Crim2cases62to81 1

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198012 April 22, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO AND VICENTA LAPIZ y MEDINA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 17, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02366, which denied the appeal brought therewith and affirmed the
May 31, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila Branch 40 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 99·176598 and 99-176599 to 603. The RTC convicted Angel Mateo y Jacinto
(Mateo) and Vicenta Lapiz y Medina (Lapiz) a.k.a. ''Vicky Mateo" (appellants) of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042),
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and of five
counts of estafa.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private complainants,
namely, Abel E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza
(Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgilio N. Concepcion (Virgilio), met appellants
on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for overseas
employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese
firms, promised them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters
for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could facilitate private complainants’
employment as direct hires and assured their departure within three weeks. However,
after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to
P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them. Appellants
likewise failed to return private complainants’ money. This prompted Manuel to go to the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a
Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas
employment. Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint and executed
their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI
referred the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable
cause against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa4 and accordingly
filed the corresponding Informations5 for the same before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate car
importer and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the private
complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor’s Office.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC disposed of the cases in its Decision6 rendered on May 31, 2006 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment, this Court finds
both accused ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y MADINA a.k.a. "VICKY
MATEO" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale and hereby
sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay P500,000.00 fine each as well as
to indemnify private complainants (1) Manuel Oledan the sum of P25,000.00, and (2)
Emilio A. Cariaga, (3) Abel E. Balane, (4) Virgilio N. Concepcion and (5) Victorio D.
Flordeliza the sum of P18,555.00 each.
This Court finds both accused also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-176599,99-176600, 99-176601,99-176602 and 99-176603 for five (5) counts of
Estafa and each accused is hereby sentenced in each case to an indeterminate penalty of
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
The [Philippine] Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) shall be furnished with
certified copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution failed
to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They contended that
Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received money from him; that there
is likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money
he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding
office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and that their transactions with
Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel documents.
The CA, however, denied appellants’ appeal in its Decision 8 dated February 17, 2011,
viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40,
dated May 31, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
Per Resolution10 dated September 19, 2011, the Court required both parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. Appellants filed their Supplemental Brief,11 while appellee
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opted not to file any
and just adopted the appellee’s brief it filed before the CA.12
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the
person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA
8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group.13 These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the
RTC found appellants to have undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised
private complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was affirmed by
the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge." 14 And
when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.15 Second, the Certification issued by
the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a license nor authority to
recruit workers for overseas employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this
Certification. Third, it was established that there were five complainants. Clearly, the
existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the
prosecution.
Appellants’ argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private
complainants deserves no credence.1âwphi1 Suffice it to say that money is not material
to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal
recruitment" under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or not." Besides, even
if there is no receipt for the money given by the private complainants to appellants, the
former’s respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter’s involvement in
the prohibited recruitment.16
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are: (1)
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation."17 All these elements are likewise present in this case. As aptly held by the
CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private complainants
by making it appear as though they had the authority and resources to send them to
Japan for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan for which they
would be hired although, in truth, there were none; and, that by reason or on the
strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their money in
payment of the placement fee, documentation and hotel accommodations. All these
representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the apellants must be made
liable under par2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing any of the complainants must
necessarily fail. As noted by the RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the
transactions, serving as runner of Mateo and was even the one keeping the money
entrusted by the private complainants to appellants. She would also often pacify the
private complainants' uneasiness about the absence of receipts for each of the amounts
given and repeatedly assure them they would be deployed to Japan. In short, she was
an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of Mateo in the illegal recruitment
of the private complaintants.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the lower courts' conviction of appellants for
the crimes charged.
It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA failed to award interest on the
money judgment in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment in. Large Scale.
Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, therefore, imposes interest at the rate of
6% per annum on each of the amounts awarded from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 17,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02366 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amounts ordered restituted in Criminal Case No. 99-176598
shall each earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to
2207 finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association,
Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with
handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals
from the funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig
would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and
Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts
then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means
of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for
transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to be standard practice at
WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it
appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and
then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from
her capital contribution.3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of
qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total of
P6,268,300.00, brokendown into the following amounts:
Criminal Case No. 03-2178

P200,000.00
P250,000.00
P200,000.00
P55,000.00
P55,000.00
P85,000.00
P350,000.00
P250,000.00
P20,000.00
P250,000.00
P60,000.0
Crimnal Case No. 03-2189
P150,000.0
P50,000.00
P46,300.00
P205,000.00
P200,000.00
P25,000.00
P500,000.00
P500,000.0
P30,000.0
P400,000.0
P300,000.00
P500,000.00
P65,000.00
P47,000.00
P500,000.0
P40,000.00
P400,000.00
P35,000.00
P500,000.0
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only
three of the 30 cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a
written stipulation of facts, on the basis of which these were submitted for resolution.
The stipulation stated, among others: That for purposes of efficient and speedy
administration of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the pre-trial conference
and approved by the Honorable Court, that the actualtrial and presentation of evidence
will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on Cases Numbers 03-
2178 to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination of
the hearing onsaid three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the
remaining twenty-seven (27) counts, considering that all the cases arose from similar
transactions with the same methods or modus operandi used in committing the crime
charged, and involving the same accused and the same offended party[.]4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and
sentences her to suffer the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

complainant in the amount of P200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private


9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to
twenty (20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P20,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P4[6],300.00;
P25,000.00;
P30,000.00;
P40,000.00;
P35,000.00;
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00.
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by
the key officers ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the
funds and financial records of the association, a circumstance that understandably
facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds which she converted to her personal use in the
manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer."6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA
denied her appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the
proceeds of the WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier of the association which
are supposed to be redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property
belongs to another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the taking
was done without the consent of the owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant
created a ruse showing that the funds were credited to another account but were
actually withdrawn from her own personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with
intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby means of
a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all
withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course of business and with the
approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation
against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with
grave abuse of confidence considering that her position as cashier permeates trust and
confidence.7
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of
the 30 cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of
Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden
or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon
the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as
follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,

nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her
position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately
executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and
the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which
the appellant abused."9
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves
"handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and
other funds of the association.1âwphi1 Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier
required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors
into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal
account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186,
03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are P20,000.00, P46,300.00,
P25,000.00, P30,000.00, P40,000.00, and P35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article
309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed pr is ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below P12,000.00. Hence, if
the crime charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would
have been, at least, prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was
established that the crime was qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310
provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be the one "next higher by two degrees,"
which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases
should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206,
appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The judgment to
indemnify the amounts in each of the corresponding charges stands.
SO ORDERED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December
14, 2012 Decision1 and the May 6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol (Magsumbol), questioning his conviction
for Theft.
The Facts
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria
(Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the crime of Theft in the
Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City,
Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The Information
indicting Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in the
Munipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
with seven (7) John Does whose true names and real identities are still unknown and
whose physical descriptions were not made known by available witnesses, and who are
all still at large, and mutually helping one another, with intent togain and without the
consent of the owner, Menandro Avanzado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut trees
from the coconutplantation of the said owner, valued at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (P44,400.00), Philippine currency, belonging to said Menandro
Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount.3
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private
complainant Engr. Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1
Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning of February 1, 2002,
Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria,
Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others,
cutting down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled
trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the
coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the site and
proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police.
Thereafter, the two, accompanied by SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only
to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees (subject trees) had been cut down.
The coco lumber were no longer in the area. They took photographs of the stumps left
by the men.
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado (Atanacio),accused

Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol, Barangay Captain Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain
Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its claim of innocence for all the
accused.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut
down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the
land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that he had never set foot on his
property for about 20 years already and that he was not present whenthe cutting
incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol,
Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the
coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol
claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a
relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that morning of February 1, 2002.
Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the
coconut trees planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of
the coconut trees but merely supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive
any remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the coco
lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut
treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the
accomplishment of the work being done thereat. Inanoria corroborated the narration of
Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled trees were planted inside the lot owned by
Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due
to his refusal to accede to latter’s request for him to testify against his co-accused in
relation to the present criminal charge.4
Ruling of the RTC
On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the prosecution was able
to establish with certitude the guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft.
The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by the accused in the face of positive
identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not
believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased witness on account of
his relationship with accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo Magsino,
Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and
applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby sentences them to suffer an
imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 6
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado
and the other heirs of Norberto Avanzado the sum of P13,200.00 representing the value
of the 33 coconut trees they have cut and sold to accused Ramirez.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the RTC before
the CA insisting that the prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum of proof
necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged. They posited that the RTC
erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their part to commit the crime
of simple theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was presented to prove the
element of intent to gain.6
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the findings of facts
and conclusions of law by the RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered
against the accused. The CA was of the view, however, that the crime committed in this
case would not fall under the general definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision which penalizes
theft of damaged property. The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and
credence to the testimony of Caringal who was not shown to have been motivated by
any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC that Atanacio’s
testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with
Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert
the truth. Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the
accused cut the coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into coco lumber,
gave rise to the presumption that it was done with intent to gain. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
March 15, 2011, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria,
Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of tw0
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private
complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P13,200.00).
SO ORDERED.7
The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision but their
motion was denied by the CA on May 6, 2013.
Issues:
Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this Court and
imputes to the CA the following
ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT

FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, IN THAT:
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE

COCONUT TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO
AVANZADO; and
II
MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT, ARE NOT
PRESENT IN THE CASE AT HAND.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that
the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the
demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is true that the
trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and
fast one. The exception is observed if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance that
would have cast doubt on the guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently exists
in the case at bench.
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under
the RPC, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and
accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench, petitioner Magsumbol and his co-
accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft of damaged property
underparagraph (2) of Article 308 of the RPC which provides:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. xxxxx;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and xxx.
[Emphasis Supplied]
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the
property belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object
thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an intentional felony
for which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with
criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent
substantiated tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned
by Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were
planted within the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense, on the other hand, averred
that only the coconut trees found within the land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol
and his co-accused. Menandro testified that there were muniments that delimit the
boundaries between the adjacent lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none and
that "x" marks were just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the boundary of
his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and
competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their respective submissions. In view
of such conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court
cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The
uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presenceof the
criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandro’s land,
no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-
accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important point in the present case, to wit:
Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut
down the coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial reversals, he
sold all the coconut trees in his land to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he
could not go to the site due to health reasons, he authorized Magsumbol and Magsino to
cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of the felled trees; that he informed
Menandro about this and even offered to pay for the damages that he might have
sustained as some of his (Menandro’s) trees could have been mistakenly cut down in the
process; that Menandro refused his offer of compensation and replied that a case had
already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an audience again
from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him anymore.13
Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of
Atanacio for being unreliable and considered him a biased witness simply because he is
related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family relationship, however, does not by
itself render a witness’ testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight.14 To
warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that,
independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective,
or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused
falsely.15
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his
credibilty.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that while Magsumbol and Magsino are Atanacio’s
brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the accused and the
accuser are Atanacio’s relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his
decision, why would then Atanacio support one over the other? The logical explanation
could only be that Atanacio had indeed ordered Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees
on his land. The Court is convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-
accused encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the
undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down some of Menandro’s trees,
such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The following pronouncement
in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act,
no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent
must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule,
ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from
felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance,
the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element ofnegligence and
imprudence.17
[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-
accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the
coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight effectively negated
malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the accused would still
approach the barangay captain if their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of
Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely
or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or a
wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken impression that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The
point is that courts should carefully scrutinize the prosecution evidence to make sure
that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony, that an act
was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence
adduced must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that
conviction only flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1âwphi1 The prosecution miserably
failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-
accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice and deliberate intent and then
removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and
the May 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great
caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and
the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the
offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers,
judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation
and reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately
evaluating the evidence on hand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the September 30, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara et al., Respondents," as
well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of the assailed
judgment.
Factual Antecedents
The following facts appear from the account of the CA:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC,
effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance withits mandate
under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653.
xxxx
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s
past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate
settlement oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained a loanof [P]10
Million each. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC
and insisted that the signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative
of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by
OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans
purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in
the form of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International,
Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the
private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred
to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru
Falsification of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of
Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans of Timmy’s,
Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding probable cause, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed Informations 5 against the private
respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in
the RTC in Manila.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents
pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial was conducted.
Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After
the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The
presiding judge granted the private respondents’ Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and
ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch. The case was subsequently re-
raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge.6
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private
respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007, the
private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence7 praying for the dismissal of the
criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the
private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal
Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all of the accused in these cases.
On July20, 2007, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 moved for a reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was denied
by the respondent RTC judge in an Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10
Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking

Corporation (OCBC) depositors’ money appear to have been lost – which must have
contributed to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no motion for reconsideration
of the July 2, 2007 Order granting respondents’ demurrer to evidence was filed by the
handling public prosecutor, Manila Prosecutor Marlo B. Campanilla (Campanilla). Only
complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, and the same lacked Campanilla’s approval and/or conformé; the copy
of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the RTC11 does not bear Campanilla’s
approval/conformé; instead,it indicates thathe was merely furnished with a copy of the
motion by registered mail.12 Thus, while the prosecution’s copy of PDIC’sMotion for
Reconsideration13 bore Campanilla’s subsequent approval and conformity, that which
was actually filed by PDIC with the RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain the public
prosecutor’s written approval and/or conformity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed anoriginal Petition for Certiorari 14 with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the
trial court. Itclaimed that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lackor excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; that the prosecution
was deprived of its day in court; and that the trial court disregarded the evidence
presented, which undoubtedly showed that respondents committed the crime of estafa
through falsification ofcommercial documents.
On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following decretal
portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders of the respondent RTC judge are AFFIRMED and
deemed final and executory.
SO ORDERED.15
Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July 2, 2007
Order of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move for the
reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. The CA declared thus –
More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact that the
July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court has already attained finality. This Order was
received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the Private
Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not seek for the
reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the authority to file a Motion
for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who can file a petition for
certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of the Public
Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 and the failure
of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before September 1, 2007
made the order of the trial court final.
As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this matter
in the case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows:
"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liabilityarising therefrom. Hence,
if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made
only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the
OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for
reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect ofthe case. However, the offended party
or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or
acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In
so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of
the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorarior mandamus, if
grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party
has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 16
In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was denied its
day in court; that on the contrary, the prosecution was afforded every opportunity to
present its evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents committed the crime
charged.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could testify,
based on personal knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by the
respondents; that the prosecution should not have relied on "letters and unverified
ledgers," and it "should have trailed the money from the beginning to the end;" 17 that
while the documentary evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan documents were
falsified, it has not been shown who falsified them. It added that since only two of the
alleged 13 manager’s checks were being questioned, there arose reasonable doubt as to
whether estafa was committed, as to these two checks; instead, there is an "inescapable
possibility that an honest mistake was made in the preparation of the two questioned
manager’s checks since these checks were made out to the names of different payees
and not in the names of the alleged applicants of the loans."18 The appellate court added
–
x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went after
they were deposited to the checking account of the private respondent Jose C. Go. There
is only a vague reference that the money was used to fund the personal checks earlier
issued by x x x Go. The petitioner should have gone further and identified who were the
recipients of these personal checks and if these personal checks were negotiated and
honored. With all the resources of the public prosecutor’s office, the petitioner should
have done a better job of prosecuting the cases filed against the private respondents. It
isa shame that all the efforts of the government will go for naught due to the negligence
of the public prosecutors in tying up the chain of evidence in a criminal case. 19
As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of evidence,
these are mere errors of judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction – which may no longer
be reviewed lest respondents be placed in double jeopardy.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, the
CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.
Issues
In the Petition, it is alleged that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT –
(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT

RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN

IT WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND
(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND

