicab on their way to (the) North Harbor to board
a boat bound for Iloilo City. While plying along Pier 15 their taxicab was flagged down by a patrol mobile car. Accused Marlon Lacerna (appellant
herein) was sitting in front while accused Noriel Lacerna was at the back of the taxicab. The accused carried two bags. One bag contained their
personal belongings and the other bag contained things which their uncle Edwin Lacerna asked them to bring along. When their taxicab was
stopped, the two policemen in the Mobile car requested them that they and their baggage be searched. Confident that they have not done anything
wrong, they allowed to be searched. During the (search), the two accused were not allowed to alight from the taxicab. The knapsack bag which
contained their clothes was first examined in front of them. The second bag was taken out from the taxi and was checked at the back of the taxicab.
The accused were not able to see the checking when the policemen brought the plastic bag at the back of the taxi. After checking, the policemen told
them its ‘positive’. The accused were (asked) to alight and go to the patrol car. They were brought to the WPD Headquarters at United Nations.
While there, they were brought inside a room. They asked what wrong they have done but the policemen told them to wait for Major Rival. At about
8:00 o’clock P.M., Major Rival talked to them and asked them where the baggage came from and they answered that it was given to them by their
uncle. Then Major Rival asked them to hold the marijuana and pictures were taken. Later, they were brought inside the cell where they were
maltreated by the ‘Kabo’. The ‘Kabo’ forced them to admit ownership of the marijuana. Noriel was boxed on the chest, blindfolded and a plastic (bag)
was placed on his neck and was strangled. The mauling took place for about 30 minutes inside the toilet. They refused to sign the Booking and
Arrest Report but they impressed their fingerprint on a white bond paper. They were brought by Melencio to the Inquest Prosecutor at the City Hall.
On the way to the Inquest Prosecutor, Melencio told them to admit the charge against them before the Inquest Fiscal, because if they will deny,
something (would happen) to them in the afternoon and Melencio even uttered to them ‘vulva of your mother.’ Because they were apprehensive and
afraid, they admitted the charge before the Inquest Fiscal.

(Appellant) Marlon Lacerna first met his uncle Edwin Lacerna at Munoz Market. The second time was on September 11, 1992, when his uncle went
to his brother’s house in Caloocan City and requested him to bring his (uncle) personal belongings upon learning that he (Marlon) is leaving for Iloilo
Page 17 of 258
city the next day, September 12, 1992. He told his uncle to bring his personal belongings either in the evening of that day or the following day at the
(Grand) Central (Station), Monumento because he was going to buy a ticket for Noriel as he intend (sic) to bring the latter with him in going home to
the province. His uncle already gave a ticket for him. When he and Noriel (arrived) at the Grand Central at about 10:00 o’clock A.M. on September
12, 1992, their uncle was already there. The latter placed the plastic bag besides their baggages. They no longer inspected the contents of the bag
as the same was twisted and knotted on top. After getting a ticket from the office of Don Sulpicio Lines, Marlon told Noriel to hail a taxi and then they
proceeded to the pier.

(Appellant’s) purpose in going home to Iloilo was to get all the requirements needed in his application to enter the Marines.

Accused Noriel just arrived in Manila three days before September 12, 1992 to look for a job and was staying with (appellant) at Caloocan City. In
the evening of September 11, 1992, (appellant) requested him to come xxx with him to Iloilo and assured him that he (would) be the one to pay for
(Noriel’s) fare. (TSN., January 6, 1993, pp. 3-23; January 8, 1993, pp. 2-12; January 11, 1993, pp. 2-18; January 20, 1992, pp. 2-6; January 22,
1993, pp. 2-14)”

Ruling of the Trial Court

The court a quo observed that appellant could not be convicted of “delivering” prohibited drugs because the Information did not allege that he
knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of “transporting or dispatching in transit” such prohibited drugs because these acts
were not alleged in the Information. The trial court mused further that appellant could not be convicted of “selling” marijuana because the elements
constituting this crime were not proven. However, the Information charged appellant with “giving away to another” prohibited drugs, a charge which
was different from “delivery” defined under Section 2 (f) [13] of R.A. 6245, as amended. Citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing,[14] the trial court ruled that
“giving away” to another is akin to “transporting” prohibited drugs, a malum prohibitum established by the mere commission of said act. Thus, the
court a quo convicted appellant of “giving away” marijuana to another on the following premise:[15]

“It is not denied by (appellant) that he did give to his co-accused cousin Noriel Lacerna the bundled 18 blocks of marijuana who thereupon seated
himself at the rear of the taxi with the marijuana. His claim that he did not know the contents of the blue plastic bag can hardly be believed because it
is within judicial notice that the marijuana contents readily emits a pungent odor so characteristic of marijuana as what happened when the 18 blocks
were displayed in open Court. But as stated, guilty knowledge is not required by the phrase ‘GIVE AWAY TO ANOTHER’ (Sec. 4). It was clearly
established that he gave the stuff to another, that is, to his co-accused Noriel Lacerna. The law does not distinguish as to whether the word ‘another’
refers to a third person other than a co-accused or to a co-accused. The information, as in the case at bar, need not allege guilty knowledge on the
part of Marlon Lacerna in ‘giving away’ to another the marijuana. (Appellant) should, therefor be found culpable for violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as
amended, as charged for ‘giving away to another’ the marijuana.”

Accused Noriel Lacerna, on the other hand, was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court a quo reasoned that “it cannot be said that he did
‘give away to another’ the marijuana for it was (appellant) who gave the marijuana to (Noriel).” Besides, unlike appellant who was urbanized in
mannerism and speech, Noriel Lacerna manifested probinsyano traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.

The Issues

Appellant objects to the trial court’s Decision and assigns the following errors:[16]

“I

The lower court erred in making a sweeping statement that the act of ‘giving away to another(’) is not defined under R.A. 6425 specifically requiring
knowledge what intent one (sic) is passing is a dangerous drug, as contradistinguished from the term ‘deliver; where knowledge is required.

II

The lower court erred in not giving credence to the assertion of accused-appellant that he had no knowledge that what were inside the plastic bag
given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves.

III

The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”

The Court’s Ruling

After meticulously reviewing the records of the case and taking into account the alleged errors cited above and the argument adduced in support
thereof, the Court believes that the issues can be restated as follows: (1) Was appellant’s right against warrantless arrest and seizure violated? (2)
Was the trial court correct in convicting appellant for “giving away to another” 18 blocks of marijuana? and (3) May the appellant be held guilty of
“illegal possession” of prohibited drugs? The Court answers the first two questions in the negative and the third in the affirmative.

First Issue: Appellant’s Right Against

Page 18 of 258
Warrantless Search and Seizure

The defense argues that the bricks of marijuana were inadmissible in evidence as they were obtained through illegal search and seizure. Appellant
alleges that at the time of the search and seizure, he and his co-accused were not committing any crime as they were merely riding a taxicab on the
way to Pier 15, North Harbor in Manila. Hence, the precipitate arrest and seizure violated their constitutional right and the marijuana seized
constituted “fruits of the poisonous tree.”

The Solicitor General disagrees, contending that the search and seizure were consistent with recent jurisprudential trend liberalizing warrantless
search and seizure where the culprits are riding moving vehicles, because a warrant cannot be secured in time to apprehend the mobile target.

Both contentions are inaccurate. In the recent case of People vs. Cuison,[17] this Court reiterated the principles governing arrest, search and seizure.
To summarize, let us begin with Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Constitution further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of the provision mentioned is inadmissible in evidence:

“SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

However, not being absolute, this right is subject to legal and judicial exceptions. The Rules of Court, Section 12 of Rule 126, provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for “dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.”

Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest have also been judicially formulated as follows: (1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure.[18] Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
securing a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases however, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.[19] Military or police checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual. [20]

In the case at bar, the taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped at the police checkpoint by PO3 Valenzuela. It should be stressed as a
caveat that the search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to routine checks -- visual inspection or flashing a light inside the car,
without the occupants being subjected to physical or body searches. A search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of
probable cause.[21]

In applicable earlier Decisions, this Court held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana
emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused;[22] (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been
acting suspiciously;[23] (c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen;[24] (d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped
and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana;[25] and (e)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or
spy -- one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged -- that said accused were bringing
prohibited drugs into the country.[26]

In the case at hand, however, probable cause is not evident. First, the radio communication from General Nazareno, which the arresting officers
received and which they were implementing at that time, concerned possible cases of robbery and holdups in their area.[27] Second, Noriel Lacerna’s
suspicious reactions of hiding his face and slouching in his seat when PO3 Valenzuela’s car passed alongside the taxicab might have annoyed the
latter, or any other law enforcer, and might have caused him to suspect that something was amiss. But these bare acts do not constitute probable
cause to justify the search and seizure of appellant’s person and baggage. Furthermore, the Claudio ruling cannot be applied to this case because
the marijuana was securely packed inside an airtight plastic bag and no evidence, e.g., a distinctive marijuana odor, was offered by the prosecution.

Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely
consented to the search. True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on mere suspicion -- not probable cause -- that they
were engaged in a felonious enterprise. But Valenzuela expressly sought appellant’s permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed to have
his person and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally
recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.[28]

Page 19 of 258
We are aware that this Court in Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence, because such acquiescence was
not consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances.[29] In the case before us, however, appellant himself who was “urbanized in mannerism and speech” expressly said that he was
consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.[30] In his brief, appellant explicitly, even if awkwardly,
reiterated this: “Confident that they [the accused] have not done anything wrong, they allowed to be searched.” This declaration of appellant is a
confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search
and seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there was no poisonous tree to speak of.

Second Issue: Did Appellant

“Give Away” the Prohibited Drug?

The trial court justified the conviction of appellant for “giving away to another” the prohibited drugs, because he literally handed to Noriel the plastic
bag containing marijuana, manually transferring the plastic bag from the front seat to the backseat of the taxicab. We hold, however, that this is not
the act penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended, the violation of which is charged in the Information, penalizes “any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.”

The phrase “give away” is commonly defined as “to make a present of; to donate, or to make a sacrifice.”[31] As used in a statute making it an offense
to “sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of” liquor without a license, this phrase was construed as extending only to a disposition in ejusdem generis
with a sale or a gift.[32] It is synonymous with “to furnish,” a broad term embracing the acts of selling and giving away with the intent of transferring
ownership. Selling by itself is one distinct mode of committing the offense, and furnishing is intended only to include other modes of affording
something to others besides selling it.[33]

As distinguished from “delivery,” which is an incident of sale, “giving away” is a disposition other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of a sale
which involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway), where ownership
is transferred.

According to appellant, he gave the plastic bag and the knapsack to Noriel because the latter got into the taxicab first and because there was more
room in the backseat than in the front. By handing the plastic bag to Noriel, appellant cannot be punished for giving away marijuana as a gift or
premium to another. In Cuison,[34] this Court acquitted an accused of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs because the act per se of handing
over a baggage at the airport cannot in any way be considered criminal.

Further, adopting the trial court’s interpretation would lead to absurd conclusions. Following the trial court’s line of reasoning, Noriel should have
been held liable for the same crime when he gave the plastic bag to PO3 Valenzuela for the latter’s inspection. And yet, the trial court inexplicably
acquitted him. Valenzuela would similarly be criminally culpable as he testified that he turned over the plastic bag to his superior, Lt. de Soto. It is a
well-settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to give effect to the legislative intention and to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion.[35]

Third Issue:
May Appellant Be Convicted of Illegal Possession?

Appellant’s exoneration from giving away a prohibited drug to another under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act does not, however, spell freedom
from all criminal liability. A conviction for illegal possession of prohibited drugs, punishable under Section 8 of the same Act, is clearly evident.

In People vs. Tabar,[36] the Court convicted appellant of illegal possession under Section 8 of said Act, although he was charged with “selling”
marijuana under Section 4, Article II thereof.[37]

The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession
of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by
the seller.[38]

Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale
be identified and presented in court.[39] That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be established without a showing that the accused possessed,
sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of
prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.

In People vs. Manzano,[40] the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the
Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
Page 20 of 258
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus
determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.

From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows:
(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.[41]

The evidence on record established beyond any doubt that appellant was in possession of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs, without the
requisite authority. The NBI forensic chemist’s identification of the marijuana or Indian hemp was conclusive.

Appellant protests the trial court’s finding that he knew that the plastic bag contained marijuana. The lower court ruled that appellant could not have
possibly missed the pervasive pungent smell emitted by marijuana which was duly noted when the marijuana was exhibited in open court. This
reasoning, however, is not supported by the evidence; the plastic bag, at the time of the search and seizure, was “twisted and tied at the top,” and
thus airtight. PO3 Valenzuela did not even notice this pervasive characteristic smell until he poked a hole in the plastic bag and unwrapped the
newspaper covering one of the marijuana bricks.

It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. On grounds of public policy and compelled by
necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, as “the greater master of things,” to forbid certain acts in a limited class of
cases and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. [42] Such legislative enactments are based on the experience
that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer’s knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely accomplish
their purposes; besides, the prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person’s intent, it is the crime itself.[43]

This, however, does not lessen the prosecution’s burden because it is still required to show that the prohibited act was intentional.[44] Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend
to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.[45] Intent to commit
the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown. In Bayona, the Court declared:[46]

xxx The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. x x x x The act prohibited by
the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of
the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to
intimidate the voters.

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done.
‘Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. * * *’ (U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil., 128).”

In illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecution is not excused from proving that possession of
the prohibited act was done “freely and consciously,” which is an essential element of the crime.

In the case at bar, appellant was found to have in his possession a plastic bag containing 18 kg of marijuana formed into 18 bricks which were
separately wrapped. His possession thereof gives rise to a disputable presumption under Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,[47] that he is
the owner of such bag and its contents. His bare, unpersuasive, feeble and uncorroborated disavowal -- that the plastic bag was allegedly given to
him by his uncle without his knowing the contents -- amounts to a denial which by itself is insufficient to overcome this presumption.[48] Besides, this
defense, unless substantiated by clear evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor by courts, for it can just as easily be concocted. Verily, it is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions involving dangerous drugs.[49]

Further, the trial court did not give credence to appellant’s denial. It is axiomatic that appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment
of witnesses’ credibility by the trial court, because the latter was in a better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness
stand.[50] The defense failed to present sufficient reasons showing that the trial court had overlooked or misconstrued any evidence of substance that
would justify the reversal of its rejection of appellant’s defense of denial.

Appellant is, therefore, liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [51]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of
R.A. 6425; SENTENCED, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum; and
ORDERED to pay a fine of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00). Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Page 21 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989 ]

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch I,
Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We
impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).

The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:

Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in
the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air
rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence
appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:

"... the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the
necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a
reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness
and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his untimely
death;..." (p. 8, Rollo)

On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:

THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE.

II

THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.

III

THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)

This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon. However, the resolution of the
second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.

On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:

WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND

II

WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE
BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)

Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is,
whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the
petitioner that "discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. L-11965, 30 April 1958. In
that case We held that the allegation of “with intent to kill ..." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a
minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:

Page 22 of 258
"If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber’ is an inherent contradiction tantamount to
failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)

If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.

On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the
two terms should not be confused.

The word "intent" has been defined as

"(a) design; a determination to do a certain thing; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent;…; the
design resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the
other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939),
in this wise:

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong...” (underscoring Ours) p. 583

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental
processes within a person, the former refers to the desired effect of one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to
the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to
the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of
age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot
him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused.[1] In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert[2] has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act, no crime can exist, and because… the infant[3] (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability." (emphasis Ours).

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors
above nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they)
acted with discernment."[4] The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment
as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that
discernment is equivalent or connotes "intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element
of dolo as a means of committing an offense.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and
negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor
above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to
be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below
fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the
phrase "Any person..." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.

In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto,
supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:

"That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she ... 'with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla..., into a deep place of the Penaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got
drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of
pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Underscoring Ours)

From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant was that the combined effect of the
words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence,
petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment," it in effect alleged "intent." The former may never
embrace the idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.

Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should have first been brought before the
Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged
mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto
Page 23 of 258
menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately
imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 341; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The
same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:

"xxx xxx xxx

(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; x x x " (underscoring supplied)

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:

"The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the
penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability." [5]

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which
the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be
considered.

The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This
erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol
vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17
September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Page 24 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 80089, April 13, 1989 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SATURNINO REY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Saturnino Rey was charged with the crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, committed as follows:

"That on or about 8:40 o'clock in the evening of May 28, 1983, at Poblacion, Pilar, Capiz, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named accused armed with a .45 caliber pistol, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one NICOLAS PAGAYUNAN in a
sudden and in unexpected manner, thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound above the nipple and sternum, right, thru and thru which
caused his death thereafter;"[1]

After trial, Judge Rodrigo V. Cosico found the following facts to have been established:

"x x x On the evening of May 28, 1983, which was a fiesta day, while Rosette Pagayunan, a teacher at the San Esteban Elementary School, was
preparing to cook food at her house, she found out that there was no water. Accordingly, Mrs. Pagayunan instructed her two (2) children, Babette
and Nicolas, to get water from the faucet of the accused Saturnino Rey, also a public school teacher. At that time, Mr. Rey's faucet was allegedly the
only one with water at the neighborhood because of the long drought. Nicolas was then a ninteen-year old fourth year high school student at the
Colegio de la Purisima Concepcion, Roxas City. Babette and Nicolas proceeded towards the house of Mr. Rey to get water. Babette and Nicolas
found Roban Rey, son of the accused, near the faucet. Roban was sitting atop the steps of the kitchen stairway talking with Nicolas. While Nicolas
was standing beside the faucet waiting for his pail to be filled with water, he was shot twice by Saturnino Rey from the window of his bedroom which
was about four (4) meters away. The shooting was witnessed by Roban Rey and Babette Pagayunan, who was about three (3) meters away from
the faucet. After he was hit, Nicolas said to Roban: 'I was hit'. Soon after, Nicolas fell front of Roban. Roban went up their house and told Saturnino
Rey: 'Daddy you hit Colas'. Babette went home and reported the shooting incident to her mother who fainted. The Pagayunan sisters and their
group went to the place to get the body of Nicolas, who was taken to the Medicare Hospital in Pilar, Capiz, where he was given a first-aid treatment.
Thereafter, Nicolas was taken to Roxas City but died before reaching the hospital.

"On the morning of May 29, 1983, Patrolmen Jose Ballera and Hanzel Villareal conducted an investigation at the place of the shooting incident and
found an empty shell (Exh. C) below the window of the room of Saturnino Rey. During the investigation, Roban Rey, in the presence of the police
investigators and Romeo Bacalocos, pointed to the direction of the window of the room of his father, Saturnino Rey, as the place where the firing
came from."[2]

The trial court found the defendant-appellant guilty, as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00, to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages and to pay the costs.

From this judgment, the accused Saturnino Rey appealed. His counsel assails the trial court for completely believing the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. Counsel points to certain facts and circumstances of weight and substance which the trial court allegedly overlooked,
misapplied or misinterpreted, and which, if considered, will materially alter the result, to wit: "1) the fact that it was summer and the water system
connections, particularly those in the higher level of the town, were not functioning; 2) the fact that the water faucet at the backyard of the accused-
appellant was not functioning, not merely because the water pressure was too weak for the faucet to function but also because the water connection
had been disconnected (t.s.n., p. 283); 3) the fact that the houses of both the deceased and the accused-appellant and their immediate
neighborhood are on the same higher level of the town; 4) the fact that the household of the accused-appellant were getting their water supply from
Martin Cunada, their nearest neighbor, because he had a water pump, several water storage tanks, and a well; 5) the fact that the immediate
neighbors of the Pagayunans had wells, water storage tanks, as well as water system connections and some of their neighbors were relatives and
close friends of the Pagayunans; 6) the fact that the Pagayunans were known and seen to obtain their water supply from these immediate neighbors;
7) the fact that the Pagayunans (who were relatively new in the neighborhood) had never drawn water from the faucet of the accused-appellant; 8)
the fact that the house of the accused-appellant was at least 120 meters away from the house of the deceased; 9) the fact that the only access to
the accused-appellant's bedroom window from the outside was through the shuttered gate of the wire-enclosed vegetable garden; 10) the fact that
the six-foot-high chicken and bar-wire fence of the vegetable garden was covered with climbing plants, thereby blocking the view from the window as
well as from the outside into the bedroom; 11) the fact that the accused-appellant's house was of the bungalow type and the sill of the bedroom
window was only about 3.5 feet from the ground; 12) the fact that the deceased was found just below or near the bedroom window and within the
enclosed vegetable garden, not only by members of the accused-appellant's family but also by Martin Cunada, a friend and barkada of the
deceased, who happened to be passing by just after gunfire sounded; 13) the fact that Martin Cunada, who stayed for some five minutes at the
scene of the incident right after the shooting, did not see Babette Pagayunan or any other member of the deceased's family anywhere in the vicinity;
14) the fact that after the shooting only Babette Pagayunan of the Pagayunan household was seen with the deceased and the Rey children at the

Page 25 of 258
Medicare Hospital in Roxas City; 15) the fact that none of the four water containers the deceased allegedly brought with him to the accused-
appellant's backyard faucet was ever found or seen before, during, or after the shooting; 16) the fact that except for Dr. Buenvenida, all the other four
(4) witnesses of the prosecution concocted some material portions of their testimonies; 17) the fact that in a small rural town in the interior the
inhabitants sup and sleep early; and 18) the act that it was the night of the town fiesta and older folks tend to be more security-conscious."[3]

The appeal is without merit. The circumstances enumerated by the counsel for the appellant are of little importance because the accused-appellant,
Saturnino Rey, had admitted having fired the shot that killed the deceased Nicolas Pagayunan. His testimony in court reads, as follows:

“Q Now, will you please inform the Honorable Court at about 8:40 in the night of May 28, 1983 where you were and what you were doing.

A I was inside my room of my house.

Q And what were you doing?

A I was lying down.

Q Did you have any companion in your room that night and at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q Inform the court who were your companions.

A My child aging four years of age with my second wife.

Q What happened while you were in your room that night and that time with your child?

A There was a person who opened my window, the window of my room where I was lying down.

Q Now do you know who was that person who opened the window of your room where you were lying down?

A No, sir. At first I did not know.

Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the room where you were staying in and the window which was opened?

A The frontage of my house is facing (witness pointing to the western direction). The elevation of the flooring is one foot. The height of the
window from the floor is this high (witness referring to the window of the courtroom estimated to be 2 1/2 feet).

Q After you noticed that a person opened your window, the window of your bedroom, what happened?

A I felt for my pistol.

Q What happened after that?

A I sat on the bed and asked, 'Who are you?'

Q And did you receive an answer after asking who was that person?

A No, sir.

Q What happened after you received no answer?

A I fired a shot.

Q How many times did you fire your pistol?

A Twice.

Q By the way, how wide was that window in your room?

A About 1 1/2 meters wide.

Q And did you see anybody to whom or at whom you fired your pistol?

A The first shot that I fired was upward, on the air.

Q My question to you is, did you see any person outside the window?

Page 26 of 258
A Yes, sir.

Q Were you able to discern the facial features of the person you saw at the window?

"ATTY. PATRICIO:

Objection, your Honor.

COURT:

All right, reform.

ATTY. ABELA:

Q How well did you see the person you saw at your window?

A Silhouette.

Q Will you be able to recognize the person you saw at your window that night?

A No, sir.

Q And what was the person you saw at your window doing when you fired the shot?

A You mean the first shot?

Q The first shot what was the person doing?

A After he pushed the shutter of the window he put his hand down.

Q And at that time you fired the second shot what was the man doing?

A I was looking at him and he had the action of drawing something and that was the time I fired the second shot.

Q By the way how close was the man to your window that night?

A Just like this, from myself up to Atty. Abela (distance estimated to be 1 ½ meters).

Q My question to you is, how close was that man to the window of your room?

A He was right at the window.

Q And what part of the body of that man can be seen by you?

A From the waist.

Q And how far were you seated on your bed, how far was your bed from the wall of the window?

A About one foot.

Q What happened after you fired the second shot directed at that man at your window?

A I gave out an alarm to my children."[4]

Having invoked self-defense, it was incumbent upon the defendant-appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence the fact that he acted in self-
defense. The defendant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the killing.[5] In this regard, defendant-appellant failed to discharge the burden reposed
upon him by law to prove self-defense. The trial court found that the testimony of the defendant-appellant gave evasive and ambiguous answers

Page 27 of 258
before the court. [6] We have examined the record of the case and we find no cogent reason to disturb said findings of the trial court. The witnesses
for the prosecution had no evil motive to testify falsely against the appellant.

Besides, defendant-appellant's testimony, even if true, does not establish a case of self-defense. There is no evidence of unlawful aggression on the
part of the deceased. The defendant-appellant merely testified that he saw a person open the window of his bedroom and when he inquired who the
person was and received no answer, he fired a shot into the air; then, when said person lifted his right arm chest high, [7] he fired the second shot.
The interval between the two shots was only about three (3) to five (5) seconds.[8] For unlawful aggression to be appreciated in self-defense, there
must be an actual sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[9] The raising of
the right arm chest high alone by an unarmed person cannot be considered unlawful aggression. Absent unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased, there cannot be self-defense on the part of the accused.

The defendant-appellant also failed to rebut the presumption that the shooting was done with criminal intention His conduct after the shooting
incident was inconsistent with the conduct of a person who had innocently shot a person by accident. It would appear that he did not do anything to
help his victim who was lying down on the ground, bleeding and moaning. He did not go down from his house even after finding that the person he
had shot was Nicolas Pagayunan. Instead, he uttered curses.[10] Then, very early the next morning, at about 5:30 o'clock, he left his house and
stayed with his brother in a neighboring municipality,[11] and did not go home even to help the police in their investigation.[12] Flight is an indication of
a guilty mind.

The defendant-appellant also contends that treachery or alevosia was not charged in the information filed against him, or proven by the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.

The contention is without merit. The information filed in this case specifically stated that the accused, Saturnino Rey, armed with a .45 caliber pistol,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot Nicolas Pagayunan "in a sudden and unexpected manner." This is sufficient allegation of treachery because a
sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the person of the one attacked is the essence of treachery or alevosia. It is not
necessary that the information should use specifically the word "alevosia" or treachery. It is sufficient if the information alleges facts in clear and
explicit language which would show treachery or alevosia without the use of the specific word.[13]

Treachery in the shooting of Nicolas Pagayunan was established by the testimony of Babette Pagayunan who declared that the accused-appellant
suddenly and without warning shot the deceased as the latter was waiting for his pail to be filled with water and while talking to the son of the
accused-appellant. The attack was sudden, unexpected, without warning, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression. In fact, the deceased did not sense any danger that he would be shot by the defendant-appellant as there was no previous grudge or
misunderstanding between them.

The claim of the defendant-appellant that he had fired a warning shot into the air appears to be an afterthought. Babette Pagayunan categorically
declared that her brother, Nicolas Pagayunan, was hit on the first shot. Her testimony, on cross examination, reads as follows:

Page 28 of 258
“Q How many shots did Saturnino Rey the accused, direct to your brother?

A Two shots were delivered by Saturnino Rey. The first shot hit my brother. I did not know whether the second shot hit my brother. After
the first shot my brother staggered towards Roban."[14]

Besides, the shots were fired in rapid succession so that the first shot could not serve as a warning shot. Babette Pagayunan stated:

“Q How long after the first shot did you hear the second shot?

A Seconds only. The interval was seconds.

Q So that the second shot came right after the first shot?

A Yes, sir."[15]

The defendant-appellant, Saturnino Rey, also testified, as follows:

Q You testified a while ago that you fired two shots. How long after you fired the first shot that you also fired the second shot?

A The interval was only seconds.

Q About two seconds?

A Three seconds or more.

Q But it could not be more than five seconds, right?

A No, sir."[16]

As the People's counsel observed, if the version of the defendant-appellant were true, the empty shell would have fallen near the defendant-
appellant's bed; inside his room, and not outside the house where Pat. Hanzel Villareal found it; and that the first shot would have hit a part of the
house.

The trial court, therefore, correctly found the offense committed by the defendant-appellant to be murder, qualified as it was by treachery.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), J., with reservations as to the penalty only consistent with her dissent in P. vs. Millora.
Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., subject to the same reservations indicated by the chairman.

Page 29 of 258
 [ G. R. No. L-3008, March 19, 1951 ]

FEDERICO SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

JUGO, J.:

Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of theft of one electric motor marked "Cyclix," with Western Electric Company
cable, and one lantern slide projector, with their corresponding accessories, for the operation of motion pictures, valued at P6,000, belonging to the
Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., represented by its President-Manager, Teodoro S. Benedict©.

After trial he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto
mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correctional, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the
costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the above judgement and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correctional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay the costs, ordering that the lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator (Exhibit D) be returned to the owner, the
Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.

The defendant filed a petition for certiorari in this Court against the Court of Appeals. Only questions of law are raised which may be reduced to the
issue whether or not the acts of the accused, as found by the Court of Appeals, constitute theft.

The Court of Appeals, in a carefully prepared opinion, held as follows:

"Taking into account the respective contentions of the parties and the evidence produced in support thereof, We are of the opinion despite Emilia
Saenz' letter (Exhibit E) where she writes to Benedicto that Federico Soriano was only in charge of collecting the rents and of transmitting them to
her, that appellant was their representative and duly appointed substitute administrator in her stead. It seems also clear that, because of the
disturbance caused by the war, the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was indebted to the Saenz for rents due on account of the lease; and that appellant in
the exercise of the powers conferred upon him (Exhibit 16) could have sued said debtor to foreclose the mortgage executed by the Eagle Cinema
Co., Inc., in favor of his principals, if he could not have come to a better understanding with Teodoro S. Benedicto. It is no longer disputed that the
properties of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in the building were lost, and that the lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator
(Exhibit D) have been found in the house and in the possession of the appellant after having repeatedly denied any knowledge of the equipment and
accessories of the Cine and disclaimed any responsibility for their loss. Considering these facts that have been fully established in the case, and
particularly the manner and circumstances under which said projector and generator were taken from the building of the Eagle-Theater, can
appellant be held liable for the crime of theft of such properties?

"Counsel for appellant contends that the latter is entitled to an acquittal, because in the case at bar

"1. All the elements of theft are not present;

"2. There was no criminal intent (on the part of the appellant) ;

"3. The action of the appellant is susceptible of two interpretations, both consistent with his innocence or guilt. Therefore, he should be acquitted; and

"4. The guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

"The crime of theft of which appellant stands charged and convicted, is covered by the 1st paragraph of Article 308 of the Kevised Penal Code,
which read as follows:
'Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.—Theft is committed by any person who, with intent of gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.',

and we agree with counsel for appellant that in order to justify a conviction for theft the following elements must concur, namely: (a) that a chattel or
personal property must have been taken or abstracted; (b) that there be intent of gain when the taking away of the article took place; (c) that the
property stolen be owned by another; and (d) that in the taking, neither violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things be employed.

"With regard to the 'taking,' appellant contends that he did not execute this element of theft because being an attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Saenz,
he acted for his principals, and for all intents and purposes of the power conferred upon him, he was the principal himself and, naturally, he could not
steal something belonging to him under the principle that 'Rei nostrae furtum facera rum possumtis'. The power of attorney (Exhibit 16) clearly
empowered the appellant 'to ask, demand, sue for, recover, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money * * * and other things of value of
whatsoever nature or kind,' and gave him 'full power to do anything requisite and necessary to be done in the premises as fully as I (Emilia Saenz)
could if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney and substitute attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by
virtue hereof.' But appellant fails to take two important factors into consideration, to writ: firstly, that when he took, as he finally admitted to have
taken, the lantern slide projector and the 'Cyclix' motor generator from the Eagle-Theater, he did not really act in behalf and representation of his
principals, for otherwise he would not have repeatedly denied having taken said properties and insinuated that they had been taken by the

Page 30 of 258
Japanese; and secondly, that even his principals could not have taken and appropriated said properties for themselves without previous and proper
action in court, because no mortgage creditor can foreclose the property mortgage to him without judicial proceedings. Thus, the doctrines laid down
by the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Reyes, (Phil., 441); People vs. Soriano, (50 Phil., 203) Manila Mercantile Co. vs. Flores (50
Phil., 759) and Levy Hermanos, Inc., vs. Ramirez (60 Phil., 978), on which appellant builds up his contention, are of no bearing on the case at bar.

"Discussing further this element of 'taking,' it can be added that the projector (Exhibit C) and the generator (Exhibit D) were in the premises of the
Eagle Theater, and that sometime in September, 1944, when the Japanese Ishii ceased to operate the Cine, appellant received the keys of the
building where said equipment was stored. So, the question that remains to be determined in connection with this point is whether appellant, having
received those properties, could, for the purposes of the crime of theft, take things already in his possession. It is to be remembered that the
apparatus, accessories and equipment of the Cine belonged to the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., though they were mortgaged to appellant's principals;
that the mortgage was never foreclosed, and that neither Teodoro S. Benedicto, as President, General Manager and majority stockholder of said
corporation, nor any other duly authorized person in his stead, had ever entrusted said properties to him for the execution of the mortgage, or for any
other purpose. And even conceding for the sake of argument that with the return of the keys and the delivery of the building to appellant, he would
have received the physical possession of the machinery therein located, yet, the acquisition of such possesion did not carry with it the power to
exercise any act of dominion over said chattels. Among the leading cases that can be cited to illustrate this phase of the problem, we quote the
following from Question No. XXXI of Viada (vol. 3, page 433, 4th ed.) ;

"'Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several head of cattle under his care, guilty of the crime of estafa within case No. 5 of
article 548, or of theft, defined and punished in article 533, No. 2, of the Spanish Penal Code'— The Supreme Court has decided that it was this
latter and more serious crime that was committed: 'Considering that the crime of theft is committed when one, with intent of gain, and without using
violence or intimidation against persons, or force upon things, takes away personal property of another without the owner's consent; and in the
present case Manuel Diaz Castilla undoubtedly committed the crime defined, for, with intent of gain, he took away two bucks and a female goat,
against the will of his master, the owner of said animals, which were under his care as shepherd; Considering that, in holding that the crime
committed was that of theft and not of estafa, as claimed by the appellant, ignorant of the true elements which constitute the latter crime, the lower
court did not commit any error of law, nor violate any legal provision, as contended by defendant's counsel in support of this appeal.' (Decision
rendered on June 23, 1886, published in the Gazette of September 16, p. 189.)

"And this is so, because as stated in the case of United States vs. Nieves de Vera, (43 Phil. 1000):

'When the delivery of a chattel or cattle has not the effect of transferring the juridical possession thereof, or title thereto, it is presumed that the
possession of, and title to, the thing so delivered remains in the owner; and the net of disposing thereof with intent of gain and without the consent of
the owner constitutes the crime of theft'
"As to the element of 'intent of gain,' We further declare that whenever a cattle or other personal property value is abstracted without the consent of
the owner, and the evidence on record does not show any other reason for the abstraction, it is to be presumed and logically inferred that such act
was motivated by an intent of gain." (Decision, pp. 7-12.)

The petitioner shields himself behind the power-of-attorney, Exhibit 16, granted to him by Emilia Saenz, the owner of the building which was rented
by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., the essential part of which reads as follows:

"To ask, take, sue for, recover, collect and receive any and all sums of money, debts, dues, accounts, interests, demands, and other things of value
of whatsoever nature or kind as may be or hereafter be due, owing, payable or belonging to the community entrusted to me (Emilia Saenz) in the
City of Iloilo and to have, use, and take any and all lawful ways and means for the recovery thereof by suit, attachment or otherwise, and to
compromise, settle and agree for (Decision, 5-6.)

It is clear that said power of attorney did not authorize the petitioner to take away the projector and the generator, hiding them in his house and
denying to the owner and the police authorities that he had them in his possession, which was an illegal act, not covered by his power-of-attorney.
He was authorized only to ask, take, sue for, recover, collect, etc., sums of money, debts, dues, accounts and other things which were or might
thereafter be due, etc., to his principal Emilia Saenz. This authority referred mainly to the collection of the rents of the building rented by the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc. The projector and the generator were not due or owing to Emilia Saenz. It is not to be supposed that Saenz herself would have
denied the possession of those articles. If it was the purpose of the petitioner only to protect those instruments from looting, there is no reason why
he should have concealed them from the owner and denied having them.

Even though the equipment, including those articles, were mortgaged to Saenz to guarantee the payment of the rents due on the building, yet there
had been no foreclosure and neither she nor the petitioner had the authority to take away and conceal those articles from the owner or the police
authorities. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., had the right to possess said articles.

With regard to the element of taking or asportation, there is no doubt that it existed, notwithstanding that the petitioner had been entrusted with the
keys of the building where they were kept. This point has been settled by Viada, numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and of the
Philippines, some of which authorities are cited above.

As to the element of intent, it is clear that when the petitioner carried away and concealed from the owner and the police authorities the above-
mentioned articles, he acted with intent of gain. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person, which in the
present case unmistakably point to that intent.

Page 31 of 258
In view of the foregoing, the petition for the writ of certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Page 32 of 258
 [ G.R. NO. 165842, November 29, 2005 ]

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, PETITIONER, VS. PROMULGATED: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant,
who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which
was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January
1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite
Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was
single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C.
Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. [5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point,
Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was
jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did
not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.[8]

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with
her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further
testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He
did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married
Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private
complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. [9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did
not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant,
he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest
belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one
to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To
support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]

Page 33 of 258
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of good faith and reliance on the Court's ruling in United States v.
Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage; the matter should be submitted to the proper court for
resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision
appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should
apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña's presumptive death as the
absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is
still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of
death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard
from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The
petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions
remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before
the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a
judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second
marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private
complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave
her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law,
jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Page 34 of 258
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior, serà castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. [20] The phrase "or before the
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death
after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy."[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she
contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. [23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand,
Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2)
the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the
Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1)
an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. [28] He explained that:

... This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of
the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject believes that the former
marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute
a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime
of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime. [29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.[30] Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."[31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers
injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to
have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in
the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.[34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea.[35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity;
hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after
the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or
good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that
his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of
a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of
the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed
to discharge his burden.
Page 35 of 258
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely
because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals
and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner
prescribed and the causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered
society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true,"
is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would
make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the
subjective condition of individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain
objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by
law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.[43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four
consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]

Page 36 of 258
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article
40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with
bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by
the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. [48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the
Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the
person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven
years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption
is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit
to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. [50] The
Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other
spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only
refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a
deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the
Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings
in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined
that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second
marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present. [54] Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even
with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable,
should not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a
second marriage.[56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof
of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

... Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must
file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a
second marriage is already established.[58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial
declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for
Page 37 of 258
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with
possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as
presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x
x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy. [59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse
is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code,
which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The
petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one
of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy
was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate
court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral
damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la
adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta
enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados. [64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound
by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. [66]

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the
Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

Page 38 of 258
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright,
moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission
of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 [67] and analogous cases (which refer to
those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)[68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral
damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. The standards are the following: act with
justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." The latter provision is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each
case.[71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought
his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private
complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband. [72]

The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral
damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not
recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all
recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though
they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant's
conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for
the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was
embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn't sleep" but "couldn't eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis
appears for judicial interference with the jury's reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37
N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good
morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even
considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to
be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
Page 39 of 258
892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the
law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant's
misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for
which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v.
Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97
Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant's
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations distinguish this
case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A.
L. R. 958.[76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

Page 40 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 45964, April 25, 1939 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. RESTITUTO FALLER (ALIAS R. AGUILAR), DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.

DECISION

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. (After hearing the evidence, the Court
of First Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not caused maliciously and willfully, but through reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto
Faller, under paragraph 3 of article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through reckless imprudence, to pay a fine of
P38 and to indemnify the offended party Ramon Diokno in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. From this decision,
an appeal was taken.

In this instance the appellant assigns as sole error of the court the fact that he was sentenced for a crime with which he was not charged, contending
that a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different from that committed through reckless imprudence.

The court has not committed this error. The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to property with which he is charged. Reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The information
alleges that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally. To this information no objection was interposed. Negligence being a
punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and
criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.

Laurel, J., see concurring opinion

Page 41 of 258
 [ G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955 ]

FRANCISCO QUIZON, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On December 19, 1952, the respondent Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint against the herein petitioner, Francisco
Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence,
the value of the damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be imposed by
the justice of the peace court. The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, but the latter returned it to
him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant appealed from this ruling of the Court of First
Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.

Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:

"Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

"(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:".

Sections 87 of said Acts reads as follows:

"Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction
over:

"(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to: (6) Malicious mischief;".

In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Penas y Ferrer and Key y Rochas, 86 Phil., 596; and Natividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87
Phil., 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to jutices of the
peace and judges of the municipal courts is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first instance, when the penalty to be imposed is more
than six months imprisonment or a fine of more than P200.00.

The question, therefore, is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the court of First Instance when the crime charged
is damage to property through reckless negligence or imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125.

We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property
through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of the
latter. This assumption is not legally warranted

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:

"Art. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within
the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief".

It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the general intention to carry out the felonious act (a
feature common to all wilful crimes) but that he should act under the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho concurra
animo especifico de danar" (Cuello Calon, Der. Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent of Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909; 12 Feb. 1921). ,

"El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho danoso y de la conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de
perjudicar, la intencion de danar. Si no eariste semejante animo el hecho no constituye delito." (II Cuello Caldn, p. 870-871).

The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the requirement of Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already
quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter",
Le., not punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief can not be committed through negligence, since culpa
(negligence) and malice (or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct.
1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5 Oct. 1942, has expressly recognized that this crime is one of those that can not be committed by imprudence or
negligence.

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it
and merely ; determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure can
not be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from wilful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of
such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to property".

Page 42 of 258
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed wilfully. For each
penalty for the wilful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum, if the wilful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.

It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of malicious mischief, did so in total disregard of
the principles and considerations above outlined. Our conclusion is that "malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has
exclusive reference to the wilful and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised Penal Code, and to no other offense.

A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87 of the Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes
an exception to the general jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at offenses
punishable with not more than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00 or both. To this traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act
added eight (8) specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable in said courts without reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious mischief is
one of these exceptions, while imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of them.

For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies exclusively in the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ
of certiorari is granted and the order of remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without pron- ouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Page 43 of 258
 [ G. R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376, March 31, 1958 ]

RUFINO T. SAMSON, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose names are unknown in two separate
informations with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank before the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Cases Nos. 12802 & 12803). On a plea of not guilty, they were tried and found guilty as Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et al. charged, the
court sentencing each of the three defendants to suffer in each case a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, they were sentenced to indemnify the Philippine Ryukyus
Command, the payee of the checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases.

The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and
Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of
arresto mayor in each of the two cases.

Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review contending (1) that the acts done by him, as found by the Court of
Appeals, do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa through (falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court
of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new trial.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are: "Espiridion Lascaño, father of the late Felipe Lascaño, a lieutenant of the USAFFE, who died during
the last World War, and his widow Rosalina Paras, through the latter filed, as Felipe Lascaño's only legitimate surviving heir, their claim papers with,
the Red Cross Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon in the early part of 1946.

"On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting the checks of the two claimants who were
with him at Camp Murphy by approaching an officer of the Philippine Army who could identify said persons assuring Samson that he had known said
claimants for a long time. Having been assured twice of the identity of the supposed claimants and after examining their residence certificates
attached to the claim papers, Samson accompanied by Cruz and the supposed claimants went to talk to Lt. Manuel Valencia and requested him to
act as guarantor to secure the claimant's checks. Believing in the representations made by Samson, Lt. Valencia accompanied them to the
Deceased Check Delivery Section, Finance, AFP, and secured the release of PNB Check No. 754497J, Exhibit C, in favor of Rosalina Paras for the
sum of P6,417.11 and PNB Check No. 754498J, Exhibit D, in favor of Espiridion Lascaño for the sum of P6,417.10. Thence, the party impaired to
the Bureau of Treasury, Finance Building, where again through the help of Rufino T. Samson, the two checks above-mentioned were cashed by the
teller Rosario Mallari who knew Samson. In accordance with the regulations of the Bureau of Treasury the payee Rosalina Paras, not knowing how
to write or sign her name, was required to thumbmark on the back of the check, Exhibit C, and below her thumbmark Rufino T. Samson and
Francisco Ordoñez signed as witnesses. Espiridion Lascafio who knows how to sign his name was asked to do so on the back of the check, Exhibit
D, and below his signature Samson signed not as a witness but as the last indorser. The accounts called for in said two checks were delivered to
Samson and Cruz, who, as will be shown hereafter, was the person who signed as Francisco Ordoñez, counted the money and delivered it to the
supposed claimants. The party then proceeded to the Aristocrat Restaurant where together with about eleven others took their lunch for which
Vergara paid P60, besides giving Samson P300 supposed to be paid to the officers who helped them in securing the checks plus P10 for Samson's
taxi fare. Samson left the party and went to the movie to meet a friend from Camp Murphy.

"On October 4, or just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy Samson was informed by Severino Anda, one of those who were
with the party which cashed the checks, thus said checks were delivered to the wrong parties. Worried by such news he left for Sorsogon the
following day to locate the real claimants. While on the train he saw an old couple whom he suspected to be the fake claimants because they had
been throwing furtive glances at him. Upon arriving at Sorsogon he reported the matter to the police and caused to be taken the couple's finger
prints, names and address. At about 10 a.m., October 6, he went to look for the house of the Lascaño family. He found Espiridion Lascaño too old
and weak to leave the house. He saw Rosalina at the school where she was teaching and inquired from her whether she had received a check from
Camp Murphy as well as the check of the old man and he was answered in the negative. He returned to Manila the following day and on October 8
reported the matter to Sgt. Luis Balignasan, G-2 PC, who after taking his affidavit promised to help him and conduct the necessary investigation. He
submitted a copy of the finger prints of the suspects."

Analyzing the criminal responsibility of appellant Samson, the court made the following comment:

"Coming now to appellant Rufino T. Samson, we believe that the following facts are admitted; that on the strength of the assurances given by Amado
L. Cruz that the supposed claimants were the real ones he requested the help of Lt. Manuel Valencia to act as guarantor and Valencia, relying on his
representations, accompanied him and the claimants to the Delivery Window and secured the checks for them; that again Rufino T. Samson helped
Amado T. Cruz and the supposed claimants by signing as witness together with Cruz so that the supposed claimant Rosalina Paras could cash her
cheek and went to the extent of signing as last indorser on the back of the check, Exhibit D, in favor of Espiridion Lascano and then later at the
Aristocrat Restaurant accepted from Vergara and Cruz the sum of P300 to be paid to the officers who helped them and the further sum of P10 for his
taxi fare. There is no evidence that he was aware that the supposed claimants were not the real ones and his subsequent conduct shows it to be
true; but although he did not know them personally he induced another friend of his, Lt. Manuel Valencia, to believe in the identity of said claimants
thus helping his co-accused Amado L. Cruz, Bonifacio Vergara and John Doe and Maria Doe to perpetrate the crime of estafa through falsification. It
Page 44 of 258
is unbelievable that he would accept as his share the meager amount of P310 if he were a co-conspirator in the commission of a fraud amounting to
over P12,000. We see nothing strange in his acceptance of P310 as a token of gratitude on the part of the claimants, but he has undoutedly acted
with reckless imprudence for having taken no precaution whatsoever in assuring himself that the supposed claimants were the real ones. The mere
assurances given him by Amado L. Cruz were not sufficient to justify his acting in the manner he did."

We find no error in the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the appellant herein acted with gross negligence in assuring Lt. Valencia and
the cashier of the identity of the supposed claimants, as a result of which the impersonators managed to secure possession of the checks in question
and to cash the same. Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and
ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts,
since they were personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former classmate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify
disbursement of such a large amount if the funds belonged to appellant; and we see no justification for his treating government funds with less care
and diligence than if they were his own. Nor does the submission to this appellant of residence certificates constitute adequate identification, since
these certificates are tax receipts and not means of establishing the identity of persons; and appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently
intelligent and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen.

There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by
acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even
assuming that he had no intention to defraud the offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits,
appellant's participation together with the participation of his co-defendants in the commission of the offense completed all the elements necessary
for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document (Article 17, Revised Penal Code). Anyway and for
the purposes of the penalty that was actually imposed upon appellant, it is immaterial that he be considered only guilty of falsification of a
commercial document through reckless negligence, because the penalty for the crime of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172,
No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5.000.00 which under the
provisions of Articles 25 and 26 of the same Code is a correctional penalty. Consequently, if in the cases at bar the crimes of falsification were due to
reckless imprudence, the corresponding penalty would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 365, opening paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code), which comprehends the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals upon appellant.

Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of appellant constitute in each case the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile
document by reckless imprudence, because in so far as the falsification is concerned, his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of
identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said ehecks and their proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true payees
participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the
proceedings (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code). Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to the official duties of appellant, he would
be nevertheless liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court of Spain
assert the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence since in falsifying public or mercantile documents the element of intent to
cause damage is not required because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents.

"An act executed without malice or criminal purpose, but with carelessness, negligence, or lack of precaution, which causes harm to society or to an
individual, should be classified as either reckless negligence or simple imprudence; the person responsible therefor is liable for such results as
should have been anticipated, and for acts "which no one would commit except through culpable indifference.

"The courts heretofore dealing with acts punishable under the Penal Code of Spain which, with slight modifications, is practically the same as the
one in force in these Islands, have heard and decided cases involving falsification of documents with reckless negligence. They therein applied the
provisions of article 581 of the Spanish Code, which is identical with article 568 of the Code in force in these Islands, as may be seen among others,
in judgments in cessation of July 8, 1882, December 21, 1885, November 8, 1887, and December 7, 1896; also in case No. 2818, United States vs.
Mariano Vega, decided by this Court." (U.S. vs. Maleza, 14 Phil., 468).[1]

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that the
information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be
said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.

The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case is: "When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116, Rules of Court). As a complement we have also the following rule: "An offense charged necessarily includes
that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, Idem.).

While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,* G. R. No. L-6641,
July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser
offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act
Page 45 of 258
with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent
man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is
a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.

Under a charge of forcible abduction, the defendant may be convicted of illegal detention if the evidence does not show that the kidnapping was with
lewd designs. (People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil., 775.)

The crime of theft is included necessarily in that of robbery and therefore a defendant can be convicted of the former, notwithstanding that he was
charged the latter offense. (U. S. vs. Birueda, 4 Phil., 229; People vs. Rivera, 64 Phil., 578.)

The crime of robbery en cuadrilla is necessarily included in that of bandolerisimo (brigandage), and therefore the defendants can be convicted of the
former on an information charging the latter. (U. S. vs. De la Cruz, 4 Phil., 430.)

Where the information charges brigandage, but the evidence fails to show that the crime was committed by an armed band, the defendants can be
convicted of robbery. (U. S. vs. Mangubat. 3 Phil., 1.)

Under a charge of malversation a public official may be found guilty of estafa. (U. S. vs. Solis, 7 Phil., 195.)

Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elements of the offense charged in the information be
proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime proved. This conclusion is
strengthened by the provisions of Section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court under which appellant could no longer be prosecuted for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents by reckless negligence were we to acquit him in the cases at bar on the obviously technical theory of the
dissenters.

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears
supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification
has been willful, it would be incongrous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.

With regard to the motion for new trial filed by appellant for the purpose of introducing an allegedly newly discovered evidence which consists of an
affidavit of one Emiliano Salangsang-Salazar, it appearing that the same if admitted would only be corroborative in nature and would not have the
effect of altering the result of the case, the same is denied.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.

Page 46 of 258
 G.R. No. L-19660 May 24, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. AMBROCIO CANO Y PINEDA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

On or about August 2, 1961, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed with the said court an information accusing defendant-appellee Ambrocio Cano
y Pineda of the crime of damage to property with multiple physical injuries, thru reckless imprudence, alleging:

That on or about the 21st day of September, 1960, on the National Highway at San Isidro, municipality of San Fernando, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Ambrocio Cano y Pineda, being then
the driver and person in charge of La Mallorca Pambusco bus with body No. 846, Plate No. TPU 23177 (Pampanga '60), in utter disregard
of traffic rules and regulations and without exercising due precaution to avoid accident to persons and/or damage to property, and by
driving at a speed more than that allowed by law and on the wrong side of the road, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive, manage and operate said vehicle in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner, causing, as a result thereof the said bus driven by
him to hit and bump a Philippine Rabbit Bus with body No. 257, bearing Plate No. TPU-25589 (Tarlac '60), then driven by Clemente Calixto
y Onia, thereby causing damages to the said Philippine Rabbit Bus in the amount of P5,023.55, to the damage and prejudice of the owner,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., in the said amount of P5,023.55, Philippines Currency, and on the same occasion inflicting physical
injuries to the passengers of said buses, namely, Francisco Feliciano, Hilario Pasamonte Linda Ongria, Lorenzo Calixto, whose physical
injuries, barring complications, required and will require medical attendance for a period of not less than three (3) months; Regina
Mendoza de Gacuain, Virginia Camba, Francisco Guevarra, George Sebastian, Francisco Rabago, Oscar Favorito, Lida Toledo, whose
physical injuries, barring complications, required and will require medical attendance for a period ranging from one week to one month;
Adelaida Buenconsejo Vda. de Shaup, Eulogio Catalico, Marina Gonzales, Abraham Serrano, Epifanio Payas, Seprando Fontanilla, Pedro
Bingcang, Tomas Ortega, Mateo Estaris, Andres Espinosa, Ligaya Garcia, Romeo Rivera, Mateo Estacio, Jaime Castillo, Clemente
Calixto, Dedicacion San Juan, Antonio Calixto, Teofilo Raon, Francisco Mallari, Alfonso Aquino, Esmeralda Cayasi, Salvacion Vda. de
Ortega, Patrocinio Caasi, Lily Ortarsa, Eulogio Canlas, Esperanza de la Cruz, Benita Cesar, Laulita Batalia, Miguela Quilay, Benjamin
Tiglao, Ligaya Garcia Bindua, Marlita Balmonte, Geronimo Briones, Juan Velasco, Tomasa Mateo, and Bobby Galhoun whose physical
injuries, barring complications required and will require medical attendance for a period ranging from seven to nine days, and incapacitate
said injured persons from performing their customary labor for the same period of time, respectively.1äwphï1.ñët

All contrary to law.

Upon arraignment,1 defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Months later,2 he filed a motion to quash the information upon the ground:

1. That the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, has already prescribed;

2. That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction of the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; and

3. That the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to property, serious and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.

After due hearing, the lower court issued an order3 holding that, "without discussing whether or not this particular misdemeanor of slight physical
injuries" — through reckless imprudence — "has prescribed ... it is clear that said misdemeanor cannot validly be complexed with grave or less grave
felonies", and, accordingly, granting the motion to quash and ordering the prosecution "to amend the information within ten (10) days" from notice, by
"deleting therefrom all reference to slight physical injuries". A reconsideration of this order having been denied, the prosecution interposed the
present appeal.

The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the offense of slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence cannot be complexed with
that of damage to property with multiple physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, because "misdemeanor" may not, under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, be complexed with grave or less grave felonies.

However, the information herein does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to
property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence
of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious
physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to property. Appellee and the lower court have seemingly
assumed that said information thereby charges two offenses, namely (1) slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to
property, and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence — which are sought to be complexed. This assumption is, in turn,
apparently premised upon the predicate that the effect or consequence of defendants negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or vital
factor in said offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate.

As early as July 28, 1955 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, had the occasion to state, in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,
Pampanga (G.R. No. L-6641), that:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that

Page 47 of 258
 by their structure can not be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence
in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt separately from wilful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible." Much of
the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence", and the like; when
the strict technical offense is more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide", or "simple imprudence causing damages to
property."

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Article 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, tile theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
each crime when committed wilfully. For each penalty for the wilful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional minimum if the wilful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way
from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual wilful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.

Thirdly, regardless of whether the issue adverted to above should be decided in the affirmative or in the negative the proper procedure for the lower
court was to reserve the resolution thereof until after the case has been heard on the merits, when decision is rendered thereon, there being no
question that the court has jurisdiction and can properly try the defendant for damage to property and serious or less serious physical injuries thru
reckless negligence. It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting
from a single act, or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the
most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each one of the aforesaid crimes which, put together, may be graver than the penalty for the most
serious offense.

Fourthly, from the viewpoint both of trial practices and justice, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the prosecution should split the action against
the defendant, by filing against him several informations, namely, one for damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru,
reckless negligence, before the court of first instance, and another for slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace
of municipal court. One thing is, however, certain. Such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice
in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the
municipal court and the court of first instance. Worse, still, in the event of conviction in the municipal court and appeal to the court of first instance,
said evidence would still have to be introduced once more in the latter court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits and the rendition of the
judgment that the facts proven and the applicable law may warrant, with the costs of this instance against the defendant-appellee, It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Page 48 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 131588, March 27, 2001 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

DAVIDE JR., C.J.:

One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City, reported over print and broadcast media, which claimed the
lives of several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were undergoing an "endurance run" as part of the Special Counter Insurgency
Operation Unit Training. Not much effort was spared for the search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos
(hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to local authorities. GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated
Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information reads as
follows:
That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an
Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from ... behind in a sudden and
unexpected manner with the use of said vehicle ... members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout
Class 07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a column of 3, with a distance of
two feet, more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st man to the
last man, unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in
spite of the continuous warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez
Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards,
by continuously waving their hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a distance of 100 meters
away from the jogger's rear portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf)
on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw themselves to [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting,
bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield,
and upon being aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, continued to travel on a
high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on said 1st line, as a result thereof the following were killed on the
spot:

1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco

2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas
3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren
4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez
5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo
6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito

While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while the following eleven (11) other trainee/victims were
seriously wounded, the accused thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause other than said accused's spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered on the following victims which prevented their death, to wit:

1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo

2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit
3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala
4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo
5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glabe Polboroza
6. Arman Neri Hernaiz

While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:

1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera

2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano
3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang
4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion
5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro

after which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore-enumerated helpless.

Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995 and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last phase of the training was the "endurance run" from said Camp
to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run on 5 October 1995 started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns: the first
and second of which had 22 trainees each, and the third had 21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green and black
combat shoes. At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. When they reached Alae, the driver of the Hummer vehicle was
instructed to dispatch advanced security at strategic locations in Carmen Hill. Since the jogging trainees were occupying the right lane of the
highway, two rear security guards were assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand
signals for other vehicles to take the left lane.[1]

Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were assigned as rear guards of the first column. They recalled that
Page 49 of 258
from Alae to Maitum Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed them, all of which slowed down and took the left portion of
the road when signaled to do so.[2]

While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high
beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the
vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals and coming closer and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear
guards told their co-trainees to "retract." The guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by
the said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle. The driver did not reduce his
speed even after hitting the first and second columns. The guards then stopped oncoming vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit again.[3]

The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel, conducted an ocular inspection of the place where the incident
happened. They then proceeded to inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City Prosecutor manifested, thus:
The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which [was] involved in the October 5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf
vehicle colored light blue with strips painting along the side colored orange and yellow as well as in front. We further manifest that ... the windshield
was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the front just below the windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the impact. The lower portion
was likewise damaged more particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said vehicle was likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a cut of the
plastic used as a bumper; that the right side of the headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front signal light, right side was likewise damaged.
The side mirror was likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck from the ground to the lower portion of the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of
the truck on the front level is 5 ft.[4]
PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at Precinct 6, Cagayan de Oro City, and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October
1995, several members of the PNP came to their station and reported that they had been bumped by a certain vehicle. Immediately after receiving
the report, he and two other policemen proceeded to the traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of the
hit-and-run vehicle remained on the highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway, which led him to conclude that the brakes of the
vehicle had not been applied. The policemen measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft. long.[5]

GLENN's version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:

At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the latter's fellow band members to provide them with
transportation, if possible an Isuzu Forward, that would bring their band instruments, band utilities and band members from Macasandig and
Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there, they were supposed to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-
sponsored "Sabado Nights" of the Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting had asked such a favor from
him.[6] Since the arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN immediately went to Cugman, Cagayan
de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he proceeded back to his house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and told his wife that he would go
to Bukidnon to get his aunt's Isuzu Forward truck because the twenty band members and nine utilities and band instruments could not be
accommodated in the Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends asked to go along, namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Peña, and a certain Akut.[7]

After leaving GLENN's house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza Restaurant. GLENN saw his "kumpare" Danilo Cosin and the latter's wife,
and joined them at the table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale pilsen beer. When the Cosin spouses left, GLENN joined his travelling
companions at their table. The group left at 12:00 midnight for Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional rains. It took them
sometime looking for the Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the truck in Agusan Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had
mechanical problems. Hence, GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that they would use the Isuzu Elf truck instead.[8]

GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no moon or star; neither were there lampposts. From the Alae
junction, he and his companions used the national highway, traversing the right lane going to Cagayan de Oro City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan
junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left curve going slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the opposite
direction of the national highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to dim. GLENN
switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour. It was only when the vehicles were at a distance
of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the other car's headlights were switched from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to
adjust from high brightness to sudden darkness.[9]

It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after passing the oncoming vehicle, that GLENN suddenly heard
and felt bumping thuds. At the sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his right foot on the brake pedal. But the impact was so sudden that he
was astonished and afraid. He was trembling and could not see what were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to
pump the brake, nor did he notice that his foot was pushing the pedal. He returned to his senses only when one of his companions woke up and said
to him: "Gard, it seems we bumped on something. Just relax, we might all die." Due to its momentum, the Elf continued on its track and was able to
stop only when it was already very near the next curve.[10]

GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right headlights of the truck had been busted upon the first
bumping thuds. In his confusion and fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN did not report the incident to the Puerto Police Station because
he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was only when he reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken; the side
mirror and round mirror, missing; and the windshield, splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had occurred, and he
realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor Emano.[11]

The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-ASA Office, Cagayan de Oro City. The former testified that
when he went to GLENN's house at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was heavy rain; and at 12:00 midnight, the rain was moderate. He
corroborated GLENN's testimony that he (Crescente) went to GLENN's house that evening in order to hire a truck that would bring the band
instruments, band utilities and band members from Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival.[12] Almazan, on the other hand, testified
that based on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there was rain from 8:00 p.m. of October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the
next day; and the sky was overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995. What she meant by "overcast" is that there
was no break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and stars could not be seen.[13]

The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100 meters away from the place where the incident occurred. He
testified that he was awakened on that fateful night by a series of loud thuds. Thereafter, a man came to his house and asked for a glass of water,
Page 50 of 258
claiming to have been hit by a vehicle. Danilo further stated that the weather at the time was fair, and that the soil was dry and not muddy.[14]

In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple
attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to
indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and
each of the victims of attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.

Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in finding that he caused the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees
even after seeing the rear guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that he caused the truck to run even faster after noticing the
first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still have avoided the accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and glaring light from the
oncoming vehicle.

In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that "the accused out of mischief and dare-devilness [sic], in the exhilaration of the night breeze and
having dr[u]nk at least three bottles of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the rear guard[s] and see them scamper away as they saw him and his
vehicle coming at them to ram them down."[15]

Likewise, the OSG posits that "the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging trainees was probably brought by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a
total of three (3) bottles of beer earlier before the incident."[16]

Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., "the possibility that [GLENN] could have fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in
that unholy hour of 3:30 in the early morning, and thus was not able to stop his Isuzu Elf truck when the bumping thuds were occurring in rapid
succession; and after he was able to wake up upon hearing the shout of his companions, it was already too late, as the bumping thuds had already
occurred."[17]

Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more scrupulous in weighing the evidence. If we are to subscribe to the
trial court's finding that GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent to kill was wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent,
he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, should be
indulged.[18]

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a
malicious intent on GLENN's part.

First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon. And according to
PAG-ASA's observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place,
the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the
moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.

Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made
them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.

Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the
same lane as GLENN's vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as GLENN's truck such that their backs were turned
towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.

Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENN's testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring
lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the
lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees.

Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one `to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order
to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young
college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with
his truck.

The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that
despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or
skid marks along the traffic scene.

For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENN's vehicle to the confluence of the following factors:

1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck would have still proceeded further on
account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.

2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine and smooth asphalt, free from obstructions on the road
such as potholes or excavations. Moreover, the highway was going a little bit downward, more particularly from the first curve to the place
of incident. Hence, it was easier and faster to traverse a distance of "20 to 25 meters which was the approximate aggregate distance" from
the first elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the columns.

3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms only) could hardly make an impact on the 3,900 kilograms
truck, which was moving at a speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers per hour.

Page 51 of 258
 4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and the under chassis was elevated, the truck could just pass
over two persons lying flat on the ground without its rubber tires running over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would not notice any
destabilization of the rubber tires.

5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding, the forward movements constituted a force
parallel to the momentum of the forward-moving truck such that there was even much lesser force resisting the said ongoing momentum.

It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations -- one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree
of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -- the Court should adopt the explanation which is more
favorable to the accused.[19]

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would
drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.

Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless,
important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be true.[20] Thus, in People v. Godinez,[21] this Court said that
the existence of a motive on the part of the accused becomes decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that the shooting was
purely accidental.

Neither is there any showing of "a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police elements disguised in a vehicular accident." [22] Even if
there be such evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be convicted because if such
were the case, the proper charge would be rebellion, and not murder.[23]

GLENN's offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping
thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.

We have once said:

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury.[24]
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. [25]

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical
condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place
immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was established that the road
was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in
accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it
would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he
was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the
existing circumstances and conditions at the time.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held
guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions
punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).[26] In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,[27] we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,[28]
the accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of "homicide with serious physical injuries
and damage to property through reckless imprudence," and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed
by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the accused was convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage to
property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have
constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses.
Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial
court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment.
Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.[30] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Page 52 of 258
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; and if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last
paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore, constitutes a qualifying circumstance
because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree.[31] Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the
penalty, the court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through
imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.[32]

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that GLENN "escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving
behind the victims." It being crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by
one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the
penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said penalty,
which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period.

Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca [33] and of GLENN that the latter surrendered to Governor
Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which could properly be imposed taking into account the
modifying circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since the maximum term for each count is only two months
the Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.

As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the same. Conformably with current jurisprudence, [34] we reduce the trial
court's award of death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete
the awards of P30,000 to each of those who suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered
holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of
death indemnity for each group of heirs of the trainees killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of the other victims are deleted. Costs
against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and
Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., abroad on official business.

Page 53 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 125066, July 08, 1998 ]

ISABELITA REODICA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint [1] against petitioner with the Fiscal’s Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging
petitioner with “Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury.” The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight
Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing
plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to
property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla
bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of
its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period
of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision [3] convicting petitioner of the “quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries,” and sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand
Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. [4]

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting
physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p.
711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-
11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio’s book, p. 718).[5]

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of
time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for
Filing Appellant’s Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief.[6]

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision [7] on 31 January 1996
affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE
SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS
BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH
JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. [9]

... ... ...

dffffmjh

Page 54 of 258
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. [10]

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following
grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW
FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A
SECONDARY SOURCE.

A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING
OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED
IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED
BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority
regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People
v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor – not arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there were two separate light felonies
involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering
them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, “do not … rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months,” citing Lontok
v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones
menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

...... ...

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act
resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information.

She then suggests that “at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and computed or added together, only
sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts.”

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by
arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three
months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a
separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok’s criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts.
89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in not sustaining Lontok’s motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She
submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only
the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have
been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and
prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to “complex” reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the
law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.
Page 55 of 258
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight
physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the
damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.[15]

The OSG then debunks petitioner’s defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal’s office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first
assigned error. However, she considers the OSG’s reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the
“complexing” of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations
were filed -- one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations should have been filed.
She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21] would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to “complex” damage to property through
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise “inapposite,” for it deals with attempted
homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render
nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia[24] favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent
Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the
proper penalty.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by
a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong
which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is
arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or
with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty
then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the

Page 56 of 258
exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public
censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the
penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed
through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of
P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty
would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first
paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph
of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the
extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to
a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein
provided “the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64.”

