Review

Reviewed Work(s): The Knowing-Doing Gap: How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge into
Action by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton
Review by: Alexandre Barsi Lopes
Source: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 558-560
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Johnson Graduate School of
Management, Cornell University
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Book Reviews 2 Reviews on Knowledge in Organizations

The Knowing-Doing Gap: How Smart Companies Turn

Knowledge into Action.
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert 1. Sutton. Boston: Harvard Busi-
ness School Press, 2000. 314 pp. $27.50.

Why do companies fail to perform well even after pouring

funds into knowledge management initiatives? This is the
main question Pfeffer and Sutton investigated in The Know-
ing-Doing Gap, a very interesting report on their findings from
an investigation of several different organizations in a variety
of sectors and industries. Although the authors do not make
it explicit, both academic and practitioner communities
should benefit from this book. For academics, the book chal-
lenges several assumptions found in the extant knowledge-
management research, demanding that scholars take a step
back to examine the objectives and accomplishment of this
research area. For practitioners, this book examines the pos-
sible causes of failed implementation of new knowledge ini-
tiatives within the organization and suggests ways of dealing
with these obstacles.

The text starts by identifying the existence of the problem

that drives the book: investment in knowledge (training, high-
er education, acquisition of books, and the like) commonly
does not always pay off for organizations. The authors reason
(and go through great lengths to justify) that the cause of this
problem lies in the knowing-doing gap, organizations' inability
to transform existing knowledge into meaningful action. Pfef-
fer and Sutton claim that although many companies succeed
in acquiring and developing new knowledge, they fail in the
actual implementation of this knowledge because of the
knowing-doing gap. In their four-year quest to uncover the
reasons for the knowing-doing gap, the authors reviewed
existing academic literature and conducted a dozen qualita-
tive and quantitative studies.

Chapter 1 also contains one of the most thought-provoking

sections in this book: a discussion of how knowledge-man-
agement projects may be contributing to the knowing-doing
gap. Pfeffer and Sutton suggest that by focusing so much on
knowledge-management initiatives that take knowledge as a
codifiable commodity, researchers and practitioners end up
disregarding the more fundamental issue of implementing
knowledge the organization already has. The emphasis on
information technology as the paramount issue of knowl-
edge-management projects contributes to the inactivity
observed in companies that fail to create and implement new
products and services. This happens because the informa-
tion-technology focus diverts resources from knowledge
implementation initiatives while continuing to provide the
appearance that knowledge is a priority in the organization.
The authors argue that the really important knowledge is
tacit, which is only exemplified by doing and cannot be treat-
ed as something that can be stored on a computer medium.

The following chapters discuss the main causes for the

knowing-doing gap: (1) excessive talk-organizations believe
they are doing something even if they are only discussing it,
as if simple discussion would magically lead to execution; (2)

558/ASQ, September 2001

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 Book Reviews

excessive reliance on organizational memory-people's

desire for stability and a powerful organizational culture may
cause the organization to stand still or to play by rules not
valid anymore; (3) fear-when fear reigns in the organization-
al climate, employees will be afraid to express their ideas and
act on the knowledge they have acquired; (4) measurement
problems-with the absence of measures, problems with
processes will be masked, and management will lack direc-
tion to act toward improvement; exaggerated concern with
outcomes may be an obstacle for experimentation with new
ideas; and (5) internal competition-even when a part of the
organization knows and implements good ideas, the rest of
the organization may reject these ideas if the organizational
climate is too competitive. In each of these chapters the
authors reinforce their arguments with the discussion of case
studies. Additionally, they provide support for their ideas and
findings with existing research from management theory,
sociology, and psychology. Moreover, in every chapter the
authors offer some suggestions that would help managers
recognize when a particular problem may be hindering the
company's attempt to transform knowledge into action. The
suggestions are then positively reinforced through the pre-
sentation of cases that identify how some companies over-
came particular problems.

In the last chapters, the authors extensively discuss the

cases of three companies that were able to transform knowl-
edge into action and summarize the main lessons in the
book: (1) action should prevail over talk and real learning will
come from doing; (2) knowing why things are made is as
important as knowing how; (3) tempered responses to mis-
takes and absence of fear will lead to more positive experi-
mentation and action; (4) competition should be directed
toward other companies; (5) measurement should be closely
aligned with behavior and organizational culture; and (6) lead-
ers are fundamental in turning knowledge into action. Overall,
most of those lessons have been discussed before in other
outlets, but the support from the case studies and their
direct application to the knowing-doing gap highlight their
importance.

This book also has some problems. First, the suggestions for
analyzing (When is talk excessive? When is organizational
memory negative?) and overcoming the obstacles causing
the knowing-doing gap are too vague. Granted that the
authors do not attempt to deliver a recipe book and that the
issues discussed in the book are complex, but it is some-
what frustrating that the demarcation between the good and
bad practices the authors analyze is so blurred. For example,
discussing knowledge initiatives by e-mail is considered neg-
ative in one of the cases in the book and positive in another.

Additionally, the authors digress a little when talking about

fear and internal competition, almost as if they are using this
book to express their dislike of those management tactics.
Their concern with fear is also related to one of the main
contradictions in the book. Although the authors believe that
fear is an abominable management technique, in some of the
"positive" cases the authors present, instances of fear (fir-
ings and demotions) appear to be the tool management

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 selected to implement knowledge initiatives. Furthermore,
some of the "negative" examples the authors use through-
out the book refer to companies that are not only successful
but also particularly innovative. This makes it difficult to
resolve contradictions in the negative examples the authors
describe-Are they successful despite their use of internal
competition? Will their use of internal competition cause their
ruin?

Overall, this well-written and very interesting book is suc-

cessful as a warning about what is really important in knowl-
edge management. It is also successful in identifying poten-
tial causes of the knowing-doing gap and presenting cases of
companies that overcame it. It is less than successful, how-
ever, as a source of specific suggestions about how to recog-
nize the existence of and prevail over the knowing-doing gap
in one's own organization.

Alexandre Barsi Lopes

Katz Graduate School of Business
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Knowledge-driven Work: Unexpected Lessons from

Japanese and United States Work Practices.
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Michio Nitta, Betty J. Barrett, Nejib
Belhedi, Simon Sai-Chung Chow, Takashi Inaba, Iwao Ishino,
Wen-Jeng Lin, Michael L. Moore, William M. Mothersell, Jen-
nifer Palthe, Shobha Ramanand, Mark E. Strolle, and Arthur
C. Wheaton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 188
pp. $35.00.

Despite Japan's political, economic, and corporate woes,

reports of Japan's death are an exaggeration (to paraphrase
Mark Twain). Japan may not currently be the Number One
country in terms of economic and business success and rep-
utation, but Western managers and scholars nonetheless still
have much to learn from Japanese management and work
organizations. Such learning is especially appropriate as we
move into a "knowledge economy," with an increasing
emphasis on "virtual knowledge."

The comparative success of the Japanese economy and

some of its leading manufacturing firms in the 1970s and
1980s induced much interest in Japanese management
styles (sometimes called Japanization) in Western countries.
This interest was illustrated by works such as Dore (1973),
Lee and Schwendiman (1982), and many others. Womack,
Jones, and Roos (1990) was a celebration of the power of
the Japanese car industry. Most of its American and Euro-
pean competitors were running scared of the mighty Japan-
ese. Gai-jin managers visited Japanese firms and tried with
varying degrees of enthusiasm to implement Japanese-style
management techniques, which were seen as their recipes
of success. Although many Western managers and acade-
mics visited Japanese firms, like most tourists, they mar-

560/ASQ, September 2001

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