NOT OF JURISDICTION.20
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court granting respondents’ demurrer – that
is, by "joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for
Reconsideration. Nonetheless,it admitted that while it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20,
2007 Motion for Reconsideration, it had only until July 18, 2007 within which to seek
reconsideration since it received the order on July 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor
received a copy of the Order only on July 5, 2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in
filing the motion should not prejudice the interests of the State and the People.
Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required Motion
for Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in the filing of the Petition for
Certiorariwith the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs the Court to excuse its
mistake in the nameof public interest and substantial justice, and in order to maintain
stability in the banking industry given that the case involved embezzlement of large
sums ofdepositors’ money in OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding that
demurrer was proper. It claims that it was able to prove the offense charged, and it has
shown that respondents were responsible therefor.
In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court granting
respondents’ demurrer was null and void to begin with, and thus it could not have
attained finality. It adds thatcontrary to respondents’ submission, the private
prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration contained the public prosecutor’s written
conformity, and that while it may be saidthat the public prosecutor’s motion was two
days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof and passed upon its merits; by so
doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public prosecutor’s action of adopting the private
prosecutor’sMotion for Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it should
therefore besaid that the prosecution’s resultant Petition for Certiorariwith the CA on
January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-day period, counted from
November 5, 2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial court’s October
19, 2007 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available remedy
against the assailed Orders of the trial court, since the granting of a demurrer in criminal
cases is tantamount to an acquittal and is thus immediately final and executory. It adds
that the denial of its right to due process is apparent since the trial court’s grant of
respondents’ demurrer was purely capricious and done with evident partiality, despite
the prosecution having adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed
estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Petitioner thus prays that the
assailed CA dispositions be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela Rosa
(Dela Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in Criminal Case
Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 – argue in their Comment22 that the trial court’s grant
of their demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent prosecution for
the same offense would thus violate their constitutional right against double jeopardy.
They add thatsince the public prosecutor failed to timely move for the reconsideration of
the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order, it could not have validly filed an original Petition for
Certiorariwith the CA. Nor can it be said that the prosecution and the private prosecutor
jointly filed the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court
because the public prosecutor’s copy of PDIC’smotion was merely sent through
registered mail. Therefore if it were true that the public prosecutor gave his approval or
conformity to the motion, he did so only afterreceiving his copy of the motion through
the mail, and not at the time the private prosecutor actually filed its Motion for
Reconsideration with the trial court.
Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the grant
of their demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of the facts
and evidence bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet
the quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of respondents.
They argue thatthere is no evidence to show that OCBC released loan proceeds to the
alleged borrowers, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that these loan
proceeds were then deposited in the account of respondent Go. Since no loans were
granted to the two borrowers, then there is nothing for Go to misappropriate. With
respect to the two manager’s checks issued to Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta
International, respondents contend that these may not beconsidered to be the loan
proceeds pertaining to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loan application
because these checks were not in the name of the alleged borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. as payees. Besides, these two checks were never negotiated with
OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit, since they did not bear the respective
indorsements or signatures and account numbers of the payees; thus, they could not be
considered to havebeen negotiated nor deposited with Go’s account with OCBC.
Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged loan
proceeds in Go’s OCBC account is questionable, since under banking procedure, a cash
deposit slip may not be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it has not been shown who
prepared the said cash deposit slip. Respondents further question the validity and
authenticity of the other documentary evidence presented, such as the Subsidiary
Ledger, Cash Proof,23 Schedule of Returned Checks and Other Cash Items (RTCOCI), etc.
Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under Article
315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have been established; specifically, it has not
been shown that Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds, and that a demand was made
upon him for the return thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in 1997,
fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. – were
approved, after which two manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of
these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different entities – Philippine
Recycler’sInc. and ZetaInternational – without any documents issued by the supposed
borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds
tothe two payees. Thereafter, these two manager’s checks – together with several
others totaling P120,819,475.0024 – were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC
Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go. Then, several automatic transfer deposits
were made from Go’s savings account to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-
0 which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks.
The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that OCBC, a
commercial bank, was ordered closed by the BSP sometime in October 1998. PDIC was
designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s affairs, assets and liabilities,
records, and collected the bank’s receivables.
During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent demand
letters to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of P10 million each,
and which apparently remained unpaid. In response to the demand letters, Timmy’s, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans from OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc.,
through its designated representative, claimed that while it is true that it applied for an
OCBC loan, it no longer pursued the application after it was granted a loan by another
bank. When the OCBC loan documents were presented to Timmy’s, Inc.’s officers, it was
discovered that the signatures therein of the corporate officers were forgeries. In their
defense and to clarify matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s corporate officers executed affidavits and
furnished official documents such as their passports and the corporation’s Articles of
Incorporation containing their respectivesignatures to show PDIC that their purported
signatures in the OCBC loan documents were forgeries. After its investigation into the
matter, PDIC came to the conclusion that the signatures on the Timmy’s, Inc. loan
documents were indeed falsified.25
On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded
that the AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover, PDIC discovered other
bogus loans in OCBC.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed of Go, who
was likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President, or SVP,
and Chief Operating Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu – approved a
P10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmy’s, Inc. After deducting finance
charges, advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net loan proceeds amounting
to P9,985,075.00 covered by Manager’s Check No. 0000003347 27 dated February 5,
1997.28 The face of the check bears the notation "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha
numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to the purported loan of Timmy’s, Inc.29
However, the payee thereof was not the purported borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a
certain "Zeta International". Likewise, on even date, Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 30
for P9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its face is indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-477",
which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to the purported loan of AsiaTextile Mills,
Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was made payable not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc.,
but to "Phil. Recyclers Inc."
On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February 5,
1997, it appears that the two checks – together with other manager’s checks totaling
P120,819,475.00– were encashed; on the face ofthe checks, the word "PAID" was
stamped, and at the dorsal portion thereof there were machine validations showing
thatManager’s Check No. 0000003347 was presented at 6:16 p.m., while Manager’s
Check No. 0000003340 was presented at 6:18 p.m.32
After presentment and encashment, the amount of P120,819,475.00 – which among
others included the P9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc. loan and the
P9,985,075.00 proceeds of the supposed Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan – was deposited in
Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch, apparently on
instructions of respondent Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC Cash Deposit
Slip34 dated February 5, 1997, with the corresponding machine validation thereon
indicating that the deposit was made at 6:19 p.m.35 The funds were credited to Go’s
savings account.36
It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go

from his personal OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling P145,488,274.48
were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.37 After Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340
and 0000003347, along with several other manager’s checks, were encashed and the
proceeds thereof deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0
withautomatic transferfeature to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0, funds
were automatically transferred from the said savings account to the current account,
which atthe time contained only a total amountof P26,332,303.69. Go’sOCBC Current
Account No. 008-00-000015-0 was credited with P120,819,475.00, and thereafter the
account registered a balance of P147,151,778.69. The seven previously dishonored
personal checks were thenpresented for clearing, and were subsequently cleared that
sameday, or on February 5, 1997.38 Apparently, they were partly funded by the
P120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include Manager’s Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28, 1998, Go
issued and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director of the
Departmentof Commercial Banks, specifically requesting that the BSP refrain from
sending any communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among others.
He manifested that he was "willing to assume the viability and full payment"of the
accounts under investigation and examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts.
Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiencyof the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a
demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify
the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered
sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b)
the precise degree of participation therein by the accused."41 Thus, when the accused
files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient
enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 42
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of such discretion."43 As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction."44 When grave abuse of discretion is present,
an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an

acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled
that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to
evidence,its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil
action of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or
set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of
the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its
consequent order of acquittal void.45
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able toclearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of
its authority to dispense justice."46
In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may
require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice."47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly erred in
affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which
Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and
public interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent
evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In
evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the
prosecution’s evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier
of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC
depositors’ money – not to mention that the banking industry is impressed with public
interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in
intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust oron commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation orconversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender." 49
Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return
the same; thus, the term "demand deposit."
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x
savingsx x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the
bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The
depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x
x x50
Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking."This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to
observe ‘high standards ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed written into every
deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking
requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family."51
In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with respect
to the bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration for the bank’s
benefit. From this, it may beinferred that when such bank president makes it appear
through falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in fact such
individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the loan proceeds and
converts the same, estafa is committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s Check
Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s funds which clearly
belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although he was not the named payee therein.
Next, the money was automatically transferred to Go’s OCBC Current Account No. 008-
00-000015-0 and used to fund his seven previously-issued personal checks totaling
P145,488,274.48, which checks were dishonored the day before. Simply put, the
evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and
benefit. "The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of
another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion
to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right. x x x In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.Thus, the merepresumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to
conclude thata probable cause exists for the indictment x x x."53
As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the

misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced; the
bank has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’ money is no longer under
their unimpeded disposal.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank demanded
the return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is not an element
of the felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal complaint for estafa.
Indeed, the accusedmay be convicted ofthe felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa,
demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion." 54
Thus, strictly speaking, demand is not an element of the offense of estafa through abuse
of confidence; even a verbal query satisfies the requirement.55 Indeed, in several past
rulings of the Court, demand was not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa
through abuse of confidence, orunder paragraph 1(b).56
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial document
under Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is
committed ina commercial document."58 As to estafa through falsification of public,
official or commercial documents, it has been held that –
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of

committing Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of Falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed.
Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document todefraud another
is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of Estafa, not by the falsification
of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 59
Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval

memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other credit documents – by
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting or
signatures constitute falsification of commercial and public documents.
As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice it

to state that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of the
falsification. The fact that previously, his personal checks totaling P145,488,274.48 were
dishonored, and the day after, the amount of P120,819,475.00 was immediately credited
to his account, which included funds from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347 or the loan proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in his
possession falsified documents [which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the
presumption that he authored it arises."60
x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the
capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and
therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged

document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his savings
account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight at
the height of the bank’s inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish x x x
involvement in the falsification.61
Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As OCBC
SVP and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the purported
Timmy’s, Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC Disclosure
Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions to deposit the
proceeds of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, among others, in Go’s
OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch.63 Finally, she was a
signatory to the two checks.64
On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for Corporate
Accounts – Account Management Group, among others prepared the Credit Approval
Memorandum and recommended the approval of the loans.65
In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order – concluded
that based on the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have falsified the loan
documents pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. since the individuals
who assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged were not presented incourt
to testify on such claim; that the prosecution witnesses – Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco)
of PDIC, the designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella
Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch – were not present when the loan
documents were executed and signed, and thus have no personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged falsification; and as high-ranking officers of
OCBC, respondents could not be expected to have prepared the saiddocuments. The
evidence, however, suggests otherwise; it shows that respondents had a direct hand in
the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. The loan documents were even signed by
them. By disregarding what is evident in the record, the trial court committed substantial
wrong that frustrates the ends of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The
trial court’s act was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of

discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
personal hostility. x x x66
On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of Manager’s
Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and Timmy’s,
Inc., respectively, but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International, and
there are no documents drawn by the borrowers assigning the loan proceeds to these
two entities, then it cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds released to these
borrowers. The trial court added that it is doubtful that the two manager’s checks were
presented and negotiated for deposit in Go’s savings account, since theydo not contain
the required indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures of the tellers and
individuals/payees who received the checks and the proceeds thereof, and the respective
account numbers of the respondents; and the checks were presented beyond banking
hours. The trial court likewise held that the fact that a cash deposit slip – and not a
check deposit slip – was used to allegedly deposit the checks raised doubts as to the
truth of the allegation that the manager’s checks were deposited and credited to Go’s
savings account.
The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted of mere
"letters and unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there was an
"inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made" in the preparation and
issuance of Manager’s CheckNos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two checks
are claimed to be just a few of several checks – numbering thirteen in all – the rest of
which werenever questioned by the receiver PDIC. The appellate court added that the
prosecution should have presented further evidence as to where the money went after
being deposited inGo’s savings and current accounts, identifying thus the recipients of
Go’spersonal checks.
What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds ended
up in the personal bank accountsof respondent Go, and were used to fund his personal
checks, even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative
ofestafa, as may be seen from the afore-cited Sorianocase.
The bank money (amounting to P8million) which came to the possession of petitioner
was money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity
as the President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner
of the P8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if
the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case
here. According to the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another
person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that
said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when infact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not.
Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the
same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the legal
owner of the P8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s fiduciary with respect to
that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his hands. 67
Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable to
entities other than the alleged borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s checks
themselves indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc.’s and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through the alpha numeric codes specifically assigned to
them that are printed on the face of the checks; the connection between the checks and
the purported loans is thus established. In the same vein, the CA’s supposition that there
is an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made inthe preparation of the
two questioned manager’s checks" is absurd; even so, the bottom line is that they were
encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds thereof were deposited in Go’s bank
savings and current accounts and used to fund his personal checks.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that the

recipients of Go’s personal checks be identified. For purposes of proving the crime, it has
been shown that Goconverted bank funds to his own personal use when they were
deposited in his accounts and his personal checks were cleared and the funds were
debited from his account.1âwphi1 This suffices. Likewise, the Court agrees that the
prosecution’s reliance on the supposed loan documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip,
cash proof, RTCOCI and other documents was proper. They are both public and private
documents which may be received in evidence; notably, petitioner’s documentary
evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.68 With respect to evidence consisting of
private documents, the presumption remains that "therecording of private transactions
has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been followed." 69
Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume the
viabilityand full payment" of the accounts under examination – which included the
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others – is an offer of
compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.70
In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be

considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as
an implied admission ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.71
As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial court,
any dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which should
merit appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent ignorance of procedure, if
not indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case – becomes unnecessary. It
is conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or conforméto PDIC’s Motion for
Reconsideration should have rendered the trial court’s assailed Ordersfinal and executory
were it not for the fact that they were inherently null and void; Campanilla’s
irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day in court and their right to exact
justice and retribution, not to mention that they could have caused immeasurable
damage to the banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void judgment or order has no legal
and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever
it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void
judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored."72 More appropriately, the following
must be cited:
x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot
confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it
is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the
public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the
prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in
law.73
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x
x x be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the
accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the
wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the
private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although
the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double
jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties as members of the Bench xx x."74
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision and January
22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2,
2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said
cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013
vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision
affirmed in toto the August 26, 1002 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the
appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he
wanted to get even ("manabla ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his
house.4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there
was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from
the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. 5 Eric
Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran
to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the
burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not
to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air.6The appellant also told
the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and
nieces.8 Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings.9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation
of the incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s
house; and that it had been intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that
the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare
and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage. 11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in
Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal.12
He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one
of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen.13The appellant claimed that he went to
sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started
when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that he
did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his neighbors came from the
explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration. 14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not
see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001. 15 Dimas
Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the
same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the
fire broke out.16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26,
2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual
findings since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary
evidence. The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to
the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty
imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in
Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City.The trial and appellate courts thus
resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove the
appellant’s culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may

be sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to
justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused."19
In the present case,the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain

that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of
others, set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted
violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001;
second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even,
and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the
appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house;
fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out
the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill
anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant carried a
traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire
marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s
house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that
the appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the
appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to
kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an
individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is
contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and
prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a
gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell
the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag
during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his
part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep
inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke
up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility
towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee
his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute
any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in
fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended, which reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of

burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or
different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in

general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite
purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and
conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not
limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops
or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there
are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to

transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or
leisure.1âwphi1
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances

thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or

destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks

factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or

explosive materials.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons." 20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs
simple arson. Section 3 of this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion

Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform

or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard,

bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and

emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.22This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that
constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple
arsoncontemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and
national security implications than destructive arson.23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house
or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the present case. The
Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread
to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which
stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department
likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise
testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of
perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of
the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to
burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson
is reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to
reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable
should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium period of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into
account, we therefore impose on the appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records
do not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the
offended parties. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable.25
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of simple arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years

and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163437 February 13, 2008
ERNESTO PIDELI, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ON appeal via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City,
convicting petitioner Ernesto Pideli of theft in the amount of P49,500.00 belonging to his
brother’s business partner. The appeal zeroes in on the questions of ownership, unlawful
taking and intent to gain. In short, is it estafa or theft?
The Facts
Sometime in March 1997, Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) entered
into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project at
Tongcalong, Tinongdan Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet. Placido and Wilson agreed to
undertake the project in favor of ACL Construction (ACL), the contractor awarded the
development project by the Department of Public Works and Highways.3
Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner), brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to
Placido, offered the duo the use of his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad, Benguet. Petitioner was an employee of the Provincial
Planning and Development Office of Benguet, likewise based in La Trinidad. With the said
arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure
an assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract.4
On November 17, 1997, after the completion of the project, ACL summoned all its
subcontractors to a meeting. Placido, Wilson and petitioner were in attendance. At the
meeting, ACL management informed Placido and Wilson that the final payment for the
work that they have done would be withheld. It was learned that they failed to settle
their accountabilities with the MTFSH.5
Placido, Wilson and petitioner made representations with the accountable ACL personnel,
a certain Boy Candido, to facilitate the release of their payment. They assured Boy that
the matter of the unpaid obligations to MTFSH has been resolved. Boy acceded to the
request and proceeded to release the final payment due to Placido and Wilson,
amounting to P222,732.00.6
Consequently, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a
net income of P130,000.00. Placido, as partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of
the net amount as his share in the project. Petitioner, however, advised the two to first
settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the hardware store.
Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with express
instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them.7
The following day, or on November 18, 1997, Placido attempted but failed to contact
petitioner. He had hoped to obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold
of petitioner the next morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing
was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier.8 Despite repeated demands,
petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract. 9
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against
petitioner Ernesto Pideli. Eventually, an Information bearing the following allegations was
instituted against petitioner:
The undersigned accuses ERNESTO PIDELE (sic) of the crime of THEFT,

committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1977, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent of gain (sic) and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away, cash money in the amount of
P65,000.00, belonging to PLACIDO CANSIO (sic) y TALUKTOK, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount
of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Then, trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the People portraying the foregoing facts was supplied by private
complainant Placido, the lone prosecution witness.
Petitioner’s defense founded on denial is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Ernesto Pideli, 43 years old, married, government employee and a

resident of Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet. He is a government employee at
the Provincial Planning and Development Office, Capitol, La Trinidad,
Benguet. He was first employed at the Provincial Engineer’s Office on April
11, 1978. Sometime in 1980, he was appointed as Project Development
Officer of the Provincial Planning and Development Office and continuously
up to the present.
Wilson Pideli is his brother. In 1997, his brother Wilson had a construction
project along Tinongdan, Itogon, Benguet. His brother asked him if he
knows of a hardware which can extend him credit for construction
materials. He approached the manager of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware, Mrs. Editha Paayas, who then said that they could extend credit
to his brother. As of 1997, his brother owed the hardware the amount of
P279,000.00 for the construction materials supplied by the hardware,
namely: reinforcement bars, cement, tire wires and other construction
materials. This amount was paid to the hardware by installment. The first
installment was paid in June 1997 when the main contractor paid his
brother. His brother gave him P179,000.00 at his residence and he was
the one who paid the hardware which issued him a receipt (Exhibit 1-C).
After the project was completed, his brother gave him P100,000.00 on
November 18, 1997 while he, his brother and Placido Cancio were at the
Rose Bowl Restaurant. He went to the hardware but the manager was not
there. One of the staff then informed him that the manager will still have
to compute the interest of their loan credit and so he deposited
P75,000.00 which was covered by a receipt (Exhibit 1-B). Their account
was finally computed in December 1997 and so he paid their balance of
P25,000.00. All in all, he paid the hardware the amount of P279,000.00.
When his brother tendered to him the P100,000.00 at the Rose Bowl
Restaurant, Placido Cancio was also there discussing the expenses. The
money which his brother got from the main contractor, Boy Cupido, the
partner of the late Engineer Lestino, was being held by his brother and not
Placido Cancio.
The total cost of the materials taken by his brother from the Mt. Trail Farm
Supply is P279,000.00. On June 10, 1997, he paid the initial payment of
P179,000.00 covered by Exhibit 1-C issued by the sales boy Cris. The
second partial payment was made on November 18, 1997 in the amount
of P75,000.00 covered by Exhibit 1-B issued by Mrs. Editha Paayas. The
last time that he paid was on December 18, 1997 in the amount of
P25,000.00. This was not yet the full payment because according to Mrs.
Paayas she still has to compute for the interest. (TSN, May 2, 2000, pp.
19-20). Aside from the amount of P279,000.00 representing the materials
taken by his brother, he still has an outstanding account with Mt. Trail
Farm Supply charged in his name. This is the reason why in the receipt it
was noted as part payment (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 21).
On cross-examination, Ernesto Pideli said that he was never a partner of

his brother. It was only in 1997 that his brother sought his assistance to
look for a hardware where he can buy construction materials on credit. All
materials ordered by Wilson for the project were placed in his account
because it was easier for the hardware to contact him at their office which
is nearer. After the project in Itogon, Wilson stopped his construction
project. He denies having taken the P65,000.00. He does not also know
where the amount went (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 18).
On redirect, he said that when he tendered the first payment of