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed
with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.[26]

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised
Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public
censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same
Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a
less grave felony – not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article
48 provides as follows:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in
Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no
complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light
felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single
act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct
penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical
injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves
and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have
been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer
question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her
failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. [28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as
many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. [29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

Page 57 of 258
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.[30]

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as “The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.” Section 32(2)[31] thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over “all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.”

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the
offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with
destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the
law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since
by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a
lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions
that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under
that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs,
MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71
of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs,
MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of which was from 1
month and 1 day to 4 months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two
months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose
penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with
the fiscal’s office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable
to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period “shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,” does not
distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. [33] Thus, in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of
the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, “the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the
MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities,
said cases may be commenced only by information.” However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only
by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[37] Hence, in case of conflict between
the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the
applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Page 58 of 258
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.” Under Section 2 thereof, the
period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the
prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial
proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma
apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days
after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription
of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE
as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Page 59 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 74324, November 17, 1988 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FERNANDO PUGAY Y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON Y MAGDALENA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY Y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON Y MAGDALENA were charged with the
crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads
as follows:
"That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of
Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which
caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

"That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.

"CONTRARY TO LAW" (p. 1, Records).

Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused
guilty of the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in
favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00, plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P5,000.00.

"Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.

"Costs against both accused.

"SO ORDERED" (p. 248, Records).

Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors committed by the court a quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS
DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL
TO ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE
OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept
together.

On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a
ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the
accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group
saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris
wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the
gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the
burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.

The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the
scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and
Samson as the authors thereof.
Page 60 of 258
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five
other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two
accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.

After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to
be without merit.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay
admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the
accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on
Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness
Gabion in the commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused?appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They
claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion
for the commission of the offense.

Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the
contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even
without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated,
self-serving and unreliable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).

Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the
fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue
that the deliberate non-presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.

There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records)
the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of
gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution
witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797). Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.

Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased
to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an
unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother
of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that he saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried.
Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous
misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.

In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on he deceased and then Samson set him on fire
is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased,
he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.

However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:

"Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani
Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?

"A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.

"Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?

"A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing so.

"Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is
what I want to know from you, if that is true?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?

"A. I do not know that would be that incident.

"Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually?

"A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.

"Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not
to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?

Page 61 of 258
"A. I was not told, sir.

"Q. Did you come to know . . . . . how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?

"A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was gasoline.

"Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.

"A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.

"Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?

"A. Yes, sir" (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started
to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was
in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the
deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two
accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun
of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et.
al. 37 Phil. 1371).

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris
wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell
of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to
avoid every undersirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the
deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury."
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder is proper considering that his act in
setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely
helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary,
there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the
attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable
substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it can be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the
Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4
of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of
homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn.
The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983,
pp. 16-17).

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarity liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment.
The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages as found by the court a quo.
Page 62 of 258
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Page 63 of 258
 [ G.R. No. L-32477, October 30, 1981 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO APOSAGA AND CONSTANCIO MONTE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

Automatic review of the decision dated April 28, 1969 of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. 1625 for
murder, imposing the death penalty on accused-appellants Francisco Aposaga and Constancio Monte for the murder of Atty. Jose Barranda.

The victim, who was popularly called "Attorney", was a law practitioner in Cotabato and Agusan. At the time of his death, he lived in his 36-hectare
farm at Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, with his common-law wife Gloria Salongcong and their four children namely, Ruth, Samuel, Ester and
Jose, Jr. Gloria had four other children by a previous liaison, namely, Fe, Noe, Felomena and Fely, all surnamed Cabrera, who were likewise staying
with the couple at their house on the said farm. In the same barrio live the two accused-appellants as well as Sotera Salongcong Resaba, a sister of
Gloria, whose house near the highway is about 1/2 kilometers away from the Barrandas'; Jesus Francisco, an ousted ex-tenant of "Attorney" and a
nephew of Gloria and Sotera, whose house is also along the highway; and Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of accused-appellant
Aposaga.

Monte was recruited by the deceased from his former employment as security guard of Lianga Industries, Inc. in Tumbis, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to
be the administrator of his farm. He arrived in Polomolok with his family in July, 1965 and stayed in a house owned by the Barrandas near their own.

From the house of the Barrandas there were three then as now possible routes to the provincial highway, one passing through the house of Sotera
and Jesus on the General Santos side, another through the house of Aposaga and Estorque on the Marbel side, and the third was a short cut
through a small road, to the highway.

The deceased was last seen alive in the morning of December 13, 1965. He had summoned Monte to their house at about six o'clock that morning,
and they conferred about the farm. Afterwards, Monte had breakfast with "Attorney's" family before leaving the house. "Attorney" also left shortly
thereafter to go to Dadiangas, taking the second route (Marbel side) described above. Gloria Salongcong also left the house one minute later for
Dadiangas, taking the first route on the General Santos side, to pass by the house of her sister Sotera to fetch her daughter Fe, who was then
staying with Sotera, to bring her to Dadiangas for her medical examination.

While walking on the trail to the highway, Atty. Barranda was chased by 3 men armed with bolos or knives, who acted concertedly in hacking or
stabbing the victim to death. His lifeless body was later buried inside a dry well, while his portfolio and personal papers were buried around 300
meters away from the body.

Nothing was mentioned or heard about the death of Atty. Barranda until on January 20, 1966, Pio Francisco came to Barrio Palkan to barter fish and
visit his son Jesus. The latter told his father that he could hardly sleep at night because he was being "abused" or "raided" by Aposaga, Monte and
alias Calbo, and that these three had killed the attorney. Pio verified the matter from Sotera Salongcong, who confirmed the killing of the deceased.
He decided to report to the authorities, but waited for the picture of accused Aposaga in the possession of Gloria Salongcong before he made a
report.

Pio first mentioned the matter to a Sgt. Edoria of the Philippine Constabulary when he saw him in front of their house on January 30, 1966 or 48 days
thereafter. Sgt. Edoria immediately brought him, together with Felomena Cabrera, to the office of Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the 101st PC Company.
They showed Sgt. Vargas a newspaper clipping about a certain Francisco Lozada, who was wanted by the authorities with a prize of P10,000.00 on
his head for a series of robbery and murder cases. After being told that the wanted man was in barrio Palkan, Sgt. Vargas lost no time in going to
the said barrio, together with other PC soldiers. When they reached the said barrio, Felomena pointed to them the house of Aposaga. But when he
confronted Aposaga, he found out that his name was Francisco Aposaga and not Francisco Lozada, and that his physical features did not tally with
the description in the newspaper clipping. He therefore returned to headquarters without making an arrest.

At noon of the same day, Felomena Cabrera came tosee him again, this time with Jesus Francisco, informing him that Aposaga was the killer of Atty.
Barranda. It was only then that he learned of the murder of Atty. Barranda. He therefore returned to Palkan with 2 other PC officers to conduct an
investigation. When they arrived there, Aposaga was no longer in his house, having left for Norala to harvest palay, according to his wife.
Nevertheless, he proceeded with his investigation.

On February 1, 1966 he took the statements of Constancio Monte (Exh. "K", pp. 19-20, Folder of Exh., Vol. I) and his wife, Bienvenida Ferrer Monte
(Exh. "M", pp. 24-25, Folder of Exh., Vol. I), both pointing to Aposaga and Calbo as the killers, and of Noe Cabrera (Exh. "I", p. 1, Folder of Exh., Vol.
II), naming Aposaga, Monte and Calbo as the culprits. Thereafter he filed a motion to exhume the body of the deceased (Exh. "D", p. 10, Folder of
Exh., Vol. I).

The examination was conducted on February 2, 1966 in the presence of Dr. Teodoro J. Reyes, municipal health officer of Polomolok, the PC
provincial commander, the chief of police, and members of the Rural Health Unit of Polomolok. They found the already decomposing body of Atty.
Barranda, which was identified through the identifying information furnished by his wife, like the dentures, the clothes he was wearing, his height and
built, as well as the I.D. and personal papers in his wallet and other things found on his body. After the exhumation, they also unearthed the valise or
portfolio of the deceased which was buried about 300 meters away from the body and 15 meters from the house of Jesus Francisco. The spot was
pointed to them by Jesus Francisco himself who admittedly buried the same. The valise contained the raincoat and other personal things of the
deceased. They also recovered a cellophane bag containing some legal documents and land titles purportedly removed from the bag of the
deceased. On the basis of the above, a criminal complaint dated February 1, 1966 was filed against Francisco Aposaga, alias Calbo, alias Pedoy,
Sotera Salongcong and Constancio Monte (p. 5, CFI rec.).
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On February 14, 1966, after more statements were taken, the complaint was amended (p. 4, CFI, rec.), such that the name of alias Calbo was
indicated as Alfredo Villanueva, that of alias Pedoy as Jesus Francisco, and Gloria Salongcong was included among the accused. Of the six
accused named in the amended complaint (Aposaga, Monte, Villanueva, alias Calbo, Francisco, alias Pedoy, Sotera Salongcong and Gloria
Salongcong), Villanueva remained at large and never faced trial; Gloria Salongcong was ordered excluded from the complaint on June 10, 1966 for
insufficiency of evidence (p. 29, CFI rec.); and Jesus Francisco alias Pedoy was likewise dropped from the complaint on January 10, 1967 upon
motion of his counsel (pp. 45-48, CFI rec.) for the purpose of utilizing him as a state witness (p. 54, CFI rec.); and Sotera Salongcong was also
excluded from the complaint upon her own motion (pp. 50-51, CFI rec.) on January 27, 1967. The warrant issued for Gloria Salongcong was
therefore recalled, while Francisco and Sotera, who had been under detention, were ordered released. On August 4, 1967, Jesus Francisco was
ordered re-included in the complaint and a new warrant issued for his arrest (p. 76, CFI rec.). Yet, despite his appearance in court as a witness for
the prosecution, he was never re-arrested. Thus, only Aposaga and Monte faced trial after they waived their right to the second stage of the
preliminary investigation (p. 79, CFI rec.), and an information was filed against them on April 24, 1968 (p. 81, CFI rec.).

After trial, the trial court in its decision (pp. 136-179, CFI rec.) dated April 28, 1969, found the two accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to
the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.

The trial court noted that the evidence for the prosecution suffered from many flaws and some inconsistencies (p. 31, rec.). Nevertheless, it gave
credence to the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses and other corroborative witnesses for the state.

Noe Cabrera, 13 years old, student, and a resident of Pag-asa, General Santos City, testified that at about six o'clock in the morning of December
13, 1965, while he was riding his carabao, he saw his stepfather, Atty. Barranda, walking towards the highway. Paran (Francisco Aposaga) and
Calbo (Alfredo or Jessie Villanueva) ran after him. All at once Paran hacked him in the neck while Calbo thrust his knife at the victim. The deceased
("Attorney") was trying to parry their blows with the sweater he was carrying. Then Constancio Monte arrived and also hacked the victim. When the
victim stumbled and fell, Monte rode on him and thrust his knife through the victim's stomach. He was just about 25 meters away from them. Later,
the two dragged the victim's body to the cogonal area, after which they approached the witness (Noe), and Paran threatened him that if he should
squeal, he and his mother, sisters and brothers were going to be killed. Monte got the bag carried by the deceased and they left towards the
direction of the highway. The witness went home to eat. His mother was not in the house yet, having left earlier for Dadiangas.

When his mother arrived home in the afternoon, she asked him if he had seen his stepfather, to which he answered no. She therefore asked him to
accompany her in looking around for the victim. They went to the house of Dorot (Doroteo Estorque) where they saw Dorot, Monte, Paran and
Calbo, the wife of Monte, and others, drinking. His mother made several inquiries about his stepfather.

The wife of Dorot said that Attorney rode a yellow bus going to Marbel. Dorot and his son Vicente also gave the same information. She asked other
persons, who gave negative information. When they went home, Monte and his wife came also. His mother told them that she was going to San
Francisco (Agusan) to look for Attorney. But Monte advised her not to go any more because there were three persons who came to fetch him to go
to Davao. Noe went downstairs. Monte followed him to borrow his sledge, which he lent to him. Afterwards, he brought his horse to Crossing
Palkan to drink. When he was returning home, he saw Vicente, Calbo and Paran. Vicente was riding the carabao while Calbo and Paran were
following the sledge, where the body of their stepfather was loaded. They were going towards barrio Palkan. He lot his horse run and headed for
home. He did not tell his mother or his brothers and sisters about the attack on his stepfather because he was afraid. It was only when he was
brought to the PC headquarters in Dadiangas that he talked of the incident for there he was no longer afraid (pp. 5-63, TSN).

Felomena Cabrera, 16 years old, student and residing at Pag-asa, Lagao, General Santos City, testified that she was living with her mother, step-
father (the victim brothers and sisters at their house in crossing Palkan on December 13, 1965. In the morning of the said date, her stepfather
summoned Monte to their house, and the two talked for sometime. Thereafter, Monte ate breakfast with them before returning to his house. When
he had gone, Attorney prepared to leave for Dadiangas. He left via their kitchen towards the west to the national highway. One minute later, her
mother also left, leaving her to care for her younger brother. She cooked soup rice. While cooking, she went to the balcony to get her younger
brother. From there she saw Monte running towards the direction of Attorney. She followed him with her eyes, and saw him hacking her stepfather
with two others, namely, Aposaga and alias Calbo. She went to the house of Monte and asked Monte's wife, Bienvenida, why they killed Attorney.
Bienvenida answered "because the Attorney is a bad man". The two of them went down towards the road. They met Monte who warned them not to
reveal, otherwise they will kill first Felomena's mother. She just went home and fed her younger brother.

When her mother arrived home that afternoon, she (mother) asked if the Attorney had returned home, to which she answered in the negative. Her
mother then asked Noe to accompany her in looking for the Attorney. The two went out and were away for more than an hour, while she stayed in
the house to take care of her younger brother.

Drawing a sketch, the witness explained the relative position of their house with those of Dorot (D. Estorque), Sotera and Monte, and the national
highway, as well as the three (3) possible routes from their house to the highway (pp. 65-84, TSN).

On cross-examination, the witness indicated on the sketch prepared by her, the specific spot where she saw her stepfather being hacked, and where
she first saw Monte running. She also described the attacks on her stepfather - how Aposaga hacked him first while he was walking, followed by the
thrusting by Monte. She averred that when she later talked with her brother Noe, they agreed not to tell anyone about what they saw; otherwise they
will all be killed starting with their mother (pp. 85-135, TSN).

Dr. Teodoro Reyes, 51 years old, Municipal Health Officer of Polomolok, South Cotabato, testified that he has been the Municipal Health Officer of
Polomolok for more than 10 years. On February 2, 1966, he was fetched by a policeman of Polomolok to exhume the body of Atty. Jose Barranda.
He went to a field about 500 meters north of the residence of Atty. Barranda, together with a few policemen and PC soldiers. They found the already
decomposing body buried in a well 5 feet deep and about 3 meters in diameter, covered with blood-stained newspapers, a jacket and soil about one
foot deep. He established the identity of the cadaver as that of Atty. Barranda from the description furnished by Mrs. Barranda (Gloria Salongcong).
Besides, he knew Atty. Barranda when he was still alive as he had been handling cases in Polomolok. When he examined the body, he found 4 fatal
wounds, 3 of which were caused by sharp-bladed instruments and one by mauling. His findings are embodied in his medico-legal post-mortem
certificate (pp. 2-4, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I), as follows:

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 "DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED:

"Under this, are other pertinent findings on this cadaver and its clothings which have bearings on the injuries sustained or direct causes of death:
Premise or statement of the General Condition of the Cadaver during time of examination: The cadaver although in a state of much decay, there are
still some or big portions of the skin left specially on the chest, back and abdomen; big portions of muscles much softened and some parts melting;
big portions of abdominal viscerae are inside and soft; and semi-melted. So also is the condition in the chest.

"(a) One stab wound of the right chest, entering into the interspace between the 5th and 6th costal cartilage. This stab wound coincides with
the cut through the polo shirt of the cadaver and that of his camiseta T-shirt he was wearing. The cut is about four (4) cm. wide, going inside the
chest to a depth of at least five (5) inches. The direction is towards the back. The medial edge of the wound is 2-1/2 cm. lateral to the right lateral
border of the xyphoid. The width of the cut is parallel to the direction of the rib. Wide area of old blood stain can be seen on the clothing over the
chest, also some part of the upper abdomen. This is a fatal wound.

"(b) A big cross-wise cut of the left upper abdomen, with a length of about five (5) inches, as can be seen on the intact part of skin of the
cadaver, and cut portions of loops of intestine inside. The medial edge of this cut or wound starts from about the middle portion of the front part of
the abdomen going lateralwards to the left to a length of about five (5) inches. This is a fatal wound.

Remarks: There is no evidence of cut on the clothing, for we found that all the clothings on the left side of the body were lifted or raised that might
have escaped the cutting.

"(c) Fracture of the left part of the skull:

Description is divided into the upper portion of the skull and that of the lower mandible or jaw. Upper portion of the skull:

There is a rounded depressed fracture of the bone beneath the left upper gum, about a ten centavo coin size. Its medial border is about 1-1/2 inches
distant from the center of the upper gum. Also, the zygomatic process of the left temporal bone is broken (fractured) and detached. That completely
broken piece is still attached only by a ligament.

Lower portion of the skull or lower jaw: The neck of the head (the posterior elevation for articulation) of the left mandible or left side of the lower jaw
is completely fractured, and the head portion is missing. The fractured head is missing.

The picture taken for this is herewith attached. The back part of this picture is marked 'C'.

Remarks: I honestly believe the deceased was mauled on the left face so hard that caused the fatal fracture. The rounded depressed fracture is
most probably due to the elevated portion or the nail of the hard object used for mauling. This is fatal. The brain cannot escape big injury.

"(d) A big cut on the apple green jacket the cadaver is covered (with) [picture taken of said jacket herewith attached. The back part of the
picture is marked 'D'].

Description:

There is about 6-1/2 inch cut of the right shoulder of this jacket going medial-ward and more on its back portion. The inner shirts on this part are
stained with old blood stains. The jacket is somewhat loose for the cadaver.

Remarks:

I strongly and sincerely believe that this cut involved the lower part and the base of the right side of the neck. It is a big cut. This is a fatal wound.

With the big cut on the jacket the cadaver is covered on its right shoulder area and reaching up to the base of the right side of the collar, with the
corresponding cuts on the inner shirts the cadaver is wearing, but no evidence of cut could be found on the bones – as scapula and right clavicle,
simply means that the big cut involved only the muscles, big blood vessels and vital nerves of the right side of the lower part of the neck and
shoulder area near that side of the neck -- in short, the soft tissues were cut, without cutting the bones (called the hard tissue).

"Conclusion: (a) With all honesty and sincerity, it is very definite that the cadaver now exhumed is Atty. JOSE BARRANDA'S.

(b) The causes of death are mentioned under the item DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED.

(c) The causes of death are purely foul play or murder. All the cuts are due to sharp-bladed instruments; the fracture on the face due to blunt
hard object with hard projection on it.

"xx xx xx."

According to the doctor, the wound described in paragraph (a) was a thrust wound inflicted while the victim was standing in front of the assailant (p.
219, TSN); the one under paragraph (b) could have been inflicted while the victim was lying down; the other one under paragraph (c) could have
been caused by mauling while the victim was lying down; and the wound in paragraph (d) was inflicted while the victim was standing, with the
assailant at the back of the deceased, probably ahead of the other wounds (p. 222, TSN).

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Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to the 27th Traffic Team, 45 years old, and residing at Cotabato City, declared (pp. 262-
320, TSN) that in 1966 he was assigned to the 101st PC Company at General Santos, Cotabato, having been transferred thereto since December 1,
1965. He did not know the accused before, and he met them only on January 30, 1966. He first met Francisco Aposaga on said date when
Felomena Cabrera came to his office with Pio Francisco and Sgt. Edoria to report the presence in their barrio of a certain Francisco Lozada who was
wanted by the police with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a series of robbery and murder cases. After being shown a newspaper clipping with
a picture and description of Lozada, he went to Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato with 2 other PC soldiers to verify the report. The house of
Aposaga was pointed to them by Felomena when they were about 300 meters therefrom. Proceeding to said house, they called for Francisco
Lozada, but it was Francisco Aposaga who came and identified himself as Aposaga, not Lozada. When Sgt. Vargas compared the photo and
description of Lozada from the newspaper clipping to the person of Aposaga, the description did not tally, as there was no mole, scar or tattoos at
the back of his body. As a result, they returned to the PC headquarters without making an arrest.

After lunch on the same day, Felomena Cabrera showed up again at the PC headquarters with Jesus Francisco, the son of Pio. Jesus was asking
him why he released Aposaga when he was the killer of Atty. Barranda. That was the only time he learned of the death of Atty. Barranda. He lost no
time in returning to Palkan. But when he arrived there, Aposaga was no longer in his house. His wife informed him that Aposaga went to Norala to
harvest palay. He (Sgt. Vargas) proceeded to the house of Monte, who informed him that Aposaga killed Attorney in the morning of December 13
(1965). Sgt. Vargas invited Monte and his wife to the headquarters for investigation. While there, they gave corroborative statements to the effect
that Aposaga and a companion known as Calbo hacked and killed Atty. Barranda upon inducement by Sotera Salongcong who paid them P200.00
(Exhs. "K" and "L", pp. 19-21, Folder of Exh. Vol. I). He also took the statements of Noe and Felomena Cabrera, then filed a motion to exhume the
body, which was actually done by the municipal health officer in his presence as well as in the presence of their commanding officer, Capt. Adriano
Bulatao, the Polomolok chief of police and some other persons.

Jesus Francisco, 36 years old, farmer and resident of Marbel Crossing, Tampacan, Tupi, South Cotabato, declared that on December 13, 1965 he
was in his house near Crossing Awas in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Constancio Monte passed by his house that morning, then left in the direction
going to Sulit. At about 6:30 a.m., he went to his sanguta (where tuba is extracted). He met Sotera Salongcong, who was going to Dadiangas. She
gave him P200.00 from Francisco Mendez, telling him to deliver it to Aposaga, which he did at the latter's house at about 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock.
Aposaga was then with Constancio Monte and Wilfredo Villanueva, alias Calbo. After that he saw these three again at about 11:00 a.m. near their
house which was near his sanguta. The three told him that Atty. Barranda was already dead, and gave him the bag of the Attorney with instructions
to bury it. In the bag was a cellophane folder containing papers and documents. He buried the bag in the land of Cestua, and kept the papers in the
cellophane under a banana tree. These he did because the trio told him he will be killed if he didn't, which made him afraid. When he asked them
why they killed the Attorney, their answer was "Don't talk". He did not report the matter to the authorities because they had been threatening him
with death if he did so (pp. 322-350, TSN).

The statement of accused-appellant Monte (Exh. "K", pp. 17-18, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I) on February 1, 1966, may be summarized as follows: that
he has been a tenant of Atty. Barranda since July 1965; that sometime in the morning of December 13, 1965, Atty. Barranda was hacked and killed
by Francisco Aposaga and a companion known to him only as Calbo; that Aposaga told him they were given P200 by "Suterania" (Sotera)
Salongcong; that the latter hired them to kill Barranda because he had raped Fe Cabrera; that Fe Cabrera confirmed this raping to him; that the
cadaver of Atty. Barranda was thrown into a deep Japanese dug-out somewhere in the farmlot of Alfredo Acejo; that Aposaga used a bolo while
Calbo used a knife (flamingo); that at the time of the killing, Barranda was carrying a leather bag (portfolio) containing land titles and records of cases
he was handling; that the said bag was given to "Pedoy", a nephew of Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong; and that the said bag was buried while the
contents were wrapped in cellophane and covered by banana leaves among banana plants near the house of Pedoy.

These allegations were mostly reiterated by Monte in Exhibit "L" (pp. 21-23, Folder of Exh., Vol. I). In addition, he stated that the killing was plotted
by his family, as he accidentally learned when he overheard a conversation between Gloria and Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong where the latter was
saying "If in case somebody went up the house Gloria and the children will just go upstairs and they will not be disturbed because the purpose is just
Atty. Barranda" (sic).

The other prosecution witnesses were:

(1) Gloria Salongcong, the common-law wife of the deceased who narrated that the latter failed to appear at their appointed meeting in
Dadiangas on December 13, 1965, and that she and her son Noe went out to look for him upon her return to Palkan in the afternoon of
the same day (pp. 137-173, TSN).

(2) PIO FRANCISCO, who learned of the slaying of the deceased from his son Jesus on January 20, 1966, and who first brought it to the
attention of the authorities on January 30, 1966 (pp. 187-205, TSN).

(3) Epifanio Doria, the PC sergeant who was first told by Pio Francisco about the killing, and who brought him to the PC headquarters for
the actual reporting (pp. 178-187, TSN).

(4) Sotera Salongcong, who narrated that a certain Francisco Mendez gave her P200 for delivery to accused Aposaga without explaining
what the money was for, and who delivered it to Aposaga through Jesus Francisco without her asking for what purpose it was (pp. 230-
260, TSN).

The theory of the defense is that the charge is a frame-up on the part of the victim's family, whose members plotted his murder, with Jesus Francisco
as the mastermind and alias Calbo the lone hatchetman. Testifying on their own behalf, both accused-appellants denied knowledge of and
participation in the commission of the crime, and maintained that they never knew of the death of the deceased until investigations were already
under way some two to four months thereafter.

The testimony of accused-appellant Aposaga, 27 years old, farmer and resident of Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, dealt mainly in explaining
about his sudden departure from Palkan on January 30, 1966, the date the PC went to his house. He narrated that when Sgt. Vargas came to his
house (the date of which he could not remember), he was looking for Francisco Lozada. He informed Vargas that his name was Francisco Aposaga

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and not Lozada. Vargas examined his body and was convinced that he was a different person. So Vargas left, but not before he told him that he
was going to Iloilo for a vacation. He proceeded to Norala (South Cotabato) that same afternoon. When he reached Norala, his aunt told him that
his mother was sick so he should proceed to Iloilo. Because of such information, he left Norala hurriedly, taking MV Legaspi at Cotabato City and
disembarking in Iloilo. He learned of the murder of Barranda 3 or 4 months later when his wife wrote him informing that he was wanted for the
murder. He then went to the PC in Iloilo, requesting for an escort to Mindanao as he was afraid he might be killed. But the PC in Iloilo could not
provide him with any escort, so he stayed in Iloilo. He visited the PC in Iloilo for about 5 times, until the PC from Polomolok came to get him. He
admitted having been a tenant of the deceased, but denied participation in his killing. He also denied having received P200.00 from Jesus
Francisco. He did not know the person of alias Calbo.

On cross-examination, he stated that he threw away the letter of his wife when he went to the PC because he did not think it was important. He did
not know what was the company or organizational unit of the PC he visited in Iloilo, nor the name of its commanding officer. He stayed in Iloilo for 8
to 10 months.

His cousin, a certain Jose, who is married to his first cousin Clomia Viana, fetched him at Palkan because his mother was ill. He had to go to Norala,
however, to inquire from his aunt, Paz Aposaga, how serious his mother was. His aunt told him in tears to go home to Iloilo because his mother was
serious, per information of the same Jose. He never received any letter from his parents, brother or sister or any relative from Iloilo asking him to go
home (pp. 440-462, TSN).

Defense witness Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of Aposaga, 58 years old, farmer, and resident of Crossing Palkan, Polomolok,
South Cotabato, declared that on December 13, 1965, he and Aposaga were plowing in the farm lot of the deceased from 6:00 A.M. to 5:30 P.M.,
stopping only for breakfast and lunch. There was no unusual incident that transpired on said date, except that in the morning he heard someone call
"wait, wait" and saw Gloria Salongcong coming down their house. At that time Aposaga was 30 meters behind him, also plowing. The place where
they were plowing was about 150 meters from the house of Barranda. He did not see Atty. Barranda that morning. He only learned about his death
through the PC. He knows that Atty. Barranda and Gloria Salongcong usually quarrelled about Gloria's children because the place he is working is
near their house. On cross-examination, he admitted having subscribed to an affidavit (Exh. "J", p. 16, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I) wherein he had
stated that he could not see Aposaga because of the tall talahibs, but he explained that such answer was wrong and his real answer was, "I cannot
see him when he was covered by talahibs but if we will be out from the talahibs I can see him" (p. 386, TSN).

Vicente Estorque, 20, married, son of Doroteo and brother-in-law of Aposaga and likewise residing at Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato,
corroborated his father's testimony about the whereabouts of Aposaga on December 13, 1965. He testified that on that day, he had been plowing
from 10:00 A.M. with his father and brother-in-law Aposaga. In the afternoon he plowed from 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. Afterwards he met Vicente or Jesus
Francisco (Pedoy) on his way home. Francisco borrowed his sledge, so he had to carry his plow on his shoulder because he lent his sledge to
Francisco. The sledge was returned two hours later with bloodstains and with its bamboo breast missing. He could not, however, recover the
missing part because Francisco had been avoiding him. On questioning by the court, he stated that they did not go back to plow in that field any
more (p. 407, TSN); in fact, that land was never planted because Aposaga left for Panay (p. 409, TSN).

Accused-appellant Constancio Monte, 38 years old, farmer and resident of Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, testified (pp. 463-525,
TSN), that he met Atty. Barranda when the latter was a lawyer of Lianga Industry in San Francisco, Agusan, where he used to work as guard of its
bulldozer department. In July of 1965, Atty. Barranda convinced him to go with him to Palkan, South Cotabato, to be the overseer of his 36-hectare
farm, as a condition of which he need not give any share of the harvest to Barranda as landowner but only to his wife, Gloria Salongcong. In
addition, he (Monte) will get 25% of the proceeds of the 18-hectare land in Matatum which was planted to potatoes and cabbage, plus P5.00 monthly
per head of the carabaos, horses and cattle he was supposed to care for. When he arrived with his family in Palkan in the same month, Atty.
Barranda called for Sotera Salongcong and Jesus Francisco, his erstwhile tenants, and told them that it was their last day as Monte was taking over.
Atty. Barranda instructed him (Monte) to get the carabao and plow from Jesus Francisco.

In the month of December, Fe Cabrera informed him that she was raped by Atty. Barranda. Sometime later, while he was under the Barrandas'
house to fetch the cow, he overheard a conversation among Jesus Francisco, Sotera Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong, wherein Sotera was
saying, "We better have Attorney killed x x x so that we can revenge of what he has done to your child who was being raped" (sic).

Early one morning, about the second week of December, 1965 (he could not exactly remember the date), Barranda called for him to instruct him to
take care of the carabaos and cows because he was leaving for Agusan to become a judge. After their talk, he took breakfast with the Barranda
family. Thereafter, he brought the children Ruth, Fely, Samuel and Noe to his house upon instruction of Atty. Barranda. He went to the toril with Noe
to tie the carabao. While there, Noe told him that Atty. Barranda was leaving. At the same instance he heard someone shouting, "wait for me", and
saw Jesus Francisco running, followed by Calbo. He did not know who Calbo was, but Noe told him that he is from Polomolok. However, he did not
know what transpired afterwards as he did not look anymore. From the toril, he could see Aposaga plowing with Doroteo Estorque. He stayed in the
toril for about 30 minutes.

Monte admitted having gone to the PC headquarters for investigation and having executed an affidavit (Exh. "K", p. 19, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I); but
when he appeared before Judge Mirabueno (municipal court of Polomolok), he was made to sign by Sgt. Vargas although he told the judge that
there was an error. The error was that when he mentioned the name "Francisco" as the person who hacked and killed the deceased, he meant
Jesus Francisco and not Francisco Aposaga. However, since he had no lawyer then, he did not know how to go about the correction. It was only
when Francisco Aposaga, who is his friend, contacted his lawyer that he was accommodated in his defense by Atty. Velarde, as he had no money.
As for the second affidavit which he executed one week after (Exh. "L", p. 21, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I), he was made to sign the same without
appearing before Judge Mirabueno.

On cross-examination, he maintained that he did not know who is Pedoy whose name is mentioned in his affidavit as the nephew of Sotera
Salongcong to whom the killers gave the bag of Atty. Barranda. He denied having been asked the question and having given the answers found in
his affidavits referring to Aposaga. He did not know what he was signing as he does not know how to read.

Against this background, the trial court promulgated its aforementioned decision on April 28, 1969 and denied the defense's motion for
reconsideration and new trial on May 31, 1969 (p. 200, CFI rec.).
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Hence, this appeal.

Appellants now raise only one issue -- that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They try to discredit the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of the two eyewitnesses which, they claim, are "corrupt, bias, unreliable and incompetent because of
their inherent improbabilities" (p. 86, rec.), as shown by the following circumstances:

A. As to Noe Cabrera

1. If Noe really witnessed the murder of his stepfather, why did he not shout for help (pp. 32-33, TSN)? Why did he not tell his mother about
it when the latter arrived home from Dadiangas and was asking about the victim (p. 35, TSN)? Why did he have to go with his mother
around the barrio to look for his stepfather if he knew — after having witnessed the killing -- that his stepfather was dead (pp. 15-18,
TSN)?

2. If he were really threatened by the culprits (p. 10, TSN) so as to produce fear in him, why did he have to go riding his horse by himself
that evening of the incident. (p. 20, TSN)? Why did he consent to sleep in the house of Monte after the PC arrived to conduct the
investigation (p. 23, TSN)? Why did he continue to visit the houses of Monte and Aposaga after December 13, 1965 (pp. 163-164, TSN)?

B. As to Felomena Cabrera

1. How could Felomena have witnessed the murder of her stepfather from the kitchen of their house when, according to the PC investigator,
Sgt. Vargas, the place of the incident was not visible from the kitchen or balcony of the Barranda house because it was covered by
banana hills, talahibs and calamansi trees (pp. 301-302, TSN)?

2. Why did she not secretly tell her mother about the incident (p. 72, TSN)?

3. Why was her first report to the PC not about the murder of her stepfather but about the presence of a certain wanted man in their barrio
(p. 264, TSN)? Why did it take her 48 days to make such report?

WE find the above observations insufficient to warrant the exculpation of the appellants. While it is true that the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses
may have suffered flaws and inconsistencies, the same refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to destroy their credibility. Their actuations
after witnessing the commission of the crime (i.e., not shouting or running for help, not reporting earlier, etc.), do not indicate that they were not
present when the killing of their stepfather took place. Likewise, the testimony of the PC investigator that the place of the incident is not visible from
the kitchen of the victim's house, because of the presence of banana hills, talahibs and calamansi trees, cannot overcome the positive assertion of
Felomena that she saw her stepfather killed, especially so since the investigation took place about 50 days after the incident and conditions
obtaining them may be different from those at the time of the offense.

A closer scrutiny of their testimonies shows convincingly that they had indeed witnessed the commission of the crime. The only doubtful portion is
their allegation that they were threatened with death -- with their mother the first to be killed -- against revealing it. Because, even if there were such
a threat, they could have secretly revealed it to their mother who would certainly take steps to protect them. Besides, if the danger of the threat was
real to them, they should have stopped going to the houses, of the accused, instead of maintaining normal relations with them after the incident;
Felomena should not have gone to the PC headquarters twice on January 30, 1966; and Noe should not have slept in the house of Monte after his
family had gone to Dadiangas to make the report.

These actuations are inconsistent with the reality of the threat. It is easier to believe that they discussed the incident with their mother but had to
deny it to protect her. The maxim "blood is thicker than water" must have prompted these two (2) eyewitnesses to insist that their mother did not
know anything about it. Otherwise, the involvement of their mother and other close relatives will be an undeniable conclusion.

Besides, the trial court, while noting the same flaws and inconsistencies, gave credence to the testimonies of the said eyewitnesses who, despite
their minority, the excitement generated by the court proceedings and the long and searching cross-examinations, firmly stuck to their testimonies
which pointed to the appellants and a companion known as Calbo as the killers of their stepfather.

Time and time again WE have ruled that where the issue is credibility of the witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial judge, who heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless he has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This exception does not obtain here (People vs. Laguisma, 98
SCRA 69 [1980]; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 386 [1980]; People vs. Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465, 472 [1979]).

Furthermore, no motive was shown why the two eyewitnesses should testify against them falsely; hence, they must be telling the truth (People vs.
Arevalo, 92 SCRA 207 [1979]; People vs. Lim, 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).

The appellants likewise theorize that the prosecution witnesses Sotera Salongcong, Jesus Francisco and probably Gloria Salongcong must have
plotted against the life of the deceased. Sotera and Jesus harbor resentment against the victim for having ousted them from their tenancy in favor of
Monte. Besides, Sotera wanted to revenge the raping of her niece by the deceased. These are strong motives to do away with the victim, whereas
the appellants have no motive to kill him.

In the case of People vs. Veloso (92 SCRA 515, 524 [1979]), WE held that motive, as distinguished from criminal intent, is not an essential element
of a crime and hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. Motive is essential to conviction in murder cases only when there is doubt as
to the identity of the culprit, something which does not obtain in this case (also People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; People vs. Caggauan, 94
Phil. 118 [1953]).

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The defense vainly tried to utilize the apparent involvement of the prosecution witnesses Gloria and Sotera Salongcong and Jesus Francisco in
claiming a frame-up and a scheme to lay the blame on the two (2) accused-appellants. While WE agree with the observation that these 3 witnesses
are probably involved in various ways and degrees, and their exclusion from the charge is questionable, WE cannot find any reason to believe that
the appellants are innocent as they pretend to be. As aptly held by the trial court, "that there were principals by induction in the commission of a
crime who were not prosecuted is no legal impediment to a finding of guilt of the principals by direct participation for the same crime. x x x [T]he non-
prosecution of Gloria and Sotera Salongcong in the case at bar did not make the indictees before us less guilty, much more, innocent as to be
blessed with a judgment of acquittal" (pp. 52-53, rec.).

On the contrary, the guilt of both appellants appear to be a moral certainty, even without the testimonies of Gloria, Sotera and Jesus. Aside from the
positive identification of the two eyewitnesses, the evidence even of the defense tend to establish the guilt of the appellants.

The tale woven by Aposaga about his sudden departure from Polomolok as soon as the authorities started the investigation, was not only
uncorroborated but was also too improbable to believe. First, he said he told Vargas that he was going to Norala for a vacation. When Vargas
returned after he had gone, his wife told Vargas that Aposaga went to Norala to harvest palay. When he reached Norala, his aunt told him to
proceed to Iloilo because his mother was ill. But the source of his aunt's information was the same cousin who allegedly fetched him from Polomolok
for the self-same reason -- the alleged illness of his mother. He allegedly stayed in Iloilo for about 8 to 10 months although according to the records,
he was there for more than a year until the policemen from Polomolok came to arrest him. It should be pointed out that his sudden departure must
have left his wife and child in Polomolok without any means of support, as the land he was plowing was never planted after he left (p. 409, TSN). All
these could lead to but one conclusion -- that he had to flee and hide with his guilty conscience to avoid arrest. Flight and going into hiding indicate a
guilty conscience (People vs. Guevarra, 94 SCRA 642 [1979]; People vs. Moreno, 85 SCRA 649 [1978]).

Defense witnesses Doroteo and Vicente Estorque, father and brother, respectively of Aposaga's common-law wife, tried to establish an alibi for
Aposaga. Their testimonies, however, are inherently weak and doubtful in many substantial aspects, and appear to be nothing more than vain
attempts to save a "family member" from conviction. For instance, they testified that Aposaga was plowing with them at the time of the incident.
Doroteo, however, stated that when he heard the shout "wait, wait", Aposaga was 30 meters behind him although he could not see him as he was
hidden by talahibs (p. 385, TSN; Exh. J-1). Vicente, on the other hand, plowed with Aposaga and his father only from 10:00 to 10:30 that morning (p.
404, TSN), whereas the incident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M. Doroteo further declared that there was nothing unusual that happened on
December 13, 1965, and he does not remember what day it was. Yet, he could recall at the witness stand four (4) years later that he saw Gloria
Salongcong running at five o'clock that morning; what dress Gloria was wearing; what time they started plowing (6:00 A.M.); what time they left the
farm; what time they took their meals; what they ate for breakfast and lunch and other minor details of daily life. Doroteo claimed that he does not
know Calbo but he admitted seeing him in the house of Monte that fateful morning of December 13th (p. 394, TSN). He never tried to find out who
uttered the words "wait, wait" (p. 394, TSN). He was surprised to learn of the death of the victim whom he had believed to be in Bislig (p. 386, TSN);
but he never visited the remains after exhumation when he already knew he was dead (p. 379, TSN). Is this the natural reaction to a surprising
death of a barrio-mate who owned the land he was plowing? Vicente's testimony likewise suffered from similar inconsistencies and improbabilities
as to command little, if any, probative value. The testimonies of these defense witnesses are mere concoctions that cannot neutralize the positive
identification of the appellants by the two prosecution witnesses.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the accused was alleged to be must be
located at such a distance that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed (People vs. Tirol, L-30538,
January 31, 1981; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 387 [1980]; People vs. Mercado 97 SCRA 232 [1980]; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 [1979]).
Such was not the situation in this case; for the place where Aposaga was allegedly plowing was only about 150 meters from the house of the victim
(p. 368, TSN) and within hearing distance from the place of the incident. The place of the incident in turn was only 60 to 70 meters from the victim's
house (p. 314, TSN). It was therefore very convenient for Aposaga to slip away from his plowing and participate in the murder of the deceased even
if he actually plowed the farm in the morning of December 13, 1965.

Furthermore, Aposaga was named as a killer of the deceased in two sworn statements executed by his co-accused Monte (Exhs. "K" and "L"), which
sworn statements were corroborated by his wife Bienvenida (Exh. "M"). Monte tried to retract these statements on the witness stand by explaining
that when he said "Francisco" he meant Jesus Francisco, and not appellant Francisco Aposaga, and that the said affidavit was never read to him by
Municipal Judge Narciso Mirabueno, before whom he signed and swore to it. The latter claim was belied by Judge Mirabueno who testified that he
read the contents of all affidavits to the affiants and made sure they understood. He also asked searching questions to determine the truth of their
statements (pp. 557-569, TSN). Since it has not been shown that the said judge has any interest in the case, it is not difficult to determine which of
the two (2) testimonies deserves consideration.

As to the claim of mistaken identity of the person named "Francisco", it is obvious from the very substance of Monte's sworn statements that the
"Francisco Aposaga" he named therein as a killer of the deceased was different and distinct from the "Jesus Francisco" (Pedoy) who buried the
leather bag of the deceased. Besides, it is understandable that Monte will try his best to save his co-accused who had so gallantly provided him a
defense counsel which he could not afford.

For his part, Monte tried to establish his innocence by pointing out that it was unnatural for him to kill Atty. Barranda after the latter had satisfactorily
explained about the problems of his work and after they had breakfast together (p. 82, rec.). Besides, he had no motive to kill his employer and
benefactor who had given him better opportunities and sufficient means to support his family by taking him as tenant and supervisor (pp. 89-90,
rec.). Unfortunately, these allegations cannot overcome the incriminating testimonies of the two (2) eyewitnesses. Besides, even from his own
testimony, the following circumstantial evidence appear to be inconsistent with his innocence:

1. Monte testified that he heard of a threat against the life of the deceased in a conversation among Gloria Salongcong, Sotera Salongcong
and Jesus Francisco (p. 471, TSN). Yet, when he saw Jesus running after the deceased carrying a bolo, he did not even look to see what Jesus
intended to do (pp. 485-486; 500-501, TSN).

2. He did not do anything about the disappearance of his employer for forty-eight (48) days, even though the last time he saw him (deceased)
was when somebody (Jesus Francisco) was running after him (pp. 500-501, TSN).

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3. If it were true that the deceased had told him he was going to Agusan to become a judge (p. 475, TSN), why did he not remind Gloria of
such fact when Gloria came looking for her husband (p. 489, TSN)?

4. Although he saw Jesus running after the deceased that morning, he did not say so when Gloria asked him about the deceased; and when
Gloria expressed the possibility that the deceased might have been waylaid, his answer was, "Nobody could do that because it is daytime" (p. 490,
TSN).

5. Monte escaped from the municipal jail on July 9, 1966, allegedly because his wife was sick in San Francisco, Agusan. He explained that
when he wired his wife to inform her that their hearing will be in May (1966), his father-in-law replied that she was sick (p. 524, TSN). If that were
true and this allegation was never corroborated, his escape should have been timed around May, 1966, and not July of that year. The records do
not disclose any hearing in July, 1966. Surely, it is more logical to conclude that Monte's flight, like that of his co-accused, indicated a guilty
conscience.

All the above could lead but to one conclusion, that the guilt of the two (2) accused-appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

This case should, however, be further investigated to determine the participation of Sotera Salongcong, Jesus Francisco and Gloria Salongcong in
the perpetration of the crime. Their own respective statements implicate themselves. Moreover, as pointed out by the appellants, these prosecution
witnesses have strong motives to kill the deceased: Sotera and Jesus for their ouster from tenancy, and Gloria for the rape of her daughter Fe.

However, for lack of necessary votes, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT APPELLANTS ARE HEREBY
SENTENCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA, WITH COSTS AGAINST THEM.

LET A COPY OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION SO THAT OTHERS WHO
APPEAR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME MAY BE DULY PROSECUTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

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 [ G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AH CHONG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature
of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclosed
by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" is a detached house situated some 40 meters from
the nearest building, and in August, 1908, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants,
who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length
and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a
small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window,
there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had retired for the night, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front
of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the
door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom
he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran" out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have been on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had
an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity. Pascual had left
the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibanez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back
to No. 28 and called Lieutenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was
"a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascual suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frighten him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he
was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on
the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Page 72 of 258
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that -

"The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

"4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

"(1) Illegal aggression.

"(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

"(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitled to complete exemption from criminal liability for the
death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if
he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings, defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such
an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property
under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or
his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance
or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e. g., in larceny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes and misdemeanors generally some
degree of criminal intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand
a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28
Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N. Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7
Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is
an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offenses therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare
that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally
liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemptions. But while it is true that
contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of
article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offenses therein defined,
in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he
intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in
degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313) ; and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater
or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is
greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the
thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mind, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

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"Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.

"Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.

"Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from
that which he had intended to commit."

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, says that a voluntary act is a free,
intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that
the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of
1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in
the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which
was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in
his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as
we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

"In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declares that where there is no intention there is no crime * * * in order to affirm,
without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no
moral injury." (Vol. 2, The Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use
of the following language:

"It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of
the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime."

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three
sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element
or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or omission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

" * * * Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act denned and punished
by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court."

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein
defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

"He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degree, and with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

"He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.

"In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article
81.

"The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the
first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper."

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is
that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any
criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and
American statutes to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extend a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice;
that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean,, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly"
or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it
means "not merely 'voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes
"malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or "willfully," but "the
Page 74 of 258
difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual,
and signifying rather the intent from which flows any unlawful and injurious act committed without legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, sees. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
"willfully," "maliciously," "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that, with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil
intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcefully presents this
doctrine:

"In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that -

"There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can
not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exist. We find this doctrine confirmed by -

"Legal maxims. - The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims
as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, 'the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so;' Actus me invito factus non est
meus actus, 'an act done by me against my will is not my act;' and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from
civil. So also -

"Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. 'By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the same ground, we hold him innocent.' The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And -

"In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did
from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems hot his
due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of
bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as
good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, sees. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice results from the adoption of the
arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our
tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class
of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make
the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
(cases cited in Cyc, vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77) ; and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a
real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and it suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefor, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise than
in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of
fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded
from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and
as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den.
C. C, 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;. Reg. vs. Cohen, 8
Cox C. C, 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good
faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or otherwise, upon which he acted.

"If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing - or, in terms
more, nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them - he is legally
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in
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adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on
the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what
he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme
measure." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as
a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent
of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the
facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished
by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act
punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parsons, C. J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: "If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be
murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such
belief." (Charge to the grand jury in Self ridge's case, Whart. Horn., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p. 7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

"A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arm and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is discharge; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real
design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if there had been a bullet in the
pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol
is loaded - a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self- defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing,.are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this
principle." (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts
are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

"Question III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than that
reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see
or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from
him the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking
him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-
law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion
resulting from there blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited
during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in
self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid
found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exist rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: 'Considering, from the facts found by
the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife, who was nursing her
child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish the person or persons attacking, nor the instruments with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the fact that the attack was made from behind and because there was no other than fire light in
the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly
that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same
stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly
because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness
of the house and the consternation which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to know or distinguish whether
there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, nor that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court
did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8
of the Penal Code, it erred, etc.' (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)" (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.)

"Question XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there
was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: 'Face down, hand over your money!' because of which, and almost at
the same moment, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, 'Oh! they have killed me,' and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, 'Miguel, Miguel,
speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined,' realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a
corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-

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defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code ? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack,
and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prision mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal
from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)" (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

"Question VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window - at this, he puts his
head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered 'the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned' -
because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol
at one of the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as
having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisities of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor
of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed,
and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correccional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attacked his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877)." (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling
into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed threatened his person
and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he
is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Moreland, and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C. J., and Mapa,J., dissent.

Page 77 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO Z. OANIS AND ALBERTO GALANTA, DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

MORAN, J.:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and
corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence
and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prision correccional and to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of Pl,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938, Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from
Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina name Irene in Cabanatuan
get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were
instructed to arrest Balagtas and if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of
police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of
his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he voluntered to go with the
party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to
Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also
said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour, Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by
Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the
door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw
her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire
scene, Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to
who killed the deceased, Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial
hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's
body which caused his death.

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave,
however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he
too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are
Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed, Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that, after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up,"
Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets;
that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking
up something from the floor, he fired at him.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to
exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oanis averred that he fired at Tecson when the latter was
apparently watching somebody in an attitude of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oanis shot Tecson
while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him, But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from
these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their
mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants
themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was
awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanja shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that
the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her
testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not
only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions
had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do
not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.

Page 78 of 258
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired
at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his
identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended
that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was
Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court hold and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is
murder though specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.

In support of the theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U. S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The
maxim is ignorantta facti excrisat but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong
case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "if you enter the room I will kill you." But at
that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a
kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is
the case of a man who was masked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled
pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head
was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake
of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed
by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of
killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to
Irene Requinea. This, indeed is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was reall Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome
his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil., 738), yet he is
never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
effected otherwise (6 C. J. S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule
109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an
arrest. (5C. J., p. 753; U. S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a lifetermer, a fugitive from
justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when, in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different
facts, in U. S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere
trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify
precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation—not condonation—
should be the rule; otherwise we would offer, a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants, is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil,
939). In the words of Viada, "para que se califique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de
dañar; existiendo esa intention, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar
un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially, inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs.
Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According lo
such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present—appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The
second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to
arrest Balagtas, or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in
their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfilment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without
any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty

Page 79 of 258
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correccional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the Heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
costs.

Yulo, C. J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Page 80 of 258
 [ G. R. No. L-6189, November 29, 1954 ]

SAMSON VILORIA CALDERON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Accused of homicide, defendant Samson Viloria Calderon was, after due trial, convicted, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, of homicide thru
reckless negligence and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from h months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 6 months of prision
correccional, to indemnify the heirs of Eustacio Rodil, deceased, in the sum of P3,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. On appeal taken by said defendant, the Court of Appeals found him guilty of homicide and imposed upon him an indeterminate
penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor nor more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal and, in all other
respects, affirmed the decision of the court of first instance, with costs against the defendant. The latter has brought the case; to us for review by writ
of certiorari.

The pertinent facts are set f forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which we quote:

"En la noche del dia primero de abril de 1951, el leniente del ejercito, Leopoldo Regis, al mando de un peloton de soldados, desplego doce de los
mismos, entre ellos Samson Vlloria Calderon, en el lado izquierdo del area Tejeron-Harran, Santa Ana, Manila, que se puso bajo cordon, por
sospecharse que dentro de ella estaban tres jefes de los Huks. Samson formaba la linea del cor- don paralela al carco de 'square type wire fence1
(t.n.t. p. 3) del solar de unos dos mil metros cuadrados de la casa No. 227 de la calle Tejeron, Santa Ana, donde vivian Eustaeio Rodil, su esposa y
sus hijos. El carco de alambre estada reforzado con plantas de gumameia de treclio entrecho. En el solar habia alguno que otro grupo de platanos y
una zahurda detras de la casa. Entre 11:00 y 12:00 de esa nocha, Benjamin Rodil, uno de los hijos de Eustacio, se desperto por los ladridos de los
perros y el riiido que luego observo producia el paso de un hobra. Abril la ventana y se puso a observar, jy al ooavencerse que habia una persona
fuera del cerco, desperto a Sus hermanas, Elisea y Virginia, y a su sobrino, Bernardo, informoles que alguien estaba fuera del eerjcd y ordeno a
Elisea que abriera las dos bom- billas electrlcas de a cien bujias cada una, puestas detras de la casa para alumbrar la zahurda, pues que dos como
habo tentativa de hurto de sus cerdos en anteriores ocasiones, creia que otro se inter taba llevar a cabo. Encendidas las luces, Benjamin y su
sobrino Bernardo bajaron al solar, recogieron piedras y tiraronlas hacla el lugar doide se oian los pasos, haciendo al mismo tiempo ruido para
ahuyentar. Asi estuvleron por unos quince minutos en que, a veces, no oian los pasos del lndividuo que estaba fuera del cerco, hasta que Eustacio
Rodil bajo y pregunto que era lo que habia. Le contestgron que se oian pasos fuera del cerco, y Eustacio se dirigio hacia alii, llevando en la mano
derecha un bolo que llaman army bolo, que solia usar para cortar la hierba del solar. Apenas se habia alejado unos quince pies de Benjamin, se oyo
un tiro y Eustacio volvio diciendo que le habian tocado palpando al efecto la parte anterior de su hombrq izquierdo, de la que manaba sangre. Se
desmaycantes de llegar a su casa y le tuvieron que alzar y colocarle en su cama. Mientras le quitaban la ropa para descubrir sus heridas. llegaron
dos soldados del ejercito, Samson viloria y Ernest Lemos, y despues el tenlente Leopoldo Regis, qua sugirio el traslado de Eustacio al Hospital
General, sugestion a la que ss conformo el Dr. Deogracias Rodil, uno de los hijos de Eustacio qua avisado del suceso llego poco antes que Regis,
porque no tenia a mano medios para contenar la hemorragia que manaba de las heridas de su padre. Embarcaron a ijustacio en un jeepney, y el Dr.
Deogracias y los dos soldados le llevaron al Hospital General. Segun el Dr. Deogracias, el pregunto por el que disparo a su padre y ninguno de los
dos soldados le eontesto, pero, segun Samson, el le contesto que habia sido el. En el Hospital Eustacio fallecio al dia siguiente, 2 de abril, y el
resiltado de la autopsia de su cadaver, practicada por el Dr. Mariano B. Lara, Chief Medical Examiner, MPD, consta en el Exh. B, * * *

****

Segun Benjamin, no oyo mas que el eatampido de un tiro, y de acuerdo con el soldado Lemos, que estaba a tres metros de distancia de Viloria, no
vio a este disparar sino una sola vez. El cadaver de Eustacio, sin embargo, presentaba tres heridas de entrada, en la parte anterior del hombroi
izquierdo, y una de salida en la espalda, en la region escapular izquierda, heridas que tales comiestan marcadas en los disenos del Exh. B-1, la
Uniea de salida aparece mas baja que las de entrada.

Viloria admite que fue el quien disparo el tiro, que hirio y mato a Eustacio en la occasion de iutos, y explicando el suceso, dijo:

e that time that he was a Huk to kill me, so I shot him.

made you believe that he was a Huk?
se there was information to the effect that there were many huks in this area.

****

Q Do you know the place where the civilian came from?

A I know sir.
Q From where?
A From my front. He came from the direction opposite the place where I was at that time. (t.s.n. p. 35).
Q Was there any conversation between you and the civilian before you shot him?
A The civilian and I had a conversation.
Q What was that conversation about?
A I told him three times to halt and he said, if we did not clear out of the area he would kill us.
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 Q Who would kill you?
A The man.
Q When you said to the civilian to halt did you identify yourself?
A Yes, sir.

****

Q In what way did you identify yourself?

A I told him I am a soldier.
Q What did the man say if there is any?
I identified myself to him that I was a soldier, and that I told him not to move, but he said, that if we did not clear out the area he would kill,
A
and he swung his bolo to me and I retreated.
Q What more did he do?
A He nevertheless continued advancing forward and he made movement as if to put one of his legs over the fence, (t.s.n, p 36)
Q At the time that the civilian was going toward you, could you see him?
A I could see him only when he was two meters distance from me.
Q In that distance of two meters that was you could see him already, do you re- member if that civilian carried with him something?
A He has. He had an army bolo in his hand.
Q In what hand was he carrying the bolo?
A On the right hand.
Q When he was at a distance of two meters, that was when he was going toward you, what did he do?
A He was about to hack me with his bolo.
Q Did he hack you?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times did he hack you? What did he do?
A Three times.
Q At the time when the civilian was hacking you, could you demonstrate the position of the body and the weapon in his hand?
(Witness demonstrate by placing the witness chair in front of him and letting it be supposed as the fence in front of the witness and bends
A forward over the top of the fence so that the upper part of his body is bent and over the top of the fence with his right hand raised as if to
strike, the left leg being placed on the witness chair, supposed to be the fence.)
Q What was the distance of the civilian when he was hacking you?
A One meter.
Q After hacking you three; times, what did you do?
A I shot him.
Q Would you demonstrate before this Hon. Court your position at the time when you shot the civilian?
(Witness demonstrated in a squatting position with his left foot forward, his left elbow on his left knee and with left hand a little bit raised and
A
his right hand drawn back as if holding the trigger part of a rifle.)
Q At the time when you were about to shoot him, what did you feel in your person?

****

A I thought he was trying to kill me.

Q What made you believe that he was trying to kill you?
A I thought he was a Huk.
Q After having shot the civilian, what did you do?
A I told my companion, Ernesto, to report the matter to Lt. Regis," (t.s.A. p 37)

Appellant maintains that:

"I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that late Eustacio Rodil did not commit acts of unlawful aggression against the petitioner-appellant;

II. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner-appellant fired the shot under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury;

III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the shot fired by the petitioner-appellant did not proceeding from an innocent mistake of fact;

IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the ruling held by this Honorable Court in People vs. Oanis et al. (7k-Phil. 259), is applicable in the
instant case.

Page 82 of 258
In support of the first, second arid third assignments error, it is urged that Eustacio Rodil gave appellant three bolo slashes, which missed him; that
he believed a Huk; and that appellant fired at Rodil in self-defense and acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. In this connection the Court of Appeals said:

“Eustacio venia de su casa, se dirigia al cerco ds su solar, tendido fuera del cordon, y no estaba por lo tanto, dentro del area sospechosa,
accorralada en esa ocasion por la fuerza armada a que pertfeneeia Viloria. El solar detras de la casa de Eustacio, a cuyo cerco este se flirigia,
estaba alumbrado por dos bombillas electricas de a cien bujias eada una. Mas aun, antes de que Eustacio bajara de su casa y fuera al cerco, al otro
lado del cual se encontraban Viloria, a este estuvieron Benjamin y Bernardo tirandole piedras y ahuyentandole con la voz, Sodas estas
eircunstancias no daban ugar a suponer que habia Huks en el solar de la casa de Eustacio, porque ningun Huk atacaria eneendiendo prijneramente
las luces electricas, para exponerse asimismo a los que estaban en la sombra, y menos aun tiraria piedras y huyentaria haciendo ruido con la voz.
No se concibe, pues, como Viloria, que debe estar entrenado contra las emboscadas de los Huks. podia creer oue Eustacio era un disidente; sobre
todo porque, segun el mismo, fue advertido que despejara aquel sitio o de ojfcro modo seria muerto. Esta advertencia no puede proceder de un
Huk, y es toda la advertencia de un hombre que vive dentro de la ley, y dentro de la ley quiere proteger sus intereses. Pero esta conversacion, que
segun Viloria tuvo con Eustacio, no fue oida por Benjamin, ni la confirma Lemos, quien ni siquiera corrobora a Viloria en su afirmacion de que fue
atacado tres veces por Eustacio con un army bolo, y eso que, segun Lemos, el le vio a Viloria en el acto de disparar a Eustacio, lo que indica que el
estaba tambien en condicipnes de haber podido ver si Eustacio hubiera atacado a Viloria. Por el hecho de que entre Viloria y Eustacio habia de por
medio el cerco desquare type wire fence, no era de creer que aunqne este pudiera saltarlo,causa dificil a su edad de 68 anos y su avitaminasis que,
segun el Dr. Deogracias, lo impedia mover libremente las extremidades inferiores, lo intentaria, sabiendo que con ello se exponia a un ataque, sin
defensa de su parte. Ademas, estando Viloria fuera del 34 cerco, Eustacio no era sino un espantajo dentro del cerco, que si levantaba su bolo, lo
haeia para espantar, sin colocar de ninguna manera a aquel en sitijiacion peligrosa. Y debe ser asi, porque de acuerdo con las heridas que el Dr.
Lara localize en q! cadaver de Eustacio, la unica de salida en la espalda, en la region clavicular, aparece mas baji que las de entrada, en la cara
anterior del hombro izquierdo, y su dlreccion, como se van en laigura B-1, es de un angulo de unos 60 grados, lo que denota que el acusado
etaando dispare su armi estaba a un nivel mas alto que Eustacio, y no como trato de demostrarlo, agacbandose eon la pierna izquierda hacia
delante y apoyando su codo izqikierdo en su rodilla izquierda.

No siendo exculpatoria la explieacion dada por Villoria, y admitido por el que fue quien disparo el tiro que hirio y mato a Eustacio, el debe responder
por esta agresion criminal, sin que pueda a su favor invocar que en esa noche estaba en su puesto de soldado, por exigencias del deber y el
servicio, publico, porque estos, en un gobierno derden y de ley, no immunizan al abuso, el exceso y el crimen. El resultado de sus actos, ni siquiera
puede considerarse justificado por una falsa o erronea identificacion de su victima, porque esta se hallaba dentro de su solar, fuera del cordon,
caminaba a la luz electrica de doscientas bujias, le advertia, segun el, que despejara el sitio, todo lo cual revela claramente que no era disidente, ni
queria danarle, y el no estaba de ningun modo en peligro para optar por una determinacion extrema, porque se interponia entre el de alambre, que
este no trato agredirle, maliciosa y 7 Eustacio el cerco lie saltarlo para resueltamente.

It is apparent from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals found the theory of the defense unworthy of credence. Not being subject to our review,
this finding is conclusive in the determination of the assignments of error under consideration, which thus turn out to be based upon false predicates
and are, accordingly, untenable. At any rate, if, when the fatal shot was fired by appellant, as testified to by him, Rodil had just raised his left foot and
placed it or was about to raise his left foot and place it on the lower portion of the wire fence, which was slightly over one yard in height, for the
purpose of climbing it, he could not have given,at the same time, a bolo slash, for appellant was on the other side of the fence, squatting about a
yard away therefrom, and hence, beyond his reach. Besides, Rodil - who was weak, for, apart from: being over 68 years of age, he had avitaminosis,
which impaired the freedom of movement of his legs could not have gone over the fence without holding it with both hands and would have lost his
balance had he swang his bolo while he was in the position described by appellant. Even ore unbelievable is the latter's testimony to the effect that,
when Rodil was still about a yard from the fence, and, hence, two (2) yards away from appellant, the former had already tried to hack him twice with
his (Rodil's) bolo, which, in view of the distance and the fence separating them, had no possibility of landing on appellant. It is, likewise, interesting to
note that, according to the evidence for the defense, appellant was, at the time of the occurrence, squatting upon a ditch, whereas Rodil was, not
only standing, but, also, trying to climb the fence, and, consequently, at a higher level than appellant. Yet, the former's injury had a downward
direction, although it would have gone upward, if appellant's testimony were true. It is thus apparent, from the record, that appellant was neither
candid nor truthful in the narration of facts; that the Court of Appeals was fully justified in giving no credence to his testimony and in accepting the
version of the prosecution; and that the first three assignments of error cannot be sustained.

It is contended, under the last assignment of error, that, having acted under a mistake of fact, appellant is exempt from criminal liability and that, at
most, he is merely guilty of homicide thru negligence. In support of this pretence, it is urged that, in deciding the case, we should consider the
condition of emotional stress under which appellant must have been when he fired the fatal shot, not the objective facts, as the same appeared after
the event, and that, being a peace officer, he was entitled to act in conformity with his honest belief at the time of the occurrence. Although generally
material, the belief and intent of the accused are not necessarily decisive in the disposition of the case. The judgment and discretion of public
officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a
clear legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the spirit and purpose of the law.
This is specially true in the case of members of the armed forces, whose main duty is to defend the state, and, consequently, the people who, in a
democratic society like ours, are the repository of sovereignty. Such duty would be a myth if a law abiding tax payer could be slain in his own home
with impunity.

The army bolo held by Rodil at the time of the occurrence does not suffice to justify his killing for, does the fundamental law not guarantee the
inviolability of his domicile? Was it not, accordingly, the legal obligation of; appellant to respect and even protect the same? Was Rodil not entitled,
therefore, to defend it as his own "castle" or citadel? Any other view would create the impression that peace officers are public masters, not public
servants, thus alienating the faith and confidence of the people in the government, and undermining the foundation of all democratic institutions.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals did not believe that appellant had acted under a mistake of fact. Indeed, he had no reason to assume, or even
suspect, that Rodil was a Huk, the latter being inside his property, which was fenced, as well as outside the area then guarded by the army.
Moreover, shortly before the shooting, members of the Rodil family had switched on two 100-watt electric bulbs, which illuminated their lot brightly.
Then, they went to the yard and started throwing stones in the direction of the place where appellant and other soldiers were posted, believing them
to be marauders with evil designs. In addition, the former made some noise in order to scare the latter away. This lasted for about 15 minutes, after
which Eustacio Rodil appeared in the scene, holding an army bolo in his right hand, and proceeded to the spot where the supposed marauders were

Page 83 of 258
posted, at the same time bidding them to go away. As Rodil approached or reached the fence aforementioned, he was fatally shot by: appellant.
Obviously, no individual, who is a Huk, bent on killing the appellant, would have lighted the place with said electric bulbs. Much less would said Huk
have performed or caused to be performed the acts above referred to the effect of which upon appellant and his companions was to warn; them in
advance before attacking him. In other words, appellant had absolutely no justification whatsoever to believe and could not have believed either that
Rodil was a Huk or that he intended to kill said appellant.

In the light of these facts, and considering that Rodil was shot with the intent of killing him, it is clear that appellant does not deserve an acquittal. The
cases of People vs. Lara (48 Phil. 153) U. S. vs. Mojica (42 Phil. 784), U. S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 239) and People vs. Bayatnbao (52 Phil. 3111),
cited by the defense, are not in point. In the first two cases, there was actually an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. In the last two
cases, the defendant had reasonable grounds - which herein appellant did not have to believe that their lives were in imminent danger. We have,
likewise, considered the applicability of the rule laid down in the base of People vs. Mamasalaya, (50 O.G.1004), involving, among others, an officer
of the Philippine Constabulary, one Lt. Cabelin, in command of several members of said force, who, in compliance with his instructions, had fired at
some houses in the barrio of Sapalan, Cotabato, Cotabato, thereby killing several innocent persons. In; acquitting him, this Court said:

"* * * There is no charge or claim that he acted deliberately and criminally in killing the four innocent civilians knowing that they were innocent. In
good faith he believed that the three houses pointed out to him by Bulalakao were being occupied by bandits and lawless elements whom he was
ordered to disperse. Capture or destroy. The question is whether he incurred in negligence or reckless imprudence in ordering his men to fire upon
the houses. As previously stated, the witnesses for the defense including lit. Cabelin told the court under oath that the patrol was first fired upon from
the three houses but in spite of this unprovoked fire he and his sergeant shouted and called out to the inmates of the houses not to fire because they
(members of the patrol) were P.C. soldiers; and it was only when the firing: persisted that he ordered his men to return the fire. Of course, the
prosecution denies this claim. But even assuming as claimed by the prosecution that the patrol had not been first fired upon, and that Cabelin and
his sergeant had; not shouted or called out to the inmates of the houses to identify himself and his men, tinder the circumstances, we believe that the
shooting was .justified for having been done and effected under an honest mistake." (Italics supplied)

We do not believe that appellant herein is substantially in the same predicament as Lt. Cabelin for: (1) the former had not been told by anybody that
Eustacio Rodil was a Huk or an outlaw, unlike Cabelin who had been advised that the inhabitants of the houses in question were bandits and/or
lawless elements, and was requested to proceed against them as such; (2) Cabelin was in Gotabato, in a region known to be infested by said
elements, whereas Rodil was in Manila, outside the area cordoned by the peace officer; (3) the Mamasalaya case involved an appeal directly from a
decision of the court of first instance, whose findings of fact are not binding upon the Supreme Court, which accepted and believed the version of
Cabelin, or most of it, whereas the case at bar is before us upon a petition for review, by writ of certiorari, of a decision of the Court of Appeals, which
found the theory of the defense to be unworthy of credence and this finding is conclusive upon us; and (4) a majority of the members of this Court
with one member writing a strong dissenting opinion and 3 members not taking part in the decision found that Cabelin had acted under the "honest
mistake" that the deceased were dissidents and/or outlaws, and that he was "justified" in ordering the shooting, unlike the case at bar in which the
court of first instance, the Court of Appeals and the majority of this Court agree that appellant had no reason to "mistake" Rodil for a Huk and that the
former was not justified, therefore, in shooting him.