P179,000.00, a statement of account was prepared by the salesboy of Mt.
Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (Exhibit 1-D). He was furnished a copy of
the statement of account. After the first and second payment, other
materials were obtained by his brother, this is the reason why they still
have a balance of P20,000.00 to be settled within the hardware. 11
(Underscoring supplied)
RTC and CA Dispositions
On March 13, 2001, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction, disposing in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond

reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING the accused
of the crime of theft and hereby sentences him after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4 years of
prision correccional medium as minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor
maximum as maximum (applying Art. 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code)
and to reimburse the private complainant the amount of P49,500.00 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from date of filing of the
complaint up to the time it is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.12
In convicting petitioner of theft, the trial court ratiocinated:
x x x Upon evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court finds

the lone testimony of the private complainant more credible than the
testimony of the defense witnesses. The testimony of the private
complainant is positive and credible, sufficient to sustain a conviction even
in the absence of corroboration. The testimony of defense witness Wilson
Pideli was glaringly inconsistent and contradictory on material points. At
the initial stages of his (Wilson Pideli) testimony on direct examination, he
categorically stated that it was he and his laborers who implemented the
project (rip rap project along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet) awarded to
him by ACL Construction. The private complainant had no participation in
the project (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 9-10). Later, in his narration of
what actually transpired between him, his brother Ernesto Pideli and
private complainant at the Rose Bowl Restaurant on November 17, 1997,
he said that after computing their expenses, he entrusted to the private
complainant the following amounts: 1. P15,000.00 to be given by the
private complainant to the laborers who excavated for the project; 2.
P500.00 to be given by the private complainant to Mr. Apse as payment
for the cement test; 3. P10,500.00 because he (private complainant) was
pestering him (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 14-16). The question is, if the
private complainant had no real participation in the project subject of this
case, why would Wilson Pideli be entrusting such amounts to the former. If
really private complainant has no involvement whatsoever in the project,
why was he present at the: 1. Mido Restaurant where Josephine Bentres
was disbursing final payments to the subcontractors of the project, and 2.
At the Rose Bowl Restaurant when the Pideli brothers were computing the
expenses incurred in the project and also presenting his list of expenses
(Exhibit B, Exhibit 2). Later, in his testimony on direct, Wilson Pideli said
that when he started the project, private complainant asked him to join
him and he (Wilson Pideli) agreed provided the private complainant share
in the expenses. Private complainant did not, however, share in the
expenses nor did he provide any equipment (TSN, October 18, 1999; p.
13) yet he entrusted the aforementioned amounts to Cancio. On cross-
examination, Wilson Pideli admitted that he gave private complainant
P10,500.00 despite the fact that he did not share in the expenses for the
implementation of the project (TSN, November 22, 1999, pp. 5-6). Such
act is abnormal and contrary to human behavior and experience. The only
plausible and logical conclusion is, private complainant and Wilson Pideli
were partners in a joint venture. Just as private complainant did, in fact,
stated, he was the one who provided the laborers and some equipments
used in the project. Thus, it is only logical that the money for the payment
of the wages and the cement test were entrusted to him because it was
his responsibility/obligation to pay them and not because they were his
neighbors as the defense would like this court to believe. The reason
propounded by Wilson Pideli to explain his actuations is too flimsy for this
court to believe. Furthermore, Wilson Pideli admitted on cross that while
the case was filed by private complainant against his brother Ernesto
Pideli, he submitted an affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City. In Paragraph 1 of the said affidavit which was read into the
records of the case, he (Wilson Pideli) alleged that "Placido Cancio was his
companion in the project at Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet which he
subcontracted for ACL Construction." When asked by the Public Prosecutor
what he meant by his statement, Wilson Pideli categorically admitted that
Placido Cancio (the private complainant) is his partner in the endeavor
along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet (TSN, November 22, 1999, p. 8).
The testimony of Wilson Pideli, instead of being corroborative, in effect,
weakened the cause of the defense. The rule is that witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. It has not been uncommon to reach a conclusion
of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v.
Gondora, 265 SCRA 408). Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies (People v. Ferrer, 255
SCRA 190).
It is unfortunate that the evidence on record does not disclose the
agreement between the private complainant and Wilson Pideli with regards
to the sharing of the capital (expenses) and profits on the project. Article
1790 of the Civil Code, however, provides: "Unless there is stipulation to
the contrary, the partners shall contribute equal shares to the capital of
the partnership." Paragraph 1 of Article 1797 of the same code further
provides: "The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with the
agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits has been
agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the same
proportion." Thus, it is safe for the court to conclude that as a partner in
the joint venture, Placido Cancio is entitled to 1/2 share in the net
proceeds, i.e. P130,000.00 + 2 = P65,000.00.
The accused insists that private complainant and his brother were not
partners in the subcontract project. According to him, he merely acted as
guarantor of his brother so the latter can withdraw construction materials
on credit from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware. As the guarantor,
he was also the one who paid his brother’s credit when his brother was
able to collect payment. Thus, denying the charges filed against him.
Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative
and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Paragua, 257 SCRA 118).
Affirmative testimony is stronger than a negative one. As between positive
and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth, on one hand, and a
bare denial, on the other hand, the former is generally held to prevail
(People v. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA).
Finding the testimony of the private complainant to be more credible than

that of the accused and his witnesses, the court rules that the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by law in favor of the accused has
been overturned and must be convicted of the crime charged.
Article 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any person

guilty of theft shall be punished by:
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,

if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000.00, but does
not exceed P22,000.00; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of the code the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be." x x x
The penalty imposed upon those guilty of theft depends on the amount
stolen. Accused carted away P65,000.00 representing private
complainant’s share in the next proceeds of the project. Accused’s brother,
Wilson Pideli, however, gave the private complainant and this was
admitted by the latter the amount of P10,500.00 when the latter kept on
pestering him at the Rose Bowl Restaurant and P5,000.00 at the initial
(first) payment. Thus, the amount of P10,500.00 and P5,000.00 should be
deducted from his net share of P65,000.00 leaving a balance of
P49,500.00 which is now the basis for the construction of the penalty.13
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner appealed to the CA. In a decision promulgated on April 30, 2003, the CA
affirmed14 the trial court disposition.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the adverse judgment. The motion was, however, denied
with finality through a Resolution dated March 9, 2004.15
Issues
In this petition, petitioner imputes to the CA triple errors, viz.:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN WAS OWNED BY
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT;
II.
THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III.
THAT THE ALLEGED TAKING BY THE PETITIONER WAS ATTENDED WITH
INTENT TO GAIN.16 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, the thrust of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the resolution
only of questions of law.17 Any peripheral factual question addressed to this Court is
beyond the ambit of this mode of review.18 Indeed, well-entrenched is the general rule
that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law.19
The petition at bench raises not only questions of law but also of facts. We are asked to
recalibrate the evidence adduced by the parties and to reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses. On this ground alone, the petition is dismissible.
We, however, deem it proper to delve into the merits of the present petition considering
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review. 20
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the crime of theft, viz.:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent. x x x
Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows:

1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.21
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final
payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their
obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to
account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their
respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due
him under the construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot be held liable for theft
of the unaccounted funds. The monies subject matter of the complaint pertain to the
partnership. As an agent of partner Wilson, intent to gain cannot be imputed against
petitioner.
The CA correctly debunked petitioner’s postulation in the following tenor:
We likewise find no merit in appellant’s contention that the money did not
belong to the private complainant as the latter was only claiming for his
share of P65,000.00; that it was owned by the partnership and was for
payment of materials obtained from the supplier. Complainant’s share in
the amount of P65,000.00 manifestly belonged to and was owned by the
private complainant.
Appellant’s argument that since the money belonged to the partnership,

hence, cannot be the object of the crime of theft as between the partners,
and that appellant as their agent acted in good faith and without intent to
gain, holds no water. Parenthetically, this argument is inconsistent with
the assertion of the defense witnesses that complainant had no
participation at all in the project, and, hence, had no right to a share in its
payment. In any case, appellant was not complainant’s partner but his
brother. As for his alleged acting in good faith and without intent of gain, it
is jurisprudentially settled that intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is made manifest by overt acts of the person. The intent to gain is
presumed from the taking of property appertaining to another.
Appellant presented a receipt dated November 18, 1997 allegedly

evidencing his payment of P75,000.000 to Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware store. Granting arguendo that appellant paid P75,000.00 to the
Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (which the trial court did not grant
credence), the same still does not exculpate him from liability. The net
income earned and disbursed to the partnership of private complainant
and Wilson Pideli was P130,000.00 and a balance of P55,000.00 still
remained despite the alleged payment, which should be divided into two
(2) or P27,000.00 for each of them. However, not a single centavo of this
amount was received by private complainant.
When appellant received the disbursement, he had only physical custody

of private complainant’s money, which was supposed to be applied to a
particular purpose, i.e. settle the account with the supplier. Appellant’s
failure to do so or to return the money to the private complainant renders
him guilty of the crime of theft. This is in line with the rulings of the
Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000
(1929) that the delivery of money to another for a particular purpose is a
parting with its physical custody only, and the failure of the accused to
apply the money to its specific purpose and converting it to his own use
gives rise to the crime of theft. The basic principles enunciated in the De
Vera case was reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Tan, 323 SCRA
30, an Anti-Carnapping case, where the High Court ruled that the unlawful
taking or deprivation may occur after the transfer of physical possession
and, in such a case, "the article (is considered as being) taken away, not
received, although at the beginning the article was, in fact, given and
received." We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
appellant had but the material/physical or de facto possession of the
money and his act of depriving private complainant not only of the
possession but also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the
money such that he (the appellant) could dispose of the money at will
constitutes the element of "taking" in the crime of theft.22 (Underscoring
supplied)
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of
theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera,23 the Court has consistently ruled that not all
misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the
Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined:
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is
taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to
his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused
has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material
or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.24
In De Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an Igorot, a bar of gold
weighing 559.7 grams for the purpose of having a silversmith examine the same, and
bank notes amounting to P200.00 to have them exchanged for silver coins. Accused
appropriated the bar of gold and bank notes. The Court ruled that the crime committed
was theft and not estafa since the delivery of the personal property did not have the
effect of transferring the juridical possession, thus such possession remained in the
owner; and the act of disposal with gainful intent and lack of owner’s consent constituted
the crime of theft.
In People v. Trinidad,25 defendant received a finger ring from the offended party for the
purpose of pledging it as security for a loan of P5.00 for the benefit of said offended
party. Instead of pledging the ring, the defendant immediately carried it to one of her
neighbors to whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated the money to her own use.
The Court, citing De Vera, similarly convicted defendant of theft.
In People v. Locson,26 this Court considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a

bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies
with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day
for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical
possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-
cited cases, beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for
personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller
occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s possession
due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be
committed.
In People v. Isaac,27 this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft and not estafa when
he did not return the jeepney to its owner since the motor vehicle was in the juridical
possession of its owner, although physically held by the driver. The Court reasoned that
the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney because the Public Service Law and
its regulations prohibit a motor vehicle operator from entering into any kind of contract
with any person if by the terms thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his
equipment under a fixed rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the
"boundary system," legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of the
owner. Thus, the accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an extension of the
owner’s.
The doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Roque v. People.28
Now, on the penalty. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes theft in the
following tenor:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years.29 (Underscoring supplied)
The record bears out that private complainant originally claimed P65,000.00 as his share
in the partnership. However, he admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on
two separate occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily, only P49,500.00 is due private
complainant.
Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and
medium prescribed in the abovequoted first paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges
from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, plus one (1) year for every
additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in this case is two (2)
years for the excess amount of P27,500.00.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could be twelve (12)
years while the minimum term would fall under the next lower penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years), to be imposed in any of its periods.
Both the trial court and the CA sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor maximum, as maximum term. We sustain it. Petitioner’s civil liability is
likewise maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007
NOMER OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 22 May 1996, petitioner Nomer Ocampo, Elmer Miranda, and Danilo Cruz were
charged with the crime of robbery with physical injuries. The Information reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1995, at around 8:15 o’clock in the evening,
in Barangay San Nicolas I, Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force and
intimidation grab one Rommel Q. Misayah by the neck and armed with a bladed weapon
attack the latter, inflicting upon him physical injuries which required and did require
medical attendance, and on the occasion thereof, accused in furtherance of their intent
to gain did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
with them the following, to wit:
a) One (1) Icom radio . . . P4,500.00

b) Two (2) T-shirts . . . 350.00
c) A pair of maong pants . . . 345.00
d) A clutch bag . . . 150.00
e) Cash . . . 29,000.00
with a total value of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY

FIVE (P34,345.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by
the said Rommel Q. Misayah, to the damage and prejudice of the owner,
in the afore-said [sic] amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Records show that there was an Amended Information 2 dated 17 July 1996 changing the
crime charged to Robbery with Violence and Intimidation against all of the accused–
Ocampo, Cruz and Miranda. Arraignment ensued on 19 July 19963 where all of the
accused pleaded not guilty. Accused Cruz jumped bail during the pendency of the trial
and was tried in absentia.4
The prosecution presented and offered the testimony of Rommel Q. Misayah and several
documentary evidence.
Misayah testified that on 14 November 1995, at around 8:10 p.m., he was walking along
San Nicolas Street on his way home when three male individuals approached him. 5 As
the place was sufficiently lighted by a nearby post, he was able to identify the trio as
accused Cruz, Ocampo and Miranda. When the three accused were already near him,
Cruz grabbed Misayah’s neck and choked him while Miranda held his shoulder and got
his shoulder bag.6 Ocampo meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife, warning him
not to fight back. Sensing that he would be harmed anyway, Misayah fought back by
pushing the hands of the accused and trying to parry their blows. He and Cruz then fell
on the ground with Cruz on top of him. When the handle of his shoulder bag snapped, all
of the accused ran away with the shoulder bag.7
By reason of the incident, Misayah sustained wounds in his hands caused by the bladed
weapon held by Ocampo when he attempted to evade Ocampo’s blows. 8 The shoulder
bag taken from Misayah contained the items enumerated in the aforequoted
Information.
At the nearby Municipal Hall, Misayah reported the incident to Police Officers de Leon,
Mon Mendoza, and Catalino Mutuc.9 Misayah was brought to Balitucan Emergency
Hospital for treatment and thereafter proceeded to the precinct. After further
investigation, he then executed a statement before Sr/Insp. Catalino Mutuc and SPO4 de
Leon.10
In their defense, accused Ocampo, Miranda, and another witness, Oliver Santos, gave
their version of what happened that night.
Miranda testified that he was with Ocampo in the afternoon of 14 November 1995 to
accompany the latter to borrow a wheelbarrow from a certain Lut Ocampo. 11 Miranda
and Ocampo played chess until 6:00 in the evening at Lut Ocampo’s place while waiting
for him to arrive. As they were leaving that place, they met Cruz. Instead of proceeding
home, Ocampo invited Miranda for a drink at an establishment identified as "Irma’s" and
Cruz went along with them. That was already about 7:30 in the evening. While on their
way to
Irma’s, Cruz and Misayah "bumped each other and had an altercation."12 Then Miranda
informed his companions that he would go ahead. Miranda was about one yard away
from Cruz and Misayah when he saw Cruz strangle Misayah. Claiming that he did not
want to get into trouble, he did not pacify Cruz and Misayah. He hurriedly left and
proceeded to Sally Feliciano’s house and stayed there until 11:00 in the evening. As he
was in a hurry to leave the incident where the altercation happened, he did not notice
what happened to Ocampo.13
Ocampo, on his behalf, testified that he knew Misayah who has a drug store in
Magalang, Pampanga. At about 8:00 p.m. of 14 November 1995, he was walking with
Miranda and Cruz on their way to Vannie’s Restaurant when Cruz crossed the street and
approached Misayah.14 Ocampo and Miranda continued walking when Ocampo saw Cruz
choke Misayah and then have an exchange of fist blows. Ocampo and Miranda did not
assist Cruz as it was only a brief fist fight. Ocampo saw Cruz run away while he and
Miranda were left behind. Ocampo and Miranda saw Misayah run towards the Municipal
Hall and the two proceeded to their respective homes.15
Defense witness Oliver Santos who knew the three accused testified that on the evening
of 14 November 1995, he was at Vannie’s videoke having a drinking spree with his
friends. At 9:00 p.m., he asked leave from his friends to go ahead. While waiting for a
motorcycle ride outside of Vannie’s videoke, he saw Cruz and Misayah, whom he knew
as the owner of a drug store, acting as if they were strangling each other. The fight took
about a minute. He did not bother to do anything because he was afraid and also
because fighting was a common incident in that area.16 Santos was somewhat inebriated
when he witnessed the incident as he had consumed one (1) pitcher of draft beer.
However, he still recognized the faces of Misayah and Cruz. On that occasion, he also
saw Ocampo and Miranda walking towards the town proper.17
All three accused were convicted by the trial court in a decision18 dated 31 May 2000,
which held:
WHEREFORE, finding the three (3) accused, Danilo Cruz, Nomer Ocampo and Elmer
Miranda @ Mitoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Physical
Injuries defined and penalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, with the
presence of an aggravating circumstance of conspiracy, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer each an imprisonment in an indeterminate penalty of from [sic] eight (8) years to
twenty one (21) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Rommel Q. Misayah the amount of
P34,345.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Ocampo and Miranda appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals. However, in its
decision19 dated 10 February 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
trial court’s decision, stating thus:
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence against persons is penalized under
par. 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Considering the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court), which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, which is
prision mayor medium or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall
be the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional medium, in any of its periods, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, appellants should have been meted the
indeterminate penalty of from [sic] 4 years and two months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from [sic] four (4) years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellants,
SO ORDERED.20
Miranda did not challenge the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals. On
the other hand, Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21 which was denied through a
Resolution dated 20 May 2004.22 Ocampo alone then filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.23
Ocampo argues that the appellate court erred in finding him criminally liable because: (i)
Misayah’s testimony was uncorroborated; (ii) it was unbelievable that Misayah would
just walk on a slightly lighted street when he is carrying a considerable amount of cash
and other items; (iii) there was no clear record that the prosecution presented any of the
police officers who apprehended and investigated petitioner; (iv) the court failed to give
credence to the testimony of Santos simply because he was tipsy; (v) although Misayah
claimed that he had been grabbed by the neck, his medical certificate does not show any
injury on the neck or on the arm to confirm if he was indeed held by Miranda on that
part of his body; (vi) the examining doctor was not presented to confirm the authenticity
of the issued medical certificate and to be cross-examined thereon; and (vii) it is very
unlikely that Misayah’s shoulder bag could accommodate all the items he claimed to
have been contained therein. In sum, petitioner reiterates that the prosecution failed to
prove that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for which he is being
charged.
Before proceeding to the merits of this case, certain observations from the trial and
appellate courts’ decisions have to be clarified.
The initial information filed by the prosecution in this case designated the offense
charged as Robbery with Physical Injuries.24 This was later amended to Robbery with
Violence and Intimidation.25 Yet, the trial court’s decision convicted the accused of
Robbery with Physical Injuries under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code. The
appellate court, on the other hand, affirmed the conviction under Article 294 (5) but
classified the crime as robbery with violence against persons.
The variance in the assigned nomenclatures may give rise to the false impression that
robbery with physical injuries under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code is distinct
from robbery with intimidation as well as robbery with violence against persons. The title
or heading of Article 294 reads "Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons." Said heading is clearly the general nomenclature given to all five (5) types of
robbery enumerated
thereunder.26 Paragraphs 2 to 5 cover robbery with physical injuries.27 Paragraph 5, in

particular, defines what is known as simple robbery. Simple robbery involves only slight
or less serious physical injuries.28 For conviction under this paragraph, the injury inflicted
should not fall within the categories provided for in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294.
Thus, over and above the dichotomy of the terms employed, it is certain and beyond
dispute that the three accused were tried for the crime under Article 294 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Now, to the merits.
The core of Ocampo’s arguments in this instant petition is that the findings of the
appellate court do not conform to the evidence on record. It should be emphasized that
factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari before the Court as
this Court is limited to reviewing only questions of law.29 The findings of fact of the trial
court are binding upon this Court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 30 Exceptions to
this rule are when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings
and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. 31
Absent any ground to apply the exception to this instant case, there is no reason,
therefore, to disturb the findings of the lower courts.
Petitioner claims it was erroneous for the appellate court to give credence to Misayah’s
uncorroborated evidence because it failed to establish where his money and other
valuables came from and his injuries did not conform to the nature of the attack made
on him as well.
Based on the records, we cannot see how and why the questions raised by petitioner can
cast doubt on the credibility of the testimony of Misayah. As Misayah owns a drug store,
it is not unlikely that Misayah would have P29,000.00 cash in his possession as he
returned home from a day’s work. With respect to the injuries suffered by Misayah, he
stated in his cross examination that he tried to parry the blows made by all the accused
by the use of his hands.32 Thus, it is believable that his hands would bear the brunt of
the blows. Further, Miranda himself admitted during his direct examination that he
"personally saw" Cruz strangle Misayah.33
Moreover, we give weight to the trial court’s observation that Misayah testified "in a
straightforward manner" and positively identified not only Cruz as the one who choked
him but also the other
two (2) accused.34 The testimony of a sole witness, though uncorroborated, is sufficient
for conviction if it is free from any sign of impropriety or falsehood.35 The testimony of a
lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a
conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and
had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner.36 Indeed,
the testimony of a single witness is sufficient and needs no corroboration, save only in
offenses where the law expressly prescribes a minimum number of witnesses. 37
On the lower court’s disregard of defense witness Santos’s testimony, we have

consistently held that where the credibility of witnesses is an issue, the appellate court
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court unless some facts and
circumstances may have been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of the
case.38 The Court accords deference to the trial court’s appraisal on a witness’s
credibility, or lack thereof, because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct
and demeanor of the witness while testifying.39 Given that the observation of the trial
court with respect to Santos is supported by evidence, there is no ground to discredit the
trial and appellate courts’ assessment of Santos’s testimony.
Petitioner likewise alleges that Misayah’s testimony was filled with inconsistencies such
as his allegation that he immediately executed an affidavit after the incident when in fact
his affidavit was dated 20 November 1995 or six days after the incident. However, it is
not beyond reason if a victim like Misayah would immediately report the incident but
subsequently make a sworn statement days after the incident especially when the
victim, as did Misayah, suffered injuries requiring medical attention. Moreover, the RTC
records also show that Misayah executed a separate sworn statement before SPO1
Mutuc, investigator of Magalang Police Station, on 16 November 1995 40 and the

prosecution submitted another affidavit by Misayah taken before SPO2 Rivera 41 in its
formal offer of evidence. It is not unlikely, therefore, that several affidavits were in fact
executed by Misayah in the days immediately following the incident.
Even as petitioner challenges the evidence of the prosecution, he downplays the

inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense. Said inconsistencies,
particularly on the witnesses’ accounts of what proceeded after the incident, are material
and have rendered their testimonies implausible. It is hard to believe that there was a
mere lapse of memory of either Miranda or Ocampo on whether they were indeed left
behind together or whether one of them fled and the other was left behind even before
the departure of Cruz.42 Certainly, one cannot fail to observe or at least recall later who
was with whom considering the gravity of the incident and the fact that only three of
them were together that evening.
More fundamentally, the defense’s version of the incident is contrary to human

experience and behavior. As correctly pointed out by the trial court:
It is incredible that accused Nomer Ocampo and Elmer Mirand[a] have not done anything
when their companion Danilo Cruz was in a fight with complainant. The least they could
do was to pacify the two protagonists yet, they did not do this and
they proceeded to go to their respective way home as if nothing has happened. If indeed
the incident happened so fast and that the accused Danilo Cruz and complainant Rommel
Misayah separated immediately after that "sudden strangling" of each other" [sic], the
least that Ocampo and Miranda could do [sic] was to wait and ask Cruz what happened.
Yet, again, they did not do this. x x x x43
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself, such that the common experience and observation of
mankind can show it as probable under the circumstances.44 And, the best test of the
credibility of a testimony is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and
common experience of man.45 Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes
incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.46
On the conspiracy aspect, it is worthy of note that while the Court of Appeals in the body
of its decision sustained the existence of conspiracy as held by the lower court 47 yet in
the penultimate paragraph of the decision as well as in the dispositive portion, it ruled
out the presence of conspiracy. Thus:
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence against persons is penalized under
par. 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Considering the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court),48 which is not offset by any
mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, which is prision
mayor medium or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be the penalty
next lower in degree which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional
medium, in any of its periods, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months. Thus, appellant should have been meted the indeterminate penalty
of from 4 years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two months of prision correccional,
as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.49
It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of the decision prevails over the
opinion, the former being the final order while the opinion is an informal expression of
the views of the court, thus forming no part of the judgment.50 Following this rule, the
appellate court thus found the presence of abuse of superior strength as an aggravating
circumstance but not conspiracy.
The appellate court is correct in ruling out conspiracy. The existence of conspiracy
cannot be presumed. The elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.51 Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself.52 Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 53 It may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime. All taken together, however, the evidence therefor must be reasonably strong
enough to show a community of criminal design.54
In the case at bar, there is no convincing evidence that all of the accused had resolved
to rob Misayah prior to the actual robbery. What is evident is that the robbery that
transpired was a spur of the moment decision among the three accused. For one,
Miranda and Ocampo were consistent in their statement that they were on their way to
have a drink at the common time of the incident. For another, they saw Misayah by
chance. Still for another, there was no evidence that all of the accused knew beforehand
that Misayah would be passing by the street where the robbery occurred that fateful
evening. Neither was it shown that the street was part of Misayah’s regular route on his
way home.
According to Misayah in his testimony, Cruz grabbed his neck and choked him while
Miranda held his shoulder.1avvphi1 Ocampo meanwhile was in the middle, holding a
knife and warning him not to fight back. While the evidence did not prove the existence
of conspiracy, it indelibly established that the accused took advantage of their superior
strength.55
Article 294, paragraph (5) of the Revised Penal Code fixes the penalty for
simple robberyat prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, the range of which is from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day to ten (10) years.56 Considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period while the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional medium in any of its periods, the range of which is four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.57
We note that the appellate court’s decision did not order the accused to indemnify
Misayah the amount of P34,345.00. The records do not show that this amount had
already been paid pursuant to the Decision of the trial court dated 31 May 2000. Thus,
we modify the appellate court’s decision in this respect.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 10 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Accused Ocampo is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of
prision mayor as maximum. Petitioner Ocampo together with his other co-accused
Miranda and Cruz are ordered to indemnify Rommel Q. Misayah the amount of
P34,345.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO REGALA y
ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him
of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by 2nd Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows: Sppedsc
"That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at

Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused confederating
together and helping one another, with intent to gain, violence and
intimidation upon persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when
inside, hogtied said Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala
(sic), take, steal, rob and carry away cash amount of P3,000.00 and two
(2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner
Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency;
and in pursuance of the commission of the crime of robbery against the
will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two
times sexually abused and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the
bed and in the kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was
identified at a police line-up by Nerissa and her grandmother. Calrsc
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, who personally examined the rape victim; Nerissa Tagala,
the rape victim, 17 years old, a third year high school student; and her grandmother,
Consuelo Arevalo, who was her companion when the robbery with rape transpired at
Consuelos house.
The prosecutions version is stated in Appellees Brief as follows: Sccalr
"On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay
Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her
grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant Armando
Regala and his two other companions entered the formers house. (pp. 6-7,
TSN, August 26, 1996).
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by
removing the pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room
of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one
after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his

companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala
in bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, appellant
and his two companions counted the money which they took from the
"aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces
of ring valued at P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13,
1
TSN, August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health
Clinic of Aroroy, Masbate for medical examination. In the Medical Report
presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it was
shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen at 4:00 oclock and
7:00 oclock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault
upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) 2
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he
was staying in the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate.
Ramilo was the manager in the gold panning business where accused-appellant was
employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and corroborated his defense and stated that
accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay
Bangon. Calrspped
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification
of the accused. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused

Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the victim Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00,
the cash and value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa
Tagala the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs."3
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that: Scedp
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE IDENTITY OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence in

identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. He claims that the
complaining witness could not have positively identified him as there was no electricity
nor any light in the place of the incident which took place at 9:00 oclock in the evening.
Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify accused-appellant only after he was pinpointed by
Nerissa, and made contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-
appellant removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later stated that accused-
appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer, Dr.
Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness either voluntarily submitted to a
sexual act or was forced into one. Edpsc
The appellee insists that appellants lame defense of alibi cannot stand against the
4
positive identification made by the victim, and avers that the victim, a 16 year old barrio
lass at the time the rape was committed, was motivated by a sincere desire to seek and
obtain justice. The Solicitor General also recommends an additional award of
compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala. Edp
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the

perpetrator of the crime. Misedp
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her
grandmother in the latters house when the accused-appellant Regala, together with the
unidentified companions entered the house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long,
at her grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took off her
panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual
intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the
floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could not shout
because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two companions of the
accused-appellant entered the room as she was being raped. Two rings valued at about
P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko" and the other "Citizen") and money was
taken by the accused-appellant and his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw
accused-appellant counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was
brought to the kitchen, still hogtied, and raped again.5 On cross-examination, Nerissa
stated that although there was no electricity, and the light in the house was already off,
she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time Regala was counting the
money, one of his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money" and
there was "some reflection" on the face of Regala6 She remembered the face of Regala
because of an earring on his left ear7 which he was wearing when presented at the police
line-up.8
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter.

Armando Regala entered the house with two companions, hogtied her and Nerissa, and
were asking for money. After having sexual intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took
P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from her aparador, and got a stainless Seiko
wristwatch and two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala
because of his earring on his left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the
police station. She was not able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged
with a piece of cloth by Regala.9 On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that
she was able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off the mask he
was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and his flat top hair cut. 10
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was
sufficient to clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala as the person who, with two
companions, committed the crime of robbery accompanied by rape on the night of
September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala positively identified Armando Regala because at the
time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of the accused
beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of
10
Regala. Although the three intruders were wearing masks when they entered the house,
they removed their masks later.11
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight may, in
proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of
witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.12
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory

replies of Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before" 13 or
"after"14 she and Nerissa were hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify
the accused-appellant. The contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract
from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a
flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there was a
reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo remembered the earring on
his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police
station. Misoedp
Dr. Conchita Ulandays testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant
that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances of Regala. The admission of
Dr. Ulanday that her findings point to the fact that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was
forced into sexual act" does not prove that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual
act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was suggested evidence of penetration as shown by
the two lacerations at 4 oclock and at 7 oclock which were fresh wounds. That the act
was involuntary was clearly established by the fact that Nerissa was hogtied when she
was sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a 16-year old
barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-
motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. And as repeatedly
pronounced by this Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter
subject herself to a public trial or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and
deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.15
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in
force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph
1 thereof: Edpmis
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson."
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are
cases16 holding that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will
not increase the penalty. In People vs. Martinez,17 accused Martinez and two (2) other
unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged with the special complex
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the
penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely,
nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two
(2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery with
rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts,
with all acts or rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime." Jjsc
There are likewise cases18 which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Candelario19 where three (3)
of the four (4) armed men who robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of
them", this Court, citing People vs. Obtinalia,20 ruled that "(T)he characterization of the
offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were
several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account
in raising the penalty to death." Scjj
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s
should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the
enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where
there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances. Sjcj
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the
occasion of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the
standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same
level as robbery with multiple rapes.21 However,the remedy lies with the legislature. A
penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender 22 and no person should be
brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. 23
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant

should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by
the trial court is proper. Supreme
As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that compensatory damages should be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00.
Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an award of civil indemnity exdelicto of P50,000.00, which is
given in favor of the offended party in rape.24 Also a conviction for rape carries with it
the award of moral damages to the victim since it is recognized that the victims injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the ordinary crime of rape to warrant per
se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.25
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
civil indemnity. Court
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND
ISABELITA ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
VITUG, J.:
Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an information
therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where
the property, unlawfully taken is found to have later been acquired?
The above query is the sole issue in this Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
People of the Philippines, praying for the reversal, annulment and setting aside of the
Order of 28 February 1986 1 of the respondent Judge, who has ruled in the negative, as
well as his Order, dated 21 March 1986, 2 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
petitioner prays that the respondent Judge be directed to assume jurisdiction over, and
to proceed with the trial of, the criminal case.
On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L.
Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of
pesos were taken. An information, dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the
perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed thereat
asCriminal Case No. G.R. No. 42078. 3
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential

Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433,
against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara,
from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal. 4
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by the accused [now private
respondents], issued the now questioned order of 28 February 1986, viz:
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash, filed by the accused thru

counsel, praying that the information filed against both accused be
quashed, on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the
offense charged. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per
police investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this
reason, Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent
crime, separate and distinct from that of Robbery. The accused
claims, likewise, that jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court
within which territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.
The Prosecution filed an opposition thereto, alleging among others,

that there is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of a case
of fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the principal
offense of robbery was committed. The prosecution claims further,
that the consideration in the enactment of PD 1612 was to impose
a heavier penalty on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes
robbery or theft.
On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact that in all
criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the Municipality or Province wherein the offense was
committed, or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took
place. 5
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal,

outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and considering that
all criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the
Municipality or Province where the offense took place, this Court,
necessarily, does not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED, without

prejudice to the filing of the corresponding action against the
accused in the Court having proper jurisdiction.
The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the court's order of 21
March 1986.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is
the commission of robbery, in this case committed in Quezon City, the information
therefor filed in said City accords with the provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, and the refusal of the Court a quo to assume and exercise
jurisdiction thereover constitutes a serious error of law and a grave abuse of discretion.
He theorizes that fencing is a "continuing offense." He explains that the Anti-Fencing Law
has been enacted for the purpose of imposing a heavier penalty on persons who profit
from the effects of the crime of robbery or theft, no longer merely as accessories under
Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, but as equally guilty with the
perpetrators of the robbery or theft itself.
In People vs. Ledesma, 6 we said:
. . . A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series

ofacts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor,
there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse
acts each of which, although of a delictual character merely
constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such
concurrence of delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." For it to
exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during
a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or
violated; unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two
or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. 7
"Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose
of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. 8
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on
fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery
or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in
order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been
previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or
theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime
of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should
thereby be triable likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted. 9
We are not unaware of a number of instances 10 when the Court would allow a change of
venue in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there
are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had
jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice." 11 Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such
compelling circumstances, nor are we prepared to state that the lower court gravely
abused its discretion in its questioned orders.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the
orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.’’