Is appellant herein guilty of homicide or, merely, of homicide through either simple or reckless negligence? We have given considerable thought to
this question and devoted a good deal of our time in the study of the authorities pertinent thereto, and the conclusion reached by the majority off the
members of this Court is in favor of the first alternative, for the following reasons, namely

1. In People vs. Guillen (47 O. G. 3433, 3440) it was held that "a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232). Where such an unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605)." In People vs. Castillo (42 O. G. 1914,
1921), this Court declared that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence, for reckless negligence implies lack of
intent I to kill, without which the crime of frustrated homicide can not exist. In the case of People vs. Dumon (72 Phil, 41, 49), the court
convicted of double homicide a person who killed a couple, allegedly in the act of copulation, in the erroneous belief that the woman was
his wife committing adultery, the theory that the offense had been committed thru reckless negligence, having been rejected, for the
reasons among others, that "the act of firing the fatal shots was intentional" on the part of the accused. Similarly a peace officer, who killed
a person asleep, in the mistaken belief that he was a notorious criminal and escaped convict, whom the authorities wanted dead or alive,
was found guilty of murder in People vs. Oanis (74 Phil. 256). In disposing of the case, this Court said:

"The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). In the words of Viada, 'para que se calif pique un hecho de imprudenciSt es preciso que no haya mediado
en el malicia ni intene alguna de dafiar; existiendo esa intencion, deberd calificarse el hecho del delito que ha produeido, por ma's que no
haya sido la ijitencidn del agente el causar un mal de tanti gravedad csomo el que se pirodujo.' (Tomo 7, Viada Cddigo Penal
Comentado1, 5. a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is willfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to
support a plea of mitigated liability."

2. The case of People vs. Fernando (49 Phil., 75), in which the defendant, was convicted of homicide through reckless negligence, is
substantially different from the case at bar. It was satisfactorily established in said case that the defendant therein was informed that the
victim was an out-law, wanted by the authorities, and the surrounding circumstances were such that said defendant had some reason to
believe the information to be true. In the, Fernando case, the language used was:

"The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of
suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of
a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoners' uniform, who was calling the owner of the house, and the
silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown
man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling ground the place. The suspicion became a reality in his
Page 84 of 258
 mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the
midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and
then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be a wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who
was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment; when the forces of fear and the sense of duty were at odds, the
accused was not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a
suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man
was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact that he called 'Nong Miong,' which indicated that the owner
of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who it was that was
calling her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action.

"Taking into consideration the state of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown
persons, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack,
and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal, with
malicious intent, because he thought at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise
the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what
he thought him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising Seasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.

"The crime committed by the accused, therefore, Is homicide through reckless negligence * * *." (pp. 78-79)

Upon the other hand, appellant herein had never been informed that Rodil was a Huk. As already adverted to the conditions obtaining pt the time of
the occurrence were such as to leave no room for doubt that Rodil could not be Huk and did not intend to kill the herein appellant. Incidentally, the
Fernando case is clear Authority against appellant’s bid for acquittal,

3. Appellant herein has much in common with the defendant in People vs. Oanis (74 Phil., 257). The latter was it1 peace officer who had
been ordered to apprehend, "dead or alive" a notorious gangster and escaped convict known as Balagtas. Having been informed that the
latter was living with a taxi dance girl, named Irene, the accused proceeded to the house in which she lived. As he opened the door of her
room, defendant saw a man in her bed, whereupon he (defendant) shot and killed him. Although, acting under the erroneous belief that the
victim was Balagtas, this Court convicted the accused, not merely of homicide, but of murder. Obviously, the main reason behind this
conclusion was the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim without checking carefully the latter's
identity as its place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. In shooting Rodil who,
obviously, could neither be a Huk nor a killer appellant herein has acted under similar conditions.

4. The view of the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of April 26, I883, is substantially the same.

In connection therewith, we quote from Viada:

"Si morador de un cortijo que oyendo ladrar los perros, y temeroso de que alguien se acercase a sustraer las caballerias, se asoma al balcon, dando
el 'quien vive, y como madie contestase, dispara la escopeta sobre un bulto, apareciendo al dia siguiente en dicho sitio el cadaver de un sujeto,
Intimo amigo de aquel, cuya familia no supo expliearse el motivo que le condujera al lugar dondo fue' encontrado muerto, sera responsable del
deTLito de homicidio. o simplemente del de imprudencia temeraria? – El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado oue la primera y mas grave calificaciSn es
la procedente: 'Considerando que en la sentencia recurrida se declara como hecho probado que Pedro Molina, despues de preguntar repetidamente
aquilnvive?1 y como nadie le contestase, disparo su escopeta sobre un bulto que distinguio a distancia de seis varas, lo cual demuestra que
ejecuto’ este hecho voluntaria e intencionalmente sobre una persona, porque de una persona debiS creer que era el expresado bulto, cuando le
pregunto 'quiln vive?', y por lo tanto, que cometiol el delito de homicldifi por que ha sido penados Considerando que para que se entienda que un
hecho se ha cometido por imprudencia emeraria y pueda tener aplicaci6n el parrafo primero del art. 581 del Codigo penal, es requisite
indispensable que en la ejecucion no haya mediado malicia, lo cual no ocurre en el caso del recurso porque con malicia, y voluntad obrd Pedro
Molina disparando un arma de fuego sobre el bulto de una persona a la que causo la muerte, etc." (S. de 26 de abrll de 1883, Gaceta de 5 de
septiembre.) (Viada, Vol. 7 5th ed., p. 23.)

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be as it is hereby affirmed. However, in
view of the appellant's youth and considering that he had joined the Philippine Army a few months only, prior to the occurrence, the Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to forward a copy of this decision to the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice, for consideration of the
propriety of extending to appellant herein the benefits of executive clemency, after service of such period of the sentence imposed as maybe
deemed sufficient to satisfy the demands of justice and public interest. With costs against the appellant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bangzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ. concur

Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes took no part

Page 85 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 2229, July 01, 1905 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROBERT MCMANN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

WILLARD, J.:

The defendant, McMann, and one McKay were packers at Camp Vicars in Mindanao, employed by the Quarter-master's Department of the Army. On
the day in question the defendant had charge of some mules about one and one half miles from the camp. McKay was not on guard at the time, but,
for some reason which does not appear, was near the place where the defendant was stationed with the mules. McKay went to the house of a Moro,
Amay Pindolonan, for the purpose of getting matches with which to light his cigar. With his revolver in his hand he attempted to enter the house, but
the owner would not allow him to do so. A few moments later the defendant arrived at the same house. He attempted to enter, but was unable to do
so on account of the opposition of the owner. He also carried his revolver in his hand with the hammer raised ready to be discharged. A Moro named
Master, who was there at the time, was carving the head of a bolo with one hand, holding the blade in the other. The defendant snatched the bolo
from him, cutting his fingers. This Moro left for the camp to report the matter to the authorities. Soon after this McKay and the Moro Pindolonan,
being seated side by side at a distance of from 3 to 6 feet from the defendant, who was either standing or sitting on the stairway which led into the
house, the latter raised his pistol and fired at McKay. The bullet struck him in the back of the head and killed him instantly. The Moro at once jumped
up, looked around to see where the shot came from, and started to run, whereupon the defendant shot him. The exact nature of his injuries does not
appear, but it appears that at the time of the trial, about a month after the event, he was still in the hospital. At some time, probably after the killing of
McKay, although the defendant says it was before, the latter killed a dog which was on the premises. The defendant and McKay were both drunk at
this time.

That the defendant fired the shot which killed McKay is practically admitted by him in his testimony and the fact is also proved by three or four
eyewitnesses. It is claimed by his counsel in this court that the shooting was accidental arid that he had no intention of killing McKay. In the face of
tne positive testimony of the witnesses there is no ground for saying that the shooting was accidental. Two of the Moros testified that they saw him
discharge his revolver at McKay. In view of the fact that McKay and the Moro were sitting side by side, it may perhaps have been difficult for the
witnesses to have known at which one of the two the defendant aimed, but their testimony makes it plain that in no event was the discharge of the
revolver accidental.

As to the second claim of the defendant that he had no intention of killing McKay, the only evidence in support of it is the proof that the defendant
and McKay were good friends prior to the occurrence and that no reason is shown why he should have committed such an act. It may be difficult to
state what the exact cause was. It appears from the testimony that while they were in the position above stated the defendant was talking to McKay,
but McKay said nothing in reply. The cause for the commission of the crime might be found perhaps in this conversation, if we knew what it was. Or
perhaps the defendant killed McKay because he, the defendant, was drunk. But whatever the cause may have been it is not absolutely necessary for
us to find a motive therefor. The question of motive is of course very important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not
the person who committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond all doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of
McKay, it is not so important to know the exact reason for the deed.

The defendant also claims that the court below erred in holding that the crime was committed with alevosia. The judge below based his holding upon
the fact that McKay was shot from behind. The authorities cited by the de- fendant from the supreme court of Spain may be divided into two classes.
One class includes cases in which the evidence did not show by eyewitnesses the exact way in which the crime was committed. The court held that
under these circumstances alevosia could not be presumed from the condition in which the body was found or from proof that the shot must have
come from behind. These cases have no application to the case at bar, for here the proof shows exactly how the offense was committed. The
second class of cases includes those in which, after a struggle has commenced between the parties on one side and on the other, and after each
side is notified of the intention of the other side to do them injury, a member of one party is killed by a member from the other by a blow from behind.
These cases have no application to the case at bar, for here before any struggle between McKay and McMann had commenced, or before there was
any indication, so far as the evidence goes, of any trouble between them, and without any warning, the defendant shot McKay in the back of the
head.

We do not understand that the defendant claims that he intended to shoot the Moro when he killed McKay, but even if this claim were made and
supported, we do not see how it could change the result in view of the fact that McKay was shot from behind without any warning and with no
intimation that an attack was to be made upon him or the Moro.. What the rule would be had McKay been facing McMann when the latter fired at the
back of the Moro, we do not, therefore, have to decide.

The court below held that the defendant was drunk at the time the act was committed, but held also that drunkenness was habitual with him and
therefore his condition could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of lessening the sentence. The defendant in this court claims that the
court erred in holding that drunkenness was habitual with the defendant. The testimony upon that point furnished by one of the witnesses for the
defendant is as follows:

"Q. Did you say that you saw the accused and McKay drinking together on the night before the day of the occurrence?

A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Is it not true that the said night was the first time you saw the accused drinking?

A. No, sir. It is not true. I have seen him drink before.

Page 86 of 258
"Q. But you never saw him drunk before?

A. Yes, sir.

"Q. How many times had you seen the accused drunk before?

That is a difficult question to answer; I have seen him drunk many times. The first time I knew the accused I saw him drunk twelve or more
A.
times.

"Q. Then you mean to say that drunkenness was habitual with the accused?

A. When I have seen him drinking, usually he retired drunk to the quarters.

"Q. How many times have you seen the accused drinking during the time you have known him?

A. I could not say; too many times to recollect.

"Q. Are you sure of this?

A. Yes, sir."

We think this testimony justifies the court below in its holding in view of what is said in some of the decisions cited by the defendant in his brief. In the
case of Commonwealth vs. Whitney (5 Gray, 85) the court said:

"The exact degree of intemperance which constitutes a drunkard it may not be easy to define, but speaking in general terms, and with the accuracy
of which the matter is susceptible, he is a drunkard whose habit is to get drunk, 'whose ebriety has become habitual.' To convict a man of the offense
of being a. common drunkard it is, at the least, necessary to show that he is an habitual drunkard. Indeed the terms 'drunkard' and 'habitual drunkard'
mean the same thing."

In the case of Ludwick vs. Commonwealth (18 Penn. St., 172) the court said:

"A man may be an habitual drunkard, and yet be sober for days and weeks together. The only rule is, Has he a fixed habit of drunkenness? Was he
habituated to intemperance whenever the opportunity offered?"

The judgment of the court below is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the defendant.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

Page 87 of 258
 [ G. R. No. L-3248 and L-3249, May 16, 1951 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LORENZO AGUILAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

For the killing of the brothers Pedro Gonzales and Vivencia Gonzales, defendant Lorenzo Aguilar was prosecuted for murder in two separate cases,
Criminal Cases Nos. 1168 and 1169, of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. After a joint trial, Aguilar was found guilty of murder in both
cases and was sentenced in each case to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P6,000, and to pay the costs. These
two cases are here now on appeal.

There is no question as to the fact, and the appellant admits that in the evening of September 20, 1948, in the municipality of Libmanan, province
of Camarines Sur,

while on patrol as a municipal policeman, and armed with a Thompson Submachinegun, near the market place, then well lighted, he fired upon
Pedro Gonzales and his brother Vivencio Gonzales, inflicting upon the first, four wounds on the chest and abdomen, and on the second, eight
wounds about the same region of the body, killing Pedro almost instantly and producing the death of Vivencio a few minutes later. He claims,
however, that he acted in self-defense, which defense was rejected by the trial court.

After a careful review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court that the shooting took place in the manner described by the witnesses for the
prosecution and as found by the lower court, as follows. About seven o'clock in the evening of September 20, 1948, the two brothers Pedro and
Vivencio and one Candido Borbe, left the store of Tomas Aureus. On their way home, Candido Borbe stopped at a neighboring store to buy
cigarettes, leaving his companions in the street. After making his purchase and as he was leaving the store to rejoin his two companions, he saw the
accused approaching the two brothers, and at a distance of from four to five meters from the two, he opened fire on them with his Thompson rifle. At
the first burst of fire Pedro fell down dead and almost immediately a second burst from the machinegun followed felling Vivencio. Instead of staying
to see what it was all about, Candido fled running to the house of Vivencio's wife to notify her of what had befallen her husband. The incident took
place only a few meters away from the store of Tomas Aureus who, upon hearing the firing, looked out of his store and saw Pedro Gonzales fall.

Attracted by the many shots, Arsenio Aycardo, another policeman and Chief of Police Rito Dilanco rushed to the scene. Aycardo arrived first and to
him the accused surrendered his firearm. To Chief of Police Dilanco who came, a minute or two later, the defendant surrendered himself or rather
gave himself up.

It is clear from this accepted version of the incident by the prosecution that the shooting was deliberate and unprovoked, and that
consequently, the appellant is criminally responsible for the killing of the two victims. However, as already stated, the appellant claims that he acted
in self-defense, and in support of said theory he told the court during the trial that as he met or rather came upon the two brothers that evening,
Pedro Gonzales accosted him with the question as to whether or not he was the one who had arrested his brother Vivencio several nights before,
and that upon his answering in the affirmative, Vivencio immediately punched him in the left cheek, causing him to fall to the ground; that as he was
trying to stand up, Pedro Gonzales immediately attacked him with a fan knife (Exh. "2"), slashing at him right and left, the knife, in the first swing
grazing his body about the region of the abdomen, ripping his uniform but not reaching or cutting his body, and that in the second swing, the knife hit
him in the left forearm as he tried to ward off the blow; that Vivencio throw sand in his face presumably to blind and disable him; and that in order to
defend himself, he stepped back, unslung his machinegun from his shoulder, cocked it and then opened fire on the two brothers. The defense
introduced in evidence a fan knife (Exh. "2") which was allegedly found open by Patrolman Aycardo on the scene of the crime, about one meter
away from the righthand of Pedro Gonzales as he lay dead in the street. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Villaluz was also presented to describe
his (defendant's) wound in the left forearm, said to be one inch long and ^ centimeter deep.

The defense proved that on the night of September 16th of the same year, that is to say, about four days before the killing, appellant while on his
beat, in a street near the market, found Vivencio Gonzales with two friends, all under the influence of liquor, and dancing "pantomina"; that being
within the market zone and because of the lateness of the hour, he ordered them to stop; that two of them obeyed and stopped but Vivencio
continued dancing and making a spectacle of himself and otherwise creating a scandal, and so defendant Aguilar arrested him and took him to the
Municipal Building, Vivencio all the time protesting that he could not be arrested as he was a barrio lieutenant which as a matter of fact, he was; that
subsequently, Vivencio spoke to the Chief of Police and insisted that the appellant had no right to arrest him because he was a barrio lieutenant and
suggested, if not demanded, that Aguilar be dismissed from the service; that the Chief of Police told Vivencio that the suggested dismissal was not
within his power because Aguilar had been appointed by the Mayor, so that Vivencio should lodge his complaint with and address his demand to the
Mayor; and that Vivencio declared that if the Chief of Police could not diplomatically dismiss Aguilar, he (Vivencio) would dismiss him (defendant) in
a bad way. The defense also introduced evidence to the effect that the two brothers, victims of the killing were given to drinking, were often drunk
and were bad characters, abusive and desperate, known as "tough guys" and feared in the community.

In a well considered decision, the trial court presided over by Judge Jose N. Leuterio gave a number of reasons for not accepting the theory of self-
defense, most if not all of which, in our opinion are plausible and valid. For instance, His Honor says, that if it were really true that the accused fired
the shots from his rifle at close range in an effort to defend himself from the attack by the two brothers, the wounds and the clothing of the victims
would have shown severe powder burns, especially in view of the many shots fired in rapid succession, and yet, as it turned out, the wounds bore no
powder burns, and the clothing of but one of the victims showed only slight powder burns, indicating that the shots were fired from a distance of
Page 88 of 258
about four meters or more as testified to by the witness Candido Borbe. Agrin, as observed by the trial court, the two Gonzales brothers who were
members of the Guerrilla and had later joined the Bicol Brigade organized upon the landing of the Americans in 1945, must have been familiar with
the nature, operation and effectiveness of modern automatic weapons, and they would not have dared attack the accused who was then armed with
Thompson Submachinegun, much less, persisted in the attack, unarmed as they were; and that instead, if they were really bent on assaulting the
accused, instead of punching him in the face and trying to wound him with a knife, as claimed by the defense, they would have first grabbed his
Thompson Submachinegun, either to disarm him or to prevent him from using the same.

When first investigated by Capt. Velarde the defendant told that officer that when he fell down after receiving the fist blow from Vivencio, he
immediately cocked his rifle and before he could stand up and from a semi-reclining position, he opened fire. Under such circumstances, and
because the two brothers were then both standing, the bullets would have taken a more or less oblique direction, that is to say, going upward.
However, the position of the wounds, especially those where the bullets entered and came out of the body showed a more or less horizontal or even
a downward trajectory of the slugs, thereby indicating that the rifle was held and aimed with the barrel in a horizontal or slightly downward position,
from which one may rightly conclude that the defendant was then standing when he fired the shots. Possibly realizing this turn in the evidence,
abandoning his previous statements on this point made to Capt. Velarde, he (defendant) testified during the trial that he began to fire his
maehinegun after he had gotten up from his fall to the ground and was already on his feet. This, of course, affects his credibility as a witness.
Moreover, the fan knife, Exhibit "2", which was supposedly used by Pedro Gonzales in attacking the defendant, was not proven by the defense to
have belonged to Pedro. On the contrary, his widow told the court that she had never seen her husband possessing or using said lower court, at the
time and place that the shooting took place, there were quite a number of bystanders or passersby, and yet the accused could not present anyone of
them as a witness to support his theory of self-defense. On the other hand, the prosecution presented Tomas Aureus and Candido Borbe, both of
whom appear to be disinterested witnesses, without any reason or motive for testifying falsely against appellant. It will be remembered that witness
Borbe assured the court that the accused shot down the two brothers deliberately and without any provocation or previous conversation, much less,
agression.

As to the motive or reason behind the crime, in the absence of direct evidence, we can only surmise, and hazard a possibility. Knowing the
desperate nature of the two brothers and that because of the arrest of Vivencio four nights before, and considering the threat that he had uttered, the
brothers had a score to settle with him, and perhaps suspecting that they might have been armed, rather than wait to be assaulted, he anticipated
their expected move, and, as it were, beat them to the attack. Of course in such a case, there can be no self-defense for the reason that there was
no previous aggression to repel.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court and we find that the guilt of the accused of the crime of murder, has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The killing is qualified with treachery, inasmuch as the shooting was sudden, and unexpected, and the victims were not in a
position to defend themselves, especially from a submachine-gun. The crime committed was therefore, that of murder. We also agree with the
Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be accorded the appellant. The presence of this mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same justifies the imposition of the penalty corresponding to murder, in its minimum
degree. As recommended by the Solicitor General the prison sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court upon the appellant in each
of these two cases is hereby reduced to an indeterminate sentence of not less than ten (10) years and one (1) day of prisidn mayor and not more
than seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Page 89 of 258
 [ G.R. No. L-33907, January 31, 1984 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,VS. NARCISO MARTINEZ Y RUBIA ALIAS NARDING, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, finding Narciso Martinez, alias Narding, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentencing him "to reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of the deceased Roberto Dorado y de Lara the sum of P12,000.00 for
the death of the latter, the sum of P6,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs."

The facts upon which conviction was based are, as summarized by the Solicitor General in the People's Brief, as follows:

"On December 21, 1969, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, one Asuncion Mendez of 2656 Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, was fetching water
from a faucet near her house, together with one named Aling Nelly (p. 3, Feb. 3, 1971). At that moment, there was a stabbing incident about seven
meters away. (p. 4, t.s.n., ibid). Around the place where the incident happened there were many Christmas lights, and it was near the lights of the
train. (p. 5, t.s.n., ibid).

That night, Asuncion saw the accused with some companions talking to the deceased. (p. 9, t.s.n., ibid). She heard the deceased saying 'Hindi ako,
hindi ako.' Immediately thereafter, Asuncion saw the accused put his arms around the shoulder of the deceased and twisted the arms of the latter to
the back. Later, the companions of the accused got a handkerchief and covered the mouth of the deceased. Then, she saw a man coming from
across the railroad track who drew a knife, causing Asuncion to exclaim, 'Naku po.' At that instant, she saw the man with a drawn knife stab the
deceased in the chest (pp. 10-11; p. 13, t.s.n., ibid), while the accused and his companions, who covered the mouth of the deceased, were holding
the latter (pp. 11-12, t.s.n., ibid.). Asuncion later saw the deceased slowly falling forward on the ground on his stomach. Afterwards, the accused and
his companions left the place and proceeded towards the direction where Asuncion was (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., ibid.) Asuncion and Aling Nelly also went
home. (pp. 15-16, t.s.n., ibid.).

Although a few hours after the incident the police were investigating the killing, Asuncion did not at once reveal to them that she saw the commission
of the crime, because she was afraid that she might be killed. (p. 34, t.s.n., ibid). That is the reason why it was only in January (should be June) 27,
1970, when she gave a written statement (Exhibit A) to the police. She also identified the accused in the Police Precinct as the one responsible for
the killing of the deceased (pp. 38-39, t.s.n., ibid.)."

The necropsy report showed that the victim died of "profuse hemorrhage and shock due to four stab wounds, two being fatal" (Exhibit "D").

The defense is alibi. Appellant claims that on the night of December 21, 1969 he was in the company of a group of carolers who met in the house of
school teacher, Wilhelmina Villanueva, at around 7:00 P.M. The meeting was preparatory to their caroling. Appellant was a leading member of the
group, being its soloist and guitarist. The group carolled in Manila and in Quezon City. Appellant claims that he never left the group which caroled
from past 7:00 p.m. to around 4:00 a.m. the following day; and that at around 9:00 p.m. that evening, they were in Quezon City.

Appellant's testimony was corroborated by his teacher Wilhelmina Villanueva. Vicenta Credo, a co-teacher of Wilhelmina, was about to be presented
as another witness but because her testimony was to have been merely corroborative, it was dispensed with.

Appellant also denied having killed the deceased contending that it was another man, whose identity and whereabouts are unknown, who stabbed
the victim.

The Trial Court disbelieved the witnesses for the defense and accepted the prosecution version as being more deserving of credence, hence, its
judgment of conviction.

The appeal hinges on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence to establish that appellant had, indeed, conspired with his companions to
murder Roberto Dorado.

We find for conspiracy. The rule is that there is conspiracy where the acts committed by the accused taken collectively, result from concerted and
associated action, although if each circumstance is considered separately, it might not show confederation. The circumstances that in themselves
are inconclusive, may, when taken as a whole, show apparently isolated acts springing from a common object and have in view the promotion of a
common purpose.[1] To establish conspiracy, proof of a previous agreement is not essential but it must be established by positive and conclusive
evidence. And conviction must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumption.[2]

Upon the criteria aforementioned, there can be no question that appellant's act in twisting the victim's arm from behind when the latter was stabbed
by appellant's companion, was a positive act towards the realization of a common criminal intent. It can be safely assumed that had not appellant
twisted the arm of the victim to the back, the latter could have parried the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By immobilizing the hand of the
victim and by the act of appellant's companion in covering the mouth of the deceased, apparently to prevent any attempt on the part of the victim to
call for help, the appellant and his companion showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing. The method by
which appellant twisted the arm of the deceased towards his (deceased's) back clearly prevented the latter from moving and defending himself, and
without which act the crime would not have been accomplished. This makes appellant a conspirator and a principal by indispensable cooperation. [3]

In the words of Asuncion Mendez, who witnessed the incident from a distance of seven (7) meters:

"Q: And after you heard that remark from the deceased 'Hindi ako, hindi ako,' what subsequently happened?
Page 90 of 258
"A: Accused Narding put his arms around the shoulders of the deceased.

"Q: Alright, and when this accused put his arm around the shoulders of the deceased, what happened?

"A: And afterwards, he twisted the deceased arm to the back.

"Q: And at this juncture, what happened next?

"A: The companion of Narding got a handkerchief and covered the mouth of the deceased.

"Q: Alright, and after that companion of the accused put handkerchief on the mouth of the deceased, what next happened?

"A: And then I saw a man coming from across the railroad track and draw a knife and I said 'Naku po' and I happened to sit down.

FISCAL BARBOSA: (CONT'D)

"Q: Which caused you to sit down?

"A: He stabbed the deceased.

FISCAL BARBOSA: (CONT'D)

"Q: At that particular moment that this man coming from across the railroad track did the stabbing, where was this accused and his companion who
placed a handkerchief in the mouth of the accused then?

"A: They were there and holding the deceased.

COURT:

"Q: And how was the accused Narding holding the deceased when the man made the thrust?

FISCAL BARBOSA:

Witness demonstrating the position of the hands at the back.

"Q: And how about the other one who place handkerchief on the mouth of the victim, what was he doing, if he was doing anything?

"A: He was there standing."

The testimony of a single witness, even it uncorroborated, is sufficient for conviction provided it is clear and convincing, as in this case. Asuncion
could not have been mistaken about appellant's identity as she was only about seven meters away besides the fact that appellant went towards her
direction as he left the crime scene.[4] Nor has any motive to fabricate the facts been attributed to her.

Her delay of several months in reporting the incident to the police does not affect her credibility, the reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information
in a criminal case being of common knowledge[5] besides the fact that she was in fear of her life.[6]

The non-presentation of the other eyewitness, Aling Nelly, does not detract from the prosecution evidence, the number of witnesses called to testify
being left largely to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officer.[7]

The accused's alibi is a weak defense not only because of the facility with which it is fabricated, but also because it is so easy for witnesses to get
confused as to the dates.[8] Thus, although the accused's teacher, Wilhelmina Villanueva, corroborated his testimony about his being a member of a
caroling group, considering that they caroled from December 15 to 23 of that year [9] , the likelihood of a confusion or mistake in dates is great.
Evidence that said witness could pinpoint the date with exactitude is wanting. Moreover, an alibi becomes worthless in the face of positive
identification by prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.[10] In this case, appellant was positively identified by eye-
witness Asuncion, whose testimony the Trial Court found to be natural and truthful, quick, frank and straightforward.

Further, to establish an alibi, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was at some other place when the crime was committed but it must likewise
be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at such time.[11] There was no showing of physical
impossibility for the accused to have been at the crime scene because he was then, according to him, at the Teacher's Village, Quezon City, an
easily negotiable distance from the crime scene.

Appellant's claim of lack of motive to commit the crime neither tilts the balance in his favor, motive not being essential to secure conviction[12] except
when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit[13] , which doubt is inexistent herein. The certifications in appellant's favor regarding his good
behavior during detention is more properly directed to the executive branch of government.

In fine, the judgment of conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.

Page 91 of 258
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, being in accordance with law and the evidence is hereby AFFIRMED, except as to the indemnity for
death, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00.[14]

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 92 of 258
 [ G.R. No. 59951, June 24, 1983 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO AQUINO ALIAS EDU, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Emilio Aquino appealed from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court at Dagupan City, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Primitivo Orines in the sum of P12,000 (Criminal Case No. 0518).

According to the evidence of the prosecution, at three o'clock or early in the morning of Good Friday, April 17, 1981, Emilio Aquino followed Primitivo
Orines, his wife Erlinda Dacasin Orines, his sister-in-law Flora Dacasin and his son Alfredo, all residents of Barangay Tebag, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, while they were walking on the road at Barangay Jimenez, Mapandan, Pangasinan for the purpose of hearing mass in the church of
Manaoag, Pangasinan on the occasion of the town fiesta.

Aquino, who was holding a long firearm, fired at Primitivo Orines who fell and died on the spot. Upon hearing the shot, Erlinda, Flora and Alfredo
looked back to find out who fired the shot. They saw Aquino with his firearm. Erlinda was only two arms' length from Primitivo when he was shot.
Erlinda embraced her husband. Aquino fired two more shots.

This caused Erlinda, Flora and Alfredo to hide in a nearby canal. Aquino approached the victim, divested him of his slippers, boots, belt and wallet
and then fled. The shooting was perpetrated on a moonlit night and in a place which was illuminated by an electric lamp. Erlinda and Alfredo were
acquainted with Aquino who was often seen in the house of Domingo Estayo at Barangay Tebag, about twenty meters away from Orines' house.

The killing was reported to the police. Aquino was arrested at around five o'clock on that same morning in his house at Barangay Lambayan. The
autopsy disclosed that there was a wound of entry in the back. A slug was embedded in the thoracic cavity. There were massive hemorrhages in the
lungs and heart (Exh. A).

Aquino, 43, pleaded an alibi. He declared that from ten o'clock in the evening of April 16 to five o'clock in the morning of April 17, 1981, he was in
Barangay Lambayan in the house of Tomas Pontaoe who died on April 15, 1981, attending the vigil together with Barangay Captain Cenon Aquino
and other barangay officials. Aquino happened to be a councilman of Barangay Lambayan, Mapandan. The house of Pontaoe was about two
kilometers from Barangay Jimenez where Orines was shot. His alibi was corroborated by Cenon Aquino, Saturnino Pontaoe and Henry Soria. A
paraffin test made on the accused on April 22 or five days after the killing showed negative results for nitrates (Exh. 3-A and 3-C).

The trial court rejected the alibi of the accused because he was sufficiently identified by the prosecution witnesses and because it would take less
than an hour on foot or about five minutes by vehicle to negotiate the distance between Barangay Jimenez, where the crime was committed, and the
house at Barangay Lambayan where the vigil was held.

Appellant Emilio Aquino contends in this appeal that the trial court erred (1) in disregarding the contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, (2) in not sustaining the clear, straightforward, impartial and convincing testimonies of the defense witnesses and (3) in not acquitting him
because of his innocence or at least on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Appellant raised the absence of motive. He made a minutiose scrutiny of the testimony of the victim's widow and son, eyewitnesses to the crime. He
detailed the discrepancies and improbabilities thereof.

However, all his contentions are sufficiently answered in the Solicitor General's brief. Also ably refuted by the Solicitor General are the asseverations
of the defense witnesses regarding Aquino's alibi and the supposed darkness of the place which rendered difficult the identification of the culprit.

It should be borne in mind that in less than two hours after the shooting, the police were at the scene of the crime, and the victim's widow, son and
sister-in-law, all eyewitnesses, gave their statements and pointed to Aquino as the gunwielder to the station commander. Aquino was immediately
arrested in his house notwithstanding his pretension that he had just come from a vigil for the dead.

Thus, the widow, Erlinda Dacasin, identified the accused about two hours after the shooting:

"9. Q. How did you come to know that Edu Aquino was the one who shot your husband?—A. I saw him shot my husband, sir.

"11. Q. How far were you from your husband when he was shot?—A. Two (2) full arms' length (depa), sir.

"12. Q. Were you walking side by side with your husband when he was shot?—A. My husband was walking in front of or ahead of us, sir.

"13. Q. Where did Edu Aquino, the man who shot your husband, came from if you know?—A. Edu Aquino came from the banana plants where he
hid, sir, and he was following us when he shot my husband." (Exh. B.)

The widow knows Aquino very well because he used to go to their house when he was still unmarried (No. 20, Exh. B).

The police blotter reads:

Page 93 of 258
"0430H—INP elements this Station led by Lt Emilio P Angeles, Stn Comdr, dispatched to Brgy Jimenez, this mplty to investigate a shooting incident
wherein one Primitivo Orines, a resident of Brgy Tebag, Sta Barbara this prove was gunned down while said victim was walking together with his
wife, son & a sister-in-law on their way to Manaoag this prov to hear mass for the Holy Week. Suspect Edu Aquino, a resident of Brgy Lambayan,
this mplty and one Domingo Estayo of Brgy Tebag, Sta Barbara this prov were apprehended for custodial inves. Case under inves." (Exh. E.)

Why did Aquino kill Orines, 39? Erlinda, the widow, surmised that Domingo Estayo, the compadre of Aquino, masterminded the killing of her
husband (Exh. B; 33-36 t.s.n., Oct. 6, 1981). Alfredo, the son, supposed that envy was the motive. The deceased was a cargador. He was also
engaged in the buy-and-sell of large cattle. He earned around one thousand pesos a month. (82 t.s.n. Nov. 11, 1981.) As the prosecution's evidence
shows, the immediate motive was robbery.

The crime actually committed is robbery with homicide since after the killing Aquino took the personal effects of Orines. As the crime charged is
murder, the trial court correctly convicted Aquino of murder only.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Page 94 of 258
 [ G.R. Nos. 63709-10, July 16, 1986 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JULIAN PERANTE, JR. AND ORLANDO OBIAS, ACCUSED, JULIAN PERANTE,
JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

Two separate informations for murder were filed against Julian Perante, Jr. and Orlando Obias in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. Only Perante
was tried because Obias was then at large.[1] The joint trial of the two cases resulted in the conviction of the accused-appellant and the imposition on
him of the death penalty.[2] The case is now before us on automatic review.

The facts as determined by the trial court are briefly as follows:

In the early morning of July 3, 1981, in Sitio Loctob, Leyte, while Aniano Roque, Romeo Roque and Mamerto Berian were sleeping in a small nipa
hut on the farm they were tilling, two men pounced upon them with bolos, killing Aniano instantly and inflicting mortal wounds on Romeo from which
he died about three hours later. Only Mamerto Berian survived the attack which he was later to recount in court.[3]

The killers, according to Berian, were Julian Perante, Jr. and Orlando Obias. They first attacked Romeo, who was sleeping near the door and was
probably awakened when they arrived. Julian delivered two stab thrusts and two hacking is blows and was followed by Obias. Perante then went to
the recumbent Aniano and also stabbed him, again to be followed by Obias. Berian, paralyzed at first with fear, was finally able to jump out of the
window and escape.[4]

On cross-examination, Berian declared that he could clearly see both accused because of the kerosene lamp hanging in the hut when Perante and
Obias attacked them.[5] He could plainly identify the assailants and easily recognized Perante because he had met him several times before when he
passed by their farm and sometimes asked for a light.[6]

Another witness, Felicitas Lariosa, testified that in the morning of July 3, 1981, she was awakened by her nephew, Romeo Roque, who was covered
with blood. When she asked him what had happened, he said he had been attacked by Julian Perante and Orlando Obias. Romeo Roque died
about three-and-a-half hours later shortly after he was taken to the hospital.[7]

Against the positive identification made by Berian and the corroboration of witness Lariosa, Perante offered the defense of alibi. According to him he
was in the morning of the tragedy in a place about two kilometers from the scene of the crime and did not learn about the killings until nine days later,
on July 12, 1981.[8] He was corroborated by his brother, Julius.[9]

Alibi is an inherently weak defense, more so when, as in this case, the accused is supported only by his own relative. Moreover, Perante was not
able to present clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to go to Sitio Loctob during that fatal morning and to return the
same morning to Bagong Silang where he claimed he had stayed until he woke up at about 6 o'clock.

"The rule is well-settled that an alibi cannot prosper unless clear and satisfactory evidence is presented that the accused was present at some other
place at the time the crime was allegedly committed and that from that place it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the
crime was committed either before or after the time he was at such other place (U.S. vs. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587; People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil.
601). Much less can it prevail when there is clear evidence regarding the evidence of the accused. (People vs. Masani, G.R. No. L-3973, Sept. 18,
1952; People vs. Binsol, 100 Phil. 713; People vs. Unlai, G.R. Nos. L-8866-70, January 23, 1957; People vs. Villaroya, 101 Phil. 1061; People vs.
Alcaraz, 103 Phil. 533)"

The defense also argues that Perante had no motive for the killings even if it were true, as asserted by the prosecution, that the accused had come
to steal the chickens and carabao in the farm. As these were outside the hut, Perante and Obias would not have found it necessary at all, assuming
they were the thieves, to kill the persons in the hut.[10]

Who can tell what goes on in the mind of the depraved person, when the bestial in him takes over his better nature and urges him to kill? Indeed,
the annals of crime are replete with mindless murders, of lives wantonly snuffed out by killers who had no reason at all to kill.

At any rate, motive is important only when the identity of the culprit is in doubt, and not when he is positively identified by a credible witness.[11] In the
instant case, Berian definitely pointed to Perante and Obias as the killers, and his testimony has not been satisfactorily refuted.[12]

The trial court found that the crimes committed were murder, qualified by treachery and with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. We agree.

"It has been repeatedly held by this Court that there exists the qualifying circumstance of treachery when one takes the life of a person who is
asleep" like Aniano Roque in this case.[13] As for Romeo Roque, who had just awakened when attacked, there was also treachery "because the
victim, who may still be dazed and unprepared for the attack, would not be in a position to offer any risk or danger of retaliation to the attacker." [14]

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is applicable because the hut in which the victims were attacked belonged to Juan Roque, who was the
father of Aniano Roque and the grandfather of Romeo Roque. They did not just happen to be there when they were killed but were actually
Page 95 of 258
supposed to be occupying the hut for the entire duration of their work in the field.[15]

The claim of minority and lack of sufficient intruction, not having been established, is rejected. However, for lack of the necessary votes, the death
penalties imposed by the court a quo are hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby modified and the accused-appellant sentenced to the penalty indicated in the preceding
paragraph for each of the two crimes of murder committed. The civil indemnity is increased to P30,000.00 each for the heirs of Aniano Roque and
Romeo Roque.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Page 96 of 258
 G.R. No. L-36858 June 20, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MACARIO A. ULEP, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

A man must love his wife. He must not lift a finger to hurt her. Indeed he must be her protector. When against this unwritten rule he beats her, he
ceases to be a man. He becomes a beast. And the law imposes the supreme penalty when in the process he kills her. It is parricide pure and simple.

This is what Macario A. Ulep, was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Second Judicial District. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs in a decision of March
20, 1973.

The facts are undisputed. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of
physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of Police of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health
Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and the husband of the
deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the daughter
of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference.

At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial. Accordingly, the police chief and Dr. Eliseo Bonoan, a
physician, caught up with the funeral Procession at the Catholic cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased.

The autopsy reports read as follows:

POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION

Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP

Age: 42

Nationality: Filipino

Address: No. 24, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

Date: May 25, 1970

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS

SKIN:

A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in color was noted on the upper half, anterior aspect of the
arm, left.

SKELETAL SYSTEM:

Complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs, left. The 4th and 5th ribs fractured along the midolavicular
line, left. The 6th and 7th ribs fractured along the anterior auxillary line, left. Presence of extravascated blood
and injuries of the surrounding tissues of the broken ribs areas, left.

Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the juncture of the rib and external cartillages with concomitant
injury to its sounding tissues and extravascated blood, right side.

THORACIC CAVITY:

Presence of about 200 cc. of a serous fluid found within the cavity.

Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:

Heart with small amount of clotted blood. Coronary vessels congested. The big blood vessels contained
small amount of clotted blood.

ABDOMINAL CAVITY:
Page 97 of 258
 Presence of about 500 cc. of serous fluid within the cavity.

DIGESTIVE SYSTEM:

Apparently normal

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:

The meningeal vessels were congested.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

CARDIAC ARREST

PRIMARY SHOCK.

(Exh. D, p. 16, rec.). 1

Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. A statement was prepared and signed by the accused and
was subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos Norte. In this statement, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted that he caused the
death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent words. The following day, PC sergeant Damian
Bautista of Camp Juan, Laoag City conducted another investigation of accused Macario Ulep. His statement was reduced to writing and then
subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. He reiterated that the cause of death of his wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his elbowing her on her breast. This
statement was marked Exhibit "B".

Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She vomitted and then went to bed, The accused then
left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. He reported this death to their barrio captain.

Despite these statements, (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt, Ulep retracted his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before
that, and while his wife went to have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast.
With the pain in her chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."

The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE
ELBOW BLOWS BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON HER BREAST, AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS AFFIDAVITS, EXHIBIT "A"
AND EXHIBIT "A-1," ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WHEN SUCH ADMISSION IS BUT A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO
A LONG STANDING PROCESS OR CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM, AS TESTIFIED TO BY DR. PEDRO BLANCO FOR
THE DEFENSE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.

Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo, the wife, of the accused. Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and
primary shock due to fractured ribs? The appellant alleges that the gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing illness of the body system
caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo.

The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. Eliseo V. Bonoan who conducted an autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile
deceased by a previous marriage. The husband who previously denied permission to conduct an autopsy was present when the autopsy was
performed shortly before the body was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan, the cause of death
was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary shock. We agree and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan.

The defense took exception to Dr. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the chest could have been caused by blows or physical pressure. Could
such injuries not have been inflicted by elbow blows when the victim was standing or by knee or feet blows when the victim was lying on her back or
was sitting with her back against the wall?

While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest of his wife immediately before her death and the prosecution
attributed these blows as the proximate cause of the cardiac arrest and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death, the defense assails this
theory of the prosecution in the following manner:

Page 98 of 258
 First, there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This indicates that the elbow blows were not of sufficient force to
fracture the ribs. This is so because a fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and it is the
extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion. 2 Dr. Blanco attributes the absence of swelling or contusion on the
chest, where the fractures were found, to the fact that the fracture conditions Were of long standing; that is, some repairs has
happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling to disappear (t.s.n., p. 180).

Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr. Bonoan were present, the same could have not caused
cardiac arrest and primary shock. This is so because only extravasated blood was present around the immediate area of the
fractures, This means that the fractures were not depressed or that the fractured ends did not cave-in, so as to injure the heart
and impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. The claim of Dr. Bonoan that the chest is pliant and is like an accordion which
can be compressed is puerile to say the least. Even so, the elbow blows of the accused could not have caused a compression of
the chest wall, no matter how pliant it could be. And even on the theory that the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a
piece of wood placed on the chest, while the victim was lying on her back, still the fractures could not have injured the heart or
impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest, because the fractures, were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. The
fractures merely caused the extravasation of blood within the fractured areas. And neither would the fractures cause primary
shock because they were merely complete fractures; which means a mere breakage that would not cause the stoppage of the
heart, because it does not tend to compress the heart. 3

And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points of fracture, the same could not have caused cardiac
arrest or primary shock because the lacerations were limited to the pleura. The points of fracture did not cave-in or were not
depressed and they did not injure or impede the heart to cause cardiac arrest. Neither did the lacerations of the pleura cause
primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura, which indicates that the hemorrhage was nil. This is so because the
serous fluid in the pleura -as not reddish.

On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased died of cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the
heart due to a long standing process or condition in her body system. Thus the theory of the defense is strengthened by the very
evidence of the prosecution. 4

Furthermore, both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. of serous fluid in the pleura. The appellant claims that it is not normal
whereas the prosecution says that the pleura normally contains 100 to 200 cc. of serous fluid and that this is normal. Anyway both agree that there
should be enough serous fluid to lubricate the tissues.

The presence of 500 cc. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which, according to Dr. Blanco, the physician, witness for the appellant, may be due
to the chronic condition of the kidney like nephritis and edema or the hardening of the liver or a long progressively weakening of the heart. 5 Dr.
Bonoan did not concur in this view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a result of the diffusion of the medicine used in the
embalming. 6 We find cogent basis in the explanation given by Dr. Bonoan.

Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted blood in the heart and blood vessels as well as the congestion of the
meningeal vessels. The appellant bares that this is a sign of the hardening of the heart. Dr. Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there were no
signs of circulatory weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the heart and such being the condition there could be no abnormality
and thus he further declares that such clots are normally found in the heart of a dead person or in any part of the circulatory system. 7

There is an admission by Dr. Blanco, the appellant's witness, that he has not "attended a case of fractured ribs" 8 and that he explains cardiac failure
as a "failing of the heart" and his further concept is that it is "the stopping of the heart." He says that such stoppage could be due to trauma, such as
a fracture of the ribs. 9

A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death of Asuncion Pablo on May 21, 1970. She was legally married to
Macario Ulep, the appellant herein. The death, established in two affidavits, Exhibits "A" and "B," was caused by said accused. In these affidavits,
the appellant admitted that he elbowed and attacked his wife. This attack caused the complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her left
chest and the 3rd, and 4th ribs, right chest of Asuncion Pablo on the same evening of May 21, 1970. The trial judge observed: "There was never any
attempt on the part of the accused to repudiate the sworn statements wherein he admitted that the cause of death of his wife was his having elbowed
her many times on her breast." 10

Having realized the gravity of his act, the appellant presented a witness to prove that sometime in February or March, 1969 his wife was pinned
down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a bullcart and was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said that two
(2) ribs on each side of the chest were fractured, without stating which particular ribs were so affected.

From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy report, the cause of death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest
and primary shock caused by the strong pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. This happens when one steps, kneels or presses the body
of a victim against a wall. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal results.

We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book, Medical Jurisprudence under the title of "SHOCK," to wit:

Sec. 225. Shock. — Death may also be due to the shock associated with the injury. The possibility of a person dying from the
shock attendant upon an injury which, by itself appears to be unimportant is attested by experience. No satisfactory explanation
of the cause of the shock seems to have been found, though it is due in some way to the upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of
the body. Shock from an injury may be fatal even when the blow leaves no trace behind it; as, for instance, when a person
receives a violent blow upon the pit of the stomach, or behind the ear, or to the larynx. ... In the case of Reg. v. Slane, et al., 11
the deceased had received injuries to the abdomen by kick and blows, but there were no marks of bruises present, or anything to

Page 99 of 258
 show the cause of death. Death however, had followed twenty minutes after the maltreatment and was evidently due to the
shock. The prisoners were convicted of murder. 12

We have previously stated that:

Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused
—

(a) is the efficient cause of death; or

(b) accelerated his death; or

(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability. 13

Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article
4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended."

Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the
spleen and peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with
the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully
inflicted. 14

We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death
and that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.

There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in human acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic
death.

The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to indemnity, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Page 100 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-35574, September 28, 1984 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CUEVAS, J.:

In an amended Information[1] filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of
PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day
y Pablo, with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y Pablo was
working as a security guard; and the said accused, having in her possession a bottle containing gasoline suddenly and without warning, poured the
contents on the person of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo suffered burns and
injuries which subsequently caused his death.

Contrary to law."[2]

Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and thereafter sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay costs.

From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which referred the appeal to us considering that the penalty
imposed was reclusion perpetua) assailing her aforesaid conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting her solely on the basis
of the alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that Pneumonia was a complication of the burns sustained by the victim; 3) in not finding her not
to have caused the death of the deceased; and 4) in not acquitting her at least on ground of reasonable doubt.

The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:

"On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then
working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo-worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she
placed in a coffee bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry at her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her
clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the
door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON"
(t.s.n., p. 14, id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim
(t.s.n., p. 14 id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame. (Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p. 197, Rec.)

The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she
admitted having burned the victim.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when
he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p. 208, rec.) due to 'Pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2° secondary'."[3]

Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus:

"It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when appellant returned from Olongapo City. She fed her grandson and put him to bed. After filling the tank with
water, she remembered that the next day was a Sunday and she had to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline with which to
clean them. Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station and bought ten centavos worth of gasoline. Then she
remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his place of work. (p. 13, ibid.)

Appellant saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing by the window. As the iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the
wooden door. Elias opened the door, but when he saw his wife he shouted at her. Appellant said that she had brought the gasoline which he needed
for his lighter, but Elias, who was under the influence of liquor, cursed her thus: 'PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON'. Elias continued shouting and
cursing even as appellant told him that she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted. Appellant trembled and became dizzy. She was
beside herself and did not know that she was sprinkling the gasoline on her husband's face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while.
Then she remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so she went home leaving her husband who was walking to and fro and not paying
attention to her (pp. 13-14, Ibid., p. 2, March 20, 1969)

She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to apologize to her husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA,
however, she found that police officers were present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when he saw her he chased her. A
policeman pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the wife of Elias. When she replied in the affirmative, the police officer accused her of burning
her husband. She denied the accusation. But the police took her to the headquarters, and prepared a written statement, Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant
was made to sign said statement upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it. Although she did not know the contents, she signed it
because of the promise. (pp. 14-16, Id.; p. 5, March 20, 1969)"[4]

Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; and (2)
whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.

Page 101 of 258

Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay City. She was thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo
Garcia of the Pasay City Police who took her statement in Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into writing.[5] After Sgt.
Garcia was through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal Paredes who asked her questions regarding the said statement and its
execution and before whom said statement was subscribed and sworn to by her. In that investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown
gasoline at her husband and thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement –

"T Ano ang nangyari ay iyong binusan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na si Elias Day?

S Dahil may sala siya, at sinonog niya ang aking mga damit, at may babae pa, at saka lahat ng aming pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.

T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo sa iyong asawa?

S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip kong buhusan ng gasolina, kaya ang aking ginawa ay bumili ako ng halagang 10
sentimos sa Esso Gasoline Station sa Taft Avenue at inilagay ko sa isang boti.

T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay makabili ng gasolina sa station ng Esso sa Taft Avenue dito sa Pasay City, ay ano ang ginawa mo?

S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya na pinaggoguardiahan sa Nawasa at pagdating ko ruon ay kumatok ako sa pintuan ng Nawasa, at nang marinig
niya ang aking katok sa pinto ay binuksan niya ang pintuan, at pagkabukas ng pintuan ay nakita niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako ay minura ng puta
putan Ina Mo, lalakak ka ng gabi, at namumuta raw ako, at pagkatapos na ako ay mamura ay hinahabol pa ako ng suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po
kinuha ko ang aking dalang bote na may gasolina at aking ibinuhos sa kanyang katawan, at aking kinuha ang posporo at aking sinindihang at
hangang magliyab ang suot niyang polo shirt, na may guhit na itim at puti.

T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa kanginang humigit kumulang na mag-iika alas 11:00 ng gabi Marzo 6, 1965?

S Opo, aking sinonog ang aking asawa." (Exhs. A & A-1- Italics supplied)

She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she did not understand its contents because she is not a
Tagala aside from having reached only the primary grades; and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely upon the promise of the
policemen that she will later be released.

We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as true. For the truth is that appellant knew and understood
Tagalog despite her not being a Tagala, having stayed in Manila since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning incident in question for which
she was investigated. During this period of almost fourteen years, she was in daily association with Tagalogs communicating with them in Pilipino.
This is clear from her admission on cross-examination which runs thus –

"Q But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you have been living here in Manila?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you speak Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q And you were well understood by these Tagalog people?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, you can understand Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q And you can also read Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q You can read?

A Yes, but I do not have interest to read." (TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).

All throughout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant was before Fiscal Paredes, before whom she subscribed and swore to the truth
of all what appeared in her statement,[6] no denunciation of any sort was made nor leveled by her against the police investigators. Neither was there
any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be released

Page 102 of 258

later. We therefore find her aforesaid claim highly incredible and a mere concoction. For why will the police still resort to such trickery when the very
sworn statement given by her proved by its contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact, almost all the recitals and narrations
appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations
contained therein. Moreover, We find said statement replete with details which could not have been possibly supplied by the police investigators who
have no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with her and the victim, especially with respect to the circumstances and incidents which
preceeded the fatal incident that brought about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's pronouncement that appellant's
sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully understood its contents; and that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto.

Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when taken without maltreatment or
intimidation[7] and may serve as a basis of the declarant's conviction.[8] It is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The burden of
proof is upon the person who gave the confession.[9] That presumption has not been overcome in the instant case.

Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn statement in assessing her guilt since it was given shortly
after the incident took place. By then, she had yet no time to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the aftermath consequences of ther
criminal design she must have been motivated by no other purpose except to admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took the witness
stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January 13, 1969……more than five years after the incident and
decidedly after she had the benefit of too many consultations.

That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she went to the latter's place of work on that fatal night and
intended all the consequences of her nefarious act finds clearer manifestation and added support in her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed
concern over the fate that had befallen the victim……her husband…..especially at times when he needed her most. Being the wife, she must be the
closest to him and the hardest hit by the mishap if she has not authored the same nor voluntarily participated therein. She was then reasonably
expected to come to his succor and alleviate him from his sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having seen her husband even once
while the latter lay seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and death. Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she ever present during the
wake while the victim's remains lay in state. That she was under detention does not excuse nor justify those glaring and significant omissions. For
she could have asked the court's permission for any of the enumerated undertakings which we believe would not have been denied. But she did not
even attempt.

Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more convinced of the falsity and incredibility of her assertions. For
instance, her claim that her purpose in buying gasoline at so an unholy hour of the night, past ten o'clock in the evening, solely for the purpose of
cleaning her shoes which she would wear in going to church the following Sunday, hardly recommend acceptance. That she dropped at her
husband's place of work also at the middle of the night for no other purpose except to deliver to him gasoline for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too
taxing upon one's credulity.... more so if we have to consider the previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning of that fatal day.

In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband died of pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as
shown by the toxicology report indicating presence of alcohol in the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband on fire, she is not criminally
liable for her husband's death.

We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination.

The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to exculpate the appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes,
pneumonia could not be caused by taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to produce an almost
comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a diminution of the oxygen content of the body.[10] In fine, as correctly pointed out by the
Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an efficient supervening cause of his death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four
days after the burning.

The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2° secondary. There is no question that the burns
sustained by the victim as shown by the post-mortem findings involved about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia
was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that
this could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having
developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.

Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

"Art. 4. Criminal Liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."

the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.[11]

The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL, 748,
751 is as follows -

"One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The
fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the deceased might have
recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound
and contributed to the death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The
principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held
to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to
Page 103 of 258
put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove
that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are themselves
consequences of the criminal act, must in law be deemed to have been among those which are in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he
must be responsible." The rule has its foundation on a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take
away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of medical men and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment."

In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the heirs of the deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00.
That should now be increased to P30,000.00

WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.

It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court recommends her for executive clemency. For the
purpose, let His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., on leave.

Page 104 of 258

 [ G. R. No. 34665, August 28, 1931 ]

THE PEOPLE OP THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DONATO BINDOY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

VILLAMOR, J.:

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First In- stance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged
against the accused is homicide, according to the following information:

"That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato
Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in
the chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code."

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.

The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of
Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife
called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so,
Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to
defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which "attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening* while Bindoy and Pacas were
struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's
hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind
Bindoy.

There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of
Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left
his house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were
nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he
hit Omamdam; he was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly
lawful.

The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying,
tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.

There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges that it was caused
accidentally and without malicious intent.

Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not
incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's
wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion.
The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as
we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas,
the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act,
since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.

The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for
the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment
when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind
him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die
of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve,'* adding further: "This wound was an
accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal
evidence adduced by the fiscal.

We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this
case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:

Page 105 of 258

"The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when
possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.

"In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of
evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act."

In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitle to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal
Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Page 106 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 9426, August 15, 1914 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FILOMENO MARASIGAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

MORELAND, J.:

In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while engaged in examining his sugar
crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused
and his wife to approach them.

On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" [indicating the division line between the lands of the two.] "Let us
make it straight."

Francisco replied, saying: "Why do you want to make the line straight? If you make the line straight, it will put certain logs and trees on your land."

To this the accused replied: "Those logs are there simply for the purpose of marking my land."

Francisco replied: "Why are you not satisfied with the line just as it was when we took possession of our respective lands?"

To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his knife and struck at Mendoza.

On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon Mendoza seized the accused by
the neck and the body and threw him down. While both were lying upon the ground the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. The
latter seized the hand which held the dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While they were thus, fighting for the possession of the knife,
the wife of the accused came forward and took the dagger from her husband's hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized Mendoza by the neck
and threw him from her husband, who after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless.

As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious, the extensor
tendon in one of the fingers having been severed. The wounds were cured in seven days at a cost of about P45, but the middle finger of the left hand
was rendered useless.

The story of the affair told by the accused is quite different from that just related, but the facts as stated were as found by the trial court and the
evidence given fully supports the findings. We have examined, the case carefully and see no reason why it should be reversed upon the facts. We
may say the same as to the law.

The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be given another opportunity to present evidence he would be
able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to have been rendered useless by the cut already described was
not necessarily a useless member, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal
condition. He also asserts that he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the middle finger that was disabled but the third
finger instead.

We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefulness
of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of
the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.

Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation. Mendoza is not
obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which
disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Page 107 of 258

 G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which
was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again
hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his
daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe
Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend
to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr.
Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal
examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier
accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other.
(p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS
Page 108 of 258
 1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo
Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected
to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central
Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were
closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the
ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is
criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition
and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he
was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

Page 109 of 258

 The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time
of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right
away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which
was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the
wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm
(tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with
tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4,
par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without
his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November,
1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound
had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp.
20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses
found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to
56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe
disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of
muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the
injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered
depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of
the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of
afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles
and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli
produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central
nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is
usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat
shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72
Page 110 of 258
 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle
of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This
incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People
v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila
Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp.
931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident,
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed
the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508,
Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It
does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still
be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of
the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage
of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and
to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other.
One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities
are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may
be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
Page 111 of 258
 imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable
by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct
a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on
the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was
based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined.
This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

Page 112 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIO GUILLEN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2764,
whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as
charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Simeon Varela (or Barrela) in the sum of
P2,000,00 and to pay the costs.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after
the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the
mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded
to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for a
period of about 8 days in the government Psychopathic Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should report their findings
accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the board of medical experts, presidedAby Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic
Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exh. "L"), under the heading "Formulation'and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:

"FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

"Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he
was not under observation.

" The motive behind, the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the Narco-synthesis. That the
narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only that Julio C. Guillen was telling us the
truth, but also did not reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

"Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to
differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.

"His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that
preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.

"On the other hand he is a man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this
ease, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.

"What is of some interest in the personalty of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but
sometime when an. employee in La Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Monzano, a Spaniard, one of the managers of the
factory because Mr. Monzano wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a
knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Uueno
was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.

"All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization about the
consequences of his acts.

"In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C Guillen is not insane "but is an individual with a personality defect which in
Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.

"Final Diagnosis
"Not insanes Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis."

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the
defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tried, as he was tried, for the offenses he committed
on the date in question.

THE FACTS

Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, We
find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal
case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:

Page 113 of 258

On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affiliated with any particular political group, had voted for the defeated
candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946, Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his
alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was
aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval
of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night of
March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, attended by a big crowd, President
Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on
a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousands of listeners of the advantages to be
gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought
of two hand grenades which were given him by an Anerican soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of
whiskey. He had'likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacanan, or following his intended victim in the
latter's trips to the provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.

On the morning of that date he went to the house of Amado Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exh. "B"), in accordance
with their previous understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-
parity" meeting held there. On account of its materiality in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English
translation (Exh. "B-2*) from its original in Tagalog reads:

"FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES

"I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights
pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.

"I did not expect to live long; I only had one life to spare. And had I expected to live much longer, had I had several lives to spare, I would not have
hesitated either to sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.

"Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their
deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.

"I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all thiss he had deceived the people, he had astounded them
with too many promises with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. .For
these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen millions souls. And why
should I not give up my life too if only for the good of those eighteen million souls.

"These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. It matters not if others will curse
me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in the performance of my said act.

"Hurrah for a free Philippines.

"Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
"May God pity on me.
"Amen.

"JULIO C. GUILLEN"

A copy (Exh. "B-1") of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in
the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exh. "B-1" appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.
TUfhen he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried
one of the hand grenades (Exh. "D"), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the
chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just
closed his speech, was being congratulated by .Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castaneda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and, without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the
platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group
of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the
grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela)—who died on the following day as a result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of
the grenade (Exhibits F and "F-1)—Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one of
the spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and-, after the explosion, ran away
towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Mirandai Suspecting that that person was the thrower of the object that exploded,
Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape.
Page 114 of 258
Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the
meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the
information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for
the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan
Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the
object which exploded and -whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.

During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same timeAried to justify his action in throwing
the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so-called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit
B which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.

Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the
presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to questions propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police,
who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the
declarations made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.

THE ISSUES

In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namelya first, "in
finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela;" second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder"; third,"in applying sub-section 1 of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon
the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the
commission of the crime."

The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen
attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew
fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the
persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed
by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated
that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some
people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the
President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other words, although it was not his
main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no compunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing
the President.

The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the
death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Ekailio Maglalang, and that he
should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the
penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order
that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither inalice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention
exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced." (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p. 7.) And, as was held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605).

The case of People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, cited by counsel for appellant does not support his ..contention. In that case the defendant, with
intent to kill his sweetheart, fired a shot from his revolver which hit not the intended victim but the latter»s niece, who was seriously wounded. The
defendant in that case contended that he was guilty only of unlawful discharge of firearms with injuries, but this Court held that the act having been
committed with intent to kill and with treachery, defendant was guilty of frustrated murder.

Squarely on the point raised by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:

"Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira
aquel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero, transcurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la
detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero: supuesta la i no intencion en A de
matar a C, y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de C de imprudencia temeraria?—La Sala de lo criminal de la
Audiencia de Granada lo estirad asi, y condeno al procesado a catorce años de reclusion por el homicidio y a un ano de prision correccional por la
imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de asesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con alevosia, es
evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutarla el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia temeraria, sino que
tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo dispuesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo
dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en la antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del

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Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de
18 de junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1.o de agosto.)" (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

"Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes.— When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."

We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The ease before us is clearly governed by the first clause
of article 49 because by a single act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave
felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become
aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into account when the person
whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby
commencing the commission of a felony by overt acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than
his owi spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted
and not frustrated murder.

In this connection, it should be stated that, although there is abundant proof that, in violation of the provisions of Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed
toyjards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at
him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the failure of the prosecution to insert in
the information the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain from making a finding to that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the
President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not
deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires
that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion tjgmgoraJL in its maximum
period to death. (Art. 248) . It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence
shall be executed in accordance mth Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the
trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.

MORAN C. J.:

Mr. Justice F. R. Feria voted for the affirmance of the judgment of the lower court, but, on account of his absence at the time of the promulgationn of
this opinion, his signature does not appear herein.

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 [ G.R. No. L-39519, November 21, 1991 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL PINTO, JR. AND NARCISO-BUENAFLOR, JR., DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

FERNAN, C.J.:

As an aftermath of the mission of the Legazpi City Police Department to serve on Christmas day in 1970 a search warrant on Francisco Bello who
was allegedly training a private army, patrolmen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then
Circuit Criminal Court in said city, of killing not only Bello but also 9-year-old Richard Tiongson and Rosalio Andes and seriously wounding Maria
Theresa Tiongson. The dispositive portion of the decision of June 13, 1974[1] reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Daniel Pinto, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of:

(a) MURDER in CCC-X-288-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to
indemnify the heir of Rosalio Andes in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;

(b) MURDER in CCC-X-289-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to
indemnify the heirs of Francisco Bello in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;

(c) MURDER in CCC-X-298-Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua);
to indemnify the heirs of Richard Tiongson in the amount of Twenty five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;

(d) FRUSTRATED MURDER in CCC-X-299 Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment of from Six (6) Years and One
(1) Day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum; to indemnify the victim, Maria
Theresa Tiongson, in the amount of Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs.

In addition to the foregoing the accused are sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office."

According to the prosecution, on December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police secured from the City Court of Legazpi a warrant for the search of the
house and premises of Francisco Bello in Mariawa, Legazpi City on the ground that the police had probable cause to believe that Bello illegally
possessed a garand rifle, a thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols.[2] The police had earlier undertaken a surveillance of Bello on the
basis of information it had received that he was conducting an "obstacle course" or training men for combat since October, 1970.[3]

Upon receipt of the search warrant, the Chief of Police, Dr. Solomon Adornado, [4] called his officers to a "confidential conference" at the residence of
Mayor Gregorio Imperial. Present at said conference were the mayor, his secretary, and the officers of the patrol division, secret service and the
administration of the city police. The Chief of Police was assisted by Major Alfredo Molo, head of the intelligence division of the city police, in briefing
the group on how to serve the search warrant and to arrest Bello as the latter had been identified as the one who shot Salustiano Botin the night
before. At the time of the briefing, no warrant of arrest had yet been issued against Bello.[5]

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The policemen were divided into three teams and around five members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who were also present were assigned to
the different teams.[6] Team 3 was placed under the charge of Sgt. Salvador de la Paz with a policeman named Luna and appellants Buenaflor and
Pinto as members. Wilfredo Romero was the PC member assigned to the team.[7] Except for Romero and Pinto who were each armed with a
carbine, the policemen of Team 3 each carried a .38 caliber pistol.[8]

Loaded in four vehicles, the three teams proceeded from the residence of the Mayor to barrio Homapon arriving there at around seven o'clock in the
evening. The four vehicles met at the junction of Homapon and the road to Mariawa. They had decided to ride on the way to Mariawa when one of
the jeeps bogged down because of the muddy road. Hence, the three teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the teams
maintaining a distance of around ten meters between them.[9]

Suddenly, Romero noticed the members of his team running. He ran with them and then he heard someone shout "Pondo!" (stop). The shout was
followed by a shot and then a burst of gunfire. The team had by then deployed to the right side of the road. When Romero checked the men by
shouting the agreed pass-word of "bayawas" for which the person challenged answered "santol",[10] he found that Buenaflor was 5 meters in front of
him "at the bank of the road", Pinto was two meters to the right of Buenaflor, Sgt. de la Paz was two meters to his (Romero's) right, Luna who was
holding a walkie-talkie was to his left and another policeman was in front of Luna.[11] When Romero heard the gunburst, he saw "flashes of fire" "just
in front" of him or from the place where Buenaflor was.[12]

The area where the team deployed was lower in elevation than the road but Romero heard the rumbling of a jeep going towards the direction of
Homapon when he heard the burst of gunfire and saw the flashes of fire from the direction of Buenaflor.[13]

On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix Capellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the driver.
They had just come from a lechonada party in the hacienda in Mariawa of Mrs. Purificacion Napal Anduiza, the mother of Francisco Bello. Fr.
Capellan had celebrated mass to commemorate the death anniversary of Mrs. Anduiza's father. When Fr. Capellan decided to go back to his parish,
the Anduizas offered their jeep for his transportation.[14] Seated on the front seat of the “McArthur type” jeep which had only a canvass top but no
cover on the sides and back,[15] were the driver, Mrs. Tiongson with a child on her lap and Fr. Capellan.[16] Richard Tiongson was seated on the steel
seat behind the driver while his sister Maria Theresa was beside him.[17] The three other children were also seated at the back.