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias"Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO,
alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the
felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged
in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the
trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with
kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away
one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose
of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code. 1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted
in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with
extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with
this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused

ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance
with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion
perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally
the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages. 3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-
statement of facts in the People's brief 5which adopted the established findings of the
court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the
proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version
proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on

January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta

Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a
driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused

Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's
husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro
that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take
his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so

she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on
(sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of
Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front
seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He
poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced,
"ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she
has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let
her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-
14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma.
Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her
gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car
went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched
her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic)
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There
Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check
for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand.
Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he

changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma.
Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to
the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles
ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van.
Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the
car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to

CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying
to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati.
(tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13) 6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car
down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter
ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8Much later, when he took the stand at the trial
of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire
need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories
have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court
cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for
ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances
where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with
regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific
intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to
determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was
committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or
whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and
murder would constitute separate offenses. 10Also, where injuries were inflicted on a
person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the
motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be
direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant,
other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we
were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well
and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam,
(sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for
this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty,
13
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as
United States vs. Ancheta, 14and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15it has been held
that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them,
holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional
testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the

bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you

already when the checks was (sic) being handed to
you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the

checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why

is it that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto.
Domingo, after all you already received the money
and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when

she signed the checks we will take her to her house
at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house
at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given you
the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic)

came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or
some other place along the way we might be
apprehended by the police. So when we reached
Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already
stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the

nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17It can hardly be assumed that when complainant
readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under
the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in
the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the
victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by
appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in
Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same
constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree
No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from
the allegation in the information that the victim was carried away
and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the
robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North
Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they
intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with
her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more
cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes
committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion
perpetua. 18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause
in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19Such opinion and complementary submission consequently
necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of
Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on
which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been
made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a
modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that
the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term
in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds
sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our
discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary
robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the American
occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since
the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation

of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the
formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to
constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the
band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band
of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the
band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22(Emphasis
supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. 23The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could
not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same,
there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the
circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses
thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that

lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace,
order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway

robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be

discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person
chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which
single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress
of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to
the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, " such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of
the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the
offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the
liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there
be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the
Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains
under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under
the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective
victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as
the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the
same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that
matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime
of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree
just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed
regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the
offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it
would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property
committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of
statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to
the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into
its meaning, 26and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the
milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched
to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal
law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend
that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in
the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor
vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the
accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the
time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential
Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972? 27And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the
unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we
apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in
the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was
casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of
the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines
"highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway
robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined
in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of
their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29shall be appreciated
against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against
appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate,
the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom,
since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter
offense with which they are charged. 30For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through
intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the
case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information
where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against
appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly
but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with
intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge
of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the
elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another
one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique
Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article
295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended
party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138470 April 1, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ARTEMIO GARCIA y CRUZ, JR. and REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, accused.
REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y
Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On June 3, 1998, Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime
of Carnapping with Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. The Information
against them reads:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1996, in the municipality of

San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and helping with each other, with intent of gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of violence and
intimidation, forcibly take from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio;
That during the commission of the offense, or by reason thereof, the said
accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Wilfredo Elis in different
parts of his body causing mortal wounds which directly resulted in his
death.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Thereafter,
the case was tried on the merits.
It appears from the record that on December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab
operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was approached by Garcia and Bernabe because
they wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol
region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.
Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a brand new
Toyota Tamaraw FX for P475,500.00.3 Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for
two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the other hand, rented
the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 driver’s fee. They
agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol.4
In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked
up Ignacio’s Tamaraw FX at his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same
back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol. 5
Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about
the vehicle he had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay
Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis’ wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and
asked where her husband was.6
In the afternoon of December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of the Moncada,
Tarlac Police notified the Chief of Police that two suspicious looking persons were seen
selling a vehicle in Anao, Tarlac at the grossly inadequate price of P50,000.00. The Chief
of Police immediately formed a team,7 but when they reached Anao, Tarlac, they found
out that the two accused had already left for Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. The team
thereafter coordinated with the Nueva Ecija Police. The two accused were seen in front of
a store in Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they failed to produce
documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police
Station for investigation.8
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the
Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio. In the early morning of December 24,
1996, a joint team of police officers composed of members of the Moncada and Marilao
Police, together with the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, were accompanied
by Cortez to Moncada, Tarlac, where the latter positively identified Ignacio’s Tamaraw
FX.
Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They admitted to him that they
stabbed Elis and dumped him along the highway near the "sabana" in San Rafael,
Bulacan. They claimed that they were compelled to eliminate Elis when he refused to join
their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. Garcia brought the policemen, together with Cortez
and the Barangay Captain, to San Rafael, Bulacan where he pointed to the place where
they killed Elis. However, the police were unable to find Elis’ body. After returning to
Moncada, Cortez immediately inspected the interior of the vehicle and found bloodstains
on the side and back of the driver’s seat. He also found several personal items belonging
to Elis, such as his clothes and driver’s license,9 as well as Garcia’s bag which contained
bonnets, tear gas, the warranty card and the car registration papers.10
On December 29, 1996, the Moncada police received information that a male cadaver
was found in San Rafael, Bulacan, submerged in mud ten meters away from where they
searched earlier. The cadaver was identified as that of Wilfredo Elis by his wife, Nancy. 11
Dr. Benito Caballero, Municipal Health Officer and Medico-Legal Officer of the province of
Bulacan, who performed the autopsy, found four stab wounds in the posterior, one stab
wound in the lateral and one on the left side of the thorax. He opined that the wounds
which penetrated the abdomen and lungs were fatal.12
In their defense, Garcia and Bernabe alleged that they agreed to rent the subject vehicle
for a period of five days from December 18, 1996; that Garcia and Elis had a fight
because the latter allegedly did not want to go with them to Nueva Ecija; that Elis, while
driving the Tamaraw FX, bumped a passenger jeepney along Baliuag Highway; that they
left Elis along the Baliuag Highway at 3:30 a.m. so he can inform Cortez that they were
already in Bulacan and were en route to Nueva Ecija to have the dented portion of the
vehicle fixed.13
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court finds and so holds that
the prosecution has been able to establish the accused’s criminal
culpability. In view thereof, Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado
Bernabe y Orbe are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Carnapping with Homicide in violation of Republic
Act No. 6539 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Accordingly, absent
any circumstances that will aggravate the commission thereof, both of
them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, both accused are hereby ordered jointly and severally to
indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo Elis, the sum of P50,000.00; to pay them
the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages; P15,290.00 for actual/
compensatory damages; and P250,000.00 for loss of earnings.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
Both accused appealed from the decision of the trial court. On March 31, 2000, accused
Garcia filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,15 which was granted in a Resolution
dated September 27, 2000.
Appellant Bernabe raises the following assignment of errors:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
CARNAPPING AS DEFINED IN REPUBLIC ACT 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS
AMENDED ARE PRESENT AND DULY PROVEN.
II
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT

BERNABE WAS PART OF AN ALLEGED CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE

ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."16 More specifically, the elements
of the crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.17
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of
carnapping were proved in this case.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.18
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of
the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased
for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said
possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to
the Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two
separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join
their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been freely and voluntarily given
to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant.19 Thus, the duration
of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite period as contended by the
defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the prosecution, has no bearing on the
culpability of the appellant. It does not matter whether the unlawful taking occurred
within the period of the lease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his
co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on which the crime and the nature
thereof is to be determined. To reiterate, the prosecution was able to establish that
appellant and his co-accused stabbed the victim to death because he refused to join
them in their plan to appropriate the vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of
unlawful taking through violence, rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted the crime
of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The
settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or
violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property
be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong
to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices.
So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's
will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property
belonging to another is imputable to the offender. 20
Furthermore, at the time of their apprehension, appellant Bernabe and Garcia were
unable to give a plausible explanation why they still had the Tamaraw FX in their
possession. Appellant Bernabe claims that he and his co-accused went to Nampicuan,
Nueva Ecija to have the dent on the vehicle repaired. Garcia, on the other hand, testified
that there was no such damage. A person in possession of a stolen article is presumed
guilty of having illegally and unlawfully taken the same unless he can satisfactorily
explain his possession of the thing.21
Appellant contends that he did not conspire with his co-accused to commit the crime of
carnapping.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime,22 which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments.23 In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by
the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. 24
In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and Bernabe, through Joselito
Cortez, hired the brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio for their
trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m. of December 18, 1996, they left for Bicol on board the
Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of
Moncada, Tarlac reported to the Chief of Police that two suspiciously looking persons,
who turned out to be Garcia and Bernabe were offering to sell a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; and that the two were finally
apprehended with the subject vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the
Tarlac and Nueva Ecija Police.
While there may be no direct evidence of the commission of the crime, the foregoing
constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant Garcia’s and Bernabe’s
conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction
were met, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.25 The circumstances indeed
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Bernabe
and Garcia were the perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon
the court.26
The records show that Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they
were responsible for taking the vehicle and killing the victim, Elis. On December 24,
1996, Cortez went to the Moncada Municipal Jail and talked to them while they were
detained. Both admitted to him that they forcibly took the said vehicle from Elis, stabbed
him and thereafter dumped him at San Rafael, Bulacan.27 Subsequently, on December
26, 1996, Cortez and Ignacio went to Moncada and confronted the two in their cells.
Garcia admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they stole the vehicle because they were in
dire need of money, while Bernabe kept quiet.28
Appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his
admission to Cortez and Ignacio on the grounds that (a) he did not make such
admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c)
assuming he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under
duress and intimidation.29
In People v. Andan,30 it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial

investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, and not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellant’s voluntary admission to Cortez that he and
his co-accused conspired in killing the deceased when the latter opposed their plan to
sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence against him.
Anent Garcia’s extrajudicial confession implicating appellant in the commission of the

offense, it appears that the latter did not oppose or affirm Garcia’s statement. Neither
did he make an attempt to refute the same insofar as his participation in the commission
of the crime was concerned. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
"he cannot invoke his silence during this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak
and failing to do so, his silence weighs heavily on him. Thus, it was not accused-
appellant’s Garcia’s admission that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own
silence when it was ‘such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true’." 31
Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in
the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing
when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
We likewise find no merit in the allegation that duress was employed on appellant.
Suffice it to state that such bare allegation of force and duress is not enough to prove
that he was indeed tortured to admit complicity in the offense charged.
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of RA 6539, as amended by Section

20 of RA 7659, to wit:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.32 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant
Bernabe and his co-accused, Garcia.
The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim should be
affirmed. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled
to such amount as indemnity for the death, without need of any evidence of proof of
damages.33 This is in addition to the actual damages of P15,290.50 which was duly
substantiated by proof.34 We, however, reduce the award of moral damages to
P50,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence.35
Lastly, we find the court a quo’s award of P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity to be
without basis. Nancy testified that her husband Wilfredo was earning P600.00 a day prior
to his death,36 however, she failed to produce evidence to substantiate her claim. As held
in the case of People v. Panabang,37 a self-serving statement is not enough; the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity must be duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 21, finding appellant Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of Carnapping with
Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him
to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P15,290.00 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages
in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. The award of P250,000.00 for loss of earnings is
DELETED for lack of factual basis.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990
LAURO SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioner,
CRUZ, J.:
The factual findings of the lower courts are as a matter of policy not disturbed by this
Court in the absence of any of the recognized exceptions that will justify reversal. As
none of these exceptions appears in the case at bar, the petitioner's conviction, based on
such findings, must be affirmed.
The evidence of the prosecution is, in the view of the Court, conclusive of the petitioner's
guilt.
Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion Peñalosa, entrusted

her car, a 1976 Ford Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of the
carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week later, Santos persuaded her to have
her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within a period of two months. 1
After two months, Peñalosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at MacArthur Highway,
Malabon, to retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless she paid him
P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the money then, she left the shop to get the
needed payment. Upon her return, she could not find Santos although she waited five
hours for him. She went back to the shop several times thereafter but to no avail. 2
Peñalosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon. Unable to
recover her car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against Santos with the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed when the
petitioner convinced the military authorities that the complainant had sold the vehicle to
him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor.
3
This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on Peñalosa's complaint was filed against
Santos in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October 26,1982. After trial, the
accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced to "an indeterminate penalty of from
four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months as
maximum, both of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P38,000.00 which is the value of the car without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and with costs." 4
On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but Santos was held guilty of qualified theft and
not estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent court 5 read:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED: the

offense committed by the appellant is qualified theft and he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN
(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prisionmayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify Encarnacion Peñalosa the
sum of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and, to pay the costs.
In his defense, the petitioner now quibbles about the supposed inconsistences of the
complaining witness that he says make her testimony questionable. Our ruling is that
such inconsistencies are minor lapses and do not impair Peñalosa's credibility as a whole.
Santos also wonders why, if it is true that she had asked him to repair and repaint her
car, she had not even made an advance payment. One reason could be that he himself
did not ask for such advance, considering that they were members of the same bowling
team. There is even the suggestion that he was smitten with her although she says she
rejected his suit. 6
The petitioner's main reliance, though, is on the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase
which he submitted at the trial to prove that Peñalosa had sold the car to him and now
had no claim to it.
The lower courts were correct in rejecting this shoddy evidence. It is a wonder that it
was even considered at all when the case filed in Camp Crame was dismissed.
A cursory look at this alleged document will show that it is spurious. There are
alterations and deletions that are not even initialed to authenticate the changes. Two
entire paragraphs are cancelled. The name and address of the supposed original vendee
are crossed out and those of the petitioner are written in place of the deletions.
Moreover, the so-called deed is not notarized.
It would have been so easy to re-type the one-page document to express clearly and
indubitably the intent of the parties and then have it properly acknowledged. But this
was not done. The petitioner insists that the document was originally intended to be
concluded between Peñalosa and Domingo Corsiga but was hastily changed to make
Santos the buyer and mortgagee. 7 Surely a vendee would not be so rash as to depend
for his title to the thing purchased on such a shabby and dubious deed of sale.
The petitioner also makes much of the fact that Peñalosa did not even sign a job order or
get a receipt when she delivered her car to him for repairs. In fact, she did not even
check where his repair shop was. He forgets that he was no less trusting either. He
himself does not explain why the amount of P6,000.00 he allegedly gave for the car was
not acknowledged by Peñalosa in the Deed of Sale or in a separate instrument. There
was no proof at all of such payment.
Given these circumstances, we find it easier to believe that Peñalosa had signed the
original document with the intention of selling her car to Domingo Corsiga, the party first
named therein, but later changed her mind. She left the unused document in her car and
Santos, chancing upon it when the vehicle was delivered to him, decided to modify it to
suit his purposes.
Besides, as the respondent court correctly observed, why would Santos still demand
from Peñalosa the cost of the repairs on the car if he claims he had already bought it
from her? And there is also the glaring fact that Santos was unable to register the car in
his name despite the lapse of all of two years after his alleged purchase of the vehicle.
In his supplemental memorandum, the petitioner says he could not register the car
because it had merely been mortgaged to him and he had to wait until the expiration of
the period of repurchase. 8 Yet, during his cross-examination on March 5, 1984, Santos
repeatedly declared that the car belonged to him and that the right of repurchase
expired after two months from November or December 1980. He also said that rather
than register it, he could cannibalize the car and sell the spare parts separately at
greater profit. 9
The Court also notes that, according to Santos, he accompanied Peñalosa to redeem her
car from Corsiga and that he himself gave her the money for such redemption in
Corsiga's presence. 10 Having made that allegation, it was for the petitioner himself to
present Corsiga as his witness to corroborate that statement. Santos did not, and so
failed to prove what was, to begin with, an improbable defense. Ei incumbit probatio ui
dicit.
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was
theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the
description thereof as alleged in the information. 11 And as described therein, the offense
imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things. 12
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in
his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between the two crimes is
that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and
converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused
has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical
(natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same
constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa." 13
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the
vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, 14 we held that the
subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to him supplied
the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared:
... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan,

agrees to sell B a certain quantity of rice at a certain price per
picul. A ships several sacks of the grain which B receives in his
warehouse. If, prior to the measuring required before the payment
of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the
different sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime
of theft. Now, it may be asked: Did not B receive the sacks of rice
shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A voluntarily deliver the sacks of
rice which he owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was the taking of
the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's consent?- No.
This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is

untenable, according to which, when the thing is received and then
appropriated or converted to one's own use without the consent of
the owner, the crime committed is not that of theft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of qualified theft
because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not alleged in the
information as a qualifying circumstance. 15 Santos would have had reason to argue that
he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may
be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial. 16 Hence the imposable
penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying circumstances, should be in the
maximum degree.
According to the Solicitor General:
The value of the car is P38,000.00. Under Article 309 of the