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After crossing the creek on their way to Homapon and as the driver "changed to high gear with a dual",[18] Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some
300 yards ahead.[19] Fearing that there might be "people with bad intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Capellan told the driver to go faster.[20] Then Fr.
Capellan heard one shot and after a few seconds and around 50 meters ahead, there was rapid firing with some of the bullets hitting the jeep.[21]
According to Mrs. Tiongson, the widow of Col. Angel Tiongson of the PC, the rapid firing sounded "automatic".[22] The firing came from the left
rear side of the jeep.[23]

Before they were fired upon, Maria Theresa saw a man lying flat on his stomach while holding a gun on the left side of the road just ahead of the
jeep.[24] Through the light of the jeep, Maria Theresa noticed that the man was wearing a jacket and a hat and he was on the shoulder of the road. [25]
After passing the man, the rapid firing ensued. Richard said "ugh" and fell on the floor of the jeep. Maria Theresa was about to hold Richard when
she felt herself hit at the buttocks. Then they all screamed.[26]

The jeep continued its fast uphill climb until it reached a level area and almost fell into a ditch were it not for a clump of banana plants. The jeep
came to a full stop. Fr. Capellan saw three men with flashlights but he could not distinguish their faces as it was dark and their flashlights were
focused on the ground.[27] Mrs. Tiongson saw a PC jeep and some cars and, believing that one of the cars was that of the Mayor, she called Tia

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Citang, the mother of the mayor, at the same time identifying herself.[28] She must have managed to take Richard from the jeep and was cuddling him
on the ground near the left rear end of the jeep when she requested Fr. Capellan to administer extreme unction on Richard. As Fr. Capellan had no
holy oil, he gave the boy absolution.[29]

Even after Mrs. Tiongson had identified herself as the widow of Col. Tiongson to the men around, nobody listened to her appeal for help. When she
approached Chief of Police Adornado, she hit him and asked him why they shot her and her companions. The Chief of Police replied that the
shooting was no longer his fault because Mrs. Tiongson and her companions did not stop when told to do so. She requested the Chief of Police for
a car in which to take Richard to the hospital or for a driver and even for a walkie-talkie so she could talk to Mayor Imperial but the Chief of Police did
not heed her pleas.[30] (TSN, February 9, 1972, pp. 17-22).

A few minutes later, a jeep driven by Fernando Anduisa arrived. Mrs. Tiongson and her children boarded the jeep. At the intersection of the road to
Legazpi City proper and the road to Mariawa, the area was brightly lighted and armed men ordered them to put their hands up. They were told to
alight from the jeep to be searched but Mrs. Tiongson begged the lieutenant manning the area to let them pass so they could bring her two children
to the hospital.[31]

Richard and Maria Theresa were brought to the Sacred Heart Clinic in Legazpi City. Thirteen-year-old Maria Theresa was treated for a gunshot
wound at the "right upper quadrant of the right buttocks".[32] Her pelvis and abdomen were x-rayed. One of the x-ray plates[33] revealed an oval spot
indicating a foreign body in Maria Theresa's pelvis. The attending physician decided not to extract the foreign body as Maria Theresa was not a
"very good surgical risk".[34] The hospital charged P282.90 for Theresa's hospitalization.[35] She was later brought by an army plane to the PC Station
Hospital in Camp Crame, Quezon City for further treatment and hospitalization[36] but the foreign body was never removed from her pelvic area.

Richard sustained a gunshot wound at the back about the level of the 5th lumbar vertebrae. The bullet traveled obliquely to the left kidney, the
lesser sac, the liver and the right auricle.[37] Richard was operated at the hospital but he died at 8:45 the following morning due to massive

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hemorrhage caused by the gunshot wound.[38] When he was autopsied, a lead slug was found embedded in his heart.[39] His mother paid P862.35[40]
for his hospitalization and was charged P200 by the church. Mayor Imperial paid P500 to Funeraria Oro for Richard's burial.[41]

Meanwhile, according to Chief of Police Adornado, after the shooting incident involving the Tiongsons, the police pursued their mission to serve the
search warrant on Bello. When they reached Bello's residence in Mariawa, they were met by a "volley of fire." Suddenly, the house was lighted and
a certain Escober met him. Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the police searched the area and found a
Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition of a garand rifle, ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber pistol and 380 bullets for an
automatic pistol.[42] Thereafter, the Chief of Police declared the search terminated and the entire searching party left for headquarters. [43] The
following day, he issued Special Order No. 24 which states:

".December 26, 1970

"To All Concerned:

"The following men mentioned below are hereby assigned at Homapon until their mission is accomplished, effective as of today, December 26, 1970:

“1. Sgt. Salvador de la Paz, In-charge

“2. Pfc. Carlos Barbin, member

“3. Pat. Eduardo Arcinue, member

“4. Pat. Juan Luna, member

“5. Pat. Daniel Pinto, member

“6. Pat. Celedonio Abordo, member

“7. Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, member

"Report progress of mission any time of day through the radio system. For strict compliance.

(Sgd.)

SOLOMON B. ADORNADO

Chief of Police

"Copy furnished: The Honorable City Mayor, The Patrol Command, LCPD, the OIC and file." [44]

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The mission was to keep peace and order in the specified place and to determine the whereabouts of Bello.[45] It was not necessary to specify the
mission in the order itself because the Chief of Police "had a close understanding with the squad that went to Homapon".[46] For a "convenient tactical
deployment," Sgt. De la Paz further divided Team 3 into three groups with patrolmen Buenaflor and Pinto composing Group II.[47]

At noontime of December 26, 1991, Francisco Bello, more popularly known as Paquito, arrived at the residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando,
Talahib, Daraga, Albay. He was with Inocencia's brother, Francisco Andes, Francisco's son Ananias, and Leoncio Mostoles. Rosalio, another son
of Francisco, also arrived with the group.[48] Bello requested Inocencia and her husband that he and his group be allowed to spend the night in
Inocencia's house.[49]

Inocencia woke up at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of December 27, 1991. At the sala, on her way from her room to the kitchen, she saw Bello
sleeping alone. From the kitchen, Inocencia went to the balcony through the sala. On her way back to the kitchen, she noticed that Bello, who was
wearing a red shirt and an underwear, had awakened. Bello opened the window, spat out and went to the balcony. He reentered the sala and,
saying that it was cold, Bello put on his clothes and pants. He also wore his jacket. He went back to the balcony and asked for water. Inocencia's
husband gave Bello a glass of water. After gurgling, Bello placed the glass on the window sill and asked Inocencia's husband for a cup of coffee.[50]

Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was on the balcony facing
the copra kiln ("agonan") with his back towards the pili tree, gradually fell to the floor with his hands above his head. Then there was another burst of
gunfire. From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she later identified as Pinto, near
the pili tree which was around eight meters from where Bello was, and another man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs.[51]

Inocencia, with her two-year-old child in her arms,[52] was about to rush to Bello when her husband pulled her. Just then a man, whom Inocencia
identified as Buenaflor, came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and her husband and told them to lay flat on the floor. The man asked them
where the gun was. Inocencia told him that there was no gun in the house but then, when she looked around, she saw a long firearm with its muzzle
pointed upward leaning against the wall near the door around two meters from where Bello laid flat on his back. Bello himself had a gun but it was in
its holster tucked on his waist.[53] It was Buenaflor who took both the long firearm and the gun in Bello's holster.[54]

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When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio was dead.[55] Inocencia went near the pili tree where Rosalio's body was,
knelt down and asked the man with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The man answered that Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did not
notice any weapon near Rosalio's body.[56]

Bello's hands and feet were tied together and a bamboo pole was inserted between them so that two men, one of them being Francisco Andes,
could carry the cadaver.[57] Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds".[58] A former pilot and
28 years old at the time of his death, Bello sustained a gunshot wound at the left temple, an inch above the highest point of the pinna of the left ear.
The bullet which entered his head through the squamous temporal bone travelled towards the occipital region down to the floor of the left middle
cranial fosa until it reached the base of the tongue.

Bello had three gunshot wounds on his chest. One bullet entered the superior part of the right scapular area about the level of the third thoracic
vertebrae. The bullet travelled to the right inna in a slightly upward direction making its exit at the lateral part of the right supraclavicular fossa above
the clavicle. The second gunshot wound was at the left side inter-scapular area. The bullet travelled upwards and to the right fracturing the 7th rib,
entered the lower lobe of the left lung, punctured the pulmonary conus, went through the junction of the right auricular appendage and the right
auricle, the anteromedial side of the pericardium, grazed the medial surface of the middle lobe of the right lung and exited at the right side of the
chest. The third gunshot wound was below the right nipple. The bullet went to the chest cavity, the lower lobe of the right lung, the dome of the
diaphragm, the right lobe of the liver, the 8th thoracic vertebra and exited at the left of the midline at the inferior interscapular area.[59]

While Bello's corpse was being autopsied, a slug fell from his jacket. A bullet jacket and lead fragments were found at the base of his skull and a
slug was extracted from the floor of his mouth.[60]

Rosalio Andes, 23 years old, also died of shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet entered his right temporal area, macerated the brain,
fractured both parietal bones and exited at the left parietal bone. Another bullet entered the left interscapular area below the level of the 6th rib,
travelled to the dome of the left diaphragm, the left lobe of the liver, the pancreas, the small intestines, and the perineum below the ramus of the right
pubis. The slug was found at the gluteoperineal junction about 2 inches below the tip of the coccys and 2 1/2 inches above the gluteal line. A third
bullet entered the left knee and exited at the medial side of the leg. [61]

The slugs and parts of bullets which were extracted from the bodies of the victims were turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on
December 29, 1970 by Fiscal Aquilino Bonto for safekeeping purposes.[62] The empty shells and slugs which both the PC and the Legazpi City police
found in Talahib were also turned over to the NBI[63] in the same manner that the four empty carbine shells[64] found by the PC near the coconut tree

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a meter from the shoulder of the road to Mariawa were also turned over to the NBI.[65] Also submitted to the NBI for ballistic examination were twelve
Smith & Wesson caliber .38 revolvers, two Smith & Wesson "paltik" caliber .22, four Tell caliber .38 revolvers, one Bosque automatic pistol caliber
.380, four US carbine Inland rifles caliber .30, three US Springfield rifles caliber .30, one Thompson submachine gun caliber .45 and one Colt
automatic pistol caliber .45.[66]

Defendants Pinto and Buenaflor both denied having fired at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family.[67] Pinto, who admitted carrying a caliber .30
carbine during the incident,[68] testified that the shooting occurred because the Tiongsons' jeep "was going towards" them.[69]

According to Pinto, when they reached Mariawa, it was he who fired one shot in the air.[70] After the search had been conducted in Bello's premises,
Team 3 was instructed by a "superior officer" "to remain and maintain peace and order in (the) vicinity including Mariawa".[71] While he and Buenaflor
were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they "chanced upon a house" wherein Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of Bello's
bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the captives.[72]

At daybreak, Pinto saw Bello smoking at the porch. Buenaflor, who was behind him, called Bello. Then a single shot coming from the house rang
out. It was answered by a burst of fire which Pinto "presumed" came from Buenaflor. By reflex action, Pinto transferred from the pili tree to a nearby
coconut tree. But before he reached the coconut tree, he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the man was menacingly near
him, Pinto shot him.[73]

After a lull in the firing, he went up the house to look for Bellos' other companions. He saw the body of Bello on the porch and "near" it was a garand
which he took. He also got Bello's short firearm "from a holster." He turned over both the garand and the short firearm to Buenaflor. One of the
captured persons kicked Bello's body saying that if not for Bello, his son would not have been killed. Thereafter, the two dead person were carried
by the captured bodyguards to Mariawa.[74]

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In Mariawa, Pinto contacted (through the radio) police outpost No. 5 in Banquerohan and two jeeps arrived. When they reached the junction in
Homapon, Major Molo, who was with Fiscal Benito Se, told Pinto to go back with him to Talahib. Although Pinto warned Major Molo that it would be
dangerous to go back because one of Bello's men had escaped, they nevertheless proceeded to Talahib. With three other policemen, they arrived
there between eight and nine in the morning where they were instructed to "look for evidence specifically x x x for a thompson." He found in the
porch two shells and the others found a hat and a flashlight. Thereafter, they returned to Mariawa and later, to Legazpi City proper.[75]

On cross-examination, Pinto stated that he did not know that they found Bello in an area which was beyond the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. He
admitted that while they were instructed to patrol the area, they were also told to effect the arrest of Bello even if no complaint had been lodged
against him.[76] According to Pinto, of the fifteen bullets in the magazine of his carbine, only two remained. He fired "most" of the thirteen shots
during the "Bello incident".[77]

Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters. Rosalio was "face-to-face" with him when
Pinto shot him. As Rosalio did not fall from the first shot, Pinto continued shooting him.[78] When he went up the porch he saw the garand "lying on
the floor" but the gun tucked on Bello's waist was still in its holster.[79]

On the Tiongson incident, Pinto asserted that he did not fire his carbine.[80] When he saw the headlight of the Tiongsons' jeep, he also saw a
flashlight being waved. A little later, he heard a shout ordering the jeep to stop. Then he heard one shot and immediately after, the volley of fire as
the jeep was going towards his direction. As it passed by him, he heard the jeep's passengers shriek. [81]

For his part, Buenaflor declared that during the mission to serve the search warrant on Bello, he carried the ".38 caliber revolver Tel." (sic) which had
been issued to him by the Legazpi City Police Department. He did not fire his gun at the Tiongsons and, "as a matter of fact," he surrendered his
firearm for ballistic examination.[82] In the afternoon of December 26, however, Major Molo issued him a Thompson submachinegun.[83]

While patrolling Homapon, he and Pinto "chanced upon" some persons who told them that they could guide them to where Bello was. At the place
which they later found to be Talahib, they went near a pili tree from where they saw a house "below." Then he saw a man who turned out to be
Mostoles. Buenaflor apprehended Mostoles because the latter was Bello's bodyguard and he had a .22 caliber firearm with him. He came by
another man with a bolo, named "Banteque" and apprehended him also. Then, from behind the pili tree, Pinto appeared with yet another man. They

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waited for a while until another man, who turned out to be Francisco Andes, came within four meters of him. Buenaflor pointed his submachinegun
at him so Andes approached him. Buenaflor confiscated Andes' .22 caliber firearm.[84]

From the group, Buenaflor learned that Bello provided them with firearms and that Bello himself had a pistol tucked in his holster as well as a garand.
He and Pinto then tied the men to the pili tree. Later, he saw a person in the balcony of the house below and Buenaflor shouted twice: "Paquito,
mag-surrender ka!" Then Buenaflor heard "a shot coming from the direction of the balcony followed by successive shots." He sought cover behind
the pili tree and, while in a crouching position, fired his submachinegun towards the balcony. Pinto was then behind him. As Pinto shifted his
position while firing his carbine, Buenaflor went down to the "elevated portion going down to the nipa shack" until he was near the coconut tree.
There he found a person lying with his face down. He later found out that the person was the son of Francisco Andes. [85]

After the firing had stopped, Pinto told him that Bello was dead. Pinto then went up the house. Buenaflor went back to the pili tree, untied the four
persons they had captured, and told them to do something so they could carry the bodies of Bello and (Rosalio) Andes.[86]

Like Pinto, on cross-examination, Buenaflor also asserted that he did not fire his gun at the jeep carrying the Tiongsons.[87] While admitting that the
person who led them to Bello had told them that the latter was in Talahib, Buenaflor did not know that Talahib was a barrio of Daraga, Albay and not
of Legazpi City.[88] He reiterated that he shouted at Bello urging him to surrender[89] but he was not able to fire a warning shot or identify himself as a
member of the police force "because after the second shot there was already a burst of gunfire".[90]

Buenaflor affirmed that the first shot emanating from the balcony of the house in Talahib which was around fifteen meters from the pili tree, came
from a "high caliber firearm."[91] After they had found out that Bello was dead, Pinto went up the house. Later, Pinto gave him Bello's 380 automatic
pistol and garand.[92] Although he looked at those firearms, he did not determine whether they had been fired. [93] He noticed, however, that the
magazine of the garand was "intact".[94] Aside from Bello's fire-arms, Buenaflor and Pinto confiscated two .22 caliber revolvers and two bolos from
Bello's bodyguards.[95]

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Buenaflor stated that his Thompson submachinegun had two clips with each clip containing 30 bullets. When he gave back the firearm to Major
Molo, only four bullets were left of the one clip he had used.[96] He remembered having squeezed twice the trigger of his Thompson submachinegun
or automatic rifle in Talahib.[97] His service revolver was still with him then.[98]

As a result of this series of events, four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor. The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor
for the murder of Andes which was filed on July 26, 1971 reads:

"That on or about the 27th day of December, 1970, in sitio Ando, Barrio Talahib, Daraga, Albay and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, accused Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, Jr and Pat. Daniel Pinto,
Jr., and by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, SN-213436 and a US Carbine Inland, Cal. 30, SN-5099407, owned respectively by
said accused, shoot one Rosalio Andes, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds as described in the attached Autopsy Report marked as Annex "A" and
being made an integral part of this information, thereby causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to his instantaneous
death.

"Contrary to law."

The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor with having murdered Bello contains basically the same allegations as the above and it was filed on
the same date. On August 24, 1971 two other informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor: one for the murder of Richard Tiongson and
another for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson. On arraignment, Pinto and Buenaflor both pleaded not guilty to all the charges.

After trial, the trial court rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. For the killing of Bello and Andes, the trial court appreciated evident
premeditation as a qualifying circumstance and treachery, nighttime and use of public position as aggravating circumstances. For the incident
involving the Tiongson children, it considered the crimes as qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of public position.

Pinto and Buenaflor instituted the instant appeal praying for exoneration mainly on the basis of their claim that the killings were perpetrated in the
course of the performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors.

In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense
has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes an
incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code.[99]

Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved, originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant on Bello.
In the process, however, the appellants abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with only a
search warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other persons of their
lives.

While the defense presented proofs that Bello had a string of record in the police blotter for misdeeds ranging from taking the harvest of their
hacienda without the permission of his parents to assaulting his stepfather, and that he was "dangerous while under the influence of liquor",[100] there

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was no proof that he had been convicted of any offense or that he was a dangerous fugitive from justice which would warrant a "shoot-to-kill" order
from police authorities. Proof of bad moral character of the victim only establishes a probability that he committed a crime but it certainly cannot be
the reason for annihilating him nor may it prevail over facts proven showing that the same victim had been cold-bloodedly killed.[101] As such, the
suspicion that Bello was maintaining a private army was not a sufficient justification for his being rubbed out without due process of law.

The police theory that Bello authored the shooting of one Salustiano Botin on Christmas eve is neither a justification for his arrest without a warrant.
It should be observed that while the police had obtained a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms against Bello even on Christmas day
which was supposed to be a holiday, no such effort was made in securing a warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged frustrated killing of Botin. The
improbability of the defense evidence through the testimony of Botin himself that Bello had shot him in the evening of December 24, 1970 is
bolstered by the same testimony showing that while he was shot by Bello in the presence of the police force who were converging at the Junction of
Homapon and Mariawa, the same law enforcers were unable to arrest Bello. Besides the fact that no other eyewitness corroborated Botin's
testimony even in the face of his own admission that Bello had no reason to shoot him, no complaint was ever lodged against Bello for the alleged
shooting.[102]

On the other hand, the prosecution, through eyewitness Rogelio Escober, tried to establish that during said shooting incident, the police were looking
for Bello at the store of a certain Serrano.[103] Unable to find Bello, the police, specifically Pinto, mauled Escober while asking him to testify against
Bello for allegedly shooting Botin.[104] The police had focused their vehicles’ headlights near the bodega of ex-Mayor Los Baños in their effort to flush
out Bello who, unknown to the police, had earlier left the vicinity. It was when the police fired at the said bodega that Botin must have been
accidentally shot.[105] This story was uncorroborated but if true, would show the police's dangerous propensity for using otherwise official operations
in an unlawful manner.

A propensity for rash judgment was likewise amply shown at the incident involving the Tiongson children. Since the jeep coming towards them was
owned by the Anduizas, the appellants acted obviously in the belief that Bello was its passenger and posthaste they fired upon it even without any
reasonable inquiry as to the identity of its passengers.[106] Granting that the police indeed fired a warning shot, sound discretion and restraint dictated
that, there being no responding shots from its passengers after the alleged warning shot and considering the condition of the road which was not
only muddy but uphill, instead of directing aimless gunburst at the jeep, the most that they could have done was to render the jeep immobile by
shooting its tires. That way, they could have verified the identity of the passengers. 'As it were, they riddled the jeep with bullets injuring in the
process innocent passengers who were completely unaware of what they were up against.

Appellants' stark denial of firing their guns upon the Tiongson family falls flat in the face of various circumstantial evidence which point to their
culpability. There is the unflinching testimony of Sgt. Romero that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction of Buenaflor as the jeep bearing the
Tiongsons passed by. Said testimony was corroborated by that of Rafael Jacob, the PC member of team 2, that while no one in his team fired his
gun, the "sporadic firing" came from team 3 after the first burst of fire which occurred while the jeep was "abreast of team 2".[107] Even defense
witness Mariano Rico, a policeman who led team 1, was "sure" that he heard gunshots at the moment when "the jeep had just passed team 2".[108]

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Then there are the four empty .30 caliber carbine shells which were found near the coconut tree where, according to Romero, Pinto was deployed.
While he himself carried a carbine, Romero did not fire it and his testimony was never contradicted. When the four empty shells were compared with
the test shells which were fired from the US carbine, caliber .30 Inland Division, SN-5099407, which, according to the aforequoted information
charging appellants with having killed Andes, was used by Pinto, they were found to have "significant similar individual characteristics".[109]

While it is true that the ballistic report reveals that the lead bullet taken from the body of Richard was fired from a Smith & Wesson type firearm[110]
and Buenaflor was proven to be carrying a .38 caliber Tell revolver, the findings of expert witnesses or, in this case, the ballistic report pointing to
another kind of caliber .38 weapon as the source of Richard's wound only serves as a guide for the courts after considering all the facts of the
case.[111] The undisputed fact is that Buenaflor was specifically pointed by Romero as the one who fired his firearm as the Anduiza jeep bearing the
Tiongsons passed by. Inasmuch as no evidence that Romero would prevaricate to pin responsibility on Buenaflor was ever presented, there is,
therefore, no reason to discredit his testimony.[112]

In addition to all these, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established. Such motive provided circumstantial evidence
leading to the inference that indeed he fires his gun.[113] According to the unrebutted testimony of Rogelio Escober, an overseer of the Napal
hacienda and constant companion of Bello, on November 1, 1970, Buenaflor and another policeman named Santos Urbina, Jr. borrowed Bello's jeep
on the pretext that they needed it to transfer Moscoso, the suspect in the Perez killing, to the Albay Police Headquarters. When it was returned, the
jeep had bloodstains. Bello and Escober later learned from a PC officer that the jeep had been used in dumping in Guinobatan the body of
Moscoso. Confronted by the PC officer, Bello admitted that the jeep was borrowed by Buenaflor and Urbina and agreed to execute a sworn
statement on the matter. Consequently, the PC authorities notified Mayor Imperial of the solution of the Moscoso killing.

Three days later, Escober and Bello met Urbina who warned Bello, "Kit, if you want to give your statement, just say that I borrowed your jeep for
thirty minutes. This is a brotherly advice because something might happen to you." Bello retorted that he would do what was right and that was to
tell the truth. Urbina said that it was up to Bello but he repeated that he was giving Bello a brotherly warning that something might happen to him[114]
(TSN, August 23, 1973, pp. 4-20). These facts were of course denied by Buenaflor. However, as between the positive declaration of a prosecution
witness and the negative denial of the accused, the former deserves more credence.[115]

All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in defiance of their superior
officer's order only "to find the whereabouts" of Bello[116] and to desist from using their weapons "without clearance from the Chief of Police".[117]

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Since there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[118]

The fact that the victims were different from the one the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or mistake in
the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this conclusion is
the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) -- without checking carefully the latter's identity -- as to place
himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously.[119] Neither may the fact that the accused made a
mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered a mitigating circumstance. [120]

It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in the
presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy with each other. [121] Prior agreement between the appellants to kill their
intended victim is not essential to prove conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design.[122] In this
case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by the fact that only the two of them fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons
passed by. This they did in defiance of the order of their superior not to shoot unless ordered to do so. Conspiracy having been proved, the guilt or
culpability is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees.[123]

The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was shown by the manner by which they killed
the two. In this incident, however, they invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their claim.

Under Article 11 (1) of the Rules of Court, an accused must prove the presence of all the following elements of said exempting circumstance: (a)
unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[124] The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.[125]

In this case, Buenaflor insists that he fired at Bello because, after calling out to him to surrender, his shout was answered by a gunshot. Pinto
corroborates his story but the principal prosecution eyewitness in this incident, Inocencia Malbas, swears that she heard no such shout to surrender
nor a gunshot from Bello's direction before Bello was fired upon by the appellants. Physical evidence as well as the testimonies of Buenaflor himself
and Pinto show that Inocencia, and not the appellants, was telling the truth.

Rafael Señora, the NBI agent who went to Talahib and the road to Mariawa to investigate as well as to take pictures, found no bullet marks at the
crime scene which would pertain to a .22 caliber "paltik" firearm which Bello's men allegedly used.[126] As no other "paltik" firearms were recovered

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from the crime scene other than the two which Buenaflor confiscated from Mostoles and Francisco Andes, the possibility of said firearms or one of its
kind having been used by Bello's men against the appellant particularly the one who escaped is nil.

Buenaflor claimed that the shot after his call to Bello belonged to a high-powered gun[127] obviously referring to the firearms recovered from Bello
himself. According to Buenaflor, however, when he found the rifle, its magazine was "intact" and he did not manipulate the rifle to know how many of
its bullets had been used.[128] Moreover, if Bello indeed fired a gun, it must be the firearm in his holster and not the garand which was found a couple
of meters from where Bello had fallen. That Bello did not fire any of his two firearms is buttressed by Pinto's own testimony that Bello was smoking
with his back towards them when he was shot at and that at that moment, he did not see Bello holding a gun.[129] We cannot help, therefore, but
conclude that the defense claim that Buenaflor's call to Bello was answered by a gunshot is but a figment of their imagination designed for their own
exoneration.

Appellants' claim of unlawful aggression on the part of Bello or his men would have been clarified had any of Bello's men whom they had captured
been presented in court. These men, Leoncio Mostoles, Franciso Andes, Domingo Bantigue and Ananias Andes had executed statements before
the Legazpi City police to the effect that they heard Buenaflor's call for Bello to surrender and that Bello fired his gun at the appellants. However, all
four of them later executed statements before the NBI retracting said earlier statements in view of the fact that the police had threatened them to
make the statements favorable to the appellants.[130]

As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his
statement alone. Even Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes attack Pinto.[131] Inocencia swore that she did not see any weapon near
the fallen Rosalio. Indeed, if the aggression did occur, Pinto would not have lost time in presenting in court the bolo which Andes threatened to use
on him. But granting that Rosalio had a bolo, Pinto was not justified in inflicting the wounds sustained by Rosalio because a mere threatening
attitude of the victim will not constitute unlawful aggression. [132] Moreover, Pinto's testimony that Rosalio menacingly approached him with a bolo
after Buenaflor had released a gunburst directed at the house where Bello was, is contrary to human behavior if not totally ridiculous. On the
contrary, by his own admission, Pinto continued firing until he saw Rosalio fell.

An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not only on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if weak, the prosecution evidence gains more credibility. [133] Unfortunately, in this case, inspite of the
fact that the prosecution had only one eyewitness to the killing of Bello and Andes, the appellants had not presented sufficiently strong evidence to
shore up their claim of self-defense.

We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the commission of all four crimes in this case. The killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello
and Rosalio Andes as well as the wounding of Maria Theresa Tiongson were all so sudden that all of them were left defenseless. This is shown not
only by the testimonial evidence of the commission of the crimes but also by the nature and location of the wounds of all the victims.[134] The
presence of treachery qualifies the killings to murder and the wounding of Maria Theresa to frustrated murder. Nighttime, however, may not be
appreciated as there is no proof that it was specifically sought in the commission of the crime and therefore we deem it absorbed by treachery.

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Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case but we find that the appellants indeed took advantage of their
public position in perpetrating the crime. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. There being no mitigating circumstance to temper the penalty and there being only the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of their public office under Article 14 (1) of the said Code, the proper penalty is death. [135] However, in view of the constitutional abolition
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellants for each of the three murders they committed.

For the wounding of Maria Theresa, the penalty imposable, applying Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium. There being no reason to further lower the penalty by one degree pursuant to the provision of Article 250, and there being one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[136] the proper penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa is six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum. The indemnity of eight thousand
pesos imposed by the lower court should be respected considering that while there is evidence as to the actual amount she spent while confined at
the Sacred Heart Hospital in Legazpi City, there is no proof as to the expenses she incurred after she was transferred to the Camp Crame Hospital in
Quezon City.

As in all cases wherein peace officers are accused, this case creates a feeling of frustration in everyone. The crimes committed here ought to have
no place in this democratic and civilized society. True it is that a police officer is sometimes left in a quandary when faced with a situation where a
decisive but legal action is needed. But, as this Court said in Calderon vs. People and Court of Appeals (96 Phil. 216, 225 [1954]), "(t)he judgment
and discretion of public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the
spirit and purpose of the law." Police officers must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society
must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. In the words of then Justice Moran in the Oanis case (Supra):

"It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal ‘must be taken by storm’ without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere
trifle in the hands of officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation – not condonation - should be the rule;
otherwise we would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the modifications that appellants shall solidarily be liable for the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three murders they committed and, for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correcional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant Daniel Pinto, Jr. had been a police officer for only five months [137] when the crimes were committed, let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Office of the President for whatever action may be proper to temper his penalty. [138]

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but agree with J. Bidin in the result.
Bidin, J., in the result.

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 [ G.R. No. 38773, December 19, 1933 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.

DECISION

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

The judgment appealed from finds the appellant Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and
sentences him to eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.

The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living children, has been suffering from partial paralysis for some
time, walks dragging one leg and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of
paralysis. One of his daughters named Maria and another, are married, while still another one is a nun. With the exception of the other married
daughter and the nun, alt of them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend for support.

Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about
the end of the year 1928. It was then that the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. The relations
between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the
deceased had gone to such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong,
when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.

Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it
brought upon his family but also because the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some time the
appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by
marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he
never complied with his promise.

The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the deceased worked and asked leave of the manager
thereof to speak to Osma. They both went downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that occasion the
appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his death.

After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his
daughter and that, upon hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude, the deceased
tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the
movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.

The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased. We find that this conclusion is
supported by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent
scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because
then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his
letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant in
stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not
have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.

Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased as well as those of his having
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in
favor of the appellant.

Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and
commenced the aggression by whipping out and brandishing his penknife.

The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where the crime committed is different
from that intended by the accused, should be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been interpreted as
applicable only in cases where the crime committed befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and
June 28, 1899), which is not the case herein.

The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal.
In view of the concurrence therein of three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is,
prision mayor, should be imposed.

Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of
prision correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the costs. So
ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.

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 G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (ALIAS FRANCISCO
CAGURO, ALIAS FRANCISCO ADMONES, ALIAS BUCOY, ALIAS FRISCO GUY), DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

VICKERS, J.:

The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of asesinato, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without any just cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery, assault and attack one Yu Lon by suddenly
giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head, under conditions which intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment
of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as a
consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were
necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon.

After hearing the evidence, Judge Luis P. Torres found the defendant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu Lon in the sum of P1,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Appellant's attorney de oficio makes the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in finding that the appellant the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon, the victim to the crime charged in the
information.

2. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon (a fact which we specifically deny), the trial court erred
in finding that the appellant struck his supposed victim.

3. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon, and that the appellant did strike his supposed victim
(facts which we specifically deny) the trial court erred in finding that the blow was dealt from the victim's rear.

4. The trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellant was fully established.

5. Assuming that the four preceding errors assigned are without merit, the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of
murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of convicting him of the crime of maltreatment, under article 266 of the said
Code.

It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the
corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to
the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his
father, the man that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with
his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the
sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through San Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and then lost sight of
him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were walking along Calle Mestizos, saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon's
assailant. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem examination was made the
next day by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region,
and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor in the left kidney.

Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police, and about 3 o'clock the next morning Sergeant Sol Cruz and other detectives, accompanied by
Yu Yee, went to the scene of the crime and found blood stains in the street. Yu Yee said that he could recognize his father's assailant, and described
him as being about five feet in height, 25 or 30 years old, with long hair and wearing a suit of dark clothes. After Sergeant Sol Cruz had been working
on the case for three or four days he received information that the accused might be the person that had assaulted Yu Lon, and on August 4th the
accused was arrested by detectives Manrique and Bustamante. He was wearing a dark wool suit. Yu Yee was immediately called to the police
station. The accused was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven persons that had been detained for investigation. They were wearing
different kinds of clothes. Yu Yee without hesitation pointed out the defendant as the person that had assaulted Yu Lon. He identified him not only by
his long hair combed towards the back and worn long on the sides in the form of side-whiskers (patillas), but also by his high cheek-bones and the
fact that his ears have no lobes. The defendant was identified at the trial not only by Yu Yee, but also by Chin Sam and Yee Fung.

With respect to the first four assignment of error, which raise questions of fact as to the identification of the accused, and whether or not be struck
the deceased, and if he did assault the deceased, whether he did so in a treacherous manner, we see no sufficient reason, after considering the
evidence and arguments of counsel, to doubt the correctness of the findings of the trial judge. The accused was identified by Yu Yee and two other
Chinese, and although Yu Yee may have overstated at the trial some of the facial peculiarities in the defendant that he claimed to have observed at
the time of the incident, it must be remembered that Yu Yee without hesitation picked the defendant out of a group of eleven persons as his father's
assailant, and that he had exceptional opportunities for observing his father's assailant, because while that person was walking back and forth
behind Yu Lon, Yu Yee was facing the assailant.

Page 134 of 258

We find the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses as to the whereabouts of the defendant on the night in question unworthy of
credit.1awphil.net

The testimony of the three Chinese that a man struck the deceased and then ran away is corroborated by the testimony of a 15-year old boy,
Dominador Sales.

As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been struck on the back of the head, the expert testimony shows that
in such a case a person instinctively makes an effort to preserve or regain his balance, and that as result thereof the deceased may have fallen
backwards. Another consideration is that sidewalks almost invariably slope towards the pavement, and this being true, when the deceased
straightened up, he naturally tended to fall backwards. The evidence leaves no room for doubt that the accused struck the deceased on the back of
the head, because when the deceased was assaulted he and Yu Yee were standing on the sidewalk, facing each other, and if the accused had not
struck the deceased on the back of the head, it would have been necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee. Since the accused
struck the deceased from behind and without warning, he acted with treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." (Article 14, No. 16, of the Revised Penal Code.)

The fourth assignment of error is a repetition of the first.

In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead of murder.

Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from
that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U.S.
vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14 U.S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil., 344.)

In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the fact
that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; that where death result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that
the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility;
that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one
does not intend to produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is taken
into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96.)

The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon.
There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact
that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating
circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22).

The next question is whether the crime committed by the defendant should be classified as homicide or murder. Can the defendant be convicted of
murder when he did not intend to kill the deceased?

We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct
consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner. he
would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with
treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no incompatibility, moral or legal, between alevosia and the mitigating circumstance of not having
intended to cause so great an injury:

Considering that there is no moral or legal incompatibility between treachery and the mitigating circumstance No. 3 of article 9 of the Penal
Code, because the former depends upon the manner of execution of the crime and the latter upon the tendency of the will towards a
definite purpose, and therefore there is no obstacle, in case treacherous means, modes or forms are employed, to the appreciation of the
first of said circumstances and simultaneously of the second if the injury produced exceeds the limits intended by the accused; and for that
reason it cannot be held in the instant case that this mitigating circumstances excludes treachery, or that the accused, being chargeable
with the death of the offended party, should not be liable due to the voluntary presence of treachery in the act perpetrated, although with
mitigation corresponding to the disparity between the act intended and the act consummated, etc. (Decision of May 10, 1905, Gazette of
April 20, 906; Viada: 5th edition, Vol. 2, p. 156.)

In the case of the United States vs. Candelaria (2 Phil., 104), this court speaking through Chief Justice Arellano said:

In trying Jacinto to a tree the three defendants acted treacherously (alevosamente). Whether it was to prevent him from making resistance,
whether it was to torture him for the purpose of making him give information, or whether it was for the purpose of inflicting further
punishment, the fact is that by this means the defendants secured themselves against any risk which might have arisen from an attempt at
self-defense on the part of the victim. We are of opinion that they had no intention to cause so great an evil as that which resulted, but this
does not neutralize that other qualifying circumstance of the resulting death, because if there was no alevosia for the purpose of killing
there was alevosia for the purpose of the illtreating. The means employed were not made use of for the precise purpose of making certain
the death of Jacinto de Jesus but as a safe means of illtreating him without risk to the persons who were doing so. If by this means the ill
treatment was aggravated, it follows that it is a qualifying circumstances in the death which resulted. It was not a condition of the purpose,
but it was a condition of the criminal act itself, in whatever sense this be taken.
Page 135 of 258
The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, and there being present in this
case one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to seventeen years, four months, and one day
of reclusion temporal. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

Page 136 of 258

 G.R. No. 138645. January 16, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. WILBERT CABAREO, Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Treachery is appreciated when it is shown that an assailant deliberately and consciously adopted a means of attack without risk to himself. In the
present case, it was not shown that the attack had been deliberately adopted, or that it had entailed no risk to appellant.

The Case

Wilbert Cabareo appeals the November 23, 1998 Judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 48852, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated January 20, 1998, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Portia T. Cabalum charged appellant as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of December, 1997, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and by means of
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Nerio Casaquite with the firearm which the accused was then provided, hitting
the victim on the back portion of his body which caused his death.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon his arraignment on February 27, 1998, 3 appellant, assisted by Atty. Manuel Casumpang, pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court
a quo rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being sufficient and satisfactory proof shown to establish the guilt of the accused, Wilbert Cabareo alias
Bebot, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with which he stands charged, he is therefore hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with such accessory penalties as provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code and, moreover, to indemnify the family of the
victim [in] the amount of P50,000.00 as well as reimburse the family [in] the amount of P89,000.00 for the expenses [for] the wake and burial of the
victim, and [to] pay the cost.4

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, 5 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the following narration of facts:

December 13, 1997, [was] the barangay fiesta of Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo (TSN, April 24, 1998, p. 4). At around 9:00 [o]n the evening of the same
day of festivities, a disco was going on near the house of Barangay Chairman Aurelio Catedrilla (Ibid., pp. 5-6). Suddenly, there was a commotion
near the store that was located a few arms length away from the venue of the disco (Ibid., p. 7). It involved a certain Pestilo and the younger brother
of a certain Manolo (Ibid., pp. 8-9). The younger brother of Manolo splashed beer on Pestilo (Ibid., p. 9). Then, Aurelio Catedrilla went to the place
where the trouble was to pacify them (Ibid., pp. 9-10). He was followed by Nerio Casaquite (Ibid.). When Aurelio Catedrilla reached the place, Wilbert
Cabareo, alias Bebot, shot him at the back with a 10 inch long firearm (Ibid., pp. 10 and 12). However, instead of the bullet hitting Aurelio Catedrilla,
it hit the back of Nerio Casaquite (Ibid., p. 12). Wilbert Cabareo was about two arms length away from them when he pulled the trigger (Ibid., p. 11).

Nerio Casaquite fell to the ground, while Wilbert Cabareo fled from the scene (Ibid., p. 13). The barangay tanod came to Nerio Casaquites aid and
brought him to the hospital (Ibid.).

However, Nerio Casaquite later succumbed to the gunshot wound he sustained (Ibid., pp. 23-25).6

Version of the Defense

Denying the charge against him, appellant narrates the facts in the following manner: 7cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 12 and 13, 1997, Barangay Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo, was celebrating its Barangay Fiesta. As additional come ons to liven the
celebration, a disco dance was held every night from December 12 to 13, 1997 near the house of the incumbent [b]arangay [c]aptain, Aurelio
Catedrilla.

On December 13, 1997 at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, while the disco dance was in progress, a certain Tayok Estiba and Pablo Sanchez were
having a drinking spree at the nearby store about two (2) armslength [sic] from the discohan, probably as a sign of having reconciled after their
quarrel the night before December 12, 1997, which was successfully pacified by Nerio Casaquite and Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla. At that
particular time, accused-appellant while passing by the store towards the discohan was invited by Pablo Sanchez and Tayok Estiva and [he] obliged
himself to join in their drinking spree. Thereafter, Pablo Sanchez and Tayok Estiva being drunk again quarreled with each other. As before, Nerio
Casaquite came to pacify them[;] however, this time, the protagonists would not listen to him. Consequently, he requested the [b]arangay [t]anod
present to fetch the [b]arangay [c]aptain, Aurelio Catedrilla to help him in pacifying the quarelling Pablo Sanchez and Tayok Estiva. A few minutes
later, Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla arrived with his tanods and a military man. Immediately, the said military man hit Tayok Estiva with the butt
of his armalite rifle, forcing Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla to admonish him not to hurt Tayok Estiva being his grand nephew. In obedience, the

Page 137 of 258

said military man now turned his ire against Pablo Sanchez. To prevent the latter from being further hurt by the military man, Nerio Casaquite now
ushered Pablo Sanchez out of the store and persuaded him to go home.

Meanwhile, Tayok Estiva, not yet fully assua[ged] of his anger against Pablo Sanchez, was seen grappling with his uncle, Barangay Captain Aurelio
Catedrilla, for possession and control of a 12 gauge shot gun inside the store and in the presence of accused-appellant. While thus in that situation,
the gun accidentally fired[,] hitting Nerio Casaquite at his back causing his death. Afterwards Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla told his grand
nephew, Tayok Estiva, to leave the place. When he finally left the scene of the accident, accused-appellant followed and also went home.

The next morning, Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla was arrested at his house as the primary suspect in the shooting and killing of Nerio
Casaquite on the night of December 13, 1997. Despite the said arrest of Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla being duly witnessed by his cousin,
guest Absalon Lego, however, the latter never told the arresting police authorities that it was accused-appellant who actually shot Nerio Casaquite. It
was only 3 days later, and while Barangay Captain Aurelio was already jailed, when Absalon Lego, who was fetched from his house by the younger
brother of the Barangay Captain, conveniently executed a sworn statement inculpating accused-appellant as the one who really shot Nerio
Casaquite on the night of December 13, 1997. As a result, accused-appellant, Wilbert Cabareo was arrested on December 19, 1997. Despite his
protestation, however, the arresting police dismissed his claim of innocence, without even giving him the benefit of the doubt, in fairness and in the
interest of law and justice [which] the police were sworn to uphold and protect.

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision, the trial court found the testimony of the prosecution witness, Absalon Lego, to be positive and straightforward, hence persuasive and
credible. 8 Lego, who personally knew appellant, positively identified him as the shooter. Moreover, the witness had a good view of the incident
because he was only a few meters away from the locus criminis, which was well-lighted at the time.

The trial court also rejected appellants claim that Tayok Estiva was the killer. It held that this defense was improbable because the person in front of
Estiva was Aurelio Catedrilla, not the deceased. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery.

Hence, this appeal. 9

Issues

In his Brief, appellant cites the following alleged errors:

The lower court erred in finding the defense of accused-appellant that it was Tayok Estiva who fired the gun that hit Nerio Casaquite, highly
improbable.

II

The lower court likewise erred in finding the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness, Absalon Lego, sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.10cräläwvirtualibräry

In the main, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness. The Court, in addition, will also determine the character of the crime
and the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted of homicide, not murder.

Main Issue:

Credibility of Lone Eyewitness

The defense assails the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Absalom Lego, claiming that he was outside the store where the incident
occurred. Moreover, his attention was focused on the nearby disco, not on the store, thus rendering his account highly improbable. Moreover, when
he saw the police arrest Catedrilla, the former did not readily point to appellant as the malefactor. It was only three days later that he came forward,
stating that he had seen what happened and that appellant had fired the fatal shot.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that particularly falls within the authority of the trial
court, as it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand. For this reason, appellate courts accord its factual findings
and assessments of witnesses with great weight and even finality, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance. 11cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, the trial court, which had the opportunity to hear and examine the testimony of the lone prosecution eyewitness, was convinced of his
credibility. Eyewitness Lego narrated that he was only a few meters away from the incident and positively stated that it was appellant who had fired
the shot that killed the victim:

Q Where [was] this Aurelio going followed by Nerio Casaquite?

Page 138 of 258
A He was intending to pacify the trouble.

Q Was he able to go where the trouble was?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when he reached the place what did Aurelio Catedrilla do?

A He was shot by Bebot.

Q When you said Bebot are you referring to the accused in this case Wilbert Cabareo?

A Yes, sir.

xxx

Q When Bebot shot Aurelio who was hit?

A Nong Nerio Casaquite was hit.

Q And what was Nerio Casaquite doing when he was hit?

A He had his back towards the accused also.

COURT:

Q How many times did the accused shoot Aurelio?

A One time.

Q What kind of weapon did he use?

A A 12 gauge gun.

Q How long [was] that gun which he used in shooting Nerio?

A Like this.

xxx

COURT:

Q So, there was no exchange of words between Nerio and the accused when the gun was fired?

A No, there was none.

Q And what happened to Nerio when you said he was shot?

A He fell to the ground.

Q Right there at the place where he was shot?

A He was about to walk back first before he fell to the ground.

Q How far [was] that place where he fell [from] the place where he was shot?

A About one (1) arms length.

xxx

PROS. GEDUSPAN:

Q How about Wilbert Cabareo alias Bebot, what did he do after he shot Aurelio?

A He fled.

Page 139 of 258

Q And what happened to Nerio Casaquite after he fell down?

A The Barangay Tanods came to Nerios aid.

Q Where did they bring Nerio Casaquite?

A To the hospital.

Q How about you, what did you do?

A I also fled.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, Lego had a clear view of the incident, which happened in a sufficiently illuminated area.

Q So, the place where the trouble ensued was two (2) armslength [sic] away from you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was that place near the store or near the dance hall?

A It was near the store and near the disco place.

Q What about the place where the commotion took place, was that lighted?

A Lighted.

Q What kind of light?

A It was lighted by an electric bulb.

Q Where was that bulb placed in relation to the store?

A It was inside the store.

Indeed, appellant has given us no sufficient reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial court. Futile is his claim that Lego, whose attention
ought to have been focused on the disco instead, could not have witnessed the shooting incident. First, Lego had a clear view of the store because it
was only a few meters away and was open on three sides, having only one wall at the back. Second, it was natural for him to look in that direction,
because of the commotion that had occurred prior to the actual shooting and the arrival of Catedrilla with three companions, one of whom had a long
firearm. In fact, Legos attention would have been focused on the store, because Catedrilla even hit one Pablo Sanchez with the butt of a firearm.

That Lego reported to the authorities what he had seen only after a delay of three days is of no moment. In People v. Lapay, 13 this Court ruled that a
witness non-disclosure to police authorities of appellants identity immediately after the occurrence of a crime is not entirely against human
experience. Delay in revealing the names of malefactors does not, by itself, impair the credibility of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. 14 In
this case, Lego readily admitted that he was afraid to report to the authorities. His failure to specify the object of his fear 15 did not make his testimony
less credible.

Estiva Not the Shooter

Appellant further claims that it was Estiva who shot the victim and that the RTC erred in rejecting this claim. Allegedly, the trial court merely stated
that said defense was highly improbable because it was not the victim who should have been hit. Rather, it should have been Catedrilla, being
directly in front of Estiva who was allegedly grappling for possession of the gun at the time.

It must be pointed out that the conviction of appellant was based primarily on the testimony of Prosecution Witness Lego, who had positively
identified the former. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of all the witnesses, gave credence to Legos
testimony and rejected appellants claim. Its ruling on this point is clear and unassailable.

Crime and Punishment

Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 4. Criminal Liability. --- Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

In the present case, appellant is responsible for the death of Nerio Casaquite, even if the formers intended target when he fired the gun was
supposedly Catedrillo. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the actual victim be different from the one intended. 16
As held in US v. Diana 17 decided by the Court as early as 1915, [t]he same crime would have been committed if the injured man and the deceased
Page 140 of 258
had been Dionisio Legara, instead of the defendants nephew, x x x; the crime of homicide would have been committed just the same and one man
would have been deprived of his life by the criminal act of another.

Treachery

The trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. 18 It failed to explain, however, the basis of said ruling. Indeed, the proven facts do not
adequately establish the presence of this qualifying circumstance.

Treachery is present when the means, method or form of execution gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. It must
be proven that such means, method or form of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted without danger to the accused. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant fired at the back of the victim. It was not able to show, however, that appellant had deliberately
adopted the attack, considering that it was executed during a commotion and as a result of it. Moreover, it could not be said that the attack was
without risk to himself, because the victim was then in the company of three other persons, all of whom were alert and one was even armed. Indeed,
the Court has held thus: 20

x x x. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the
deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or
retaliate. This circumstance can only be applied, according to the tenor of Article 13, Sub-section 16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit
employs means, methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at the same time to
eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the other party might offer. In United States vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926, it was held
that the circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to
raise a homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the
perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself.

Well-settled is the rule that a qualifying circumstance must be established as clearly as the elements of a crime. 21 In this case, treachery was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Absent any other qualifying circumstance, appellant should therefore be convicted only of homicide, 22 not murder.

Civil Liability

We affirm the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto, which is granted without need of proof other than the commission of a crime. 23 Likewise,
the trial court correctly awarded the sum of P89,000 as actual damages, which we find to be supported by evidence.

WHEREFORE , the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide and SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The award
of civil indemnities is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur .

Page 141 of 258

 C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants. AVELINA JAURIGUE,
appellant.

DE JOYA, J.:

Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue
was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years,
four months and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also
credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.

From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on
June 10, 1944, claimed —

(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be
completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;

(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and

(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of having
been committed in a sacred place.

The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the following facts:

That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo,
Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the
former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a
handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.

On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly
refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered
girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she informed her mother
about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.

On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and surreptitiously entered the room where she
was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and
brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her
father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that
Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the
following morning. Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue
was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.

In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of having taken
liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that
Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which
he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the
altar with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were electric
lights.

Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious
services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the
presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word,
Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct
of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which
she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches
deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards
the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him
Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who
was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala
sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might
retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and
windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That father and daughter went home and locked themselves up,
following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house,
at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit
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B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as
already stated above, and went with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which were presented
as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.

The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It has been entertained and has existed in
all civilized communities.

A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And they are the
future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make
use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and upheld
this view.

On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a country where women
freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.

In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right to property acquired
by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor
cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay
kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became
the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare,
62 Phil., 504). .

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased
grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without
revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength
alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended
in his death, since she had no other means of defending herself, and consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil.,
344).

And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo which she happened to be carrying at
the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated
place, while she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22
Phil., 249).

In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and, believing that some person was
attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held
that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using
deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a
deadly assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could
be considered as an attempt against her honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..

In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house late at night on September 15, 1942,
and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely
shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above..

According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant
and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent,
the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father
and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches
deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..

But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel,
admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject
to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had
acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce
passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs.
Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).

Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife,
as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in
her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).

The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the defendant and appellant, with the
aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to
show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She

Page 143 of 258

happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of
religious hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.

The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first assignment of error to a
certain degree.

In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the
circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but
with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69
of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United
States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..

The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed
in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its
medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and
appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal
penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment,
and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..

Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Page 144 of 258

 [ G.R. Nos. 137481-83 & 138455, March 07, 2001 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CONRADO SALADINO Y DINGLE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

CONRADO SALADINO y Dingle was convicted of three (3) counts of rape and one (1) attempted rape and sentenced to death.[1] He is now with us
on automatic review.

Lourdes Relevo is the niece of accused-appellant Conrado Saladino. Her mother and Conrado's wife Rosita are sisters. Lourdes calls him Kuya
Conrad. The parents of Lourdes live in Balayan, Batangas.

Sometime in 1995 Lourdes, then thirteen (13) years old, was sent by her parents to Manila to live with Conrado and Rosita Saladino in Pasig City
because her own parents could not afford to send her to school. Rosita was a factory worker while Conrado was a money-changer in a bus terminal.
Rosita, whom Lourdes called Ate Rose, gave the young girl weekly allowance; in turn, she helped out in the household chores.

The Saladinos lived in a small two-storey house in 126-D Pastor Compound, Rosario, Pasig City, along with the spouses Zaldy and Corazon Cedeño
and their three (3) children, Estrella, Elizabeth and Evelyn, together with three (3) boarders whom Lourdes only knew as Tita, Liza and Glenda.
There were three (3) rooms separated only by curtains. Conrado, Rosita and Lourdes slept in a small cramped room - the couple on a bed and
Lourdes on a mattress on the floor.

Sometime in September 1995 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening while Lourdes was lying on her mattress resting and feeling sick, Conrado woke
her up and asked her to transfer to the bed as she might catch cold. Rosita was already dressed up because she was working in the 10:00 o'clock
PM to 6:00 o'clock AM shift. Conrado conducted Rosita to the jeepney stop and returned to their room about fifteen (15) minutes later. He laid down
beside Lourdes. About twenty-five (25) minutes later, he started fondling her breasts. He poked a kitchen knife at her waist and threatened to kill her
if she shouted. He dropped the knife, pinned down Lourdes' hands to her belly, and removed her shorts and panty with his hand that was free. He
then removed his own shorts and underwear, went on top of Lourdes, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. [2] Lourdes struggled and Conrado's
penis slipped out several times, but he re-inserted it everytime and resumed his bestial movements for about fifty (50) minutes according to Lourdes.
When she finally succeeded in pushing him away, he warned her not to tell anyone or else he would kill her.

Lourdes confided the sexual assault to Rosita. But Rosita refused to believe her and even said that her husband was not capable of doing such a
dastardly act. Lourdes also told Corazon Cedeño who reacted by asking the Saladinos to leave the house. It took the Saladinos almost a year to find
a house.

Meanwhile, Lourdes slept in the room of Corazon and Zaldy. The Saladino couple finally transferred to 101-B Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Rosario,
Pasig City, leaving behind Lourdes with the Cedeños. But Lourdes did not tell her mother, who was in Batangas, about the rape.

After some time, Rosita invited Lourdes to live with them in their new house. Rosita assured her that the incident would not happen again because
they had a boarder. Wanting to finish her schooling and in need of money, Lourdes relented and moved in with the Saladinos again.

Despite Rosita's assurances, things did not turn out well for Lourdes. On 17 December 1996 at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, while Lourdes was
sleeping in the living room, Conrado again held her at knifepoint and threatened her into silence. He removed her shorts and panties, then his own
shorts and underwear and had forced intercourse with her. Again, she cried and struggled but her efforts were in vain.

Lourdes told Rosita about the new incident but Rosita, as in the past, refused to believe her. She turned to Corazon who advised her to wait for her
mother, who was spending Christmas in Manila, before going to the police. When Lourdes and Rosita went to Batangas to fetch Lourdes' mother
Elena Relevo, the complaining witness could not summon enough courage to tell her mother about the rape. Elena stayed in Pasig City for eleven
(11) days after which, on 28 December 1996, she, Lourdes, Rosita and Conrado went to Batangas to celebrate New Year's Eve.

On 1 January 1997 Lourdes, Conrado and Rosita returned to Manila. The following day at 7:00 o'clock in the morning Conrado again raped Lourdes
at knifepoint. On 3 January 1997 at about the same time the day before, he again poked a knife at her and proceeded to remove her shorts and
panties and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. This time, when Lourdes saw him let go of the knife, she freed herself from his grasp and
kicked him. Then she ran to the bathroom and stayed there until he left the house.

Lourdes packed her clothes and went to Corazon Cedeños' house. Finally, she gathered enough strength to tell her mother about the sexual abuses,
which prompted Elena to fetch her and take her home to Batangas.

Elena had Lourdes examined by a doctor, who confirmed that Lourdes was no longer a virgin. They then filed a case with the Pasig City Prosecutor's
office. Lourdes underwent another physical examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. The examination by Dr. Romeo Salen,
Medico-Legal Officer, revealed that Lourdes had deep healed lacerations at 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions. Dr. Salen concluded that
Lourdes was already in a non-virgin state physically.[3]

Four (4) Informations for rape were filed against Conrado Saladino for the incidents in September 1995, on 17 December 1996, 2 January 1997 and
3 January 1997. All four (4) Informations similarly alleged that on the dates indicated accused-appellant with lewd design and by means of force had
sexual intercourse with Lourdes Relevo y Mendoza, against her will and consent.

Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant Conrado Saladino claimed that on the night of the alleged first rape, he was drunk. After taking his wife
to the jeepney stop, he went back to his room where he saw Lourdes lying on bed. He then laid beside her. Being in an amorous mood, he started
fondling her breasts. According to him, he was not met with any resistance. Emboldened, he proceeded to kiss her lips, breasts and private parts. He
then took off both their undergarments and went on top of her. He attempted to insert his penis into her vagina but since he was drunk, he failed to
Page 145 of 258
achieve an erection. According to him, Lourdes was fully aware of what was happening yet did not show any reaction.

Conrado also testified that the reason they left the old house was because they did not have any privacy since the rooms were separated only by
curtains that were fastened together only by safety pins. Also, Corazon and Rosita had a misunderstanding over Rosita's jewelry that disappeared.
After some time, Lourdes and one of the boarders in the old house, Glenda Andrade, followed them to their new house. He tried to avoid any
intimate contact with Lourdes but he noticed that she was seducing him, parang tinutukso niya ako.[4] Unable to resist, he gave in to fondling her at
least once a week,[5] then kissed her everyday before going to work. But he did not have sex with her because he was afraid she would get pregnant.
He also testified that Lourdes would get angry every time he refused to insert his penis into her vagina.

The trial court found accused-appellant Conrado Saladino guilty of rape in Crim. Cases Nos. 112410-H, 112411-H and 112412-H. Taking into
account the qualifying circumstance of the minority of the victim and her relationship to accused-appellant, the lower court meted Conrado Saladino
three (3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. He was also sentenced to pay the private complainant P150,000.000 as indemnity, and P90,000.00
as moral damages. The trial court also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 112413-H and sentenced him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, and to pay the offended party P50,000.00 in civil indemnity and P30,000.00 for moral damages.

The complaining witness and accused-appellant presented conflicting versions. Lourdes Relevo, on one hand, told a harrowing account of a young
girl's life utterly destroyed because of the satyrical urges of a man who was entrusted with her life and future. Accused-appellant, on the other hand,
painted a tale of consensual sex between an unwilling but weak male adult and a young temptress.

Which of the two (2) conflicting narrations of what transpired between the parties deserves greater weight and better entitled to full credence, is the
crux of this controversy. Indeed, this matter involves the assessment of credibility, a task best left to the trial court, which had the advantage of
observing the witnesses directly, picking up on the subtle nuances of human behavior, and the emphasis, gesture and inflection of voice; and, of
testing their credibility by their demeanor on the stand.[6] We have often said that we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.

In giving credence to the testimony of the private complainant, the lower court said -
The testimony of the Private Complainant, Lourdes Relevo, was candid, straightforward and firm. She testified with spontaneity, only interrupted
when she was overcome with emotion. She cried when asked to recall details of the incidents when the Accused assaulted her virtue. She remained
steadfast and firm in her declarations notwithstanding humiliation and embarrassment, especially when, upon cross examination, she was asked to
narrate the lurid details of the sexual acts committed upon her. On the witness stand, she pointed an accusing finger at the Accused, her uncle, and
in an avenging tone, reaffirmed her accusations against him.[7]
In contrast, the lower court observed that accused-appellant appeared evasive, answered in a low voice, which was hardly audible. It also pointed
out that Conrado appeared uncertain when he admitted that he touched the breasts, kissed the lips and private parts of the private complainant and
laid on top of her, insinuating that she consented to this sexual activity. This led the trial court to conclude that accused-appellant "did not have the
demeanor of a man unjustly accused of a serious offense."[8]

Such observations do not portend well for accused-appellant. In reviewing with utmost scrutiny the records of this case, we fail to see any reason to
disturb the findings of the court a quo. The emotion displayed by private complainant thoroughly convinced the trial court that her testimony was
genuine. Even the transcripts of her direct and cross examinations would point to no other conclusion. In her testimony, she revealed sordid details
of the assault with such clarity and lucidity that could only come from the victim of the malevolent act. When asked questions designed to elicit
conflicting answers, she stood her ground and answered the questions in the manner of a person with nothing to tell but the truth.

Indeed, it is highly unlikely for a young girl like Lourdes to falsely accuse an uncle of a heinous crime, undergo a medical examination of her private
parts, subject herself to the humiliation of a public trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation, unless motivated by a potent desire to seek
justice for the wrong committed against her.[9] In the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the
accused, her testimony deserves credence.[10]

On the other hand, accused-appellant's perverted version of the "sweetheart theory" is uncorroborated, self-serving and deserves scant
consideration from the Court. Save for his own declaration, accused-appellant was unable to present anything else to prove that carnal knowledge
between him and Lourdes was consensual. Indeed, this Court finds it unlikely that a young girl like Lourdes would consent to have sexual relations
with a person she calls Kuya and more than ten (10) years her senior, and an uncle-in-law in fact. There is no evidence on record that she is a
pervert, nymphomaniac, temptress or in any other condition that may justify such a theory.

Contrary to accused appellant's assertions, the long delay in the filing of the charges is not an indication of false accusation, since the delay was
satisfactorily explained. After the first incident, Lourdes confided to her aunt Rosita and to Corazon; however they refused to do anything. Faced with
two (2) prior rejections, it is understandable for a young girl like Lourdes to remain silent rather than endure the humiliating experience of being
rebuffed once again by disbelieving adults.

It has also been held that there is no standard form of behavior when people, particularly young girls, are confronted by shocking and frightful
incidents such as rape.[11] A thirteen (13)-year old girl who kept silent about being raped and becoming pregnant as a result thereof, is not
necessarily lying. It would not have been easy to speak of such a humiliating occurrence. Besides, Lourdes also feared for her life and that of her
family. Her assessment of the threatened risk caused by accused-appellant might have been overestimated, but considering her youth and
inexperience, this fact alone does not render her testimony unreliable.

One cannot expect a thirteen (13)-year old girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence
to disregard a threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been forcibly sexually assaulted. [12]

Accused-appellant assails the lower court in concluding that he used force and intimidation. He insists that "the resistance of a woman in rape must
be tenacious and manifest. A mere verbal objection unaccompanied by physical resistance may amount to consent."[13] He asserts that since there
was no showing that he ever covered the mouth of the victim during the alleged rape, her failure to shout for help to the other house occupants was
an indication that the intercourse was consensual. He also posits that if indeed Lourdes was raped, she would not have agreed to transfer to the
Page 146 of 258
house of the person who abused her.

We do not agree. According to Lourdes, accused-appellant poked a knife at her waist while threatening to kill her and her aunt if she resisted. That
act of accused-appellant was more than sufficient to subdue the victim and cow her into silence, because of the imminent danger not only to her life
but to her aunt as well. Under the circumstances, her failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the
criminal acts of the accused-appellant.[14] Also, we have held in People v. Grefiel[15] that "(i)ntimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear --
fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as
when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident."

It might be that to the depraved mind of accused-appellant, the lack of resistance or shouting on the part of his poor victim was a sign of consent,
nay, even enjoyment. But in the crime of rape, what is given paramount consideration is the state of mind of the victim and not that of the perpetrator.
From the point of view of the victim, the knife aimed at her waist was a real threat to her life. Her failure to shout or offer resistance was not because
she consented to the deed but because she honestly believed she would be killed if she shouted or resisted. Such threat is sufficient intimidation as
contemplated by our jurisprudence on rape. And be that as it may, if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation,
then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation in the sexual act voluntary.[16]

Lourdes' transferring to the new residence of accused-appellant despite the rape does not affect her credibility. It was established that she depended
on accused-appellant and his wife Rosita for support. Her return to the house of Conrado after she was raped was out of necessity. If she did not do
so, she would not have been able to continue her schooling in Manila. Besides, she was assured by accused-appellant's wife, her very own aunt,
that the incident would not happen again.

In an attempt to discredit the private complainant, accused-appellant pointed out supposed "inconsistencies" in her testimony, to wit: (a) Every time
Lourdes testified she always brought with her a copy of her complaint-affidavit; (b) Her claim in her complaint-affidavit that accused-appellant
removed her panties is inconsistent with her claim at the witness stand, where she said that accused-appellant removed her shorts; (c) Her claim
that accused-appellant held her two (2) nipples while he was holding a knife is a physical impossibility; (d) Her testimony that accused-appellant told
her to be quiet or he would kill her and Rosita is contrary to what she alleged in her complaint-affidavit that he would kill her Ate Rosita only; (e) Her
statement that accused-appellant held her two (2) hands with one hand while his other hand was removing her shorts and panties is a physical
impossibility; (f) Her claim that when she was first raped the private parts of accused-appellant pumped her for more than fifty (50) minutes is
physically impossible; and, (g) Her testimony that in the first rape accused-appellant attempted to kiss her on the lips and her cheeks but he failed is
another impossibility considering that he was on top of her and could have easily kissed her on the lips and cheeks. [17]

The crux of Lourdes' testimony was that accused-appellant had copulated with her, and the act was accomplished through intimidation. The alleged
"inconsistencies" raised by accused-appellant are of minor significance and do not impinge upon her assertion that she was raped. Errorless
testimonies cannot be expected especially when a witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience.[18] A witness who is telling the truth is not
always expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Thus, we have followed
the rule in accord with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than
destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.[19]

However, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos[20] the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender, being special qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the death penalty cannot be
imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove complainant's minority and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both
minority and relationship in the four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved
during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise
would deny accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. [21] Thus, he can only be
convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.

The imposition of an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, in attempted rape is also erroneous. The proper penalty for rape in the
attempted stage should be two (2) degrees lower than the penalty for consummated rape,[22] or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum imposable penalty should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period and the minimum from prision correccional.

In the three (3) cases of simple rape, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count is upheld, consistent with current jurisprudence. [23]
The award of P30,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape is increased to P50,000.00 also consistent with jurisprudence.[24] In addition, an
award of P30,000.00 in exemplary damages is also imposed, the relationship between the sex offender and his victim being aggravating.[25] In the
case of attempted rape the P30,000.00 award as moral damages is reduced to P15,000.00. [26] The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is
removed, there being no legal basis therefor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:

1. In Crim. Cases Nos. 112410-H (G.R. No. 137481), 112411-H (G.R. No. 137482) and 112412-H (G.R. No. 137483) accused-appellant
Conrado Saladino y Dingle is found guilty of three (3) counts of Simple Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count. He is also ordered to pay private complainant Lourdes Relevo P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 for moral
damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages, for each count of rape.

2. In Crim. Case No. 112413-H (G.R. No. 138455), accused-appellant Conrado Saladino y Dingle is found guilty of Attempted Rape and is
sentenced to ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to eight (8) years, four (4) months and
ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as maximum. The accused-appellant is further ordered to pay private complainant Lourdes Relevo
moral damages of P15,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Page 147 of 258

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Page 148 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992 ]

SULPICIO INTOD, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because
of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out; however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted:
“We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) ‘you were not injured”.[2]

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. Hence this
petition.

This petition questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. -- Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an
attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent
pointed out that:

x x x. The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code),
but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his co-accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at
her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. [3]

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation[4] of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

Page 149 of 258

x x x it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. [5]

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected.[6] The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender
his formidability,[7] and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property.[8] The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.[9]

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. [10]

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. [11] There must be
either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act [12] in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. [13] Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2)
there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.[14]

Page 150 of 258

The impossibility of killing a person already dead[15] falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.[16] One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.[17]

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not
present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case has facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong,[18] the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the
spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to
achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no
less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt
is committed.