Revised Penal Code, if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty should be the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty plus one year for each additional P10,000.00.
Thus the imposable penalty is the maximum of prision mayor with
a range of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12)
YEARS plus an additional ONE (1) YEAR for every P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00, raising the maximum penalty into Reclusion
Temporal in the minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being one

aggravating and no mitigating circumstance the imposable penalty
recommended is from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS of reclusion temporal.
We approve the above observations and sentence the petitioner accordingly,
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as herein modified. The petitioner is

declared guilty of theft and sentenced to from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal. He is also ordered to restore the car
in question to the private respondent, or if this is no longer possible, to pay her the
value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00,
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 134120 January 17, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LEA SAGAN JULIANO, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This case was certified to us for review by the Court of Appeals after finding appellant
Lea Sagan Juliano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. 2053, and that the proper penalty
to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.
Appellant was charged of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks
Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. 2051 and 2052, and Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2
(d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2053. The pertinent Information for
Estafa reads as follows:
Criminal Case No. 2053
That on or about July 27, 1991, at Kalawag II, Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan
Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, [purchase] one hundred ninety (190) Bags of Rice
from JCT Agro-Development Corporation and in payment thereof, the said accused [did]
make or draw and issue in favor of the said Corporation Check No. 142254 post-dated
July 30, 1991 for a value of EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS
(P89,800.00), Philippine Currency, drawn against the Philippine Commercial
International Bank, Isulan Branch, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, knowing at the time of issue
that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check and
when presented for encashment, the same was dishonored by the said bank for reason
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds", and on August 20, 1991, the said accused again
issued PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and 145454 in the amounts of P50,000.00 and
P39,800.00, respectively, in replacement of PCIB Check No. 142254 which was earlier
dishonored, and when the said replacement checks were presented for encashment, the
same were again dishonored by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage
and prejudice of JCT Agro-Development Corporation in the said amount of P89,800.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines.1
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Joint trial of the
three criminal cases ensued.2
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records,3 are as follows:
At about 10:00 a.m. of July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190 sacks
of milled rice worth P89,800 from the sales office of complainant JCT Agro-Development
Corporation ("JCT") in Kalawag II, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. She issued postdated Check
No. 142254 drawn against the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat, dated July 30, 1991 for P89,800 in payment of the goods. The sale was
evidenced by Ordered Goods Slip No. 5452 4 dated July 27, 1991, with the check number
written thereon.
On July 30, 1991, Remedios Torres, JCT’s cashier and acting manager, encashed the
check, but the drawee bank refused payment because it was drawn against insufficient
funds. Thereafter, Torres requested one Mrs. Graza to tell appellant to visit JCT’S office
because the check she issued bounced.
Appellant went to JCT’s office and Torres showed her the check that bounced. Appellant
pleaded that Torres accept two checks to replace the first check that was dishonored,
and Torres agreed. The replacement checks payable to JCT were (1) PCIB Isulan Branch
Check No. 1454525 dated August 20, 1991 for P50,000; and (2) PCIB Isulan Branch
Check No. 1454546 dated August 22, 1991 for P39,800. The Ordered Goods Slip was
then revised upon Torres’ instruction. Torres surrendered the first check, PCIB Check No.
142254, to appellant when she accepted the two replacement checks.
On their due dates, Torres encashed the two replacement checks, but they were
dishonored by the drawee bank. The bank issued two Check Return Slips7 indicating that
payment was refused because the checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." JCT,
through Torres, sent a demand letter8 dated August 31, 1991 to appellant informing her
of the dishonor of the replacement checks. Appellant received the demand letter on
September 6, 1991.
Thereafter, appellant went to the office of JCT. Torres brought appellant to one Major
Salvador of the PNP, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. Before him, appellant executed a
promissory note9 dated September 10, 1991 wherein she promised to pay JCT as
follows: (1) P20,000 on September 16, 1991; (2) P19,800 on September 23, 1991; (3)
P20,000 on September 30, 1991; (4) P20,000 on October 7, 1991; and (5) P10,000 on
October 14, 1991, which all amount to P89,800.
Through her driver, appellant sent JCT P10,000 for the installment due on September
16, 1991. JCT rejected the payment because it was short by P10,000. Appellant no
longer made any payment. JCT then sent her a demand letter10 dated October 21, 1991,
through registered mail, reiterating the dishonor of the checks she issued and giving her
five days from receipt of said letter to pay the amount of P89,800; otherwise, legal
action would be taken against her.
The trial court found that appellant was guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d), of the Revised Penal Code for issuing PCIB Check No. 142254, and violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and 145454. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, Lea
Sagan Juliano, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks law, and of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d).
Accordingly, the Court hereby sentences:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2051
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00)
PESOS; and to pay the costs of suit;
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00)
PESOS; and to pay the costs of suit.
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment,
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to pay to the
JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of EIGHTY NINE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED (P89,800.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing the
value of ONE HUNDRED NINETY (190) BAGS of milled rice, with legal rate of interest
from the date of filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid; and to pay the
costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
Appellant appealed her conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 2053 to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court found appellant guilty of the offense. It pointed out that
Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on October 22, 1975, increased the
penalty12 provided in Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It held that
pursuant to the said amendatory law and considering that the amount of the unpaid
check is P89,800, appellant should be penalized by reclusion perpetua. Hence, the Court
of Appeals referred the case to us in accordance with Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant raised the following issues:
1. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa under Article 315, 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false pretenses or
any fraudulent act.
2. Appellant’s failure to deposit the amount of PCI Bank check numbered

142254 for P89,800.00 in this case does not give rise to a prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
3. The appellant could not be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (d) of
the Revised Penal Code due to the dishonor of the replacement checks
because these were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.13
The trial court held appellant liable for Estafa for the following reasons: (1) The fact that
appellant had insufficient funds in the bank to cover the check at the time she postdated
or issued Check No. 142254 is sufficient to make her liable for Estafa; and (2)
appellant’s failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover her check within three days
from receipt of notice from the payee or holder that said check had been dishonored for
insufficiency of funds is prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
In the first and second assigned errors, appellant contends that she could not be found
guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she employed deceit constituting false
pretenses or any fraudulent act.
Appellant alleges that when she issued postdated PCIB Check No. 142254 on July 27,
1991, she represented that the check would be fully funded on July 30, 1991. She stated
that when complainant JCT accepted the postdated check, it was aware that the funds
for the said payment would become available only on the maturity date of the check. JCT
was also aware that the postdated check would be fully funded from the proceeds of
another check which had not yet been cleared for payment.
Appellant asserts that when JCT agreed to accept the postdated check, it was aware of
and in effect accepted the risk that the postdated check would not be funded in case the
check that was supposed to fully fund the same would not be cleared. She alleges that
the officers of JCT must have known that notwithstanding her representation, there was
always a chance that the said check would not be funded on its maturity date for a
variety of reasons, among them force majeure. Some of those who purchased rice on
credit from her (appellant) may not pay their obligations. The fact that she (appellant)
was mistaken in her belief that she would be able to fund the check on its maturity date
does not prove deceit.
Appellant maintains that her actions thereafter also belied any intention to defraud. After
she was notified of the dishonor of the first check, she did not hide or abscond, but she
offered to replace the first check with two checks. Appellant also contends that when JCT
accepted the replacement checks in place of PCIB Check No. 142254, she was relieved of
her obligation of funding said check. Hence, she alleges that she is not covered by the
prima facie presumption of fraud under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal
Code. She claims that since deceit is absent in this case, she is not liable for Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow…:
...
2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
...
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the

offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act.
The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender has postdated or issued a check
in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at
the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank
or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the
payee has been defrauded.14 Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense
and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the
issuance of the bad check.15 The drawer of the dishonored check is given three days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check, otherwise, a
prima facie presumption of deceit arises. 16
As regards the first reason of the trial court in holding appellant liable for Estafa, we find
that appellant did not deceive complainant JCT by stating that she had sufficient funds in
the bank on the date of issuance of the check. JCT knew that the postdated check was
not yet funded as of the date of its issuance and that it would be funded on July 30,
1991. Prosecution witness Remedios Torres testified, thus:
...
PRO. DE PERALTA:
...
Q:- The check which you said … was used by Lea Sagan Juliano which is
PCIB Check No. 142254 dated July 30, 1991, why is it dated July 30 when
the transaction occurred on July 29?
A: - She placed it post dated with her assurance that she deposited at
PCIB and it is not yet cleared and it will be cleared on July 30, 1991.
Q:- You said her deposit was not yet cleared, why, did she tell you that
she deposited a check at the PCIB of Isulan?
A: - Yes, sir."17
As regards the second reason of the trial court for holding appellant liable
for Estafa, we note that appellant no longer deposited the amount
necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the
verbal notice of dishonor of said check because complainant JCT had
accepted the replacement checks and surrendered the first check to
appellant, which indicated that JCT no longer held appellant liable for the
payment of her obligation under the first check.
It has been established that after the dishonor of the first check, PCIB
Check No. 142254, Remedios Torres, JCT’s acting manager, verbally
informed appellant at JCT’s office that she was unable to encash said
check due to insufficiency of funds, but she did not demand that appellant
make good PCIB Check No. 142254 within three days from receipt of said
notice. Instead, on the same occasion, Torres accepted PCIB Check No.
145452 dated August 20, 1991 for P50,000 and PCIB Check No. 145454
dated August 22, 1991 for P39,800 as the replacement of PCIB Check No.
142254, which first check she surrendered to appellant. JCT was then
holding appellant liable for payment under the replacement checks, PCIB
Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454, and no longer under PCIB Check No.
142254. Torres testified, thus:
...
PRO. DE PERALTA:
Q: - And since you said PCIB Check No. 142254 in the total amount of
P89,800.00 [bounced] because of insufficiency of funds, what did you do
next?
A: - I went to the residence of Mrs. Graza to [ask] Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano
is she still purchasing from her the same rice and I found out she had
been there very often so I asked Mrs. Graza to help or tell us if ever Mrs.
Lea Sagan Juliano to come over and visit our office because the check she
issued in payment of the 190 sacks of rice in the total amount of
[P]89,800 [bounced].
...
Q: - When Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano appeared in your Office at Kalawag II,
what did you tell her?
A: - When she arrived at our office I showed her the check that [bounced].
Q: - And what transpired next?
A: - Then afterwards she told me she asked for consideration to give or

allow certain period to pay that said check by issuing us again another
check to be staggard so that she can be able to pay the amount because
of her pleadings I let her issue by surrendering the previous check and she
issued me the two checks dated August 20 and 22.
Q: - When you said surrendered the check in the amount of P89,800.00,

are you referring to PCIB check no. 142254?
A: - That was the check I returned to her.18
In accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant
instead of demanding payment under the first check (PCIB Check No. 142254) on the
same day that JCT’s Acting Manager informed appellant of the dishonor of the first
check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the necessary
amount to cover the first check within three days from the verbal notice of dishonor. On
July 31, 1991, appellant’s balance in her account with PCIB Isulan Branch was P78,400.
It is possible that appellant could have deposited P11,400 to make good the first check
worth P89,800 if JCT made it clear that it was demanding payment under the first check.
It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days after
appellant’s receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of the first check, because by then the
prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant for failure to deposit the amount
necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have
been established.l^vvphi1.net
Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited the
amount necessary to cover the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, within the required
period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant. For it was
due to complainant JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and surrendering
the first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the amount
necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal notice of
dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her liable for payment under the said check. The
surrender of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant would explain why the
prosecution failed to submit said check in evidence, and merely relied on testimonial
evidence to prove the issuance of the check.
In failing to prove the element of deceit by appellant, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of P89,800, which is
the value of the sacks of rice she purchased.
The third assigned error need not be discussed since the trial court did not convict
appellant of Estafa for the issuance of PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and
145454.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch
19, in Criminal Case No. 2053, is set aside and appellant Lea Sagan Juliano is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised
Penal Code. Appellant is ordered to pay JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat, the sum of Eighty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P89,800.00),
representing the value of 190 bags of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the
date of filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125059 March 17, 2000
FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 29, 1996,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 15993, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-25910 to 15, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel
Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48)
postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and
incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied,
Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was suspending his
installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans and
specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint
was dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all
incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the
complaint as to the alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's
postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When
FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell,
the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every
time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of
petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC
filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored
checks.
On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon
City six Informations docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25910 to Q-91-25915,
charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910 reads:
That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue
in favor of Francel Realty Corporation a check 813514 drawn against
Citibank, a duly established domestic banking institution in the amount of
P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30, 1990 in
payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that
she/he did not have any funds in the drawee bank of (sic) the payment of
such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for
payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer
thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. did not have any funds therein,
and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still
fails and refused (sic) to redeem or make good said check, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Francel Realty Corporation in the amount
aforementioned and in such other amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly worded as in

Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910, except for the dates, and check numbers2 were
consolidated and jointly tried.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges. Trial then
proceeded.
The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate
court, is as follows:
The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24, 1989, at

the office of the private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (a private
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business) at 822 Quezon
Avenue, QC, accused Francisco Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to
private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six
checks (among a number of other checks), each for P9,304.00 and drawn
pay to the order of FRC and against Francisco's account no. 845515 with
Citibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh. C),
Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check No. 813518
dated February 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516 dated December 30,
1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 dated January 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and
Check No. 813519 dated March 30, 1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial
payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the house and lot
subject of the written contract executed and entered into by and between
FRC as seller and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24, 1989
(Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the house and
lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC in the sum of
P135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agreeing and committing
himself to pay the balance of P316,000.00 in 48 equal monthly
installments of P9,304.00 (which sum already includes interest on
successive monthly balance) effective September 30, 1989 and on the
30th day of each month thereafter until the stipulated purchase price is
paid in full. The said six Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier
indicated were drawn, issued, and delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC
as and in partial payment of the said 48 equal monthly installments under
their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in September 1989,
the Building Official's certificate of occupancy for the subject house — a
residential townhouse — was issued (Exh. N) and Francisco took
possession and started in the use and occupancy of the subject house and
lot.1âwphi1.nêt
When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to the
Citibank for payment on their respective due dates, they were all returned
to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason: account closed as indicated
in the drawee bank's stamped notations on the face and back of each
check; in fact, as indicated in the corresponding record of Francisco's
account no. 815515 with Citibank, said account already had a zero balance
as early as September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding the fact that
FRC, first thru its executive vice president and project manager and
thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally and in writing, of
the checks' dishonor and demanded from him the payment of the amount
thereof, still Francisco did not pay or make good any of the checks (Exhs.
I thru K). . .3
The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, is as follows:
The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking possession
and starting in the use and occupancy of the subject townhouse unit,
Francisco became aware of its various construction defects; that he called
the attention of FRC, thru its project manager, requesting that appropriate
measures be forthwith instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did
not acknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco thus mailed to
FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum giving notice that
effective June 1990, he will cease and desist "from paying my monthly
amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR (P9,304.00)
PESOS towards the settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of
Unit No. 14 of FRC Townhomes referred to above, unless and until your
Office satisfactorily complete(s) the construction, renovation and/or repair
of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to above" and that should FRC
"persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5) days from
your receipt of this Verified Notice, forthwith petition the [HLURB] for
Declaratory Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief from my
obligation to pay my monthly amortization to your good Office and allow
me to deposit said amortizations with [HLURB] pending your completion of
FRC Townhomes Unit in question"; that Francisco thru counsel wrote FRC,
its president, and its counsel notices/letters in sum to the effect that
Francisco and all other complainants in the [HLURB] case against FRC shall
cease and desist from paying their monthly amortizations unless and until
FRC satisfactorily completes the construction of their units in accordance
with the plans and specifications thereof as approved by the [HLURB] and
as warranted by the FRC in their contracts and that the dishonor of the
subject checks was a natural consequence of such suspension of
payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or deposit all other
postdated checks issued by Francisco and the other complainants and still
in FRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5); that Francisco and the other
complainants filed the [HLURB] case against FRC and later on a decision
was handed down therein and the same is pending appeal with the Board
(Exhs. 6, 7, & 12 thru 17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of presentation
of the subject checks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at
least P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that
Francisco closed his account no. 845515 with Citibank conformably with
the bank's customer service officer's advice to close his said account
instead of making a stop-payment order for each of his more than 30
post-dated checks still in FRC's possession at the time, so as to avoid the
P600.00-penalty imposed by the bank for every check subject of a stop-
payment order.4
On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P.
Blg. 22 in each of the six cases, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-25911, Q-

91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-25914 and Q-91-25915, the Court finds
accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced in and for each case to suffer imprisonment of thirty
(30) days and pay the costs. Further, the accused is hereby ordered to
pay the offended party, Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual
damages, the total sum of fifty-five thousand eight hundred twenty four
pesos (P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
commencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until full
payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. His appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15993. But on February 29, 1996, the appellate court ruled:
On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so hold that
appellant has no basis to rely on the provision of PD 957 to justify the
non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his checking account and the
notices sent by him to private complainant that he will stop paying his
monthly amortizations.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it was denied per
Resolution dated April 22, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE

LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE
ANY JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE
PAYMENT OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE
PROJECT.
III

LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE
SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVER THE SUBJECT
CHECKS UPON PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.
IV
LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND AWARDING
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.7
The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his conviction for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, considering that he had cause to stop payment of the checks issued to
respondent. Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the buyer of a townhouse unit has
the right to suspend his amortization payments, should the subdivision or condominium
developer fail to develop or complete the project in accordance with duly-approved plans
and specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of private
complainant's townhouse project were incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his
right to suspend payments should not render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.
The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged with were violations
of B.P. Blg. 22, the intent and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a worthless
check are immaterial.8 The gravamen of the offense charged is the act itself of making
and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. Mere issuing of a bad check is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. In his view, P.D. No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense
against the charges against him.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22),9 an offense is committed
when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 10
In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other
elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the
time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for
payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum
that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the
offense are present. 11 But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or
contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports.
12
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of
petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of
funds." 13 But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this
case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said
presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the
offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that
on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the
checks should be deemed as issued only then. 14 The checks in this case were issued at
the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the
records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that
his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for
encashment. 15 On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of
presentation of the checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account No. 845515
with Citibank was not for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the
drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each time petitioner issued a
"stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated checks in private
respondent's possession. 16 Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it establishes petitioner's state of mind at the
time said checks were issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely had no knowledge
that his funds or credit would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for
encashment. He could not have foreseen that he would be advised by his own bank in
the future, to close his account to avoid paying the hefty banks charges that came with
each "stop payment" order issued to prevent private respondent from encashing the 30
or so checks in its possession. What the prosecution has established is the closure of
petitioner's checking account. But this does not suffice to prove the second element of
the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires "evidence of knowledge of
insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are presented for
encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case,
would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It
must be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the
punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute. 17
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 it is
difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the
financial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse
buyers under P.D. No. 957. 19 A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as
to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the legislature. 20 Courts will
not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of
legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 21 More
so, when it will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be
reconciled and given due effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend
payments until such time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the
buyer. 22 This exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments, is to our
mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is
charged with.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of

petitioner's and other units of the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC,
we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment.
To say the least, the third element of "subsequent dishonor of the check. . . without
valid cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As already stated, the
prosecution tried to establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22.
Here that presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop payment,
thereby negating the third element of the crime.1âwphi1
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the
Revised Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law. 23 We find nothing in
the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the Revised Penal Code from
supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner's
exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the
charges against him.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is

ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of
sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149858 September 5, 2007
FRANCISCO M. BAX, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ILYON INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2000 and its Resolution dated September 5, 2001
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23356 affirming in toto the Decision dated December 14, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Pasig City declaring petitioner guilty of nine (9)
counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
On August 16, 1994, Francisco M. Bax, petitioner, was charged with violations of B.P. 22
(10 counts) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 71, Pasig City,3 docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 14354 to 14363.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 14354 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue
to Ilyon Industrial Corporation to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check No.:
AGRO94438
Drawn against
United Coconut Planters Bank
In the amount
P47,250.00
Dated/Postdated
:
March 13, 1994
Payable to
Ilyon Industrial Corp. rep. by Benedict Tan
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment, which check could have been dishonored for insufficiency of funds
had not the accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to "Stop Payment", and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of the said check or made arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except as to the numbers and dates of the other nine checks issued by petitioner, and
the reason for their dishonor (drawn against insufficient funds), the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14355-14363 and the above Information are similarly worded.
The facts are:
Sometime in October 1993, petitioner, for and in behalf of Vachman Industries, Inc.
(VACHMAN), purchased 80 metric tons of chemical compounds, known as caustic soda
flakes, from Ilyon Industrial Corporation (ILYON), respondent.
On December 6, 1993, ILYON delivered 27 metric tons of caustic soda flakes to

petitioner. Again in January 1994, ILYON delivered another 27 metric tons of caustic
soda flakes to petitioner. In payment therefor, petitioner issued ten (10) checks
amounting to P464,750.00 in favor of ILYON.
Upon presentment of the checks to the United Coconut Planters Bank for payment, they
were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. Despite ILYON’s demand,
petitioner failed to make good the bounced checks for the reason that he has been
encountering financial problems. As a result, ILYON caused the filing of ten (10)
Informations against petitioner.
After hearing or on March 27, 1998, the MeTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner
guilty as charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the
accused, Francisco Bax, "GUILTY" of the crime of Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, (10) counts, and accordingly sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
in each case and to pay the offended party the sum of P464,750.00, the amount of all
the ten (10) checks and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, presided by Judge Pablito Rojas, rendered a
Joint Decision dated December 14, 1998 affirming with modification the MeTC Decision,
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) accused is ACQUITTED in Criminal case No. 14354;
(b) the sentence imposed on accused in Criminal Case Nos. 14355 to 14363 of six (6)
months imprisonment for each is hereby increased to ONE (1) YEAR in each case; and
(c) the total amount of indemnity to be paid by the accused to the complainant-
corporation is PHP 417,500.00.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal,4 the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23356 rendered its Decision on
December 19, 2000 affirming in toto the RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated September
5, 2001.
Hence the instant petition.
The basic issue is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The Solicitor General contends that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the RTC
Joint Decision sustaining that of the MeTC because all the elements of violation of B.P.
22 are present in each case. Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that since he did
not receive a written notice of dishonor, not all the elements of the offense have been
established by the prosecution. Accordingly, he should be acquitted.
We agree with petitioner.
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even finality
on appeal, except when it has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which,
if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case. This exception is
present here.5
Section 1 of B.P. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Thus, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements of the offense:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.6
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the second element.

To hold petitioner liable for violation of B.P. 22, it is not enough that the issued check
was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that he knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was
issued.7 Hence, the law provides that he must be notified of the dishonor, thus:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit,
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.8
While it is true that ILYON, through its president, Benedict Tan, asked petitioner to pay
the dishonored checks, however, such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 22.
Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that
was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually
notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five banking
days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon
or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such
notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.9
In Domagsang v. Court of Appeals,10 we held that the notice of dishonor of a check to

the maker must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the drawer or maker of the dishonor
of his check is not enough, thus:
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in
writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law. i.e., "that where there
are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to
pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced
that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be
punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but
that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The
consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the checks, obviously,
there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. 22
would start and end. Thus, the prima facie evidence of petitioner’s knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds or credit at the time he issued the checks did not arise.11
We thus find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner is guilty of violations of B.P. 22.
However, petitioner should pay the face value of the nine (9) dishonored checks plus
legal interest. It is well settled that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where such acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases.12
We however modify the award of petitioner’s civil liability to ILYON from P417,500.00 to
P425,250.00. In Criminal Case No. 14354, petitioner was acquitted by the RTC since the
reason for the dishonor was his "stop payment order" to the drawee bank to enable
VACHMAN to reconcile its accounts with ILYON. Hence, only the face value of the
remaining nine (9) checks should be included in the computation of petitioner’s civil
liability. Each check has a face value of P47,250.00 which, if we multiply by nine, yields
P425,250.00.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Francisco M.
Bax is acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 14355 to 14363 for violations of B.P. 22 for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered,
however, to pay the offended party, ILYON, the face value of the nine (9) checks in the
total amount of P425,250.00 with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the
Informations until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by

MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers

participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created

between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and
the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending
the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application
of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of

petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de
Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William
Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of

Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after
being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong

Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters
of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an
integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds
and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession
or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the