In the case of Stokes vs. State,[19] where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place
where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Stokes that the crime was not committed. x x x It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did
not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is
inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by
outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State,[20] the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the
court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the
public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: ‘Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a
sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes
cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell,[21] defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment,
the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.

Page 151 of 258

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder
against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the
American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable. Whereas, in the
United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge.
In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility.[22] In U.S.
vs. Wilson[23] the Court held that:

x x x factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as
the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan,[24] the accused
was indicted for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without the
knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was
performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused
liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that “elimination of impossibility as a defense to a
charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern
view”. In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of
legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility
until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of accomplishment, the offender cannot escape
criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime -- neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only reason for
this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge --
that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not
merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase “inherent impossibility” that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act “which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment x x x”. In that case, all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2,
and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court
sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 152 of 258

Feliciano, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

Page 153 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 133695, February 28, 2001 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

DANIEL MAURICIO y Perez, accused-appellant, will elude the gallows because of a simple, although vital, omission in the Information charging him
with rape. To the uninitiated in the workings of the justice system, this seeming leniency to a felon who raped his 11-year old daughter is a blatant
outrage. But for those who are abreast with the law, the imposition of a lower penalty in this case is consistent with due process. The rule that saves
Mauricio today from the capital punishment is not a mere technicality but a safeguard of one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Jonalyn Mauricio was born on 16 June 1986 to Daniel Mauricio and his common-law wife Emedelyn Geotina. But they separated when Jonalyn was
only three (3) years old. She and her father lived in Shaw Boulevard with her paternal grandparents Alfonso and Ely Mauricio, while her mother and
brothers resided in Pasay City. The grandparents owned a boarding house, a modest eatery and a commercial space which they leased out as a
barber shop. Since Daniel Mauricio did not have a stable income and was always out drinking, her grandparents supported Jonalyn and sent her to
school. Jonalyn would sleep with her grandparents in the room above the eatery, while Daniel stayed in the other building where the apartments and
the barber shop were located. Later, Daniel took in a live-in partner and occupied one (1) room in the third floor with her, while the other room was
occupied by his brother Reynaldo.

One evening in 1995 when Jonalyn was fast asleep in her room, she was awakened when she felt someone taking off her shorts and panty. It was
her father, who then removed his own pants and underwear. Daniel then whispered to Jonalyn his bestial intentions, "Maglaro tayo." He appeared to
Jonalyn to be high on drugs. She had seen her father take drugs before and knew what it did to him. He then went on top of her as she was lying
face down and inserted his penis into her vagina. "Taas-baba 'yung ari niya sa akin, sir,"[1] she would later testify in court. After the painful ordeal that
evening, Daniel wiped off the sap of his dastardly act, and then left without uttering a word. Jonalyn, in shock, went to a corner and cried until she fell
asleep.

Jonalyn lived out this harrowing scene over and over again. She could not recall how many times her father raped her, nor the exact dates.
Sometimes, he would just fondle her breasts. At one time, her father raped her when she fell asleep in her uncle's room after playing video games on
his computer. Another time, Daniel abused her when she baby-sat her half-sister at the request of his current live-in partner. As Jonalyn would later
testify, "Basta pag natutulog ako sa restaurant, he always touched me, sir."[2] When asked how he did it, "Hinahawakan po niya ang ari niya tapos
pinapasok po niya sa vagina ko, sir."[3]

Sometime in 1996 Jonalyn and her grandparents transferred to Welfareville Village in Pasig City. Her grandfather Alfonso eked out a living by selling
ice to neighbors while her grandmother Ely worked as a manicurist doing home service for clients. As usual, Daniel was jobless and seldom sober,
and continued to rape his own daughter. Jonalyn recalled one incident where she was asleep in the sofa when Daniel inserted his finger into her
vagina and mashed her breasts. She also recalled another incident, which occurred sometime in July 1997, when her grandparents were out of the
house. Her father Daniel laid behind her, spread her legs and inserted his penis inside her organ. All this time Jonalyn did not say a word to anyone
about her father's lechery.

On 16 August 1997 Daniel committed his last act of inhumanity which prompted Jonalyn to finally to break her silence. Daniel arrived home from
work at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, apparently in his usual state of drunkenness. Only Jonalyn was in the house; she was washing dishes.
Daniel suddenly grabbed her by the waist and carried her to her bed. She struggled and was able to escape Daniel momentarily, but he succeeded
in grabbing her again and threw her down her bed. Daniel told her, "Maybe, your lolo is molesting you." Fortunately, Daniel returned to his senses
and apologized to his daughter saying, "Pasensya ka na anak, may problema lang ako sa trabaho." He then told her not to tell anybody about the
incident.

But his apparent repentance and pleas not to squeal on him came too late. Jonalyn, no longer able to tolerate the physical and mental torment,
rushed to the house of her neighbor and classmate Myrna Marcelo. With the help of another neighbor, she called Bantay Bata 163. The person on
the other end of the line identified himself as Elmer Chavez. She then initially narrated her ordeal to him.

The next day, she went to the house of her classmate Anna Patricia at Jose Fabella St., New Correctional Compound, Mandaluyong. There she met
Elmer Chavez, the Bantay Bata staffer who answered her call, and Bella Zabala, a Bantay Bata social worker. She was interviewed by Zabala about
the molestation. The two then accompanied Jonalyn to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for medical examination.

The examination revealed that Jonalyn had "elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healed laceration at 1o'clock position x x x the vaginal canal
narrow with prominent rugosities," and concluded that "subject is in non-virgin state physically."[4]

Jonalyn was brought to the ABS-CBN office in Quezon City for another interview. She was asked if she was willing to file charges for rape against
her father even if it would result in him getting the death penalty, and Jonalyn answered in the affirmative. Then accompanied by Coleen Samar,
another Bantay Bata staffer, Jonalyn went to the Mandaluyong Police Station to give her statement to the police.

On 8 September 1997 two (2) Informations were filed by the City Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City, one alleging that in August 1997, or prior
thereto, with force and intimidation, the accused Daniel Mauricio willfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of Jonalyn Mauricio y Geotina, a girl
eleven (11) years of age. The other Information alleged that on or about 16 August 1997 Daniel Mauricio, with lewd designs and by means of force
and intimidation, willfully and feloniously attempted to have carnal knowledge of his daughter Jonalyn Mauricio Y Geotina, a girl eleven (11) years of
age, thus commencing the commission of rape directly by overt acts but did not produce the crime by reason of cause or causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, i.e., she was able to flee from the accused.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Ma. Luisa Capili of the Mandaluyong Police Station Women's Desk who took the statement of the victim,
Page 154 of 258
Jonalyn's grandfather Alfonso Mauricio, Jonalyn Mauricio herself, Coleen Samar, Elmer Chavez and Dr. Dennis D. Belin, the medico-legal officer of
the PNP Crime Laboratory who examined Jonalyn.

Dr. Belin found a laceration in Jonalyn's hymen in the 1:00 o'clock position and concluded that she was in a non-virgin state. The doctor determined
the degree of resistance of Jonalyn's vagina by introducing his finger into her organ and found her resistance to be strong, which meant that "the
subject had limited sexual experience." The width of the vaginal canal, which he found to be narrow, indicated that the subject had had limited sexual
experience, or not more than three (3) times. He also opined that the "sexual experience" could have been caused by a finger or any instrument
other than the male sex organ. He further stated that only one (1) laceration was found but that it was possible for a single laceration to manifest
even when there were several intercourses. He concluded that based on the condition of the wound it was inflicted at least two (2) weeks before the
examination. He also said that the laceration might have been caused by other "stressful activities" since the laceration was less shallow and had
less parameters than one normally caused by rape.

Daniel Mauricio denied he raped Jonalyn. He claimed that in their old house in Shaw Boulevard, Jonalyn slept in the sala where the waitresses of the
eatery also slept. Thus, according to him, it was impossible for him to have committed rape because the waitresses were always in the sala at night.
He insisted that he could not possibly have raped Jonalyn in his brother Reynaldo's room because Reynaldo always came home from work at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, and that it was very unlikely that his live-in partner would ask Jonalyn to baby-sit for her because the two (2) were not in
good terms. According to Daniel, Jonalyn was jealous of his live-in partner and wanted her own parents to reconcile.

The trial court[5] sustained the prosecution evidence, found Daniel Mauricio guilty of rape and sentenced him to death. He was also found guilty of
attempted rape in the other case, and sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
maximum. He was further ordered to pay complaining witness Jonalyn Mauricio P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

We sustain the conviction of Daniel Mauricio for rape. His barefaced, uncorroborated denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of his victim.
When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.[6] Thus the trial court observed of the testimony of Jonalyn -
She gave a very straight-forward and spontaneous account of her horrible experience she encountered from the hands of her father but sometimes
interrupted by her sobbing and by the tears dropping from her eyes probably reminding her of the dark and sad episode in the early chapter of her
life authored by no less than her father x x x x

To the mind of this Court these feelings of anger and emotional outbursts of the victim is (sic) but a normal and ordinary behavior of a human being
against a satyr whose beastliness was the cause of her loss of virginity at a tender age especially so if he is the person who brought her to this
world.
We find no reason to reverse the trial court. Factual findings of trial courts, particularly the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
much weight and the highest respect on appeal. Trial courts have the opportunity to observe first hand the demeanor and conduct of witnesses and
examine other proofs as well, thus they are better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions. [7] The emotion and tears displayed by the
victim convinced the trial court of the genuineness of her testimony. Indeed, it is very difficult if not impossible to feign such a convincing demeanor.
We find it hard to imagine how a girl of tender age could give so vivid a depiction of such acts of bestiality if such acts were not inflicted on her. The
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit.[8]

The credibility of Jonalyn is not diminished by the fact that it took her two (2) years from the time she was first violated to come forth and break her
silence. In People v. Narido we said that considering that the complainant was a child of tender years, effectively under the control of the appellant, it
was not difficult to understand why even after she was abused she stayed on and did not complain. Indeed, a daughter raped by her very own father
must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion as to why the very person that gave life to her could be capable of such a detestable act.

Neither is Jonalyn's credibility affected by her failure to recall the exact dates of the commission of the offense. Such lapse is a minor matter and can
be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the
presence of other people.[9] The failure of complainant to remember some details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication, precisely
indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court proceedings.[10]

Coupled with the strong corroborative testimony of the medico-legal officer who verified that the victim had prior sexual experience, Jonalyn's
testimony is sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence in favor of accused-appellant.

We reject the contention of accused-appellant that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime because Jonalyn was always accompanied
by the waitresses in the eatery. It is well-nigh impossible for one person to be accompanied by some other person every single second of his life.
Even the most congenial person has his moments of privacy. Besides, it is an established principle that lust has no regard for time and place. For,
rape can be committed even in the most unlikely places, such as a park, a roadside, school premises, or an occupied room.[11]

It cannot be said that accused-appellant was deprived of due process when the Information filed against him for Rape failed to state the exact date of
the commission of the offense. Date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of the
woman.[12] Thus, the precise date need not be alleged in the Information. Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states -
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
Thus, the allegation in the Information that accused-appellant committed the crime "sometime in August 1997, or prior thereto," does not violate his
right to due process and is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt for the crime charged.

Even counsel for the defense does not controvert the factual findings of the court. In the appellant's brief, counsel prayed "that the judgment of
conviction against accused-appellant Daniel Mauricio x x x be MODIFIED wherein the death penalty that was meted out on him should be
REDUCED to RECLUSION PERPETUA x x x x." The Solicitor General, in his Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Brief, made a recommendation to
the same effect.

In this regard we agree with accused-appellant and the Solicitor General. As mentioned earlier, we cannot sustain the imposition of the death
Page 155 of 258
penalty. The law under which he was prosecuted is Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7610.[13] Article 335 as amended by Sec.
11 of RA 7659, or the Death Penalty Law, provides:
Art.335. When and how rape is committed.- x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim x x x x

In People v. Ramos[14] this provision was interpreted to mean that for death to be imposable the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender being a special qualifying circumstance should be specifically alleged in the Information. In the case at bar, although the
Information did properly allege the complainant's minority, it failed to specify the relationship between the complainant and accused-appellant. It is
not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify
the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would lead to a denial of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against him.[15] Thus, for this oversight, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by
reclusion perpetua.

We likewise agree with the Solicitor General, in the other case, that the evidence on record cannot sustain a conviction for attempted rape. The
Revised Penal Code defines an attempted felony thus -
Art. 6. Consummated, Frustrated, and Attempted Felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable x x x

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
"Overt acts" has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. [16]

Jonalyn testified that in the morning of 16 August 1997 when the supposed attempted rape took place, Daniel grabbed her by the waist and carried
her to the room while she was resisting. She further testified that she was able to run but Daniel got hold of her again and threw her on her bed.
Daniel then told her "Maybe (your) lolo is molesting (you)," and "Pasensya ka na anak may problema lang ako sa trabaho."

Applying the above definition to the facts of the case, it would be stretching the imagination to construe Daniel's act of throwing Jonalyn to her bed as
an overt act that will "logically and necessarily ripen" into rape. The external act must have a direct and necessary connection with the crime that the
accused intended to commit. Whether Daniel indeed intended to commit the crime of rape cannot be seen merely from this particular act. Thus,
Daniel should be acquitted of the charge of attempted rape.

The award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is sustained it being discretionary on the part of the court, and may be awarded without need of
independent proof.[17] Furthermore, as the trial court failed to award the civil indemnity ex delicto, we award additional P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
to the complaint the same being mandatory.[18]

As to the award of P30,000.00 exemplary damages, we note that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1 December 2000,
requires that aggravating circumstances, in order to be appreciated, be stated in the information. The pertinent provision of the new Rule 110 states -
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment (emphasis supplied).
The use of the word "must" indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic
aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the
information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused. Since the
aggravating circumstance of relationship can no longer be appreciated against the accused in this case, there is no more legal basis for the award of
exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision in Crim. Case No. 35-H-MD rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Br. 214, is MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ is found GUILTY of the crime of Rape under Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua instead of death. He is further ordered to pay Jonalyn Mauricio P50,000.00 for civil indemnity ex delicto and P50,000.00 for moral
damages. The award of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is deleted.

In Crim. Case No. 35-H-MD for Attempted Rape, the Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Daniel Mauricio y Perez guilty is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; consequently, he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Page 156 of 258

 G.R. No. 33463 December 18, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASILIO BORINAGA, defendant-appellant.

MALCOM, J.:

Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a resident of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with
one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On the morning
of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the contract,
notwithstanding that only about two-thirds of the fish corral had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon
at that time. On hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him, to which Mooney answered
that if they wanted to do something to him they should wait until after breakfast, Lawaan then left with his men, and Mooney, after partaking of his
morning meal, returned to his shop.

On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of
the Perpetua, his back being to the window. Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike with a
knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a
result of the force of the blow, but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should be stated that
Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say
that he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the
first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a
flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again the same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to
give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it.

The foregoing occurrences gave rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder.
The defense was alibi, which was not given credence. The accused was convicted as charged, by Judge Ortiz, who sentenced him to fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties and the costs.

The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and
mind of the accused. More than mere menaces took place. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his friends for not
accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed treacherously toward vital organs of the victim. The means used
were entirely suitable for accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be qualified as murder because of the presence of the circumstance of
treachery.

The only debatable question, not referred to in the briefs, but which must be decided in order to dispose of the appeal, is: Do the facts constitute
frustrated murder or attempted murder within the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code? Although no exact counterpart to the facts at bar has been
found either in Spanish or Philippine jurisprudence, a majority of the court answer the question propounded by stating that the crime committed was
that of frustrated murder. This is true notwithstanding the admitted fact that Mooney was not injured in the least.

The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to
accomplish the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of
the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. (U. S. vs.
Eduave [1917], 36 Phil., 209; People vs. Mabugat [1926], 51 Phil., 967.)

No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of that accused to establish a lesser crime than that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a
wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life fully meriting the penalty imposed in the trial court.

Based on foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.l

Page 157 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-32754-5, July 21, 1978 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL PILONES Y. YBAÑEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Manuel Pilones appealed from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VI-170 (70) and CCC-VI-171(70),
convicting him of murder and frustrated murder, and sentencing him in the murder case to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Antonio G.
Renolia in the sum of P18,000.

In the frustrated murder case, he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for having assaulted Nicanor Ilagan. No indemnity was imposed.

In the evening of April 9, 1970 a wake or vigil for the dead (lamayan) was held in a house near Jossie Bakery, located at J.(F.) Posadas Street,
Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila. Among the many persons present at that vigil were Nicanor Ilagan, 19, single, jobless, a student, and Antonio G. Renolia
(Renolla), nicknamed Tony, 22, married, a jeepney driver, respectively residing at 2572 F. Posadas Street and 2495 Bagong Sikat Street, both
located at Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila.

Shortly after midnight or in the early morning of April 10, 1970, the house, where the vigil was being held, was stoned. Ilagan and the others came
out of the house and went to the street to find out who had hurled the stones. As Ilagan stood on the lighted street, he was shot in the knee (Exh. E).
He fell on the ground. The assailant was at a distance of around six meters from Ilagan and about fifteen meters away from the electric lamp on the
street. Ilagan saw his assailant's face. Because of the light of the electric lamp, Ilagan remembered his assailant as the same person whom he had
seen a week before in that vicinity, challenging persons to a fight.

When Ilagan fell, Tony, who had also come out of the house, went to his assistance and tried to lift him. While in a stooping position, Tony was shot
by the same assailant. The bullet entered his "upper left anterior chest" over the second rib and "coursed downward and backward, lacerating his left
pulmonary artery and his right lung" (Exh. D).

The assailant and his companions, Danny Banlag, Milo and others, who were armed with arrows and carried stones, ran away.

Tony or Antonio G. Renolia died on the way to the hospital. Ilagan was also brought to the hospital where he was treated for two weeks.

For sometime, the police made no progress in the investigation of the crime. On the third day after the shooting, Ilagan, while in the hospital, was
informed by his friends, one of whom was Aida, that his assailant was Manuel Pilones.

Fifty days after the shooting, or on May 30, 1970, Manuel Pilones, 20, jobless, a resident of 148 Tenement Housing Project, Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila,
was arrested for vagrancy by patrolmen of Precinct No. 9. Ilagan, who was fetched from his residence by Tony's mother, identified Pilones as the
person who had shot him after midnight on April 10, 1970. At that confrontation, Pilones was just one arm's length from Ilagan.

When Ilagan fingered Pilones as the malefactor, who had shot him and Tony Renolia (Question No. 19 of Exh. F), Pilones did not say anything (18
tsn July 13, 1970). Emiliana Giray Renolia, the mother of Tony, a resident of 2225 F. Posadas Street, Punta, Sta. Ana, was also at the precinct. She
likewise identified Pilones as the assailant of her deceased son and three other persons (Crime Report, Exh. G). Pilones refused to give any
statement or comment at that investigation. The investigator's testimony on this point upon interrogation by the fiscal is as follows (2 tsn July 30,
1970):

"Q. In Exhibit F (Ilagan's statement), the witness Nicanor Ilagan pointed to Manuel Pilones in answer to Question No. 19, where was accused
Pilones when pointed to by witness Nicanor Ilagan? - A. He was present in the investigation room, sir.

"Q. How far was he from Nicanor Ilagan when pointed to by him? - A. He was near the table, sir.

"Q. Do you know whether the accused heard Nicanor Ilagan when pointed to as the one responsible for the shooting of the victim? - A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What did he say? - A. Nothing, sir.

"Q. Did you investigate accused Pilones? - A. Yes, sir.

Page 158 of 258
"Q Did you confront him with this case? - A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What did he say? - A. He said nothing.

"Q. Did you take his statement? - A. No, sir.

"Q. Why? - A. He is (was) not willing to give his statement.

"Q. Why was he not willing to give his statement? A. I do not know, sir.

"Q. Did you explain the reason why? - A. Yes, sir, but he refused to give his statement."

At the trial, Pilones relied on an alibi. He testified that when the shooting occurred, he was in the house of his aunt, Marilou Campbell, at Olongapo
City. He was in that place from December 31, 1969 to May 28, 1970. His aunt and his brother-in-law, who was allegedly his companion in going to
Olongapo City, did not take the witness stand to corroborate his alibi.

Anacoreta Castro, a widow and a neighbor of Pilones at Punta, Sta. Ana, corroborated his alibi. However, her testimony is weakened by a serious
contradiction. She testified that Pilones, who was like a child to her because his family and her family "are practically one", left for Olongapo City
before Christmas, while, on the other hand, Pilones testified that he went to that place after Christmas or on December 31, 1969 (6 and 14 tsn July
30, 1970).

The personal circumstances of Pilones may be useful in assessing his character. He has a common-law wife. He has tattoo marks on his body
placed by Ben Lumot. He claims that he was framed up by Patrolman Bayani Lasian, who resided at the sixth floor of the tenement house, where he
(Pilones) also resided. Patrolman Lasian allegedly suspected Pilones of being implicated in the killing of Patrolman Gameng. Lasian allegedly had a
grudge against Pilones because during a basketball tournament among residents of the tenement house Pilones "tripped" and Lasian boxed him (7
tsn July 30, 1970; See Exh. 1). The residence of Pilones is about 12 meters away from Posadas Street.

The crucial factual issue is whether Pilones was sufficiently identified by the prosecution's sole eyewitness, Ilagan, as the assailant of Ilagan and the
deceased Tony Renolia.

The doctor, who treated Ilagan, testified that when he operated on Ilagan's wounded knee, he extracted therefrom metallic fragments. On the other
hand, the doctor, who conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Renolia, testified that he extracted a .22 caliber slug from the victim's body. Since
there is a difference between a slug and a metallic fragment, Pilones' counsel contends that Ilagan and Renolia were shot by different persons or
with different weapons.

That circumstance is not sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on appellant's guilt. It merely conveys the impression that, inasmuch as according to
Ilagan, he and Renolia were shot in succession, Pilones used different weapons. He had time to change weapons. He had companions who could
have assisted him in the execution of his felonious acts.

The fact is that Ilagan positively identified Pilones as the person who shot him (Ilagan). Even if Renolia was shot by Pilones' companion, with a
firearm different from the .22 caliber rifle used against Ilagan, Pilones would still be criminally liable for Renolia's death because he, obviously,
conspired with the person who shot Renolia. Pilones and his companions were together at the scene of the crime. They left the place together. They
had community of design.

The decisive fact is that Pilones was not only identified by Ilagan but at the confrontation in the police precinct between accuser and accused,
Pilones, as the accused, just kept silent and did not deny Ilagan's accusation and the identification made by Renolia's mother. "He who remains
silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent” (31 C.J.S. 494). Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 23. Admission by silence. - Any act or declaration made in the presence and within the observation of a party who does or says nothing when
the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him."

"Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as
a quasi-confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-
Page 159 of 258
defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that
he is not innocent."(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed. p. 401).

Appellant Pilones contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which is the affidavit
of Arturo Pangan, a detainee in the city jail of Manila. Pangan declared in his affidavit that in the "riot", clash or encounter (salakay o sagupaan) on
April 9, 1970 between the residents of Barrio Puso and the residents of Labasan Bukid, he and Romy Pilones, a brother of Manuel Pilones, were
together and he saw that Antonio Renolia and Nicanor Ilagan were shot by Aquilino Pingol with a .22 caliber rifle; that Pingol was in the company of
Danny and Nilo Garcia, alias Nilong Bulag, and that at that time Manuel Pilones was in Olongapo City.

It is evident from Pangan’s affidavit that he was referring to another incident. Pangan was referring to a riot or rumble between two groups of
persons. Ilagan did not testify to any rumble or tumultuous affray between the residents of two places. He testified simply to a shooting at F. Posadas
Street, Punta, Sta. Ana when he came out of the house where a vigil for the dead was being held.

Moreover, if according to Pangan, Romy Pilones, the brother of appellant Manuel Pilones, was with Pangan on that occasion, the alleged newly
discovered evidence could have been presented by the appellant during his trial. His brother, Romy, could not have been ignorant of what Arturo
Pangan knew and Romy could have informed Manuel Pilones earlier that the assailant of Ilagan and Renolia was Pingol.

The trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial.

We are convinced that Pilones was sufficiently identified by Ilagan as the person who shot him and Renolia. Pilones has not shown any reason as to
why Ilagan would accuse him of murder and frustrated murder. There is no showing that Ilagan had connived with Patrolman Lasian, whom Pilones
believes is the one responsible for his arrest, to frame up the accused.

No motive was established as to why Pilones shot Ilagan and Renolia. The shooting can be characterized as purely a mischievous act of deviltry
committed by a jobless and lawless person who did not know of any better way of using his time.

The trial court erred in holding that the crime as to Ilagan is frustrated murder. The wound in his knee was not sufficient to cause his death. The
crime is only attempted murder. The accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would bring about the death of Ilagan.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that in Criminal Case No. 171(70), Pilones is convicted of attempted
murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor minimum, as maximum, and to pay an indemnity to Nicanor Ilagan in the sum of two thousand pesos.

The term "life imprisonment" used by the trial court should be changed to reclusion perpetua. It is the latter term that carries with it the imposition of
the accessory penalties (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58; Art. 73, Revised Penal Code). Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., no part.

Page 160 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-5848, April 30, 1954 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SY PIO, ALIAS POLICARPIO DE LA CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the defendant-appellant herein Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz,
guilty of frustrated murder against the person of Tan Siong Kiap, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 years, 1 month, and 11
days of prision mayor, to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party Tan Siong Kiap in the sum of P350,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that court certified it
to this Court under the provisions of section 17(4) of Republic Act No. 296, on the ground that the crime charged was committed on the same
occasion that the defendant-appellant had committed crime of murder, with which the defendant-appellant was also charged.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that early in the morning of September 3, 1949, the defendant-appellant entered the store at 511
Misericordia, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Once inside he started firing a .45 caliber pistol that he had in his hand. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Tan Siong
Kiap, who was in the store and saw the accused enter and afterwards fire a shot at Jose Sy, asked the defendant-appellant, "What is the idea?"
Thereupon defendant-appellant turned around and fired at him also. The bullet fired from defendant-appellant's pistol entered the right shoulder of
Tan Siong Kiap and passed through his back. Upon being hit, Tan Siong Kiap immediately ran to a room behind the store to hide. From there he still
heard gunshots fired from defendant-appellant's pistol, but afterwards defendant-appellant ran away.

Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was treated. He stayed there from September 3 to September 12,
1949, when he was released upon his request and against the physician's advice. He was asked to return to the hospital for further treatment, and
he did so five times for a period of more than ten days. Thereafter his wound was completely healed. He spent the sum of P300 for hospital and
doctor's fees.

The defendant-appellant shot two other persons in the morning of September 3, 1949, before shooting and wounding Tan Siong Kiap; one was Ong
Pian and the other Jose Sy. On September 5 information was received by the Manila Police Department that defendant-appellant was in the custody
of the Constabulary in Tarlac, so a captain of the Manila police by the name of Daniel V. Lomotan proceeded to Tarlac. There he saw the defendant-
appellant and had a conversation with him. On this occasion defendant-appellant admitted to Lomotan that his victims were Tan Siong Kiap, Ong
Pian, and Jose Sy. The Constabulary in Tarlac also delivered to Lomotan the pistol used by the defendant-appellant, marked Exhibit C, and its
magazine, Exhibit C-1, both of which the Constabulary had confiscated from the defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant was. thereupon
delivered to the custody of Lomotan, and the latter brought him to Manila, where his statement was taken down in writing. This declaration was
submitted at the time of the trial as Exhibit D, and it contains all the details of the assaults that defendant-appellant had made in Manila in the
morning of September 3 against the persons of Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy. This written statement was taken down on a typewriter and
afterwards signed by the defendant-appellant in both his Chinese and Filipino names, the latter being Policarpio de la Cruz.

According to the declaration of the defendant-appellant, some months prior to September 3, 1949, he was employed as an attendant in a restaurant
belonging to Ong Pian. Defendant-appellant's wife by the name of Vicenta was also employed by Ong Pian's partner, Eng Cheng Suy. Prior to
September 3 the relatives of his wife had been asking the latter for help, because her father was sick. Defendant-appellant asked money from Ong
Pian, but the latter could only give him P1. His wife was able to borrow P20 from her employer, and this was sent to his wife's parents in Cebu.
Afterwards defendant-appellant was dismissed from his work at the restaurant of Ong Pian, and he became a peddler. Ong Pian presented a list of
the sums that defendant-appellant had borrowed from him, and these sums were deducted from the salary of his wife. Defendant-appellant did not
recognize these sums as his indebtedness, and so he resented Ong Pian's conduct.

As to Tan Siong Kiap, the confession states that a few days before September 3, 1949, defendant-appellant had been able to realize the sum of P70
from the sales of medicine that he peddled. He laid this money in a place in his room, but the following morning he found that it had disappeared
from the place in which he had placed it. Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy, upon the discovery of the loss of the money, told defendant-appellant that he
must have given the money to his wife, and that nobody had stolen it. After this incident of the loss, the defendant-appellant used to hear Tan Siong
Kiap and Jose Sy and other Chinamen say that the money had not been actually stolen, but that he lost it in gambling. Because of these accusations
against him, he nurtured resentment against both Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy.

So early in the morning of September 3, while a China-man by the name of Ngo Cho, who was the possessor of a caliber .45 pistol, was away from
his room, defendant-appellant got his pistol and tucked it in his belt. With this pistol he went to the restaurant at 822 Ongpin, and there shot Ong
Pian. After shooting him, he proceeded to 511 Misericordia, in the store where Jose Sy and Tan Siong Kiap were, and there he fired at them. Then
he escaped to Legarda street, in Sampaloc, where he borrowed P1 from his relatives. From there he went to Malabon, to the house of his mother, to
whom he told he had killed two persons and from whom he asked money.

The foregoing is the substance of the written declaration made by the defendant-appellant in Exhibit D on September 6, 1949. At the time of the trial,
however, he disowned the confession and explained that he signed it without having read its contents. He declared that it was not he who shot the
three victims, but it was one by the name of Chua Tone, with whom he had previously connived to kill the three victims. He introduced no witnesses,
however, to support his denial. Neither did he deny that he admitted before Captain Lomotan having killed the three persons, or having been found in
Tarlac in possession of the caliber .45 pistol, Exhibit C, and its magazine, Exhibit C-1. In his cross-examination he admitted many of the incidents
mentioned in the confession, especially the cause of his resentment against his victims Ong Pian, Jose Sy, and Tan Siong Kiap.

The trial court refused to believe his testimony, and, therefore, found him guilty of the crime charged.

Page 161 of 258

On this appeal counsel for the defendant-appellant claims that the trial court erred in not finding that Tan Siong Kiap received the shot accidentally
from the same bullet that had been fired at Jose Sy, and in finding that defendant-appellant has committed a crime distinct and separate from that of
murder for the slaying of Jose Sy. We find no merit in this contention. According to the uncontradicted testimony of the offended party Tan Siong
Kiap, when the latter saw defendant-appellant firing shots, he asked him why he was doing so, and the defendant-appellant, instead of answering
him, turned around and fired at him also. It is not true, therefore, that the shot which hit him was fired at Sy.

It is also contended that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. We also find no merit in this contention. The evidence
submitted to prove the charge consists of: the uncontradicted testimony of the victim himself; the admissions made verbally by the defendant-
appellant before Captain Lomotan in Tarlac; the fact that the defendant-appellant had escaped and was found in Tarlac; his possession of the .45
caliber pistol coupled with the fact, attested to by the testimony of the physician who examined and treated the wounds of Tan Siong Kiap, that the
wounds found in his person must have been caused by the caliber .45 bullet; and, lastly, the confession of the defendant-appellant himself, Exhibit
D, which he was not able to impugn. As against this mass of evidence, defendant-appellant has only made a very unbelievable story that it was not
he but another that had committed the crime charged. His admissions at the time of the trial regarding the incidents, as well as the cause of his
having assaulted his victims, coincide exactly with the reasons given in his written confession. This shows that he had made the confession himself,
for nobody but himself could have known the facts therein stated. The claim that the offense has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt must be
dismissed.

The defendant-appellant lastly claims that the lower court also erred in sentencing him to pay an indemnity of P350. The offended party testified that
he actually spent P300 for hospital and doctor's fees, and that he was confined in the hospital for nine days. The above facts stand uncontradicted.
This assignment of error must also be dismissed.

It is lastly contended that the defendant-appellant should be found guilty only of less serious physical injuries instead of the crime of frustrated
murder as defendant-appellant admitted in his confession in the open court that he had a grudge against the offended party, and that he connived
with another to kill the latter. The intent to kill is also evident from his conduct in firing the shot directly at the body of the offended party.

But while the intent to kill is conclusively proved the wound inflicted was not necessarily fatal, because it did not touch any of the vital organs of the
body. As a matter of fact, the medical certification issued by the physician who examined the wound of the offended party at the time he went to the
hospital, states that the wound was to heal within a period of fourteen days, while the offended party actually stayed in the hospital for nine days and
continued receiving treatment thereafter five times for a period of more than ten days, or a total of not more than thirty days. The question that needs
to be determined, therefore, is: Did the defendant-appellant perform all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim?

In the cases of U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil., 209, People vs. Dagman, 47 Phil., 768, and People vs. Borinaga, 55 Phil., 433, this Court has held that it is
not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim, but that it is sufficient that he
believes that he has committed all said acts. In the case of People vs. Dagman, supra, the victim was first knocked down by a stone thrown at him,
then attacked with a lance, and then wounded by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused, but the victim upon falling down feigned death, and the
accused desisted from further continuing in the assault in the belief that their victim was dead. And in the case of People vs. Borinaga, supra, the
accused stabbed his intended victim, but the knife with which he committed the aggression instead of hitting the body of the victim, lodged in the
back of the chair in which he was seated, although the accused believed that he had already harmed him. In both these cases this Court held that
the crime committed was that of frustrated murder, because the subjective phase of the acts necessary to commit the offense had already passed;
there was a full and complete belief on the part of the assailant that he had committed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of the
intended victim.

In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit, but he was able to escape and hide in another room.
The fact that he was able to escape, which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he was not
able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually performed all the acts of
execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it can not be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been
completed. And as it does not appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and, as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwards a
reasonable doubt exists in our mind that the defendant-appellant had actually believed that he had committed all the acts of execution or passed the
subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant-appellant.

We are, therefore, riot prepared to find the defendant-appellant guilty of frustrated murder, as charged in the information. We only find him guilty of
attempted murder, because he did not perform all the acts of execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention that he had to
kill his victim might be carried out.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified, and the defendant-appellant is found guilty of the crime of attempted
murder, and the sentence imposed upon him reduced to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional, to 10
years of prision mayor. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. With costs against the defendant-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Page 162 of 258

 [ G.R. NO. 88724, April 03, 1990 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CEILITO ORITA ALIAS "LITO," DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II,
Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed in the said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):

"The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the offended party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of
the crime of Rape committed as follows:

"That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above?named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he
conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her will and without her consent.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits
were formally offered and admitted, the prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and
instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):

"WHEREFORE, the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC),
beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY,
PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four
Thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.

"SO ORDERED."
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102, Rollo):

"WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

"SO ORDERED."
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court,
considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.

The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):

"Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a
Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.

“In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44,
tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held
her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).

“She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the first floor was locked from the
inside, appellant forced complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his
right hand poking a 'balisong' to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the second floor, he
commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant’s room.

“Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed
himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20,
ibid).

“He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he
continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she
kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).

Page 163 of 258

“Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her
vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).

“She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she
ran to another room. Appellant again chased her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).

“Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house, and knocked on the door. When
there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the
door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it
around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at
the second floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.

“Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.

“Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit 'A') which states:

‘Physical Examination - Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.

‘PE Findings - Pertinent Findings only.

‘Neck - Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.

‘Breast - Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.

‘Back - Multiple pinpoint marks.

‘Extremities - Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.

‘Vulva - No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding
vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with
difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.’”

As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:

1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses; and

2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused.

The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility
amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)

A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the
witnesses’ straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably
considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The
most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato,
G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details
must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358,
March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of
spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little
discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of
her. According to the accused, this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in
order that there will be a consumation of the act." (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended
there. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a material part of the victim's
testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.

We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be
accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth
(People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p. 56,
Rollo):

Page 164 of 258

"As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony
before the court. Her answers to every question profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and straightforward. To the Court she was a
picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the
accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor."

When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed provided her testimony is
clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA
487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People v. Soterol, G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA
400). The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The victim's
testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat.
Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of
Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed
hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force
and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of
the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):

"x x x. The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of both accused and offended party without the
slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated. The partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would not give way
even by hastily scaling the same."

A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et al., G. R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126
SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):

"x x x And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8)
meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened individual being pursued. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration,
especially occuring (sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being injured. How much
more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of
her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her
unless she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind."

In a similar case (People v. Sambili, G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled that:

"What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she
had to run away from the latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts she would not
have done nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated."

The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the
non?presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who
should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June
29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the
victim, the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no
longer available. The accused did not bother to contradict this statement.

Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat on its face. Some were not even substantiated
and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really
calls for discussion is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.

The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the same view.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:

"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

“1. By using force or intimidation;

“2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

“3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs
shall be present.

"xxx xxx xxx."

Page 165 of 258

Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 193).

On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:

"ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable.

"A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.

"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."

Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. Our concern now is
whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.

The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice
Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily understood even by law students:

"x x x A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against
his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the
purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the
acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential
element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency
between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which
should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance."

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed
the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v.
Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21,
1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People
v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of
rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of
frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray’
decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its
penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriñia case, supra, might have prompted the
law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.

In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim, the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr.
Zamora when he "categorically declared that the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he
tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p.
57, Rollo):

"x x x It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit ‘A’) as interpreted by Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration
of the latter of uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from
the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras, People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA
109, 113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance with
the medical certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where
there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone
in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results."

The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical
certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation)
Page 166 of 258
and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was
uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially
(pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):

"Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?

"A It entered but only a portion of it."

xxx xxx xxx

"Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when you said comply?

"A I inserted his penis into my vagina.

"Q And was it inserted?

"A Yes only a little."

The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible (People v.
Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v.
Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an
indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso, supra).

Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the accused because after a thorough review of the records,
We find the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.

Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R.
Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised
Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion
perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in
relation to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v.
Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Page 167 of 258

 [ G. R. No. 13785, October 08, 1918 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS ADIAO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:

The defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with the crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated
theft. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he was found guilty of the crime of frustrated theft, and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary

The sole error assigned on appeal is that the lower court erred in holding that the defendant was guilty of the crime of theft as disclosed by the facts
appearing of record. We have examined the evidence carefully and from our study are unable to say that the proof is contrary to the findings of the
lower court. Stated in one sentence, the defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage
of a Japanese named T. Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees.

Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime can not properly be classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the
Penal Code, but that since the offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the felony, he is guilty of the
consummated crime of theft. The fact that the defendant was under observation during the entire transaction and that he was unable to get the
merchandise out of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. The following decisions of the
supreme court of Spain are in point:

"The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit he was seen by a policeman,
yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but sometime later. The court said: "* * * The trial court did not err * * * in
considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen
who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the thing
stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time." (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)

Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on account of the solemnity of the act,
although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while the defendant was still inside the church, the offended
party got back the money from the defendant. The court .said that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as
consummated. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)

The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the case took a small box, which was
also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over the cover of
the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards who were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated
robbery, and said: "* * * The accused * * * having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where it had
been, and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was
thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the elements of the
consummated crime." (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)

There exists the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position. Wherefore, in view of the provisions of
articles 517 and 518, No. 5, of the Penal Code, and there being present one aggravating circumstance compensated by no mitigating circumstance,
the penalty must be imposed in the maximum degree.

Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant is sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances
against him. The merchandise in question, attached to the record as Exhibit A, shall be returned to the lawful owner, T. Murakami. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Page 168 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 12155, February 02, 1917 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PROTASIO EDUAVE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

MORELAND, J.:

We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder.

We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The
aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had
killed the complainant.

There was alevosia to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in
part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches
deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.

The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local
officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such at the time
the crime here charged was committed.

That the accused is guilty of some crime is not denied. The only question is the precise crime of which he should be convicted. It is contended, in the
first place, that, if death had resulted, the crime would not have been murder but homicide, and in the second place, that is is attempted and not
frustrated homicide.

As to the first contention, we are of the opinion that the crime committed would have been murder if the girl had been killed. It is qualified by the
circumstance of alevosia, the accused making a sudden attack upon his victim from the rear, or partly from the rear, and dealing her a terrible blow in
the back and side with his bolo. Such an attack necessitates the finding that it was made treacherously' and that being so the crime would have been
qualified as murder if death had resulted.

As to the second contention, we are of the opinion that the crime was frustrated and not attempted murder. Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a
frustrated felony as follows:

"A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."

An attempted felony is defined thus:

"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which constitute the felony be reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntarily desistance."

The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the
consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the
crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and
compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is
his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted form frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is
no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the
acts have been performed which should result int he consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not
arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.

To put it in another way, in case of an 'attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of he offense. He is interrupted and compelled to
desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.

On the other had, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the
offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to
something beyond his control.

The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the
last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective.
It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control—that period between the point where he begins
and the point where the point where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his
own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the
last act, it is frustrated.

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That the case before us is frustrated is clear.

The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the
judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.

Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Carson and Trent, JJ., concur in the result.

Page 170 of 258

 [ G. R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

STREET, J.:

The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is under discussion in the present appeal are these:

At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the inter-island steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse
and not far from where the river debouches into Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the
accused, Calixto Valdez y Quid, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and
stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.

The work of raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he accordingly began to abuse the men with
offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult
them. The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand,
threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great
and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.

The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two
scows were moored to the shore, but between these and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. As it was full
midday, and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively
shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and was drowned.

Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped into the water, the accused told the remaining members of the
crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue; but inasmuch as these witnesses are sure that
Venancio did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact that the accused at this juncture threatened the
crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment except to show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to
the surface and could thus be recovered. Though this friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.

It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his
personal belongings have been delivered to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is needless
to say, take it for granted that he is dead.

The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and
we think that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The
proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers could see; and this circumstance, coupled with the
known fact that human life must inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility that he might have
swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we consider too remote to be entertained for a moment.

As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned there likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in
throwing himself into the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death.
As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the
same. As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try
to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs.
Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N. S.], 701.)

In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in the brief of the Attorney-General, as follows: It
appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at
the injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning. The medical authorities charged
with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person, supposing that
he had received no succour, and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. Having been convicted as the
author of the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of
frustrated homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That even though the death of the injured
person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the
aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled
the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him, and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined
resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the
decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of
the injured person was due to the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Cargantel, and he was properly convicted of the
offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a
wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9, Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for
twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500,

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and to pay the costs. Said sentence is in accordance with law; and it being understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those
specified in article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Mapa, C. J., Malcolm, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

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 [ G.R. No. L-30449, October 31, 1979 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE ALIAS "TONY MANOK" AND REYNALDO
ARVISO Y REBELLEZA ALIAS "RENE BISUGO", DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of April 17, 1969 by the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, which found the accused guilty of murder and
sentenced them to the death penalty.

The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs. Corazon Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased,
Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that at the time of the incident, she resided at Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. She lived at Pasay City for about
five months before moving to another dwelling at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. While residing at Pasay City, she conceived a child and during this
period, it was not unusual for her, accompanied by her husband, to step out of the house in the wee hours of the morning. They set out on these
irregular walks about five times.

During her residence at Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty times. Sometimes her brother would stay instead at their
parents' house at Muntinlupa, Rizal. He usually spent his weekends in his residence at Bo. Balubad, Porac, Pampanga. Apolonio and her husband
were very close to each other; whenever Apolonio paid them a visit, he usually slept in the house and sought their help on various problems.

Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in
front of an establishment known as Bill's Place at M. de la Cruz Street, Pasay City. In her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police executed on
November 3, 1968, Corazon surmised that her husband must have been painting the town red ("nag good time") in that same place. Upon learning
this information from her husband, Corazon obtained permission to leave the house at 3:00 a. m. so she could fetch her brother. At that time, she
had not been aware that Apolonio was in Pasay City; she had been of the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. She went to fetch him
because she wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. In explaining the rationale for her noctural mission, she employed in her
sworn statement the following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi
mabuti."

On her way, as she rounded the corner of P. C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a group of about seven persons, including the two
accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She recognized the two accused because they were former gang-mates of her brother; in fact, she
knew them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo," respectively.

Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp instrument. Later, in the course of giving her sworn
statement before the Pasay City police on November 3, 1968, Corazon positively identified Antonio and Reynaldo, who were then at the office of the
General Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, Pasay City Police Department. She also stated that if she saw the other members of the
group again, perhaps she could likewise identify them. At the trial, Corazon likewise pointed out the two accused. During the incident, she exerted
efforts to identify the other group members, taking care to conceal herself as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek cover.

When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group catch up with her brother and maltreat him. Some
beat him with pieces of wood, while others boxed him. Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left
behind. He was sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long knife. Corazon was not able to observe
where Antonio later fled, for she could hardly bear to witness the scene.

When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a pool of his own blood. The incident threw her in a
state of nervous confusion, and she resolved to report the incident to her younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street, Pasay City. Her sister in turn
decided to break the news to their father at Muntinlupa.

Subsequently, Corazon learned that the police authorities were searching for her brother's gangmates for having killed him. She also learned that
the suspects were in hiding. On the same day - October 19, 1968 - accompanied by her family, she went at 2:00 p. m. to the Police Department to
inquire about her brother's corpse. They were directed to the Funeraria Popular, where an autopsy was held. Sometime later, on November 1,
1968, she transferred residence to Quezon City.

Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the decedent Apolonio, and that he prepared the
corresponding Necropsy Report. Dr. Cueva found that the deceased suffered 22 stab wounds in the different portions of his hips; in the front portion
of the chest and neck; in the back portion of the torso; and in the right hand. He testified that the wounds sustained by the deceased brought about a
massive hemmorhage which caused death. He also testified that it is possible that the instrument marked as Exhibit "B" could have been used in
inflicting the multiple stab wounds sustained by the deceased, except the stab wounds on the neck.

Both the accused took refuge in the defense of alibi. Antonio Garcia claimed that at that time of the incident - starting with the chase and ending with
the victim's death - in the morning of October 19, 1968, he was at a place called Pacita's Canteen which adjoins Bill's Place at M. de la Cruz Street.
Reynaldo Arviso claimed that in the evening of the preceding night (October 18, 1968) he went on a drinking spree with his friends at Pacita's
Canteen. He went home at 10:30 p. m. and slept up to 7:00 a. m. of October 19, 1968. From 7:00 a. m. of that day, he performed his duties as a
bus conductor by calling for passengers near Pacita's Canteen.

The trial court pinpointed the issue as revolving around the identity of the persons who participated in the killing of the deceased. It banked on the
testimony of the witness, Corazon Dioquino, who positively identified the accused as participants in the attack. Noting that "the defense did not even
attempt to present any evil motive on the part of the witness," the court concluded that "the two accused took part in the perpetuation of the crime
Page 173 of 258
charged." It gave short shrift to the defense of alibi presented by the two accused, noting that, by their own admission, the two accused were
residents of the vicinity of the crime.

In respect of the circumstances attending the crime it said:

But considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime; superior strength; and treachery, which three aggravating circumstances had been
sufficiently established by the prosecution, the same cannot be offset by said voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his agent, plus the
uncontested fact that deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. suffered no less than 22 stab wounds, convincing evidence of the apparent criminal
perversity of the accused, the court, therefore, has no alternative but to impose the supreme penalty.

And rendered judgment as follows:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused, Antonio Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information, and considering the aggravating circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, each one of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

The two accused are further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND
(P12,000.00) PESOS, jointly and severally; and to pay their proportionate share of the costs."

In their Brief, the accused contended that the lower court erred: in not considering nighttime and superior strength as absorbed in treachery: in
finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance despite absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was purposely sought to insure the execution
of the crime; in finding superior strength as an aggravating circumstance despite absence of evidence to sustain such a finding; in finding treachery
as an aggravating circumstance despite absence of evidence to that effect; in not stating the qualifying circumstance of the alleged crime; in holding
that the accused Reynaldo Arviso stabbed and hit the victim when there is no evidence as to the participation of the said accused Arviso in the
execution of the alleged crime; and in failing to consider the material inconsistencies, prejudice and other circumstances in the uncorroborated
testimony of the only eyewitness, rendering said testimony not worthy of belief.

The assignment of errors by the accused is anchored on their attempt to discredit the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, a function which, if
successfully undertaken, would totally obliterate the nexus between the accused and the crime. The defense vigorously maintained that the
testimony of the only eyewitness is a fabrication, and that she was in fact absent from the scene which she described in both her sworn statement
and in her testimony at the trial.

The defense asserted that Corazon Dioquino's testimony was riddled by material inconsistencies. The defense sought to capitalize on the
discrepancy of a sketch made by Corazon and the sketch made by Pasay City Electrical Engineer Jaime Arriola. Corazon's sketch shows Juan
Sumulong Elementary School to be right in front of P. C. Santos Street; while Arriola's sketch shows that the school is about 135 meters from the
corner of the street. The defense contended that the discrepancy was a deliberate falsehood on the part of the witness.

Corazon testified that she was near the corner of P. C. Santos Street when she saw her brother under chase in front of the school, and that she met
the group in front of the school in a matter of five seconds, more or less. The defense assailed her testimony on this point as incredible on the
ground that the distance between the point where she saw her brother being chased, up to the point where she met them, is 135 meters, and no
human being can cover that distance in five seconds. Moreover, Corazon testified that she was 20 meters away from the place where the accused
caught up with her brother. Again, the defense criticized her testimony in this respect by pointing out that the true distance is 175 meters.

The defense insisted that Corazon's sketch of the locale of the crime (Exhibit "1") constitutes "the high point of falsity of her testimony." The defense
sought to substantiate this claim by arguing that from her sketch, it appears that she never crossed paths with her brother or his pursuers. The
witness testified that she saw her brother at the point which is four to five meters from the corner of P. C. Santos Street. Yet she also testified that
she saw the incident from 20 meters. The witness claimed she hid after hearing the shot at a point which is 170 meters from the scene of the crime.
The defense argued that she could not have covered the distance in such a short time, and that this belies her claim that she was only 20 meters
from the scene of the crime. The defense pointed out that Arriola's sketch (Exhibit "2") shows that the school is 135 meters from the scene of the
crime, and the point where the witness claimed she viewed the crime is 170 meters from the scene of the crime, thus giving the lie to her claim that
she was 20 meters away.

The alleged inconsistencies in Corazon's testimony - which the defense makes much of - are not irreconcilable with the physical facts. At the outset,
it should not be overlooked that Corazon was testifying as an eyewitness to the traumatic incident by which her brother met a violent death at the
hands of a mob. Naturally, Corazon can not be expected to deliver a testimony which passes microscopic scrutiny and scrupulous armchair analysis
of the facts, conducted under circumstances far removed from the turbulence and emotional color of the event as it actually transpired. Al contrario,
if Corazon's testimony were meticulously accurate with respect to distance covered and the time taken to negotiate it, an impartial observer would
wonder whether such exactitude were not the product of previous rehearsal, if not of fabrication. In times of stress, the human mind is frequently
overpowered by the ebb and flow of emotions in turmoil; and it is only judicious to take into consideration the natural manifestations of human
conduct, when the physical senses are subdued by the psychological state of the individual.

Corazon was a resident of Pasay City for only about five months. She testified that she is not familiar with the streets along M. de la Cruz Street.
Moreover, Corazon did not categorically testify that she covered the distance of 135 meters in five seconds. More accurately, she testified that she
walked for a period of from five to ten seconds, more or less. Put in this way, the period was sufficient to allow her to negotiate the distance.
Moreover, Corazon did not stay rooted to one spot while the incident was taking place, but surreptitiously edged her way up to Magtibay Street,
which is closer to the place of the killing.

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The defense also claims that the delay which Corazon allowed to transpire, before reporting the crime to the authorities and giving her sworn
statement (on November 3, 1968), is indicative of fabrication. The killing took place before dawn of October 19, 1968. In the afternoon of the same
day, Corazon and her family went to the Police Department to inquire about the remains of her brother. Corazon already knew that the police were
taking steps to round up the killers. She incurred no fault in waiting until the culprits were arrested before confronting them and giving her statement.
It would have been the better part of legal procedure if she had given her statement earlier; but since she was only a 22-year old housekeeper at that
time, she can not be held to a higher standard of discretion.

The defense further contends that the failure to present Corazon's husband in court indicates that Corazon was not actually at the scene of the crime
at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. If the defense felt that the husband had a contribution to make in the cause of truth, there was nothing which
prevented them from compelling his process by summons. This they failed to do; and their omission should not be taken to reflect adversely on the
prosecution, who evidently believed that the husband's testimony was unnecessary.

Finally, the defense claims that it was unnatural for Corazon, after viewing her brother's body, to proceed to her sister's house one kilometer away,
instead of returning to her own house, which was just a block or so away. It is not unnatural for a witness to a gruesome event, to choose to confer
with a person bound to her by ties of consanguinity, even if such a conference necessitates that she traverse a longer distance. The exercise of
judgment, on the spot, should not be gauged by reason applied in hindsight with a metrical yardstick.

The next major burden which the defense undertook to assume was to contend that the accused Reynaldo Arviso is innocent because there is no
evidence as to his participation in the execution of the crime. It is claimed that there is absolute absence of evidence to show that Reynaldo was a
direct participant and that the only evidence against him is that he was seen pursuing the victim. However, the finding of Reynaldo's guilt stems, not
from his direct participation in the criminal execution, but from his participation in the conspiracy to kill the deceased. His participation in the
conspiracy is supported by Corazon's testimony that he and Antonio were the leaders of the pack following closely at the heels of the victim.

It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts point to a joint purpose and design. A
concerted assault upon the victim by the defendants may indicate conspiracy. (PP v. Monroy & Idica, L-11177, Oct. 30, 1958, 104 Phil. 759).
Conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendants had the same criminal purpose and were united in its execution.
(PP v. Datu Dima Binahasing, L-4837, April 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 902). Those who are members of the band of malefactors by which a murder is
committed and are present at the time and place of the commission of the crime, thus contributing by their presence to augment the power of the
band and to aid in the successful realization of the crime, are guilty as principals even if they took no part in the material act of killing the deceased.
(US v. Abelinde, No. 945, Dec. 10, 1902, 1 Phil. 568; People v. Carunungan, L-13283, Sept. 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 534). To establish conspiracy, it is
not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient that the malefactors have acted in concert, pursuant to
the same objective. (PP v. San Luis, L-2365, May 29, 1950, 86 Phil. 485).

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proven by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert is proven (PP v. Colman, L-6652-54, Feb. 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 6). A conspiracy may be entered into after the
commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. (PP v. Barredo, L-2728, Dec. 29, 1950, 87 Phil. 800). Conspiracy implies
concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution. (PP v. Carbonel, L-24177, March 15, 1926, 48 Phil. 868; PP v. Danan, L-1766,
March 31, 1949, 83 Phil. 252).

When a group of seven men, more or less, give chase to a single unarmed individual running for his life, and they overtake him and inflict wounds on
his body by means of shooting, stabbing, and hitting with pieces of wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not detract from their status as
conspirators that there is no evidence of previous agreement, it being sufficient that their wills have concurred and they labored to achieve the same
end.

The defense submits that the failure of the lower court to specify the qualifying circumstance in the crime of murder is violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court. We find no such infirmity. Since the principle concerned is "readily understood from the facts, the conclusion and the
penalty imposed, an express specification of the statute or exposition of the law is not necessary." (People vs. Silo, L-7916, May 25, 1956, 99 Phil.
216). In the absence of a specification by the trial court, the defense surmised that the qualifying circumstance in this case is evident premeditation;
but the defense argued that evident premeditation was not shown. We agree. Under normal conditions, conspiracy generally presupposes
premeditation. But in the case of implied conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of proof as to how and when the
plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it can not be determined if the accused had "sufficient time
between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had
the opportunity for reflection and persisted in executing his criminal design. (PP v. Custodio, L-7442, October 24, 1955, 97 Phil. 698; PP v. Mendoza
and Sinu-ag, L-4146 and L-4147, March 28, 1952, 91 Phil. 58; PP v. Yturiaga, L-2816, May 31, 1950, 86 Phil. 534; PP v. Lozada, No. 46998, Nov.
16, 1940, 70 Phil. 525; PP v. Upao Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957, 101 Phil. 1226; PP v. Sakam, No. 41566, Dec. 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27; PP v. Peralta,
L-19069, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP v. Pareja, L-21937, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693).

Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the
information. But the defense argued that treachery was not present. We are so convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can in no way
be presumed but must be fully proven. (US v. Asilo, No. 1957, Jan. 30, 1905, 4 Phil. 175; US v. Arciga, No. 1129, April 6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110; PP v.
Durante, No. 31101, Aug. 23, 1929, 53 Phil. 363; PP v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027). Where the manner of the attack was not
proven, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the crime should be considered homicide only. (Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec,
80 Phil. 424).

In People vs. Metran (L-4205, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 543), the aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men, abuse of superiority, and nocturnity,
were considered as constituting treachery, which qualified the crime as murder, since there was no direct evidence as to the manner of the attack.
However, in this case we believe that the correct qualifying circumstance is not treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here we are confronted with a
helpless victim killed by assailants superior to him in arms and in numbers. But the attack was not sudden nor unexpected, and the element of
Page 175 of 258
surprise was lacking. The victim could have made a defense; hence, the assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no showing when
the intent to kill was formed, it can not be said that treachery has been proven. We believe the correct rule is found in People vs. Proceso Bustos
(No. 17763, July 23, 1923, 45 Phil. 9), where alevosia was not appreciated because it was deemed included in abuse of superiority.

We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which made this finding on parallel facts. Our jurisprudence is
exemplified by the holding that where four persons attacked an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commenced and
treachery was not proven, the fact that there were four assailants would constitute abuse of superiority. (People v. Lasada, No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912,
21 Phil. 287; US v. Bañagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10, 1913, 24 Phil. 69). However, the information does not allege the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superiority; hence, this circumstance can only be treated as generic aggravating. (People v. Acusar, L-1798, Dec. 29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490; People
v. Beje, L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil. 1052; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184).

The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed at night, which covers the period from sunset to
sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. Is this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14,
provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of
the offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it
facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative.

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely sought the cover of nighttime. Next, we
proceed and apply the objective test, to determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking
spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal
cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine
their identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. These circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and
we find that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their
impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily identified.

The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Neither
of these qualifying circumstances was proved; hence, the killing can not be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime of homicide,
which is punished by reclusion temporal. It is not controverted that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities; they are therefore entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone mitigating circumstance, offset by the two generic aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superiority and nocturnity, produces the result that in the crime of homicide, one aggravating circumstance remains.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby modified in that the two accused, Antonio Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y
Rebelleza, are sentenced to undergo an indeterminate imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 18 years as maximum, but in all other respects
affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.

Page 176 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-32624, February 12, 1980 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PACIANO NIERRA ALIAS PACING, GAUDENCIA NIERRA, FELICISIMO
DOBLEN ALIAS SIMOY AND VICENTE ROJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS. GASPAR MISA, ACCUSED WHOSE DEATH SENTENCE IS
UNDER AUTOMATIC REVIEW.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision dated March 4, 1970 of Judge
Pedro Samson C. Animas of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City Branch II, convicting them of murder, sentencing
each of them to death and ordering them to pay solidarily an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim, Juliana Nierra (Criminal
Case No. 2081).

Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was also sentenced to death and ordered to pay a similar indemnity (Decision of August 25,
1969, pp. 36-8, Record). His death sentence is under automatic review.

According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Paciano Nierra, 39, her brother-in-law, were competitors in the
businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Paciano sold
pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II, while Paciano was the owner of two launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was
the wife of Aniceto Nierra, Paciano's elder brother. To mollify Paciano, by diminishing the competition between their launches, Aniceto sold Elsa
II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano were not on speaking terms.

In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose,
Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted
murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in
June, 1969. He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)

Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in
consideration of three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the muni-
cipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away from General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the same place on
August 12, 1969.

That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa scheduled the assassination on July 8, 1969, Paciano said that it was up to Misa since
he was the one who would kill Juliana.

In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Paciano Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a package containing a caliber .38 pistol with five
bullets. Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout
on the night of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.

On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near the creek or canal about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the
crime. Gaudencia was stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of the crime. Paciano was near the
house of Juanito Desinorio about twenty- seven steps from the scene of the crime. The houses of the two Desinorios were separated from the
house of Juliana Nierra by an alley.

Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the crime in close proximity to the back of Juliana's house where, as he
had previously observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature. The house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the
beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.

Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa
unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol
and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed the actual killing.

The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained a gunshot wound in the tongue. The bullet passed through the buccal cavity down to
the spinal column where the slug was extracted.

Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing commotion, went down from the house and saw his prostrate wife with blood oozing from her
mouth and nose. Her panty was pulled down, her dress was raised up to her waist, and her genital organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor
pronounced her dead.

After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the houses of Tony Desinorio
and Francisco Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso Gas Station, crossed the creek or canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the
gun into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind and returned to the
Page 177 of 258
beach near the victim's house.

The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing through the alley between the house of the victim and the Desinorio houses, which alley
separated the buildings of the Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia resided. Their residence was about two hundred meters away from the scene of the crime.

A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening of July 8, 1969, when
the killing was perpetrated, testified that she saw Paciano Nierra wearing an underwear and striped T-shirt running from Saguing Street to Barrio
Tinago. About five minutes later, she saw Paciano crossing the boulevard and running towards Saguing Street. He was wearing long pants. The
witness made a statement to the police about what she had seen.

Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for Tupi and alighted near the municipal building. Paciano Nierra arrived in that place
and gave him four hundred pesos. Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and proceeded to the victim's house where he
mingled with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil there, staying there for four nights.

He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission of one peso per
passenger. Policemen arrested him and Rojas for questioning but they were later released. He left the city and brought his family to Barrio Luan,
Maitum, South Cotabato. There, he was arrested again, this time by Constabulary soldiers.

On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A. B. Vencer, Jr. of the city police department. He signed a confession admitting the killing
of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other accused therein. The statement was sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the
killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch of the scene of the crime was prepared.

On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary investigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing and confirmed his confession
implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn to before
the city judge.

Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with murder
aggravated by reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City.

As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co-accused, his confessions and testimony were offered by the prosecution and were the
main bases of the judgment of conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.

As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual cases will be separately reviewed.

Misa's case. - His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him
the gravity of the offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.

That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal procedure. Not only that. He executed
two extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman. He testified at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was sentenced to
death, he was the prosecution star witness during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against his co-accused, delineating their roles in the
commission of the killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as to his
understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).

Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside and that the case be remanded to
the lower court for new trial. To hold a new trial, wherein Misa himself would again be the star prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and
preposterous ceremony.

The case of the Nierra spouses. - They denied any complicity in the killing of Juliana Nierra. Their version is that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at
about eight o'clock in the evening, Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his house. Gaudencia Nierra was in her room, writing something. Eduardo
Nierra, the couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion Sabihon, a housemaid, was somewhere in the house premises.

Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he came out of the room, he met Nolasco Docallos who said that Juliana Nierra was
shot. Paciano Nierra asked who shot her. Docallos answered that he did not know.

Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's motorcycle in going to the hospital. Paciano instructed his son Eduardo to render
assistance. Paciano could not go out because two years before he had undergone a surgical operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the
children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor that Juliana was already dead.

At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day, Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She talked with Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto
Nierra, her brother-in-law and husband of the victim, did not answer when she tried to talk with him.

Page 178 of 258

Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife and their Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano,
boarded a bus and went to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a trip which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed upon
with Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not able to buy bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez Restaurant.

The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at two o'clock in the afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor. They were not able to talk
with Aniceto Nierra. In the evening of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the repose of the soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the
second, third and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the succeeding nights because she was advised that it was bad for her to do
so. Their child attended the novena. Paciano could not attend the novena because he had kidney trouble. They gave one hundred pesos to
Juliana's family as contribution to the funeral expenses.

The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial, Aniceto lost consciousness and collapsed. Paciano revived him by pressing his
abdomen. After the coffin was placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra spouses gave to Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos
(Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness because he was a recidivist and his testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. That
contention is devoid of merit.

Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in his confessions and testimony was that he was hired by the Nierra spouses, through
Doblen, to kill Juliana for the price of three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the conviction of the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the
assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony refer to minor details.

And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual commitment to pay Misa the balance of two thousand six hundred pesos
must have impelled him to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a revelation spelled his own destruction.

The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for
killing Juliana Nierra. He was induced to do so because of the monetary consideration promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to
Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Before Juliana's assassination, Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill Nene Amador, her
former housemaid, who was allegedly Paciano's mistress. That projected killing did not materialize.

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view of the rule that "the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as evidence against appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by
evidence other than such testimony and that there is no such independent evidence. This argument is wrong. It is not supported by section 27 of
Rule 130.

Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant" (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531, 541).

Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding that the motive for the killing was to stifle business competition. This argument is
refuted by the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that Paciano Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the
manager or "brains" of Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola distribution businesses.

In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa II, while it was under construction. Aniceto had to sell that launch because of
Paciano's threat that somebody would be hurt if its operation was continued. Paciano told Rodelio that the latter's mother, Juliana, who was
pockmarked, was bad and dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions, Paciano even challenged his brother to a fight.

Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court convicted them on the basis of the hearsay testimonies of Guillermo Sanchez and Jose
Samoya. This argument is misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool
used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death. Misa's evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.

The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that Misa, Rojas and Doblen were implicated in the killing of Juliana Nierra. It was the
affidavit of Sanchez, linking Misa to the killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in the solution of the case. After the connection of Misa with the
crime was established, the police arrested him and obtained his confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the instigators.

The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the affidavit of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J)
which was obtained through an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not clear as to that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on
August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified at the preliminary investigation. The record of his testimony before the fiscal was signed by him. He was
assisted by counsel at that preliminary investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise of immunity was shown to have been made by the fiscal to Rojas.

In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial and decisive evidence consists
of Misa's testimony and confessions.

Page 179 of 258

Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted at the preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant Doblen, having been allegedly
hired by the offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for
Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).

The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already noted, were convicted on the
basis of Misa's confessions and testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown or rebutted Misa's evidence.

It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend of Aniceto Nierra by
pretending that he had no hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.

We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and
Gaudencia Nierra did not go to the funeral parlor to view the remains of Juliana.

After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there was a confrontation between the said spouses and Aniceto Nierra in the house of
their brother, Alonso, in the presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The following dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:

Paciano: "Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of your wife?"

Aniceto: "Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to you that you were standing by the post and Paciano (Gaudencia) was also standing in
another post when he (Misa) killed my wife. From now on, I have no brother by the name of Pacing."

Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.

Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they were confined in the city jail (translation):

"My companion Pacing (Paciano):

"I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do my best that you will be free. Before the trial of (in) court, I would like that you give me
the sum of P600 even if you give the cash advance of P500 before Sunday. OK and you give the same thru the hole.

"Your companion,

Sgd. Gaspar Misa

"Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately." (Exh. 1)

The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co-conspirators. The Nierras were co-principals by inducement. By acting as lookouts
during the perpetration of the killing, they became co-principals by cooperation as well.

Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. - Doblen's alibi was that on the night of the killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan, South Cotabato. He returned to
General Santos City at ten o'clock in the morning of the following day. He denied that he accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July
4, 1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing the murder weapon.

Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his pumpboat at Lion's Beach, General Santos City. However, that could not have
precluded him from having acted as lookout on that same beach.

These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's confessions and testimony have no probative value because there was no other
evidence proving the alleged conspiracy. As already stated, that rule does not apply to testimony given on the witness stand where the defendants
have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).

It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because he was not present when Misa and the Nierra spouses discussed the liquidation of
Juliana Nierra and that when Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did not know that it contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is
contended that he was not present at the said conference between Misa and the Nierra spouses.

These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen and Rojas indubitably show that they had community of design with the Nierra
spouses and Misa in the assassination of Juliana Nierra.

Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained
under an alleged promise of immunity.

It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain anything connecting him to the murder. In that affidavit, he denied that he had any
participation in the commission of the crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the admission in evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at
all.

Page 180 of 258

The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As to
the Nierras, relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.

Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added shame, disgrace or obloquy to
the material injury caused by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417).

In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of guilty. That did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon
him.

Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in accordance with law. However, for lack of the
requisite ten votes, the death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene
of the crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for his work.

After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as
accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals. However, since their participation was
not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to
them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases).

In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if
his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs.
Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.

(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is commuted to reclusion perpetua. The civil liability imposed upon her by the trial court is
affirmed.

(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are convicted as accomplices. They are each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten
years of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals
an indemnity of six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the extent of six thousand
pesos for the principals' civil liability. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Page 181 of 258

 [ G.R. NO. 79811, March 19, 1990 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PIO CANTUBA & PEDRITO LALAGUNA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

The accused-appellants Pio Cantuba and Pedrito Lalaguna together with co-accused Gualberto Versales (alias Berting), Satur Gerbuela, Ricardo
Baco, Rogelio Penales (alias Pugo), Romeo Totong Labuyo and Mayor Moises Espinosa were charged with the crime of Murder under Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code in an amended information which reads as follows:

"That on or about December 23, 1981 in the municipality of Masbate, province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the said accused, confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and with
night-time as a means to better facilitate the commission of the crime, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one ATTY. ADOLFO CELERA,
by then and there shooting him at several parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter, mortal wounds which are the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.

"Contrary to law." (p. 124, Rollo)

The accused Cantuba, Lalaguna, Versales, Gerbuela, Baco and Mayor Moises Espinosa pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Penales and Labuyo
remained at large and were not arraigned.

The defense, in a motion for an order requiring the Prosecuting Fiscal or Fiscals in this case to conduct another investigation and thereafter to
include in the Amended Information all persons, who appear responsible therefore, moved for the inclusion of one Pat. Torrecampo, a confessed
participant in the alleged crime, as one of the accused. Although the motion was granted by the court, the issue was eventually rendered moot and
academic when the trial was completed without the Prosecuting Fiscals having complied with the court's order.

On April 27, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find accused PIO CANTUBA and PEDRITO LALAGUNA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify jointly and solidarily the heirs of Atty.
Celera in the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.

"Accused GUALBERTO VERSALES, SATUR GERBUELA and MAYOR MOISES R. ESPINOSA, are hereby ACQUITTED, for insufficiency of
evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with the consequent cancellation of their bailbonds.

"The case against accused RICARDO BACO who is already dead is DISMISSED.

"The case against ROMEO alias TOTONG LABUYO and ROGELIO PENALES alias PUGO who, up to the present are at large, is hereby placed in
the ARCHIVES.

"SO ORDERED." (pp. 66-67, Rollo)

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Margie Rator, Romulo Tama and Pat. Rodolfo Torrecampo and on the
basis of their testimonies the facts as hereunder narrated are reconstructed by the Solicitor General, as follows:

"On December 21, 1981, Patrolman Rodolfo Torrecampo, then under suspension but working as the bodyguard of Mayor Moises Espinosa, went to
Dagusungan, Milagros, Masbate to fetch one Romeo 'Totong' Labuyo, the 'encargado' of Mayor Espinosa's ranch, and to Pulang-Bato, Masbate,
Masbate to fetch Pio Cantuba, the mayor's 'sidekick' in his cockpit (TSN, Sept. 3, 1985, pp. 335, 337; TSN, September 2, 1985, p. 297).

"On December 23, 1981, all three went to the provincial jail to secure the release of Ricardo Baco, a detention prisoner (TSN, Sept. 3, 1985, pp. 338,
342). Together with Baco, they proceeded to the house of Saturnino Gerbuela, a provincial guard, but the latter was not at home (Id., p. 343). They
left Baco behind to wait for Gerbuela with instructions that they both should proceed to Sunrise Disco Pub at 6:00 p.m. (Id.). Torrecampo, Labuyo
and Cantuba went to the Bel-Air Theater to kill time staying there for about two hours before proceeding to the Sunrise Disco Pub (Id., pp. 344, TSN,
November 7, 1985, p. 446). Ricardo Baco was already at the Sunrise Disco Pub when they arrived (TSN, September 3, 1985, p. 345).

"Torrecampo told the group to wait outside while he checked inside the pub to see if Atty. Adolfo Celera was inside (Id., p. 345). As the pub was
dark, he could not confirm Atty. Celery's presence (Id., p. 346). Coming out of the pub, Torrecampo explained to Cantuba, Labuyo and Baco how
they would kill Atty. Celera. He handed to Labuyo a .45 cal. pistol and to Baco a knife (machete) (Id., pp. 346, 347). Torrecampo described the
features of the victim to Baco (Id., p. 346) and instructed Cantuba, who knew Atty. Celera, to signal Baco and Labuyo as soon as he sees their victim
approaching (TSN, November 7, 1985, p. 446).

"Atty. Adolfo Celera was a practicing lawyer and had run for public office (Id., p. 450). He had been the lawyer for the complainant in a rape case
brought against Mayor Espinosa, formerly Governor of Masbate (TSN, January 23, 1985, p. 75, TSN, October 21, 1987, pp. 3-4), who at the time of
Page 182 of 258
Atty. Celera's death had filed a case against the latter for moral damages (TSN, September 2, 1985, p. 294). After the trial of the damage suit began,
Atty. Celera confided to his wife that Mayor Espinosa had warned him that should he lose the suit a 'miracle' would happen (TSN, October 21, 1985,
pp. 4, 5). Subsequently, Atty. Jolly Fernandez (later Assemblyman), who collaborated with Atty. Celera in the rape case against Mayor Espinosa,
was 'bombed' as he left the court On December 2, 1981 (Id., pp. 6, 7).

"On the evening of December 23, 1981, Atty. Celera, together with Margie Rotor and Ave Refil, attended the Christmas party of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT). They left the place after staying for one hour and took a tricycle to Pil-Tel, a local long distance telephone company. Atty.
Celera went inside Pil-Tel while his companions waited outside. Margie Rotor noticed that there were also three other people standing outside Pil-Tel
(Id., p. 59) one of them she recognized as Pio Cantuba a long time acquaintance (Id., p. 60). After 5 minutes, Atty. Celera came out of Pil-Tel and
then headed for the Sunrise Disco Pub (TSN, January 23, 1985, pp. 56, 58, 61) just across the street from Pil-Tel. (Id., p. 58, 59; TSN, June 10,
1985, p. 135). Ave Refil was called by somebody and Atty. Celera and Margie Rotor went inside the Pub and ordered a bottle of White Castle and
before they had consumed its contents Atty. Celera told her that he will go home already (Id., p. 62).

Margie Rotor accompanied Atty. Celera to the gate of the pub where they stood facing the street waiting for a tricycle, with Margie Rotor standing at
the right side of Atty. Celera (TSN, January 23, 1985, p. 63). The gate was lighted by a long fluorescent lamp. Near them, by the side of the
Carandang Optical, Margie Rotor noticed a man standing by a blue Yamaha Motorbike with a butterfly sticker (Id., p. 71). She also noticed that Pio
Cantuba and his two companions were still standing near the wall of Pil-Tel (Id., p. 63; TSN, January 24, 1985, p. 133). Then the three dispersed.
Pio Cantuba walked towards UCPB which was to her left and then Cantuba returned and headed towards where she and Atty. Celera were standing
(Id., p. 64). One of Cantuba's companions who was wearing a white t-shirt and maong pants, whom Margie Rotor recognized in the courtroom and
turned out to be Ricardo Baco, circled behind them (Id., p. 64).

"As Cantuba slowly approached them, Margie Rotor saw that Cantuba was holding a gun (Id., 65). Then she heard a gunfire (TSN, September 3,
1985, p. 348) and Atty. Celera staggered. Then Ricardo Baco rushed from behind and stabbed Atty. Celera twice on the left chest (Id., p. 349; TSN,
January 23, 1985, p. 66). Atty. Celera fell to the ground, groaning (Id., p. 67).

"As Cantuba and Baco were fleeing, Margie Rotor saw a 'tricycle' speeding towards the fallen victim (Id., p. 68) but Margie Rotor was able to pull his
body out of its path (Id., p. 69). The glaring lights of the vehicle made it difficult for her to make out and identify the rider (Id., p. 68). However, 17 year
old Romulo Tama, a bystander who had also seen the blue Yamaha motorbike with a butterfly sticker near Carandang Optical, saw the rider, whom
he recognized as Pedrito Lalaguna, start the engine and speed away right after Atty. Celera fell to the ground mortally wounded (TSN, June 10,
1985, pp. 131, 132).

"Margie Rotor, Patrolman Igloso and Nino, a waiter at Sunrise Disco Pub, took Atty. Celera to the Masbate Provincial Hospital in a tricycle (TSN,
June 23, 1985, pp. 69, 70). Atty. Celera sustained a gunshot in the left lumbar area, or at the left back just above the waistline, with no exit wound,
and two stab wounds on the left side of his body, one over the 'epig. area' and the other between the 6th and 7th ribs between sternal and mid-
clavicular lines or just below the nipple (TSN, July 30, 1985, p. 259; September 2, 1985, pp. 291-292). Adolfo Juancho Celera, Jr., eldest son of the
deceased, also rushed to the hospital and saw the doctor remove a .45 cal. slug from his father's right torso (TSN September 2, 1985, p. 288). Atty.
Celera died in the hospital.

Technical Sgt. Randolf Arizala, together with Col. Cesar Veloso immediately investigated the reported shooting of Atty. Celera (TSN, November 26,
1984, p. 13). Arizala saw the slug that was extracted from the deceased (Id., pp. 14, 15). As a result of an on-the-spot investigation, Sgt. Arizala
traced the blue Yamaha motorcycle to Ernesto Lampago and found the vehicle at the latter's address in Masbate, Masbate (Id., pp. 16, 18). While
the rear tire was deflated, Sgt. Arizala observed that the engine was still warm (Id., p. 17). Lampago explained that the motorcycle was owned by
Godofredo Versales whose wife mortgaged the same to Lampago (Id., p. 17). Sgt. Arizala impounded the vehicle (Id., p. 18).

"That same evening, at around nine o'clock in the evening, Romeo Gerona, went out of his sister's house to buy cigarettes (TSN, July 30, 1985, pp.
266, 267). On the way, a tricycle with four persons on board passed him and then stopped in front of the house of Mayor Espinosa (Id., p. 267). He
recognized two of them - Pugo Penales and Pio Cantuba (Id., pp. 267, 268)." (pp. 4-9, Appellee's Brief; p. 124, Rollo)

Now Appellants Pio Cantuba and Pedrito Lalaguna filed the instant appeal assigning the following errors:

The Lower Court erred in finding that accused, Pio Cantuba, fired the fatal shot that snuffed the life of deceased Adolfo Celera, despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

II

The Lower Court erred in convicting accused, Pedrito Lalaguna, despite the fact that the only evidence against him consisted solely of having been
seen driving a motorbike away from the scene of the crime.

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 III

The Lower Court erred in disregarding the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
(p. 3, Appellee's Brief)

It is the contention of accused-appellant that even if he (Cantuba) did approach the victim with a gun in his hand, it was never established that the
fatal shot came from his gun.

The contention is untenable. First, the factual points marshalled by the appellants do not engender reasonable doubt as to his (Cantuba) culpability.
Second, even assuming that he (Cantuba) never fired his gun, he would still be principally liable as a co-conspirator in the killing of Atty. Celera
under the principle that the act of a conspirator is the act of all co-conspirators. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is
immaterial in a conspiracy.

With regard to the alleged conflicting testimonies of the two principal witnesses, Margie Rotor and Pat. Torrecampo, as to who really fired upon Atty.
Celera, the Court is convinced that the testimony of Margie Rotor is more credible than that of Torrecampo because when witness Margie Rotor
heard the gunfire, it was after she saw Pio Cantuba holding a gun while walking towards them. This court finds that the only competent persons to
identify the person who fired the gun are the witnesses present at the scene of the crime. Witness Margie Rotor who was standing right beside the
victim is more believable than Torrecampo who was standing across the street. When contradictory statements refer only to minor details, this does
not destroy their credibility. Their inconsistency in minor details is proof that they were not rehearsed.

With respect to the sworn statement of Ricardo Baco claiming that it was Totong Labuyo who shot Atty. Celera remain hearsay evidence and,
therefore, inadmissible since Baca was never presented to allow the prosecution to cross-examine him. Moreover, it was physically impossible for
Baco to see who actually fired the gun because Baco went the opposite direction and encircled Rotor and the victim from behind. His eyes were
fixed on the victim and not on the gunwielder who was at a distance from the victim.

It is a well settled rule that when the main thrust of the appeal is that of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution is assailed, and appellant
failed to demonstrate why this court should depart from the cardinal principle that the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility should not
be disturbed on appeal due to its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying unless some fact or
circumstance may have been overlooked that may affect the result of the case.

Anent the second assignment of error, it is the contention of the accused-appellant Pedrito Lalaguna that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the fact that the only evidence against him consisted solely of having been seen driving a motorbike away from the scene of the crime.

We do not agree with the appellant's claim that his participation in Atty. Celera's murder is tenuous because the records show otherwise. Both
prosecution witnesses Margie Rotor and Romulo Tama testify to one motorbike or 'tricycle' that was speeding at precisely the same time, i.e.,
immediately after Atty. Celera had fallen to the ground as a result of the gunshot and stab wounds.

Accused-appellant Lalaguna points out that Margie Rotor did not testify against him. This statement is misleading. Margie Rotor testified against the
rider of the speeding 'tricycle' as a participant in the ambush because he was bent on running over the fallen Atty. Celera. The only element missing
in her testimony is the identity of the rider because of the glare of the vehicle's lights. This, however, was supplied by Romulo Tama who recognized
the rider to be Pedrito Lalaguna, whom he had known even before the incident. Their testimonies as to the motorbike aspect of the incident
corroborate each other. They both distinctly remember the noticeable speed of the vehicle and that it happened after Atty. Celera had fallen to the
ground. By reason of their relative vantage points, this court finds each witness naturally recalling details which the other would not have noticed.
This is indicative of credible and unadulterated testimony. Slight variations in the testimony of two witnesses strengthen their credibility (People v.
Villamil, 135 SCRA 610).

Accused-appellant further calls the attention of this court to the fact that Pat. Torrecampo did not mention him (Pedrito Lalaguna) as among his
companions when the former directed the killing. This court finds this fact not exculpatory.

It does not in any way contradict the testimonies of Margie Rotor and Romulo Tama that appellant Lalaguna was at the scene of the crime and tried
to run down the victim. Appellant Lalaguna's identity and participation had been sufficiently established, and his motives become inconsequential
(People v. Soriano, 134 SCRA 542).

The trial court correctly convicted appellant Lalaguna as a co-conspirator as the circumstances of his participation indubitably showed unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful acts as can be gleaned from the fact that, Lalaguna knew of the plot to assasinate Atty. Celera as
he too had been ordered to scout for a man who could do the job (TSN, Sept. 3, 1985, pp. 355-356). He also knew exactly the place where the killing
was to take place and also the date and approximate time of the assault.

At the very least, therefore, he had to know about the Torrecampo plot and decided to joint its execution. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists
if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. (People v. Caday, 28 SCRA
388; People v. Sy, 113 SCRA 207)

Appellant Lalaguna insists that the act of driving a motorbike is an equivocal act. This would be correct only if the testimony of Romulo Tama were
considered in isolation from the testimony of Margie Rotor, Pat. Torrecampo and Sgt. Rodolfo Arizala which clearly indicate that Lalaguna drove the
Page 184 of 258
vehicle to run down the victim and that he shared in the criminal intent to do away with Atty. Celera. Therefore, the criminal culpability of appellant
Pedrito Lalaguna had been clearly established.

Relative to the last assigned error, the state has satisfactorily discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants' discussion of their third assignment of error seems to imply that the decision was premised on the weakness of the arguments and
evidence for the defense. However, an unprejudiced reading of the decision and the points already discussed will readily show otherwise.

Be it noted that the questioned judgment tried very well to rebut the defense of alibi of Pio Cantuba and Pedrito Lalaguna. Appellants defense of alibi
is jurisprudentially weak (People v. Onquillano, 149 SCRA 442; People v. Acelajado, 148 SCRA 142). As they were not able to demonstrate by
convincing evidence that it was not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Moreover, the
defense of alibi is generally accepted with caution, because under certain circumstances might exonerate the accused on the ground of impossibility
of participation, or at the very least, raise a reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, both appellant claimed that on the night and time of the incident
they were not at the vicinity of the Sunrise Disco Pub where the alleged crime was committed, as they were then in the house of Asst. Provincial
Treasurer Manlapaz playing 'pusoy'. But considering the admitted fact that the distance between the house of Asst. Provincial Treasurer Manlapaz
where the accused claimed to be, is only 300 meters away from the Sunrise Disco Pub, where the crime was perpetrated, there is no physical
impossibility for both accused to be at the scene of the crime. Accordingly, such defense merits no serious consideration. Moreover, both accused
were positively identified by prosecution witnesses Margie Rotor, Rodolfo Torrecampo and Romulo Tama. Accused Pio Cantuba, as the person who
fired the gun and Pedrito Lalaguna, as the rider of the speeding motorbike or 'tricycle' who was bent on running over the fallen body of Atty. Celera.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Page 185 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-39519, November 21, 1991 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL PINTO, JR. AND NARCISO-BUENAFLOR, JR., DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

FERNAN, C.J.:

As an aftermath of the mission of the Legazpi City Police Department to serve on Christmas day in 1970 a search warrant on Francisco Bello who
was allegedly training a private army, patrolmen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then
Circuit Criminal Court in said city, of killing not only Bello but also 9-year-old Richard Tiongson and Rosalio Andes and seriously wounding Maria
Theresa Tiongson. The dispositive portion of the decision of June 13, 1974[1] reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Daniel Pinto, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of:

(a) MURDER in CCC-X-288-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to
indemnify the heir of Rosalio Andes in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;

(b) MURDER in CCC-X-289-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to
indemnify the heirs of Francisco Bello in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;

(c) MURDER in CCC-X-298-Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua);
to indemnify the heirs of Richard Tiongson in the amount of Twenty five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;

(d) FRUSTRATED MURDER in CCC-X-299 Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment of from Six (6) Years and One
(1) Day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum; to indemnify the victim, Maria
Theresa Tiongson, in the amount of Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs.

In addition to the foregoing the accused are sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office."

According to the prosecution, on December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police secured from the City Court of Legazpi a warrant for the search of the
house and premises of Francisco Bello in Mariawa, Legazpi City on the ground that the police had probable cause to believe that Bello illegally
possessed a garand rifle, a thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols.[2] The police had earlier undertaken a surveillance of Bello on the
basis of information it had received that he was conducting an "obstacle course" or training men for combat since October, 1970.[3]

Upon receipt of the search warrant, the Chief of Police, Dr. Solomon Adornado, [4] called his officers to a "confidential conference" at the residence of
Mayor Gregorio Imperial. Present at said conference were the mayor, his secretary, and the officers of the patrol division, secret service and the
administration of the city police. The Chief of Police was assisted by Major Alfredo Molo, head of the intelligence division of the city police, in briefing
the group on how to serve the search warrant and to arrest Bello as the latter had been identified as the one who shot Salustiano Botin the night
before. At the time of the briefing, no warrant of arrest had yet been issued against Bello.[5]

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The policemen were divided into three teams and around five members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who were also present were assigned to
the different teams.[6] Team 3 was placed under the charge of Sgt. Salvador de la Paz with a policeman named Luna and appellants Buenaflor and
Pinto as members. Wilfredo Romero was the PC member assigned to the team.[7] Except for Romero and Pinto who were each armed with a
carbine, the policemen of Team 3 each carried a .38 caliber pistol.[8]

Loaded in four vehicles, the three teams proceeded from the residence of the Mayor to barrio Homapon arriving there at around seven o'clock in the
evening. The four vehicles met at the junction of Homapon and the road to Mariawa. They had decided to ride on the way to Mariawa when one of
the jeeps bogged down because of the muddy road. Hence, the three teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the teams
maintaining a distance of around ten meters between them.[9]

Suddenly, Romero noticed the members of his team running. He ran with them and then he heard someone shout "Pondo!" (stop). The shout was
followed by a shot and then a burst of gunfire. The team had by then deployed to the right side of the road. When Romero checked the men by
shouting the agreed pass-word of "bayawas" for which the person challenged answered "santol",[10] he found that Buenaflor was 5 meters in front of
him "at the bank of the road", Pinto was two meters to the right of Buenaflor, Sgt. de la Paz was two meters to his (Romero's) right, Luna who was
holding a walkie-talkie was to his left and another policeman was in front of Luna.[11] When Romero heard the gunburst, he saw "flashes of fire" "just
in front" of him or from the place where Buenaflor was.[12]

The area where the team deployed was lower in elevation than the road but Romero heard the rumbling of a jeep going towards the direction of
Homapon when he heard the burst of gunfire and saw the flashes of fire from the direction of Buenaflor.[13]

On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix Capellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the driver.
They had just come from a lechonada party in the hacienda in Mariawa of Mrs. Purificacion Napal Anduiza, the mother of Francisco Bello. Fr.
Capellan had celebrated mass to commemorate the death anniversary of Mrs. Anduiza's father. When Fr. Capellan decided to go back to his parish,
the Anduizas offered their jeep for his transportation.[14] Seated on the front seat of the “McArthur type” jeep which had only a canvass top but no
cover on the sides and back,[15] were the driver, Mrs. Tiongson with a child on her lap and Fr. Capellan.[16] Richard Tiongson was seated on the steel
seat behind the driver while his sister Maria Theresa was beside him.[17] The three other children were also seated at the back.

Page 187 of 258

After crossing the creek on their way to Homapon and as the driver "changed to high gear with a dual",[18] Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some
300 yards ahead.[19] Fearing that there might be "people with bad intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Capellan told the driver to go faster.[20] Then Fr.
Capellan heard one shot and after a few seconds and around 50 meters ahead, there was rapid firing with some of the bullets hitting the jeep.[21]
According to Mrs. Tiongson, the widow of Col. Angel Tiongson of the PC, the rapid firing sounded "automatic".[22] The firing came from the left
rear side of the jeep.[23]

Before they were fired upon, Maria Theresa saw a man lying flat on his stomach while holding a gun on the left side of the road just ahead of the
jeep.[24] Through the light of the jeep, Maria Theresa noticed that the man was wearing a jacket and a hat and he was on the shoulder of the road. [25]
After passing the man, the rapid firing ensued. Richard said "ugh" and fell on the floor of the jeep. Maria Theresa was about to hold Richard when
she felt herself hit at the buttocks. Then they all screamed.[26]

The jeep continued its fast uphill climb until it reached a level area and almost fell into a ditch were it not for a clump of banana plants. The jeep
came to a full stop. Fr. Capellan saw three men with flashlights but he could not distinguish their faces as it was dark and their flashlights were
focused on the ground.[27] Mrs. Tiongson saw a PC jeep and some cars and, believing that one of the cars was that of the Mayor, she called Tia

Page 188 of 258

Citang, the mother of the mayor, at the same time identifying herself.[28] She must have managed to take Richard from the jeep and was cuddling him
on the ground near the left rear end of the jeep when she requested Fr. Capellan to administer extreme unction on Richard. As Fr. Capellan had no
holy oil, he gave the boy absolution.[29]

Even after Mrs. Tiongson had identified herself as the widow of Col. Tiongson to the men around, nobody listened to her appeal for help. When she
approached Chief of Police Adornado, she hit him and asked him why they shot her and her companions. The Chief of Police replied that the
shooting was no longer his fault because Mrs. Tiongson and her companions did not stop when told to do so. She requested the Chief of Police for
a car in which to take Richard to the hospital or for a driver and even for a walkie-talkie so she could talk to Mayor Imperial but the Chief of Police did
not heed her pleas.[30] (TSN, February 9, 1972, pp. 17-22).

A few minutes later, a jeep driven by Fernando Anduisa arrived. Mrs. Tiongson and her children boarded the jeep. At the intersection of the road to
Legazpi City proper and the road to Mariawa, the area was brightly lighted and armed men ordered them to put their hands up. They were told to
alight from the jeep to be searched but Mrs. Tiongson begged the lieutenant manning the area to let them pass so they could bring her two children
to the hospital.[31]

Richard and Maria Theresa were brought to the Sacred Heart Clinic in Legazpi City. Thirteen-year-old Maria Theresa was treated for a gunshot
wound at the "right upper quadrant of the right buttocks".[32] Her pelvis and abdomen were x-rayed. One of the x-ray plates[33] revealed an oval spot
indicating a foreign body in Maria Theresa's pelvis. The attending physician decided not to extract the foreign body as Maria Theresa was not a
"very good surgical risk".[34] The hospital charged P282.90 for Theresa's hospitalization.[35] She was later brought by an army plane to the PC Station
Hospital in Camp Crame, Quezon City for further treatment and hospitalization[36] but the foreign body was never removed from her pelvic area.

Richard sustained a gunshot wound at the back about the level of the 5th lumbar vertebrae. The bullet traveled obliquely to the left kidney, the
lesser sac, the liver and the right auricle.[37] Richard was operated at the hospital but he died at 8:45 the following morning due to massive

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hemorrhage caused by the gunshot wound.[38] When he was autopsied, a lead slug was found embedded in his heart.[39] His mother paid P862.35[40]
for his hospitalization and was charged P200 by the church. Mayor Imperial paid P500 to Funeraria Oro for Richard's burial.[41]

Meanwhile, according to Chief of Police Adornado, after the shooting incident involving the Tiongsons, the police pursued their mission to serve the
search warrant on Bello. When they reached Bello's residence in Mariawa, they were met by a "volley of fire." Suddenly, the house was lighted and
a certain Escober met him. Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the police searched the area and found a
Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition of a garand rifle, ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber pistol and 380 bullets for an
automatic pistol.[42] Thereafter, the Chief of Police declared the search terminated and the entire searching party left for headquarters. [43] The
following day, he issued Special Order No. 24 which states:

".December 26, 1970

"To All Concerned:

"The following men mentioned below are hereby assigned at Homapon until their mission is accomplished, effective as of today, December 26, 1970:

“1. Sgt. Salvador de la Paz, In-charge

“2. Pfc. Carlos Barbin, member

“3. Pat. Eduardo Arcinue, member

“4. Pat. Juan Luna, member

“5. Pat. Daniel Pinto, member

“6. Pat. Celedonio Abordo, member

“7. Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, member

"Report progress of mission any time of day through the radio system. For strict compliance.

(Sgd.)

SOLOMON B. ADORNADO

Chief of Police

"Copy furnished: The Honorable City Mayor, The Patrol Command, LCPD, the OIC and file." [44]

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The mission was to keep peace and order in the specified place and to determine the whereabouts of Bello.[45] It was not necessary to specify the
mission in the order itself because the Chief of Police "had a close understanding with the squad that went to Homapon".[46] For a "convenient tactical
deployment," Sgt. De la Paz further divided Team 3 into three groups with patrolmen Buenaflor and Pinto composing Group II.[47]

At noontime of December 26, 1991, Francisco Bello, more popularly known as Paquito, arrived at the residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando,
Talahib, Daraga, Albay. He was with Inocencia's brother, Francisco Andes, Francisco's son Ananias, and Leoncio Mostoles. Rosalio, another son
of Francisco, also arrived with the group.[48] Bello requested Inocencia and her husband that he and his group be allowed to spend the night in
Inocencia's house.[49]

Inocencia woke up at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of December 27, 1991. At the sala, on her way from her room to the kitchen, she saw Bello
sleeping alone. From the kitchen, Inocencia went to the balcony through the sala. On her way back to the kitchen, she noticed that Bello, who was
wearing a red shirt and an underwear, had awakened. Bello opened the window, spat out and went to the balcony. He reentered the sala and,
saying that it was cold, Bello put on his clothes and pants. He also wore his jacket. He went back to the balcony and asked for water. Inocencia's
husband gave Bello a glass of water. After gurgling, Bello placed the glass on the window sill and asked Inocencia's husband for a cup of coffee.[50]

Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was on the balcony facing
the copra kiln ("agonan") with his back towards the pili tree, gradually fell to the floor with his hands above his head. Then there was another burst of
gunfire. From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she later identified as Pinto, near
the pili tree which was around eight meters from where Bello was, and another man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs.[51]

Inocencia, with her two-year-old child in her arms,[52] was about to rush to Bello when her husband pulled her. Just then a man, whom Inocencia
identified as Buenaflor, came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and her husband and told them to lay flat on the floor. The man asked them
where the gun was. Inocencia told him that there was no gun in the house but then, when she looked around, she saw a long firearm with its muzzle
pointed upward leaning against the wall near the door around two meters from where Bello laid flat on his back. Bello himself had a gun but it was in
its holster tucked on his waist.[53] It was Buenaflor who took both the long firearm and the gun in Bello's holster.[54]

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When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio was dead.[55] Inocencia went near the pili tree where Rosalio's body was,
knelt down and asked the man with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The man answered that Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did not
notice any weapon near Rosalio's body.[56]

Bello's hands and feet were tied together and a bamboo pole was inserted between them so that two men, one of them being Francisco Andes,
could carry the cadaver.[57] Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds". [58] A former pilot and
28 years old at the time of his death, Bello sustained a gunshot wound at the left temple, an inch above the highest point of the pinna of the left ear.
The bullet which entered his head through the squamous temporal bone travelled towards the occipital region down to the floor of the left middle
cranial fosa until it reached the base of the tongue.

Bello had three gunshot wounds on his chest. One bullet entered the superior part of the right scapular area about the level of the third thoracic
vertebrae. The bullet travelled to the right inna in a slightly upward direction making its exit at the lateral part of the right supraclavicular fossa above
the clavicle. The second gunshot wound was at the left side inter-scapular area. The bullet travelled upwards and to the right fracturing the 7th rib,
entered the lower lobe of the left lung, punctured the pulmonary conus, went through the junction of the right auricular appendage and the right
auricle, the anteromedial side of the pericardium, grazed the medial surface of the middle lobe of the right lung and exited at the right side of the
chest. The third gunshot wound was below the right nipple. The bullet went to the chest cavity, the lower lobe of the right lung, the dome of the
diaphragm, the right lobe of the liver, the 8th thoracic vertebra and exited at the left of the midline at the inferior interscapular area.[59]

While Bello's corpse was being autopsied, a slug fell from his jacket. A bullet jacket and lead fragments were found at the base of his skull and a
slug was extracted from the floor of his mouth.[60]

Rosalio Andes, 23 years old, also died of shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet entered his right temporal area, macerated the brain,
fractured both parietal bones and exited at the left parietal bone. Another bullet entered the left interscapular area below the level of the 6th rib,
travelled to the dome of the left diaphragm, the left lobe of the liver, the pancreas, the small intestines, and the perineum below the ramus of the right
pubis. The slug was found at the gluteoperineal junction about 2 inches below the tip of the coccys and 2 1/2 inches above the gluteal line. A third
bullet entered the left knee and exited at the medial side of the leg. [61]

The slugs and parts of bullets which were extracted from the bodies of the victims were turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on
December 29, 1970 by Fiscal Aquilino Bonto for safekeeping purposes.[62] The empty shells and slugs which both the PC and the Legazpi City police
found in Talahib were also turned over to the NBI[63] in the same manner that the four empty carbine shells[64] found by the PC near the coconut tree

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a meter from the shoulder of the road to Mariawa were also turned over to the NBI.[65] Also submitted to the NBI for ballistic examination were twelve
Smith & Wesson caliber .38 revolvers, two Smith & Wesson "paltik" caliber .22, four Tell caliber .38 revolvers, one Bosque automatic pistol caliber
.380, four US carbine Inland rifles caliber .30, three US Springfield rifles caliber .30, one Thompson submachine gun caliber .45 and one Colt
automatic pistol caliber .45.[66]

Defendants Pinto and Buenaflor both denied having fired at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family.[67] Pinto, who admitted carrying a caliber .30
carbine during the incident,[68] testified that the shooting occurred because the Tiongsons' jeep "was going towards" them.[69]

According to Pinto, when they reached Mariawa, it was he who fired one shot in the air.[70] After the search had been conducted in Bello's premises,
Team 3 was instructed by a "superior officer" "to remain and maintain peace and order in (the) vicinity including Mariawa".[71] While he and Buenaflor
were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they "chanced upon a house" wherein Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of Bello's
bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the captives.[72]

At daybreak, Pinto saw Bello smoking at the porch. Buenaflor, who was behind him, called Bello. Then a single shot coming from the house rang
out. It was answered by a burst of fire which Pinto "presumed" came from Buenaflor. By reflex action, Pinto transferred from the pili tree to a nearby
coconut tree. But before he reached the coconut tree, he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the man was menacingly near
him, Pinto shot him.[73]

After a lull in the firing, he went up the house to look for Bellos' other companions. He saw the body of Bello on the porch and "near" it was a garand
which he took. He also got Bello's short firearm "from a holster." He turned over both the garand and the short firearm to Buenaflor. One of the
captured persons kicked Bello's body saying that if not for Bello, his son would not have been killed. Thereafter, the two dead person were carried
by the captured bodyguards to Mariawa.[74]

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In Mariawa, Pinto contacted (through the radio) police outpost No. 5 in Banquerohan and two jeeps arrived. When they reached the junction in
Homapon, Major Molo, who was with Fiscal Benito Se, told Pinto to go back with him to Talahib. Although Pinto warned Major Molo that it would be
dangerous to go back because one of Bello's men had escaped, they nevertheless proceeded to Talahib. With three other policemen, they arrived
there between eight and nine in the morning where they were instructed to "look for evidence specifically x x x for a thompson." He found in the
porch two shells and the others found a hat and a flashlight. Thereafter, they returned to Mariawa and later, to Legazpi City proper.[75]

On cross-examination, Pinto stated that he did not know that they found Bello in an area which was beyond the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. He
admitted that while they were instructed to patrol the area, they were also told to effect the arrest of Bello even if no complaint had been lodged
against him.[76] According to Pinto, of the fifteen bullets in the magazine of his carbine, only two remained. He fired "most" of the thirteen shots
during the "Bello incident".[77]

Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters. Rosalio was "face-to-face" with him when
Pinto shot him. As Rosalio did not fall from the first shot, Pinto continued shooting him.[78] When he went up the porch he saw the garand "lying on
the floor" but the gun tucked on Bello's waist was still in its holster.[79]

On the Tiongson incident, Pinto asserted that he did not fire his carbine.[80] When he saw the headlight of the Tiongsons' jeep, he also saw a
flashlight being waved. A little later, he heard a shout ordering the jeep to stop. Then he heard one shot and immediately after, the volley of fire as
the jeep was going towards his direction. As it passed by him, he heard the jeep's passengers shriek. [81]

For his part, Buenaflor declared that during the mission to serve the search warrant on Bello, he carried the ".38 caliber revolver Tel." (sic) which had
been issued to him by the Legazpi City Police Department. He did not fire his gun at the Tiongsons and, "as a matter of fact," he surrendered his
firearm for ballistic examination.[82] In the afternoon of December 26, however, Major Molo issued him a Thompson submachinegun.[83]

While patrolling Homapon, he and Pinto "chanced upon" some persons who told them that they could guide them to where Bello was. At the place
which they later found to be Talahib, they went near a pili tree from where they saw a house "below." Then he saw a man who turned out to be
Mostoles. Buenaflor apprehended Mostoles because the latter was Bello's bodyguard and he had a .22 caliber firearm with him. He came by
another man with a bolo, named "Banteque" and apprehended him also. Then, from behind the pili tree, Pinto appeared with yet another man. They

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waited for a while until another man, who turned out to be Francisco Andes, came within four meters of him. Buenaflor pointed his submachinegun
at him so Andes approached him. Buenaflor confiscated Andes' .22 caliber firearm.[84]

From the group, Buenaflor learned that Bello provided them with firearms and that Bello himself had a pistol tucked in his holster as well as a garand.
He and Pinto then tied the men to the pili tree. Later, he saw a person in the balcony of the house below and Buenaflor shouted twice: "Paquito,
mag-surrender ka!" Then Buenaflor heard "a shot coming from the direction of the balcony followed by successive shots." He sought cover behind
the pili tree and, while in a crouching position, fired his submachinegun towards the balcony. Pinto was then behind him. As Pinto shifted his
position while firing his carbine, Buenaflor went down to the "elevated portion going down to the nipa shack" until he was near the coconut tree.
There he found a person lying with his face down. He later found out that the person was the son of Francisco Andes. [85]

After the firing had stopped, Pinto told him that Bello was dead. Pinto then went up the house. Buenaflor went back to the pili tree, untied the four
persons they had captured, and told them to do something so they could carry the bodies of Bello and (Rosalio) Andes.[86]

Like Pinto, on cross-examination, Buenaflor also asserted that he did not fire his gun at the jeep carrying the Tiongsons.[87] While admitting that the
person who led them to Bello had told them that the latter was in Talahib, Buenaflor did not know that Talahib was a barrio of Daraga, Albay and not
of Legazpi City.[88] He reiterated that he shouted at Bello urging him to surrender[89] but he was not able to fire a warning shot or identify himself as a
member of the police force "because after the second shot there was already a burst of gunfire".[90]

Buenaflor affirmed that the first shot emanating from the balcony of the house in Talahib which was around fifteen meters from the pili tree, came
from a "high caliber firearm."[91] After they had found out that Bello was dead, Pinto went up the house. Later, Pinto gave him Bello's 380 automatic
pistol and garand.[92] Although he looked at those firearms, he did not determine whether they had been fired. [93] He noticed, however, that the
magazine of the garand was "intact".[94] Aside from Bello's fire-arms, Buenaflor and Pinto confiscated two .22 caliber revolvers and two bolos from
Bello's bodyguards.[95]

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Buenaflor stated that his Thompson submachinegun had two clips with each clip containing 30 bullets. When he gave back the firearm to Major
Molo, only four bullets were left of the one clip he had used.[96] He remembered having squeezed twice the trigger of his Thompson submachinegun
or automatic rifle in Talahib.[97] His service revolver was still with him then.[98]

As a result of this series of events, four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor. The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor
for the murder of Andes which was filed on July 26, 1971 reads:

"That on or about the 27th day of December, 1970, in sitio Ando, Barrio Talahib, Daraga, Albay and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, accused Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, Jr and Pat. Daniel Pinto,
Jr., and by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, SN-213436 and a US Carbine Inland, Cal. 30, SN-5099407, owned respectively by
said accused, shoot one Rosalio Andes, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds as described in the attached Autopsy Report marked as Annex "A" and
being made an integral part of this information, thereby causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to his instantaneous
death.

"Contrary to law."

The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor with having murdered Bello contains basically the same allegations as the above and it was filed on
the same date. On August 24, 1971 two other informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor: one for the murder of Richard Tiongson and
another for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson. On arraignment, Pinto and Buenaflor both pleaded not guilty to all the charges.

After trial, the trial court rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. For the killing of Bello and Andes, the trial court appreciated evident
premeditation as a qualifying circumstance and treachery, nighttime and use of public position as aggravating circumstances. For the incident
involving the Tiongson children, it considered the crimes as qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of public position.

Pinto and Buenaflor instituted the instant appeal praying for exoneration mainly on the basis of their claim that the killings were perpetrated in the
course of the performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors.

In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense
has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes an
incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. [99]

Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved, originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant on Bello.
In the process, however, the appellants abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with only a
search warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other persons of their
lives.

While the defense presented proofs that Bello had a string of record in the police blotter for misdeeds ranging from taking the harvest of their
hacienda without the permission of his parents to assaulting his stepfather, and that he was "dangerous while under the influence of liquor",[100] there

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was no proof that he had been convicted of any offense or that he was a dangerous fugitive from justice which would warrant a "shoot-to-kill" order
from police authorities. Proof of bad moral character of the victim only establishes a probability that he committed a crime but it certainly cannot be
the reason for annihilating him nor may it prevail over facts proven showing that the same victim had been cold-bloodedly killed.[101] As such, the
suspicion that Bello was maintaining a private army was not a sufficient justification for his being rubbed out without due process of law.

The police theory that Bello authored the shooting of one Salustiano Botin on Christmas eve is neither a justification for his arrest without a warrant.
It should be observed that while the police had obtained a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms against Bello even on Christmas day
which was supposed to be a holiday, no such effort was made in securing a warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged frustrated killing of Botin. The
improbability of the defense evidence through the testimony of Botin himself that Bello had shot him in the evening of December 24, 1970 is
bolstered by the same testimony showing that while he was shot by Bello in the presence of the police force who were converging at the Junction of
Homapon and Mariawa, the same law enforcers were unable to arrest Bello. Besides the fact that no other eyewitness corroborated Botin's
testimony even in the face of his own admission that Bello had no reason to shoot him, no complaint was ever lodged against Bello for the alleged
shooting.[102]

On the other hand, the prosecution, through eyewitness Rogelio Escober, tried to establish that during said shooting incident, the police were looking
for Bello at the store of a certain Serrano.[103] Unable to find Bello, the police, specifically Pinto, mauled Escober while asking him to testify against
Bello for allegedly shooting Botin.[104] The police had focused their vehicles’ headlights near the bodega of ex-Mayor Los Baños in their effort to flush
out Bello who, unknown to the police, had earlier left the vicinity. It was when the police fired at the said bodega that Botin must have been
accidentally shot.[105] This story was uncorroborated but if true, would show the police's dangerous propensity for using otherwise official operations
in an unlawful manner.

A propensity for rash judgment was likewise amply shown at the incident involving the Tiongson children. Since the jeep coming towards them was
owned by the Anduizas, the appellants acted obviously in the belief that Bello was its passenger and posthaste they fired upon it even without any
reasonable inquiry as to the identity of its passengers.[106] Granting that the police indeed fired a warning shot, sound discretion and restraint dictated
that, there being no responding shots from its passengers after the alleged warning shot and considering the condition of the road which was not
only muddy but uphill, instead of directing aimless gunburst at the jeep, the most that they could have done was to render the jeep immobile by
shooting its tires. That way, they could have verified the identity of the passengers. 'As it were, they riddled the jeep with bullets injuring in the
process innocent passengers who were completely unaware of what they were up against.

Appellants' stark denial of firing their guns upon the Tiongson family falls flat in the face of various circumstantial evidence which point to their
culpability. There is the unflinching testimony of Sgt. Romero that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction of Buenaflor as the jeep bearing the
Tiongsons passed by. Said testimony was corroborated by that of Rafael Jacob, the PC member of team 2, that while no one in his team fired his
gun, the "sporadic firing" came from team 3 after the first burst of fire which occurred while the jeep was "abreast of team 2".[107] Even defense
witness Mariano Rico, a policeman who led team 1, was "sure" that he heard gunshots at the moment when "the jeep had just passed team 2".[108]

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Then there are the four empty .30 caliber carbine shells which were found near the coconut tree where, according to Romero, Pinto was deployed.
While he himself carried a carbine, Romero did not fire it and his testimony was never contradicted. When the four empty shells were compared with
the test shells which were fired from the US carbine, caliber .30 Inland Division, SN-5099407, which, according to the aforequoted information
charging appellants with having killed Andes, was used by Pinto, they were found to have "significant similar individual characteristics".[109]

While it is true that the ballistic report reveals that the lead bullet taken from the body of Richard was fired from a Smith & Wesson type firearm[110]
and Buenaflor was proven to be carrying a .38 caliber Tell revolver, the findings of expert witnesses or, in this case, the ballistic report pointing to
another kind of caliber .38 weapon as the source of Richard's wound only serves as a guide for the courts after considering all the facts of the
case.[111] The undisputed fact is that Buenaflor was specifically pointed by Romero as the one who fired his firearm as the Anduiza jeep bearing the
Tiongsons passed by. Inasmuch as no evidence that Romero would prevaricate to pin responsibility on Buenaflor was ever presented, there is,
therefore, no reason to discredit his testimony.[112]

In addition to all these, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established. Such motive provided circumstantial evidence
leading to the inference that indeed he fires his gun.[113] According to the unrebutted testimony of Rogelio Escober, an overseer of the Napal
hacienda and constant companion of Bello, on November 1, 1970, Buenaflor and another policeman named Santos Urbina, Jr. borrowed Bello's jeep
on the pretext that they needed it to transfer Moscoso, the suspect in the Perez killing, to the Albay Police Headquarters. When it was returned, the
jeep had bloodstains. Bello and Escober later learned from a PC officer that the jeep had been used in dumping in Guinobatan the body of
Moscoso. Confronted by the PC officer, Bello admitted that the jeep was borrowed by Buenaflor and Urbina and agreed to execute a sworn
statement on the matter. Consequently, the PC authorities notified Mayor Imperial of the solution of the Moscoso killing.

Three days later, Escober and Bello met Urbina who warned Bello, "Kit, if you want to give your statement, just say that I borrowed your jeep for
thirty minutes. This is a brotherly advice because something might happen to you." Bello retorted that he would do what was right and that was to
tell the truth. Urbina said that it was up to Bello but he repeated that he was giving Bello a brotherly warning that something might happen to him[114]
(TSN, August 23, 1973, pp. 4-20). These facts were of course denied by Buenaflor. However, as between the positive declaration of a prosecution
witness and the negative denial of the accused, the former deserves more credence.[115]

All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in defiance of their superior
officer's order only "to find the whereabouts" of Bello[116] and to desist from using their weapons "without clearance from the Chief of Police".[117]

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Since there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[118]

The fact that the victims were different from the one the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or mistake in
the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this conclusion is
the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) -- without checking carefully the latter's identity -- as to place
himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously.[119] Neither may the fact that the accused made a
mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered a mitigating circumstance.[120]

It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in the
presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy with each other.[121] Prior agreement between the appellants to kill their
intended victim is not essential to prove conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design.[122] In this
case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by the fact that only the two of them fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons
passed by. This they did in defiance of the order of their superior not to shoot unless ordered to do so. Conspiracy having been proved, the guilt or
culpability is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees.[123]

The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was shown by the manner by which they killed
the two. In this incident, however, they invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their claim.

Under Article 11 (1) of the Rules of Court, an accused must prove the presence of all the following elements of said exempting circumstance: (a)
unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[124] The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. [125]

In this case, Buenaflor insists that he fired at Bello because, after calling out to him to surrender, his shout was answered by a gunshot. Pinto
corroborates his story but the principal prosecution eyewitness in this incident, Inocencia Malbas, swears that she heard no such shout to surrender
nor a gunshot from Bello's direction before Bello was fired upon by the appellants. Physical evidence as well as the testimonies of Buenaflor himself
and Pinto show that Inocencia, and not the appellants, was telling the truth.

Rafael Señora, the NBI agent who went to Talahib and the road to Mariawa to investigate as well as to take pictures, found no bullet marks at the
crime scene which would pertain to a .22 caliber "paltik" firearm which Bello's men allegedly used.[126] As no other "paltik" firearms were recovered

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from the crime scene other than the two which Buenaflor confiscated from Mostoles and Francisco Andes, the possibility of said firearms or one of its
kind having been used by Bello's men against the appellant particularly the one who escaped is nil.

Buenaflor claimed that the shot after his call to Bello belonged to a high-powered gun[127] obviously referring to the firearms recovered from Bello
himself. According to Buenaflor, however, when he found the rifle, its magazine was "intact" and he did not manipulate the rifle to know how many of
its bullets had been used.[128] Moreover, if Bello indeed fired a gun, it must be the firearm in his holster and not the garand which was found a couple
of meters from where Bello had fallen. That Bello did not fire any of his two firearms is buttressed by Pinto's own testimony that Bello was smoking
with his back towards them when he was shot at and that at that moment, he did not see Bello holding a gun.[129] We cannot help, therefore, but
conclude that the defense claim that Buenaflor's call to Bello was answered by a gunshot is but a figment of their imagination designed for their own
exoneration.

Appellants' claim of unlawful aggression on the part of Bello or his men would have been clarified had any of Bello's men whom they had captured
been presented in court. These men, Leoncio Mostoles, Franciso Andes, Domingo Bantigue and Ananias Andes had executed statements before
the Legazpi City police to the effect that they heard Buenaflor's call for Bello to surrender and that Bello fired his gun at the appellants. However, all
four of them later executed statements before the NBI retracting said earlier statements in view of the fact that the police had threatened them to
make the statements favorable to the appellants.[130]

As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his
statement alone. Even Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes attack Pinto.[131] Inocencia swore that she did not see any weapon near
the fallen Rosalio. Indeed, if the aggression did occur, Pinto would not have lost time in presenting in court the bolo which Andes threatened to use
on him. But granting that Rosalio had a bolo, Pinto was not justified in inflicting the wounds sustained by Rosalio because a mere threatening
attitude of the victim will not constitute unlawful aggression. [132] Moreover, Pinto's testimony that Rosalio menacingly approached him with a bolo
after Buenaflor had released a gunburst directed at the house where Bello was, is contrary to human behavior if not totally ridiculous. On the
contrary, by his own admission, Pinto continued firing until he saw Rosalio fell.

An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not only on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if weak, the prosecution evidence gains more credibility. [133] Unfortunately, in this case, inspite of the
fact that the prosecution had only one eyewitness to the killing of Bello and Andes, the appellants had not presented sufficiently strong evidence to
shore up their claim of self-defense.

We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the commission of all four crimes in this case. The killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello
and Rosalio Andes as well as the wounding of Maria Theresa Tiongson were all so sudden that all of them were left defenseless. This is shown not
only by the testimonial evidence of the commission of the crimes but also by the nature and location of the wounds of all the victims.[134] The
presence of treachery qualifies the killings to murder and the wounding of Maria Theresa to frustrated murder. Nighttime, however, may not be
appreciated as there is no proof that it was specifically sought in the commission of the crime and therefore we deem it absorbed by treachery.

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Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case but we find that the appellants indeed took advantage of their
public position in perpetrating the crime. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. There being no mitigating circumstance to temper the penalty and there being only the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of their public office under Article 14 (1) of the said Code, the proper penalty is death.[135] However, in view of the constitutional abolition
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellants for each of the three murders they committed.

For the wounding of Maria Theresa, the penalty imposable, applying Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium. There being no reason to further lower the penalty by one degree pursuant to the provision of Article 250, and there being one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[136] the proper penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa is six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum. The indemnity of eight thousand
pesos imposed by the lower court should be respected considering that while there is evidence as to the actual amount she spent while confined at
the Sacred Heart Hospital in Legazpi City, there is no proof as to the expenses she incurred after she was transferred to the Camp Crame Hospital in
Quezon City.

As in all cases wherein peace officers are accused, this case creates a feeling of frustration in everyone. The crimes committed here ought to have
no place in this democratic and civilized society. True it is that a police officer is sometimes left in a quandary when faced with a situation where a
decisive but legal action is needed. But, as this Court said in Calderon vs. People and Court of Appeals (96 Phil. 216, 225 [1954]), "(t)he judgment
and discretion of public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the
spirit and purpose of the law." Police officers must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society
must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. In the words of then Justice Moran in the Oanis case (Supra):

"It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal ‘must be taken by storm’ without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere
trifle in the hands of officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation – not condonation - should be the rule;
otherwise we would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the modifications that appellants shall solidarily be liable for the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three murders they committed and, for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correcional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant Daniel Pinto, Jr. had been a police officer for only five months [137] when the crimes were committed, let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Office of the President for whatever action may be proper to temper his penalty. [138]

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but agree with J. Bidin in the result.
Bidin, J., in the result.

Page 201 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 159280, May 18, 2004 ]

AUGUSTO SIM, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:

On appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a Decision [1] by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
May 21, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 34, finding petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr.
and co-accused Elison Villaflor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, instead of
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) thereof, as well as its Resolution[3] dated August 1, 2003 denying appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner and
co-accused Elison Villaflor were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisioón correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusioón temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan the sum of
P480,000.00 representing the amount paid for the purchase of the car that was impounded by the authorities.

Elison Villaflor and Augusto Sim, Jr., were formally charged with the crime of Estafa in an Information dated September 6, 1999 which reads:[4]

That on or about May 2, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jay Byron Ilagan in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means
of false manifestations which they made to said Jay Byron Ilagan to the effect that they are selling one (1) colored green Nissan Pathfinder pick-up
with motor number PD27-555735 bearing Plate No. BCF-620 in the amount of P480,000.00 registered in the name of Henry Austria, and by means
of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Jay Byron Ilagan to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P480,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent, as the said car is a stolen car and they are not the owner, and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of
P480,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jay Byron Ilagan in the aforesaid amount of P350,000.00,
Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

Private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan is a tire supplier whose store, Marfi Tire Supply, is located along the highway at San Pablo City, Laguna. He
had been dealing with accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is engaged in the same business of selling tires and rims at 39 C-3
Road, Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City.

In March 1998, private complainant talked to Elison somewhere in Tondo, Manila, and expressed his interest in buying a vehicle. Elison told him that
he knew someone who sells vehicles at a cheap price, and that he had bought a Toyota Tamaraw FX at lower than the market price. Private
complainant then asked Elison to ask if there was an Isuzu pick-up for sale. A month later, Elison called private complainant to inform him that he
was able to find a 1997 Nissan Pathfinder. They agreed to inspect the vehicle together as private complainant wanted to buy it before his birthday on
May 31, 1998.[5]

On April 30, 1998, only Elison went to Dagupan City to get the Nissan Pathfinder from his friend, petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. Petitioner told Elison
that the Nissan Pathfinder was given to him by a customer in payment of a debt and had been used only for a year.

Elison brought the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder to San Pablo City. Private complainant at first did not like the vehicle since it was not the brand he was
looking for. Elison said that his kumpadre would look at the vehicle as the latter was also interested in it.[6]

Private complainant decided to buy the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder at the agreed price of P480,000.00. The amount was paid in five checks issued by
Fe Ilagan under her account at Solidbank-San Pablo Branch. One check was dated May 6, 1998 in the sum of P350,000.00, and four checks in the
sum of P32,500.00 each was dated June 6, July 6, August 6 and September 6, all in 1998.[7]

Elison gave private complainant photocopies of the Certificate of Registration (C.R.) and Official Receipt (O.R.) issued by the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) showing the name of the owner as one Henry Austria. While waiting for the processing of the papers, the vehicle was parked at private
complainant’s place. After a week, Elison brought the deed of sale which private complainant signed without the signature of the owner, Henry
Austria. After private complainant signed the deed of sale, he gave it back to Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the
owner/vendor and transfer of registration in the name of private complainant. [8]

On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to private complainant the deed of sale signed by the owner/vendor, together with the new C.R. and
O.R. issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the name of private complainant. [9]

The checks given by private complainant in payment of the vehicle were deposited by petitioner in his name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five
checks were debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the registration papers from Elison, private complainant was eventually able to use the
Nissan Pathfinder.[10]

Page 202 of 258

On October 28, 1998, private complainant’s vehicle was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping operatives of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR
NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers were inspected and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a “hot
car” as it had been reported stolen on November 29, 1997 by its real owner, Golf Construction of the Philippines, Inc. pursuant to the Alarm Sheet
issued by the PNP Traffic Management Group.[11]

Private complainant accompanied the ANCAR operatives to the residence of Elison. He went with them to Camp Crame, and named petitioner as
the owner of the vehicle. However, they were not able to locate petitioner right away. Meanwhile, the vehicle was impounded by the authorities. The
investigation revealed that its original motor and chassis numbers were replaced and/or tampered but its Production Number remained intact.
Eventually, the real description of the vehicle was fully established and identified by no less than the manufacturer/assembler of the unit, Universal
Motors Corporation.[12]

Private complainant spoke with Elison about the possible recovery of the money paid by him for the confiscated vehicle. On November 30, 1998,
private complainant met petitioner for the first time. Petitioner signed a Promissory Note with Deed of Undertaking whereby he obligated himself to
pay private complainant the amount of P480,000.00 plus attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 in scheduled installments. Petitioner issued a check in the
amount of P75,000.00 but private complainant did not encash it, thinking that if he does, petitioner would not pay him anymore. Private complainant
was unable to recover the money paid by him to petitioner.[13]

Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged with estafa under a criminal information dated September 6, 1999. Elison was arraigned on
September 17, 1999; while petitioner was arraigned on June 1, 2000. Both pleaded “not guilty.”

After trial, the trial court convicted both Elison and petitioner of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with the modification that appellants should be convicted of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, assigning the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT CONSPIRACY IS
PRESENT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE
ACQUITTAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

Two issues are presented before this Court: (1) Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private
complainant Jay Byron Ilagan; and (2) Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

On the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that there is no conspiracy between him and co-accused. He points that it was only co-accused
Elison Villaflor who dealt with private complainant. The latter had not even met him before he was allegedly forced to sign the amicable agreement.

Petitioner further alleges that contrary to the findings of the appellate court, there is no convincing evidence to show that petitioner performed any
previous or simultaneous act with Elison in committing the offense against private complainant. The witnesses presented by the prosecution did not
show or prove that petitioner directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with
Elison.

Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit.

Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before,
during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[14]
Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active
cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.[15]

In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals,[16] we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and
shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of
circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it
out with their full cooperation and participation.

As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioner’s actions in relation to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant
clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts transcend mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison.[17]
Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who dealt with or personally transacted with private complainant until the time the sale was
consummated, by his own testimony petitioner admitted all the acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the
fraud upon private complainant.[18] That petitioner is a conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is evident from the fact that as between
Page 203 of 258
them, both knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner.[19]
Petitioner, together with Elison, clearly deceived private complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the latter’s damage
and prejudice. In addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting himself to private complainant as having the necessary authority to
possess and sell to the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him P480,000.00 only to renege on that promise and for failure to reimburse
the said amount he collected from private complainant, despite demand, amount to estafa punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the findings of fact of the trial court, aptly observed: [20]

That conviction under the afore-cited provision is more proper is evident from the trial court’s finding that appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. from the very
beginning was aware that the subject vehicle was not his nor given to him in payment of debt as he made appellant Villaflor to believe. Nonetheless,
appellant Villaflor was not absolved from liability, having actively conspired with appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. to convince private complainant to
purchase the Pathfinder upon their false pretense and representation that said vehicle was being sold by its real owner, Henry Austria, the name
appearing in the registration papers and deed of sale under circumstances clearly showing their knowledge that the status of said vehicle is dubious
or anomalous, as in fact it turned out to be a “hot car” or had been stolen/carnapped from its true owner. The totality of the evidence indicates a
common or joint design, purpose and objective of the accused-appellants to defraud private complainant who parted with his money upon the belief
that there is no problem regarding the ownership of the Pathfinder sold to him by the appellants.

The trial court rejected the argument of the defense that it was private complainant who supposedly had the vehicle and its registration papers
checked at Camp Crame before buying the same. It pointed out that verification would have been difficult considering that the motor and chassis
numbers in the registration papers are correct but the name of the owner appearing therein is false.

Elison’s false pretense in holding out that he had authorization from the owner to sell the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder was made in conjunction with
petitioner’s fraudulent misrepresentation that he was legally entitled to possess the aforesaid vehicle. The evidence shows that petitioner and Elison
acted in conspiracy to deceive private complainant into buying a stolen Nissan Pathfinder, thereby defrauding the latter in the amount of
P480,000.00, and upon their false pretense and representation as to the real status of the vehicle, i.e., that said unit is in fact being sold by its true
owner Henry Austria and that Augusto Sim, Jr. in whose name the checks were issued had the authority or right to sell the same. After a few months,
the vehicle sold was apprehended and impounded by police authorities for being stolen or carnapped which resulted in pecuniary damage to private
complainant who had demanded the return of his money from petitioner and Elison.[21] The evidence of the prosecution satisfactorily established the
fraudulent acts and representations which induced private complainant to part with his money for which he suffered damage and loss when the
vehicle sold to him by petitioner and Elison was recovered by its true owner through operatives of the police anti-carnapping group.[22]

On the second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the evidence is not sufficient to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.

While the trial court charged and convicted petitioner and his co-accused of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the
appellate court modified the lower court’s decision by convicting them of the same crime under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).

Regardless of whether petitioner is charged or convicted under either par. 1 (b) or par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, he would still be
guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements of the crime, have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
False pretenses or fraudulent acts were committed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud by falsely pretending to possess
property. In this case, false pretenses or fraudulent acts were employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud by falsely
pretending to possess the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder, where damage and deceit have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach
of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling
and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a species of fraud.[23]

Swindling or estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud is committed
“[b]y using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by other similar deceits.”[24]

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) are: (1) There must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) Such false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) The offended
party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because
of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (4) As a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[25]

These four elements are present in the instant case: (1) False pretenses were employed by petitioner and his co-accused to deceive private
complainant into purchasing the stolen Nissan Pathfinder; (2) False pretenses were employed prior to, and simultaneously with, the fraudulent sale
of the Nissan Pathfinder; (3) Private complainant relied on false pretenses of petitioner and co-accused, inducing him to part with his money due to
the misrepresentation employed by the perpetrators of the fraud; and (4) As a result of false pretenses and misrepresentations by petitioner and co-
Page 204 of 258
accused, private complainant suffered damages in the amount of P480,000.00.

Furthermore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in the best position to make an assessment of the witnesses’
credibility and to appreciate complainants’ truthfulness, honesty and candor.[26] Factual findings of trial courts, as well as their assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court more so when these are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[27] As against
the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainant, petitioner’s mere denial cannot prevail.

The proper imposable penalty for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) is prisióon correccional in its maximum period to prisioón mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed prisioón mayor or reclusióon temporal, as the case may be.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[28] if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of
the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

In the present case, petitioner defrauded private complainant in the amount of P480,000.00. The fact that the amount involved in the case at bar
exceeds P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This legal interpretation accords
with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused.[29]

The maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be taken from the maximum period of the penalty under Art. 315, which is reclusioón
temporal, since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be
imposed should not exceed twenty (20) years.

Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of estafa under Art. 315[30] is prisión mayor in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud exceeds
P22,000.00, the minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, which is prisión
correccional in its maximum period. Hence, the minimum period of the penalty should be from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.

We are convinced that the appropriate penalty in accordance with law that can best serve the ends of justice in the case at bar should range from
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisioón correccional, as minimum, to twenty years of reclusióon temporal, as maximum, for the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the May 21, 2003 Decision and August 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the
penalty imposed. Appellant Augusto Sim, Jr. is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prisióon correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusióon temporal, as maximum, for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a). He is
further ordered to indemnify the private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan, jointly and severally with Elison Villaflor, the sum of P480,000.00 with interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum until fully paid.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Working Chairman), Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

Page 205 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 93436, March 24, 1995 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MELCHOR REAL Y BARTOLAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 1606 finding appellant guilty of
murder.

We affirm, with modification, the appealed decision.

The information against appellant reads as follows:

"That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and criminally attack, assault and hack with a sharp bolo one Edgardo Corpuz y Rapsing, hitting the latter on the nape, causing an injury which
caused the death of the said Edgardo Corpuz y Rapsing several days thereafter.

"That the accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of Aroroy, in the following cases:

Crime Date of Conviction

1. Ill treatment by Deed - July 6, 1965

2. Grave Threats - November 25, 1968"

( Rollo, p. 14).

Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.

After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P30,000.00 and costs.

Hence, this appeal.

II

At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and Edgardo Corpuz, both vendors, engaged in a heated
argument over the right to use the market table to display their fish.

Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the public market, tried to pacify them, saying that they were arguing over trivial
matters.

The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpuz raised his voice again and said something to appellant. The latter, in a
soft voice, uttered "SOBRA NA INA NA IMO PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are being too oppressive).

When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus
turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical
clinic. When asked by his wife as to who hacked him, he answered "Melchor Real."

A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying declaration of Corpus, who said that it was appellant who stabbed him. Corpus died two days
later.

Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation and anger when the victim threw his fish in the presence of so many
people.

Page 206 of 258

He testified as follows:

"Q. When Edgardo Corpus was lambasting you in the presence of the public, what did you do, how did you feel?

A. I got angry.

Q. And what did you do?

A. So I hacked him.

Q. Was he hit?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In what part of his body was he hit?

A. At the right neck.

Q. Did you admit to the authorities that it was you who hacked Edgardo Corpus?

A. Yes, sir."

On cross-examination, he again admitted his guilt.

Q. And when this Edgardo Corpus turn (sic) his back, you immediately hacked him on his neck?

A. Yes, sir" (TSN, July 9, 1986, pp. 6-8; Italics supplied).

III

Before us, appellant argues that the crime committed was only homicide and not murder and that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances:
namely, passion and obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense.

We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted with alevosia
when he attacked the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was
coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused
because of the provocative act of the victim (People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault upon the victim was
preceded by a heated exchange of words between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the assault
came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can
be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to
and fro near appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.

The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia where the decision to attack was made peremptorily and the
victim's helpless position was accidental (People v. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 [1974]).

Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation. The
peculiarity of these two mitigating circumstances is that they cannot be applied at the same time if they arise from the same facts or motive.

If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he cannot successfully claim in the same breath that he was also
blinded by passion and obfuscation. At most, only one of two circumstances could be considered in favor of appellant (People v. Yaon, Court of
Appeals, 43 O.G. 4142 cited in I Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1981]).

The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce passion and obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in
a market place within full view and within hearing distance of many people.

The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that the attendant aggravating circumstance was reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in
the information. The trial court and the Solicitor General are in error.

According to the information charging appellant of murder and the evidence, the accused was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6,
1965 and grave threats on November 25, 1968.

In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the
Page 207 of 258
Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the
law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike in
reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind from that for which he was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal
Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).

Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art.
282, Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-
treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than
reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.

There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the same title of the Code. While
grave threats fall in a title (Title Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating
circumstance requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one for which
the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is no
evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect.

Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is convicted of the crime of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
reclusion temporal as maximum. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Page 208 of 258

 [ G.R. No. 93143, August 04, 1992 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAXIMO R. RACE, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused appeals from a judgment of conviction for the crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 5571 of Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Masbate, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Wherefore, finding the accused to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape the Court hereby finds him guilty without doubt (sic) and
applying the aggravating circumstances (sic), hereby sentences him to serve a (sic) penalty of reclusion perpetua to be served at the National
penitentiary, and to pay the victim in the form of moral damages the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the cost of the suit. He is credited four fifths
(4/5) of his preventive imprisonment."

The prosecution for rape was commenced by a complaint[1] filed on 22 September 1988 by Corazon E. Collantes, mother of the offended party,
Maria Pura, with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Masbate which reads:

"The undersigned, Complainant under oath (sic), unto this Honorable Court, accuses MAXIMO ROSERO RASE JR., for (sic) the crime of RAPE
committed as follows:

That on September 14, 1988 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning more or less at Barangay F. Magallanes, Municipality of Masbate, Province of
Masbate, Philippines and within the preliminary (sic) jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, move (sic) by some evil
motives, with leud (sic) design did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of abuse of confidence did lie and had (sic)
carnal sexual intercourse of said (sic) Maria Pura, a woman of mute, deep and retarded (sic) against her will and consent."

Having found probable cause to exist after asking the witnesses searching questions, the Judge of the MTC issued on 6 October 1988 an order for
the arrest of the accused.[2]

On 10 November 1988, the MTC issued an order declaring that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and that "a prima
facie case" exists against him. It then forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate.[3]

On 29 November 1988, 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Iñigo D. Fontelar of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Masbate issued a resolution,[4]
duly approved by Provincial Prosecutor Hermenegildo F. Betonio, Jr., recommending that an information for the crime of rape be filed against the
accused because "(t)he undisputed evidence on record as fully disclosed by the court and discussed in its order of November 10, 1988, (sic) which
we agree, no doubt establishes a prima facie case and/or probable cause to hold the accused for trial." Accordingly, on 7 December 1988, said
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate an Information for rape, [5] duly approved by the Provincial Prosecutor,
which reads:

"The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Maximo Rosero Race, Jr. of the crime of Rape committed as follows:

That on or about September 14, 1988, in the morning thereof, at barangay Magallanes, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniosly (sic) have carnal
knowledge of one Maria Pura, a deaf-mute, retarded and an embecile (sic) against the latter's will and consent."

Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment[6] and trial proceeded thereafter on various dates with the prosecution presenting Dr. Artemio
G. Capellan, Noel Abela and Elena Alim as its witnesses for its evidence in chief, and Elvira Collantes as its witness on rebuttal. The accused took
the witness stand in his own defense.

On 15 December 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision[7] convicting the accused of the crime of rape, the dispositive portion of which was
quoted earlier. According to the court, rape was committed because Maria Pura, being deaf-mute and mentally retarded, cannot give consent; it was
determined that moral compulsion, amounting to intimidation, was employed by the accused. Said the court:

"The victim being mentally retarded could not be asked questions as what (sic) happened to her although she sometimes understands (sic) some
questions. The circumstances appearing as seen by Noel Abele shows (sic) that sexual intercourse was committed on the person of Maria Pura a
mentally retarded, deaf-mute. Maria Pura being mentally retarded could not actually give consent in order that she could have sexual intercourse
with the accused.

The Court could not even say as testified that force was employed upon the victim but the appearance of the woman alone and her physical
condition could not stop any physical force. However, for the reason that the accused has been known to the woman who (sic) even slept, though
outside of their house in an attachment, moral compulsion which is tantamount to intimidation was employed by the accused when the sexual
intercourse happened. It is a sorry state that the victim could not testify. The Court however, is convinced that rape was committed.[8]

xxx

Page 209 of 258

The accused when confronted by the family of the victim denied having sexual intercourse with Maria Pura. However Maria Pura, although a deaf-
mute when asked by Collantes and by Noel Abela, and by the sister Elena Alim pointed to the accused to have committed, (sic) such a dastardly act.
She pointed to the accused when asked as to what happened. There is no reason for Maria Pura to tell a lie. Being (sic) of unsound mind and
laughing (sic) at the time when she was investigated, only shows (sic) that there was sexual intercourse through moral compulsion which the court
believes is intimidation. That she should give consent, such question when subjected to all doubts and understanding (sic) would show that this
woman who is mentally retarded and a deaf-mute could never give consent to any sexual intercourse committed on her by the accused.”[9]

It also appreciated against the accused the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion[10] because he admitted during cross?examination that he was
previously convicted of the crime of homicide but was out on parole at the time of the rape.

From the said decision, accused came to this Court by filing a notice of appeal on 18 December 1989. [11] He has only one assignment of error in the
Brief for the Appellant,[12] to wit:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED."

In support of the alleged error, he contends that reasonable doubt exists in this case because: (a) the scene of the crime is well populated and
inhabited; since it was daytime and there were many people outside the house when the incident occurred, it is possible that another man or a
neighbor of the Puras, and not the accused, assaulted Maria Pura; (b) he is on parole and knew that if he violated the terms and conditions thereof,
he would be rearrested to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence; it was, therefore, unlikely that he would commit another crime; (c) there is no
reliable eyewitness to the crime; and (d) he manifested his honesty by not denying that he slapped Noel Abela after the latter made fun of him (the
accused) when he came out of the toilet.[13]

The facts of this case as presented by the prosecution are faithfully summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee[14] as follows:

"In the morning of September 14, 1988, Elvira Collantes, left her forty-year old sister Maria Pura in their house located at Magallanes St., Masbate,
Masbate to go to the market. Maria was cross-eyed, mute, retarded and a polio victim, standing less than four feet who could only nod her head and
make signs to be able to communicate. She can crawl but cannot stand unsupported. (TSN, October 23, 1989, p. 4; TSN, April 26, 1989, p. 3; TSN,
June 22, 1989, p. 9; TSN, October 10, 1989, pp. 3-4, 6).

Maria was left alone in the house with Maximo Race, Jr. also known as Jun, who during that time had asked Elvira for permission to use the toilet
built outside the house. Since Race had been using the toilet in the past with their permission, she agreed. She knew Race because he often sleeps
outside the extension of the Pura house, particularly in the Pura store which is attached to the house (TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 3, 5; TSN, June
22, 1989, pp. 3, 8).

At around 10 a.m. of the same day, Noel Abila, son of Elena Alim both of whom lived in the Pura residence together with Maria, had just come home
from school when he heard a voice. He immediately ran to the kitchen where the voice came from and saw Race putting his pants on (TSN, June 22,
1989, p. 4; TSN, October 20, 1989, p. 3).

Noel then saw his Aunt Maria in the dining room. She was laughing at Race. Noel let Maria sit on a chair. When Noel asked his Aunt Maria what
Race did to her she moved her body forward and backward in a push-pull movement. Noel thereupon accused Race of raping Maria and threatened
to report the incident. Race slapped Noel and went out of the house to the place where he drinks liquor (TSN, June 22, 1989, pp. 5,6; TSN, October
23, 1989, p. 4).

Noel afterwards informed his uncle Glen Collantes, husband of Elvira Collantes of the incident. Glen brought Race to Maria Pura, who pointed at
Race. When Glen asked Maria what Race did to her she again made the push-pull movement. Maria was laughing (TSN, June 22, 1989, pp. 7, 8,
10).

Elena Collantes, who was working at D'SAN Restaurant, went home upon learning of the incident. Elena, together with their mother 'Azon', later went
to the Municipal Hall to lodge a complaint (TSN, October 10, 1989, pp. 4-8).

After the complaint was filed, Maria was examined by Dr. Artemio Capellan, the Municipal health officer, in their house, the following day (TSN,
October 10, 1989, p. 8; TSN, April 26, 1989, pp. 3, 5).

The results of the examination were stated in a medical certificate issued by Dr. Capellan (Exh. "A"). To wit:

'For External examination:

Fairly developed and fairly nourished, mentally retarded, mute, female, adult, Filipino. The breast (sic) are fully developed, hemispherical in shaped
(sic) and slightly soft in consistency. The areola are pinkish brown in color with nipples are (sic) prominent and protruding.

Contusion, abrasion nor (sic) hematoma were not found in the body of the victim.

Genital examination:

Pubic hair not abundant, Labia majora and labia minora are coaptated. Hymenal opening originally linear in shaped (sic) showing old laceration,
corresponding to 5:00, 7:00 o'clock position in the face of the watch. Hymenal orifice admits the vaginal speculum without resistance. Vaginal
rugosities are present but obliterated. Vaginal canal is moderately tight.
Page 210 of 258
 Conclusion:

1. No extra genital injuries were noted on the person of Maria Pura.

Microscopic examination:

a) Presence of human semen and dead sperm were (sic) noted.?

Maria had sexual contact because the speculum can be inserted into her without difficulty. She had an old healed hymeneal laceration caused a day
before. Some of the sperm found in her vagina were living at the time they were examined (TSN, April 26, 1989, p. 4)."

On the other hand, the accused denies the commission of the crime. He summarizes his story in his Brief as follows:

"x x x In the morning of September 14, 1988, he asked Elvira Pura-Collantes’ permission to use their toilet. Elvira is a younger sister of Maria. Said
toilet is outside the Puras’ house. He did not go to their kitchen nor borrowed (sic) cellophane from Noel Abela. When he came out of the toilet Noel
shouted at him and teased him. He got angry and slapped Noel and threw one of his slippers, to (sic) the latter. Noel ran away crying and called for
his mother who is working in a restaurant. Noel's mother arrived home and scolded him (accused). It is not true that he raped Maria Pura. The Puras
are just angry with him because he slapped Noel. The nearest house to the Puras is only a meter away. And there were many people around when
he slapped Noel (TSN, pp. 2-7, October 20, 1989)."

We find no difficulty in agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that the accused had sexual intercourse with Maria Pura on the date as charged.
Although there was no eyewitness to the act, the confluence of the facts and circumstances unerringly establishes the commission of the act. The
Solicitor General correctly enumerates these facts and circumstances:

(1) When witness Elvira Collantes left the house in the morning of 14 September 1988, only her sister Maria Pura and the appellant were left
therein;

(2) Witness Noel Abela, upon arriving home at 10:00 o'clock that morning, chanced upon the accused closing the zipper of his pants in the kitchen
while Maria was at the adjacent dining room, laughing at the accused;

(3) When Noel asked Maria what accused did to her, she moved her body forward and backward; she repeated this motion when asked by Glen
Collantes, her brother-in-law, pointing at the same time to the accused;

(4) Upon examining Maria the following day, Dr. Capellan, the Municipal Health Officer, noticed the presence of "human semen and dead sperm",
thus indicating that she had sexual intercourse within the past twenty-four (24) hours.

There can be no doubt that if the carnal knowledge was accomplished under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, the foregoing circumstantial evidence would have been sufficient to support a conviction for such a crime pursuant to Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court which provides:

"SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."

The foregoing disquisitions render utterly ineffectual and reduce to naught accused's assigned error and the arguments in support thereof. But did
the act of the appellant constitute the crime of rape as defined under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code? To arrive at the answer, the following
crucial issues must be resolved:

1) whether the information properly charges the accused with the commission of rape; and

2) assuming that it does, whether the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

"ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. -- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

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 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua."

xxx

The proper complaint and information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstances which would make the carnal knowledge of a woman
qualify as such under Article 335. Otherwise stated, the same must concretely describe the crime of rape in any of the specified forms to duly inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation;[15] the right to be informed of such accusation is one of his constitutional rights. [16]

The accusatory portion of the information in this case reads:

"That on or about September 4, 1988, in the morning thereof, at barangay Magallanes, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniosly (sic) have carnal
knowledge of one Maria Pura, a deaf-mute, retarded and an embecile (sic) against the latter's will and consent."

As can be readily seen, it does not specifically describe any of the circumstances under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. It is evident that the
information was hurriedly and poorly crafted for aside from the deficiency abovementioned, the 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor even wrongly
spelled the words feloniously and imbecile. This notwithstanding, the allegation therein that the accused had sexual intercourse with a woman who is
retarded and an imbecile implies that the victim was not in full possession and control of her moral reasoning faculty; this is sufficient enough to have
alerted the accused that the charge against him is for rape under the circumstance that the woman is deprived of reason.[17] An imbecile is "a
mentally defective person of the second lowest order of intellectual potential (mental age between 3 and 7 years), usually requiring custodial and
complete protective care."[18] Imbecility is "(a) form of mental disease consisting in mental deficiency either congenital or resulting from an obstacle to
the development of the faculties supervening in infancy. Idiocy. x x x For any process of reasoning, or any general observation or abstract ideas,
imbeciles are totally incompetent. Of law, justice, morality, property, they have but a very imperfect notion, x x x.” [19]

And now on the second issue.

It may be recalled that the trial court convicted the accused based on two circumstances: (a) the use of intimidation and (b) the inability of the
offended party to give consent because she is "a deaf-mute, retarded and an embecile (sic)".

The first is definitely without basis as no evidence was adduced to prove it. The trial court merely inferred this from what it describes as "moral
compulsion" which it ascribes to the fact that "the accused has been known to the woman who (sic) even slept, although outside their house in an
attachment." These are inferences running riot which elementary logic and common sense reject.

What has to be determined then is whether the offended party, Maria Pura, before, during and even after the sexual intercourse on 14 September
1988, suffers from mental retardation or imbecility which deprived her of reason at the time the appellant had carnal knowledge of her.

Without an admission by the accused, this Court's task of resolving this issue would have been difficult as it would be entirely dependent on: (a) the
conclusion of the trial court that Maria Pura is "a deaf mute, retarded and an embecile (sic)"; this conclusion is principally anchored on exactly the
same allegation in the information; (b) the finding by Dr. Capellan, entered in his physical and medical examination report, that she is mentally
retarded; (c) the testimony of Noel Abela that when the victim was asked what the accused did to her, she demonstrated a push-pull movement and
was laughing while looking at the accused; and (d) the court's view of the woman when she was brought to the court. On that occasion the following
transpired:

"ELENA ALIM TESTIFYING UNDER SAME OATH

COURT:

Q You were requested by the court to bring your elder sister and the court has seen you bringing a woman accompanied by a certain man, is that
your elder sister, Maria Pura?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And that man is your younger brother?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Who (sic) is the name of your younger brother?

A Gaspar.

Q Gaspar, would you let her stand?

A (Gaspar assisted the woman Maria Pura in standing up)

Q How tall is she?

Page 212 of 258

A (Less than 4 feet and cross-eyed woman (sic))

Q Could you talk?

A (Woman is nodding)

Q Who (sic) is your name?

A (The woman when asked her name just nodded her head, she is telling something but could not talk)"[20]

No expert witness was presented to testify on Maria Pura's imbecility.

Fortunately for the Prosecution, the appellant readily admitted that Maria Pura is mentally deficient:

Thus, in his Brief, he states:

"In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution was not scrutinized with extreme caution. To stress, there is no reliable eyewitness to the crime
charged. The alleged rape victim is physically and mentally deficient being a deaf-mute, retarded and (sic) imbecile."[21]

Maria Pura was then incapable of giving rational consent to the sexual act. In effect, she is deprived of reason. In People vs. Manlapaz,[22] which
involves a 13-year old girl with the mentality of a 5-year old child, this Court held:

"Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who is below twelve years of age is rape because she is incapable of
giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse. ‘Las mujeres privadas de razon, enajenadas, idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su estado
mental de apreciar la ofensa que el culpable infiere a su honestidad y, por tanto, incapaces de consentir. Pero no es condicion precisa que la
carencia de razon sea completa, basta la abnormalidad o deficiencia mental que solo la disminuye, sim embargo, la jurisprudence es discordante?
(II Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975, pp. 538-9).

?Comete violacion el que yace con mujer que no tiene normalmente desarrolladas sus facultades mentales (19 nov. 1930); aqui esta comprendido
el yacimiento con debiles o retrasados mentales (11 mayo 1932, 25 feb. 1948, 27 sept. 1951); constituye este delito el coito con una niña de 15
años enferma de epilepsia genuina que carece de capacidad para conocer el valor de sus actos (2 marzo 1953); el yacimiento con oligofrenicas
(mentally deficient persons) (28 abril, 24 octubre, 1956, 19 feb. 1958); x x x? (Ibid, note 3).

The same rule prevails in American jurisprudence. ‘There can be no question but that a copulation with a woman known to be mentally incapable of
giving even an imperfect consent is rape' (State vs. Jewett, 192 At. 7).

'An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse with a female who was mentally incapable of validly
consenting to or opposing the carnal act? (65 Am Jur 2nd 766 citing State vs. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86, 187 NW 971; Cokeley vs. State, 87 Tex.
Crim. 256, 220 SW 1099; 31 ALR 3rd 1227, sec. 3).

`In this species of rape neither force upon the part of the man nor resistance upon the part of the woman forms an element of the crime. If, by reason
of any mental weakness, she is incapable of legally consenting, resistance is not expected any more than it is in the case of one who has been
drugged to unconsciousness, or robbed of judgment by intoxicants. Nor will an apparent consent in such a case avail any more than in the case of a
child who may actually consent, but who by law is conclusively held incapable of legal consent. Whether the woman possessed mental capacity
sufficient to give legal consent must, saving in exceptional cases, remain a question of fact x x x. It need but be said that legal consent presupposes
an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. This degree of intelligence may exist with an impaired and
weakened intellect, or it may not? (People vs. Boggs, 290 Pac. 618 citing People vs. Griffin, 49 Pac. 711 and People vs. Peery, 146 Pac. 44)."

This rule has been reiterated by this Court in the following decisions which upheld convictions for the crime of rape: People vs. Gallano,[23] where the
31-year old victim had the mental level of a 7-year old child; People vs. Asturias,[24] where the 17-year old victim had the mental level lower even
than that of a 7-year old child; People vs. Sunga,[25] where the 23-year old victim, had the mentality of an 8 to 9-year old child; and People vs.
Palma,[26] where the victim was a 14-year old retardate with an intellectual capacity described as "borderline mental deficiency".

In the Asturias case, this Court in effect held that if the mental level of a woman above twelve (12) years old is that of a child below twelve (12) years
old, even if she voluntarily submitted to the bestial desires of the accused, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation, or of the victim being
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious are absent, the accused would still be liable for rape under the third paragraph of Article 335. The
reason for this is that if intercourse with a victim under twelve (12) years old is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose
mental age is that of a child below twelve (12) years of age would also constitute rape.

Affirmance of the decision appealed from is thus inevitable. The accused cannot be permitted to escape from the wrath of the law. Having
succumbed to his bestial instinct and desire to satisfy his animal greed by preying on a defenseless imbecile who ought to be the object of sympathy,
he has become a two-legged beast which civilized society must hold in prison in order that he may answer for his evil deed. However, there is a
need to modify both the amount of indemnity awarded to the offended party and the credit of four-fifths (4/5) of the accused's preventive
imprisonment. Also, the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion should be set aside.

Pursuant to People vs. Arenas,[27] which involves the rape of a mentally retarded woman, the indemnity to be paid should be increased to
P40,000.00. The four-fifths (4/5) credit, on the other hand, is improper. Accused is entitled to be credited with the full time of his preventive

Page 213 of 258

imprisonment under the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code and not under paragraph two, which prescribes the four-fifths (4/5)
credit, since there is no evidence that he did not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion. This circumstance is not alleged in the information. The
prosecution did not prove it. Upon cross-examination of the accused by the Prosecutor, over the objection of the defense counsel, the only
information elicited is that the accused had earlier been convicted for the crime of homicide, had served the sentence and had later been released.[28]

The fact of his being out on parole was brought out upon questioning by the court after the termination of the cross-examination.[29] It would thus be
unfair to appreciate reiteracion against the accused. Besides, for the same to exist, it is necessary that "the offender has been previously punished
for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty." [30] Appellant was
earlier convicted for the crime of homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal.[31] That penalty is not equal or greater -- but is definitely lower --
than that provided for the crime of ordinary rape which is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 5571 finding the
accused appellant MAXIMO R. RACE, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

Page 214 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-36941, June 29, 1984 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL SAYLAN ALIAS PAEL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in Criminal Case No. 52-M which imposed the
death penalty.

RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in the sworn complaint of Eutropia Agno said to have been committed as follows:

"That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1972, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Craser, Malinao, Gingoog City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to have sexual intercourse, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with the use of a dagger, force and intimidate Eutropia Agno y Arcay, to remove her pantie and to lay down on the
ground and with the use of a dagger, force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Eutropia Agno y Arcay, a woman of good
reputation and against her will. That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior
strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, ignominy and reiteracion." (Expediente, p. 27.)

The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" and after trial the court rendered the following judgment:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Republic Act No. 4111, and the commission of the offense having been attended by three aggravating without any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00), and to pay the costs. In view of the fact that the offended party is a married woman, aside from the fact that she has not become
pregnant as a result of the commission of the rape, the Court makes no pronouncement as to acknowledgment and support of offspring." (Id., p. 64.)

The factual version of the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as follows:

"The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman and a resident of Barrio Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom teacher of the Mali-
nao Elementary School (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 22, 1973).

"In the afternoon of January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public market in Gingoog City to buy foodstuffs for her family and thereafter, she
proceeded to the store of her mother to fetch her five-year old daughter Nilsonita (p. 4, tsn., Id.). On their way home, Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded
a passenger jeepney and while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the other passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the
Malinao Elementary School, the appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple whom she did not know (pp. 5, 6, tsn., Id. ). The jeepney went only as far as
Malinas citrus farm because the road to Barrio Malinao was not passable by vehicles (p. 5, tsn., Id.). It was almost 6:30 o'clock in the evening when
the jeepney arrived at the Malinas citrus farm and so all the passengers alighted and had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao which was about three
and a half kilometers away (p. 5, tsn., Id.). After walking some distance and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the group and took
the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group took the opposite road (p. 9, tsn., Id.). The appellant, however, joined the group of Eutropia
and when they reached the place where the road was plain, appellant who was then walking side by side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a dagger
about eight inches long and pointing it at the latter said, 'Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!' (pp. 11, 12, tsn., Id. ). At this juncture, appellant placed
his right arm around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger pointed at her left breast (p. 12, tsn., Id.), after which he dragged Eutropia at some
distance. When they reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita
and Rudy Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following them (pp. 17, 18, tsn., Id.). Thereafter, appellant again
dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and
Rudy Gonzales were (pp. 14, 15, 16, tsn., Id.). The appellant then ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant
threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered her to lie down (pp. 18, 19, tsn., Id. ). Subsequently, appellant placed
himself on top of the victim and inserted his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her by moving his buttocks up
and down (pp. 20, 21, tsn., Id.).

"After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up which the latter helplessly and grudgingly followed (p. 23, tsn., Id.). Appellant again
inserted his penis into her vagina and then performed a push and pull movement (pp. 23, 24, 25, tsn., Id.). Not satisfied with the second intercourse,
appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again preparatory to a third intercourse (p. 26, tsn., Id.). Appellant again performed the sexual act with her
(pp. 26, 27, tsn., Id.).

"After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he bent her body downwards with her hands and knees resting on the
ground (p. 28, tsn., Id.). When the latter was already in this position, appellant then placed himself behind her, inserted his penis into her vagina and
executed a push and pull movement in the dog's way of sexual intercourse (pp. 27, 28, tsn., Id. ).

"After performing this uncommon way of sexual intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again which the latter reluctantly obeyed because
appellant's dagger was always pointed at her and thereafter he had carnal knowledge of her for the fifth time (pp. 29, 30, tsn., Id. ).

"After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked Eutropia if she will tell her husband what he did to her and the latter
answered, 'I will not tell' (p., 31, tsn., Id.). But she only said this so that appellant would let her go home (p. 33, tsn., Id.).

Page 215 of 258

"Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children were left and upon arriving thereat, they found Nilsonita (Eutropia's
daughter) asleep with Rudy seated dozing beside her (pp. 32, 33, tsn., Id.). Nilsonita who was sleeping was carried by the appellant and then they all
proceeded to Malinao (pp. 33, 34, tsn., Id.).

"After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her friend "Ben" and upon approaching the said house, she shouted, 'Ben, Ben, please give
me hot water' (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Upon hearing her voice, Ben, who was still awake at the time, opened the door of his house and allowed Eutropia to
come up (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Eutropia immediately went upstairs and went straight to the room of Ben as she was feeling very bad (p. 34, tsn., Id.).
Appellant, who was then carrying Nilsonita, and Rudy Gonzales, were also allowed to go upstairs (p. 35, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, Eutropia requested
Ben to fetch her husband (p. 35, tsn., Id.).

"When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that evening, her husband was already there (p. 36, tsn., Id.). She then asked him whether
the appellant was still around, and in reply, he told her that appellant had already left (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Eutropia then told her husband that she was
raped by the appellant (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Upon learning of the dastardly act committed by the appellant, he advised his wife to submit herself to a
medical examination (p. 37, tsn., Id.).

"The following morning, the offended party was brought to the office of the City Health Department of Gingoog City where she was examined by Dr.
Ireneo O. Pascual, who after conducting a thorough physical examination, issued a medical certificate with the following findings, to wit:

'(1) Multiparous.

'(2) Presence of viscid whitish secretions at vaginal fornix.

'(3) Microscopic examination of secretions reveals epithelial cells, but no spermatozoa identified.'

(pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1973; Exh. "A").

"Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that he met Mrs. Eutropia
Agno in the afternoon of January 23, 1972 at the public market of Gingoog City buying foodstuffs for her family (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 26, 1973). On
their way back to Barrio Malinao, they boarded a passenger jeepney and while he was inside the vehicle, he noticed that the other passengers aside
from Mrs. Agno, her daughter, and himself were the appellant and a couple whose names he did not know (p. 4, tsn., Id. ). The jeepney, however,
could only travel up to the Malinas Citrus farm and so they had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao (p. 4, tsn., Id.) After walking some distance and
upon reaching a trail for carabaos, the appellant suddenly pulled a dagger and placed his arms around the neck of Mrs. Agno and then dragged her
towards the carabao trail (pp. 4, 5, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, he and Nilsonita were left behind and they fell asleep because it took a long time for the
appellant and Mrs. Agno to come back for them (p. 5, tsn., Id.). When Mrs. Agno and the appellant returned, he was already awake while Nilsonita
was still asleep and so appellant had to carry her in going home to Malinao (p. 6, tsn., Id.). After walking some distance, Mrs. Agno saw the house of
Mang Ben and because she was feeling bad, they all went to the house of Mang Ben where Mrs. Agno spent the night (p. 7, tsn., Id. ). Afterwards,
he and the appellant left the house of Mang Ben and then they proceeded to his house at Malinao where both of them slept (pp. 7, 21, tsn., Id. )." (At
pp. 2-8.)

The accused did not deny having had sexual Intercourse with Mrs. Agno; in fact he admitted that he copulated with her for three successive times in
the early evening of January 23, 1972, but he claimed that it was with her consent. Accordingly, he now claims that:

"I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THA THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE WILL AND CONSENT
OF THE COMPLAINANT.

"II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES HAD ACCOMPANIED THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE." (Brief, p. 5.)

The appeal must fail for the reasons stated hereunder.

This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could directly testify on the alleged sexual abuse and the accused alleges consent on the part of the
complainant. The question of credibility arises and under the circumstances We have to rely heavily on the determination made by the trial judge
who observed the demeanor of the witnesses while before Us is only the cold transcript of what they said.

We accept the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court that the complainant was in fact raped by the appellant. There is no fact or
circumstance in the record which will justify a different action.

The claim of the appellant that the sexual intercourse was mutually agreed is utterly incredible. If it were true that Mrs. Agno consented to have
coitus with the appellant, her conduct thereafter defies understanding because it is contrary to reason and it has not been shown that Mrs. Agno, a
school teacher, was bereft of common sense. For if it was true that the sexual act was indeed mutually desired and performed why did she complain
not only to her husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the appellant is carried out in a discreet manner. On the other
hand, the version of the complainant has indicia of credibility. For her version bared her shame to a small community and her exposure was
necessary only because she had to reveal the truth. No, We simply cannot believe the appellant's version.

We have said above that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are entitled to great respect. In finding the appellant guilty, this is what the
court a quo said in part:

"The testimony of the accused is incredible. When he told his love to the offended party for the first time, they were only two in the latter's house. He
had more time with her then. She refused him because she is married. He tried for the second time. He was again refused because she is married. It
Page 216 of 258
is unthinkable and highly improbable that on the evening of January 23, 1972, after only three minutes, the offended party would rush to accept his
love and go to the extent of thanking him for his considering her daughter as his own, unless she was coerced, threatened, forced and intimated.

"It is highly improbable for a school teacher with several children to exchange her husband only 40 years old and with a good means of livelihood for
one whom she does not know and whom she has observed as doing nothing except to play basketball. It is subversive of the traits, character and
nature of Filipino women to say that the offended party, a school teacher and a girl scout accepted the love of a man who is good for nothing and
surrendered her whole body and virtue to him after an accidental courtship of only three minutes. The offended party is an unsophisticated and
conservative woman, fixing her hair the old fashion way. She does not apply make-up on her face, and her dress is up to her knees. This makes the
pretensions of the accused all the more incredible." (Expediente, p. 59.)

The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength, nocturnity, despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion.

The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider
nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape." (Id., p. 63.)

Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail,
about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from
detection and punishment (U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest
house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. (People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id., p. 62.)
We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also
"The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the
matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation." (Brief, p. 24.)
This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band, for which the accused has been
penalized, was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter
than the penalty for rape." (Id., p. 63.)

Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of rank because it was a fact known to the
appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no
deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.

The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but it cannot be affirmed completely because of the lack of the necessary
number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death
and the indemnity to be paid to the offended party is increased to P20,000.00. Costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De La Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., no part.

Melencio-Herrera, J., on official leave.

Page 217 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-32205, August 31, 1979 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. (1) EMERITO ABELLA ALIAS KULOT, (2) GORGONIO AÑOVER, (3)
RODOLFO APOLINARIO, (4) MAXIMO APOLONIAS, (5) DOMINGO ASTROLOGIA ALIAS BLACKIE, (6) JOSE BARBAJO, (7) PERFECTO
BILBAR ALIAS PORPING, (8) CATALINO CABCABAN ALIAS INDAY, (9) RODOLFO CARBALLO, (10) RUSTICO CIDRO, (11) CRESENCIO
CUIZON, (12) FRANCISCO DIONISIO ALIAS SATUD, (13) ELINO DURAN, (14) ABSALON ENRIGAN, (15) JOSE FRANCISCO ALIAS KARATE,
(16) SINDOLFO GALANTO, (17) LEOCADIO GAVILAGUIN ALIAS CADIO, (18) ALFREDO GAYLAN, (19) ROMULO GELLE, (20) FELIX
HERNANDEZ, (21) GUILLERMO IGNACIO, (22) ALFREDO LAGARTO, (23) BENEDICTO LORAÑA ALIAS PAYAT, (24) ELEUTERIO
MALDECIR ALIAS ASWANG, (25) CIRIACO OPSIAR ALIAS SIMARON, (26) ROBERTO PANGILINAN, (27) ROLANDO PANGILINAN, (28)
EUGENIO PROVIDO, JR., (29) VICENTE QUIJANO, (30) JUANITO REBUTASO, (31) ROMEO RICAFORT ALIAS ROMY, (32) MARCELO
SARDENIA, (33) ELEUTERIO TABOY, (34) ANGEL TAGANA, (35) AGUSTIN VILLAFLOR ALIAS TISOY, (36) JOSE VILLARAMA AND (37)
SOFRONIO VILLEGAS, ACCUSED. (1) EMERITO ABELLA, (2) MAXIMO APOLONIAS, (3) JOSE BARBAJO, (4) CATALINO CABCABAN, (5)
RODOLFO CARBALLO, (6) FRANCISCO DIONISIO, (7) ELINO DURAN, (8) ABSALON ENRIGAN, (9) JOSE FRANCISCO, (10) LEOCADIO
GAVILAGUIN, (11) FELIX HERNANDEZ, (12) GUILLERMO IGNACIO, (13) BENEDICTO LORAÑA, (14) EUGENIO PROVIDO, JR., (15) VICENTE
QUIJANO, (16) ELEUTERIO TABOY, (17) ANGEL TAGANA, (18) JOSE VILLARAMA AND (19) SOFRONIO VILLEGAS, ACCUSED WHOSE
DEATH SENTENCES ARE UNDER AUTOMATIC REVIEW.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony. It was a reprise of a similar riot which occurred in the national
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal on Sunday morning, February 16, 1958 (People vs. De los Santos, L-19067-68, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 702).

The record reveals that in the morning of Sunday, June 27, 1965 Numeriano Reynon, a prisoner-trustee, was performing guard duty at the jailhouse
of the penal colony in Panabo, Davao del Norte.

The jailhouse (bartolina) was a two-story building whose second floor was divided by a corridor or passageway one and a half meters wide. On one
side was a single cell about ten meters long and eight meters wide. On the opposite side were three small cells.

Around seventy (seventy-five, according to defendant Cabcaban) prisoners were incarcerated in the big cell. It was indubitably congested. The
prisoners used a drum to dispose of their waste matter. Confined in the three small cells were seventeen prisoners who had committed grave
misconduct and who were known as "close-confined" prisoners to distinguish them from the prisoners in the big cell who were just undergoing
punishment.

The prisoners belonged to two gangs: the Oxo gang, whose members were Visayans with an Oxo mark tattooed on their bodies, and the Sigue-
Sigue gang whose members hailed from Luzon. The name Sigue-Sigue was tattooed on their thighs or buttocks. The existence of these gangs in
the New Bilibid Prison was traced by Judge (now Justice) Andres Reyes in the De los Santos case, supra. See People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759.

Shortly before noontime of that Sunday, June 27, 1965, or after the inmates of the big cell had taken their lunch, Reynon locked that cell. The
seventeen inmates of the three small cells, all members of the Oxo gang, had also taken their lunch but Reynon did not lock their cells because he
was waiting for the prisoner-janitor to bring out from those cells the cans used as urinals.

At that juncture, Leocadio Gavilaguin, a prisoner from the small cell, approached Reynon and asked permission to pawn his pillow to Rodolfo
Carballo, an inmate of the big cell. Reynon told Gavilaguin that Carballo would not accept his pillow because it was very dirty. As it turned out,
Gavilaguin was simply employing a ruse to inveigle Reynon into opening the door to the big cell.

When Reynon refused to open the door, Gavilaguin grabbed him from behind. Then, as if on cue, "the close-confined" prisoners from the small cells
surrounded Reynon and assaulted him. One prisoner stabbed Reynon while the others hit him on the chest and right temple with fistic blows.
Reynon lost consciousness and collapsed on the floor.

A prisoner took the bunch of keys which were in Reynon's custody and opened the door of the big cell. (According to some extrajudicial confessions,
Reynon himself opened the door.) Led by Kulot (Emerito Abella), Tisoy (Agustin Villaflor) and Cadio (Gavilaguin), the other thirteen prisoners from
the small cells rushed into the big cell. They were (1) Gorgonio Añover, (2) Rustico Cidro, (3) Absalon Enrigan, (4) Sindolfo Galanto, (5) Felix
Hernandez, (6) Benedicto Loraña alias Payat, (7) Eleuterio Maldecir alias Aswang, (8) Ciriaco Opsiar alias Simaron, (9) Vicente Quijano, (10)
Juanito Rebutaso, (11) Eleuterio Taboy, (12) Jose Villarama and (13) Sofronio Villegas. They were armed with improvised weapons. So, there were
around eighty-six prisoners in the eighty-square-meter big cell when the massacre occurred.

The seventeenth closely confined prisoner, Perfecto Bilbar alias Porping, stayed in the small cell. He locked its door and closed the padlock of the
big cell (Page 9, Record, Report of Jose T. Castro).

Inside the big cell, Villaflor (Tisoy) shouted: "Tumabi ang Bisaya!" ("Visayans go to the sides"). Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay, an inmate of the big
cell, placed pieces of wood and a blanket on the door to keep it closed (16 tsn July 25, 1967).

According to the eyewitnesses, Arsenio Guevarra, Juan del Rosario (a victim), and Roberto Rodrigo, all prisoners, the inmates from the big cell, who
joined the sixteen raiders from the three cells in assaulting the victims, were (1) Rodolfo Apolinario, (2) Maximo Apolonias alias Max, (3) Domingo
Astrologia alias Blackie, (4) Jose Barbajo alias Joe, (5) Catalino Cabcaban alias Inday, (6) Rodolfo Carballo alias Rudy, (7) Crescencio Cuizon alias
Sianong Kulot, (8) Francisco Dionisio (he pleaded guilty), (9) Elino Duran, (10) Jose Francisco alias Karate, (11) Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay, (12)
Roberto Pangilinan alias Pagong, (13) Rolando Pangilinan, (14) Eugenio Provido, Jr. alias Junior, (15) Romeo Ricafort alias Romy, (16) Marcelo
Sardenia and (17) Angel Tagana.
Page 218 of 258
Some of these seventeen prisoners destroyed the floor of the big cell, removed the wood therefrom and used the pieces of wood in clubbing to death
some of the victims.

The assaulted prisoners, who were unarmed, did not resist the attack. Many of them were lying flat on the floor with raised hands or clinging to the
walls made of steel-matting. The affray lasted for about an hour. Although three whistles were sounded at the start of the massacre and prison
officials rushed to the corridor near the big cell, they could not do anything because the door was locked and the key was held by one of the raiders.
No one among the assailants was injured.

The offenders at first did not surrender to prison officials who had arrived at the scene after the alarm was sounded. It was only after they were
assured that they would not be maltreated that Abella advised his companions to surrender.

Villaflor gathered all the weapons used by his group. He gave them and the bunch of keys to Geronimo Jorge, the overseer of the penal colony,
through the holes of the steel-matting. Those weapons consisted of five sharp-pointed wooden daggers, seven sharp-pointed aluminum daggers,
three wire ice picks, two bamboo ice picks, two Gillette blades with wooden handles, a stone wrapped with cloth (caburata), a wooden club
(Reynon's balila) and twenty-two pieces of wood.

Ten victims, identified as (1) Romeo Bulatao, (2) Manalo Castillo, (3) Jose Castro, (4) Gualberto Fuentes, (5) Jose Magpantay, (6) Severino Pacon,
(7) Carlito Padilla, (8) Generoso Palino, (9) Jacinto Refugia and (10) Delfin San Miguel, were pronounced dead on arrival at the penal colony
hospital. Salvador Abique, Demetrio Camo, Manuel Cayetano and Armando Sanchez died in that hospital. The fourteen victims died of shock,
cerebral hemorrhage and severe external and internal hemorrhage.

Three other victims survived. Reynon sustained a lacerated wound on his eyebrow and a stab wound on the left shoulder. He was confined in the
hospital for nineteen days.

Juan del Rosario, a prisoner in the big cell, suffered a lacerated wound in the head and six incised wounds on the right cheek, mid-anterior side of
the neck, right side of the neck and the left arm.

Bartolome de Guzman had a lacerated wound on the head, two incised wounds at the nape and at the left hypochondriac region, a stab wound on
the neck which penetrated the larynx and two superficial punctured wounds on the left and right sides of the chest.

The examining physician testified that Reynon, Del Rosario and De Guzman would have died had there been no timely medical attendance.

In July, 1965 the statements of several jail inmates were taken by the prison investigator. They were sworn to before the municipal judge of Panabo.

On September 24, 1965 Vicente B. Afurong, supervising prison guard and senior investigator of the Davao Penal Colony, filed in the municipal court
of Panabo a complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder against thirty-seven prisoners of the penal colony who allegedly took part in
the assault (Criminal Case No. 1773).

The accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. On October 22, 1965, a special counsel of the provincial fiscal's office filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Davao City Branch II, charging the thirty-seven accused with multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 9405).

As specified in the information, at the time the massacre occurred the thirty-seven accused were quasi-recidivists because they were serving
sentences for different crimes after having been convicted by final judgment, as indicated below:

(1) Abella - qualified theft, murder and frustrated murder; (2) Añover - murder, theft of large cattle and evasion of service of sentence; (3) Apolinario -
qualified theft; (4) Apolonias - homicide; (5) Astrologia - robbery, homicide, frustrated homicide and qualified theft; (6) Barbajo - robbery with habitual
delinquency; (7) Bilbar - homicide; (8) Cabcaban - theft;

(9) Carballo - homicide; (10) Cidro - frustrated murder and evasion of service of sentence; (11) Cuizon - murder and robbery; (12) Dionisio - murder,
robbery in an inhabited house, six counts, and theft, four counts; (13) Duran - homicide; (14) Enrigan - homicide; (15) Francisco - robbery; (16)
Galanto - homicide; (17) Gavilaguin - murder, homicide and evasion of service of sentence; (18) Gaylan - murder; (19) Gelle - murder; (20)
Hernandez - homicide;

(21) Ignacio - murder, arson, evasion of service of sentence and frustrated murder; (22) Lagarto - murder; (23) Loraña - murder, frustrated murder,
attempted robbery with homicide and robbery with serious physical injuries; (24) Maldecir - murder, frustrated murder, double homicide and evasion
of service of sentence; (25) Opsiar - murder, frustrated murder and qualified theft; (26) Roberto Pangilinan - murder and theft, two counts; (27)
Rolando Pangilinan - murder; (28) Provido, Jr. - theft, two counts and violation of articles 157 and 178 of the Revised Penal Code;

(29) Quijano - murder; (30) Rebutaso - robbery; (31) Ricafort - homicide and attempted homicide; (32) Sardenia - robbery, four counts; (33) Taboy -
murder; (34) Tagana - robbery with physical injuries, malicious mischief, slander by deed, slander with slight physical injuries and violations of Manila
ordinances; (35) Villaflor - robbery, frustrated homicide and evasion of service of sentence; (36) Villarama - frustrated homicide and evasion of
service of sentence, and (37) Villegas - murder and evasion of service of sentence.

At the arraignment on March 5, 1966, the accused were represented by two lawyers de oficio. The information was read and explained to them in
the Tagalog dialect.

Page 219 of 258

The nineteen accused who pleaded guilty were (1) Abella, (2) Añover, (3) Cidro, (4) Dionisio, (5) Enrigan, (6) Galanto, (7) Gavilaguin, (8) Hernandez,
(9) Loraña, (10) Maldecir, (11) Opsiar, (12) Rolando Pangilinan, (13) Quijano, (14) Rebutaso, (15) Ricafort, (16) Taboy, (17) Villaflor, (18) Villarama
and (19) Villegas.

Of the nineteen who pleaded guilty, sixteen were "close-confined" prisoners from the three small cells while three (Dionisio, Pangilinan and Ricafort)
were from the big cell.

The seventeen accused who pleaded not guilty were (1) Apolinario, (2) Apolonias, (3) Astrologia, (4) Barbajo, (5) Bilbar, (6) Cabcaban, (7) Carballo,
(8) Cuizon, (9) Duran, (10) Francisco, (11) Gaylan, (12) Gelle, (13) Lagarto, (14) Roberto Pangilinan, (15) Provido, Jr., (16) Sardenia and (17)
Tagana.

The thirty-seventh accused, Guillermo Ignacio, at first pleaded guilty but when he repudiated his extrajudicial confession, a plea of not guilty was
substituted for his plea of guilty.

After the pleas were entered, the trial court required the fiscal to present evidence as to those who had pleaded guilty. The fiscal submitted as
exhibits the extrajudicial confessions of the nineteen accused which were sworn to before the municipal judge.

At the fiscal's behest, the trial court ordered the interpreter to ask individually the nineteen accused whether they confirmed their confessions. In
open court, all of them ratified their confessions.

Typical of the confessions of the accused was Villaflor's statement taken by Ramon C. Alicarte, an investigator, on July 14, 1965 at the so-called
"reading center" of the penal colony. Villaflor said:

"13. Q. - Will you please narrate to me what you know about that unusual incident (in the morning of June 27, 1965)?

"A. - On that particular time and date, the inmates of the big cell opposite our cell were already inside their cell after they have eaten their noon meal
and after they were locked in the big cell, we inmates in the close-confinement cells were also sent out to have our noon meal.

"But before we went out from our cells, we had already agreed that we are going to get inside the big cell and we also made an agreement that one
of us from the close-confinement cells by the name of Cadio (Gavilaguin) would find a way so that we can get inside the big cell.

"After Cadio has finished eating, he went to his cell and got a pillow which was to be sold to our contact inside the big cell. When Cadio was already
at the aisle between the big cell and the close-confinement cells, our contact in the big cell by the name of Ruding Pakpak (Arsenio Guevarra)
(should be Rodolfo Carballo) came near the door of their cell and asked Cadio if the pillow he (Cadio) was holding is made of cotton.

"Cadio then called the trusty police on duty, prisoner Numeriano Reynon, and requested him (Reynon) that he (Cadio) is going to pledge the said
pillow to Ruding Pakpak (Carballo) but the said trusty was hesitant at first. When Cadio's request was seconded by Emerito Abella by saying: 'Sigi
na pare, dahil sa wala kaming pangbili ng cigarilyo', Reynon opened the door of the big cell and Ruding Pakpak said: 'Abi, Abi, tingnan ko ang unan
kung bulak ang laman.'

"Then, I saw that Reynon was grappled by some of my co-inmates from the close-confinement cell and then my companions began entering the big
cell. When I also went inside the big cell, Ruding Pakpak met me and said to me: 'Saan ang sa akin?' I pulled from my waist his weapon and gave it
to him.

"I then began looking for the inmate who had incriminated me in the previous incident in the prison compound which caused my being jailed in the
close-confinement cells. I then asked Pakpak as to where is Jimmy (Refugia) and he pointed Refugia to me who was then at the ceiling.

"When I saw Refugia, I also climbed and pulled him down. When he fell down the floor, I stabbed him and after that I left Jimmy (Jacinto) who was
already fatally wounded. Then, I began looking for another of our enemies. I then saw Manuel Cayetano who was already wounded. I took the club
from Emerito Abella and began beating Cayetano with it until I stopped beating him when I saw that he was no longer moving. I gave the club to
Kulot (Emerito Abella) and rested for awhile.

"I then saw Pakpak grappling with Bundat and Pakpak called for me to help him. I went near them and I stabbed Bundat once. And Bundat
lessened his grip from Pakpak then began stabbing Bundat (sic) and when he saw that Bundat is (was) dead, he mixed with the rest.

"Then, he asked me: 'Ano ba ito Cusa (Agustin), aamin rin ba ako?'. Then, I told him: 'siempre tapos na rin iyon' and he kept quiet. I then
continued my rest until at (sic) the employees and guards arrived at the jail. While the rest of my companions continued stabbing and beating our
victims, I rested." (Exh. B, pp. 63-64, Record).

Gavilaguin's narrative of the massacre is as follows:

"15. Q. - Will you narrate to me the story of said incident?

"A. - At about 11:55 a.m., June 27, 1965, we were sent out of the cell for our lunch. After the lunch, I called the jailer (trusty police) the person of
Reynon and told him: 'Pare, we finished our meal. Please come and I'll tell you something.' Then, he approached and said: 'What?' ‘I have a pillow
to be given to Rudy Pakpak for sale. You may inspect it if you wish.'

Page 220 of 258

"After (he) inspected, he called Rudy Pakpak and said: 'Will you buy this pillow?' and Rudy said: 'Open the door so that I can see it.' Reynon
opened the door and when it was opened, Sofronio Villegas (prisoner) held him (Reynon) tightly, and I grabbed the key from the hand of Reynon.
When I got (it), I pushed him away and opened the door. When I got inside the cell, I said: 'Visaya at Ilocano ay tumabi.'

"My companions followed me inside in the big cell and I told them to watch on the door. I saw trusty police Budoy and (he) closed the door and said:
'Mamatay kayong lahat diyan.'

"When I went to the middle part of the big cell, I met Abiki having Sigi-sigi tatoo. I stabbed him and he was able to grab the weapon (sharp-pointed
stakes) taken from me. When he held my hand, he told me: 'Kalugar (sic), Pilay, you help me. Tulongan mo ako. Malaki masyado ito.'

"Pilay approached us and I gave him the blade and he used the same to cut off the neck of Abiki. Abiki released me and I continued stabbing for
several others (sic). When I saw him down, I left him and went to the others. I saw some Sigi-sigi members. I also stabbed them after which I told
Rudy Pakpak: 'Hilahin mo dito ang mga patay.'

"I saw some who were still alive and I told him: 'Beat them on the head with the wooden clubs.' Afterwards, the employees arrived and shouted:
'You surrender' and we called Mr. Jorge for whom we made the surrender by giving to him our weapons such as sharpened stakes and others.

"Then, we were ordered to go down naked with hands tied and thereafter, we were instructed to go to the place near the toilet until the Judge arrived.
The dead ones were brought down x x x." (Exh. E, pp. 76-77 or 55-56, Record).

The trial court forthwith rendered a partial decision convicting the nineteen accused, who pleaded guilty, of the complex crime of multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder, qualified by treachery and premeditation (alleged in the information) and with the special aggravating circumstance of
quasi-recidivism which was not offset by their plea of guilty.

In addition, recidivism, which was alleged in the information, was appreciated against Abella, Añover, Cidro, Dionisio, Enrigan, Galanto, Gavilaguin,
Hernandez, Loraña, Maldecir, Opsiar, Rolando Pangilinan, Quijano, Ricafort, Taboy, Villaflor and Villegas.

Reiteration, which was also alleged in the information, was appreciated against Abella, Gavilaguin, Maldecir, Villaflor, Villarama and Dionisio.

Eighteen accused who pleaded guilty were sentenced to death. Rebutaso, the nineteenth accused who also pleaded guilty, was sentenced to
cadena perpetua (should be reclusion perpetua). All of them were ordered to pay solidarily an indemnity of six thousand pesos to the heirs of each
of the fourteen victims (Decision of March 5, 1966, p. 238, Expediente of Criminal Case No. 9405).

Those who were convicted were sent to the national penitentiary. The eighteen accused (including Ignacio) who pleaded not guilty were tried. Upon
motion of the fiscal, on the ground of lack of evidence, the trial court dismissed the case as to Perfecto Bilbar (page 299, Expediente).

After trial, the lower court in its decision of September 14, 1969 convicted twelve of the said eighteen defendants, namely, (1) Apolonias, (2)
Astrologia, (3) Barbajo, (4) Cabcaban, (5) Carballo, (6) Cuizon, (7) Duran, (8) Francisco, (9) Ignacio, (10) Pangilinan, (11) Provido, Jr. and (12)
Tagana, of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder with the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and quasi-
recidivism (treachery was not mentioned).

The trial court sentenced to death each of the said twelve accused (in addition to the eighteen "close-confined" prisoners who pleaded guilty and
were already sentenced to death in the trial court's 1966 partial decision) and ordered them to pay solidarily an indemnity of six thousand pesos to
the heirs of each of the fourteen victims, namely, Abique, Bulatao, Camo, Castillo, Castro, Cayetano, Fuentes, Magpantay, Pacon, Padilla, Palino,
Refugia, Sanchez and San Miguel. The twelve defendants were further ordered to pay solidarily an indemnity of three thousand pesos to each of the
frustrated murder victims, Numeriano Reynon, Juan del Rosario and Bartolome de Guzman.

For lack of evidence, a verdict of acquittal was rendered for six accused, namely, Apolinario, Bilbar, Gaylan, Gelle, Lagarto and Sardenia (Decision
of September 14, 1969, page 400, Expediente).

So, thirty of the thirty-seven accused were sentenced to death. The case of Rebutaso, who was sentenced to cadena perpetua and who did not
appeal, is not under review.

The death sentence imposed upon Astrologia is likewise not under review because it was not promulgated. After the trial, he was returned to the
national penitentiary for security reasons. On October 10, 1969 he was erroneously paroled because the Board of Pardons and Parole was not
informed that he was sentenced to death in the Davao court's decision of September 14, 1969 (Pages 413-4 of Expediente and pages 1, 152 and
159, Rollo).

After the rendition of that decision or during the pendency of this case, death ended the agonies of ten of the twenty-nine accused who were
sentenced to death. The ten dead defendants were Añover, Cidro, Cuizon, Galanto, Maldecir, Opsiar, Roberto Pangilinan, Rolando Pangilinan,
Ricafort and Villaflor (Pages 98, 125, 171, 176, 181, 212, 336-B, 662, 717 and 750, Volumes I and II of the Rollo).

The death penalty imposed on the remaining nineteen accused named in the title of this case (including Abella, Apolonias and Villegas who escaped
from confinement, page 158, Rollo), is the one under automatic review "as law and justice shall dictate".

Review of death sentence on those who pleaded guilty. - It may be recapitulated that of the nineteen accused in the death row, ten, namely (1)
Abella, an escapee, (2) Dionisio, (3) Enrigan, (4) Gavilaguin, (5) Hernandez, (6) Loraña, (7) Quijano, (8) Taboy, (9) Villarama (he allegedly killed on
February 12, 1976 a fellow prisoner in the national penitentiary, page 712, Volume II of Rollo), and (10) Villegas, an escapee, pleaded guilty upon

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arraignment and in open court ratified their extrajudicial confessions which were sworn to before the municipal judge. They were sentenced to death
in the trial court's 1966 partial decision.

Nine of the ten were among the sixteen "close-confined" prisoners in the three small cells who invaded the big cell. The tenth, Dionisio, was
confined in the big cell.

After a perusal of their confessions, we find that their admission of guilt therein is corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti or the fact that the
massacre described therein actually took place.

The requirements of section 20, Article IV of the Constitution with respect to extrajudicial confessions are not applicable to the confessions herein
because they were taken before the effectivity of the Constitution or before January 17, 1973 (Magtoto vs. Manguera, L-37201-02, Simeon vs.
Villaluz, L-37424 and People vs. Isnani, L-38929, all decided on March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4).

Counsel de officio contends that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty because the lower court did not apprise them of the meaning and
consequences of their plea. Reliance is placed on the dictum that in capital cases "it is advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant" (U.S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541, 543).

Also cited is the admonition that "judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction" (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., L-19491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798, 817).

And the long settled rule is that in case a plea of guilty is made in capital cases "the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as
are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated,
not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea" (People vs. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767, 770. See People vs. Baluyot, L-
32752-3, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 148).

As already indicated in our recital of the proceedings below, the trial court, in order to comply with the procedure in capital cases when a plea of
guilty is entered, required the fiscal to present evidence. The latter presented the confessions of those who pleaded guilty.

It is true that the trial judge did not adhere to the ritualistic formula of explaining to the accused the meaning and consequences of their plea of guilty
and the nature of the aggravating circumstances.

Presumably, the trial court did not do so, not only because the judicial confessions of the accused (pleas of guilty) were reinforced by their
extrajudicial confessions, but also because it was cognizant of the fact that all the accused were quasi-recidivists who had already acquired
experience in criminal proceedings and had, therefore, some comprehension of what a plea of guilty signifies.

We hold that in this case the accused did not make an improvident plea of guilty. As held in U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305, 318, it lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge whether he is satisfied that a plea of guilty has been entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning
and consequences thereof.

People vs. Yamson and Romero, 109 Phil. 793, is a case similar to the instant case. In the Yamson case two prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison
killed their fellow convict. At their arraignment for murder, they pleaded guilty with the assistance of a counsel de oficio. They were forthwith
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to death, being quasi-recidivists.

The accused appealed. This Court, in resolving the contention of counsel de oficio that the accused had made an improvident plea, held that the
trial judge must have been fully satisfied that the accused entered the plea of guilty with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences thereof.
That observation may be applied to the instant case. (Same holding in People vs. Perete, 111 Phil. 943 and People vs. Yamson, 111 Phil. 406.)

Review of the death sentence on those who pleaded not guilty. - As to the other nine accused, who pleaded not guilty and were tried and sentenced
to death, namely, Apolonias, Barbajo, Cabcaban, Carballo, Duran, Francisco, Ignacio, Provido, Jr. and Tagana, it is necessary to make a painstaking
examination of the evidence in order to ascertain whether their guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Those nine accused were in the big cell (bartolina). The prosecution's theory is that they conspired with the sixteen raiders from the three small cells
to kill the fourteen victims and inflict injuries on the three other victims.

1. Maximo Apolonias alias Max. - He was born in Barrio Anas, Dimasalang, Masbate. He finished grade four. He was convicted of homicide by the
Court of First Instance of Masbate and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. He was imprisoned in the national penitentiary on December 26, 1964. He arrived in the Davao
Penal Colony on May 8, 1965. He was twenty-four years old when he testified on March 13, 1968.

He testified that when the massacre occurred he climbed the wall of steel-matting. He allegedly did not know what transpired when the sixteen
"close-confined" raiders entered the big cell. In his statement of August 9, 1965, he denied having joined the sixteen raiders. He repeatedly
declared that he could not have been involved in the massacre because he was a new arrival in the penal colony. The massacre took place fifty
days after his arrival.

Witness Guevarra said that he did not see Apolonias assaulting the victims (109 tsn November 16, 1966). Witnesses Del Rosario and Rodrigo
implicated Apolonias but did not state definitely the acts perpetrated by the latter during the assault.

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We find that the prosecution's evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Apolonias. As to him, it is not sufficient to justify the
judgment of conviction.

2. Jose Barbajo alias Joe. - He is a native of Mabolo, Cebu City. He finished grade three. He was eighteen years old when he was convicted of
robbery. The Court of First Instance of Cebu imposed upon him a penalty of six years and eight months of prision mayor (as a habitual delinquent
he was not entitled to an indeterminate sentence) plus three years, six months and twenty-one days for habitual delinquency. He was received in
the national penitentiary on July 9, 1964. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on September 13, 1964.

He was twenty-five years old when he testified on March 12, 1968. He declared that he was sick when the massacre occurred. He climbed the wall
of steel-matting. He said that he was not a member of any prison gang.

Witness Guevarra identified Barbajo as a member of the Oxo gang and as having beaten with a piece of wood one "Bandes" (108, 115 and 127 tsn
November 17 and 18, 1966). Witness Del Rosario implicated Barbajo and witness Rodrigo definitely testified that Barbajo supplied to his
companions the pieces of wood which they used in beating the victims (10 tsn July 25, 1967).

3. Catalino Cabcaban alias Inday. - He was born in Barrio Asagna, Tanjay, Negros Oriental. He finished the fourth grade. He was convicted of theft
and evasion of service of sentence. He was confined in the national penitentiary starting August 29, 1962. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on
May 15, 1964. He was twenty-six years old on October 20, 1967 when he testified.

In his statement (Exh. DD), he admitted that he was a member of the Oxo gang but he denied that he helped the sixteen raiders in assaulting the
victims. He testified that at the time the massacre was being perpetrated he was clinging to the wall made of steel-matting. His body was examined
while he was on the witness stand. It was tattooed but not with the letters "OXO".

Witnesses Guevarra and Del Rosario, the companions of Cabcaban in the big cell, testified that Cabcaban was a member of the Oxo gang and that
he helped Abella's group in attacking the members of the Sigue-Sigue gang in the big cell. Witness Rodrigo, a prisoner acting as a special
policeman, pointed to Cabcaban as the person who beat Cabile with a piece of wood (4 tsn July 25, 1967). There is no victim surnamed Cabile, as
reported in the transcript, but Rodrigo was probably referring to the victim named Salvador Abique who was also identified by a witness as Tabique.
The name "Cabile" might be an error in transcription.

4. Rodolfo Carballo alias Ruding Pakpak. - He was born in Villadolid, Negros Occidental. He resided at 958 Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. He
finished grade six. He was convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to six years and one day of prision mayor to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.

He was brought to the New Bilibid Prison on December 8, 1962. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on June 20, 1964. He escaped from the
penal colony on August 12, 1964 and was recaptured on March 15, 1965. He was twenty-seven years old when he testified on January 8, 1968.

He admitted in his statement to the investigator that he was a member of the Oxo gang and had the Oxo tattoo mark. He testified that during the
massacre he climbed the wall of steel-matting but someone pulled his feet and he fell down on the floor.

Witness Guevarra testified that Gavilaguin, a closely-confined prisoner, wanted to sell his pillow to Carballo (who is identified in the confessions as
Ruding Pakpak), a prisoner in the big cell. It was that ruse which started the commotion (95-98 tsn November 16, 1966). Guevarra identified
Carballo as one of those who helped the sixteen raiders (107 tsn November 17, 1966). That testimony was corroborated by witnesses Del Rosario
and Rodrigo.

5. Elino Duran. - He was born in Catbalogan, Samar. He finished grade five. He was convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Samar
and sentenced to six years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal. He was brought to the national
penitentiary on December 18, 1962. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on March 5, 1963. He was twenty-nine years old when he testified on
March 12, 1968.

In his statement and testimony, he denied any participation in the massacre. He said that during the riot he climbed the wall of steel-matting. He
said that he was not a member of the Oxo gang but he believed that he was counted as an Oxo sympathizer because he is a Visayan.

He admitted that he executed a statement and that the contents thereof were true (Exh. EE). On the witness stand, He pointed to Ignacio alias Pilay,
Tagana, Astrologia, Cabcaban and Carballo alias Rudy as among those who took part in the massacre.

In his statement, he identified Cuizon, Roberto Pangilinan, Rolando Pangilinan, Cabcaban, Lagarto, Apolonias, Astrologia, Ricafort, Carballo,
Ignacio, Tagana and Dionisio as having taken part in the killings (See No. 12, Exh. EE).

Prosecution eyewitnesses Guevarra, Del Rosario and Rodrigo identified Duran as having collaborated with the sixteen raiders in perpetrating the
massacre.

6. Jose Francisco alias Karate. - He was born in Pila, Laguna and resided at San Andres Extension, Manila. He finished the first year of high
school. He used to be a judo instructor. In 1964, he was convicted of robbery by the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to
imprisonment for two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimim, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum (Exh. J-
5). He was confined in the national penitentiary on February 15, 1964. He was received in the Davao Penal Colony on May 15, 1964 and confined
in the big cell on June 25, 1965, or two days before the riot, because he was suspected of having smuggled deadly weapons into the prison
compound (pp. 93 or 115, Record). He was twenty-five years old when he testified on January 8, 1968.

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He declared that when the raiders entered the big cell he stepped aside, climbed the wall of steel-matting and prayed. However, witness Guevarra
identified Francisco as a member of the Oxo gang who helped the raiders and who, armed with a wooden club, beat the victim, Gualberto Fuentes,
who died (108, 114-115 and 127 tsn November 17 and 18, 1966). Witness Del Rosario included Francisco in his wholesale identification of twelve
assailants who helped the raiders from the small cells.

Counsel de oficio, who filed a brief for Francisco only, contended that the trial court erred in holding that Francisco was a co-conspirator. Said
counsel alleged that Francisco was convicted of robbery (snatching) because he was framed up by a certain Patrolman Liwanag of the Manila police.
According to counsel, Francisco and one Roberto Gonzales (an actor) had charged Liwanag with extorting money from the Karate Club, of which
Francisco was a member, and, in revenge, Liwanag fabricated a complaint for robbery against Francisco who was convicted and sent to the Davao
Penal Colony. No evidence was presented in the lower court by Francisco to prove that he was convicted on a trumped-up charge of robbery.

7. Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay. - He was born in La Carlota, Negros Occidental. He finished grade five. He was convicted of murder, frustrated
murder, arson and evasion of service of sentence. He was received in the national penitentiary on July 27, 1953. He arrived in the Davao Penal Co-
lony on September 22, 1961. He escaped three times from prison (Exh. J-12). He was thirty-eight years old when he testified on March 12, 1968.

He declared that when the massacre began, he stood beside the steel-matting. He saw his fellow prisoner, Arsenio Guevarra (the prosecution
witness), carrying a pillow. After the riot, he was investigated. He said that he did not read his statement but he was just made to sign it and he
signed it so that he would not be maltreated. In his statement, he admitted he was a member of the Oxo gang.

Guevarra said that he did not see Ignacio helping the group (108 tsn November 17, 1966).

Witness Rodrigo, a prisoner acting as a special policeman, identified Ignacio as a member of the Oxo gang and as the prisoner who, during the riot,
covered the door of the big cell with a blanket and pieces of wood and who, armed with a wooden club, took part in beating the victims (15-16 tsn
July 25, 1967).

Witness Del Rosario, in his wholesale identification of the twelve prisoners who took part in the assault, included Ignacio (222 tsn February 10,
1967).

8. Eugenio Provido, Jr. - He was born in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He finished the sixth grade. He was convicted of theft and violations of articles 157
and 178 of the Revised Penal Code. He was received in the national penitentiary on December 3, 1959. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on
February 29, 1964 (Exh. J-17). He was twenty-six years old when he testified on July 10, 1968.

He declared that when the sixteen raiders entered the big cell he was driven to a corner and was shielded by the other prisoners and in that situation
he heard the shouts of the rioters. He said that he did not know what actually happened because he was solicitous about his own personal safety.
He did not climb the steel-matting. He said that during the investigation of the case, he was told that he would be utilized as a State witness. He
denied that he was a member of the Oxo gang.

Witness Guevarra testified that he did not know Provido (90 tsn November 16, 1966). However, when he was asked to point to his (Guevarra's)
companions in the big cell who helped Abella's group, Guevarra fingered Provido and identified him as a member of the Oxo gang and as having
beaten the victims with a piece of wood (Ibid, 108 and 115; 127 tsn Nov. 18, 1966).

Witness Rodrigo identified Provido as having beaten the deceased Jose Magpantay with a piece of wood (10-11 tsn July 25, 1967). Witness Del
Rosario included Provido as among those who participated in the assault (222 tsn February 10, 1967).

9. Angel Tagana. - He was born in Dulag, Leyte. He finished grade two. He resided in Pandacan, Manila. He had six convictions for robbery with
physical injuries, malicious mischief and slander by deed and violations of city ordinances. He was received in the national penitentiary on June 15,
1963. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on May 8, 1965 (Exh. J-9). He was twenty-six years old when he testified on January 9, 1968.

He declared that when the sixteen raiders entered the big cell and started stabbing his companions he ran to the side of the cell. He was not
assaulted by anyone.

In his statement, he admitted that he was a member of the Oxo gang (p. 119 or 143, Record). Witness Guevarra identified him as a member of that
group and as having used a piece of wood in beating one victim (115 and 127 tsn November 17, 1966). Witnesses Del Rosario and Rodrigo also
pointed to Tagana as one of those who helped Abella's group (222 tsn February 10, 1967 and 14-15 tsn July 25, 1967).

Counsels de oficio contend that the trial court erred in holding that there was a conspiracy among the accused. That contention has no basis in the
evidence. The record supports the trial court's finding that "conspiracy can logically be inferred from the simultaneous and concerted acts of (the)
sixteen raiders who, after putting down the guard and entering the big cell, joined and combined forces with their friends and associates-inmates of
the big cell who were waiting for the go-signal to commence the attack in pursuance of their criminal objective".

The trial court added that the acts and conduct of the accused from the start of their aggression until the riot was suppressed were characterized "by
a swift, united and concerted movement that could easily indicate a community of purpose, closeness of association and concurrence of wills", as
shown particularly by the order of the two "close-confined" prisoners, Abella and Villaflor, that the Visayans in the big cell should stay on one side so
that it could be ascertained that they were the allies of the sixteen raiders.

The conspiracy among the accused was manifest and indubitable. The massacre had been planned by the sixteen "close-confined" prisoners in
collaboration with the other members of the Oxo gang in the big cell.

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Counsel de oficio assails the credibility of witnesses Guevarra and Del Rosario. These two witnesses were prisoners in the big cell. They had
sufficient opportunity to observe what took place during the hour-long riot. Del Rosario was himself a victim.

Counsel de oficio contends that reiteration is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the said accused had been previously punished for
an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. On the contrary,
according to counsel, the said accused were still serving sentence for their prior convictions.

Counsel's contention is correct as to Abella, Dionisio, Gavilaguin, Maldecir, Villaflor and Villarama against whom reiteration was considered
aggravating. They were still serving sentence for their previous crimes at the time the riot occurred. In order that the aggravating circumstance of
reiteration may be taken into account, it should be shown that the offender against whom it is appreciated had already served out his sentences for
the prior offenses (People vs. Layson, L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92, 97).

But since the accused are quasi-recidivists, the fact that reiteration cannot be appreciated against them and that their plea of guilty is mitigating will
not affect the imposition of the death penalty for the murders and frustrated murders which they had committed.

The other contention of counsel de oficio that all the accused should be given the benefit of the extenuating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
the authorities is not correct. The accused did not surrender voluntarily and unconditionally. They rejected the initial requests for their surrender.
They surrendered after prison officials armed with guns demanded their surrender. They chose the person to whom they would surrender, namely,
Jorge, the overseer.

Defense counsel's contention that treachery and evident premeditation are not aggravating in this case is untenable. The accused, who were all
armed, unexpectedly attacked the unarmed and defenseless Sigue-Sigue inmates in the big cell who had no means of escaping from that cell and
who could not avoid their assaults. The victims did not offer any resistance.

The accused had deliberately planned the attack as shown by the manner in which they executed the massacre. They provided themselves with
improvised weapons. No one among the accused sustained any injuries or was exposed to any risk arising from any defense that the victims might
have made. The victims were not able to make any retaliation. Moreover, there was abuse of superiority which absorbed cuadrilla.

In People vs. Layson, L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92, the four accused, also inmates of the Davao Penal Colony, who were armed with
bladed weapons, entered on January 17, 1964 the cell of their fellow prisoner, locked the door thereof and stabbed him to death. It was held that the
crime was murder aggravated by treachery, evident premeditation and quasi-recidivism.

The Layson case is similar to the instant case. The difference between the two cases is that in the instant case, more prisoners were involved and
there were seventeen victims.

Motion for new trial. - On October 30, 1973 or after the Solicitor General had filed his brief, twenty of the thirty accused, who were sentenced to
death, filed, personally or without the assistance of counsel, a motion for new trial. Those twenty movants are Añover alias Abarca (who died on
June 18, 1976), Barbajo, Cabcaban, Carballo, Cuizon (who died on November 6, 1977), Dionisio, Duran, Enrigan, Francisco, Gavilaguin,
Hernandez, Ignacio, Loraña, Opsiar (who died on April 2, 1974), Provido, Quijano, Tagana, Taboy, Villarama and Villegas.

Of those twenty, ten accused, namely, Dionisio, Enrigan, Gavilaguin, Hernandez, Loraña, Opsiar, Quijano, Taboy, Villarama and Villegas had
pleaded guilty. Nine of the ten were "close-confined" prisoners in the three cells. The tenth, Dionisio, was in the big cell. The other ten of the twenty
accused were from the big cell. They pleaded not guilty and they were tried.