children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d]
27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father
William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature
and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact,
to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power
of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that
the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother
was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of
Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor
Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sister’s widower William
Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the
belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that
the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for
the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute
sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of
Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No.
V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No.
II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the
deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father
William Sato from the buyers of her grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng
actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and
P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds
were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof
to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid
P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the
proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko
C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her
Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to
refuse her father’s orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato
failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong
Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the
proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and
failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include
his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly
issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were
attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the
resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file
an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,]
par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,]
who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power
of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of
said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused
knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor,
to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties
all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or
less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the
possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering
Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for
P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in
possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in
1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds
of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces
this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the
death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it
does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still
son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even
beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No
criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses,
ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code,
preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and
malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by
a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is
incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th
Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is
GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2,
2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a
decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish
the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her
mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that
nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that
the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and
private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of
Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a
brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing
of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc
among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter
Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales,
while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato,
took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is
clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law
of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the
same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991,
private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the
former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The
courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely
give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret
and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is
not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332
(1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato. 14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the
trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law
that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons
mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-
ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party. Here,
the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter,
Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida
never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels
of land could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida
predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be
invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed.
Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve
the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother,
Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from
criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence
supports petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity
between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among
the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly
avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa
or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil
aspect only.
The petition has merit
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death
on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling)
and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and
frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By
virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious
mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her
stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson
who steals from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living
with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It
is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by
law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s
spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the
relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in
this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of
jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal
system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are
conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not
terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1
[Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other
jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the
spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship
by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely,
12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or
children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since
the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates
with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity
is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists
only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends
the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after
the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the
relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the
blood of both parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even
after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced
children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties
to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to
benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their
relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold
that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury
disqualification and incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to
be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said
provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in
the same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of
one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to
his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it
is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has
also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the
solidarity of the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve
family harmony and obviate scandal.35 The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more
in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is
to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt,
rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee
that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies
when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of
the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony
by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the
accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to
the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of
the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created
the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories
under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold
the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not
apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the
offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of
the offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the
offense but the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital
of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that
determines the crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of
the court to say what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the
prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which
is not binding on the court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not
with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit,
intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time)
and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her
taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor
daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita’s
properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to
the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by
attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements
other than those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and affixing her
thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that
something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation
of her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a
document which she could not have read) because of Sato’s representation that the
document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita
showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the
document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark,
therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she execute a document to
settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted
his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning,
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay properties when the fact was
that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief
that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that
it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds
of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said
accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of
the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author
thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000.
This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on
certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the
total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000,
Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of
Manolita’s properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public
documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of
consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special
power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail
himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in
his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The
Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple
estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People. 46 It
means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification
of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal
liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply
because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all
other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause
provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose
of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article
332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a
separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would
wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public
document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender
against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved
through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in
the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter
instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family
relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 47 Thus,
the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the
parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the
offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document,
however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the
respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when
the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed
from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes
separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and
falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the
same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of
a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as
one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g.,
homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a
complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of
diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent
underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements
of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex
crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes
where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a
complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different
from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two
or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability. 52 The latter
category is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires
the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one
crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes
constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component crimes. 53 (emphasis
supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document
requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that
the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that
for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not
separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and
falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be
considered separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such
approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and
spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction
between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of
crimes in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere
material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished
individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing
Estafa Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised
Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require
that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the
falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the
estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then
the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable
element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the
phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public
document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to
facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In
particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting
third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit
another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime
under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document
is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or commercial document. 59 In other words, the crime of
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that
the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-
made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection
with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA,
the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did
so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of
the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA
(as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was
made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is
why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as
a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made
Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third
parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same
time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime
committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent
any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a
document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented
to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime
of falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and
the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is
directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 179934 May 21, 2009
vs.
ERLINDA ABORDO and VINA CABANLONG, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the 21 June 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 01701. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 10 May 2001
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, convicting
Erlinda Abordo (Abordo) of estafa in Criminal Case No. V-0654 and of illegal recruitment
in Criminal Case No. V-0655, and convicting Abordo and Vina Cabanlong (Cabanlong) of
estafa in Criminal Case Nos. V-0767, V-0769, and V-0772 and of illegal recruitment in
Criminal Case Nos. V-0768, V-0770, and V-0771.
The Facts
The Informations against the accused read as follows:
Criminal Case No. V-0654 (Estafa)
That during the period from February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994, at Poblacion Zone II,
Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused (Erlinda Abordo), by means of deceit,
deliberately misrepresenting herself to be capable of causing the employment of laborers
abroad, knowing fully well that she is not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and
receive from Jesus Rayray y Bascos the sum of P14,000.00, Philippine currency with the
undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter, despite repeated
demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant’s employment abroad, failed
and refused to return the said amount of P14,000.00, thereby appropriating and
converting the same for her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said
Jesus Rayray y Bascos in the said amount.3
Criminal Case No. V-0655 (Illegal Recruitment)
That during the period from February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994 at Barangay Poblacion
Zone II, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused (Erlinda Abordo), did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Jesus Rayray y Bascos for
employment abroad, without first securing the requisite license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.4
That during the month of December, 1994 at Barangay San Blas, Municipality of Villasis,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused (Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong), conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of deceit, deliberately
misrepresenting [themselves] to be capable of causing the employment of laborers
abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand
and receive from Jaime Fernandez y Simon the sum of P45,000.00, Philippine currency
with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter, despite
repeated demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant’s employment
abroad, failed and refused to return the said amount of P45,000.00, thereby
appropriating and converting the same for their own use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of said Jaime Fernandez y Simon in the said amount.5
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously recruit Jaime Fernandez y Simon for employment abroad, without first
securing the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.6
and receive from Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar the sum of P45,000.00, Philippine currency
with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and, thereafter, despite
prejudice of said Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar in the said amount.7
and feloniously recruit Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar for employment abroad, without first
Employment.8
That during the month of September, 1994 at Barangay San Blas, Municipality of Villasis,
and feloniously recruit Esmenia Cariño y Millano for employment abroad, without first
Employment.9
That during the month of September, 1994 at Barangay San Blas, Municipality of Villasis,
and receive from Esmenia Cariño y Millano the sum of P15,000.00, Philippine currency
with the undertaking of working for [her] employment abroad and, thereafter, despite
prejudice of said Esmenia Cariño y Millano in the said amount.10
The prosecution established that sometime in January 1994, Abordo recruited Jesus
Rayray (Rayray) for possible employment abroad and collected a total of P14,000 as
placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon leave for abroad. Rayray was
unable to leave as promised and only saw Abordo again when she was already in jail. 11
Sometime in September 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia
Cariño (Cariño) in Lipay, Villasis, Pangasinan, to persuade her to work as a domestic
helper in Hong Kong. Cariño and Cabanlong used to be neighbors in San Blas, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cariño gave a total of P15,000 as
placement fee. Despite this payment, Cariño was unable to leave for abroad. 12
Sometime in December 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina
Fernandez (Segundina) in Caramitan, Villasis, Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are
first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a recruiter. The accused told Segundina
that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon payment of
the placement fee. Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the
accused cash and other valuables amounting to P45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to
Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for abroad.13
Sometime in December 1994, the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza
(Mendoza) in San Blas, Villasis, Pangasinan to convince him to work in Hong Kong as a
security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay P45,000 as placement fee.
Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work
abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to P39,000. Despite
several promises from Abordo, Mendoza was unable to leave for Hong Kong. Thus, he
demanded from the accused the return of his money and pieces of jewelry, but to no
avail.141avvphi1
Adonis Peralta, Dagupan District Officer of the Department of Labor and Employment,
issued certifications dated 29 September 1993 and 3 August 1993 stating that the
accused were not included in the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency list of
those licensed to recruit in Pangasinan.15
The accused denied the charges against them. In their brief, the accused claimed that
they could not be held liable for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
since the element of deceit was not established. They alleged that they received the
placement fees on behalf of the travel agency. They argued that it was unclear whether
the false statements or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneously
with the delivery of the money by the complainants.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After the trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan rendered a
Decision dated 10 May 2001 disposing of the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the accused Erlinda Abordo
and Vina Cabanlong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
in large scale in Crim. Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768, V-0770 and V-0771, defined and
penalized under Art. 38, par. (a) in relation to Art. 39, par. (a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by P.D. 2018, and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay, jointly and severally, fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (100,000.00).1avvphi1
Accused Erlinda Abordo is, likewise, found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa in Crim. Case No. V-0654, as provided under Art. 315, par. 2(a), and hereby
sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the minimum, to FOUR
(4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Jesus
Rayray the amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00).
Further, accused Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of estafa and hereby sentences them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of:
1) SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in it minimum and
medium periods, as the minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, medium,
as the maximum and to reimburse Jaime Fernandez the amount of FORTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00) in Crim. Case No. V-0767;
2) SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, as the minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, medium,
as the maximum and to reimburse Exequiel Mendoza the amount of THIRTY NINE
THOUSAND PESOS (P39,000.00) in Crim. Case No. V-0769; and
3) SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, as the minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Esmenia Carino the amount
of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) in Crim. Case No. V-0772.
SO ORDERED.16
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution sufficiently established the accused’s
guilt for illegal recruitment. The accused cooperated with each other in convincing
complainants to pay placement fees for employment abroad. The accused received
money from the complainants. The act of the accused of recruiting complainants for
employment abroad without the necessary license from the POEA constitutes the offense
of illegal recruitment.
The Court of Appeals also found that the prosecution has established accused’s guilt for
estafa. The Court of Appeals stated that the very same evidence proving the accused’s
commission of the offense of illegal recruitment also established that the accused
connived in defrauding complainants by misrepresenting that they had the power,
influence, agency and business to obtain overseas employment for complainants upon
payment of placement fees. Complainants suffered damages to the extent of the various
sums of money they delivered to accused.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalties imposed on the accused as each information
involved only one complainant. The accused cannot be convicted for illegal recruitment
in large scale based on several informations each filed by only one complainant. The trial
court erred in considering the three complainants in the two criminal cases when it
convicted the accused of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since the accused were
prosecuted under several informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed
should be for each information. To convict the accused of illegal recruitment in large
scale, there must be one information that must include all the complainants. Otherwise,
the accused should be held liable only for simple illegal recruitment.
The dispositive portion of the 21 June 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
(1) In Criminal Case No. V-0655, accused-appellant Erlinda Abordo is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment and
is sentenced to suffer a prison term of Six (6) years and One (1) day as
minimum, to Twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. V-0768, V-0770 and V-0771, Erlinda Abordo and Vina
Cabanlong are found Guilty of three (3) counts of Simple Illegal Recruitment, and
are sentenced to suffer a prison term of Six (6) years and one (1) day as
minimum, to twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000 on
each count.
(3) Accused Erlinda Abordo is, likewise, found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa in Crim. Case No. V-0654, as provided for under Art. 315, par.
2(a), and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, as maximum, and to reimburse Jesus Rayray in the amount of FOURTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000).
(4) Further, accused Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of estafa and are hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of:
a) SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of
prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Jaime
Fernandez in the amount of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000) in
Crim. Case No. V-0767;
b) SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, as the minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS of
prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Exequiel
Mendoza in the amount of THIRTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P39,000) in
Crim. Case No. V-0769; and
c) SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, as the minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum, and to
reimburse Esmenia Cariño in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000) in Crim. Case No. V-0772.17
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment
and estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The Court affirms the conviction of the accused for the crimes charged. However, the
Court modifies the penalties imposed on the accused in the estafa cases.
The elements of illegal recruitment are (1) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2)
he undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.18 Recruitment and placement is "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers;
and includes referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."19
The prosecution sufficiently established Abordo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
offense of simple illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. V-0655. Without the necessary
license, Abordo unlawfully recruited Rayray for deployment abroad. In exchange for this
promised overseas job, Rayray paid Abordo P14,000.
Conniving with Cabanlong, Abordo also illegally recruited Jaime, Mendoza, and Cariño
who paid the accused P45,000, P39,000 and P15,000, respectively, as placement fees.
Despite their payments of the placement fees, all the complainants were unable to
depart the country for work abroad.
The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the accused are guilty of simple illegal
recruitment only, modifying the trial court’s ruling that the accused are guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Since the accused were prosecuted under several
informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed should be for each
information charged.20 To convict the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale, there
must be one information that must include all the complainants.21 Otherwise, the
accused should be convicted only for simple illegal recruitment.22 Accordingly, the
penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768, V-
0770, and V-0771 (for simple illegal recruitment) are likewise correct. 23
The Court also affirms the conviction of Abordo for estafa committed against Rayray and
the conviction of Abordo and Cabanlong for estafa committed against Jaime, Mendoza,
and Cariño. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude
punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa.24 The prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed estafa under Article 315,
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.
The prosecution established that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy
persons for overseas employment, the accused deceived the complainants into believing
that they would provide them overseas work. Their assurances made complainants pay
the placement fees required in exchange for the promised jobs. The elements of deceit
and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present; hence, the conviction for
estafa in Criminal Case Nos. V-0654 (against Abordo), V-0767, V-0769, and V-0772
(against Abordo and Cabanlong) should be affirmed.
Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is punished by "the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to
prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty x x x shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. x x x."
The penalty prescribed for estafa is composed of only two, not three, periods. In such a
case, Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code requires the division into three equal portions
of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three
portions. Therefore, the maximum, medium, and minimum periods of the penalty
prescribed are:
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years25
If the amount defrauded does not exceed P22,000 and there is no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period,
or 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional to 6 years, 8 months and 20
days of prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the prison sentence shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the crime. The penalty next lower
to that prescribed by Article 315 is prision correccional in its minimum period (6 months,
1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). From this, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken.26
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. V-0654 (for estafa involving P14,000), Abordo is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Abordo should also refund to Rayray the amount of P14,000 with legal interest from the
filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. V-0767 (for estafa involving P45,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The accused should also refund to
Jaime the amount of P45,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until
this amount is fully paid.
minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The accused should also refund to
Mendoza the amount of P39,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information
until this amount is fully paid.
minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional, as maximum. The
accused should also refund to Cariño the amount of P15,000 with legal interest from the
filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
The penalties in this case consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served
simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties.27 Hence,since the accused are
sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served
successively.28
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the 21 June 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01701 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. V-0654 (for estafa involving P14,000), Erlinda Abordo is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional, as maximum. Abordo should also refund to Jesus Rayray the
amount of P14,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this
amount is fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. V-0767 (for estafa involving P45,000), Erlinda Abordo and
Vina Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
The accused should also refund to Jaime Fernandez the amount of P45,000 with
legal interest from the filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
The accused should also refund to Exequiel Mendoza the amount of P39,000 with
legal interest from the filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional, as maximum. The accused should also refund to Esmenia Cariño the
amount of P15,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this
amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated June 18, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603. The assailed Decision
affirmed with modification the September 27, 2006 decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City, finding petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the
Access Devices Regulations Act of 1998; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile
phone from a certain "Tess" or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a
credit card agent, who offered a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate.
Enticed by the offer, private complainant invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in
Quezon City. While in his office, Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her
immediate boss, a certain "Arthur" [later identified as petitioner]. In their telephone
conversation, [petitioner] told private complainant to submit documents to a certain
"Carlo" (later identified as Ronald Gobenchiong). Private complainant submitted various
documents, such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification
cards and statements of accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed up his
loan status but he failed to get in touch with either [petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong.
During the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his Globe
handyphone statement of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone
numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone company, private
complainant learned that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name, and the
application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of [petitioner] and his forged
signature. Private complainant also checked with credit card companies and learned that
his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and he had a credit card
application with Metrobank Card Corporation (Metrobank).
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobank’s junior assistant manager Jefferson
Devilleres lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which
conducted an entrapment operation.
During the entrapment operation, NBI’s Special Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche
[Arteche], together with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Piñas around 5:00
P.M. [Arteche] posed as the delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching
the address written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked for Henry Yu. [Petitioner]
responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to [Arteche] two (2) identification cards
which bore the name and signature of private complainant, while the picture showed the
face of [petitioner]. [Petitioner] signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, [Arteche]
introduced himself as an NBI operative and apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche]
recovered from [petitioner] the two (2) identification cards he presented to [Arteche]
earlier.4
Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing
a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for." The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of August 2004, or prior thereto, in the City of Las Piñas,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating with certain Rochelle Bagaporo a.k.a. Juliet Villar/Tess and a certain
Ronald Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo and all of them mutually helping and aiding each other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY YU by
applying a credit card, an access device defined under R.A. 8484, from METROBANK
CARD CORPORATION, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal
documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry
Yu was successfully issued and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and
addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued. After the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
alleging that he was not in physical and legal possession of the credit card presented and
marked in evidence by the prosecution. In an Order dated May 2, 2006, the RTC denied
the Demurrer to Evidence as it preferred to rule on the merits of the case. 6
On September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a.
"Henry Yu," "Arthur" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 9(e),
Republic Act 8484 (Access Device Regulation Act of 1998). Accordingly, pursuant to
Section 10 of Republic Act 8484 and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to not more than ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. Further, accused is also ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for the offense committed.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction, but modified the penalty imposed by
the RTC by deleting the terms prision correccional and prision mayor.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the Information is valid;
(2) Whether or not the Information charges an offense, or the offense petitioner
was found guilty of;
(3) Whether or not petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the
accusations against him;
(4) Whether or not petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject
of the case.8
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner was charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically Section 9(e), which
reads as follows:
Section 9. Prohibited Acts. – The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently
applied for.
Petitioner assails the validity of the Information and claims that he was not informed of
the accusation against him. He explains that though he was charged with "possession of
an access device fraudulently applied for," the act of "possession," which is the
gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
We do not agree.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information. It states:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly stated that the accused is
petitioner "Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur." It was also specified in the
preamble of the Information that he was being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484,
Section 9(e) for possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently
applied for. In the accusatory portion thereof, the acts constituting the offense were
clearly narrated in that "[petitioner], together with other persons[,] willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defrauded private complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an access
device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank Card Corporation, using the name
of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained from him,
and which credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to
said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
prejudice of the real Henry Yu." Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was
private complainant Henry Yu and the crime was committed on or about the 13th day of
August 2004 in the City of Las Piñas. Undoubtedly, the Information contained all the
necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, although the word "possession"
was not used in the accusatory portion of the Information, the word "possessing"
appeared in its preamble or the first paragraph thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, he was apprised that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 8484,
specifically section 9(e) thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.
The Court’s discussion in People v. Villanueva9 on the relationship between the preamble
and the accusatory portion of the Information is noteworthy, and we quote:
The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of
descriptive words and phrases. It is as much an essential part [of] the Information as
the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact complements the accusatory
paragraph which draws its strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for
the charge in general terms; while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary
details. The preamble and the accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole
that gives sense and meaning to the indictment. x x x.
xxxx
Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the operative word "accuses," which sets in
motion the constitutional process of notification, and formally makes the person being
charged with the commission of the offense an accused. Verily, without the opening
paragraph, the accusatory portion would be nothing but a useless and miserably
incomplete narration of facts, and the entire Information would be a functionally sterile
charge sheet; thus making it impossible for the state to prove its case.
The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one whole
document serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full panoply of state
authority is being marshaled against him. Our task is not to determine whether
allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely
to ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled x x x. 10lawph!l
Besides, even if the word "possession" was not repeated in the accusatory portion of the
Information, the acts constituting it were clearly described in the statement "[that the]
credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said
accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
prejudice of the real Henry Yu." Without a doubt, petitioner was given the necessary
data as to why he was being prosecuted.
Now on the sufficiency of evidence leading to his conviction.
Petitioner avers that he was never in possession of the subject credit card because he
was arrested immediately after signing the acknowledgement receipt. Thus, he did not
yet know the contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over the subject
credit card.11
Again, we find no value in petitioner’s argument.
The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied
for, penalized by R.A. No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the word
"possession." Thus, we use the term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is,
"possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The acquisition of
possession involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of the thing, and
the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it.12 Animus possidendi is a state of mind,
the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each
case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well
as the surrounding circumstances.13
In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from
private complainant various documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter,
obtained cellular phones using private complainant’s identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently
applied for a credit card under the name and personal circumstances of private
complainant. Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the "messenger" (an NBI
agent) required two valid identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two identification
cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name and forged signature of private
complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein that the content of
the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.
Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to
possess. Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the credit card never came into his
possession because it was only delivered to him, the above narration shows that he, in
fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the identification cards
purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess
the same. Had he not actively participated, the envelope would not have been given to
him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was
delivery and that possession was transferred to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly,
petitioner knew that the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly
indicated in the acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it
using the identity of private complainant.
Lastly, we find no reason to alter the penalty imposed by the RTC as modified by the CA.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8484 prescribes the penalty of imprisonment for not less than six
(6) years and not more than ten (10) years, and a fine of P10,000.00 or twice the value
of the access device obtained, whichever is greater. Thus, the CA aptly affirmed the
imposition of the indeterminate penalty of six years to not more than ten years
imprisonment, and a fine of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 30603 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188726 January 25, 2012
CRESENCIO C. MILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARKET PURSUITS, INC. represented by
CARLO V. LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the 22 April 2009 Decision1 and 8 July 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the trial court finding
petitioner Cresencio C. Milla (Milla) guilty of two counts of estafa through falsification of
public documents.
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market
Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). In March 2003, Milla represented himself as a real estate developer
from Ines Anderson Development Corporation, which was engaged in selling business
properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property therein located. For this purpose,
he showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216445 registered
in the name of spouses Farley and Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as well as a Special
Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the spouses in favor of Milla.3 Lopez verified
with the Registry of Deeds of Makati and confirmed that the property was indeed
registered under the names of Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was convinced by Milla’s
authority, MPI purchased the property for P2 million, issuing Security Bank and Trust Co.
(SBTC) Check No. 154670 in the amount of P1.6 million. After receiving the check, Milla
gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps.
Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 216445. 4
Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopez’s partner, a copy of the new Certificate of
Title to the property, TCT No. 218777, registered in the name of MPI. Thereafter, it
tendered in favor of Milla SBTC Check No. 15467111 in the amount of P400,000 as
payment for the balance.5
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to Acosta, but did not furnish the latter with the
receipts for the transfer taxes and other costs incurred in the transfer of the property.
This failure to turn over the receipts prompted Lopez to check with the Register of
Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate of Title given to them by Milla could
not be found therein; (2) there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to
MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in the name of a certain Matilde M.
Tolentino.6
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount of P2 million from Milla, who
then issued Equitable PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003,
respectively, in the amount of P1 million each. However, these checks were dishonored
for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When Milla ignored the demand letter
sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI Board of
Directors, filed a Complaint against the former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October
2003, two Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents were filed
against Milla and were raffled to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC Br. 146).7 Milla was accused of having committed
estafa through the falsification of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
218777 purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034167
That on or about the 25th day of March 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private
individual, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a document
denomindated as "Deed of Absolute Sale", duly notarized by Atty. Lope M. Velasco, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, denominated as Doc. No. 297, Page No. 61,
Book No. 69, Series of 2003 in his Notarial Register, hence, a public document, by
causing it to appear that the registered owners of the property covered by TCT No.
216445 have sold their land to complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. when in truth and in
fact the said Deed of Absolute Sale was not executed by the owners thereof and after
the document was falsified, accused, with intent to defraud complainant Market Pursuits,
Inc. presented the falsified Deed of Sale to complainant, herein represented by Carlo V.
Lopez, and complainant believing in the genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale paid
accused the amount of P1,600,000.00 as partial payment for the property, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant in the aforementioned amount of P1,600,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034168
That on or about the 3rd day of April 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a document denominated as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218777 purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati City, hence, a public document, by causing it to appear that the lot covered by
TCT No. 218777 was already registered in the name of complainant Market Pursuits,
Inc., herein represented by Carlo V. Lopez, when in truth and in fact, as said accused
well knew that the Register of Deeds of Makati did not issue TCT No. 218777 in the
name of Market Pursuits Inc., and after the document was falsified, accused with intent
to defraud complainant and complainant believing in the genuineness of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 218777 paid accused the amount of P400,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant in the aforementioned amount of P4000,000.00 (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of court, his Demurrer to
Evidence.9 In its Order dated 26 January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the demurrer and
ordered him to present evidence, but he failed to do so despite having been granted
ample opportunity.10 Though the court considered his right to present evidence to have
been consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. 11
In its Joint Decision dated 28 November 2006,12 RTC Br. 146 found Milla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Cresencio Milla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law and considering that the amount involved is
more than P22,000,00 this Court should apply the provision that an additional one (1)
year should be imposed for every ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos in excess of
P22,000.00, thus, this Court is constrained to impose the Indeterminate (sic) penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count.
Accused is adjudged to be civilly liable to the private complainant and is ordered pay
(sic) complainant the total amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS with legal
rate of interest from the filing of the Information until the same is fully paid and to pay
the costs. He is further ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the
total amount due as and for attorney’s fees. A lien on the monetary award is constituted
in favor of the government, the private complainant not having paid the required docket
fee prior to the filing of the Information.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision dated 22 April 2009, affirmed
the findings of the trial court.14 In its assailed Resolution dated 8 July 2009, it also
denied Milla’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.15
In the instant Petition, Milla alleges that the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals were not in accordance with law and jurisprudence. He raises the following
issues:
I. Whether the case should be reopened on the ground of negligence of counsel;
II. Whether the principle of novation is applicable;
III. Whether the principle of simple loan is applicable;
IV. Whether the Secretary’s Certificate presented by the prosecution is admissible
in evidence;
V. Whether the supposed inconsistent statements of prosecution witnesses cast a
doubt on the guilt of petitioner.16
In its Comment, MPI argues that (1) Milla was not deprived of due process on the
ground of gross negligence of counsel; (2) under the Revised Penal Code, novation is not
one of the grounds for the extinction of criminal liability for estafa; and (3) factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive.17
On the other hand, in its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that (1)
Milla was accorded due process of law; (2) the elements of the crime charged against
him were established during trial; (3) novation is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability for estafa; (4) the money received by Milla from Lopez was not in the nature of a
simple loan or cash advance; and (5) Lopez was duly authorized by MPI to institute the
action.18
In his Consolidated Reply, Milla reiterates that the negligence of his former counsel
warrants a reopening of the case, wherein he can present evidence to prove that his
transaction with MPI was in the nature of a simple loan.19
In the disposition of this case, the following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the negligence of counsel deprived Milla of due process of law
II. Whether the principle of novation can exculpate Milla from criminal liability
III. Whether the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, should be reviewed on appeal
We resolve to deny the Petition.
Milla was not deprived of due process.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), deprived him of due process. Specifically, he states that after the prosecution
had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to Evidence, and that the former
was never advised by the latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly surprised
to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that
it had issued a warrant for his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave
to File Motion for New Trial, which Milla claims to have been denied by the trial court for
being an inappropriate remedy, thus, demonstrating his counsel’s negligence. These
contentions cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in
instances wherein the negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step in to
grant relief to the aggrieved client.20 In this case, Milla was able to file a Demurrer to
Evidence, and upon the trial court’s denial thereof, was allowed to present evidence. 21
Because of his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that he had
waived his right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial court still allowed him to submit a
memorandum in the interest of justice. Further, contrary to his assertion that RTC Br.
146 denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed by his former counsel,
a reading of the 2 August 2007 Order of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Recall of Warrant of Arrest, but granted the Motion for
Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies under the Rules of Court, allowing him to file an
appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest.22
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla was given opportunities to
defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that the
mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and palpable to have
deprived him of due process.
The principle of novation cannot be applied to the case at bar.
Milla contends that his issuance of Equitable PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 before
the institution of the criminal complaint against him novated his obligation to MPI,
thereby enabling him to avoid any incipient criminal liability and converting his obligation
into a purely civil one. This argument does not persuade.
The principles of novation cannot apply to the present case as to extinguish his criminal
liability. Milla cites People v. Nery23 to support his
contention that his issuance of the Equitable PCI checks prior to the filing of the criminal
complaint averted his incipient criminal liability. However, it must be clarified that mere
payment of an obligation before the institution of a criminal complaint does not, on its
own, constitute novation that may prevent criminal liability. This Court’s ruling in Nery in
fact warned:
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by
the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of
novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on
the true nature of the original petition, whether or not it was such that its breach would
not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a
deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs. People, 90 Phil. 581;
Villareal, 27 Phil. 481).
Even in Civil Law the acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original relation between the complainant and the accused, can not produce novation.
For the latter to exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish the original
relationship, and such intent can not be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments
on account of what is totally due. Much less can it be said that the acceptance of partial
satisfaction can effect the nullification of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and
already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this Court has ruled that the offended
party’s acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the amount misapplied does not
obliterate the criminal offense (Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48 Off. Gaz. 3898). 24
(Emphasis supplied.)
Further, in Quinto v. People,25 this Court exhaustively explained the concept of novation
in relation to incipient criminal liability, viz:
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must
appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of
novation which may be effected either expressly or impliedly.The term "expressly"
means that the contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing
the new contract is to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is
required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an
incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule to
determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation,
the touchstone for contrariety, however, would be an irreconcilable incompatibility
between the old and the new obligations.
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby
produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same.
The first is when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms.
The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The
test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one
having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter
obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be
essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any
of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and
insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the manner of payment. There was
really no substitution of debtors since private complainant merely acquiesced to the
payment but did not give her consent to enter into a new contract. The appellate court
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
The acceptance by complainant of partial payment tendered by the buyer, Leonor
Camacho, does not evince the intention of the complainant to have their agreement
novated. It was simply necessitated by the fact that, at that time, Camacho had
substantial accounts payable to complainant, and because of the fact that appellant
made herself scarce to complainant. (TSN, April 15, 1981, 31-32) Thus, to obviate the
situation where complainant would end up with nothing, she was forced to receive the
tender of Camacho. Moreover, it is to be noted that the aforesaid payment was for the
purchase, not of the jewelry subject of this case, but of some other jewelry subject of a
previous transaction. (Ibid. June 8, 1981, 10-11)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa and penalizes any person who shall
defraud another by "misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property. It is axiomatic that the gravamen of the offense is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The terms
"convert" and "misappropriate" have been held to connote "an act of using or disposing
of another’s property as if it were one’s own or devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon." The phrase, "to misappropriate to one’s own use" has been said
to include "not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. Verily, the sale of the pieces of jewelry
on installments (sic) in contravention of the explicit terms of the authority granted to her
in Exhibit "A" (supra) is deemed to be one of conversion. Thus, neither the theory of
"delay in the fulfillment of commission" nor that of novation posed by petitioner, can
avoid the incipient criminal liability. In People vs. Nery, this Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent
novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by
the State in its own conation. (Emphasis supplied.)26
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla
could not have novated the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to
secure the return of the P2 million the former had already given him. Even then, these
checks bounced and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa
involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed
through Milla’s falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be
extinguished by mere novation.
The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court’s finding of guilt.
Finally, Milla assails the factual findings of the trial court. Suffice it to say that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on
and accorded great respect by this Court.27
There was no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it affirmed the
finding of the trial court that Milla was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
estafa through falsification of public documents. The prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime charged. The relevant provisions of the
Revised Penal Code read:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. – The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsification enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means
of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented himself to have the authority to sell
the subject property, and it was precisely this misrepresentation that prompted MPI to
purchase it.1âwphi1 Because of its reliance on his authority and on the falsified Deed of
Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777, MPI parted with its money in the amount of P2
million, which has not been returned until now despite Milla’s allegation of novation.
Clearly, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa through falsification of public
documents.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the Petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

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Republic of the Philippines

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, the present appeal.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal utterly lacks merit.

Republic of the Philippines

Criminal Case No. 03-2178

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court’s Ruling

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8

Republic of the Philippines

The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado (Atanacio),accused

Ruling of the RTC

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT

NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

It does not so appear in this case.

Republic of the Philippines

The following facts appear from the account of the CA:

Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the Petition, it is alleged that –

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT –

(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT

(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN

(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND

The Court grants the Petition.

It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go

As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of

As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of

Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval

As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice it

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged

An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of

Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that the

In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be

Republic of the Philippines

THE COURT’S RULING

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may

In the present case,the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain

The Crime Committed

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in