The twenty movants alleged in their motion for new trial that those who pleaded guilty did so due to "the coercion, harassment and intimidation
applied by the prison authorities" or due to "third degree" and other brutalities. They further alleged that one of the "fabricated (prosecution)
witnesses" was Guillermo Ignacio who made a retraction and that another witness, Elino Duran, was forced to sign his affidavit.

The Solicitor General commented that the grounds relied upon by the movants are not the grounds for a new trial under sections 2 and 3, Rule 121
and section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. He correctly observed that Ignacio and Duran were not utilized as prosecution witnesses.

Action on the motion for new trial was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. After an evaluation of the said motion, we find that it
is devoid of merit and is not in order.

The record does not show that Ignacio retracted his statement. Duran never claimed that he was intimidated into making his statement. Those
movants who pleaded guilty were convicted on the basis of their confessions which they ratified during the trial. On the other hand, those who
pleaded not guilty were given a fair trial. They testified and they had the opportunity to prove their innocence. Their testimonies (except Apolonias'
testimony) did not generate any reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

Propriety of the imposition of the death penalty on the eighteen accused. - As to the fourteen deceased victims, the crime is murder qualified by
treachery which absorbs abuse of superiority and cuadrilla. As to those who pleaded guilty, that mitigating circumstance is offset by evident
premeditation. Recidivism is aggravating as to some accused. As to all the eighteen accused, quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circum-
stance which justifies the imposition of the penalty for murder (reclusion temporal maximum to death) in its maximum period or death.

The fiscal and the trial court treated the fourteen killings and the injuries inflicted on the three victims as a complex crime of multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. The trial court imposed a single death penalty.

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However, the Solicitor General submits that the accused should be convicted of fourteen separate murders and three separate frustrated murders
and punished, respectively, by fourteen death penalties and three penalties for the frustrated murders because the killings and injuries were effected
by distinct acts.

It is argued that article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to this case. Cited in support of that stand is the ruling in U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1
Phil. 56 that "where the defendant has fired two shots, killing one party and wounding another, the acts constitute two distinct crimes, each of which
must be tried separately".

We hold that the Solicitor General's submission is not well-taken. In the De los Santos case, supra, which involved two riots on two successive days
in the national penitentiary wherein nine prisoners were killed (five on the first day and four on the second day), the fourteen members of the Sigue-
Sigue gang who took part in the killing were convicted of multiple murder (a complex crime) and not of nine separate murders. Only one death
penalty was imposed. It was commuted to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes.

There is no compelling reason for not deciding this case in the same way as the De los Santos case. The two cases are very similar.

The ruling in the De los Santos case is predicated on the theory that "when, for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense,
various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense", a complex one (People vs. Peñas, 66 Phil. 682, 687. See People vs.
Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236, 302 and 906, where the falsification of one hundred twenty-eight warehouse receipts during the period from November
1930 to July 6, 1931, which enabled the accused to swindle the bank in the sum of one million four hundred thousand pesos was treated as only one
complex crime of estafa through multiple falsification of mercantile documents and only one penalty was imposed).

That holding in the De los Santos case is buttressed by some precedents. Thus, in People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 and 82, 102-103, where seventy-
seven Constabularymen murdered six policemen (including the assistant chief of police) and two private citizens and gravely wounded three
civilians, they were convicted of multiple murder with grave injuries, a complex crime. The eleven sergeants and corporals were sentenced to death
while the sixty-six privates were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. (See People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185, re sedition and multiple murder.)

In People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27, nineteen Moros, forming part of a band of one hundred, massacred fourteen Constabularymen. They were
charged and convicted of multiple murder, a complex crime. Their ring leader was sentenced to death. The other eighteen accused were sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.

In People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975, where on a single occasion around fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards (formerly Constabulary
soldiers), the killing was held to be only one complex offense of multiple homicide because it "resulted from a single criminal impulse" and it was not
possible to determine how many victims were killed by each of the accused. (See U.S. vs. Fresnido, 4 Phil. 522 where the killing of three
Constabulary soldiers on a single occasion was punished as a single homicide.)

In People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831, around eighty persons stationed on both sides of the highway in Sitio Salabusab, Bongabong, Nueva Ecija,
fired at the group of Aurora Vda. de Quezon riding in five cars which were proceeding to Baler, Quezon Province. The group was going to attend the
inauguration of a monument in honor of President Manuel L. Quezon.

Killed as a result of the ambuscade were eleven persons, namely, Mrs. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Felipe Buencamino III, Mayor Ponciano Bernardo of
Quezon City, Primitivo San Agustin, Antonio San Agustin, Pedro Payumo, two Constabulary lieutenants, one corporal and a soldier.

Five persons were charged with multiple murder, a complex crime, for complicity in the ambuscade. The trial court sentenced them to death. They
appealed. The case as to three of the accused was dismissed on the ground that their confessions were taken after they had been tortured.

Two other accused, Pedro Manantan and Raymundo Viray, executed extrajudicial confessions. At the trial, they relied on alibis, which were not
given credence.

This Court imposed upon Manantan and Viray only one death penalty for the multiple murder but for lack of necessary votes, the penalty was
reduced to reclusion perpetua.

As persuasive authority, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals rendered the same ruling when it held that where a conspiracy animates several
persons with a single purpose, "their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act - the act of execution - giving rise to
a complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being" (People vs.
Leaño, 1 ACR 447, 461 per Albert, J., with Justices Pedro Concepcion, Moran, Sison and Paras concurring).

In the Leaño case, a group of twenty-five persons armed with bolos, knives, sticks and other weapons, after shouting to one another "Remember the
agreement! Don't be afraid!", attacked a group of excursionists coming from the Vintar Dam in Ilocos Norte, who were riding in a Ford coupe and
omnibus.

As a result of the attack one excursionist was killed, three suffered lesiones menos graves and four suffered light injuries. The trial court convicted
the assailants of homicide only. The Solicitor General recommended that they be convicted of lesiones menos graves and lesiones leves in addition
to homicide. The Court of Appeals held that the appellants were guilty of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones menos graves.

The holding that there is a complex crime in cases like the instant case is similar to the rule in robbery with homicide, a special complex crime, where
the number of persons killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery does not change the nature of the crime.

Page 226 of 258

We have already stated that the conviction for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, as a complex crime, qualified by treachery (absorbing
abuse of superiority and cuadrilla) and aggravated by quasi-recidivism and evident premeditation (offset by plea of guilty) and recidivism, as to some
accused, as shown in the record, should be affirmed.

The death penalty was properly imposed in conformity with articles 48, 160 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The indemnity of six thousand
pesos should be increased to twelve thousand pesos for each set of heirs of the fourteen victims.

However, justice should be tempered with mercy. Considering the circumstances which drove the accused to massacre their fellow prisoners, they
deserve clemency. The death penalty should be commuted to reclusion perpetua. The following observations of this Court in the De los Santos
case have some relevancy to this case:

"But the members of the Court cannot in conscience concur in the death penalty imposed, because they find it impossible to ignore the contributory
role played by the inhuman conditions then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly described by the trial judge in his decision.

"It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed facilities beyond measure and the starvation allowance of ten centavos
per meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of the unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of
violence to seize from their owners the meager supplies from outside in order to eke out their miserable existence.

"All this led inevitably to the formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately to pitiless gang rivalry for the control of the
prisoners, abetted by the inability of the outnumbered guards to enforce discipline, and which culminated in violent riots. The government cannot
evade responsibility for keeping prisoners under such subhuman and Dantesque conditions.

"Society must not close its eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude from its midst those who attack it, it has no right at all to confine them
under circumstances that strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of animals, and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and
slow death." (See People vs. Dahil, L-30271, June 15, 1979.)

Justice Barredo believes that in a case like the instant case, where, since the commission of the multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder in
1965 or more than fourteen years ago, the accused have been in confinement and in fact they have been in confinement for other offenses even
prior to 1965, the death penalty should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, following the precedent established in the aforecited De los Santos case, the death penalty imposed by the lower court is reduced to
reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of six thousand pesos is increased to twelve thousand pesos. The indemnities for the frustrated murders are
affirmed. Defendant Maximo Apolonias is acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs. Please see my concurring opinion Peo. Vs. Borja et al, G.R. No. L-22947.
Makasiar, J., in the result.
Santos, J., is abroad.

Page 227 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-25177, October 31, 1969 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO AND JOVENTINO
GARCES, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Davao in criminal case 8495 imposing the
death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces.

On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences
of conviction for the following crimes:

"Nicolas Layson - kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and theft;

"Cezar Ragub - frustrated murder and homicide;

"Cezar Fugoso - robbery in an inhabited house and theft;

"Joventino Garces - robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited house."

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell where the
unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly
took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the
crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their
safety, whereupon they handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered themselves.

Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe internal and external hemorrhage and shock, all
secondary to multiple stab wounds.

Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that
he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.

On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information recites:

"The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in relation to
Art. 160, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

"That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-mentioned accused, while then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their corresponding sentences of con-
viction by reason of final judgment imposed upon them, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed
instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and fe-
loniously attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries
which caused his death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2)
all of them with two or more prior convictions."

Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, freely and spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty,
the court a quo proceeded to receive testimony because of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Arti-
cle 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating circumstances of
recidivism and having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused
Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished with two or more offenses to which the law attaches a
lighter penalty with respect to the accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of the
qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to
qualify the crime to murder and the special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged while serving the penalty imposed upon
them for previous offenses as regards all the accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences all of them to
DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs proportionately."

For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and
the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

Page 228 of 258

We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation be considered in favor of all the
accused. For this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed from the commission of the
offense by a considerable length of time, during which period the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. [1]

Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these
taking place at least ten days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill
Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during which the
accused regained their equanimity. They moved their evil scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates
whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence of passion and obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the diagram (exh. J), plus the testimony of Dr. Guillermo de
Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was killed in a manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the offense,
with resultant incapability of the victim to offer resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but
this circumstance must be considered as absorbed in treachery.[2]

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;[3] evident premeditation becomes a mere generic aggravating circumstance[4] which is offset by the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also places the author
thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed for said crime. [5]

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the
time of the commission of the offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its
effect the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.[6]

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material facts and circumstances alleged in the information. The
crime of murder is punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.

It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of having been previously punished for two or more
crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against
whom it is considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet serving their respective sentences at
the time of the commission of the murder.

Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr., counsel de oficio for the four accused, who
unqualifiedly recommends affirmance of the judgment a quo.

It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.

Page 229 of 258

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is
affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino, Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,[7] to be paid jointly and severally by the four
accused. Costs de oficio.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.

Page 230 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-16302, January 30, 1965 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FORTUNATO MENDOZA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, LORENZO VILLANUEVA
AND COPIA MANSAKA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On March 7, 1958, Fortunato Mendoza, Manuel de la Cruz, Lorenzo Villanueva, Copia Mansaka, Villamor Cor-puz, Ladjahali Patdi alias Kulot and
Domingo Diaz alias Antonio Dominguez alias Bigote, were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Upon arraignment, they
all pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pending trial, the case against Ladjahali Patdi and Domingo Diaz alias Antonio Dominguez alias Bigote, was
provisionally dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting fiscal. On March 2, 1959, the case against Fortunato Mendoza, Manuel de la Cruz and
Villamor Corpuz was likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting fiscal, leaving the accused Florencio Villanueva and Copia
Mansaka to stand trial.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicting them, Lorenzo Villanueva and Copia Mansaka, of the crime of
murder and sentencing them therefor to suffer the death penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased jointly and severally in the sum of
P6,00O and to pay the costs.

In the morning of March 6, 1958, between ten and eleven o'clock, appellants Villanueva and Mansaka surrendered themselves to the Keeper of
Brigade No. 3B, Cell No. 5, of the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa, Rizal, one Arsenio Pallera. They told the latter that they had just killed a
fellow inmate and would wish to be brought to the Prison Inspector. At the same time, they turned over to Pallera an improvised bladed knife and an
ice pick.

After conducting and leaving the surrenderees to Prison Inspector Melito Geronimo, Pallera left to notify the medical officer of the killing. The said
officer, together with a nurse, then took the victim to the hospital where autopsy was performed. The report on the autopsy described "the cause of
death as shock due to multiple wounds and that the most fatal of the fifteen wounds were those on the right and left chest as well as in the
abdomen."

In the meantime, Inspector Geronimo investigated the appellants. In the said inquiry, both appellants admitted having killed Epifanio Paison. Their
respective written statements, marked by the prosecution as Exhibits E and F, are hereumler quoted so far as relevant to this decision. The first,
Exhibit E, is Lorenzo Villanueva's:

"Kahapon po nang hapon pagkatapos namin kutnain ng hapunan ay napagkaisahan namin ni COPIA MANSAKA na am ing patayirt si EPIFANIO
PAISON. Halos hindi kami nakatulog magdamag at nang dumating ang umaga ay binuksan ng aming Keeper ang pintuan ay lumabas kami ni
COPIA MANSAKA at naglinis ng fire escape. Pagkatapos kami makapaglinis ng fire escape ay dumating si Mr. Pallera at aming sinabi na buksan
ang Drigada 3B at kami ay papasok na at kami ay binuksan naman. Kami noon ay may dala na na matalas at noon kami ay nasa loob na ng bri-
gada 3-B ay umupo nalamang kami sa isang tabi. Noon inaakala ko na malapit na ang pagdating ng aming pagkain ay sinabi ko kay COPIA
MANSAKA na pumunta na siya sa buyon at kaunin na niya si EPIFANIO PAISON. Finagbilinan ko si MANSAKA na kahit sino ang lalapit sa buyon
ay huag papasukin at pinunta-han ko na si PAISON. Nadatnan ko Bi Paison na nakaupo doon sa isang tabi ng brigada at sinabi ko sa kanya na
"sandali lamang at mayroon akong sasabihin sa iyo" at si Paison ay sumama na rin sa akin sa buyon. Pagdating ko sa loob ay sinabi ko na maliligo
ako at siya ay huwag umalis. Pagkatapos ay mayroon akong tinuro na isang bagay kay Paison at noong siya ay tumingin ay sinabayan ko na nang
saksak sa dibdib hanggang sa mamatay. Pagkatapos kong masaksak si Paison ay sinabayan din ng saksak ni Copia Mansaka. Nong nakabulagta
na sa cemento si EPIFANIO PAISON ay pinutol ko ang kanyang kanang tainga at ifci-napon ko sa labas nang bintana."

Copia Mansaka's statement, on the other hand, marked as Exhibit F by the prosecution, reads as follows:

"Kaninang tangbali humigit kumulang sa alas doce, fetsa 6 ng Marzo 1958, pagkatapos dalliin sa aming brigada ang aming pagkain ay
pinagkaisahan namin ni LORENZO VILLANUEVA na lumabas sa aming brigada at lumipat sa Brigada 3-B at patayin namin si EPIFANIO PAISON.
Pagkabukas ng pintuan ng brigada 3-B, ay ang ginawa namin ni LORENZO VILLANUEVA ay humawak kaming dalawa sa drum na mayroong laman
na pagkain at nagkunwari kaming ranchero hanggang sa kami ay maka-Hpat sa 3-B. Noong kami ay makapasok sa pintuan ng 3-B ay tinulak namin
ang drum tuloy-tuloy sa loob at pagkatapos ay hinanap namin si EPIFANIO PAISON. Nakita namin si PAISON na nakaupo at pagkatapos ay dinala
namin sa loob ng buyon (toilet) at pinagtulong-tulongau naming saksakin hanggang sa mamatay. Pagkatapos naming pataytn si EPIFANIO PAISON
ay sumurender kami kay Mr. ARSENIO PALLERA na aming keeper at ibinigay namin ang matalas na aming ginamit sa pagpatay."

Aside from expressly acknowledging the commission of the crime, the herein defendants gave witness to their motives for stabbing the deceased, as
follows:

"Kaya ko siya pinatay ay noong magkaroon ng gulo sa aming brigada dahil noong fetsa 16 ng Febrero 19-r>8 ay stnabi ko na kay Paison na umalis
na siya at ang sagot sa akin, ay huag ko raw intindihin ang kanyang saiili at pakialaman ko ang sarili ko dahil sa kami ay magkalaban. Pagkatapos
kung makapugsabi ay init-sahan ako nang bote sa tabla nang tarima at tinamaan ako sa aking paa. Kaya niagmula noon ay kami ay dinala sa plaza
at binilad pagkatajms ay dinala sa Brigada 1-A at doon ay pinanga-ralan ko siya at sinabi ko sa kanya na pinalatawad ko siya ngunit ang sabi sa akin
ay huag ko siya na intindihtn at intindihin ko ang sarili ko, kaya inula noon ay pinagbanlaun ko na Biya na pataytn," (Exhibit K.)

"Ang dahilah po ay dahit sa hinngisan ni Paison ng matalas ang paa ni Lorenzo Villanueva at naaugatan kaya napagkaisahan namih ni Villauucva na
patayin si Paison kahapon ngunit wala kaming pagkakataon at kanina lamang kami nagkaroon ng ma-buksan ang pintuan ng brigada 3-B at 3-A
noong magdala ng pagkain." (Exhibit F.)

Page 231 of 258

During the trial, the prosecution also presented an eyewitness to the crime. Kicardo Corpuz, who was the Assistant Mayor of the brigade where the
victim was confined, testified that in the morning of the incident, he was with Paison until someone came along and invited Paison to go with him.
Soon thereafter, he saw Paison being dragged towards the toilet where other men were waiting. Upon reaching the toilet, he saw the appellants stab
the victim. Finally, Corpuz testified that "Paison was able to run away shouting that he was being stabbed; that the accused ran after him nnd upon
catching him took turns in stabbing him until he fell dead."

After trial, the lower court found "that the two accused killed Paison and that it is not true that they killed in self-defense." Accordingly, it imposed the
penalty under appeal.

Both Villanueva and Mausakn, at the trial as well as in this appeal, admit having stabbed to death Epifanio Paison. In justification, however, they
plead self defense. They claimed that in the morning of the incident, the victim, unprovoked and with evident intent to kill, attacked Villanueva with a
knife and that the latter was only able to wrest the weapon from Paison and used it on him instead. And, when Mansaka intervened to pacify and
break up the two, the victim likewise turned on Mansaka with an ice pick. As with Villanueva, Mansaka says he merely wrested the ice pick from
Paison and used it on the victim. And consistently with their plea of self defense, appellants repudiated at the trial the statements they gave to
Inspector Geronimo. They told the trial court that they affixed their signature and thumbmark, respectively, on Exhibits E and F without knowing their
contents as the said exhibits were not read to them.

After carefully and thoroughly going through the records, We are convinced beyond doubt that the guilt of the appellants for the crime of murder has
been fully established at the trial. We find no alternative, therefore, but to affirm the judgment under appeal.

In the first place, We cannot now ignore the contents of Exhibits E and F where the appellants expressly acknowledged the commission of the crime
charged. The evidence is overwhelming that the said documents were executed voluntarily by them. Other than the self serving insistence that the
same were not read,to them, appellants have not charged any irregularity in the execution of Exhibits E and F. They do not deny that they voluntarily
submitted themselves to Inspector Geronimo and gave statements to him relative to the killing. They do not deny that after their statements were
taken, Inspector Geronimo took them to the Assistant Director of Prisons who administered the oath on them; nor that their confessions were duly
witnessed by two prison authorities, Inspector Fernandez and Holipeiia. At no stage in the proceedings below have the herein defendants accused
any prison personnel of torturing or maltreating them to secure their extrajudicial confessions. They have not adverted to any possible reason why
Inspector Geronimo should falsify or alter their narration. But most convincing of all, the said exhibits contain details in the commission of the crime
which none but the participants to the offense could have provided.

Secondly, We reject appellant's claim to self defense upon the fundamental consideration that the said justifying circumstance may be accepted only
when it is established at the trial that the accused did not initiate the unlawful aggression. In other words, where the victim has not been shown to
have commenced the criminal attack, self defense cannot arise as a justification for the injury or death that the defendants stand indicted for. It is a
presupposition of that defense that a material attack has been taken by the victim (People vs. Santos, 17 Phil. 887; People vs. Banzuelo, 31 Phil.
365; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586).

In the case under review, not only have the appellants failed to demonstrate the victim's criminal aggression; on the contrary, the evidence is
conclusive that they were the ones guilty of aggression.

Neither appellants were supposed to be in the brigade where the victim was incarcerated. They were both inmates of Brigade No. 3A and they have
not pointed to any authorization that could have justified their presence at Brigade No. 3B. By their own confession, it was by trickery that they
gained entry into the latter brigade. They held on to a prison meal cart, pushed it towards Brigade 3B, and pretended to be "rancheros", that is,
prisoners in charge of bringing food to the cells. These are indubitable indications of their premeditated determination to carry out the assassination
of Paison. These are, unquestionably, acts of aggression.

Furthermore, appellants' claim that they were together when they went inside Brigade No. 3B furnishes another proof that the victim could not have
been the aggressor. It is unnatural to suppose that he had deliberately abandoned all caution and submitted himself to the reckless folly of attacking
two men all by himself.

Aside from the foregoing", another settled rule prevents us from sustaining appellants' theory. The justifying circumstance of self defense, once the
act against which it is invoked is admitted or proved, should be established by positive evidence. It is an affirmative allegation which must be
demonstrated with convincing credibility (People vs. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509). The
case for the defendants falls far short of the standard.

The account given by the defendants of the alleged attack upon their persons is simply incredible. According to them, while they were in Brigade No.
3B, on their way to clean a fire escape, Epifanio Paison, suddenly and unprovoked, attacked Villanueva with a knife. A fight ensued and Villanueva
was slightly wounded in both arms. After a brief scuffle, Villanueva was able to wrest the weapon away from Paison and with it, he stabbed the latter
in the chest.

On the other hand, Copia Mansaka testified that after Villanueva had stabbed Paison, he stepped in to break up the fight and separate the
combatants. He was able to part Villanueva who thereupon turned away to look for cloth with which to bandage his, Villanueva's wounded arms.
However, Paison refused to be pacified and instead drew an ice pick from his pocket and tried to stab him. Mansaka claimed that like Villanueva, he
was able to take the ice pick away, and with it, stab the deceased.

By appellant's recitation of the incident, therefore, they took on Paison one at a time. This is difficult to believe. It is not natural Hint two friends or
companions, attacked by a common enemy, should meet the assault one at a time. The more credible response to such an emergency was for them
to have repelled together the deadly threat. The more reasonable and instinctive reaction then was for them to have joined their eflForts and
resources to protect themselves.

Page 232 of 258

Besides, We find it similarly incredible that ViHanueva, after being separated by his co-accused from Paison, should simply walk away and search
for bandaging material for the superficial wounds in his arms. We cannot accept that as the rational reaction of one whose life was so dangerously
challenged by an unprovoked adversary. It would seem that having recovered from a serious attempt on his life, and, having taken the upper hand
from his attacker, ViHanueva would have adopted a less timid attitude.

Finally, the number of wounds on the body of the deceased, and their location as registered in the autopsy report, expose the inherent weakness of
the claim to self defense. There were in all fifteen wounds, one in the neck, two in the abdomen, seven in the chest and the others in the various
parts of the arms. In addition, the right ear of the victim was cut ofT. In contrast, ViHanueva had but a couple of superficial, suspicious cuts in his
arms while Mansaka was completely unscratched. If all these suggest anything, it is that the victim had been sot upon by determined assailants and
definitely not that he has lost a fight he himself started.

Considering al! the foregoing, then, it is clear that the crime committed was murder qualified by evident premeditation. Insofar as Lorenzo
Villanueva's participation in the killing is concerned, the following aggravating circumstances were established beyond doubt at the trial: (1)
reiteration or habituality, since he was previously convicted for two crimes and for which he was in confinement, namely: robbery and evasion of
sentence (Art. 14, par. 10, Revised Penal Code); (2) ignominy or cruelty as he confessed to cutting ofF the ear of the deceased (Art. 11, par. 21,
Revised Penal Code) ; (3) craft, in pretending to be "rancheros" to gain entry into Brigade 3B (Art. 14, par. 14, Revised Penal Code); and (4) that the
crime was committed in contempt of or "with insult to public authorities (Art. 14, par. 2, Revised Penal Code). With respect to Copia Mansaka, the
following1 aggravating circumstances have been conclusively proven at the trial: (1) Recidivism, having been previously convicted of murder and
evasion of service of sentence (Art. 14, par. 9, Revised Penal Code); (2) Craft, as above; and (3) that the crime was committed in contempt of or with
insult to public authorities, same as above.

The only mitigating circumstance appreciable in their favor is voluntary surrender. Consequently, as there are more aggravating than mitigating
circumstances, and in accordance with paragraphs three and four of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum penalty provided by the
code should be imposed.

Wherefore, the decision of the lower court imposing the death penalty and requiring the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P6,000 is hereby affirmed. Costs de oficio.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regain, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ. concur.

Page 233 of 258

 G.R. No. L-51368 November 6, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SAGLALA MACATANDA, defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle
rustling, Saglala Macatanda was sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, this court finds the accused Saglala Macatanda guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533 and as described in the information filed against him. Crediting in his
favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and extreme poverty without any attendant aggravating circumstances, and
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum .

The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The amount of One Hundred Fifty (P150.00) Pesos is hereby ordered paid to Atty. Reynaldo Echavez for his services as counsel
de oficio in this case in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, the amount to be taken from the funds appropriated
by the Government for the purpose.

With costs against the accused. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 1- 2)

From the judgment of conviction, Saglala Macatanda (hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this Court, raising purely legal
questions, to wit: whether the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction, and (2) being a member of a cultural minority, being a Moslem,
should be appreciated in his favor, which the court a quo refused to consider in the imposition of the penalty, and also disputing the correctness of
the trial court's computation of the proper penalty.

Before going into a discussion of the legal questions, the facts may be recited, quoting from the People's Brief, the following:

In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. the
following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the
team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the
barangay captain to search for the missing Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw
Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered
engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions fled, leaving him and
the carabaos behind. (Rec. pp. 3- 7).

Appellant was taken into custody and was charged with cattle rustling. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
(People's Brief, pp. 2-3).

Citing the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 1 appellant contends that his lack of instruction and education and his being a Moslem belonging to a cultural
minority should mitigate his liability, and the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced accordingly. He also cites the fact that the
prosecution did not object to his being credited with the aforesaid mitigating circumstances.

Under the circumstances of the present case, the Maqui case may not be invoked as a precedent. In the first place, in that case, the Supreme Court
found indication in the record which tends to show that Maqui was an uncivilized Igorot. In the present case, owing to appellant's plea of guilty, the
records discloses no evidence presented to prove the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction, which needs to be proven, as all circumstances
modifying criminal liability should be proved directly and positively. 2

Likewise, nowhere in the Maqui case was it disclosed that his being a member of a cultural minority, being an Igorot, sufficed to mitigate his liability
on that circumstance alone. What the Court considered mitigating was his being an uncivilized Igorot which amounted to more than just lack of
instruction. Again, there is no proof on record that appellant herein may be similarly described. In any case, mere membership in a cultural minority is
not expressly mentioned by the Revised Penal Code among the mitigating circumstances 3 nor would it come under paragraph 10, Art. 3 of said
Code, which speaks of ''any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. "

Appellant, however, prays for a lenient approach in consideration of his being an ignorant and semi-uncivilized offender, belonging to a cultural
minority, the two separate circumstances to be joined together to constitute the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction to mitigate his liability, 4
relying on the Maqui case from which he quotes the following:

We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142, (now Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code) the courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration the lack of instruction and
education of the offender where it appears that under all the circumstances attending, he should not be held to the strict degree
of responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5)

Page 234 of 258

Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery 5 leave
us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized
state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant
therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle. Incidentally, the Maqui case is the only case where lack of instruction was considered to
mitigate liability for theft, for even long before it, in U.S. vs. Pascual, 6 a 1908 case, lack of instruction was already held not applicable to crimes of
theft or robbery. The Maqui case was decided in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not advanced as it had in reaching its present
state since recent years, when it certainly can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in the country that he is uncivilized or semi-
uncivilized.

But more than what has just been observed. a legal impediment stands in the way to giving the lenient treatment appellant invokes in his appeal. It is
that the records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the appellant, no evidence having been taken
relative thereto because he entered a plea of guilty. 7 And the stricter treatment provided by P.D. 533 for the crime charged with a more severe
penalty imposed thereon, hardly justifies the courts to apply said law with leniency.

Appellant, finally, contends that in the computation of the penalty the rules prescribed under Article 64, paragraph 5 should be applied. To this
argument, the Solicitor General comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to penalties prescribed by special
laws. He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti- Cattle Rustling Law of 1974" as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, 8 the
penalty should not be governed by the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, his recommendation as to the proper penalty to be imposed and pursuant
to the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides:

... if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) (Appellee's Brief, p. 7)

is a minimum of not less than 10 years and 1 day and the maximum, not more than 17 years and 4 months, the penalty imposed under P.D. 533.

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the
nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not
for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal
Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be
discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, entitles
appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporary
medium.

Appellant's computation would be to lower the aforesaid penalty to prision correccional maximum, to prision mayor, medium period, in view of the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances as appreciated by the court a quo, with no aggravating circumstance attendant. For the purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should be one degree lower still, or arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision
correccional in its medium period, or from 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, and not
less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.

The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range, as to its maximum period, but is beyond the range, as to its minimum period, which should
be not more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to 4 years of prision
correccional and maintaining the maximum at 8 years of prision mayor as imposed by the lower court. With the modification as indicated, the
appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur in the result.

Page 235 of 258

 [ G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FEDERICO GERONIMO ALIAS CMDR. OSCAR, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, FEDERICO GERONIMO ALIAS CMDR. OSCAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, appellant Federico Geronimo,
together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias
David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias
Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago
Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias
Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tonio, alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo
Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and
John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnapping committed as follows:

* * * * * * *

"That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto continuously up to the present time in the province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and in other municipalities, cities and provinces and other parts of the country
where they have chosen to carry out their rebellious activities, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of, or
otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapag-palaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or1 otherwise known as the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide to
commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal
case Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal case No. 19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the
other members, officers and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many others
whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help, support, promote, maintain, direct and/or command the Hukbalahaps (HUKS)
or the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly and take arms against the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government
and laws thereof as in fact the said 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps' (HUKS) pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen,
publicly and. taken arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to attain said purpose, by then and there making armed
raids, sorties, and ambuscades, attacks against the Philippine Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and the Army Patrols and other
detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, have then and there committed wanton acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, kidnapping and planned destructions of private
and public property and plotted the liquidation of government officials, to create and spread disorder, terror, confusion, chaos and fear so as to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, among which are as follows, to wit:

'1. That on or about April 28, 1949 at Kilometer 62 at Barrio Salubsob, municipality of Nueva Ecija, an undetermined number of HUK.S led by
Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupon and Mulong did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush, assault, attack and fired upon the
party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and her PC escort whom they considered as their enemies resulting in the killing of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon, Baby
Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Major P. San Agustin, Lieutenant Lasam, Philip Buencamino III, and several soldiers and' the wounding of
General Jalandoni and Captain Manalang.

'2. That on or about August 26, 1950 in Santa Cruz, Laguna, about one hundred armed HUKS with intent to gain and for the purpose of securing
supplies and other materials for the support and maintenance of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMBS) did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly bringing the Cashier of the Provincial -Treasury, Mr. Vicente Re-ventar from his house to the Provincial Capitol
and at the point of guns forced him to open the Treasury Vault and took therefrom Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000) consisting of various
denominations and including Fifty, One hundred and Five-Hundred Peso Bills and also took away with them type-writers and other Office supplies
which they found in the Provincial Capitol Building, burning and looting private buildings in towns,

'3. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of Pasaeao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under Commander
Rustum raided! the house of one Nemesio Palo, a police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and as. a result, said HUKS were able to capture
said Nemesio Palo and once captured, with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut the neck of said Nemesio Palo
thereby causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio Palo.

"4. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias
Cemmaader Oscar ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol headed! by CpL Bayrante, resulting in seriously wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado
and Eusebio Gruta a civilian.

'5. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camariaes Sur, a group. of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar with
evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant.'" (Appellee's brief, pp. 1-8)

Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however,
he asked the permission of the court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea
of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as
Page 236 of 258
a mitigating circumstance Geronimo's counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was only primon mayor, for
the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of
murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be
considered only as simple rebellion. On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced
him to suffer, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed in the
information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo
appealed, raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, or simple rebellion.

After mature consideration, a majority of .seven justices [1] of this Court are of the opinion that the issue posed by appellant has been already decided
in the recent resolution of this Court in the case of People vs. Hernandez et al., (99 Phil., 529; 21 Lawyers Journal, No. 7 [July 31, 1956], p. 316). As
in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the
purposes expressed in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of article 135. That
both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is
shown by the absence of any penalty attached to article 134.[2] It follows, therefore that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in article 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and can not
be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in 7-themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and can not be considered as
giving rise to a separate crime that, under article 48 of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.

The terms employed in the first paragraph of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code to describe the component of violence in the crime of rebellion
are broad and general. The Spanish text (which is the one controlling, People vs.. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665) states that the acts of the rebels may
consists of—

"Sosteniendo combate[3] con la fuerza leal, causando estragos en las propiedades, ejerdendo violencia grave, exigiendo contribuciones, 6
distroyendo iaudales publicos de su inversion legitima."

If all the overt acts charged in the information against herein appellant were committed for political ends or in furtherance of the rebellion, they come
within the preceding description. Thus, count 4 (ambushing and firing upon army patrol) constitutes engaging in combat with the loyal troops; count 2
(taking funds and equipment from the Provincial Treasury of Laguna) is diverting public funds from their ligitimate purpose; while the killings outlined
in the other counts (1, 3 and 5) are instances of committing serious violence.

The majority of the Court found no cogent reason for limiting "commission of serious violence" in article 135 to hostilities against the Government's
armed forces exclusively; for in that case, the former expression would be redundant and mere duplication of "engaging in combat" with loyal troops,
also described in the same article. If the infliction of "serious violence" was separately expressed in the law, it is because the violence referred to is
that inflicted upon civilians. Again, to restrict "serious violence" to acts short of homicide, is to unwarrantedly assume that the broad term "violencia
grave" is used in the limited sense of "lesiones graves", which in our Penal Code has a specialized signification. In truth, if physical injuries constitute
grave violence, so would killing necessarily be, if not more. Additionally, it may be observed that rebellion is by nature a crime of masses or
multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. (People vs. Hernandez, supra; People vs.
Almazan, C. A., 37 Off. Gaz. 1932). Hence the broad terms employed by the statute,

The prosecution insists that the "more serious" crime of murder can not be justifiably regarded as absorbed by the lesser crime of rebellion. In the
first place, it is not demonstrated that the killing of an individual is intrinsically less serious or less dangerous to society than the violent subversion of
established government, which em-perils the lives of many citizens, at least during the period of the struggle for superiority between rebels and
loyalists. If, on the other hand, murder is punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and rebellion only by prision mayor, this leniency is due to the
political purpose that impels every rebellious act. As noted by Groizard ("Codigo Penal de 1870", Vol. 3, p. 239) —

"El analisis de toda clase de delitos politicos ofrece para el juris-consulto un resultado precioso, pues pone de relieve las diferencias cardinales que
existen entre esta clase de hechos y los delitos comunes; entre los reos de aquellos crimenes y los reos de eatos otros. Para los delitos comunes, la
sociedad tiene una constante y energica reprobacion que no atenua ni el trascurso de tiempo ni el cambio de las ideas. Para los delitos politicos, no.
Quien se atrever& si de honrado se precia, a hacer alarde de la amistad de un hombre condenado por robo 6 por asesinato? Y quien no ha tendido
la mano carinosa sin perder nada de respetabilidad, a algun reo de un delito politico en la serie continuada de revoluciones y contrarevoluciones
que constituyen desgraciadamente los ultimos periodos de nuestra historia? La consumacion del delito y el exito de la, rebelion, ya lo hemos dicho,
para el reo politico, es mas que la impunidad, es el triunfo, es el poder, es el Gobierno, es casi la gloria. Pero no sucede lo mismo tratandose de
delitos comunes: la consumacion del delito ni apaga el remordimiento, ni aleja del criminal el peligro de la pena, ni mejora en nada su condicion
respecto de la justicia. Hay, pues, entre el delito comun y el delito politico, entre las personas responsables de unos y otros diferencias sustanciales,
y el mayor error que en el estado actual de los estudios juridicos puede cometer el legislador es no apreciar esas diferencias, soBre todo en la
aplicacion de las penas."

And our history of three centuries of uninterrupted rebellions against sovereign Spain, until she was finally driven from our shores, suffices to explain
why the penalty against .rebellion, which stood at reclusion temporal maximum to death in the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, was reduced only
prision mayor in pur revised Penal Code of 1932.

In addition, the government counsel's theory that an act punished by more serious penalty can not be absorbed by an act for which a lesser penalty
is provided, is not correct. The theory is emphatically refuted by the treatment accorded by the Penal Code to the crime of forcible abduction, for
which the law imposes only reclusion temporal (article 342), notwithstanding that such crime necessarily involves illegal detention of the abducted
woman for which article 267 of the same Penal Code fixes the penalty of reclusi&n temporal, in its maximum period, to death. The same situation
obtains in the crime of slavery denned in article 272, whereby the kidnapping of a human being for the purpose of enslaving him is punished with
prision mayor and a fine of not more than P10,000.00, when kidnapping itself is penalized by article 267 with a much higher penalty.

Page 237 of 258

And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez resolution that to admit the complexing of the crime of rebellion with the felonies committed in
furtherance thereof, would lead to these undesirable results: (1) Ixrmake the punishment for rebellion heavier than that of treason, since it has been
repeatedly held that the latter admits no complexing with the overt acts committed in furtherance of the treasonous intent, and, in addition, requires
two witnesses to every overt act which is not true in the case of rebellion; (2) to nullify the policy expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing lesser
penalty upon the rebel followers as compared to their leaders, because under the complexing theory every rebel, leader or follower, must suffer the
heavier penalty in its maximum degree; and (3) to violate the fundamental rule of criminal law that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused: "in dubiis reuar est absolvendus"; "nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege."

Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously
with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime
would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But even then, the individual misdeed could not be taken with the
rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other; and the individual crime would not be a
means necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in
the case where an individual rebel should commit rape; certainly the latter felony could not be said to have been done in furtherance of the rebellion
or facilitated its commission. in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be
merged into a juridical whole.

It is argued that the suppression in the present Penal Code of article 244 of the old one (article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870) indicates the
intention of the Legislature to revive the possibility of the crime of rebellion being complexed with the individual felonies committed in the course
thereof, because the suppressed article prohibited such complexing. The text of the suppressed provision is as follows:

"Art. 244. Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedition, o con motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente-segun las
disposiciones de este codigo.

Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados camo tales los jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion."

The first paragraph is to the effect that the "delitos particulares" (meaning felonies committed for private non-political ends, as held by the
commentators Cuello Calon and Viada, since the Penal Code does not classify crimes into "general" and "particular") are to be dealt with
separately from the rebellion, punishment for each felony to be visited upon the perpetrators thereof. This paragraph has no bearing on the question
of complex crimes, but is a mere consequence of the fact that the delicts committed for private ends bear no relation to the political crime of rebellion
(other than a coincidence of time) and therefore must be separately dealt with. This is so obvious that, as Groizard pointed out (Vol. 3, p. 650), such
action (their punishment as a private misdeed) would be taken by the courts even if this first paragraph of article 244 had not been written.

Far more significant, in the-opinion of the majority, is that our Revised Penal Code of 1932 did not revive the rule contained in the second paragraph
of article 244 of the old Penal CJode (Article 259 of the Spanish), whereby the rebel leaders were made criminally responsible for the individual
felonies committed during the rebellion or on occasion thereof, in case the real perpetrators could not be found. In effect that paragraph established
a command responsibility; and in suppressing it, the Legislature plainly revealed a policy of rejecting any such command responsibility. It was the
legislative intent, therefore, that the rebel leaders (and with greater reason, the mere followers) should be held accountable solely for the rebellion,
and not for the individual crimes (delitos particidares) committed during the same for private ends, unless their actual participation therein was duly
established. In other words, the suppression of article 244 of the old Penal Code virtually negates the contention that the rebellion and the individual
misdeeds committed during the same should legally constitute one complex whole. Whether or not such policy should be maintained is not for the
courts, but for the Legislature, to say.

But while a majority of seven justices are agreed that if the overt acts detailed in the information against the appellant had been duly proved to have
been committed "as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof", then the accused could
only be convicted of simple rebellion, the opinions differ as to whether his plea of guilty renders the accused amenable to punishment not only for
rebellion but also for murder or other crimes.

Six justices[2] believe that conceding the absence of a complex crime, still, by his plea of guilty the accused-appellant has admitted all the acts
described in the five separate counts of the information; and that if any of such counts constituted an independent crime committed within the
jurisdiction of the lower court as seems to be the case under the facts alleged in Count No. 5 (the killing of Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in
the information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to appellant's conviction and
punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Hence,
the acts charged in Counts 1 to 4 can not be taken into consideration in this case, either because they were committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court below (Count 1), or because the allegations do not charge the appellant's participation (Count 3), or else the acts charged are
essentially acts of rebellion, without private motives (Counts 2 and 4).

Five justices,[3] on the other hand, hold that by his plea of guilty, the accused avowed having committed the overt acts charged in all five counts; but
that he only admitted committing them in fact "as a necessary means", "in connection and in furtherance of the rebellion", as expressly alleged by
the prosecution. This is not only because the information expressly alleged the necessary connection between the overt acts and the political ends
pursued by the accused, but in addition, it failed to charge that the appellant was impelled by private motives. Wherefore, such overt acts must be
taken as essential ingredients of the single crime of rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to this crime alone. Hence, there being no complex
crime, the appellant can only be sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion. Even more the minority contends that under the very theory of the
majority, the circumstances surrounding the plea are such as to at least cast doubt on whether the accused clearly understood that he was pleading
guilty to two different crimes or to only one; so that in fairness and justice, the case should be sent back for ,a rehearing by the Court of origin, to
ascertain whether or not the accused fully realized the import of his plea (U.S. vs. Patala, 2 Phil., 752; U.S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil., 91; U.S. vs. Jamad,
37 Phil., 305).

In view of, the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under
article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, arid also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-
appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment
Page 238 of 258
pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not
less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum
of P6,000; and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Page 239 of 258

 [ G.R. NO. L-23249, November 25, 1974 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, ACCUSED AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

MUNOZ PALMA, J.:

Convicted for having killed her husband, Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero seeks a reversal of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City
finding her guilty of PARRICIDE and sentencing her "to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor in its medium period, as the minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as the maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Francisco Caballero in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonme nt in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs", and prays for an acquittal based on her plea of self-defense.[1]

The Solicitor General however asks for the affirmance of the appealed decision predicated on the following testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the prosecution before the trial court:

Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married on June 7, 1956, at a ceremony solemnized by the parish
priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Ormoc City.[2] The marriage was not a happy one and before the end of the year 1957 the couple
separated. Late in the evening of January 2, 1958, Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio Barabad and Kakong Sacay, drank
"tuba" in a certain house in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. At about midnight, Francisco Caballero and his companions proceeded home. On the way, they
saw Francisco's wife, Cunigunda standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad. Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter
approached her, Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a knife marked by the prosecution as its Exhibit C. Francisco called for help to his two
companions who upon seeing that Francisco was wounded, brought him to the St. Jude Hospital. [3] Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital,
personally attended to the victim and found a "punctured wound on the left lumbar region measuring 1 inch externally" (Exhibit B). First aid was
given, but because there was a need for blood transfusion and the facilities of the hospital were inadequate to provide the necessary treatment, Dr.
Samson suggested that the patient be transported to Cebu City.[4] In the meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the Police Department of
Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant Restituto Mariveles and informed the latter that she stabbed her husband. [5] While Francisco Caballero
was confined at the hospital, he was interrogated by Patrolman Francisco Covero concerning the identity of his assailant and he pointed to his wife
Cunigunda. The questions propounded by Pat. Covero and the answers given by the victim were written down in a piece of paper on which the
victim affixed his thumbmarked (Exhibit D) in the presence of his brother, Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman, Francisco Tomada.[6] On
January 4, 1958, Francisco Caballero was brought to Cebu City on board the "MV Ormoc" but the trip proved futile because the victim died at
noontime of the same day from the stab wound sustained by him.[7]

Appellant, on the other hand, pleads that We discard the proof adduced by the prosecution and believe instead what she declared before the trial
judge briefly summarized as follows:

After her marriage to Francisco Caballero on June 7, 1956, appellant lived with her husband in the house of her parents in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City,
and their marriage, although not a harmonious one, was blessed with a daughter; her married life was marked by frequent quarrels caused by her
husband's "gambling, drinking, and serenading", and there were times when he maltreated and beat her; after more than a year she and her
husband transferred to a house of their own, but a month had hardly passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to go back to live
with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child; in the month of November, 1957, her daughter became sick and she went to
her husband and asked for some help for her sick child but he drove her away and said "I don't care if you all would die"; in the evening of January 2,
1958, she went out carolling with her friend, Crispina Barabad, and several men who played the musical instruments; at about 12:00 o'clock midnight
they divided the proceeds of the carolling in the house of Crispina Barabad, after which she went home, but before she could leave the vicinity of the
house of Crispina, she met her husband, Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you been
prostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us";
upon hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all";
Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground; to keep herself from falling she held
on to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the left side of his body; because her husband
continued to push her down she fell on her back to the ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying: "Now is the
time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked, she pulled out the knife of her husband
and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh; when she finally released herself from the hold of her
husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife; in the morning of January 3, she went to town, surrendered to the police, and presented
the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her on the night of the incident (see Exhibit I); Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the weapon but
because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any knife, and she did, and she gave a knife to the desk sergeant which is the knife
now marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution.[8]

The sole question thus presented in this appeal is: did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her person?

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his
person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human
being. Thus, in the words of the Romans of ancient history: Quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure suo fecisse existimetur.[9] To the
Classicists in penal law, lawful defense is grounded on the impossibility on the part of the State to avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a
Page 240 of 258
person unlawfully attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require that the innocent succumb to an unlawful aggression without
resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful defense is an exercise of a right, an act of social justice done to repel the attack of an aggressor. [10]

Our law on self-defense is found in Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

"ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

"First. Unlawful aggression;

"Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

"Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

xxx xxx xxx

As part of this law is the settled jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of
the aforecited circumstances, the rationale being that having admitted the wounding or killing of his adversary which is a felony, he is to be held
criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.[11]

In this case of Cunigunda Caballero, the trial court did not find her evidence clear and convincing, and gave these reasons for its conclusion: a)
appellant's testimony is inherently improbable as brought out by her demonstration of the incident in question during the trial of the case; b) there
was no wound or injury on appellant's body treated by any physician; c) appellant's insistence that the weapon used by her was a Moro hunting knife
and not Exh. C is incredible; d) she gave contradictory statements concerning the report made by her to the police authorities that she was choked
by her husband; and e) her husband's abandonment of her and her child afforded the motive behind appellant's attack. [12]

We are constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of
the trial court on facts testified to by the witnesses.

An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give due importance to one piece of evidence which more than the
testimony of any witness eloquently confirms the narration of appellant on how she happened to stab her husband on that unfortunate night. We
refer to the location of the wound inflicted on the victim.

Appellant's account of that fatal occurrence as given in her direct testimony follows:

"Q At that precise time when you were going home to the place of your parents, did any unusual incident occur?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was it?

A At the time when I went down from the house of Crispina Barabad, when I reached near the banana hill, my
husband held me.

Q. What happened when your husband, Francisco Caballero, held you?

A He asked me from where did I prostitute myself.

Q What did you answer?

A I answered that I did not go (on) prostituting. I told him that I was only forced to accompany with the carolling in
order to earn money for our child.

Q What part of your body did your husband, Francisco Caballero, hold you?

A He held me at the collar of my dress. (Witness holding the right portion of the collar of her dress.)

Q After you answered Francisco, what did he do?

A He said 'Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch.' Then I told him 'What is your business.
Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us.'

Page 241 of 258

Q When Francisco heard these words, what did he do?

A Francisco said 'What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all. I will kill you all.'

Q And then, what happened?

A He held my hair and slapped my face twice. Then I staggered and my nose was bleeding.

Q Do you mean to say that blood flowed out of your nose?

A Yes, sir.

Q After you were slapped twice and your nose begun to bleed, what happened next?

A He held the front part of my dress just below the collar and pushed me towards the ground.

Q While your husband was holding your dress below the neck and tried to push you down, what did you do?

A I held a part of his body in order that I would not fall to the ground.

Q And then what happened?

A Because I struggled hard in order that I would not fall to the ground, I held his belt and that was the time I got
hold of a weapon along his belt line.

Q After that what happened?

A He shoved my hands upward and pushed me to the ground and that was the time my hands were released. He
was choking me.

Q When you said your hands were released, was that before or after you were choked by Francisco Caballero?

A At that time when I was about to fall to the ground that was the time I released my hands.

Q When you were almost fallen to the ground, where were the hands of Francisco Caballero?

A On my hair.

Q You mean to say the two hands of Francisco Caballero?

A One of his hands was holding my hair. The other hand pushed me.

COURT:
Q What hand was holding your hair?

A His right hand was holding my hair while his left hand pushed me.

ATTORNEY GARCIA:

Q When you were fallen to the ground what happened?

A While I lay prostrate on the ground and believing that I have no other recourse, while his left hand was holding
my neck, I was able to take hold of the weapon from his belt line and I thrust it to him.

Q What was this weapon which you were able to get from his belt line?

A It was a hunting knife." (tsn. pp. 53-55, witness Cunigunda Caballero)

Page 242 of 258

On cross-examination, appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show her position when she stabbed her husband and she did, and although
the stenographic notes on that demonstration are very sketchy which We quote:

"Q Please demonstrate to this Court when you made the thrust to your husband?

A When I took hold of the hunting knife I made the thrust in this manner. (Witness held the ruler with her right hand
and kneeled on the floor)" (tsn. p. 67, ibid)

still We can get a clear picture of what appellant must have done, from the questions and answers immediately following the above-quoted portion of
the transcript, viz:

"Q You want to make us understand that when you thrust the weapon to the body of your husband you were lying
down flat to the ground?

A I was lying flat on the ground face upward. I was a little bit inclined because I tried to struggle trying to get away
from the hold of my husband.

Q You want to make us understand that your back was touching the ground when you made the thrust to your
husband?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q Where were you kneeled by your husband?

A On my right thigh." (ibid; italics supplied)

Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck, appellant, as she said, had no other
recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband's belt and plunge it at his body hitting the left back portion just below the
waist, described by the attending physician, Dr. Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar region. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the
knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite
natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man's belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at
the moment.

We do not agree with the trial judge's observation that as demonstrated by the accused it was physically impossible for her to get hold of the weapon
because the two knees of her husband were on her right thigh "which would have forced her to put her right elbow towards the ground" (see p. 9 of
Decision), for even if it were true that the two knees of Francisco were on his wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in the record to show that
the right arm of the accused was held, pinned down or rendered immobile, or that she pressed her elbow to the ground, as conjectured by the trial
judge, in such a manner that she could not reach for the knife. On the contrary, as indicated earlier, accused testified and so demonstrated that she
was lying flat on her back, her husband kneeling over her and her right arm free to pull out the knife and strike with it.

The trial judge also referred to a demonstration made by appellant of that portion of her testimony when she was held by the hair and pushed down
to the ground, and His Honor commented that "(S)he could not be falling to the ground, as shown to the Court by her, considering the fact that the
pushing was to and fro as shown in her demonstration." (p. 8, Decision) The trial judge, however, failed to consider that it is humanly impossible to
have an exact and accurate reproduction or reenactment of an occurrence especially if it involves the participation of persons other than the very
protagonists of the incident being reenacted. In this particular instance appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she was pushed
down by her husband, and her demonstration is described in the stenographic transcript as follows:

"Q Please demonstrate to this Court the position of your husband and you while your husband held your hair.

A He did this way. (Witness held the hair of the Court Interpreter with his left hand and his right hand held the right
shoulder of the Interpreter and pulled the Interpreter to and fro. The Interpreter represented as the accused and
the accused as the deceased.)

Q Where were your two hands?

A My two hands held his waist line." (tsn. p. 66, witness Cunigunda Caballero; italics supplied)

Page 243 of 258

In that demonstration, accused represented the victim while she in turn was impersonated by the court interpreter, and so it was difficult if not
impossible for the two to give an accurate reenactment considering that the accused assumed a role not hers during the actual incident and the court
interpreter played a part which was not truly his. At any rate, the accused showed how one hand of her husband held her hair while the other
pushed her down by the shoulder, and to portray how she in turn struggled and tried to push back her husband to keep herself from falling, she
"pulled the interpreter (representing the accused) to and fro." The fact is that Francisco succeeded in forcing appellant down to the ground as
portrayed by the latter when, following the foregoing demonstration, she was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she stabbed her husband
— a matter which is discussed in pages 8 and 9 of this Decision.

It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the victim which strongly militates against the credibility of the lone prosecution witness,
Ignacio Barabad. This witness declared that on that night when husband and wife met on the road, Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter
was near, she immediately stabbed him. If that were true, that is, husband and wife were standing face to face at a distance of one-half meter when
the stabbing occurred (tsn. p. 11, witness Ignacio Barabad), it would have been more natural and probable for the weapon to have been directed
towards the front part of the body of the victim such as his abdomen or chest, rather than at his back, left side, just above the left thigh.

In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the incident object of the accusation, the Court in its search
for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or circumstances which can be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of
a testimony, for after all the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence, [13] so much so that when a court as a judicial
fact-finder pronounces judgment that a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal knowledge but as the result of an
evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be proved.

Thus, in People vs. Aquino, L-32390, December 28, 1973, a decision of the First Division of this Court penned by Chief Justice Querube C.
Makalintal, the plea of self-defense of the accused-appellant was sustained on the basis of certain "physical and objective circumstances" which
proved to be of "decisive importance" in ascertaining the veracity of the plea of self-defense, to wit: the location of the wound on the right side of the
throat and right arm of the deceased, the direction of the trajectories of the bullets fired by the accused, the discovery of bloodstains at the driver's
seat, the finding of the dagger and scabbard of the deceased, and so on.[14]

In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-
defense.

Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her husband on that particular night of January 2. Although it is the general rule that
the presence of motive in the killing of a person is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the identity of the assailant is duly established
by other competent evidence or is not disputed, as in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as
between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing.[15]

We disagree with the statement of the court a quo that appellant's motive for killing her husband was his abandonment of her and his failure to
support her and her child. While appellant admitted in the course of her testimony that her marriage was not a happy one, that she and her husband
separated in the month of October, 1957, and since then she and her child lived with her parents who supported them, nevertheless she declared
that notwithstanding their separation she still loved her husband (tsn. p. 59, cross-examination of appellant). As a matter of fact, appellant had been
living with her parents for several months prior to the incident in question and appeared resigned to her fate. Furthermore, there is no record of any
event which occurred immediately prior to January 2 which could have aroused her feelings to such a degree as to drive her to plan and carry out the
killing of her husband.

On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason for attacking his wife, Cunigunda. Meeting his wife unexpectedly at past midnight
on the road, Francisco reacted angrily, and suspecting that she was out for some bad purpose he held her by the collar of her dress and
said: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." This was followed by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda's nose bled, pulling
of her hair, pushing her down to the ground, and strangling her — all of which constituted the unlawful aggression against which appellant had to
defend herself.

Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is her conduct shortly after the occurrence. As soon as the sun was up that morning of
January 3 (the stabbing occurred past midnight of January 2), Cunigunda went to the city and presented herself at the police headquarters where
she reported that she stabbed her husband and surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this point, the trial judge stated that
appellant made contradictory statements in her testimony concerning the report made by her to the police authorities, for while at the start she
declared that she did not report the "choking by her husband", she later changed her testimony and stated that she did relate that fact. (p. 10,
Decision)

We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of appellant on direct examination and nowhere is there a positive and direct
statement of hers that she did not report that she was choked by her husband. What the trial judge asked of appellant was whether or not she told
the police about the fist mark on her face and her answer was "No, sir, I forgot." (tsn. p. 55, supra) And on appellant's cross-examination, there was
no question propounded and therefore there was no answer given on the subject-matter of appellant's report to the police concerning the incident
except for the following:

Page 244 of 258

 "COURT:

Q Did you show that dress to the police authorities the following day?

A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor, because it was torn out.

Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?

A I showed it to the police authorities, and they told me to keep it, but not to touch it." (Tsn. p. 65, ibid)

We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant's testimony which was singled out by His Honor as one of his reasons for discrediting
her plea of self-defense.

That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her husband because he attacked her is confirmed by no less than the prosecution
witness, Patrolman Restituto Mariveles, who was on duty at the desk when appellant arrived at the police headquarters. This witness on cross-
examination declared:

"Q And she also told you that on that night previous to the incident her husband Francisco Caballero beat her up, is
that right?

A She told me that she was met on the way by her husband immediately after carolling and she was manhandled
by her husband and when she was struggling to get loose from her husband she happened to take hold of a knife
that was placed under the belt of her husband and because she was already half conscious she did not know
that she was able to thrust said knife to the stomach of her husband." (tsn. p. 23, witness R. Mariveles)

It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the police upon her surrender were not taken down in writing to serve as a faithful
and reliable account of her report, nevertheless, We are satisfied by the fact, which is not disputed, that of her own accord appellant went to the
police authorities early in the morning of January 3, informed policeman Mariveles that she stabbed her husband because he manhandled her which
rendered her "half-conscious", and brought and showed the dress she wore during the incident which was torn by the collar and with blood stains
due to the bleeding of her nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who at the time was property custodian of the Ormoc City police,
corroborated appellant's testimony concerning the dress marked Exhibit 1 for the defense. (tsn. p. 70 witness J. de Leon) If there was no clear and
positive statement in appellant's testimony either on direct or cross-examination that she informed the police that she was choked by her husband, it
was because, as We noted, no question was propounded to her on that point.

While We are on this subject of appellant's surrender, mention is to be made of the knife marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution. In her testimony,
appellant stated that Exhibit C was not the knife actually used by her in stabbing her husband because the true weapon was her husband's Moro
hunting knife with a blade of around six inches which she threw away immediately after the incident; that when she was asked by Pat. Mariveles to
look for the weapon and she could not find it, she was advised by policeman Cabral who helped her in the search to get any knife and surrender it to
the desk officer and so she took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to Pat. Mariveles. (tsn. appellant pp. 56-57, 60) This testimony of appellant was
taken against her by the court a quo which held that her declaration could not have been true. We find however no strong reason for disbelieving the
accused on this point. Appellant does not deny that she turned over Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles as the knife with which she stabbed her husband but
she claims that she did so upon advise of another policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter was not called upon by the
prosecution to refute such declaration. There is sincerity in appellant's attempt to rectify a misstatement made by her to Pat. Mariveles and We are
inclined to believe and in fact We do believe that the fatal weapon must have had indeed a blade of around six inches as stated by appellant for it to
penetrate through the left lumbar region to the victim's large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter. (tsn. Dr. C. Samson, p. 6)

All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case.

The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.

The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise present. Here we have a woman who being strangled and
choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any
weapon within her reach to save herself from impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle that the reasonable
necessity of the means employed in self-defense does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (U.S. vs.
Paras, 1907, 9 Phil. 367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact that there was no visible injury caused on the body of the appellant which
necessitated medical attention, a circumstance noted by the trial court, is no ground for discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was
imminent peril to appellant's life caused by the unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt afforded appellant the
only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from being strangled and choked to death. What this Court expressed in the
case of People vs. Lara, 1925, 48 Phil. 153, 160, is very true and applicable to the situation now before Us, and We quote:

Page 245 of 258

“It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts
to sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences."[16]

Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no law.

The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Provocation is sufficient when it is
proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense.[17] Undoubtedly appellant herein
did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for
Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment
with an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her
husband, which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being confronted by her husband for being out late at night,
accused gave a valid excuse that she went carolling with some friends to earn some money for their child. January 2 was indeed within the
Christmas season during which by tradition people carol from house to house and receive monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill. The
deceased therefore should have given some consideration to his wife's excuse before jumping to conclusions and taking the extreme measure of
attempting to kill his wife.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-appellant acted in the legitimate defense of her person, and We accordingly
set aside the judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., is on leave.

Page 246 of 258

 [ G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAMERTO NARVAEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder
which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following pronouncement:

"Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).

"Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,

"(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in
the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been
represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs;

"(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the
sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been
represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs" (p. 48, rec.).

The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:

"At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibañez, together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer
and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway
and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house
and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the
walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented
from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying- 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if
possible we will talk it over - what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however,
answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As
Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133,
t.s.n., Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shooting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I; pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p. 161, rec.).

It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased
Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom
was appellant.

From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this
Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:

Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba,
and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was among those
who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling
about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.

Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application No.
21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.

Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the survey report was not submitted until 1946
because of the outbreak of the second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba,
were set aside for Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be distributed among the
settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).

The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for
public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of
protests from the settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the Director of Lands to
Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon. Atty. Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of the
settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved the
same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in favor of the company.

On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala, for the
purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the
contested land to the company. The settlers, as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated as resulting

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from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of the company. They appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the company.

This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24, 1966, from the land which they had been
occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost
of around P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second house is not far from the site
of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store
from his former residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house,
and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used for drying grains and copra.

On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court
of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the
pendency of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to lease an area of
approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00
monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question
of ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment.
On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:

"You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement
executed on February 21, 1967. You have not paid even after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.

"In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no alternative but to terminate our agreement on this date.

"I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six-month
period shall expire on December 31, 1966.

"In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six-month period, the company shall cause their immediate demolition"
(Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).

On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel
to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol.
2), with the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would have the effect of shutting off the
accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on
that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts.

At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall
of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the
wall of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was commanding
his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted.
Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. P, p. 31, Defense
Exhibits).

Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:

"First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and

"Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convcting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights" (p. 20 of
Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).

The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them from the window of his house with the
shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore
he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be
appreciated, the following requisites must occur:

"First. Unlawful aggression;

"Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

"Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself" (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).

The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in
answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang
mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being chiselled. The verbal
exchange took place while the two deceased were on the grounds doing the fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his window
(pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun
on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant
further testified:
Page 248 of 258
"When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell
down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I
shot at him" (p. 132, supra, italics supplied).

The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim, however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise
of their rights of ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.

A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three
laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which
were being nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons, such as nail and
hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to
the place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of
the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage being done to his house, compounded by the
fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to his compadre, the
deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with "gademit" and directed
his men to proceed with what they were doing.

The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of
appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill -- which were not only imminent but were actually in
progress. There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.

The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's house
and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?

Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.

However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case No. 755 for annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident
on August 22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of
Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company, between the same parties, which the company won by virtue of the
compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also
carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to
cancel the corresponding certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due
to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was premised on
the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the
evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.

Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and
his execution of the contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during cross-examination on
January 21, 1970, thus:

"It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place because even though we do not know who really owns this portion
to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that time, it was not known who is the right owner of the place.
So we decided until things will clear up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals" (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol. 6).

In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh. 10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have
allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's
entrance and exit to the highway.

The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:

"Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes
that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing."

"Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to
said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court" (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to
the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to
unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.

"Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind" (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).

In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines which provides:

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"Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property" (italics supplied).

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph
1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was
disproportionate to the attack.

WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was
defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the
noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at
all.

Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. He should therefore
be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the
presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden
unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a
special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be
said of a situation where the slayer acted instantaneously . . ." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).

WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to
prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer
and Company, which may be summarized as follows:

"On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the
crossing, Maitum, South Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to help them, as he was working in the
hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you
will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter
told him not to believe as they were only idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda" (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).

This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have consistently held,
there must be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, . . . it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but
the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA
238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that
there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the
act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).

Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.

Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing,
and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.

Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over
just before the shooting.

But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant
surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.

Likewise, WE find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its
accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in
danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was dismantled,
thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to
reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years
earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the
hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded -- all these could be too much for any man -- he should be credited with this
mitigating circumstance.

Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but
extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense -- in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant -- and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
passion and obfuscation.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by
one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same.
Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision
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correccional. And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of
two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.

The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral
damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only contributed but
they actually provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in the community, being
married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose
that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to
the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31, 1968 (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816),
but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).

Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a Central
Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capability -- financial and
otherwise -- to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take
advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the
moral and material suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.

Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision correccional or arresto mayor and fine who has no property
with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P2.50. However, the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of the damage
caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is
not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE
PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF
HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22, 1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, and Relova, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property.
Plana, J., in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., please see separate opinion.
Aquino, J., is on leave.

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 [ G.R. No. 135981, September 29, 2000 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. MARIVIC GENOSA, APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review. The Court may pass upon all relevant issues, including
those factual in nature and those that may not have been brought before the trial court. This is true especially in cases involving the imposition of the
death penalty, in which the accused must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their defense. Even novel theories such as the
"battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense, should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the
merits, not rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Case

For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in connection with the automatic review of the
September 25, 1998 "Judgment"[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City[2] in Criminal Case No. 5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of
parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to death.

In an Information[3] dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta charged appellant-movant with parricide allegedly
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood
vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."
After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding
treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."
The Antecedents

Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion, [4] to bring "to the attention of the x x x Court certain facts and
circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant the setting aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of the death penalty."

Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the means she employed in killing her husband. On the
contrary, she had consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of his death was
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which resulted from her
admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy
report on the body of the victim.

Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial
court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent
to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered
at his hands."

She thus prays for the following reliefs:[5]

"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and a re-examination of the cause of death.

2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists of the Court to determine her
state of mind at the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.

3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists to form part of the records of the case for purposes of
the automatic review or, in the alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the case before a lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists."

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On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,[6] which substantially objected to the Motion on the ground that
appellant had not been "deprived of her right to due process, substantial or procedural."

The Issues

In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his
death, and (2) whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the
time of the killing.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for the reception of evidence from qualified psychologists or
psychiatrists whom the parties may present to establish her state of mind at the time of the killing.

First Issue: No Need for a

Reexamination of Cause of Death

Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine his exact cause of death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion
that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.

Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at
the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the
victim's death. There is no need to exhume the body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.

Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time and again, we have said that this Court is not
a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the party during
the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be granted.

Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's

State of Mind at the Time of the Killing

In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine
whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina
Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the "battered woman
syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.

Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the
responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.[7] Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will
escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when
it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness
and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal
aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.

Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it
is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a form of mental illness.[8] It has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's
perception of the danger posed by the abuser.[9]

In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that her relationship with her spouse-victim had
afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a battered woman had affected her perception of danger
and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.

The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between appellant and her deceased husband. A defense witness, Dr.
Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six (6) times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for
severe hypertension due to emotional stress.[10] Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses' quarrels every now and then. The
court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that since violence had not immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.

Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered woman syndrome" as a possible modifying circumstance that
could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the accused. The discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court
that the syndrome deserves serious consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very life. It could be that very thin line between
death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere technical or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense,
for any criminal conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the death penalty
must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could save them from capital punishment.

In People v. Parazo,[11] after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to undergo mental,
neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation to determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and
mute, yet unaided during the trial by an expert witness who could professionally understand and interpret his actions and mutterings, the Court
granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It justified its action on the principle that "only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused]
be consigned to the lethal injection chamber."

More recently in People v. Estrada,[12] we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and remanded the case "to the court a quo for a conduct of a proper
mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings." In that case, the defense
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counsel had moved to suspend the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because of his mental defect,
and to confine him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the trial court denied the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and
determining for itself that he could understand and answer them "intelligently." After trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by cruelty and thus
sentenced to death.

In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:[13]

"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some
other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellant's
competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of
the latter's history of mental illness."
It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court practically denied him a fair trial prior to
conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not performed the act voluntarily, then he could
not have been criminally liable. The Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:
"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our
penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with
freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired."[14]
In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her
spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and
emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot simply refer her
for proper psychological or psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the findings and evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes
of automatic review. The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-examine the defense witnesses and
to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is apropos, so as to allow the
defense the opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to cross
examine and refute the same.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and,
thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any,
submitted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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